HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANRversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

500                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT   15 S.C.R. 500                [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                        HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR
                                         v.
                           UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 22957 of 2017)
B                             SEPTEMBER 20, 2022
              [HEMANT GUPTA AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
              Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – s.50(a) – Hindu Succession
      Act, 1956 – s.4(2) – Constitution of India – Article 254 – Hindu
      Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005– General Clauses Act – ss.6(b),
C
      6(c) –Person had three sons, all of them pre-deceased him – Dispute
      w.r.t his agricultural property – His inheritance relating to the branch
      of one of his son was succeeded by his grandsons (respondent nos.
      3, 4) u/s.50(a), 1954 Act – Appellants are their mother and sister
      who challenged the validity of s.50(a), 1954 Act having been denied
D     any rights in the inheritance along with respondent nos.3 and 4,
      also contended that the 1956 Succession Act would prevail over
      the 1954 Act – Writ petition dismissed by High Court – On appeal,
      held: Question of repugnancy arises only if both the Parliament
      and the State legislature have made law with respect to any one of
      the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III) – In the present
E
      case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter enumerated in List III
      but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II – Thus, no question of
      repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 – Further, the property
      in question is agricultural property – Thus, succession is governed
      by the 1954 Act, hence, any amendment in the 1956 Act even if it
F     has a retrospective effect will have no bearing or impact on the
      provisions of succession governed by the 1954 Act – On facts,
      deletion of s.4(2) of the 1956 Act would not help the appellants –
      Also, 1954 Act is a special law whereas the 1956 Act is a general
      law – The existence or absence of s.4(2) in the 1956 Act would be
      immaterial – Appeal fails – Interpretation of Statutes.
G
            Interpretation of Statutes – Amendments – Operation of –
      Deemed to apply prospectively – Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 –
      Hindu Succession Act, 1956 –s.4(2) – Hindu Succession
      (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Deletion of s.4(2) – Effect, if any, on
      succession opening prior to 2005 – General Clauses Act – ss.6(b),
H
                                        500
  HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                         501


6(c) – Person had three sons who pre-deceased him – He died in            A
1997 – Dispute w.r.t his agricultural property – Held: Till 09.09.2005,
when the 2005 (Amendment) Act was enacted, s.4(2) remained on the
statute – In the present case, succession opened in 1997 i.e. prior to
09.09.2005 and the rights of the descendants in terms of s.50 became
crystallized on account of the said section r/w s.4(2) of the 1956 Act
                                                                          B
– On account of ss.6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omission
of s.4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation of s.4(2) –
Effect of the deletion can only be in respect of successions which
opened on or after 09.09.05 – All amendments are deemed to apply
prospectively unless expressly specified to apply retrospectively or
intended to have been done so by the legislature.                         C
      Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956
– State enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures, a special
law – Held: The argument relating to 1956 Act being a special law
and 1954 being a general law is completely misconceived as any
State enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures is a special        D
law.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 Repugnancy- Article 254 of the Constitution
       The question of repugnancy arises only if both the                 E
Parliament and the State legislature have made law with respect
to any one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List
III). In the present case two enactments of 1956 and 1954 are
relatable to Entries in List III and List II respectively. The
relevant Entries in List III is Entry Nos.5 and 7 whereas relevant
Entry of List II is Entry No.18. Apart from the fact that a bare          F
reading of Article 254 reflects that it refers to repugnancy in law
made with respect to matters enumerated in the Concurrent list
(List III), this Court has also laid down that question of repugnancy
would not come into existence unless it is first established that
both enactments are under the Concurrent list (List III). In the          G
present case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter enumerated
in List III but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II. Thus, no
question of repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 of the
Constitution. The other part of the argument relating to 1956
Act being a special law and 1954 being a general law is completely
misconceived. In a series of judgments, not only of this Court            H
502           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     but also of different High Courts, it has been expressed that any
      State enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures is a special
      law. [Paras 18-20][509-G-H; 510-E-F; 511-B-C]
            2.1 Deletion of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act:
            Till 2005, to be specific 09.09.2005, when the Hindu
B     Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was enacted, Section 4(2)
      of the 1956 Act remained on the statute. It is not in dispute that
      the property in question is agricultural property, and therefore,
      in 1997 at the time when Mukhtiyar Singh died, the devolution of
      interest (inheritance) would be determinable on the said date, in
C     accordance with the law existing at that time. In 1997 Section
      4(2) of the 1956 Act, was very much on the statute, its subsequent
      deletion would not have any impact on the rights of inheritance,
      which had already accrued and crystallised, prior to the
      amendment. Therefore, on facts deletion of Section 4(2) of the
      1956 Act would not help the appellants. All amendments are
D     deemed to apply prospectively unless expressly specified to apply
      retrospectively or intended to have been done so by the
      legislature. In the present case there is no such intention
      reflecting from the amending Act. By virtue of Section 6 of the
      General Clauses Act, the repeal of an enactment would not affect
E     the previous operation of such an enactment. On account of
      Sections 6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omission of
      Section 4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation of
      the said Section 4(2). The deletion of Section 4(2) took place
      w.e.f 09.09.2005. Therefore, the effect of the deletion can only
      be in respect of successions which opened on or after 09.09.2005.
F     This is because under Section 6(b) and 6(c) of the General Clauses
      Act repeal cannot affect the previous operation of any enactment
      so repealed and cannot affect the previous operation of any
      enactment so repealed and cannot affect any right which may have
      been acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is to be held
G     that succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of the
      descendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on account
      of the said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.
      Therefore, the deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective
      effect. There is one more reason, why the existence of Section

