Holding

The Court held that the poem did not satisfy any element of the offences under Sections 196, 197(1), 299 or 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and that the police erred in registering the FIR without exercising the discretion under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, rendering the FIR an abuse of process.

Summary

The appellant, a Rajya Sabha member, posted a video of a mass‑marriage on the social‑media platform X, in which a poem was recited in the background. The poem was alleged to promote communal enmity, leading the police to register an FIR under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The High Court refused to quash the FIR, holding that the investigation was at a nascent stage. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the poem’s words, taken in context, fell within the ambit of the offences and whether the police were obliged to register the FIR without a preliminary inquiry under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The Court held that the poem did not promote enmity, contain imputations, or intend to outrage religious feelings, and that no mens rea could be ascribed; consequently, no prima facie case existed. It further ruled that the police should have exercised the discretion under Section 173(3) to conduct a preliminary inquiry, which they failed to do, rendering the FIR an abuse of process; the FIR was quashed and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the poem recited in the video amounts to an offence under Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
Whether the poem constitutes an offence under Section 197(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
Whether the poem amounts to an offence under Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
Whether the poem amounts to an offence under Section 302 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
Whether the police were obligated to register an FIR under Section 173(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita without a preliminary inquiry
Whether the police should have exercised the discretion under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita to conduct a preliminary inquiry
Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR on the ground that the investigation was at a nascent stage

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 173(1), s. 173(3), s. 173(4), s. 528
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023s. 196, s. 197(1), s. 299, s. 302, s. 3(5), s. 57
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 173
Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(2), s. Article 51-A(a)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 153-A, s. 505(1)(c)

Subjects

Section 196Section 197(1)Section 299Section 302Section 57Section 3(5)Bharatiya Nyaya SanhitaSection 173(1)Section 173(3)Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha SanhitaArticle 19(1)(a)Article 19(2)Freedom of speech and expressionFundamental RightsFundamental DutiesImran Pratapgadhi caseMember of Rajya SabhaRecited poemSocial media platformFIR registered mechanicallyCommunal enmityDisharmonyPublic tranquilityNational unityAbuse of process of lawSection 528Quashing of FIRInvestigation at nascent stagePreliminary inquiryLalita Kumari judgmentCognizable offencePrima facie caseMens reaIntention

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1309 : 2025 INSC 410

Imran Pratapgadhi
v.
State of Gujarat and Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025)
28 March 2025
[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether on facts, the offences punishable under Sections 196,
197, 299 and 302 of the BNS as alleged, were made out against
the appellant, a Member of Rajya Sabha; whether the High Court
erred in rejecting the petition filed by the appellant to quash the
FIR lodged against him.

Headnotes†
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – ss.196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57
and 3(5) – Appellant, a Member of Rajya Sabha had put out a
video of a mass marriage function on his social media platform,
and in the background of the video, the words of the poem in
question were uttered – FIR was lodged against the appellant
u/ss.196, 197, 299 and 302 alleging that the poem inter alia
promoted communal enmity – Whether offences made out:
Held: No – Offence u/s.196 is attracted when the words, either
spoken or written, or by signs or visible representations, promote
enmity between different groups on the grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, caste or, community or any
other ground – The offence will be attracted when the words either
spoken or written, or signs or visible representation, promote or
attempt to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will
between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities – In the present case, the poem has nothing
to do with any religion, caste, community or any particular group –
The poem’s words do not bring about or promote disharmony or
feelings of hatred or ill-will – It only seeks to challenge the injustice
made by the ruler – It is impossible to say that the words used
by the appellant disturb or are likely to disturb public tranquility or
affect national unity – Further, mens rea has to be read into s.196

* Author
1310 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of the BNS – However, in the present case, looking to the text of
the words spoken and the context in which those were spoken, it
is impossible to attribute any mens rea to the appellant – No prima
facie case made out against the appellant u/ss.196, 197, 299 and
302, BNS – FIR was registered mechanically and is an abuse of
the process of law – Impugned order set aside – FIR quashed.
[Paras 14, 31, 34, 36, 43]

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – s.197 – Imputations, assertions
prejudicial to national integration:
Held: The poem in question does not make or publish any
imputation and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language,
regional group, caste, or community – It does not suggest that
any class of persons have been denied rights as citizens because
they are members of a religious, racial, language, regional group,
caste, or community – It does not make or publish any assertion,
counsel, plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of
enmity or hatred or ill will – The poem does not publish or make
any false or misleading information. [Para 16]

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – s.299 – Deliberate and
malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs – Whether on
facts, the appellant intended to outrage the religious feelings
of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs:
Held: No – Act of the appellant was not intended to outrage the
religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs – The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will be
if the fight for rights is met with injustice. [Para 17]

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – s.302 – Uttering words,
etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of any
person – s.302, if applicable on the facts of the present case:
Held: No – An offence u/s.302 will be made out if any words are
uttered with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious
feelings of any person – s.302, is not applicable on its face. [Para 18]

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – s.57 – Abetting commission
of offence by public or by more than ten persons:
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1311

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

Held: Even if it is assumed that the appellant has committed some
offence, it cannot be said that he has abetted the commission of
an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of
persons exceeding ten. [Para 19]

Constitution of India – Articles 19, 51-A – Protection of certain
rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – Duty of Police
officers to abide by the Constitution – Obligation of the Police
u/Article 51-A (a) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 – s.173(1) – Information in cognisable cases – Object of
s.173(3) – If allegation is of commission of an offence covered
by the law under clause (2) of Article 19 and if s.173(3) is
applicable, preliminary inquiry to be conducted:
Held: Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its
ideals – Liberty of thoughts and expression is one of the ideals of
the Constitution – Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all
citizens to freedom of speech and expression – Police machinery
is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 – Police
officers being citizens are bound to abide by the Constitution –
They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and
expression conferred on all citizens – Laws covered by the
clause (2) are protected by way of an exception provided they
impose a reasonable restriction – Article 19(2) is an exception
to the freedom enumerated under Article 19(1)(a) – Reasonable
restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable
and not fanciful and oppressive – Article 19(2) cannot be allowed
to overshadow the substantive rights u/Article 19(1), including the
right to freedom of speech and expression – Therefore, when an
allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law
referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of s.173 is
applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary inquiry
to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed
against the accused – This will ensure that the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) remain protected – Therefore, in
such cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3)
of s.173 must normally grant permission to the police officer to
conduct a preliminary inquiry – Therefore, when the commission
of cognizable offences is alleged, where punishment is for
imprisonment up to 7 years, which is based on spoken or written
words, it will always be appropriate to exercise the option under
sub-Section (3) of s.173 and conduct a preliminary inquiry to
1312 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case to proceed – If an
option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer
in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person
who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a)
even though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted – If, in such
cases, the option under sub-Section (3) of s.173 is not exercised,
it will defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of
s.173, BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police
u/Article 51-A (a) – Even while dealing with the performance of an
obligation under sub-Section (1) of s.173, where the commission
of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police
officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights
guaranteed u/Article 19(1)(a) r/w an exception carved out under
clause (2) of Article 19 as he is under an obligation to abide by
the Constitution and to respect its ideals. [Paras 29, 30]

