Holding

The Court held that the covering letter No. 2776 was forged, the NCDRC was bound to decide the forgery claim, and its orders obtained by fraud were set aside.

Summary

The appellant Indian Bank forwarded Bills of Exchange to a French bank on behalf of the respondent M/s. Satyam Fibres, which later went into liquidation. The respondent claimed the bank was negligent for not securing co‑acceptance of the bills, relying on a covering letter (letter No. 2776) that allegedly instructed the bank to obtain such co‑acceptance. The bank contended that the letter was forged and that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) erred by not examining the forgery claim. The Supreme Court held that the alleged letter was indeed forged, that the Commission was bound to decide the question of forgery/fraud, and that the Commission’s orders were vitiated by fraud. Consequently, the Court exercised its inherent power under Section 151 CPC to set aside the Commission’s judgments and dismissed the respondent’s complaint with costs.

Issues considered

The NCDRC’s duty to decide the allegation of forgery/fraud of the covering letter.
Whether the Commission’s judgment was obtained by fraud and thus subject to recall under inherent jurisdiction.
The correct interpretation of the ICC Uniform Rules regarding the responsibilities of the principal, remitting bank, collecting bank and presenting bank.
Whether Indian Bank was liable for negligence/deficiency in service for not obtaining co‑acceptance of the Bills of Exchange.
The applicability of Section 151 of the CPC to set aside a statutory tribunal’s order obtained by fraud.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 114, s. 151
Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 13(4), s. 13(5), s. 22, s. 2(j)(g)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 463, s. 464, s. 465, s. 470, s. 471

Subjects

forgeryfraudconsumer protectionreview petitioninherent jurisdictionSection 151 CPCICC Uniform Rulesbank liabilitynegligencedeficiency in service

Judgment

•
•

A INDIAN BANK
v.
M/S. SATYAM FIBRES (INDIA) PVT. LTD.

AUGUST 9, 1996

B [KULDIP SINGH ANDS. SAGHIR AHMAD, JJ.[

Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Sections 2(J)(g). 13(4) & (5) and 22.

National Commission's judgment-Review of-On grounds of forge1y
C a11d fraud by complai11a11t-Co1111nission ignored questio11 of forge1ylfraud
and di.unissed review 11etition-lfe/d : Conunission bound to decide question
of f01ge1y/fraud by recordi11g evide11ce-It had i11here11t power to recall its
judgment if/it was obtained by forge1y/fraud-Fraud amounted to abuse of
process of Commission-Evidence of p01ties already on record and vital facts
either stood admilled or proved-Hence, Supreme Cowt in appeal could itself
D decide that question--Complai11a11t committed forge1y a11d practised fraud 011
the Con11nission-7J1erefore, Conunission en·ed in disn1issing revieiv petition.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections I 14 a11d 151.

Inherent power of Cowt-Nature and exercise of-Decree obtai11ed by
E practising fraud on Court-Review petition alleging fraud dismissed without
deciding question of fraud-Held : Court bound to decide question of fraud
by recording evidence and in appropliate cases it could recall its decree.

Penal Code, 1960: Sections 463, 464, 465, 470 and 471.

F Forge1y/fraud-Fraud an essential ingredient of forgery.

Words and Phrases: "F01ge1y" and Fraud"-Meaning of-In the context
of Sections 463 and 464 of Penal Code, 1860.

The respondent entered into a contract for supply of goilds to a buyer
G in France. In due course, the goods were shipped. The respondent drew
two Bills of Exchange and forwarded the same to the Buyer through the
appellant-Bank. In the covering letter accompanying the Bills of Exchange
the respondent merely directed the appellant to present the documents to
the buyer through French Bank. In the covering letter no instruction was
H given for securing co-acceptance of the Bills of Exchange by the French
464
INDIAN BANKv.. SA1YAMFIBRES(I) PVT.LTD. 465

Bank. The documents were sent by the appellant to the French Bank but A
the same were returned unpaid. The respondent forwarded a fresh set of
Bills of Exchange for being sent to the French Bank. The Bills of Exchange,
on their face, specifically provided for acceptance by the buyer and co-ac-
ceptance by the French Bank. The B~nks were governed by the Uniform
Rules for collection made by the International Chamber of Commerce. B
Subsequently the Buyer went under lic1uidation, the French Bankintimated
that payment could not be made and the liquidator asked the respondent
to tile its claim for payment to the Buyer. Thereupon, the respondent tiled
a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commis-
sion claiming the value of the goods supplied to the Buyer in France from
the appellant on ground of negligence which amounted to deficiency in
c
service. The respondent's claim was based upon a second letter said to
have been issued by it directing the appellant to obtain co-acceptance of
the French Bank. The Commission allowed the claim and directed appel-
!ant to make the payments. The appellant filed a review petition before the
Commission alleging that the respondent played fraud inasmuch as the D
second letter was never issued to the appellant and was forged by the
respondent to obtain a decree in its favour. The Commission dismissed
the review petition ignoring the question of forgery.

Allowing the appeal, this Court, E
HELD : 1. The parties had to act in accordance with the Uniform
Rules for collection made by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC
Rules) which specify the parties to the transaction for purpose of "Collec-
tion' as defined in Clause B(l)(i). These parties are the "Principal" who
entrusts the operation of "Collection" to his Bank. This, in the instant case, F
would be the respondent as the respondent entrusted the operation of
"Collection' to the appellant. The other party is the "Remitting Bank',
namely, a Bank to whom the operation of "Collection' is entrusted ·by the
'Principal". In the instant case, the "Remitting Bank" would be the appellant
as it was this Bank to whom the respondent had entrusted the job of
"Collection". Another Bank which is involved in the whole transaction is the G
'Collecting Bank". According to the definition, this would be a Bank other
than the 'Remitting Bank". There is, yet, a third Bank, namely the "Present-
ing Bank" which, according to the definition, is, in fact, the "Collecting
Bank' making presentation to the "Drawee". "Drawee' has been defined in
Clause B(3) as the person to whom presentation is made according to the H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A collection order. Although, in the definition, there are three banks, namely,
the "Remitting Bank", the "Collecting Bank" and the "Presenting Bank" is
the same as the "Collecting Bank" not only collects the documents from the
1
nRemitting Bank 1, it also presents those documents to the "Drawee" for
payment. The "Remitting Bank" cannot be the "Collecting Bank" or the
"Presenting Bank" as the "Collecting Bank" has been defined in the ICC
B Rules as a Bank OTHER THAN THE "REMITTING BANK". The "Remit-
ting Bank" in the instant case was the French Bank. Clause C of the ICC
Rules requires that the documents sent for "Collection" must be accom-
panied by a collection order. The collection order has to contain complete ·
and precise instructions so as to enable the Bank to act in accordance with
C the instructions contained in the collection order and in accordance with
the ICC Rules. The principal has to give instructions separately (in addi·
tion to the documents) to the Remitting Bank to enable it to instruct the
collecting Bank accordingly. Article 15 of the ICC Rules indicates that the
responsibility of seeing that the Bill of Exchange is accepted, completely
and correctly, is that of the "Presenting Bank". [476-G-H; 477-A-G]
D
2.1. By filing the original covering letter along with the review peti-
~ion that the other letter of the even date was never written or issued by
the respondent, the appellant, in fact, raised the plea before the Commis-
sion that its judgment (under review), which was based on the second letter
E was obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not only on the
appellant but on the Commission too as the second letter was forged by
the respondent. Since under the ICC Rules, it is the responsibility of the
"Principal" to give or send specific and precise instructions to the Bank
besides sending the "Commercial/Financial Documents", Commission was
under a duty to decide as to whether the appellant had issued the letter
F containing the requirement of co-acceptance by the French Bank. The
Commission could not legally avoid to decide this question in view of the
specific allegation of forgery made by the appellant. [479-G-H; D-E]