H
  HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                     503


4(2) in the 1956 Act and its deletion will not have any impact in     A
the present case. The reason is that the 1954 Act is a special law,
dealing with fragmentation, ceiling, and devolution of tenancy
rights over agricultural holdings only, whereas the 1956 Act is a
general law, providing for succession to a Hindu by religion as
stated in Section 2 thereof. The existence or absence of Section
                                                                      B
4(2) in the 1956 Act would be immaterial. [Paras 22-26][511-F-
G; 512-A-D; 513-G-H; 514-A-B]
      3. Once it is held that succession in the present case with
respect to the property in question is governed by the 1954 Act,
any amendment even if it has a retrospective effect in the 1956
Act will have no bearing or impact on the provisions of succession    C
governed by the 1954 Act. Moreover, this Court in the judgment
of Vineeta Sharma has given retrospective application only to
Section 6 of the 1956 Act as amended in 2005. There is no
declaration regarding deletion of Section 4(2) being retrospective.
[Para 27][514-D-E]                                                    D
      Waman Rao and Ors. vs. Union of India 1981 2 SCC
      362 : [1981] 2 SCR 1; M/s. Innoventive Industries Ltd.
      vs. ICICI Bank and Ors. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8
      SCR 33; L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner
      of Central Excise (2020) SCC Online SC 705; Hitendra            E
      Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC
      602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360; Union of India v. Zora
      Singh (1992)1 SCC 673 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 478;
      Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE (2016) 3 SCC
      643 : [2015] 12 SCR 332 – relied on.
                                                                      F
      Babu Ram vs. Santokh Singh and others (2019) 14 SCC
      162 – held inapplicable.
      Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala 1973 (4) SCC
      225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs.
      Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 1;                  G
      Parshanti Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1997)
      11 SCC 157 : (1998) 9 JT 504; Vineeta Sharma vs.
      Rakesh Sharma & Ors. (2020) 9 SCC 1 : [2020] 10
      SCR 135 – referred to.