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.173(3) –
Information in cognisable cases – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 – ss.196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5) – Whether on facts,
it was obligatory under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of the
BNSS to register FIR:
Held: Sub-Section (3) of s.173 confers a discretion on the officer
receiving information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a
prima facie case exists to proceed – This option is available when
the offence alleged is made punishable for 3 years or more but
less than 7 years – In the present case, all the offences except
the offence u/s.57 are punishable by imprisonment for less than
7 years – s.57, on the face of it, is not applicable – Therefore, this
option was also available to the police officer in the present case
but was not exercised – In the facts of the case, even without taking
recourse to sub-Section (3) of s.173, the information furnished to
the police officer did not attract the offences punishable u/ss.196,
197, 299 and 302. [Paras 28, 31]

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.173(1) –
Information in cognisable cases – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 – ss.196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5):
Held: Allegations made in the information furnished to an officer-
in-charge of a police station must be examined by the officer only
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1313

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

with a view to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is made
out – Taking the information as correct, the officer has to determine
whether it makes out a case of the commission of a cognizable
offence – If the allegation makes out a case of a cognizable offence,
unless the offence falls in sub-Section (3) of s.173, it is mandatory
to register FIR – The offence punishable u/s.196, BNS to decide
whether the words, either spoken or written or by sign or by visible
representations or through electronic communication or otherwise,
lead to the consequences provided in the Section, the police officer
to whom information is furnished will have to read or hear the words
written or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide whether
an offence u/s.196 is made out – Reading of written words, or hearing
spoken words will be necessary to determine whether the contents
make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence – The
same is the case with offences punishable u/ss.197, 299 and 302,
BNS – Therefore, to ascertain whether the information received by
an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable
offence, the officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or
written words – This act on the part of the police officer will not
amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible
under sub-Section (1) of s.173. [Paras 25, 26, 28]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – Obligation to
register FIR – s.173, BNSS vis-à-vis s.154, CrPC – Lalita
Kumari judgment discussed – s.173(3) significant departure
from s.154, CrPC. [Paras 23, 24, 42]

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.528 – Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of FIR –
Constitution of India – Article 226 – High Court refused to
quash the FIR on ground that investigation is at nascent
stage – Correctness:
Held: There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at
a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226 or u/s.482, CrPC equivalent to s.528, BNSS – There is no
such blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High
Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation was
at a nascent stage – When the High Court, in the given case,
finds that no offence was made out on the face of it, to prevent
abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere even though
the investigation is at the nascent stage – It all depends on the
1314 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature of the
offence. [Para 42]
Constitution of India – Article 19 – Importance of the Freedom
of speech and expression – Duty of Courts – Enumerated.
[Paras 38-40, 42(viii)]

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – s.196 – Standard to be applied:
Held: When an offence punishable u/s.196 of BNS is alleged, the
effect of the spoken or written words will have to be considered based
on standards of reasonable, strongminded, firm and courageous
individuals and not based on the standards of people with weak and
oscillating minds – The effect of the spoken or written words cannot
be judged on the basis of the standards of people who always have
a sense of insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as
a threat to their power or position. [Paras 33, 42]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.153-A – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita – s.196 –
“Mens rea” – Essential ingredient:
Held: Mens rea will have to be read into s.196, BNS – On facts,
looking to the text of the words spoken and the context in which
those were spoken, it is impossible to attribute any mens rea to
the appellant. [Para 34]

Case Law Cited
Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2
SCC 1 – followed.
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4
SCR 1044 : 2021 SCC Online SC 315; Manzar Sayeed Khan v.
State of Maharashtra [2007] 4 SCR 907 : (2007) 5 SCC 1;
Ramesh v. Union of India [1988] 2 SCR 1011 : (1988) 1 SCC 668;
Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra [2024] 3 SCR 317 :
(2024) 4 SCC 156; Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya [2021] 7
SCR 65 : (2021) 15 SCC 35; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990]
Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Shreya Singhal v.
Union of India [2015] 5 SCR 963 : (2015) 5 SCC 1 – referred to.
Anand Chintamani Dighe and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
and Ors., 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 891; Bhagwati Charan
Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar, 1946 SCC OnLine
MP 5 – referred to.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1315

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

List of Acts
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 302, 57 and 3(5), Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023; Section 173(1); 173(3), Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of
the Constitution of India; Freedom of speech and expression;
Fundamental Rights; Fundamental Duties; Imran Pratapgadhi
case; Member of Rajya Sabha; Recited poem; Poem uttered in the
background of the video; Incite people of one community against
another; Social media platform; FIR registered mechanically;
Hurts community’s religious and social sentiments; Communal
enmity; Disharmony; Feelings of enmity, Hatred or ill-will; Disturb
public tranquility; National unity; Abuse of the process of law;
Section 196 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Quashing of FIR;
Investigation at nascent stage; Section 173 BNSS; Section
154 CrPC; Mandatory to register FIR; Preliminary Inquiry;
Lalita Kumari judgment; Cognizable offence; Prima facie case;
“Intention”; “Mens rea”.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1545 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.01.2025 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCRA(Q) No. 551 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Kapil Sibal, Sr. Adv., Vaibhav Srivastava, Ms. Sugandha
Anand.

Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ojaswa
Pathak, Ms. Rajeshwari Shankar.
1316 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Abhay S. Oka, J.

FACTUAL ASPECT
1. On 26th January 2025, our Constitution became 75 years old. One
of the most important fundamental rights conferred on the citizens of
India is under Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution. It is the fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expression. This case shows that
even after 75 years of the existence of our Constitution, the law
enforcement machinery of the State is either ignorant about this
important fundamental right or does not care for this fundamental right.
2. The issue in this appeal revolves around a poem recited in the
background of a video clip. The video clip was posted on social
media by the appellant. The text of the poem has been reproduced
in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:

‘‘ए खूून (blood) केे प्याासोो (thirsty) बाात सुनोु ो
ग़र हक्क़ (truth) कीी लड़ााई जुल्ु म (excesses/injustice) सहीी
हम जुल्ु म (excesses/injustice) सेे इश्क़ (love) नि�भाा देंंगेे
गर शम-ए-गि�रि�याा (melting of a candle which resembles tears)
आति�श (flame) हैै
हर रााह वोो शम्माा (light) जलाा देंंगेे
गर लााश हमाारेे अपनोंं कीी खतराा हैै तुम्ु हाारीी मसनद (throne) काा उस रब
(god) कीी क़सम हस्तेे हस्तेे कि�तनीी लााशेे दफ़नाा देंंगेे
ए खूूनकेे प्याासोंं बाात सुनोु ो’’
3. The appellant is a Member of the Rajya Sabha. The 2nd respondent
is the first informant at whose instance a First Information Report
(for short, ‘FIR’) was registered with Jamnagar Police Station for the
offences punishable under Sections 196, 197(1), 302, 299, 57 and
3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNS’). In the
complaint of the 2nd respondent, he stated that on 29th December 2024,
on the occasion of the birthday of one Altaf Ghafarbhai Khafi, a
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1317