2.2. The Authorities, be they Constitutional, Statutory or Ad· 1
G ministrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a lis) possess the
power to recall their judgments or orders if they are obtained by fraud as
Fraud and Justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant).
Fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (Fraus et do/us nemilli
patroci1tari debe1tt). The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power,
H specially under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to recall
INDIAN BANKv. SATYAMFIBRES (!) PVf. LTD. 467

its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of A
fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the
affected party to tile a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained
by fraud.· Inherent power are powers which are resident in all courts,
especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legisla-
tion but from the nature and the constitution of the Tribunals or Courts
B
themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience
to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and
to punish unseemly 'behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly
administration of the Court's business. Since fraud affects the solemnity,
regularity and orderlines~ of the proceedings of the Court and also
amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held C
to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised
upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the
court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the
inherent power to recall its order. [480·B·G]

Benoy Krishna Mukheijee v. Mohan/a/ Goenka, AIR (1950) Cal. 287; D
Gajanand Sha & Ors. v. Dayanand Thakur, AIR (1943) Pat 127; Krishna
Kumar v. Jawand Singh, AIR (1947) Nag 236; Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram
Rachpal Singh, ILR (1926) 1 Luck 341 =AIR (1926) Oudh 315; Saiyed
Muhammad Raza v. Rani Saroop & Ors., ILR (1939) 4 Luck 562 =AIR
(1929) Oudh 385 (FB); Bankey Behari Lal & Anr. v.Abdul Rahman & Ors., E
ILR (1932) 7 Luck 350 =AIR 1932 Oudh 63; Kekshmi Amma Chacld Amma
v. Mammen Mammen, (1955) Ker LT 459; Ishwar Mahton & Anr. v. Sitaram
Kumar & Ors., AIR (1954) Pat 450; Bindeshwari Pd. Choudhary v. Debendra
Pd. Singh & Ors., AIR (1958) pat 618 and Smt. Tara Bai v. V.S. Krislmas-
wamy Rao, AIR (1985) )\arn. 270, approved.
F
Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1950) AC 736 and Lazarus
Estate Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702, referred to.

2.3. Forgery is the false making of any written instrument, for the
purpose of fraud or deceit. Thus fraud is an essential ingredient of forgery. G
[481·G]
Rembert v. State,25 Am. Rep. 639 and State v. Phelps, 34 Am. Dec. 672,
referred to. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition Vol. 2, Webster's
Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition and Tomlin's Law Diction-
ary, refereed to. H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 3. Forgery and fraud are essentially matters of evidence which could
be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved
facts. The Privy Council in Satish Chandra Chatterjee laid down thus :
"Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes
for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every
puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must
B necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before
a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a
clever and dexterous knave would escape." This principle will apply not
only to courts of law but also to statutory tribunals which, like the
Commission, are conferred power to record evidence by applying certain
C provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, including the power to
enforce attendance of the witnesses and are also given the power to receive
evidence on affidavits. The Commission under the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 decides the dispute by following the procedure indicated in
Section 22 read with Section 13(4) and (5) of the Act. The Commission
has, thus, jurisdiction not only to examine a witness on oath but also to
D
receive evidence in the form of affidavits . [482-C-F]

Satish Chandra Chatterjee v. Kumar Satish Kantha Roy & Ors., AIR
(1923) PC 73, referred to.

E 4.1. The parties, in the instant case, have filed their aliidavits annex-
ing therewith a host of documents. These affidavits and documents were
treated as evidence in the case. It was on the basis of this evidence that
the main case, as also the Review Petition, were decided by the Commis-
sion. Since the evidence of the parties is already on record and all vital
F facts either stands admitted or proved, this court, in appeal, can proceed
to consider whether forgery and fraud were established in this case. This
is being done here in view of the facts and circumstances of this case;
otherwise this court would have either remanded the case to the Commis-
sion or directed the respondent to approach the Civil Court. (483-D-E]

G 4.2. The circumstances, in the instant case, are glaring and the
intrinsic evidence available on the record is clinching, so mnch so, that no
other inference is possible except to hold that the second Idler was forged
by the respondent in order to obtain a decree from the Commission for a
huge amount of French Francs. If the second letter (forge<! by the respon-
H dent) is excluded from the evidence, there remains only the first letter in
INDIANBANKv. SATYAM FIBRES(!) PVf. LID. [S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.[ 469

which it was not indicated by the respondent to the appellant to write to A
the French Bank to deliver the documents only on co-acceptance by it. The
appellant, in the circumstances, was justified in not mentioning co-accep-
tance by the French Bank. The case of the respondent being false and based
on fabricated evidence has to be dismissed. [492-F-G; 495-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1334 of B
1995.

From the Judgment and Decree dated 13.12.94 and 15.11.95 of the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in O.P.
No. 1~7/92 and R.A. No. 889 of 1993. C
WITH

Civil Appeal No. 1737 of 1995.

From the Order dated 16.11.93 of the National Consumer Disputes D
Redressal Commission, New Delhi in O.P. No. 187 of 1992.
·I
H.N. Salve, P.H. Parekh and Ms. Bina Madhavan for the Appellant.

Mrs. Ferzana Z. Behramkamdin, Pratap Venugopal, K.J. John and
Thomas Joseph fcir the Respondent. E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. These are two appeals against the judgments
of the Nati.anal Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi.
F
2. The facts on record indicate that the respondent had entered into
Contract No. 31/89 with a French Firm M/s. STE Kolori (for short, 'Buyer')
for supply of 1 lac ·metres of cotton grey sheeting of the value of French
Francs 4,37,500. In due course, the goods were shipped to the Buyer and
on 09.06.90, respondent drew two Bills of Exchange on the Buyer for
French Franc 3,50,000 and French Franc 87,500. The draft mentioned at G
the top that the Bills of Exchange had to be co-accepted by the Buyer's
bank. These documents were sent by the appellant to that Bank on 18.6.90
as requested by the respondent but on 9.7.90, the documents were returned
unpaid. However, on the instructions of the respondent, the documents
were re-presented to Banque Leumi, Paris on 13.7.90. On 9.4.91, on the H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A instructions of the respondent, a telex was sent to Banque leumi, Paris to
transfer the documents to another French Bank, namely, Societe Lyonnaise
de Banque, Lyon, France, and on the same day, fresh bills of Exchange
dated 6.3.91 were sent to the French Bank at the request of the respondent.
In these Bills of Exchange, there was no clause for co-a'cceptance by the
French Bank which, however, returned the documents unpaid on 9.8.91.
B
3. On 26th August, 1991, respondent forwarded a fresh set of Bills
of Exchange for being sent to the French Bank. The Bills of Exchange, on
their face, specifically provided for acceptance by the Buyer and co-accep-
tance by the French Bank.
c
4. It appears that the Buyer, namely, M/s. STE Kolori went under
liquidation and an order was passed by the Commercial Court at Lyon,
France for winding up the firm. The Court also appointed a Liquidator
who wrote to the respondent to file its claim.
D
5. On 1st January, 1992, Napean Sea Road .Branch of the appellant
at Bombay wrote a letter to the French Bank that payment of the Bills of
Exchange forwarded to it earlier may be made. The French Bank wrote on
9.1.92 that the Bills of Exchange had not been paid as the Buyer was under
liquidation. The Bank also, during course of correspondence, wrote that
E under French Law, co-acceptance by the Bank, was not permissible non
would it have given the Bank Guarantee, even if a request was made in
that regard by the appellant for and on behalf of the respondent. ,It was,
at this stage, that respondent gave a notice dated 26.3.92 to the appellant
claiming the entire amounts of the Bills of Exchange and subsequently filed
F a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commis-
sion at New Delhi (for short, 'Commission') claiming the value of the goods
shipped to the Buyer at France, from the appellant. The Commission by
its judgment and order dated 16.11.93 allowed the claim with the direction
to the appellant to pay to the respondent French Francs 4,10,000 with
interest (in rupees) at the rate of 18% on the rupee equivalent of the above
G amount with effect from 31st December, 1989 together with a sum of Rs.
10,.000 as costs to the respondent. It was against this judgment that the
claimant filed, in this Court, Civil Appeal No. 1737 of 1995. The connected
Civil Appeal No. 1334 of 1995 has been filed against the judgment and
order dated 13.12.94 by which the Commission has rejected the Review
H Petition filed by the appellant. Both the appeals were admitted by this
INDIANBANKv. SATYAMfiBRES (I) PVT.LID. [S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 471

