Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the Labour Court’s discretionary jurisdiction; the Labour Court’s refusal to grant relief was not arbitrary and the claim was barred by res judicata and delay.

Summary

Neelam was appointed on an ad‑hoc basis as a typist with Haryana State Cooperative Land Development Bank from January 1985 until May 1986, after which she joined the Haryana Urban Development Authority. Following a successful industrial dispute by similarly situated employees, she filed a writ petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court in 1989, withdrew it in 1993 to approach the Labour Court, and the Labour Court, on a reference by the State, dismissed her claim as belated and barred by res judicata. The High Court later set aside that award, ordering her reinstatement without back wages and holding that the dispute was not barred by res judicata. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in interfering with the Labour Court’s discretionary jurisdiction; the Labour Court’s refusal to grant relief was not arbitrary, the claim was barred by res judicata and undue delay, and therefore the High Court order was set aside. The appeal was allowed and no costs were awarded.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the Labour Court’s discretionary jurisdiction to grant relief to the workman.
Whether the respondent’s claim was barred by the principle of res judicata.
Whether a belated claim under the Industrial Disputes Act can be entertained in the absence of a statutory limitation period.
Whether the Labour Court exercised its discretion judiciously, or arbitrarily and capriciously.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 23 Rule 1
Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 137 of the Schedule

Subjects

labour lawindustrial disputediscretionary jurisdictionres judicatabelated claimlimitationad‑hoc appointmentreinstatementhigh court interferencesupreme court

Judgment

(
'
......._
A HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK
v.
NEELAM

FEBRUARY 28, 2005

B [N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Labour Laws :

Belated claim of workman-Discretionary jurisdiction of Labour Court
C to grant relief-Workman on ad-hoc service terminated-,-Labour Courfdeclined
to grant any relief to the workman as she approached it after more than seven
years-High Court however allowed writ petition filed by tvorkman and directed
re-instatement_:_Held: High Court erred in interfering with the discretionary
jurisdiction exercised by Labour Court since it was not shown to be injudicious,
D arbitrary or capricious-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226.
Terminated workman withdrew her writ petition before High Court
without seeking leave to take recourse to alternative remedy-Subsequent
reference before Labour Court-Maintainability of-Held, maintainable, being
not barred by principles of res judicata-Labour Laws-Reference.
E
Respondent was appointed as a Typist in Appellant-Bank on an ad
hoc basis from 6-1-1985. She was given extensions from time to time, which
eventually came to an end on 30-5-1986 and her services were. not
continued thereafter. Later, the respondent joined the services of Haryana
Urban Development Authority (HUDA) on or about 10-8-1988.
F Consequent to some similarly situated employees raising an industrial
dispute and getting relief of reinstatement in industrial adjudication,
Respondent filed writ petition before High Court in 1989 but withdrew
the same in 1993. Subsequently, Respondent prayed for reference of the
industrial dispute by the State. Labour Court answered the refere~ce
G against the Respondent on the premise that (i) her claim was belated; and
(ii) she having withdrawn her writ petition without obtaining any lea~e
from the High Court, the reference was barred by res judicata.

Writ petition before High Court was allowed and Respondent was
directed to be reinstated with continuity of service. However, she was held
H 424
llARY1\NA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK 1·.NEELAM 425

not entitled to any back wages. The High Court further held that the A
industrial dispute raised by the Respondent was not barred by res judicata.
Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : I. I. The \Vrit petition filed by the Respondent concededly B
was not adjudicated on merit. Apparently, she did not avail the alternative
remedy 1which was more efficacious. Before the Labour Court even
disputed questions of fact could be gone into and adjudicated upon, which
would ordinarily not be permissible in a writ proceeding. If the Respondent
had made a prayer for withdrawal of a writ petition on the said ground, C
she cannot be ,denied the remedy available to her in another jurisdiction
in terms of the (1rovisions ofthe statute. The principles embodied in Order
23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure laying down a public policy is
not applicable to a case of this nature. (430-D-EI

1.2. A writ petition filed by the Respondent could have been D
dismissed even on the ground that another alternative remedy which was
more efficacious was available and furthermore on the ground that the
writ court would not go into the disputed question of fact. Even in such
an event, it was open to the Respondent to approach the Labour Court
or to take recourse to other remedies which were otherwise available to
her. The Labour Court wrongly applied the principles of res judicata. E
(430-F; 431-BI

Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P.,
Gwalior and Ors., (19871 1 SCC 5 and Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam
and Ors., (1996) 5 SCC 419, referred to.
F
2. The Industrial Courts like any other court must be held to have some
discretion in the matter of grant of relief. 'There is no proposition of law
that once an order of termination is held to be bad in law, irrespective of
any other consideration the Labour Court would be bound to grant relief
to the workman. The Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision G
which mandates the Industrial Court to grant relief in every case to the
workman. The extent to which a relief can be moulded will inevitably depend
upon the facts and circumstances obtaining i~ each case. In absence of any
express provision contained in the statute in this behalf, it is not for the cc;iurt
to lay down a law whkh will have a universal application. 1431-C, DI
H
I
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.
•
.......
A Ajaib,Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Afarketing-cum-Processing Service
Society ltd. and Anr., ( 19991 6 SCC 82, distinguished.

Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate,.·JT. (2005) 1 ·SC 303
and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @-Pappu Yadav:and Anr.,
(2005) 1 SCALE 385, relied on.
B
3. It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenaryiurisdiction
have discretionary power to grant appropriate·relief. to the:parties. The
4

aim and ·object of the lndustrial:Disputes Act· may be tojmpart social
justice to the workman but ·.the same. by. itself·would."not· mean that
C irrespective of his conduct a·workman would automatically be entitled to
relief. .The procedural"laws like. estoppel,- waiver-and.acquiescence are
equally applicable to ·the industrial-proceedings. A person . in .certain
situation.may even·be:held to be bountl by the doctrine of Acceptance·Sub
silcntio. (434-A, BJ

D -4.1.-Respondent.did~not·raise any;industrialdispute·questioning the
.termination of her«services withinra·reasonable time. She even.accepted
- an -alternative employment-and:·has· been. continuing. therein :from
10.8.1988. It is true that Respondent had filed. a writ petition within a
-period of three years·but·indisputably·the same:was (!led.only after the
other workmen obtained same·relief from.the.Labour Courtin a reference
-E made in that behalf by the State. Evideittly·in the writ petition she-was
not in a position to establish her legal right so as to obtain a writ of or in
the nature of mandamus directing the Appellant to reinstate her in service.
She was advised' to withdraw the writ petition ·presumably because she
would· not have obtained any relief in'the said proceeding; Even the High
F Court could-have dismissed the writ petition·on ·the ground of delay or
could have otherwise refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
. , '(434~8,.·c, F;GJ

.;.4.2. The conduct of Respondent in approaching the.Labour Court after
. more than seven years had;therefore, been considered to be a relevant factor
G by the-Labour: Court for refusing to grant:any relieLto her. Such a
consideration on the-part of the Labour Court-canitot:be:said to be an
irrelevant one. The Labour Court:in'the aforementioned situation·cannot
be said.to have exercised·its discretionary·jurisdictionjnjudiciously,
arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interf-erence at the.hands of the High
Court in exercise of its discretionary:jurisdiction·underArticle 226 of the
H Constitution. 1434-G, H; 435-AI
HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK v. NEE LAM [SINHA, J.] 427

Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways and Anr., 12001 I I SCC 133 and A
Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka v. Shivalinga, 120021 10 SCC 167,
relied on.

Nedungadi Bank ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., (20001 2 SCC
455, referred to.
B
5; Both HUDA and the Appellant are statutory organizations. The
service of the Respondent with the Appellant was an ad hoc one. She served
the Appellant only for a period of one year and three months; whereas
she had been serving the HUDA for more than sixteen years. Even if she
is directed to be reinstated in the services of the Appellant without back C
wages as was directed by the High Court, the same would remain an ad
hoc· one and, thus, her services can be terminated upon compliance of the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Also there may or may not now
be any regular vacancy with the Appellant-Bank. In fact in the year 1996,
the vacancies had been filled up and a third party right had been created.
It has not been pointed out that there exists a vacancy. Considering the D
equities between the parties, it was not a fit case where the High Court
should have interfered with the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the
Labour Court. (435-B-D) .

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1672 of 2002.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.2.2000 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in C.W.P. No. 14525 of 1998.

Sanjay R. Hegde and Anil K. Mishra for the Appellant.

Keshav Kaushik, K.B. Raina, Dr. Kailash Chand and Ms. Minakshi Vij F
for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order
passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 14525 of 1998 G
whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the Respondent herein
questioning an award dated 24.2.1998 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, U.T. Chandigarh was allowed. The Respondent herein applied for
appointment as a Typi_st having come to learn from reliable sources that a
post of Typist was lying vacant in the Appellant-Bank. For filling up the said
post, neither any advertisement was issued nor the Employment Exchange H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 2 S.C.R.