                                                                      H
504                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                                    Case Law Reference
      [1973] Suppl. SCR 1                         referred to         Para 7
      [2020] 10 SCR 135                           referred to         Para 10(c)
      [1981] 2 SCR 1                              relied on           Para 13
B     [2017] 8 SCR 33                             relied on           Para 19
      1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360                      relied on           Para 23
      [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 478                     relied on           Para 23
      [2015] 12 SCR 332                           relied on           Para 24
C
                The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                VIKRAM NATH, J.
             1. This civil appeal by the original writ petitioners before the High
      Court, assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated 11.09.2009
D     passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissing Writ
      Petition (Civil) No. 2887 of 2008 whereby challenge was made to declare
      Section 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 19541 unconstitutional
      being ultra vires Articles 14, 15, 254 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
                FACTS:
E               2. Genealogy (pedigree) relevant for the case is as follows:




F




G
            From the above pedigree it is clear that the appellants are the
      widow and daughter of Ishwar Singh whereas the contesting respondent
      nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of Ishwar Singh. The dispute relates to the

      1
H         Hereinafter referred to as “1954 Act”
  HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                         505
                [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

agricultural property held by Mukhtiar Singh. He had three sons viz       A
Mahinder Singh, Jagdish Singh and Ishwar Singh. All of them pre-
deceased him. Mukhtiar Singh died on 06.06.1997 and his inheritance
relating to the branch of Ishwar Singh was succeeded by his grandsons
(sons of Ishwar Singh i.e. Jaidev and Amit - respondent nos. 3 and 4)
under Section 50(a) of the 1954 Act. Revenue records were corrected
                                                                          B
accordingly.
       3. It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 50 of the 1954
Act:
        ”50. General order of succession from males. - Subject to
       the provisions of Section 48 and 52, when a Bhumidhar or Asami     C
       being a male dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve in
       accordance with the order of the succession given below:
            a) Male lineal descendants in the male line of the descent:
          Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if any
        male descendant between him and the deceased is alive:            D
        Provided further that the son or sons of a predeceased on how
        low so ever shall inherit the share which would have devolved
        upon the deceased if he had been then alive:
            b) Widow
                                                                          E
            c) Father
            d) Mother, being a widow;
            e) Step mother, being a widow;
            f)   Father’s father                                          F
            g) Father’s mother, being a widow;
            h) Widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of
               descent;
            i)   Brother, being the son of same father as the deceased;
                                                                          G
            j)   Unmarried sister;
            k) Brother’s son, the brother having been a son of the same
               father as the deceased;
            l)   Father’s father’s son;
                                                                          H
506                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                     m) Brother’s son’s son;
                      n) Father’s father’s son’s son;
                      o) Daughter’s son.”
            4. The appellants by way of a petition under Article 226 of the
B     Constitution of India challenged the validity of Section 50(a) of the 1954
      Act as they were denied any rights in the inheritance along with
      respondent Nos.3 and 4.
             5. The relief as claimed before the High Court in the writ petition
      is reproduced below:
C               “a) To declare clause (a) of S.50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
                1954 unconstitutional being ultravires Articles 14, 15, 254 and 21
                of the Constitution of India;
                (b) To declare the Petitioners “bhumidhar” having equal rights of
                succession at par with the respondent Nos. 3-4 in the property
D               inherited by them detailed in Annexure P-3;
                (c) To grant any other relief in the interest of justice.;
                (d) To grant cost of litigation.”
             6. The challenge before the High Court was on the grounds of: (i)
      violation of Article 14; (ii) women being discriminated despite world over
E     the rights of women were being empowered; (iii) Hindu Succession Act,
      19562would prevail over the 1954 Act.
             7. Division Bench of the High Court considered the various
      submissions advanced and placing reliance on the fact that 1954 Act
      had been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution much prior to
F     the judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala 3,
      and also in view of Article 31(B) of the Constitution of India extending
      immunity to such legislation, dismissed the writ petition by the impugned
      judgment dated 11.09.2009. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal
      has been preferred.
G           8. Initially, respondent Nos.3 and 4 had put in appearance. It is
      thereafter an I.A. was filed by the Advocate on Record to seek discharge
      from the case. Such I.A. was allowed on 05.05.2022. Shri Anand Yadav,
      Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.
      2
          Hereinafter referred to as the “1956 Act”
H     3
          1973 (4) SCC 225
      HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                            507
                    [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