Court on 20.2.95 and are being disposed of by this judgment. A
6. It may be stated that the Commission, while decreeing the claim
of the respondent, had relied upon the Uniform Rules for Collection made
by the International Chamber of Commerce as also the covering letter of
the respondent dated 26th August, 1991 accompanying the two Bills of
Exchange, which according to the Commission, on the face of it, indicated B
that co-acceptance of the French Bank had to be obtained and since the
appellant, while forwarding the Bills of Exchange to the French Bank, had
not indicated in its letter that the Bills had also to be co-accepted by the
French bank, it acted negligently. This omission was also treated by the
Commission as deficiency in service. c
7. Review of this judgment was sought by the appellant on the ground
that the respondent's letter dated 26th August, 1991 accompanying the Bills
of Exchange did not mention that co-acceptance of the French Bank had
to be obtained. It was pointecl. out to the Commission that the letter dated
26th August, 1991 which was placed on the record by the respondent and D
in which a specific mention was made that co-acceptance from French
Bank had to be obtained, was letter forged by the respondent to obtain a
decree in its favour. The appellant contended that this letter was never
issued to the appellant. The letter dated 26.8.91 which was actually issued
to them did not contain any direction for obtaining co-acceptance by the E
French Bank. The Commission in its judgment dated 13.12.94 (disposing
of the review application) has considered both the letters and has
reproduced the contents thereof but it did not go into the question whether
the letter filed by the respondent was a forged letter or not.

8. The relevant portion of the findings recorded by the Commission F
in its judgment passed on the review application is quoted below :

"The Opposite Party - Bank - has alleged that the letter of 26th
August, 1991 from the Complainant to the Opposite Party - Bank
which was the letter with which the Bills of Exchange were sub- G
mitted to the Opposite Party - Bank - for collection, did not
specifically direct the Bank to secure co-acceptance of the Bills of
Exchange by the French Bank. The Opposite Party - Bank - has
alleged that the letter of 26th August, 1991 submitted as Annexure
'A' to the Complaint petition bearing No. 2776 was not the true
letter sent by Complainant; it is a forgery & fabrication. The true H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A letter of the same date (i.e. 26th August, 1991} was No. 2775 which
was the covering letter of Bills of Exchange and this letter did not
contain the material instructions regarding co-acceptance by the
French Bank. For facility the two letters are reproduced below :

(i) Letter No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991 from the Complainant to
B the Opposite Party - Bank :

"We refer your letter dated 14.8.1991 informing us about
return of documents Nos. 0005207 (FOBC 17794} and
0005208 (FOBC 17795} for Rs. 3,50,000 and FF 87,000
respectively.
c
In this connection we are enclosing fresh sets of Bills· of
Exchange with a request to kindly represent the documents
immediately to our buyer through M/s. Societe Lyonnaise De
Banque, Lyon, France. Kindly note that the Bills of Exchange
D have to be accepted by our buyer and co-accepted by the
bank viz; Societe Lyonnaise De Banque for payment on
31.12.1991."

(ii) The letter No. 2775 of 26th August, 1991 from the Complainant
to the Opposite party - Bank :
E
"We refer your letter dated 14.8.1991 informing us about
return of documents Nos. 0005207 (FOBC 17794) and
0005208 (FOBC 17795} for Rs. 3,50,000 and FF 87,000
respectively.

F In this connection, we are enclosing fresh sets of Drafts with
a request to kindly represent the documents immediately to
our buyer through M/s. Societe Lyonnaise De Banque, Lyon,
France."

It will be noticed from the letters reproduced above that the
G material instruction regarding co-acceptance of the Bills of Ex-
change by the French Bank is absent in the letter No. 2775 whereas
it is specifically recorded in the letter No. 2776. According to the
Opposite Party - Bank the letter or 26th August No. 2776 is a
forgery created by the Complainant for the purpose of this case.
H During the hearing there was considerable effort on the part of
INDIANBANKv. SAlYAM FIBRES (I) PVT. LID. (S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.J 473

the Opposite Party - Bank to prove that the letter No. 2776 was A
never issued and this has been forged to support the case of the
complainant whereas the Complainant vehemently maintained that
this was a genuine letter and that there was evidence to support
its contention. We did not think it necessary to go into this
question. We only pointed out to the Complainant that in the
B
ordinary course of correspondence, in its letter of No. 2776 the
Complainant should have stated that this was in continuation of its
previous letter No. 2775 and that the letter No. 2776 was neces-
sitated by the omission in the letter No. 2775 of the vital directions
regarding co-acceptance of the Bills of Exchange. We did not get
a satisfactory answer to this question. c
We have also once again gone through the records of the case,
the oral arguments and the written submission made by the parties
at the rehearing limited to the question of the letter No. 2776 being
a forgery and its effect on the findings recorded in the order of
this Commission of 16th November, 1993. D
It will be observed from the order that the Bills of Exchange
clearly specified that the same were to be co-accepted by the
foreign bank besides being accepted by the buying French Firm.
In these circumstances it was the duty of the Opposite Party Bank E
to ensure co-acceptance by the foreign Bank. The responsibility of
the Bank to obtain co-acceptance of the Bills of Exchange is also
manifest from the Rules of Collection laid down by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce. As the collecting bank on behalf of
its customer (Complainant) who had entrusted the task of collec-
tion of Bills of Exchange to it the Opposite Party - Bank, the latter F
is responsible for seeing that the form of acceptance of Bills of
Exchange is complete and correct.

The Rules require that "all documents sent for collection must
be accompanied by collection order which is to be made by the G
Bank in accordance with the instructions of the client or the
principal."

The instructions for co-acceptance by the foreign bank on the
Bills of Exchange were clear and unambiguous and as such even
if we ignore the covering letter No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991 said H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to have been sent by the Complainant to the Bank on the ground
that this is a forged document, it will not affect the decision already
arrived at in any manner .11

9. As pointed out earlier, the Commission did not decide the ques-
tion whether the letter dated 26th August, 1991 filed by the respondent
B was a forged letter as it was of the opinion that even if both the letters,
namely the letter filed by the appellant in Review Petition as also the letter
filed by the respondent in the original proceedings, were ignored, the
appellant was still under a liability to have mentioned in its letter to the
French Bank to whom the Bills of Exchange were forwarded, that the
C French Bank had also to co-accept the Bills before delivering the docu-
ments to the Buyer as the respondent had specifically mentioned this
requirement in the Bills of Exchange drawn on and addressed to M/s. STE
Kolori and their Bankers, namely, Societe Lyonnaise De Banque, Lyon,
France. This finding, like the findings recorded by the Commission in its
original judgment dated 16.11.93, is based on the interpretation of certain
D Clauses of the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.

10. There are two Banks, namely, the Indian Bank, Bombay (appel-
lant) through whom the Bills of Exchange were forwarded and the French
Bank, qamely Societc Lyonnaise De Banque, Foreign Department, Lyon,
E France. for payment. It is not disputed that the Banks had to act in
accordance with the Uniform Rules .for Collection made by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as ICC Rules). The
extent of liability, default, negligence or _deficiency in service, on the part
of either of the Banks would, therefore, depend on a correct reading and
interpretation of the ICC Rules which, we unhesitantly say, at the outset,
F were misread, misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Commission.