A was notified. She even did not possess the requisite qualification. Only on the
basis of her application she was appointed as a Typist on an ad hoc basis for
a period of 89 days from 6.1.1985. The said appointment was; ;however,
subject to the approval of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Haryana.
Relaxation in respect of the qualification was given to her· by the· Registrar,
Cooperative Societies on 23.12.1985. She had been given' extensions of 89
B days from time to time from 6.1.1985. The said period of.89 days eventually
came to 'an end on 30.5.1986. Her services were n~t continued thereafter. No
order of termination, however, was issued. She allegedly made a representation
to the appropriate authority for continuing her in service. Indisputably, she
thereafter joined the services of Haryana Urban Development Authority
C (HUDA) on or about 10.8.1988. ~ome other employees similarly situated
raised an industrial dispute w,hich was referred by the Appropriate Government
for adjudication before an Industrial Col!rt. The said employees got ·~ome
relief in the said industrial adjudication. It stands admitted that the Appellant-
Bank did not succeed in the. High Court in the writ .petitio~ questioning
said award whereupon the con.cerned employees were reinstated.
. .
the
·
D
Presumably, because reliefs were granted in its award by the Industrial
Court to the other workmen: a writ petition was· filed by the Respondent
herein before the High Court on 15.5.1989. The said writ petition was permitted
to be withdrawn on 11.5 .1993 stating :

E "Learned counsel for the petitioner prays that this petition be
dismissed as withdrawn so that the petitioner may approach the Labour
Court.

Dismissed as withdrawn."

F Only on 30.9.1993, a demand notice was issued by t.he Respond:nt
praying for a reference of the industrial dispute by the State. It is furthermore
not in dispute that the in the year 1996, the Appellant-Bank issued
advertisement for making appointments in the vacant posts but the Respondent
. did not apply therefor. The appointments had been made by the. Bank pursuant
G to or in furtherance of the said advertisement and the selection process carried
out in that behalf. Before the Labour Court, the Appellant herein raised a
contention that the entry in the services by the Respondent being a back-door
one, her appointment was a nullity and in any event on the expiry o(the
contractual period on 30.5.1986 her services automatically came to an end.

H By reason of an award dated 24.2.1998, the Labour Court answered the
HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK v.NEELAM [SINHA • .I 1429

reference against the Respondent on the premise that (i) her claim is belated: A
and (ii) she having withdrawn her writ petition without obtaining any leave
from the High Court, the reference was barred by the principles of res judicata.

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award, the Respondent filed
a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which was marked
as C.W.P. No. 14525 of 1998. By reason of the impugned judgment dated B
3.2.2000, the said writ petition was allowed and the Respondent was directed
to be reinstated with continuity of service on her post, relying on or on the
basis of this Court decision in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-
cum-Processing Service Society ltd., and Anr., [I 999) 6 SCC 82. However,
she was held not to be entitled to any back. wages. The High Court further C
held that the industrial dispute raised by the Respondent was not barred
under the principles of res judicata.

Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant, would contend that although there does not exist any prescribed
period of limitation for raising an industrial dispute, the same has to be done D
within a reasonable period and what would constitute a .reasonable period
will depend upon the facts of each case. The learned counsel would urge that
Ajaib Singh (supra) was rendered on its own facts and did not constitute a
binding precedent.

Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in Nedungadi Bank E
ltd v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., [2000] 2 SCC 455 wherein a different
view is said to have been taken. The learned counsel would submit that the
High Court committed a manifest error in interfering with the discretionary
jurisdiction exercised by the Presiding Officer, Lal:>our Court, insofar as it
failed to take into consideration that apart from the ground of delay, the F
Respondent having worked only for about one year and three months and as
in the meanwhile third party right had been created, the direction to reinstate
her in the services of the Appellant was wholly unwarranted. Reliance, in this
connection, was placed on Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam and Ors.,
[1996] 5 SCC 419. The learned counsel would further contend that as the
Respondent while withdrawing the writ petition did not seek for any leave of G
the High Court to take recourse to another remedy, the proceeding before the
Labour Court was not n:iaintainable. Reliance, in this behalf, was placed on
Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P.,
Gwalior and Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 5.
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A Mr. Keshav Kaushik, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, on. the other hand, would contend that the provisions of the
Limitation. Act are not attracted to proceedings under the Jndustrial Disputes
Act and the question as to whether a workman would be denied. any relief
because of the claim being a belated one or not must be considered having
. regard to purport and object for which it was enacted as in terms thereof the
·B courts are required to impart social justice to the workmen. The learned
counsel would contend that in any event in the instant case .the writ petition
was filed only after a period ofthree years and as prior thereto the Respondent
.made representations, the Labour Court committed illegality in refusing to
grant any relief to the workman. According to the learned counsel although
C . the Respondent was gainfully employed with HUDA since I 0.8.l 988 but the
same being not of a permanent nature, she would like to join the serVices of
the Appellant.