      9. We may briefly note the submissions advanced by the learned             A
counsel for the appellants as also the learned Amicus.
         Appellant’s arguments:
      10. Briefly stated the following arguments were raised on behalf
of appellants:
                                                                                 B
         a.     Succession provided in 1956 Act will prevail over the
                succession provided in 1954 Act in view of Article 254 of
                the Constitution, as there is clear repugnancy.
         b.     Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act having been deleted by an
                amendment in 2005, there would be no justification to apply
                                                                                 C
                the provisions of succession given in the 1954 Act as the
                same would now be governed by the 1956 Act.
         c.     After the judgement in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs.
                Rakesh Sharma & Ors.4, the repeal of Section 4(2) of
                1956 Act would relate back being retrospective and also
                that the amendment in Section 6 of 1956 Act would be held        D
                to be retrospective.
         d.     The provisions of Section 50(a) of the 1954 Act are violative
                of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India as there is
                clear discrimination on the ground of sex.
                                                                                 E
         e.     Reliance was placed upon the judgment in the case of Babu
                Ram vs. Santokh Singh and others5 for the proposition
                that provisions of 1956 Act will apply.
         Respondent’s (Amicus) arguments:
      11. On behalf of the respondents, learned Amicus made the                  F
following submissions, which are briefly recorded herein:
         a.     Sections 51 to 53 of the 1954 Act cannot be challenged
                being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution in
                view of the Articles 31(A) and 31(B) of the Constitution
                and the 1954 Act falling in the Ninth Schedule to the            G
                Constitution since 1964.
         b.     The provisions in the 1954 Act are in consonance with the
                settled succession of agricultural land throughout the country
4
    (2020) 9 SCC 1
5
    (2019) 14 SCC 162                                                            H
508                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A                     for various reasons laid down in the preamble and the
                      Statement of Objects and Reasons of the statute.
               c.     Provisions of the 1954 Act are not at all affected by deletion
                      of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.
               d.     1956 Act is a general law whereas 1954 Act is a special
B                     law and therefore, 1954 Act will govern the succession in
                      respect of agricultural land.
               e.     The succession provided under the 1954 Act is a move
                      toward the Uniform Civil Code inasmuch as the succession
                      applies across the board to all land holders irrespective of
C                     religion, caste or creed and personal laws of any religion do
                      not carve out any exception.
               f.     A settled law for decades should not be disturbed.
            12. Before the High Court the validity of Section 50(a) of the
      1954 Act was challenged on the ground that it ultra vires Articles 13, 14,
D     19, 21 and 254 of the Constitution.
             13. In support of the submissions, the appellants who were the
      petitioners before the High Court relied upon the judgments in the cases
      of (i) Kesavananda Bharati(ii) Waman Rao and Ors. vs. Union of
      India6 and (iii) I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu
E     & Ors.7. The High Court dealt with the judgments in detail and its ultimate
      analysis was that none of the judgments relied upon were of any help to
      the appellants. The consistent stand of this Court was that all the
      legislations included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution before the
      Judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati that is 24.04.1973, would
      stand protected under Article 31B of the Constitution and, therefore, the
F     challenge to the validity of provisions of the 1954 Act must fail.
             14. The reasoning given by the High Court, as stated above, is the
      correct interpretation of the judgments of the Court referred to above
      and as such does not warrant any interference. We may also make a
      note that, before us learned counsel for the appellants has neither raised
G     this argument nor there is any challenge to the aforesaid reasoning of
      the High Court. It may also be pertinent to note that before the High
      Court other arguments were not addressed. However, as the same have
      been raised, they are being dealt with hereinafter.
      6
          1981 2 SCC 362
H     7
          (2007) 2 SCC 1
   HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                            509
                 [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