11. Clause B of the ICC Rules which came into force with effect from
January 1, 1979 contains Definitions some of which (which are relevant for
this case) are reproduced below :
G "1. (i) "Collection" means the handling by banks' on instructions
received of documents as defined in (ii) below, in order to (a)
obtain acceptance and/or, as the case may be, payment, or (b)
deliver commercial documents against acceptance and/or, as the
case may be, against payment, or (c) deliver documents on other
H terms and conditions.
INDIAN BANKv. SA1YAMFIBRES (I) PVT. LID. (S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.J 475

(ii) "Documents" means financial documents and/or commercial A
documents:

(a) "financial dowments" means bills of exchange, promissory
notes, cheques, payment receipts or other similar instruments used
for obtaining the payment of money;
B
(b) "Commercial documents" means invoices, shipping docu-
ments, documents of title or other 'similar documents, or any other
• documents, whatsoever, not being financial documents .
11
2. The "pa1tieS thereto are :
c
(i) the "p1incipal" who is the customer entrusting the operation
of collection to his bank;

(ii) the "remitting bank" which is the bank to which the principal
has entrusted the operation of collection;
D
(iii) the "collecting bank" which is any bank, other than the
remitting bank, involved in processing the collection order;

(iv) the ''presenting bank" which is the collecting bank making
presentation to the drawee. E

3. The 11drawee 11 is the one to whom· presentation is to be made
according to the collection order."

Clause C provides as under :
F
"All documents sent for collection must be accompanied by a
collection order giving complete and precise instructions. Banks
are only permitted to act upon the instructions given in such
collection order, and in accordance with these Rules.

If any bank cannot, for any reason, comply with the instructions G
given in the collection order received by it, it must immediately
advise the party from whom it received the collection order."

Article 2, 3 as also Article 15 provide as under :

"Article 2 H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Banks must verify that the documents received appear to be as
listed in the collection order and must immediately advise the party
from whom the collection order was received of any documents
m1ssmg.

Banks have no further obligation to examine the documents.
B
For the purpose of giving effect to the Instructions of the
principal, the remitting bank will utilise as the collecting bank :
•
(i) the collecting bank nominated by the principal, or in the
absence of such nomination,
c
(ii) any bank, of its own or another bank's choice, in the country
of payment or acceptance, as the case may be.

The documents and the collection order may be sent to the
D collecting bank directly or through another bank as intermediary.

Banks utilising the services of other banks for the purpose of
giving effect to the instructions of the principal Uu so for the
account of and at the risk of the latter.

E The principal shall be bound by and liable to indemnity the
banks against all obligations and responsibilities imposed by
foreign laws or usages.

Article 15

F The presenting bank is responsible for seeing that the form of
the acceptance of a bill of exchange appears to be complete and
correct, but is not responsible for the genuineness of any signature "
or for the authority of any signatory to sign the acceptance."

12. Clauses 2 and 3 specify the parties to the transaction for purpose
G of "Collection" as defined in Sub-clause l(i) of Clause B. These parties are
the "P1 incipal" who entrusts the operation of Collection" to his Bank. This,
in the instant case. would be the respondent as the respondent entrusted
the operation of "Collection" to the appellant. The other party is the
"Remitting Bank", namely, a Bank to whom the operation of "Collection"
H is entrusted by the "Principal". In the instant case, the "Remitting Bank"
INDIANBANKv. SATYAM FIBRES(!) PVT.LID. [S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 477

would be the appellant as it was this Bank to whom the respondent had A
entrusted the job of "Collection". Another Bank which is involved in the
whole transaction is the "Collecting Bank". According to the definition, this
would be a Bank other the "Remitting Bank". There is, yet, a third bank,
namely the "Presenting Bank" which, according to the definition, is, in fact,
the !!Collecting Bankr' making presentation to the 11 Dra\vee 11 • "Dra\vee 11 has
B
been defined in Sub-clause 3 of Clause B as the person to whom presen-
tation is made according to the collection order. Although, in the defini-
tion, there are three banks namely, the "Remitting Bank", the "Collecting
Bank" and the "Presenting Bank", the identity of "Collecting Bank" and the
"Presenting Bank" is the same as the "Collecting Bank" not only collects the
documents from the "Remitting Bank", it also presents those documents to c
the "Drawee" for payment. The "Remitting Bank" cannot be the "Collecting
Bank" or the "Presenting Bank" as the "Collecting Bank" has been defined
in the ICC Rules as a Bank OTHER THAN THE "REMITTING BANK".

13. Clause C which has already been extracted above requires that D
the documents sent of "Collection" must be accompanied by a collection
order. The collection order has to contain complete and precise instruc-
tions so as to enable the Bank t~ act in accordance with the instructions
contained in the collection order and in accordance with the ICC Rules.
This will also be clear from the definition of "Collection" as set out in Sub-
clause l(i) of Clause B, which means "the handling by Banks, ON IN- E
STRUCTIONS RECEIVED, of documents", which are either "Commercial
or Financial" as defined in Sub-clause (ii)(a) and (b). The definition of
"Financial Documents" also includes Bills of Exchange. The words "for the
purpose of giving effect to the INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL"
occurring in Article 3 also make it clear that the Principal has to give F
instructions separately (in addition to the documents) to the Remitting
Bank to enable it to instruct the Collecting Bank accordingly.

14. ''.Acceptance" is dealt with in Article 15 which indicates that the
responsibility of seeing that the Bill of Exchange is accepted, completely
and correctly, is that of the "Presenting Bank". G

15. The Commission, while disposing of the complaint of the respon-
dent by its original order dated 16.11.93, had held that not only the Bill of
Exchange but the covering note accompanying those Bills clearly indicated
that the Bill was to be accepted by the buyer and co-accepted by the H

_,
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Foreign Bank. It, then, proceeded to say as under :
"The Rules for Collection laid down by the International Cham-
ber of Commerce leave no room for doubt that as per Article 3
of the said Rules, for giving effect to the instructions of the
principal, i.e., the customer entrusting the operation of collection
B to his Bank, the remitting bank (viz. the Bank to which the principal
has entrusted the operation of collection) is the collecting Bank.
As observed earlier, under Article 15 it is the presenting Bank
which is responsible for seeing that the form of acceptance of a
Bill of Exchange appears to be complete and correct. Under Item
c C "General Provisions and Divisions" of the above Rules "All
documents sent for collection must be accompanied by a collection
order which has to be made by the Bank in accordance with the
instructions of the client or the principal''. The opposite party Bank
failed to do so. We reject its plea that it was not responsible to
obtain the co-acceptance of the Bank and there was no deficiency
D of service on its part. 11

16. A mere perusal of the above passage of the Commission's judg-
ment indicates that the Commission fell into a serious error in treating the
"Remitting Bank" as the "Collecting Bank" and, then, fastening liability on
E the appellant by observing that the appellant had not acted in accordance
with Article 15 of the ICC Rules under which it was the responsibility of
the "Presenting Bankn to see that the 11Docun1ents 11 were accepted in accord-
ance with the instructions of the "Principal". The Commission thus treated
appellant not only only as the "Remitting Bank" but also as the "Collecting
Bank" and "Presenting Bank" which is not permissible as the identity of
F "Remitting Bank" is different and distinct from that of the "Collecting Bank"
and/or the "Presenting Bank".

17. As pointed out earlier, the main judgment of the Commission is
based on the ground that there was letter dated 26.8.91 which contained
G specific instruction that there had to be co-acceptance by the Foreign .,
Bank.

