HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING SOCIETYversusBALWAN SINGH

                         [2015]4 S.C.R. 616


A   HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING SOCIETY
                                  v.
                          BALWAN SINGH
                (Civil Appeal Nos. 4360-61 of 2015)
B
                           APRIL 29, 2015
               [H.L. DATTU, CJI, S.A. BOBDE AND
                      ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
C         Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 227 - Jurisdiction
     under - Scope - Respondents-members of appe/fant-
     society enrolled for allotment of apartments defaulted in
    payment of deposit amount - Society passed resolution
     expelling them from membership - Registrar of Co-
D    operative Societies approved the resolution - Revisional
    Authority confirmed the expulsion order- Writ court held that
     the respondents had not made out a case for interference
     with orders of the authorities - However, on a request of
     respondents and concession given by the counsel for the
E    society, the Writ court gave directions to society for
     construction of additional quarters - On appeal, Held: The
    prayer in the writ petition was to set aside the orders passed
     by the authorities below - Even if the said petitions were
     styled as petition u/Art.226, the content and the prayers
F    thereunder being one requiring exercise of supervisory
    jurisdiction only could be treated as petitions filed u!Art.227
    of the Constitution only - Writ court held that expulsion of
    respondents from society was justified - Having said so, the
    Court ought not to have issued the impugned directions
G   merely because a request was made for the respondents -
    Court while exercising its power u!Art.227 ought to have
    confined itself to the subject matter and the issues raised
    by parties in the writ petition - Moreover, Court ought to have

H                                616
    HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                    617
            SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

made query whether the counsel for the appellant-society A
was authorised to make such a statement by society or
whether any such resolution was passed by society giving
concession in matters of this nature - Since caution was not
exercised by writ court, the directions issued by writ court
suffer from infirmity and hence set aside - Concession - B
Cooperative Societies - Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules,
1973.
    Jaisingh and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and
Anr. (2010) 9 SCC 385 : (2010) 12 SCR 358 - relied on. C

     Advocate: Duty of lawyers towards client - Lawyer-client
relationship - Held: Lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their
clients - Lawyers to follow client's instructions rather than
substitute their judgment for that of the client - An Advocate
                                                               0
has to conduct himself and his duties in an extremely
responsible manner - It is solemn duty of advocate not to
transgress the authority conferred on him by the client -
Client is not bound by a statement or admission which he
or his lawyer is not authorised to make - Bar Council of India E
Rules, 1975 - rr. 15, 19 - Advocates Act.

    Periyar & Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. v. State of Kera/a
(1991) 4 SCC 195; Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi
AIR 1930 PC 158 - relied on.
                                                              F
                  Case Law Reference

   (2010) 12 SCR 358            relied on.     Para 16

   (1991) 4 sec 195             relied on.     Para 30        G
   AIR 1930 PC 158              relied on.     Para 31

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
4360-4361of2015.
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618         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015) 4 S.C.R.


A         From the Judgment and order dated 12.10.2012 and
      25.11.2010 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RP No.
      188/2011, in WP(C) No. 7546/2005.
                                    WITH
B        Civil Appeal Nos. 4363-4364, 4347-4348, 4365-4366,
      4353-4354, 4351-4352 and 4355-56 of 2015.
         Jayant Bhushan, Ravikesh Sinha, Abhijat P. Medh for the
      Appellant.              '
C         Huzefa Ahmadi, N. Prabhakar, Gopal Jha, Kaushik
      Poddar, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Pragya Baghel, Jaya Khanna for
      the Respondent.
          The Order of the Court was delivered
                                   ORDER
D
          1. Leave granted.
       2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and
  order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.7546 of
  2005 and connected matters, dated 25.11.2010 and in Review
E Petition No.138 of 2010 and connected matters, dated
  12.10.2012. By the impugned judgment and order in the Writ
  Petition, the High Court has affirmed the orders passed by the
  Courts/authorities below and, on the basis of a concession
  made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,
F issued certain directions to the appellant.
         3. For convenience, we would only notice the facts in Civil
      Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.9302-9303 of 2013.

       4. The appellant is a co-operative society registered under
G the provisions of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972
  (for short, "the Act"). The appellant-Society comprised of 150
  members, including the respondents, who had enrolled
  themselves with the said Society for allotment of residential
H quarters/ apartments. The appellant-Society raised a demand
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                     619
             SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

for payment towards allotment of residential quarters/ A
apartments on 28.05.1998. The respondents failed to comply
with the demand. They continued to be defaulters in spite of
continuous demand notices. In view of the default in payment
of initial deposit amount, the appellant-Society after following
the due procedure had passed a resolution expelling the B
respondents from the membership of the Society.