       15. We will now deal with the arguments raised by the counsel          A
for the appellants and the respondents in response thereto.
      I. Repugnancy - Article 254 of the Constitution
       16. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently urged that
the 1954 Act would be hit by Article 254 of the Constitution for the
reason that the 1956 Act is enacted by the Parliament whereas the 1954        B
Act is a State Act. It is also submitted that the 1956 Act is a special law
and the 1954 Act a general law.
      17. Article 254 of the Constitution reads as follows:
      “254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws            C
      made by the Legislatures of States
      (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is
      repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which
      Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing
      law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the                D
      Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the
      law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law
      made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the
      existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of
      the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void
                                                                              E
      (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect
      to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains
      any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made
      by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then,
      the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has
      been reserved for the consideration of the President and has            F
      received his assent, prevail in that State:
         Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament
      from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter
      including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law
      so made by the Legislature of the State.”                               G
        18. The question of repugnancy arises only if both the Parliament
and the State legislature have made law with respect to any one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III). In the present case
two enactments of 1956 and 1954 are relatable to Entries in List III and
List II respectively. The relevant Entries in List III is Entry Nos.5 and 7   H
510                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     whereas relevant Entry of List II is Entry No.18. The said Entries are
      reproduced below:
                “List II – State List
                Entry 18: Land, that is to say, right in or over land, land tenures
                including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of
B               rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement
                and agricultural loans; colonization.
                List III – Concurrent List
                Entry 5: Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills,
C               intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in
                respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately
                before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their
                personal law.
                                          xxx       xxx      xxx
D               Entry 7: Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of
                carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including
                contracts relating to agricultural land.”
              19. Apart from the fact that a bare reading of Article 254 reflects
      that it refers to repugnancy in law made with respect to matters
E     enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III), this Court has also laid down
      that question of repugnancy would not come into existence unless it is
      first established that both enactments are under the Concurrent list (List
      III). In this respect it would be appropriate to refer to the law laid down
      by this Hon’ble Court in the case of M/s. Innoventive Industries
      Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank and Ors.8. It is held therein that the question of
F
      examining repugnancy would not apply at all unless it is first established
      that both enactments under the Central and the State are with respect to
      matters enumerated under the Concurrent list (List III). Consequently, it
      is submitted that Article 254 would have no application to the present
      case at all. Paragraph 51 lays down the propositions after discussing in
G     detail the law on the point. For the present case, the proposition 51.1 is
      relevant which reads as follows:
                “51. The case law referred to above, therefore, yields the following
                propositions:

      8
H         (2018) 1 SCC 407, page 450, para 50-51.
      HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                             511
                    [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

         51.1. Repugnancy under Article 254 arises only if both the               A
         Parliamentary (or existing law) and the State law are referable to
         List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.”
      In the present case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter
enumerated in List III but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II. Thus, no
question of repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 of the                  B
Constitution.
       20. The other part of the argument relating to 1956 Act being a
special law and 1954 being a general law is completely misconceived. In
a series of judgments, not only of this Court but also of different High
Courts, it has been expressed that any State enactment relating to                C
Agricultural land tenures is a special law. Reference may be had to a
judgment of this Court in the case of Parshanti Vs. Deputy Director
of Consolidation9.
         II. Deletion of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act:
         21. Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act read as follows:                        D
         “4. Overriding effect of Act:
         (1) ………………
         (2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing
         contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of        E
         any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of
         fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings
         or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.”
       22. Till 2005, to be specific 09.09.2005, when the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was enacted, the aforesaid                     F
provision remained on the statute. It is not in dispute that the property
in question is agricultural property, and therefore, in 1997 at the time
when Mukhtiyar Singh died, the devolution of interest (inheritance)
would be determinable on the said date, in accordance with the law
existing at that time. In 1997 Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act, was very
much on the statute, its subsequent deletion would not have any impact            G
on the rights of inheritance, which had already accrued and crystallised,
prior to the amendment. Therefore, on facts deletion of Section 4(2)
of the 1956 Act would not help the appellants.