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

member of the Municipal Corporation of Jamnagar, a mass wedding
program was held at Sanjari Education and Charitable Trust.
The said Municipal Councillor invited the present appellant to the
function. A video of the event was made. The appellant posted the
video on the social media platform ‘X’ from his verified account.
The video has the recitation of the poem reproduced above in the
background. The allegation in the complaint is that the spoken words
of the poem incite people of one community against another, and
it hurts a community’s religious and social sentiments. It is alleged
that the song had lyrics that incited people of other communities to
fight for the community’s rights. It is alleged that the video posted
by the appellant created enmity between two communities at the
national level and hatred towards each other. It was further alleged
that it had a detrimental effect on national unity.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
4. The appellant filed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short, ‘the BNSS’) read with Article
226 of the Constitution of India, praying for quashing the said FIR.
While issuing notice on the said petition, the learned Judge had
directed the appellant to file an affidavit disclosing the poem’s source.
Accordingly, an affidavit was filed by the appellant. In paragraphs 3
to 5 of the affidavit, he stated thus:
“3. In compliance with this Hon’ble Court’s oral order
dated 13.01.2025 in R/Special Criminal Application
(Quashing) No.551 of 2025, I stated that the poem in
question, based on available information, including
sources reviewed through ChatGPT and public domain
opinions, the poem is attributed to either Faiz Ahmed
Faiz or Habib Jalib. However, as internet opinions
remain divided, I am unable to conclusively ascertain
the definite authorship between the two. A copy of the
screenshot of the results of ChatGPT search engine
are annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE-A.
4. It is further stated that a plain reading of the song
poem, it is a message of love and non-violence
5. I further solemnly affirm that I am not the writer of
the song/poem in question. 6. I state that the annexures
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produced with this affidavit are true copies of their
originals.”
(emphasis added)

5. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge
rejected the petition by holding that as the investigation is at a very
nascent stage, interference cannot be made in view of the decision
of this Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v
State of Maharashtra1.

SUBMISSIONS
6. The submission of the appellant in support of the appeal is that
none of the ingredients of the offences alleged against the appellant
are made out on the plain reading of the complaint and the poem.
It is pointed out in the appeal that, as it usually happens, posting
the video on the social media site ‘X’ receives several responses,
some in favour, some against. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
poem caused social disharmony amongst the people. It is submitted
that the poem does not promote disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill-will between the various religious, racial, language or
regional groups and castes or communities. It is submitted that,
on its plain reading, it is about sacrificing oneself to fight for rights
and truth. The poem promotes non-violence and preaches that
one must suffer injustice with love. The submission of the learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that registering FIR
based on the said poem violates the appellant’s fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. He submitted
that the police have shown insensitivity. Even the High Court has
not attempted to appreciate the message sought to be conveyed
by the poem.
7. The Learned Solicitor General of India has taken a fair stand and
has left it to the Court to make an appropriate decision. He, however,
submitted that the tall claim made by the appellant on oath that the
poem’s author can be either Faiz Ahmed Faiz or Habib Jalib is entirely
wrong. He submitted that the said contention raised by the appellant

1 2021 SCC Online SC 315
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1319

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

on oath has no basis at all. He submitted that it is the obligation of
the police to register an FIR. The High Court has followed the law
while rejecting the appellant’s petition. Therefore, the criticism made
by the learned senior counsel for the appellant about the approach
of the High Court is not correct.
8. The office report of 7th February 2025 records that affidavit of dasti
service on 2nd respondent has been filed. None appeared for the
respondent.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS

WORDS SPOKEN
9. A broad English translation of the said poem reads thus:
“Those who are blood thirsty, listen to us
If the fight for our rights is met with injustice
We will meet that injustice with love
If the drops flowing from a candle are like a flame (Analogy:
if the tears from our face are like a flame)
We will use it to light up all paths
If the bodies of our loved ones are a threat to your throne
We swear by God that we will bury our loved ones happily
Those who are blood thirsty, listen to us.”
10. On plain reading of the original Urdu version and its English translation,
the following conclusions can be drawn:
a) This poem has nothing to do with any religion, community,
region or race;
b) By no stretch of imagination, the contents affect national
integration;
c) It does not jeopardise the sovereignty, unity, integrity or security
of India;
d) It suggests that while fighting to secure our rights if we are met
with injustice, we will face it with love. We will use our tears as
flames to light up all paths;
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e) It gives a warning to the throne (the rulers). It states that if the
bodies of our loved ones are a threat to the rulers, we will bury
our loved ones happily;
f) It preaches non-violence. It says that if the fight for our rights
is met with injustice, we will meet injustice with love. This gives
a message that injustice should not be retaliated, but it should
be met with love;
g) The poem refers to the throne in the context of the fight against
injustice. The reference to the throne is symbolic. It is a reference
to an entity which is responsible for causing injustice. It gives
a warning that if the bodies of loved ones are a threat to the
throne, we will happily accept the deaths of our loved ones. It
suggests that one should be willing to sacrifice life in the fight
against injustice; and
h) Thus, the poem does not encourage violence. On the contrary,
it encourages people to desist from resorting to violence and to
face injustice with love. It states that if our fight with injustice
results into the death of our near and dear ones, we would be
happy to bury their bodies.

WHETHER ANY OFFENCE IS MADE OUT
11. Now, let us turn to the FIR, the English translation of which has been
annexed to the petition. The relevant part of the FIR reads thus:
“According to Section 196, 197(1) 302 299, 57, 3(5) of the
Indian Penal Code 2023, it is in such a way that the Imran
Pratapgarhi has created a verified X Account named Imran
Pratapgarhi Shayarlmran on social media platform X with
the username link https://x.com/shayarimran?ss in the bio
of which is Official Twitter Account of Imran Pratapgarhi |
Member Of Parliament Rajya Sabha | National Chairman
@INCMinority Member of @INCIndia Yash Bharti Awardee
Account Holder has recorded a 46-second video of a mass
marriage program at Rumi Park Morkanda Road Kalavad
Naka, Jamnagar city, Jamnagar district, Gujarat state,
titled ‘Jamnagar Gujarat Ke Ek Samuhik Vivah Program
Me ShirkatThi’ Khun Ke Pyaso Baat Suno Agar Haq Ki
Jabhanda Zulma Sa Hi, Hum Zulma Se Ishq Nibha Deng
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1321