     5. The resolution requires confirmation of the Registrar of
Co-Operative Societies (respondent No.2-herein) under Rule
36 of the Delhi Co-Operative Societies Rules, 1973 (for short, c
"the Rules") and therefore, was placed before the Registrar
for his consideration and approval. The Registrar, after due
verification of the records of the appellant-Society and in
compliance with the procedure as contemplated under the
provisions of the Act and the Rules, by an order dated D
                                                                     t
29.01.2004, has approved the resolution passed by the
appellant-Society. However, in the interest of justice the
Registrar has provided a last opportunity to the respondents
to pay their outstanding dues to the appellant-Society within
four weeks, failing which their expulsion from the appellant- E
Society would come into effect. The respondents not having
complied with the aforesaid order, the said resolution stood
confirmed and the respondents ceased to be members of the
appellatit- Society.
                                                                 F
     6. The aforesaid order of the Registrar was carried in
appeal by the respondents before the Presiding Officer, Delhi
Co-operative Tribunal under Section 86(4) of the Delhi Co-
operative Societies Act, 2003. However, on a later date, the
respondents withdrew the said appeal and preferred Revision G
Petition before the Financial Commissioner, Government of
NCT of Delhi under Section 80 of the Act. The Revisional
Authority has carefully considered the documents on record
and the submissions made by parties to the /is and concluded
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620         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     that the Registrar has rightly confirmed the expulsion of
      members of the Society. The Revisional Authority, while
      dismissing the revision petitions, by its order dated 24.02.2005
      has noticed that despite ample opportunity provided to the
      respondents, they have failed to pay the outstanding amount
B     and therefore, their expulsion is proper and justified.

       7. The respondents, aggrieved by the aforesaid orders
  passed by the Registrar and the Revisional Authority, had
  approached the Writ Court. In the Writ Petition filed, their main
C prayer was to set aside the orders passed by the Registrar
  and the revisional authority by exercising supervisory
  jurisdiction of the Court.
~_       8. The Writ Court, after duly considering the contentions
  ·~raised in the Writ Petition has come to the conclusion that the
0
    Registrar and the revisional authority have not committed any
    error in arriving at their respective conclusions and have rightly
    confirmed the resolution expelling the respondents from the
    membership of appellant-Society. The Writ Court has observed
E that the respondents have not made out a case for interference
    with the orders of the authorities below. However, on a request
    made by the respondents seeking issuance of direction to the
    appellant-Society for consideration of their request to construct
    and allot the additional quarters/ apartments to them, the same
F being agreeable to by the learned counsel appearing for the
    appellant- Society, the Court has issued certain directions to
    the appellant-Society for construction of additional quarters/
    apartments and their allotment to the respondents, by judgment
    and order dated 25.11.2010.
G
         9. Being of the firm view, that, the appellant-Society had
    not authorized the learned counsel who had appeared for them
    before the Writ Court to make any concession in favour of the
    respondents had preferred Review Petitions against the
H aforesaid common judgment and order of the Writ Court. The
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                     621
             SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

said Review Petitions were confined to the limited question of A
feasibility of implementation of the directions issued by the
Writ Court in the impugned judgment and order. The High Court
after considering the merits of the Review Petitions has
dismissed the same by its order dated 12.10.2012.
                                                                 B
     10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed
by the High Court in the Writ Petitions as well as in the Review
Petitions, the appellant-Society is before us in these appeals.

     11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the         c
parties to the /is.

     12. Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant-Society contends that in the Writ Petitions filed
under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of
                                                                  0
India, the Writ Court was not justified in passing the incidental
and ancillary directions in respect of construction and allotment
of the additional flats/apartments to the respondents. In support
of his contention, Shri Bhushan would rely upon the concurrent
finding of the Registrar, RevisionalAuthority and the Writ Court E
and submit, that, the respondents are indeed the defaulters
and, therefore, they were not entitled to continue as members
of the appellant- Society. Further, Shri Bhushan would submit
that appellant-Society at no point of time had authorized the
learned counsel for the appellant-Society to make any F
concession before the Writ Court and such being the case,
the Writ Court ought not have issued any further direction to
the appellant-Society solely on the basis of a concession made
by the lawyer appearing on its behalf without any express
consent by the appellant-Society.                                 G

.    13. Learned counsel, Shri N. Prabhakar, appearing for
Q!l~~~t of the respondents submits that the Writ Court had
only issued t~Jni_pugned directions in light of the concession
made by the learned counsel for the appellant-Society. Shri      H
622          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015) 4 S.C.R.