RES JUDICATA:

D The writ petition filed by .the Respondent concededly was not adjudicated
on merit. Apparently,· she did not avail the alternative remedy which was
more efficacious. Before the Labour Court even disputed questions of fact
could be gone into and .adjudicated upon which would ordinarily not be
permissible in a writ proceeding. If the Respondent had made a prayer for
withdrawal of a writ petition on the said ground, she cannot be denied the
E remedy available to her in another jurisdiction in terms of the provisions of
the statute.- The principles embodied in Order 23 Rule l of the Code of Civil
Procedure laying down a public policy is not applicable to a case of this
nature. A writ petition filed by the Respondent could have been dismissed
even on the ground that another alternative remedy which was more efficacious
F was available and furthermore on the ground that the writ court woul.d not go
into the disputed question of fact. Even in such an event, it was open to the
Respondent herein to approach the Labour Court or to take recourse to other
remedies which were otherwise available to her.

In Sarguja Transport (supra), it was observed :
G
" .... While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court
without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other
remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the
remedy under· Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be
H
HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK '"NEELAM [SINHA. J.] 431

deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the A
cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it
without such permission ..

The Labour Court, therefore, in our opinion, wrongly applied the
principles of res judicata.
B
BELATED CLAIM :

The Industrial Courts like any other court must be held to have some
discretion in the matter of grant of relief. There is no proposition of law that
once an order of termination is held to be bad in law, irrespective of any
other consideration the Labour Court would be bound to grant relief to the C
workman. The Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision which
mandates the Industrial Court to grant relief in every case to the workman.
The extent to which a relief can be moulded will inevitably depend upon the
facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. In absence of any express
provision contained in the statute in this behalf, it is not for the court to lay D
down a law which will have a universal application.

In Ajaib Singh (supra), the management did not raise any plea of delay.
The Court observed that had such plea been raised, the workman would have
been in. a position to show the circumstances which prevented him in
approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the <;ourt that E
such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the
Government. In that case, the Labour Court granted the relief, but the same
was denied to the workman only by the High Court. The Court referred to
the purport and object of enacting Industrial Disputes Act only with a view
to find out as to whether the provisions of the Article 137 of the Schedule F
appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable or not. Although, the
Court cannot import a period of limitation when the statute does not prescribe
the same, as was observed in Ajaib Singh (supra), but it does not mean that
irrespective of facts and circumstances of each case, a stale claim must be
entertained by the appropriate Government while making a reference or in a
case where such reference is made the workman would be entitled to the G
relief at the hands of the Labour Court.

The decision of Ajaib Singh (supra) must be held to have been rendered
in the fact situation obtaining therein and no ratio of universal application
can be culled out therefrom. A decision, as is well-known, is an authority of H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom Bharat
Forge Co. ltd v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, 1T (2005) I SC 303 and Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan@. Pappu Yadav and Anr., para 42, (2005)
I SCALE 385.

In Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways and Anr., [2001] I SCC 133, as
B regard Ajaib Singh (supra), this Court observed :

"5. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the
Tribunal committed error in denying relief to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. The learned counsel submitted that in' industrial
dispute delay should not be taken as a ground for denying relief to
c the workman if the order/orders under challenge are found to be
unsustainable in law. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court
in the case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing
Service Society Ltd., [1999] 6 SCC 82 : [1999] SCC (L&S) 1054 : JT
(1999) 3 SC 38.
D
6. We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. We have also perused the aforementioned
decision. We do not find that any general principle as contended by
the learned counsel for the petitioner has been laid down in that
decision. The decision was rendered on the facts and circumstances
E of the case, particularly the .fact that the plea of delay was not taken
by the management in the proceeding before the Tribunal. In the case
on hand the plea of delay was raised and was accepted by the Tribunal.
Therefore, the decision cited is of little help in the present case.
Whether relief to the workman should be denied on the ground of
F delay or it should be approj>riately·moulded is at the discretion of the
Tribunal depending on .the facts and circumstances of the case. No
doubt the ~iscretion is to be exercised judicially...."