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

Hum Zulma Se Ishq Nibha Deng Gar Sammegiriya Atish
Hai Har Raah Wo Samma Jala Denge Gar Laash Hamare
Apno Ki, Khatra Hai Tumari Masnad Ka, Us Rab Ki Kasam
Haste Haste Kitni Laashe Dafna Deng Hai Khun Ke Pyaso
Uploading a video vyith the words “Baat Sunohai Khun Ke
Pyaaso Baat Sun” and using provocative language about
the religion, caste and language of Hindus, Muslims
and other castes living in India, promoting enmity
between different groups, making statements that
are detrimental to national unity, making statements
that are harmful to national unity, making statements
with the intention of hurting religious feelings, making
religious insults, spreading the video among the people
with the intention of causing shock, inciting others to
commit a crime.”
(emphasis added)

12. The poem does not refer to any religion, caste or language. It
does not refer to persons belonging to any religion. By no stretch
of imagination, does it promote enmity between different groups.
We fail to understand how the statements therein are detrimental
to national unity and how the statements will affect national unity.
On its plain reading, the poem does not purport to affect anyone’s
religious feelings.
13. Now, let us examine whether any offence as alleged is attracted.
Section 196 of the BNS reads thus:
“196. Promoting enmity between different groups on
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance
of harmony.—(1) Whoever—
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by
visible representations or through electronic communication
or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds
of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste
or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony
or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities; or
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(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance
of harmony between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities, and which
disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity; or
(c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or other similar
activity intending that the participants in such activity shall
use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or
knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity
will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or
participates in such activity intending to use or be trained
to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
that the participants in such activity will use or be trained
to use criminal force or violence, against any religious,
racial, language or regional group or caste or community
and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or
is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity
amongst members of such religious, racial, language or
regional group or caste or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1)
in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the
performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to
five years and shall also be liable to fine.”
14. The offence under Section 196 is attracted when the words, either
spoken or written, or by signs or visible representations, promote
enmity between different groups, on the grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, caste or, community or any other
ground. The offence will be attracted when the words either spoken
or written, or signs or visible representation, promote or attempt to
promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between
different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities. On a plain reading of the poem, we find that the
same has nothing to do with any religion, caste, community or any
particular group. The poem’s words do not bring about or promote
disharmony or feelings of hatred or ill-will. It only seeks to challenge
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1323

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

the injustice made by the ruler. It is impossible to say that the words
used by the appellant disturb or are likely to disturb public tranquility.
Therefore, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of Section 196 (1) are
attracted. There is no allegation against the appellant of organising
any exercise, movement, drill or similar activity. There is no allegation
against the appellant that he uttered the words in any place of worship
or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship
or religious ceremonies. Hence, clause (c) will have no application.
The appellant has put a video of a mass marriage function, and in
the background, the words are uttered. Therefore, Section 196 can
have no application.
15. Section 197 reads thus:
“197. Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national
integration.—(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or
written or by signs or by visible representations or through
electronic communication or otherwise,—
(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class
of persons cannot, by reason of their being members
of any religious, racial, language or regional group or
caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to
the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold
the sovereignty and integrity of India; or
(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes
that any class of persons shall, by reason of their being
members of any religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community, be denied, or deprived of
their rights as citizens of India; or
(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or
appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons,
by reason of their being members of any religious, racial,
language or regional group or caste or community, and
such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely
to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-
will between such members and other persons; or
(d) makes or publishes false or misleading information,
jeopardising the sovereignty, unity and integrity or security
of India,
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shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1)
in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the
performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to
five years and shall also be liable to fine.”
16. As stated earlier, the poem does not make or publish any imputation
and is not concerned with any religious, racial, language, regional
group, caste, or community. It does not suggest that any class of
persons have been denied rights as citizens because they are
members of a religious, racial, language, regional group, caste,
or community. It does not make or publish any assertion, counsel,
plea or appeal likely to cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or
hatred or ill will. The poem does not publish or make any false or
misleading information.
17. Offence under Section 299 of the BNS is also alleged against the
appellant, which reads thus:
“299. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage
religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or
religious beliefs.—Whoever, with deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of
citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or by visible representations or through electronic
means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion
or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that the act of the appellant
is intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting
its religion or religious beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what
the reaction will be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.
18. Even offence under Section 302 of the BNS has been alleged, which
reads thus:
“302. Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound
religious feelings of any person.—Whoever, with the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1325

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of
any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the
hearing of that person or makes any gesture in the sight
of that person or places any object in the sight of that
person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both.”
An offence under Section 302 will be made out if any words are
uttered with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings
of any person. Even this section is not applicable on its face.
19. Section 57 of the BNS is alleged to be applicable, which reads thus:
“57. Abetting commission of offence by public or by more
than ten persons.—Whoever abets the commission of
an offence by the public generally or by any number or
class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years and with fine.”
We fail to understand, even if it is assumed that the appellant has
committed some offence, how he has abetted the commission of
an offence by the public generally or by any number or class of
persons exceeding ten.

OBLIGATION TO REGISTER A FIRST INFORMATION REPORT
20. The question is whether in the facts of the case, it was obligatory
under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of the BNSS to register FIR.
Section 173, which deals with information in cognizable cases,
reads thus:
“173. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence, irrespective of the area where the offence
is committed, may be given orally or by electronic
communication to an officer in charge of a police station,
and if given—
(i) orally, it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it;
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(ii) by electronic communication, it shall be taken on record
by him on being signed within three days by the person
giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a
book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may by rules prescribe in this behalf:
Provided that if the information is given by the woman
against whom an offence under Section 64, Section 65,
Section 66, Section 67, Section 68, Section 69, Section
70, Section 71, Section 74, Section 75, Section 76, Section
77, Section 78, Section 79 or Section 124 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is alleged to have been committed
or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by
a woman police officer or any woman officer:
Provided further that—
(a) in the event that the person against whom an offence
under Section 64, Section 65, Section 66, Section 67,
Section 68, Section 69, Section 70, Section 71, Section
74, Section 75, Section 76, Section 77, Section 78, Section
79 or Section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is
alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily
or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such
information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the
residence of the person seeking to report such offence
or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the
presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the
case may be;
(b) the recording of such information shall be videographed;
(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person
recorded by a Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section
(6) of Section 183 as soon as possible.
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section
(1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant
or the victim.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section
175, on receipt of information relating to the commission
of any cognizable offence, which is made punishable
for three years or more but less than seven years, the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1327