A     Prabhakar would state that the appellant-Society having made
      a concession before the Writ Court, cannot now dispute the
      authority of the lawyer to settle and compromise a claim before
      this Court and therefore, submits that the Writ Court was
      justified in issuing the said directions to the appellant- Society.
B
       14. Shri HuzefaAhmadi, learned counsel appearing for
  some of the respondents contends that the jurisdiction
  exercised by the Writ Court was not under Article 227 of the
  Constitution but only under Article 226 of the Constitution of
C India and therefore, such directions could be issued and have
  been rightly issued by the Writ Court. Shri Ahmadi, would
  submit that since, the appellant-Society in the affidavit filed
  before this Court has stated that certain apartments are still
  lying vacant, the same may be allotted to the respondents in
D the interest of justice. Further, ShriAhmadi would support the
  directions issued by the Writ Court and submit that the counsel
  who had appeared for the appellant-Society had not only given
  his consent for the same before the Writ Court but also not
  disputed the same in the Review Petition preferred by the
E appellant-Society and therefore, the appellant- Society now
  cannot resile from the concession made by its counsel before
  the Writ Court.

          15. The issues that would arise for consideration and
F     decision are:

           (a) What is the jurisdiction of the Court while dealing with
           a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the
           Constitution of India?
G
           (b) whether the counsel appearing for an appellant-
           Society could make concession for or on behalf of the
           appellant-Society without any express instructions/
           authorisation in that regard by the Society?
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    HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                       623
            SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

     (c) Whether such a concession would bind the appellant-    A
     Society and its members?

     (d) Since the subject matter of the concession made by
the counsel was not the issue before the Writ Court, whether
the same would bind the appellant-Society and its members?      B

     16. The first issue need not detain us for long. It is the
stand of the learned counsel for the respondents, that, since
the Writ Petition that was filed was both under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court apart from C
examining the merits of the Writ Petition could also issue
incidental and ancillary directions to do complete justice
between parties litigating before it. We do not agree. The
issue in our view is no more debatable in view of the decision
of this Court in the case of Jaisingh and Ors. vs. Municipal D
Corporation of Delhi and Anr. (2010) 9 SCC 385. The Court
has stated:

      "15 .... we may notice certain well recognised principles
     governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court E
      under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly
     the High Court, under this article, has the jurisdiction to
     ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or
     quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in
     them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court F
      has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act
      in accordance with the well-established principles of law.
     The High Court is vested with the powers of
      superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters
     where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The G
     jurisdiction under this article is, in some ways, wider than
      the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
      Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember
     the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the H
624          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A           care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is,
            therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with
            great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of
            jurisdiction must be within the well- recognised
            constraints ... "
B                                         (emphasis supplied)

        17. The scope and extent of power of the Writ Court in a
  petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution came
  up for consideration before three Judge Bench of this Court in
C the recent case of Radhey Shyam and Anr v. Chhabi Nath &
  Ors., Civil Appeal No.2548 of 2009. This Court observed that
  the Writ of Certiorari under Article 226 though directed again;;t
  the orders of a inferior court would be distinct and separate
  from the challenge to an order of an inferior court under Article
D 227 of the Constitution. The supervisory jurisdiction comes into
  play in the latter case and it is only when the scope and ambit
  of the remedy sought for does not fall in purview of the scope
  of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the jurisdiction of
  the Court under Article 226 could be invoked.
E
        18. In the present case, what was challenged by the
  members of the Society was an order passed by the Registrar
  and the Revisional Authority under the provisions of the Act
  and the Rules framed thereunder. The prayer was to set aside
F the orders passed by the authorities below. Even if the said
  petitions(s) were styled as a petition under Article 226, the
  content and the prayers thereunder being ones requiring
  exercise of supervisory jurisdiction only, could be treated as
  petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution only.
G
            19. Having said so, we will now consider the issues that
      falls for our consideration and decision in the present appeals.

          20. In the present case, the subject matter of the petitions
H
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                      625
             SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

was the orders passed by the Registrar and the Revisional A
Authority under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder. The Registrar and the Revision al Authority in their
order have considered the validity of the expulsion of the
respondents from the membership of the appellant-Society for
having defaulted in paying the principal amount to the appellant- B
Society. The Registrar and the Revisional Authority have
recorded a concurrent finding that despite notice and repeated
opportunities to deposit the required amounts to the appellant-
Society, the respondents have continued to be in default and
hence, the said authorities have confirmed the resolution C
passed by the appellant-Society expelling the respondents
from the membership of the appellant-Society. The Writ Court,
in the impugned judgment and order, has also reached the
conclusion that since the respondents had defaulted in paying
                                                                  0
the principal amount to the appellant-Society, the appellant-
Society was justified in expelling them from the membership
of the appellant-Society and hence, confirmed the orders
passed by the authorities below.