9
    (1997) 11 SCC 157                                                             H
512             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A             23. It is well settled that all amendments are deemed to apply
      prospectively unless expressly specified to apply retrospectively or
      intended to have been done so by the legislature. Reference may be had
      to the following decisions:
             [L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central
B            Excise10; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra11;
             Union of India v. Zora Singh12.]
           In the present case there is no such intention reflecting from the
      amending Act.
             24. By virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the repeal
C     of an enactment would not affect the previous operation of such an
      enactment. In Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE13, this
      Court has held that repeal is to be treated similarly as an omission and
      Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply equally to an omission
      as it would apply to a repeal. On account of Sections 6(b) and 6(c) of
D     General Clauses Act, the omission of Section 4(2) of 1956 Act cannot
      affect the previous operation of the said Section 4(2). Paragraphs 12
      and 13 of the aforesaid report are reproduced below:
             “12. From this it is clear that when Section 6 of the General Clauses
             Act speaks of the repeal of any enactment, it refers not merely to
E            the enactment as a whole but also to any provision contained in
             any Act. Thus, it is clear that if a part of a statute is deleted,
             Section 6 would nonetheless apply. Secondly, it is clear, as has
             been stated by referring to a passage in Halsbury’s Laws of
             England in Fibre Board judgment, that the expression “omission”
             is nothing but a particular form of words evincing an intention to
F            abrogate an enactment or portion thereof. This is made further
             clear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C.
             Burton, 1979 Edition. The expression “delete” is defined by the
             Thesaurus as follows:
                “Delete:- Blot out, cancel, censor, cross off, cross out, cut, cut
G            out, dele, discard, do away with, drop, edit out, effect, elide,
             eliminate, eradicate, erase, excise, expel, expunge, extirpate, get

      10
         (2020) SCC Online SC 705, para 27;
      11
         (1994) 4 SCC 602 para 26;
      12
         (1992)1 SCC 673, para 12;
H     13
         (2016) 3 SCC 643, para 12.
   HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               513
                 [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

      rid of, leave out, modify by excisions, obliterate, omit, remove, rub      A
      out, rule out, scratch out, strike off, take out, weed, wipe out.”
      Likewise the expression “omit” is also defined by this Thesaurus
      as follows:
         “Omit:- Abstain from inserting, bypass, cast aside, count out,
      cut out, delete, discard, dodge, drop, exclude, fail to do, fail to        B
      include, fail to insert, fail to mention, leave out, leave undone, let
      go, let pass, let slip, miss, neglect, omittere, pass over,
      praetermittere, skip, slight, transire.”
      And the expression “repeal” is defined as follows:
                                                                                 C
         “Repeal:- Abolish, abrogare, abrogate, annul, avoid, cancel,
      countermand, declare null and void, delete, eliminate, formally
      withdraw, invalidate, make void, negate, nullify, obliterate, officially
      withdraw, override, overrule, quash, recall, render invalid, rescind,
      rescindere, retract, reverse, revoke, set aside, vacate, void,
      withdraw.”                                                                 D
      13. On a conjoint reading of the three expressions “delete”, “omit”,
      and “repeal”, it becomes clear that “delete” and “omit” are used
      interchangeably, so that when the expression “repeal” refers to
      “delete” it would necessarily take within its ken an omission as
      well. This being the case, we do not find any substance in the             E
      argument that a “repeal” amounts to an obliteration from the very
      beginning, whereas an “omission” is only in futuro. If the expression
      “delete” would amount to a “repeal”, which the appellant’s counsel
      does not deny, it is clear that a conjoint reading of Halsbury’s
      Laws of England and the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove both             F
      lead to the same result, namely, that an “omission’ being
      tantamount to a “deletion” is a form of repeal.”
       25. The deletion of Section 4(2) took place w.e.f 09.09.2005.
Therefore, the effect of the deletion can only be in respect of successions
which opened on or after 09.09.2005. This is because under Section
                                                                                 G
6(b) and 6(c) of the General Clauses Act repeal cannot affect the previous
operation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect the previous
operation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect any right
which may have been acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is to
be held that succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of the
descendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on account of             H
514             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 15 S.C.R.