18. As against this, there is, admittedly, another letter of 26th August,
1991 from the respondent to the appellant which does nnt contain this
instruction. When this letter was filed before the Commission and a review
H of the judgment was sought on the ground that the letter containing the

I
INDIANBANKv. SA1YAMFIBRFS(l)PVT.L1D",.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 479

instruction for obtaining co-acceptance of the French Bank was never A
issued to the appellant and that the only letter issued on that date was the
letter in which this instruction was not mentioned, the Commission, instead
of deciding the controversy as to whether the other letter relied upon by
the respondent was, at all, sent or issued to the appellant, proceeded to
decide the controversy on the ground that even if no such letter was issued, B
the recital in the Bill of Exchange about co-acceptance by the French Bank
was enough and the- appellant having not acted in terms of the Bill of
Exchange and having not obtained the co-acceptance of the French Bank,
was liable to pay to the respondent the entire price of the goods supplied
to the Buyer to whom the documents would not have been delivered had
it been mentioned that before delivering the documents to the Buyer, C
co-acceptance by the French Bank was necessary, as in that event, the
documents would have been either returned, as was done on previous
occasions, or the French Bank would have given co-acceptance and thus
made payment of the entire amount to the respondent.
D
19. In view of the findings recorded by us that under the ICC Rules,
it is the responsibility of the "Principal" to give or send specific and precise
instructions to the Bank besides sending the "Commercial/Financial Docu-
ments", Commission was under a duty to decide as to whether the respon-
dent had issued the letter containing the requirement of co-acceptance by
the French Bank. The Commission could not legally avoid to decide this E
-( question particularly as the appellant had contended before the Commis-
sion that the letter No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991 was forged and fabricated
by the respondent and that the only letter issued by the respondent was
letter No. 2775 dated 26th August, 1991. The contents of both the letters
have already been reproduced by the Commission in its judgment by which F
the review application has been disposed of which would indicate that in
the letter No. 2775, there is no requirement to obtain co-acceptance by the
French Bank whereas in the other letter, namely, letter No. 2776, this
condition has been specifically mentioned.

20. By filing letter No. 2775, of 26.8.91 along with the Review Petition G
and contending that the other letter, namely, letter No. 2776 of the even
date, was never written or issued by the respondent, the appellant, in fact,
raised the plea before the Commission that its judgment dated 16.11.93,
which was based on letter No. 2776, was obtained by the respondent by
practising fraud not only on the appellant but on the Commission too as H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A letter No. 2776 dated 26.8.91 was forged by the respondent for the purpose
of this case. This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commis-
sion which needs to be reminded that the Authorities, be they Constitu-
tional, Statutory or Administrative, (and particularly those who have to
decide a !is) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if they
B are obtained by fraud as Fraud and Justice never dwell together (Fraus et
just nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that Fraud and deceit
defend or excuse no man (Fraus et do/us nemini patrocinari debent).

21. In Smith v. Easi Elloe Rural District Council, (1950) AC 736, the
House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate
C any act or order. In another case. Lazams Estate Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1
QB 702 at 712, Denning Ll said :

"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed
to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels every-
thing."
D
22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially
under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by
Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings,
the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting
aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent power are powers which are
E resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers
spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the
Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their
..
dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from
indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is
F necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business.

23. Since fraud effects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the
proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of
Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an
order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the
G Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which
prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order.
(See : Benoy Krishna Mukherjee v. Mohan/a/ Goenka, AIR (1950) Cal. 287;
Gajanand Sha & Ors. v. Dayanand Thakur, AIR (1943) Patna 127; Krishna
Kumar v. Jawand Singh, AIR (1947) Nagpur 236; Devendra Nath Sarkar v.
H Ram Rachpal Singh, ILR (1926) 1 Lucknow 341 = AIR 1926 Oudh 315;
INDIANBANKv. SATYAMFIBRES(J) PVT. LID. (S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 481

Saiyed Muhammad Raza v. Ram Saroop & Ors., ILR (1929) 4 Lucknow 562 A
= AIR (1929) Oudh 385 (FB); Bankey Behari Lal & Anr. v. Abdul Rahman
& Ors., !LR (1932) 7 Lucknow 350 = AIR 1932 Oudh 63; Lekshmi Amma
Chacld Amma v. Mamme11 Mammen, (1955) Kerala Law Times 459). The
Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by
fraud practised upon the Court (lshwar Mahton & Anr. v. Sitaram Kumar B
& 01:<., AIR (1954) Patna 450) or to set aside the order recording com- ·
promise obtained by fraud. (Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudlzary v. Debendra Pd.
Singh & Ors., AIR (1958) Patna 618; Smt. Tara Bai v. V.S. Krishnaswamy
Rao, AIR (1985) Karnataka 270).

24. We may now turn to the next and allied questions; what is forgery, C
whether forgery is a fraud and whether in the instant case, forgery and
fraud and proved?

25. Forgery has its origin in the French word "Forger", which sig-
nifies:
D
"to frame or fashion a thing as the smith doth his worke upon
the anvill. And it is used in our law for the fraudulant making and
publishing of false writings to the prejudice of another mans right
(Tenn"" da la Ley) (Stroud'sJudicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition Vol.
2).
E
26. In Webster's Comprehensive Dicitionary, International Edition,
"Forgery'' is defined as :

"The act of falsely making or materially altering, with intent to
defraud; any writing which, if genuine, mi!iht be of legal efficacy F
or the foundation of a legal liability."

27. This Definition was adopted in Rembert v. State, 25 Am. Rep. 639.
In another case, namely, State v. Phelps, 34 Am. Dec. 672, it was laid down
that forgery is the false making of any written instrument, for the purpose
of fraud or deceit. This decision appears to be based on the meaning of G
forgery as set out in Tomlin's Law Dictionary.

28. From the above, it would be seen that fraud is an essential
ingredient of forgery.

29. Forgery under the Indian Penal Code is an offence which has H

I
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A been defined in Section 463, while Section 464, deals with the making of a
false document. .Section 465 prescribes punishment for forgery. 'Forged
document" is defined in Section 470 while Section 471 deals with the crime
of using as genuine, the forged document.

30. Forgery and Fraud are essentially matters of evidence which
B could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from
proved facts.

31. The Privy Council in Salish Chandra Chatterjee v. Kumar Satish
Kantha Roy & Ors., AIR (1923) PC 73, laid down as under :
c "Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint
in this case must, no doubt, he proved by those who make them •
proved by established facts or inferences legitimately drawn from
those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions and surmises and
conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those
D inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling
artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must
necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made
plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this
were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape.'
E
32. The above principle will apply not only to courts of law but also·
to statutory tribunals which, like the Commission, are conferred power to
record evidence by applying certain provisions of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure including the power to enforce attendance of the witnesses and are
also given the power to receive evidence on affidavits. The Commission
F under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 decides the dispute by following
the procedure indicated in Section 22 read with Section 13(4) and (5) of
the Act.

33. Sub-section (4) of the Section 13 which has been made applicable
G to the proceeding before the Commission lays down that it shall have the
same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of the following matters,
namely:

(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant
H or witness and examining the witnes;; on oath;
•
lNDIANBANKv. SATYAM FIBRES(!) PVT.LID. [S. SAG!IlRAHMAD •.T.] 483

(ii) the discovery and production of any document or other A
material object producible as evidence;

(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) ............................. .
B
(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness;
and

(vi) ................. .

The Commission has, thus, jurisdiction not only to examine a witness C
on oath but also to receive evidence in the from of affidavits.

34. The parties, in the instant case, have filed their affidavits annexing
therewith a host of documents. These affidavits and documents were
treated as evidence in the case. It was on the basis of this evidence that
D
the main case, as also the Review Petition, were decided by the Commis-
sion.