Yet again in Assistant Executive Engineer, Kwnataka v. Shivalinga,
[2002] IO SCC 167, a Bench of this Court observed :
G
"Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the reasoning
of the Labour Court and contended that the view of the High Court
would not advance the cause of justice. Learned counsel for the
respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Ajaib .Singh v.
Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society ltd., [ 1999]
H 6 SCC 82 and Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. SEB, [2001] 6 SCC 222
HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK v.NEELAM [SINHA, J.] 433

to contend that there is no period of limitation prescribed under the A
Industrial· Disputes Act to raise the dispute and it is open to a party
to approach the Court even belatedly and the Labour Court or the
Industrial Tribunal can properly mould the relief by refusing or
awarding part-payment of back wages. It is no doubt true that in
appropriate cases, as held by this Court in the aforesaid two decisions, B
such steps could be taken by the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal, as the case may ·be, where there is no such dispute to
relationship between the parties as employer and employee. In cases
where there is a serious dispute, or doubt in such relationship and
records of the employer become relevant, the long delay would come
in the way of maintenance of the same. In such circumstances to C
make them available to a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to
adjudicate the dispute appropriately will be impossible. A situation of
that nature would render the claim to have become stale. That is
exactly the situation arising in this case. In that view of the matter,
we think the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel have D
no application to the case on hand ...."

In Nedungadi Bank Ltd (supra), a Bench of this Court, where S. Saghir
Ahmad was a member [His Lordship was also a member in Ajaib Singh
(supra), opined :

"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate E
Government to exercise its powers under Section I 0 of the Act. It is
not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive
matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised
reasonably and in a rati.onal manner. There appears to us to be no
rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers F
in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing
the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no
industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter
of reference under Section I 0 of the Act. As to when a dispute can
be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of G
each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be
rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section l 0 of the
Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said
that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in
question was made .... "
H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction have
discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties. The ?im and
object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social..justice to the
workman but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective of his
conduct a workman would automatically be entitled to relief. The procedural
laws like estoppel, waiver.and acquiescence are equally applicable to the
B industrial.proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be held to be
bound by the doctrine of Acceptance Sub silentio. The Respondent herein did
not raise any. industrial dispute questioning the termination of her services
_within a reasonable time: She even accepted an alternative employment and
has been continuing therein ·from: 10.8.1988. fn her replication filed before
C the Presiding Officer of the Labour.Court while traversing the plea.raised by
the Appellant herein -that -she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect
from I 0.8_. 1988 and her services had been regularized therein, it was averred:

"6. The applicant workman had already given replication to the A.LC.
cum Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she was engaged by
D HUDA from 10.8.1988 as Clerk-cum-Typist on daily wage basis.
The applicant workman has the right to come to the service of the
management and she is interested .to join them."

E
She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been regularly
employed or her services had been regularized. She merely exercised her
right.to join the service of the Appellant.
-
It is true that the Respondent had filed a writ petition within a period
of three years but indisputably the same was filed only after the other workmen
obtained same relief from the Labour Court in a reference made in that behalf
F by the State. Evidently in the writ. petition she. was not in -a position to
establish her legal right so as to ,obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus
directing the Appellant herein to reinstate her in service. She was advised to
withdraw the writ petition presumably because she would not have obtained
any relief in the said proceeding. Even the High Court could have dismissed
the writ petition on the ground of delay or could have otherwise refusd to
G. exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The conduct of the Respondent in
approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years had, therefore,
been considered to be a relevant factor by the Labour Court for refusing to
grant any relief to her. Such a consideration on the part of the Labour Court
cannot be said to be an irrelevant one. The Labour Court in the aforementioned
situation cannot be said to have exercised its discreti~nary jurisdiction
H
HARYANA STATE COOP. LAND DEVELOPMENT BANK 1'.NEELAM [SINHA, .1.J 435

injudiciously, arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interference at the hands A
of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Atticle
226 of the Constitution.

The m~tter might have been different had the Respondent been appointed
by the Appellant in a permanent vacancy.
.... Both HUDA and the Appellant are statutory organizations. The service
B
of the Respondent with the Appellant was an ad hoc one. She served the
Appellant only for a period of one year three months; whereas she had been
serving the HUDA for more than sixteen years. Even if she is directed to be
reinstated in the services of the Appellant without back wages as was directed C
by the High Court, the same would remain an ad hoc one and, thus, her
services can be terminated upon compliance of the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act. It is also relevant to note that there nray or may not now be any
regular vacancy with the Appellant-Bank. We have noticed hereinbefore that
in the year 1996, the vacancies had been filled up and a third party right had
been created. It has not been pointed out to us that there exists a vacancy. D
Having considered the equitie~ between the parties, we are of the opinion that
it was not a fit case where the High Court should have interfered with the

... discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Labour Court .

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained which is set aside accordingly. This appeal is allowed. However, in E
the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

8.8.B. Appeal allowed.