HOUSING BOARD HARYANAversusHOUSING BOARD COLONY WELFARE ASSOCIATION AND ORS.

                   HOUSING BOARD HARYANA                                         A
                              v.
                   HOUSING BOARD COLONY
                 WELFARE ASSOCIATION AND ORS.

                           SEPTEMBER 1, 1995
                                                                                 B
              [KULDIP SINGH AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.]

        Consumer Protection Act, 1986/Haryana Consumer Protection Rules,
1988:
                                                                                 c
       Ss.15,30(2) n-.4(10), 8(3)--0rder of District Forum-Appeal against-
Period of Limitation-Order pronounced by District Forum on 22.10.1992 but
not signed by President of Forum on that date-Duly attested copies made
available to parties on 30.10.1992-Appeal filed before State Commission on
30.11.1992 as 29.11.1992 was SundaJHeld, appeal filed within limita-             D
tion-No application for condonation of delay required-Date of pronounce-
ment of order in open Court cannot by itself be starting point for detennining
period of limitation-It has also to be shown that Forum order was duly
signed and dated by members of District Forum and was communicated to
parties free of charge.
                                                                                 E
      The dispute between the appellant-Board and the respondent-allot-
tees with regard to enhancement of price of the land and the additional
demand raised by the Board was taken up to the District Consumer Forum
by the allottees. The District Forum by its order dated 22.10.1992 allowed
the claim of allottees and quashed the additional demand made by the
Board. The Board filed appeals before the State Commission on 30.11.1992. F
The State Commission dismissed the. appeals holding that the same were
filed beyond the period of limitation as provided under section 15 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and no sufficient cause for condonation of
delay was pleaded. The Board filed revision petition before the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which maintained the order of G
the State Lommission. Aggrieved, the Board filed the appeals.

      It was submitted on behalf of the appellant-Board that though the
President of the District Forum had pronounced the order on 22.10.1992 in
open Court,he did not sign the said order on that date and proceeded on
leave; the order was attested and certified on 30.10.1992 and a copy thereof H
                                    219
    220                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP:3 S.C.R.

A   was furnished to the appellant only on 3.11.1992; since 29.11.1992 was
    Sunday, the Board filed appeals before the State Commission on 30.11.1992
    i.e. within one month from 30.10.1992, the date on which the attested and
    certified copy of the order was supplied to the appellant, and thus the
    appeals before the State Commission were filed within the period
    prescribed under section 15 of the Act.
B
          Allowing the appeals, this Court

           HELD : 1.1. The date of pronouncement of the order in the open court
    by itself cannot be the starting point for determining the period oflimitation
C   under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It has also to be
    shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed
    and dated by the members of the District Forum constituting the Bench and
    the same was communicated to the parties free of charge. [226-B-C]

          1.2. Section 15 of the Act cannot be read in isolation but it has to be
D read alongwith Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Haryana Consumer Protection
    Rules, 1988. A combined reading of section 15 of the Act, and Rules 4(10) and
    8(3) of the Rules indicates that the purpose, object and intention of these
    statutory provisions is to protect the interest of the parties before the Dis-
    trict Forum by making it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy
    of the order duly singed and dated by the members of the Bench and the
E   period oflimitation prescribed with regard to the filing ofan appeal shall be
    computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order in
    the manner laid down in sub-rule (10) of Rule 4. Since rule 4(10) of the Rules
    enjoins a duty .for communicating the order of the District Forum duly
    signed and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an oc-
F   casion for the parties to make an application for obtaining a certified copy
    thereof. [225-G-H; 226-A-B; 225-F]

          1.3. In the instant case, though the order was pronounced by District
    Forum in the open Court on 22.10.1992, it was not singed and dated, as
    the President had proceeded on leave soon thereafter. It was also the case
G   of the appellant that the ·counsel for the appellant-Board was informed
    that the order would be dictated and typed after the return of the President
    and that the copy would be made available to the parties only on 30.10.1992
    under the signature of the President; and the copy was in fact made
    available to the counsel for the appellant only on 3.11.1992. The counsel
H   appearing for the appellant-Board before the National Commission had
   HSG.BOARDv. HSG. BOARD COLY. WELFAREASSN. [FAIZAt"IUDDJN,J.] 221