35. Since the evidence of the parties is already on record and all vital
facts either stan& admitted or proved, we proceed now to consider
whether forgery and fraud are established. This we are doing in view of the E
facts and circumstances of this case otherwise we would have either
remanded the case to the Commission or directed the respondent to
approach the Civil Court.

36. Parab'faphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Review Application filed by
the appellant before the Commission are as under : F
"2. In brief, the case of the Complainant before this Hon'ble
Commission was that it had by its letter of the 26th August, 1991,
which letter enclosed the bills of exchange in question, gave
specific instruction to the Opposite Party - the Bank - for securing G
a co-acceptance by Societe Lyonnaise de Banque (the French
Bank) before handing over the documents of title to the goods.
Based upon this letter, the veracity of which was not questioned
by the Opposite Party at that stage in the circumstances indicated
hereinafter, this Hon'ble Commission was pleased to hold that the
Opposite Party was responsible for not carrying out the instruc- H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A lions contained in the letter dated 26th August, 1991, (Exhibit A
to the Complaint) and thereby liable in damages caused to the
complainant. It is correct that the Complainant had annexed a copy
of the letter dated 26th August, 1991 with this Complaint. However,
the Opposite Party - the Bank - failed to notice that this letter so
annexed was not the same as the letter of the same date given by
B the Complainant to the Bank. The Complainant had given a letter
on 26.8.1991 as a covering letter together with the bills of exchange,
however with a vital difference that the body of the letter did not
contain the material instructions regarding co-acceptance by the
French Bank.
c
3. The letter produced before this Hon'ble Commission bears the
same date as the letter actually given to the Bank purports to be
a covering letter (as also was the letter given to the Bank) and
bears a reference No. 2776 whereas the reference of the letter
given to the Bank is 2775. Due to these apparent similarities, whilst
D
drawing up the pleadings the material alterations made to the
contents of the letter were overlooked. The opposite party states
that the letter as produced before this Hon'ble Commission was
not a true Copy of the letter given to the Bank.

E 4. One of the reasons why this lapse occurred is because the true
significance and import of the letter was not understood and
appreciated. After receiving a copy of the order of this Hon'ble
Commission, it was found that the whole case had turned against
the Bank based upon the letter of the Complainant produced
F before the Commission. It is thereafter when the copy of the letter
which is with the Bank was perused, it was found that there is a
material variation between that copy which was given to the Bank
and its purported true copy which was produced by the Com-
plainant before this Hon'ble Commission, However, to eliminate
the possibility as to whether, in addition to the letter given to the
G Bank bearing reference No. 2775, another letter having reference
No. 2776 of the same date was also given to the Bank, a thorough
search was made of the records of the Bank at the Napean Sea
Road and other connected branches including the head office. The
search has revealed that the Bank has not received the letter
H bearing reference No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991, the contents of
INDIANBANKv. SATYAM FIBRES(!) PVf. LID. [S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 485

which are as the purported copy produced by the Complainant A
before this Hon'ble Commission. What was given by the Com-
plainant to the Bank as a coveriug letter was a letter bearing
reference No. 2775, a copy of which is annexed hereto .and marked
as Annexure I and the original of which shall be produced at the
time of hearing. Affidavit of the then manager of the said branch
B
confirming that the said letter dated 26th August, 1991 annexed as
Exhibit 'A" to the Complaint was not received by the Bank is
annexed hereto and marked Annexure "II'.

5. A perusal of this letter shows that the material instructions in
relation to co-acceptance by the French Bank are absent in this C
letter. The-Opposite Party is advised to state that considering the
fact that a letter dated 26th August, 1991, bearing REF : SF : E :
2775 was given as a covering letter to the Bank, it is inconceivable
that a second letter also as a covering letter would be given to the
Bank. The letter of 26th August, 1991 stated that it is" ...... enclosing
fresh set of drafts ..... ". There are some other discrepancies between D
this letter and the letter produced by the Complainant, as hereafter
set out.

6. The opposite party further submit that the xerox copy of the
purported letter produced before this Hon'ble Commission by the E
Complainant purports to bear an initial on the right-hand side of
the letter. The Opposite Party submits that this initial is not of any
of the officials of the Napean Sea Road Branch of the Bank at the
relevant time. The Opposite Party is, therefore, advised to submit
that this letter is a forgery created by the Complainant for the
purpose of the present case." F

37. The respondent filed a reply to the Review Application in para-
graph 4 by which he stated as under :

(a) The complainant by its letter dated 26th August 1991 bearing G
reference No. SF : E : 2775 forwarded to the opponent fresh
set of Drafts with a request to present t..\e said documents to
the buyer (viz. M/s. STE Kolori) through M/s. Societe Lyon-
naise De Banque, Lyon, France. The copy of the said lelter
which is on the file of the Complainant is annexed hereto and
marked Exhibit 'A'. H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (b) The said letter dated 26th August 1991 bearing Reference
No. EF : E : 2775 though delivered to the Opponent, the
carbon copy of the said letter available with the Complainant,
does not bear any acknowledgement of receipt. The said letter
is also meniioned in the Outward Register maintained by the
Complainant Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit 'B' is a
B
copy of the relevant page of the Outward Register of the
Complainant. The Complainant craves leave to refer to and
rely upon the Outward Register maintained by it for the
relevant period when produced.

c (c) After the delivery of the said letter dated 26th August 1991
bearing Reference No. SF : E : 2775 Complainant noticed
that the said letter did not request the Opponent to have the
said Bills of Exchange co-accepted by the Foreign Bank viz.
Societe Lyonnaise De Banque, Lyon, France. In the cir-
cumstances, the Complainant immediately addressed another
D
letter to the Opponent also dated 26th August 1991 bearing
Reference No. SF : E : 2775 wherein they gave specific
instructions to the Opponent to have to the said Bills of
Exchange accepted by the buyer viz. Mis. STE Kolori and
co-accepted by the Foreign Bank viz. Societe Lyonnaise De
E Banque. The said letter has been annexed as Exhibit 'A' to
the plaint and has also been annexed hereto as Exhibit 'C'.
The said letter was delivered to the Opponent and the same
bears the intials of the person who received the said letter in
the Opponent Bank. The said letter also bears the rubber
F · stamp of the Opponent.

(d) The said letter dated 26th August 1991 bearing Reference
No. SF : E : 2775 is also mentioned in the Outward Register
maintained by the Complainant. Exhibit 'B' hereto which is
the relevant page of the Outward Register not only shows the
G entry of the said letter bearing Reference No. SF : F : 2775
but also the entry of the aforesaid letter bearing SF : E : 2776.

(e) From the aforesaid it is evident that there were two letters
both dated 26th August, 1991 which were addressed by the
H Complainant to the Opponent.
INDIANBANKv. SA1YAM FIBRES(!) PVT. LID. [S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 487

(!) The Complainant says that pursuant to the filing of the A
original complaint, the Complainant's Advocates gave inspec-
tion of the documents, referred to and relied upon by the
Complainant, to the Opponents Advocate. The said inspec-
tion was taken on 14th October, 1992 and at the said time the
carbon copy of the letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing
B
Reference No. SF: E: 2776 was inspected by the Opponent's
Advocate. The carbon copy of the said letter which was shown
bore not only the initials of the person who received the said
letter in the Opponents bank, but also bore the rubber stamp
of the Opponents bank. The fact of the inspection having been
taken has been recorded by the Opponents Advocates in the c
letter by the dated 16th October, 1992 which is annexed
hereto and marked Exhibit 'D'.