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

officer in charge of the police station may with the prior
permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy
Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and
gravity of the offence,—
(i) proceed to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain
whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in
the matter within a period of fourteen days; or
(ii) proceed with investigation when there exists a prima
facie case.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of
an officer in charge of a police station to record the
information referred to in sub-section (1), may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that
such information discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an
investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate
to him, in the manner provided by this Sanhita, and such
officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of
the police station in relation to that offence failing which
such aggrieved person may make an application to the
Magistrate.”
Sub-Section (1) provides for giving information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence. It may be given orally or by
electronic communication to the officer-in-charge of a police station. If
the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, it
is mandatory to record the substance of the information in a book to
be kept by the officer in the form prescribed by the State Government.
No further inquiry can be made by the police officer if the information
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, subject
to the exception carved out by sub-Section (3) of Section 173, which
we will deal with later, it is mandatory to record the information in a
book. Thus, it is mandatory to register the FIR if information received
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
21. Section 154 of the CrPC reads thus:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
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offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be
kept by such officer in such form as the State Government
may prescribe in this behalf:
Provided that if the information is given by the woman
against whom an offence under Section 326-A, Section
326-B, Section 354, Section 354-A, Section 354-B, Section
354-C, Section 354-D, Section 376, Section 376-A,
Section 376-AB, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section
376-D, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB, Section 376-E
or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is
alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such
information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer
or any woman officer:
Provided further that—
(a) in the event that the person against whom an offence
under Section 354, Section 354-A, Section 354-B, Section
354-C, Section 354-D, Section 376, Section 376-A, Section
376-AB, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D,
Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB], Section 376-E or Section
509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have
been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently
mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall
be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person
seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of
such person’s choice, in the presence of an interpreter or
a special educator, as the case may be;
(b) the recording of such information shall be videographed;
(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person
recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-
section (5-A) of Section 164 as soon as possible.
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section
(1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1329

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of
an officer in charge of a police station to record the
information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to
the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied
that such information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself
or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code,
and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in
charge of the police station in relation to that offence.”
22. Sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of BNSS is substantially the same as
Sub-Section (1) of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’). Therefore, the law laid down by this
Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.2 on Section 154
of the CrPC will be relevant. Paragraph 120 of the said decision
containing conclusions/directions reads thus:
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only
to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed
or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases
where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint,
a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to
the first informant forthwith and not later than one week.
It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint
and not proceeding further.

2 (2014) 2 SCC 1
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120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering
offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must
be taken against erring officers who do not register the
FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable
offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify
the veracity or otherwise of the information received but
only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating
criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months’ delay in
reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of
all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the
accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should
be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed
fifteen days generally and in exceptional cases, by giving
adequate reasons, six weeks› time is provided. The fact
of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in
the General Diary entry.
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is
the record of all information received in a police station, we
direct that all information relating to cognizable offences,
whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an
inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1331

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary
inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.”
(emphasis added)

23. Section 154 of the CrPC does not provide for making any preliminary
inquiry. However, as held in the case of Lalita Kumari2, a preliminary
inquiry is permissible if the information received does not disclose
a cognizable offence and indicates the necessity for an inquiry.
A preliminary inquiry must be conducted only to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed. However, sub-Section (3) of Section
173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of
the CrPC. It provides that when information relating to the commission
of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more
but less than 7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police
station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned
therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary
inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for
proceeding in the matter. However, under Section 154 of the CrPC,
as held in the case of Lalita Kumari2, only a limited preliminary
inquiry is permissible to ascertain whether the information received
discloses a cognizable offence. Moreover, a preliminary inquiry can
be made under the CrPC only if the information does not disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity
for an inquiry. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an
exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173. In the category of
cases covered by sub-Section (3), a police officer is empowered to
make a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case
is made out for proceeding in the matter even if the information
received discloses commission of any cognizable offence. That is
very apparent as sub-Section (3) of Section 173 refers explicitly to
receiving information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence. Therefore, in a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 173
is applicable, even if the information pertaining to the commission
of any cognizable offence is received, an inquiry can be conducted
to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists for proceeding in the
matter. The intention appears to be to prevent the registration of
FIRs in frivolous cases where punishment is up to 7 years, even if
the information discloses the commission of the cognizable offence.
However, under Section 154 of the CrPC, the inquiry permitted by
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paragraph 120.2 of the decision in the case of Lalita Kumari2 is
limited only to ascertain whether the cognizable offence is disclosed.
24. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a
preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that a prima
facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR
and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie
case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the
first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under
sub-Section (4) of Section 173.
25. Before we go into the applicability of sub-Section (3) of Section 173
of the BNSS to the facts of the case, we must deal with sub-Section
(1) of Section 173. Take a case where a person approaches an
officer-in-charge of a police station either personally or by electronic
communication and alleges that he has seen ‘A’ assaulting ‘X’ with a
stick. If the injury caused is simple, it will be an offence punishable
under Section 115 (2) of the BNS. As per the first Schedule of the
BNSS, it is a non-cognizable offence. Therefore, based on such
information, FIR cannot be registered. If grievous hurt is caused,
it will be an offence punishable under Section 117 (2) of the BNS,
which is a cognizable offence. Therefore, the allegations made in the
information furnished to an officer-in-charge of a police station must
be examined by the officer only with a view to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is made out. Taking the information as correct,
the officer has to determine whether it makes out a case of the
commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegation makes out a
case of a cognizable offence, unless the offence falls in sub-Section
(3) of Section 173, it is mandatory to register FIR.
26. Coming back to the offence punishable under Section 196 of the
BNS to decide whether the words, either spoken or written or by sign
or by visible representations or through electronic communication
or otherwise, lead to the consequences provided in the Section.
The police officer to whom information is furnished will have to
read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the same
as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196 is made
out. Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words will be
necessary to determine whether the contents make out a case of
the commission of a cognizable offence. The same is the case with
offences punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 of the BNS.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1333