filed his own affidavit affirmed these facts which have not been con-           A
troverted by the respondents. On the contrary, in the reply filed in this
Court on behalf of the respondents it has been admitted that copies of the
order of the District Forum were ready with the office on 30.10.1992 which
were collected by the counsel for the respondent on 30.10.1992 and by the
counsel for the Board on 3.11.1992. [226-E-G]
                                                                                B
       1.4. From the facts of the case it is abundantly clear that the copies
were duly singed and dated by the members of the Forum on 30.10.1992.
That being so, the period of limitation will commence from the date on
which the copies of the order were ready and made available i.e., 30.10.1992.
The appeals were filed before the State Commission on 30.11.1992 and since      c
29.11.1992 was Sunday,the appeals were prima facie within time. There was,
thus, no question of making any application for condonation of delay in
filing the appeals as there was no delay at all. [227-B-C]

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7849-51
of 1995.                                                                        D

     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.93 of the National Con-
sumer Disputes Redressal Commission in R.P. Nos. 66 to 68 of 1993.

      M. Chandra Shekharan, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Indu Mal-
hotra and Ms. Shirin Jain for the Appellant.                                    E
      S.M. Ashri and C.S. Ashri for the Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      FAIZAN UDDIN, J. 1. Delay condoned.                                       F

      2. Leave granted.

       3. The appellant Housing Board is a statutory body constituted for
the purposes of providing cheap and economical housing facilities. The G
land for construction of tenements is provided by Haryana Urban Develop-
ment Authority (hereinafter RUDA) which is also a statutory body. The
land is acquired by the appellant-Board from RUDA under stipulation
with regard to enhancement in the price of the land consequent upon
judicial pronouncement. The appellant-Board invited applications for al-
lotment of houses/flats from the economically weaker section, belonging to H
    222                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   LIG/MIG category. The appellant-Board issued allotment letters to various
    applicant specifically mentioning in clause (9) of the allotment letters that
    as a result of the land award or arbitration proceedings, etc. if there is an
    increase in the cost, the Board may enhance the price of the dwelling
    houses/flats allotted to them. This condition was reiterated in clause 2 (w)
    of the Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement (Form A) entered into under
B   Section 11 ( 4) of the Housing Board. Haryana (Allotment, Management &
    Sale of Tenements) Regulations. 1972. It was also provided that there shall
    be no enhancement in the price after a period of 7 years from the date of
    allotment. According to the appellant-Board, this Clause 2(W) of Form 'A'
    of the Regulations was, however, amended by a notification dated 26.5.1985
C   whereby a proviso was inserted to the effect that the restriction of 7 years
    shall not be applicable when the escalation in the price is due to judicial
    pronouncement or award of an arbitrator.

          4. Consequent upon the judicial pronouncements enhancing the com-
D pensation granted to the land owners. HUDA also raised an additional
    demand on 5.3.1992 on the appellant-Board demanding a sum amounting
    to Rs. 27,96,011.80 (approximately) for the land given to the appellant-
    Board. In pursuance of this demand by HUDA, the appellant-Board in
    turn, issued additional demand letters to its various allottees of the
    houses/flats towards the enhanced price of the land as per terms of the
E   agreement and the regulations. In order to avoid payment of interest on
    the demand by HUDA the appellant-Board paid the entire amount to
    HUDA in May, 1992 including the interest that had accrued till the date
    of said payment.

F        5. Three complaints were made before the District Consumer, Forum
  Kurukshetra by. the respondents herein in the three appeals against
  aforementioned additional demand raised ~y the appellant- Board by
  contending that in view of Clause 2(W) of the agreement the additional
  demand was barred by time having been made after more than 7 years of
  the allotment of houses/flats. The appellant-board defended the said com-
G plaints by disputing the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum to entertain
  such a complaints besides other grounds of attack. The appellant-Board
  took the stand that there was no 'service' rendered within the meaning of
  clause 'O' of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act.
  1986 (hereinafter the Act) ~or there was any 'deficiency' in the service
H within the meaning of clause (g) of Section 2(1) of the Act. According to
   HSG. BOARD v. HSG. BOARD COLY. WELFARE ASSN. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.) 223

the appellant the dispute, if any, related to an alleged breach or the terms   A
of contract for which the remedy lies in the Civil Court and not in the
Consumer Forum.