      21. The Writ Court after considering the merits of the case E
has come to the conclusion that the expulsion of respondents
from the appellant- Society was justified. Having said so, in
our view, the Court ought not to have issued the impugned
directions merely because a request was made by the learned F
counsel appearing for the respondents-herein. The same
would hold true even if a concession was made by the counsel
for the appellant-Society. The Court, while, exercising its
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, ought to
have confined itself to the subject matter and the issues raised G
by parties in the Writ Petition. The digression of or expansion
of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, would open precarious floodgates of
litigation should the limitation on the supervisory jurisdiction
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626         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     not be observed mindfully.

       22. If for any reason, the Writ Court perceived the oral
  request made by the respondents to have justified the ends of
  justice and desired to accept the concession so made by the
B counsel for appellant-Society, the said request not bei11g the
  subject matter of the Writ Petition required the Court to query
  whether the counsel for the appellant-Society has been
  authorized to make such a statement by the appellant-Society
  or whether any such resolution has been passed by the
C appellant-Society giving concession in matters of this nature.
  Since the required caution was not exercised by the learned
  Judges of the Writ Court, the directions issued by the Writ Court
  suffer from infirmity and hence require to be set aside.
        23.Apartfrom the above, in our view lawyers are perceived
0
  to be their client's agents. The law of agency may not strictly
   apply to the client- lawyer's relationship as lawyers or agents,
  lawyers have certain authority and certain duties. Because
  lawyers are also fiduciaries, their duties will sometimes more
E demanding than those imposed on other agents. The authority-
  agency status affords the lawyers to act for the client on the
  subject matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles
  of the lawyer-client relationships is that lawyers owe fiduciary
  duties to their clients. As part of those duties, lawyers assume
F all the traditional duties that agents owe their principals and,
  thus, have to respect the client's autonomy to make decisions
  at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation. Thus,
  according to generally accepted notions of professional
  responsibility, lawyers should follow the client's instructions
G rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The
  law is now well settled that a lawyer must be specifically
  authorised to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on
  the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible
  authority to bind his client to a compromise/ settlement. To put
H
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                              627
             SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue of retention, has the          A
authority to choose the means for achieving the client's legal
goal, while the client has the right to decide on what the goal
will be. If the decision in question falls within those that clearly
belong to the client, the lawyers conduct in failing to consult
the client or in making the decision forthe client, is more likely      B
to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

     24. The Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 (for short, "the
BCI Rules"), in Part VI, Chapter II provide for the 'Standards of
Professional Conduct and Etiquette' to be observed by all the C
advocates under the Advocates Act, 1972 (for short, "the Act,
1972"). In the preamble to Chapter II, the BCI Rules provide as
follows:

      "An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a D
manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a
privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing
in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is
not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-
professional capacity may still be improper for an advocate. E
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation,
an advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client
and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned
both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned
contain canons of conduct and etiquette adopted as general F
guides; yet the specific mention thereof shall not be construed
as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative though
not specifically mentioned."

                                            (emphasis supplied)         G

    25. The Preamble makes it imperative that an advocate
has to conduct himself and his duties in an extremely
responsible manner. They must bear in mind that what may be
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628         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     appropriate and lawful for a person who is not a member of
      the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional
      capacity, may be improper for an advocate in his professional
      capacity.

B     26. Section II of the said Chapter II provides for duties of an
      advocate towards his client. Rules 15 and 19 of the BCI Rules,
      h"as relevance to the subject matter and therefore, they are
      extracted below:

c          "15. It shall be the duty of an advocate fearlessly to uphold
           the interests of his client by all fair and honourable means
           without regard to any unpleasant consequences to
           himself or any other. He shall defend a person accused
           of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the
D          guilt of the accused, bearing in mind that his loyalty is to
           the law which requires that no man should be convicted
           without adequate evidence.
           ***
E
           ***

           ***

           19. An advocate shall not act on the instructions of any
F          person other than his client or his authorised agent."
       27. While Rule 15 mandates that the advocate must uphold
  the interest of his clients by fair and honourable means without
  regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other.
G Rule 19 prescribes that an advocate shall only act on the
  instructions of his client or his authorized agent. Further, The
  BCI Rules in Chapter I of the said Section II provide that the
  Senior advocates in the matter of their practice of the profession
  of law mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, 1972 would be
H subject to certain restrictions. One of such restrictions
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                          629
             SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

contained in clause (cc) reads as under:                            A

     "(cc) A Senior Advocate shall, however, be free to make
     concessions or give undertaking in the course of
     arguments on behalf of his clients on instructions from
     the junior advocate."                                          B