(g) The Complainant states that after the said Review Applica-
tion was served upon the Complainant, the Complainants D
Advocate addressed a letter dated 28th December, 1993 to
the Opponents Advocates pointing out that the said Review
Application was totally false an<l misconceived inasmuch as
the said letter dated 2oth AugHst, 1991 bearing Reference No.
SF : E : 2776 was not a fabricated letter and bore the rubber
stamp of the Opponent as also the initials of the person who E
received the same in the Opponent Bank. The Complainants
Advocates by the said letter also requested for inspection of
the letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing Reference No. SF
: E : 2775 and the Inward Register maintained by the Op-
ponent Bank. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit 'E' is a F
copy of the said Complainant's Advocates letter dated 28th
December, 1993.

(h) The Opponent by their Advocates' letter dated 20 December,
1993 appointed time for inspectian of the said letter. The
Opponent Advocates by the said letter also stated that their G
client had not entered the said letter bearing Reference No.
SF : E : 2775 in their Inward Register as the Inward Register
was formerly only maintained in respect of registered letters
which were entered therein. Hereto annexed and marked
Exhibit 'F' is a copy of the said dated 29th December, 1993. H
•

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A (i) Pursuant to the appointment fixed in that regard the Com-
plainant and their Advocates attended the Office of the
Opponents Advocates on 3rd January, 1994 and took inspec-
tion on the said letter dated SF : E : 2775. The Complainant
at the said time also gave inspection of the carbon copies of
the letters bearing Reference No. SF : E : 2775 and SF : E :
B 2776 available on the file of the Complainant. Inspection of
the Outward Register of the Complainant was also given to
the Opponent and its Advocates. The giving and taking of the
said inspection was recorded by the Opponents Advocates in
their letter dated 4th January, 1994 (Exh. 'D' hereto) and also
c by the Complainant in their Advocates letter also dated 4th
January, 1994. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit 'G' is a
copy of the aforesaid letter dated 4th January, 1994.

38. Other relevant paras of the respondent's reply are paragraph 7
to 15.
D
39. The Respondent's denial that it had fabricated the letter No. 2776
is also contained in various other paras of its reply.

40. The appellant filed a rejoinder affidavit before the Commission.
Paras 3, 7, 12, 15, 21 are quoted below :
E
"3. It is only after having perused the Reply of the Complainant
that the Opposite Party has further realised that the Complainant
has played a calculated fraud with an intention to secure an order
from this Hon'ble Commission. The Complainant has all along
F played a fraud on this Hon'ble Commission in making it believe
that the Bills of Exchange have been forwarded by the alleged
letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2776 annexed as Exhibit
"A" to the Complaint. Having now read the tenor of the Reply of
the the Complainant, the Opposite party has realised that the
Complainant has with mischievous and malafide intent in its plead-
G ings before this Hon'ble Commission cleverly avoided making
reference to two different letters said to have been delivered to
the Opposite Party and the aforesaid fact is clear and evident by
the language of the pleadings. The Opposite Party further submits
that after going through the said reply of the complaint to the
H Review petition it has become very clear that the Complainant has
INDIANBANKv. SATYAM FlBRES(l) PVT. LID. [S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 489

deliberately played a fraud and now put forward a false case in A
the said reply to further perpetrate the said fraud. That Opposite
Party submits that the letter bearing No. 2775 dated 26th August,
1991 and the said letter bearing No. 2776 dated 26th August, 1991,
both purport to enclose therewith set of Bills of Exchange. It is an
admitted position that only one set of Bills were forwarded for the
B
purpose of forwarding the same to the foreign party for its accep-
tance. The fact that both letters set out that Bills of Exchanges are
forwarded therewith itself indicates that they were not meant for
substitution. Even the language of both letters belies the false case
of substitution now put up by the Complainant. It is thus clear that
the Complainant has misguided this Hon'ble Commission by rely- c
ing upon a letter bearing ref. No. 2776 dated 26th August, 1991
purporting to suggest that by the said letter, the said Bills of
Exchange were forwarded for the purpose of acceptance, whereas
in fact the said letter bearing No. 2776 dated 26th August, 1991
was never received by the Opposite party.
D
7. With reference to paragraph 4(c) of the said Reply, the Opposite
Party denies that after delivery of the said letter dated 26th August,
1991 bearing No. 2775 the Complainant noticed that the said letter
did not contain a request to the Opposite party to have the said
Bills of Exchange co-accepted by the foreign Bank and therefore E
addressed another letter to the Opposite party also dated 26th
August, 1991 bearing No. 2776 wherein the complainant give
specific instructions to the Opposite Party to have the said Bills of
Exchange accepted by the Buyer and co-accepted by the foreign
Bank. The Opposite Party says and submits that the alleged letter F
dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2776 is not a genuine letter.
The Opposite Party craves leave to refer to the Outward Register
allegedly maintained by the Complainant, when produced. The
Opposite Party submits that the Outward Register maintained by
' the Complainant does not appear to be a genuine Outward
Register as the same has entries containing references to letters G
of a later date bearing outward numbers of an earlier date. The
Opposite Party says and submits that no reliance can be placed
upon the said alleged Outward Register alleged to have been
maintained by the Complainant. The Opposite Party says and
submits that the alleged initials of the person who received he said H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A letter is not initialled by any officer/staff member of Indian Bank
working in its Nepean Seas Road Branch at the relevant time. The
Opposite Party says that prior to the filing of the Review Applica-
tion the Opposite Party obtained verification from the officers and
staff members attached to the Nepean Sea Road Branch of the
Opposite Party who certified and stated that the alleged initial on
B the alleged office copy of the Complainant is not their initial. The
Opposite Party states and submits that the mere fact that a rubber
stamp appears on the alleged letter cannot be itself confer any
authenticity. It is pertinent to note that the Complainant has
obtained an alleged acknowledgement on the. office copy of the
c alleged letter dated 26th Aug., 1991 bearing reference No. 2776
when, in fact no such letter was delivered by the Complainant to
the Opposite Party. It is further pertinent to note that the Com-
plainant did not think it fit or necessary to obtain any acknow-
ledgement on office copy of letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing
No. 2775 when the original documents i.e. the Bills of Exchange
D
were delivered to the Opposite Party therewith but the com-
plainant has allegedly obtained an acknowledgement on the alleged
letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2776. Copy of Statement
signed by the Officers and staff members at the Nepean Sea Road
Branch of the Opposite Party certifying that the alleged initials on
E the alleged acknowledgement does not belong to any of them is
hereto annexed and marked Annex 11 1".

12. With reference to paragraph 7 of the said Reply, the Opposite
Party denies the contention of the Complainant that the letter
F dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2775 was not disclosed by the
Complainant before this Hon'ble Commission as the said letter
was substituted by the alleged letter dated 26th August, 1991
bearing No. 2776, as alleged or at all. The Opposite Party submits
that it is for the first time that the Complainant has pleaded
substitution. This plea of substitution has been pleaded only after
G the fraud has been detected by the Opposite Party and brought to
the notice of this Hon'ble Commission. If the plea of substitution
, is to be believed, the Complainant would have withdrawn the letter
dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2775 at that point of time
itself since the Complainant had taken no acknowledgement for
H the same. The Opposite Party denies the contention of the Com-
INDIAN BANK v. SA1YAM FIBRES (I) rvr. LID. [S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 491

plainant that the nondisclosure was not with a 'iew to suppressing A
information, as alleged or otherwise. The Opposite Party further
denies the contention of the Complainant that the nondisclosure
was inadvertent as alleged or at all. The Opposite Party states that
the second letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2776 was
never delivered by the Complainant to the Opposite Party.
B
15. With reference to paragraph 10 of the said Reply, the Opposite
Party states that itis pertinent to note that despite the Complainant
having accepted the fact that letter dated 26th August, 1991 bear-
ing No. 2775 was addressed to the Opposite Party and the Opposite
Party would act on the instructions contained therein, the Com- C
plainant ought to have drawn reference to the letter No. 2775, if
assuming without admitting that the alleged letter No. 2776 was in
fact delivered. The Opposite Party states that, it is admitted by the
Complainant that the two letters both dated 26th August, 1991
bearing Nos. 2775 and 2776 are materially different from each
other. The Opposite Party states that the Complainant has not D
explained in any part of its reply as to what warranted the submis-
sion of the alleged letter dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2776
on the same date after submission of a letter on the same subject,
also dated 26th August, 1991 bearing No. 2775 without providing
for any reference to the earlier letter or without making any E
mention about the submission of the earlier letter to the Opposite
Party. The Opposite Party submits that the absence of continuity
or reference to the earlier letter cannot be termed as an offiission,
as alleged, by the Complainant, particularly who, according to the
Complainant itself the second letter is intended to be a substitution
of the contents of the earlier letter. p