       6. The District Forum by its order dated 22.10.1992 rejected the
objections and defence set up by the appellant-Board, allowed all the three
                                                                            B
complaints and quashed the additional demand made by the appellant-
Board. The appellant-Board filed three separate appeals on 30.11.1992
before the State Commission against the aforementioned order dated
22.10.1992 quashing the additional demands. The State Commission took
the view that all the three appeals as were filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act and as no sufficient cause    c
for condonation was pleaded, dismissed all the three appeals as barred by
time. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned order of the State Commis-
sion passed in First Appeals Nos. 389, 390 and 391 of 1992, the appellant-
Board preferred revision Petitions before the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter 'National Commission') D
being Revision petition Nos. 66 to 68/1993. The National Commission
maintained the order of State Commission and dismissed all the three
revisions by a common order dated 7.1.1993 impugned in these appeals.

       7. Learned counsel for the appellant-Board submitted that the Presi-
dent of the District Forum had pronounced the order dated 22.10.1992 in E
open court and after such pronouncement of the order he proceeded on
leave. Since the President had not signed the said order before proceeding
on leave, the same was not made available to the appellant. The said order
was, however, attested and certified on 30.10.1992 a copy whereof was
furnished to the appellant only on 3.11.1992. Since 29.11.1992 was a Sunday F
the appeals before the State Commission were filed on 30.11.1992. Accord-
ing to the learned counsel for the appellant the appeals were filed within
one month from 30.10.1992, the date on which the attested and certified
copy of the order was supplied to the appellant. Learned counsel for the
appellant vehemently urged that according to sub-rule (10) of Rule 4 of
the Haryf!.na Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 it was obligatory on the part G
of the District Forum to furnish signed and dated copy of the order free
of charge to the appellant and that such a copy was furnished to the
appellant on 30.10.1992 and, therefore, the appeals filed before the State
Commission on 30.11.1992, would be within the prescribed limitation under
Section 15 of the Act and there was no question of making any application H
     224                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

'A for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. He further submitted that
     the appellant-Board could not have filed the appeals against the order of
     the District Forum on the basis of mere pronouncement.thereof in the open
     Court unless the contents of the order were made available to the appellant
     for the purposes of preparing the appeal and challenging the same in the
     higher Forum. Learned Counsel for the appellant, therefore, urged that the
B    State Commission as well as the National Commission both committed a
     serious error in dismissing the appeals and the revisions on the ground that
     the same were barred by time and no sufficient cause for condonation of
     delay was pleaded.

C          8. Before considering the merits of• the submissions made by the
     learned counsel for the appellant it would be appropriate first to look into
     the relevant provisions relating to the limitation. Section 15 of the Act
     makes a provision for appeal and prescribes the limitation for the same. It
     reads as under :

D            15. Appeal. - Any person aggrieved by an order made by the
             District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the
             State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of
             an order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed.

E                Provided further that the State Commission may entertain an
             appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is
             satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not finding it within
             that period.

           9. Further the State Government made Rules under Sub-section (2)
 F   of Section 30 of the Act known as the Haryana Consumer protection Rules,
     1988 (hereinafter referred as Rules). Sub-rule (10) of Rule 4 and Sub-rule
     (3) of Rule 8 which are relevant for purposes of these appeals are
     reproduced hereunder :

              Rule 4( 10). - "Orders of the District Forum shall be signed and
 G            dated by the members of the District Forum constituting the Bench
                                                                                    '
                                                                                    -~

              and shall be communicated to the parties free of charge."

              Rule 8(3). - "Each memorandum shall be accompanied by the
              certified copy of the order of the District Forum appealed against
 H            and such of the documents as may be required to support grounds
    HSG. BOARD v. HSG. BOARD COLY. WELFARE ASSN. [FAIZAN UDDIN, J.) 225