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

Therefore, to ascertain whether the information received by an officer-
in-charge of the police station makes out a cognizable offence, the
officer must consider the meaning of the spoken or written words.
This act on the part of the police officer will not amount to making
a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under sub-Section (1)
of Section 173.
27. We will give an example. A person utters the following words. “If the
rulers attack me, I will not retaliate and, on the contrary, face the
attack with love. If I do that, it will lead to the defeat of the rulers.”
If the person who furnishes information, alleges that these words
are spoken or written to promote enmity between different groups
as provided in Section 196, while deciding whether the information
is of commission of a cognizable offence, the officer concerned will
have to read and understand the meaning of the alleged spoken
words. This exercise does not amount to making a preliminary inquiry
which is prohibited under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of BNSS.
28. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS confers a discretion
on the officer receiving information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists to proceed. This option is available
when the offence alleged is made punishable for 3 years or more but
less than 7 years. In the facts of the case, all the offences except the
offence under Section 57 of the BNS are punishable by imprisonment
for less than 7 years. Section 57, on the face of it, is not applicable.
Therefore, this option was also available to the police officer in the
present case. The officer did not exercise the said option.
29. At this stage, we may refer to clause (a) of Article 51-A of the
Constitution, which reads thus:
“51-A. Fundamental duties.—It shall be the duty of every
citizen of India—
(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and
institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem;
………………………………………………….....................”
The police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect
its ideals. The philosophy of the Constitution and its ideals can
be found in the preamble itself. The preamble lays down that the
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people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to secure all
its citizens liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship.
Therefore, liberty of thoughts and expression is one of the ideals of
our Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all
citizens to freedom of speech and expression. The police machinery is
a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by
the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of
speech and expression conferred on all citizens. Clause (2) of Article
19 of the Constitution carves out an exception to the fundamental right
guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19. If there
is a law covered by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by
sub-clause (a) of clause (1). We must remember that laws covered
by the clause (2) are protected by way of an exception provided
they impose a reasonable restriction. Article 19(2) is an exception
to the freedom enumerated under Article 19(1)(a). The reasonable
restrictions provided for in Article 19(2) must remain reasonable
and not fanciful and oppressive. Article 19(2) cannot be allowed
to overshadow the substantive rights under Article 19(1), including
the right to freedom of speech and expression. Therefore, when an
allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the law
referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of Section
173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct a preliminary
inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed
against the accused. This will ensure that the fundamental rights
guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19 remain
protected. Therefore, in such cases, the higher police officer referred
to in sub-Section (3) of Section 173 must normally grant permission
to the police officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry. Therefore, when
the commission of cognizable offences is alleged, where punishment
is for imprisonment up to 7 years, which is based on spoken or written
words, it will always be appropriate to exercise the option under
sub-Section (3) of Section 173 and conduct a preliminary inquiry to
ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case to proceed. If an
option under sub-Section (3) is not exercised by the police officer
in such a case, he may end up registering an FIR against a person
who has exercised his fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a) even
though clause (2) of Article 19 is not attracted. If, in such cases, the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1335

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

option under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is not exercised, it will
defeat the very object of incorporating sub-Section (3) of Section
173 of the BNSS and will also defeat the obligation of the police
under Article 51-A (a).
30. Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-
Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence
is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned
will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2)
of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide
by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution.
The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police
officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding
by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution. If
the police officers are not aware of these obligations, the State must
ensure that they are educated and sensitized by starting massive
training programs.
31. In the facts of the case, even without taking recourse to sub-
Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, the information furnished
to the police officer did not attract the offences punishable under
Sections 196, 197, 299 and 302 of the BNS.

STANDARD TO BE APPLIED
32. At this stage, we cannot resist the temptation of quoting what Bose
and Puranik, JJ., authored as the Judges of the erstwhile Nagpur
High Court. In the case of Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial
Government, C.P. & Berar3, in paragraph 67, it is held thus:
“67. Viewing the impugned article in that light we are
of opinion, as a matter of fact, that it is not seditious
because its professed aim is to obtain a change of
Government through the ballot box and not to incite
people to a disobedience of the laws of Government.
Some extravagance of language there is, and there is
the usual crude emotional appeal which is the stock
in trade of the demagogue, as well as a blundering

3 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5
1336 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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and ineffective attempt to ape the poets. But that is
all. However, it is not enough to find that the writer is not
guilty of sedition because we are concerned with Section
4 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act which travels
wider than S. 124 A. We have therefore further to see
whether these words tend directly or indirectly to incite
to sedition, or, in the words of the Ordinance, whether
they are intended or are likely to produce that effect. We
say deliberately whether the words are likely to incite to
sedition because, as the Federal Court points out, the
formula of words used in S. 4, as also in the Ordinance,
is precisely the formula used in S. 124 A, therefore to
the extent of the formula the two things are the same.
The only difference is that under the Press Act we have
to consider not only whether there is sedition in fact but
also whether the words tend, directly or indirectly, to
excite to sedition and whether they are intended or are
likely to produce that effect. We pause to observe that
here, as in the case of reasonable doubt in criminal
cases, and as in the case of putting in fear of hurt
in a matter of assault, we must use the standards of
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men,
and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of
those who scent danger in every hostile point of view.
Using those standards we hold as a fact that the effects
apprehended by the Crown and required by the section
are not likely to be caused by this article, nor do the words
used, viewed in their proper setting, tend to cause that
effect. The paper is in English. It has a limited circulation.
It is read by those who know and understand English.
It is a party paper and is read mainly by persons who
are politically minded. They are aware of contemporary
political thought and occurrences. They realise as well as
any one else that neither His Excellency the Governor
nor his advisers went round shooting and killing persons.
They know that these acts were done by the troops and
by the police. They know that there was a demand for
an impartial investigation and a judicial enquiry. They
know that the demand was refused and they know that
the whole complaint, so far as Government is concerned,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1337

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

lies there. They are therefore no more likely to attribute to
Government any greater responsibility than Mr. Jamnadas
Mehta and other members of the Central Assembly did.
They are as much aware as the writer that the appeal is
for a constitutional change of Government by constitutional
means. They were not, in our opinion, likely to interpret
it otherwise. Therefore, in our judgment, the article does
not tend, directly or indirectly to sedition, nor is it likely to
produce that result. In out view, the applications should be
allowed and the orders of forfeiture set aside. The costs
should, we think, in each case be paid by the Crown.”
(emphasis added)

33. What is held by Bose and Puranik, JJ. has been quoted with approval
in at least two cases. The first such case is in the decision of Manzar
Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra4. The second case is the
decision in the case of Ramesh v. Union of India5. Finally, the view
taken by Bose and Puranil,JJ., as the Judges of Nagpur High Court,
is again quoted with approval by this Court in the case of Javed
Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra6 . This Court in the case
of Javed Ahmad Hajam6 , was dealing with an offence punishable
under Section 153-A of the IPC. Section 153-A of the IPC is pari
materia with Section 196 of the BNS. The only difference is that
the words ‘or through electric communication’ have been added in
clause (a) of Section 196 of the BNS, which were not in clause (a)
of Section 153-A of the IPC. When an offence punishable under
Section 196 of BNS is alleged, the effect of the spoken or written
words will have to be considered based on standards of reasonable,
strong-minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on
the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The effect
of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the basis of
the standards of people who always have a sense of insecurity or
of those who always perceive criticism as a threat to their power
or position.