21. With reference to paragraph 21 to 24 of the said Reply, it is
pertinent to note that the Complainant says that the Complainant
was willing to have the goods delivered to the Buyer not only after
acceptance of the Bills of Exchange by the Buyer but also co-ac- G
ceptance by the foreign bank. The Complainant has, till date not
brought to the notice of the Opposite Party and/or this Hon'ble
Commission the basis of the aforesaid statement, as to whether
there is any agreement between the Complainant and the foreign
Buyer, or the Complainant and the foreign bank for co~acceptance.
There is no documentary or any evidence brought in by the H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A complainant to show any alleged contract for co-acceptance. In
the absence of the foreign Buyer and/or the foreign bank being
party to the present proceedings, the statement of the Complainant
that the Complainant was willing to sell the goods only if there was
co-acceptance, is not sustainable and cannot be believed. The
Opposite Party says and submits that the history of the present
B
transaction between the complainant and the foreign buyer indi-
cates that the goods were already shipped in june, 1990 prior to
the forwarding of the said Bills of the Exchange for acceptance in
August, 1991. The Opposite Party denies that the Opposite Party
has been negligent in exercising its duty to inform the foreign bank
c that the Bills of Exchange are to be accepted as per tenor of the
instrument. The opposite party denies that the Complainant is
entitled to sue the Opposite Party and recover from the Opposite
Party the amount of Bills of Exchange With interest, as alleged or
otherWise. The Opposite Party says that the only claim which the
Complainant has is against the foreign buyer and/or the foreign
D
bank and not against the Opposite Party. It is foreign pertinent to
note that the Complainant sates that there is no privily of contract
between the foreign bank and the Complainant. If the aforesaid
statement is to be believed, then the question of the foreign bank
being required lo co-accept the Bills of Exchange cannot and does
E not arise.n

41. We have also gone through other affidavits an documents, ftled
either in this Court or before the Commission, which have been brought
on record here.

F 42. We must say immediately that the circumstances, in the instant
case, are glaring and the intrinsic evidence available on the record is
clinching, so much so, that no other inference is possible except to hold
that the letter No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991 was forged by the respondent
in order to obtain a decree from the Commission for a huge amount of
G French Francs 4,10,000 it will appear that -

(i) The respondent does not deny that it had sent and issued
letter No. 2775 dated 26th August, 1991 to the appellant;

(ii) The respondent does not deny that this letter does not contain
H any direction to the appellant to obtain co-acceptance from
INDIANBANKv. SA1YAMF1BRES(I) PVf.LID. (S. SAGHIRAHMAD,J.J 493

the French Bank; A
(iii) The respondent says that it had issued letter No. 2776 dated
26th August 1991 in substitution of the earlier letter No. 2775
of the even date;

(iv) The fact this letter was sent in substitution of leller No. 2775 B
dated 26th August, 1991 is not mentioned in the letter itself;

(v) The respondent does not say that the letter No. 2775 dated
26th August, 1991 should be treated as cancelled;

(vi) The respondent had corresponded with the appellant and had c
even given a notice dated 26.3.92 through its counsel to the
appellant claiming the amounts due under the Bill of Ex-
change on the ground of negligence but nowhere does the
respondent says that the letter No. 2776 dated 26th August,
1991 was in substitution of letter No. 2775 of that date;
D
(vii) Even in the original complaint filed before the Commission,
the respondent does not say anywhere that they had issued
letter No. 2776 of 26th August, 1991 in substitution of the
letter No. 2775 of that date.
E
(viii) The plea that letter No. 2776 was issued in substitution of
letter No. 2775 was asserted by the respondent for the first
time in Review proceedings when the appellant filed this
letter before the Commission. The respondent's silence till
that stage, therefore, becomes eloquent indicating that this
letter was not in existence till then; F
(ix) What was the mode of payment agreed upon between the
Respondent and the buyer in France has not been indicated.
Nor has any correspondence, or for that matter, any agree-
ment in writing between.the respondent and the buyer, been
filed or brought on record to indicate the terms of contract G
or agreement or, at least, to indicate the mode of payment.
Had there been a clause for co-acceptance by the French
Bank in the mode of payment agreed upon between the
parties, the respondent certainly would have filed that docu-
ment to bring home its point that co-acceptance being an H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP.4 S.C.R.

A essential ingredient of the mode of payment, was specifically
mentioned by it in its "Collection Order" to the appellant.

(x) The respondent had already come to know that the buyer was
under liquidation as the liquidator himself had written to the
respondent to file its claim in respect of the goods supplied
B by it to the Buyer.

(xi) There was some correspondence with French Bank and the
French Bank wrote to the appellant, which was also brought
to the notice of the respondent, that co-acceptance by a
French Bank was not permitted under French Law and that,
c if insistence for co-acceptance by the French Bank meant
furnishing of bank guarantee, the French Bank would have
refused lo furnish that guarantee even if it was required of it
in the letter accompanying the Bills of Exchange. (This asser-
tion by the French Bank is in consonance with the Preamble
D of ICC Rules which says that "These provisions apply to all
Collections ...... unless contrary to the provisions of a national,
state or local law and/or regulation which cannot be departed
from.")

It was; thus, apparent to the respondent that there was little
E hope that the entire amount covering the goods supplied by
it to the French Buyer would be paid and, therefore, it acted
in a dexterous and sophisticated manner to fasten the liability
on the appellant by branding it as negligent in not writing
specifically to the French Buyer for co-acceptance in spite of
F its letter No. 2776 of 26.8.91 and to support this plea by
evidence, it forged the letter in question forgetting that there
existed another letter No. 2775 of that date in which the
requirement of co-acceptance by French Bank was not indi-
cated. Indeed, the Persian saying that "DAROGH GO RA
HAFIZA NA BASHAD" {A LIAR HAS NO MEMORY) is
G still the time tested truth.

In the face of overwhelming evidence, the entry in the respondent's
record indicating that letter No. 2776 was issued cannot be accepted.
Significantly, the copy of the disputed letter bears an endorsement of
H "Receipt and Rubber Stamp" allegedly of the appellant but the copy of the
INDIANBANKv. SAITAMABRES(I) PVT.LID. fS.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) 495

admitted letter No. 2775 does not bear any endorsement of receipt which A
spear.s volumes of the dexterous manner in which the respondent had
acted.

43. In view of the above, and if the letter No. 2776 (forged by the
respondent) is excluded from the evidence, there remains only the letter
No. 2775 of 26.8.1991 in which it was not indicated by the respondent to B
the appellant to write to the French Bank to deliver the documents only
on co-acceptance by it. The appellant, in the circumstances, was justified
in not to mentioning co-acceptance by the French Bank. The case of the .
respondent being false and based on fabricated evidence has to be dis-
missed. C
The appeals are consequently allowed, and both the judgments of the
Commission, namely judgments dated 16.11.1993 and 13.12.1994 are set
aside and the Original Complaint of the respondent is dismissed with costs
quantified at Rs. 25,000.
D
v.s.s. Appeals allowed.