     28. Further, the 'Code of Ethics' prescribed by the Bar
Council of India, in recognition of the evolution in professional
and ethical standards within the legal community, provides for
certain rules which contain canons of conduct and etiquette C
which ought to serve as general guide to the practice and
profession. Chapter of the said Code provides for an
'Advocate's duty to the Client'. Rule 26 thereunder mandates
that an "advocate shall not make any compromise or
concession without the proper and specific instructions of his! D
her client." It is pertinent to notice that an advocate under the
Code expressly includes a group of advocates and a law firm
whose partner or associate acts for the client.

     29. Therefore, the BCI Rules make it necessary that            E
despite the specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the
Bar or designation of an advocate as a Senior advocate, the
ethical duty and the professional standards in so far as making
concessions before the Court remain the same. It is expected
of the lawyers to obtain necessary instructions from the clients    F
or the authorized agent before making any concession/
statement before the Court for and on behalf of the client.

    30. While the BCI Rules and the Act, does not draw any
exception to the necessity of an advocate obtaining instructions G
before making any concession on behalf of the client before
the Court, this Court in Periyar & Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. v.
State of Kera/a, (1991) 4 SCC 195 has noticed the sui gen eris
status and the position of responsibility enjoyed by the
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630         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     Advocate General in regards to the statements made by him
      before the Courts. The said observation is as under:

           "19 .... Any concession made by the government pleader
           in the trial court cannot bind the government as it is
 B         obviously, always, unsafe to rely on the wrong or erroneous
           or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing
           for the State unless it is in writing on instructions from the
           responsible officer. Otherwise it would place undue and
           needless heavy burden on the public exchequer. But the
C          same yardstick cannot be applied when the Advocate
           General has made a statement across the bar since the
           Advocate General makes the statement with all
           responsibility."

o          (See: Joginder Singh Wasu v. State Of Punjab, 1994
           sec (1) 184).
           31. The Privy Council in the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra
      v. Taruba/a Dasi, Al R 1930 PC 158 has made the following
      two observations which hold relevance to the present
E     discussion:

           "Two observations may be added. First, the implied
           authority of counsel is not an appendage of office, a
           dignity added by the Courts to the status of barrister or
F
           advocate at law. It is implied in the interests of the client,
           to give the fullest beneficial effect to his employment of
           the advocate. Secondly, the implied authority can always
           be countermanded by the express directions of the client.
G          No advocate has actual authority to settle a case against
           the express instructions of his client. If he considers such
           express instructions contrary to the interests of his client,
           his remedy is to return his brief."
           (See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v.                 Shankarlal
H
     HIMALAYAN CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING                              631
            SOCIETY v. BALWAN SINGH

      Gulabchand, (1975) 2 SCC 609, Svenska A
      Handelsbanken vs Indian Charge Chrome Ltd, 1994
      sec (2) 155)
     32. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate not to
transgress the authority conferred him by the client. It is always      B
better to seek appropriate instructions from the client or his
authorized agent before making any concession which may,
directly or remotely, affect the rightful legal right of the client.
The advocate represents the client before the Court and
conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is the only            C
link between the Court and the client. Therefore his
responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the
instructions of his client rather than substitute his judgment.
     33. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel is             o
binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal;
where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission,
the Court should be wary to accept such admissions until and
unless the counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal
to make such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound E
by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not
authorised to make. Lawyer generally has no implied or
apparent authority to make an admission or statement which
would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights
of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a F
proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer
was employed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the
Court is bound by the lawyer's statements or admissions as
to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according to
generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, G
lawyers should follow the client's instructions rather than
substitute their judgment for that of the client. We may add
that in some cases, lawyers can make decisions without
consulting client. While in others, the decision is reserved for H
632          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions
      as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a
      right to make decisions that can affect his rights. We do not
      intend to prolong this discussion. We may conclude by noticing
      a famous statement of Lord Brougham:
B
            "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one
            person in the world and that person is his client."

          34. In view of the above, while allowing these appeals, we
c     set aside the directions issued by the Writ Court to the
      appellant-Society as also the judgment and order passed by
      the High Court in Review Petition.

           Ordered accordingly.
D     Devika Gujral                                     Appeals allwoed.