4 (2007) 5 SCC 1
5 (1988) 1 SCC 668
6 (2024) 4 SCC 156
1338 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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INGREDIENT OF MENS REA
34. In the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan4 and the case of Patricia
Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya7, the ingredient of mens rea has
been read into Section 153-A of IPC by this Court. Paragraphs 8
to 14 of the decision in the case of Javed Ahmad Hajam6, which
analyses both the above decisions, read thus:
“8. This Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan referred to
the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the
erstwhile Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan
Shukla v. Provincial Govt. A Division Bench of the High
Court dealt with the offence of sedition under Section
124-AIPC and Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency
Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was whether a particular
article in the press tends, directly or indirectly, to bring
hatred or contempt to the Government established in
law. This Court has approved this view in its decision
in Ramesh v. Union of India . In the said case, this Court
dealt with the issue of applicability of Section 153-AIPC.
In para 13, it was held thus :
“13. … the effect of the words must be judged from
the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and
courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating
minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile
point of view. … It is the standard of ordinary reasonable
man or as they say in English law ‘the man on the top of
a Clapham omnibus’.
(emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian Bose, J., will
have to be applied while judging the effect of the words,
spoken or written, in the context of Section 153-AIPC.
9. We may also make a useful reference to a decision of
this Court in Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya. Paras
8 to 10 of the said decision read thus :

7 (2021) 15 SCC 35
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1339

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

“8. ‘It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in
order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society.’—
Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a
very valuable fundamental right. However, the right is
not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on
the right of free speech and expression in the interest of
sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency
or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation
or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable
under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity between
different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to
maintenance of harmony is punishable with imprisonment
which may extend to three years or with fine or with both
under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide
whether a prima facie case is made out against the
appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-A
and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions
which are as follows:
***
9. Only where the written or spoken words have the
tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law
and order or affecting public tranquillity, the law needs
to step in to prevent such an activity. The intention to
cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine
qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the
prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed.
10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is the
intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between
different classes of people. The intention has to be judged
primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the
circumstances in which it was written and published. The
matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A
must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly
worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor
1340 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there
and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential
reasoning.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)

10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A, clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC is attracted when by
words, either spoken or written or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, an attempt is made to
promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will
between different religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities. The promotion of
disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be on the grounds
of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste,
community or any other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply only when
an act is committed which is prejudicial to the maintenance
of harmony between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities and which
disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity.
11. Now, coming to the words used by the appellant on his
WhatsApp status, we may note here that the first statement
is that August 5 is a Black Day for Jammu and Kashmir.
5-8-2019 is the day on which Article 370 of the Constitution
of India was abrogated, and two separate Union Territories
of Jammu and Kashmir were formed. Further, the appellant
has posted that “Article 370 was abrogated, we are not
happy”. On a plain reading, the appellant intended to
criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India. He has expressed unhappiness
over the said act of abrogation. The aforesaid words do
not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community. It is a simple protest by the
appellant against the decision to abrogate Article 370 of
the Constitution of India and the further steps taken based
on that decision. The Constitution of India, under Article
19(1)(a), guarantees freedom of speech and expression.
Under the said guarantee, every citizen has the right to
offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or,
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1341

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

for that matter, every decision of the State. He has the
right to say he is unhappy with any decision of the State.
12. In Manzar Sayeed Khan, this Court has read
“intention” as an essential ingredient of the said
offence. The alleged objectionable words or expressions
used by the appellant, on its plain reading, cannot promote
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between
different religious, racial, language or regional groups
or castes or communities. The WhatsApp status of the
appellant has a photograph of two barbed wires, below
which it is mentioned that “august 5 — black day — jammu
& kashmir”. This is an expression of his individual view
and his reaction to the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India. It does not reflect any intention to
do something which is prohibited under Section 153-A.
At best, it is a protest, which is a part of his freedom of
speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
13. Every citizen of India has a right to be critical of the
action of abrogation of Article 370 and the change of
status of Jammu and Kashmir. Describing the day the
abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression
of protest and anguish. If every criticism or protest of the
actions of the State is to be held as an offence under
Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature
of the Constitution of India, will not survive.
14. The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner
is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article
19(1)(a). Every individual must respect the right of others
to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against
the decisions of the Government is an essential part
of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner
must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified
and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. But the
protest or dissent must be within four corners of the
modes permissible in a democratic set up. It is subject to
reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with clause
(2) of Article 19. In the present case, the appellant has
not at all crossed the line.”
1342 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Hence, mens rea will have to be read into Section 196 of the BNS.
In this case, looking to the text of the words spoken and the context
in which those were spoken, it is impossible to attribute any mens
rea to the appellant.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
35. Now, we come to the impugned judgment. The decisions of this
Court in the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan4 and Javed Ahmad
Hajam6 were relied upon by the appellant before the High Court.
Therefore, the High Court was aware that it was dealing with the
appellant’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) of
the Constitution. The High Court quoted both decisions extensively
in the judgment. What is surprising is the finding recorded by the
High Court. The finding on merits is only in paragraph 22 of the
judgment, which reads thus:
“22. Looking to the tenor of the poem, it certainly indicates
something about the throne. The responses received to
the said post by other persons also indicate that message
was posted in a manner which certainly create disturbance
in social harmony. It is expected from any citizen of India
that he should behave in a manner where the communal
harmony or social harmony should not be disturbed, and the
petitioner, who is a Member of Parliament, is expected to
behave in some more restricted manner as he is expected
to know more about the repercussions of such post.”
36. In the instant case, as we have seen, no prima facie case can be
said to have been made out against the appellant qua the sections
invoked. In such a case, registration of the FIR appears to be a
very mechanical exercise and is a clear abuse of the process of
law. In fact, registration of such FIR virtually borders on perversity.
We are surprised that this very crucial aspect escaped the notice of
the High Court. The High Court ought to have nipped the mischief
at the threshold itself.
37. We fail to understand how the High Court concluded that the message
was posted in a manner that would certainly disturb social harmony.
Thereafter, the High Court gave a reason that the investigation
was at a nascent stage. There is no absolute rule that when the
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1343

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

investigation is at a nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise
its jurisdiction to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the
CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High Court,
in the given case, finds that no offence was made out on the face
of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can always interfere
even though the investigation is at the nascent stage. It all depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the nature
of the offence. There is no such blanket rule putting an embargo
on the powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the ground
that the investigation was at a nascent stage. If such embargo is
taken as an absolute rule, it will substantially curtail the powers of
the High Court which have been laid down and recognised by this
Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal8.

IMPORTANCE OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE
DUTY OF THE COURTS
38. Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups of
individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society. Without
freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is impossible to
lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a
healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by an
individual or group of individuals must be countered by expressing
another point of view. Even if a large number of persons dislike the
views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the
views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry,
dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human
beings more meaningful. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and
enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of
India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written
words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under
Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold
the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive
fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step
in and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution
which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.