A     the said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act. Therefore, the
      deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective effect.
             26. There is one more reason, why the existence of Section 4(2)
      in the 1956 Act and its deletion will not have any impact in the present
      case. The reason is that the 1954 Act, as held above is a special law,
B     dealing with fragmentation, ceiling, and devolution of tenancy rights over
      agricultural holdings only, whereas the 1956 Act is a general law, providing
      for succession to a Hindu by religion as stated in Section 2 thereof. The
      existence or absence of Section 4(2) in the 1956 Act would be immaterial.
           III. Effect of the judgment given in the case of Vineeta
C     Sharma:
              27. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
      appellants is that the applicability of amendment in Section 6 and the
      deletion of Section 4(2) from the 1956 Act would have retrospective
      effect, which is also of no help to the appellants. Once we are holding
D     that succession in the present case with respect to the property in question
      is governed by the 1954 Act, any amendment even if it has a retrospective
      effect in the 1956 Act will have no bearing or impact on the provisions of
      succession governed by the 1954 Act. Moreover, this Court in the
      judgment of Vineeta Sharma has given retrospective application only
      to Section 6 of the 1956 Act as amended in 2005. There is no declaration
E     regarding deletion of Section 4(2) being retrospective. This argument,
      therefore, also fails.
            IV. Gender bias/ women empowerment:
            28. Once it is upheld that there can be no challenge to the 1954
F           Act as the said legislation is included in the Ninth Schedule of the
      Constitution of India, this argument also has no legs to stand.
            V. Effect of the judgment in the case of Babu Ram:
             29. Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Babu Ram
      is of no help to the appellant. The case of Babu Ram related to State of
G     Himachal Pradesh where there is no State enactment legislated covering
      the matters mentioned in Entry 18 of List II that is to say that the State
      of Himachal Pradesh has no local enactment covering agricultural land
      tenures. It was in such circumstances that this Court held that succession
      of agricultural land would be governed by the 1956 Act. It would be
H
   HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               515
                 [VIKRAM NATH, J.]

worthwhile to mention that in the judgment of Babu Ram itself this               A
Court clarified that had there been a state enactment covering the field
of Entry 18 List II of Seventh Schedule, the rights over agricultural land
would have been governed by the same. Paragraphs 21 and 22 which
are relevant are reproduced hereunder:
       “21. In the present case, it is nobody’s case that the matter relating    B
       to succession to an interest in agricultural lands is in any way
       dealt with by any State legislation operating in the State of Himachal
       Pradesh or that such legislation must prevail in accordance with
       the principles under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The
       field is occupied only by Section 22 of the Act insofar as the State
       of Himachal Pradesh is concerned. The High Court was, therefore,          C
       absolutely right in holding that Section 22 of the Act would operate
       in respect of succession to agricultural lands in the State.
       22. Though, succession to an agricultural land is otherwise dealt
with under Section 22 of the Act, the provisions of Section 4(2) of the
Act, before its omission, had made it clear that the provisions of the Act       D
would not apply in cases inter alia of devolution of tenancy rights in
respect of agricultural holdings. Thus, the effect of Section 4(2) of the
Act before its deletion was quite clear that, though the general field of
succession including in respect of agricultural lands was dealt with under
Section 22 of the Act, insofar as devolution of tenancy rights with respect      E
to agricultural holdings were concerned, the provisions of Section 22
would be inapplicable. The High Court of Bombay was, therefore,
absolutely right in its conclusion. However, with the deletion of Section
4(2) of the Act, now there is no exception to the applicability of Section
22 of the Act. But we are not called upon to consider that facet of the
matter.”                                                                         F

      30. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails and is
accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Divya Pandey                                                 Appeal dismissed.   G
(Assisted by : Deepak Panwar, LCRA)




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