          of objection mentioned in the Memorandum.·                               A

         10. Reading of the provisions of Section 15 reproduced above goes
 to show that any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum
 may prefer an appeal to the State Commission within a period of 30 days
 from the date of the order. But under the proviso the State commission is         B
 enjoined with the discretion to entertain the appeal even after the expiry
 of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for
 not filing the appeal within 30 days from the date of order. Section 15 does
 not prescribe any other requirement for the purposes of filing a proper and
 valid appeal to the State Commission. The other requirements for a
 properly constituted appeal are contained in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 which         C
 contemplates that each Memorandum of Appeal shall be accompanied by
 a certified copy of the order of the District forum appealed against and
 such other documents as may be required to support the grounds of
 objection mentioned in the Memorandum of Appeal. Sub-rule (10) of Rule
 4 further makes it obligatory that the order of the District Forum shall not      D
 only be signed and dated by the members of the District Forum constituting
 the Bench but it enjoins a duty to communicate the order so passed signed
 and dated by the members of the District Forum, to the parties free of
 charge.

         11. From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the E
  Consumer Protection Act. 1986 has been enacted with the object to provide
  for better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for
  economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of their disputes and
  matters connected therewith. It is with this object in view that Rule 4(10)
  has also been made. It provides for communication of the order of the F
  District Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as
  well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be
  incurred for obtaining the certified copy. If the rule itself enjoins a duty
  for communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed and dated
  to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for the parties
  to make an application for obtaining a certified copy thereof. Thus, Section G
  15 of the Act cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read alongwith
· Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Rules and a combined reading of Section 15
  and the Rules reproduced above gives an impression that the purpose,
  object and intention of these statutory provisibns is to protect the interest
  of the parties before the District Forum by making it obligatory on the H
    226                   SUPREME COURT REPO~TS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A   District Forum to provide a copy of the order duly signed and dated by
    the members of the Bench and the period of limitation prescribed with
    regard to the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from
    the date of communication of the order in the manner laid down in sub-rule
    (10) of Rule 4.
B         12. In the facts and circumstances stated above, the date of pronoun-
   cement of the order in the· open Court by itself cannot be the starting point
   for determining the period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act. It has
   also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was
   duly signed a,nd dated by the members of the District Forum constituting
c· the Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free of charge.
   That being so, it has to be appreciated that mere pronouncement of an
   order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the
   Rules a copy of the said order has also to be communicated to the parties
   affected by the said order so that the party adversely affected therefrom
D may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing the text, reasons
   and contents thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the
   appellate or higher forums. In the absence of such communication of
   signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no
   means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same
   and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher Forum.
E
           13. In the present case as laid before the State Commission the
    appellant contended that the order was pronounced by the District Forum
    in the open Court on 22.10.1992, it was not signed and dated as the
    President had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and therefore, neither
F   the reasons on which the said order was based were known nor a copy
    thereof was furnished to the appellant- Board so as to know the reasons
    and contents of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that on an
    enquiry by the counsel for the appellant-Board (he was informed by the
    Stenographer of the President that the order would be dictated and typed
G   after the return of the President and that the copy would be made available
    to the parties only on 30.10.1992 under the signature of the President and
    the copy was in fact made available to the counsel for the appellant only
    on 3.11.1992, it may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh, learned counsel
    appearing for the appellant-Board before the National Commission had
    filed his own affidavit affirming these facts which have not been con-
H   troverted by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in this Court
   HSG.BOARDv. HSG. BOARDCOLY. WELFARE ASSN. [FAIZANUDDIN,J.) 227

by Shri KC. Chug, President, Housing Board colony Welfare Association,          A
Kurukshetra on behalf of the respondents has admitted that in the present
case free copies were ready with the office on 30-10-1992 which were
collected by the counsel for the answerjng respondent on 30.10.1992
whereas the counsel for the petitioner got the same on 3.11.1992. From
these facts it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed and dated   B
by the members of the forum on 30.10.1992. That being so that period of
limitation in view of the above discussion will commence from the date on
which the copies of the order were ready and made available i.e.,
30.10.1992. In the present case the appeals were filed before the State
Commission on 30.11.1992 and since 29.11.1992 was Sunday, the appeals
were p1ima f acie within time. In these facts and circumstances there was       C
no question of making any application for condonation of delay in filing
the appeals as there was no delay at all.

       14. For the reasons stated above the appeals succeed and are hereby
allowed. The impugned orders of the National Commission and the State
Commission are set aside. The appeals are remitted back to the State            D
Commission for disposal on merits in accordance with law. No order as to
costs.

R.P.                                                      Appeals allowed.