8 (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
1344 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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39. Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at the forefront
to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is the
bounden duty of the Courts to ensure that the Constitution and the
ideals of the Constitution are not trampled upon. Endeavour of the
courts should always be to protect and promote the fundamental rights,
including the freedom of speech and expression, which is one of the
most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal constitutional
democracy. The Courts must not be seen to regulate or stifle the
freedom of speech and expression. As a matter of fact, the Courts
must remain ever vigilant to thwart any attempt to undermine the
Constitution and the constitutional values, including the freedom of
speech and expression.
40. Before we part with this judgment, we must refer to two important
judgments. More than two decades ago, a Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court was examining an order of the Government of
Maharashtra directing forfeiture of all copies, manuscripts etc. of
a play called Mee Nathuram Godse Boltoy in Anand Chintamani
Dighe and anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors.9. While quashing
the order of forfeiture passed by the Government of Maharashtra,
Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud (as he then was) speaking for the
Bench observed that Government in that particular case seemed to
have acted in the wake of the criticism voiced against the play and
of the sense of outrage of those who believed that the play unfairly
criticized the father of the nation. He highlighted the eternal values
on which the Constitution of a democracy is founded. Acceptance
of the freedom to express a view which may not accord with the
mainstream are cardinal values. A society wedded to the rule of law
cannot trample upon the rights of those who assert views which
may be regarded as unpopular or contrary to the views shared by
the majority. Right of the playwright, of the artist, writer and of the
poet will be reduced to husk if the freedom to portray a message –
whether it be in canvas, prose or verse – is to depend upon the
popular perception of the acceptability of that message. Popular
perceptions cannot override constitutional values such as the
guarantee of freedom. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment
is extracted hereunder with approval:

9 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 891
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1345

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

“19. …….But, it is important to realise that there are
eternal values on which the Constitution of a democracy
is founded. Tolerance of a diversity of view points and
the acceptance of the freedom to express of those
whose thinking may not accord with the mainstream
are cardinal values which lie at the very foundation of
a democratic form of Government. A society wedded
to the rule of law, cannot trample upon the rights of
those who assert views which may be regarded as
unpopular or contrary to the views shared by a majority.
The law does not have to accept the views which have
been expressed by the petitioner in the play in order
to respect the right of the petitioner as a playwright
to express those views. Respect for and tolerance of
a diversity of viewpoints is what ultimately sustains a
democratic society and Government. The right of the
playwright, of the artist, writer and of the poet will be
reduced to husk if the freedom to portray a message -
whether it be in canvas, prose or verse - is to depend
upon the popular perception of the acceptability of that
message. Popular perceptions, however strong cannot
override values which the constitution embodies as
guarantees of freedom in what was always intended
to be a free society.”
(emphasis added)

41. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India10, this Court was examining the
vires of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which
provided for punishment for sending offensive messages through
communication service etc. In the above context the Bench referred
to Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(2), Preamble to the Constitution of
India and the previous decisions of this Court and after a threadbare
analysis observed that when it comes to democracy, liberty of
thought and expression is a cardinal value that is of paramount
significance under our constitutional scheme. It is one of the most
basic human rights.

10 (2015) SCC 1
1346 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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42. Following is the summary of our conclusions:
(i) Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant
departure from Section 154 of CrPC. It provides that when
information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence
which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than
7 years is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station, with
the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein,
the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to
ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding
in the matter. However, under Section 154 of the CrPC, as held
in the case of Lalita Kumari2, only a limited preliminary inquiry
is permissible to ascertain whether the information received
discloses a cognizable offence. Moreover, a preliminary inquiry
can be made under the CrPC only if the information does not
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence but indicates
the necessity for an inquiry. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of
the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section (1) of Section 173.
In the category of cases covered by sub-Section (3), a police
officer is empowered to make a preliminary inquiry to ascertain
whether a prima facie case is made out for proceeding in the
matter even if the information received discloses commission
of any cognizable offence.
(ii) Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding
a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion that
a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately
register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the
view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he
should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that
he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.
(iii) In case of the offence punishable under Section 196 of the BNS
to decide whether the words, either spoken or written or by sign
or by visible representations or through electronic communication
or otherwise, lead to the consequences provided in the Section,
the police officer to whom information is furnished will have to
read or hear the words written or spoken, and by taking the
same as correct, decide whether an offence under Section 196
is made out. Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words
will be necessary to determine whether the contents make out
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1347

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

a case of the commission of a cognizable offence. The same
is the case with offences punishable under Sections 197, 299
and 302 of BNS. Therefore, to ascertain whether the information
received by an officer-in-charge of the police station makes out
a cognizable offence, the officer must consider the meaning of
the spoken or written words. This act on the part of the police
officer will not amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is
not permissible under sub-Section (1) of Section 173.
(iv) The police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect
its ideals. The philosophy of the Constitution and its ideals can
be found in the preamble itself. The preamble lays down that
the people of India have solemnly resolved to constitute India
into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to
secure all its citizens liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship. Therefore, liberty of thought and expression is
one of the ideals of our Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) confers
a fundamental right on all citizens to freedom of speech and
expression. The police machinery is a part of the State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Moreover, the police
officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution.
They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and
expression conferred on all citizens.
(v) Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution carves out an
exception to the fundamental right guaranteed under sub-
clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19. If there is a law covered
by clause (2), its operation remains unaffected by sub-clause (a)
of clause (1). We must remember that laws covered by the
clause (2) are protected by way of an exception provided
they impose a reasonable restriction. Therefore, when an
allegation is of the commission of an offence covered by the
law referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-Section (3) of
Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to conduct
a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case
is made out to proceed against the accused. This will ensure
that the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clause (a)
of clause (1) of Article 19 remain protected. Therefore, in such
cases, the higher police officer referred to in sub-Section (3)
of Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police
officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
1348 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(vi) When an offence punishable under Section 196 of BNS is
alleged, the effect of the spoken or written words will have
to be considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-
minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based on
the standards of people with weak and oscillating minds. The
effect of the spoken or written words cannot be judged on the
basis of the standards of people who always have a sense of
insecurity or of those who always perceive criticism as a threat
to their power or position.
(vii) There is no absolute rule that when the investigation is at a
nascent stage, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
to quash an offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the
CrPC equivalent to Section 528 of the BNSS. When the High
Court, in the given case, finds that no offence was made out
on the face of it, to prevent abuse of the process of law, it can
always interfere even though the investigation is at the nascent
stage. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case as well as the nature of the offence. There is no such
blanket rule putting an embargo on the powers of the High
Court to quash FIR only on the ground that the investigation
was at a nascent stage.
(viii) Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or group
of individuals is an integral part of a healthy civilised society.
Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is
impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of
the Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions
or thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals
must be countered by expressing another point of view. Even
if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by
another, the right of the person to express the views must be
respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas,
films, stage shows including stand-up comedy, satire and art,
make the lives of human beings more meaningful. The Courts
are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we,
the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is
our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a).
We Judges are under an obligation to uphold the Constitution
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1349

Imran Pratapgadhi v. State Of Gujarat and Anr.

and respect its ideals. If the police or executive fail to honour
and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19
(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in
and protect the fundamental rights. There is no other institution
which can uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens.
(ix) 75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky
on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that
matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up
comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst
different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle
all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which
is so fundamental to a free society.
43. Though this judgment is authored by one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J.),
it is based on valuable inputs by Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
44. In the circumstances, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
We, accordingly, quash and set aside the impugned order. We also
quash and set aside FIR No. 11202008250014 of 2025, registered
with City A-Division Police Station, Jamnagar, and further proceedings
based thereon. The Appeal is accordingly allowed.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey