HA MALBARI (DEAD) BY LRS.versusNASIRUDDIN PIRMOHMAD AND ORS.

A                     HA MALBARI (DEAD) BY LRS.
                                   v.
                    NASIRUDDIN PIRMOHMAD AND ORS.

                              SEPTEMBER 30, 1997

B           [S,B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]


          Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 : Section 41.

          Indian Succession Act, 1925 : Section 306.
c
          Indian Easements Act, 1882 : Section 59.

           License-Death of licensee during pendency of proceedings-Effect of
    -Initiation of proceedings under Section 41 of 1882 Act for recovery of
    property rights-Death of licensee during pendency of proceedings-High
D   Courts held that proceedings were not relating to personal cause of action--
    Proceedings do not abate with the death of licensor-Appeal before Supr~me
    Court by legal heirs of licensee-Held no fault can be found with the view
    taken by the High Court-Once the license is put to an end, the right of
    reversion survives for the licensor and whoever intermeddles with the property
E   after the death of the /irer ee would be liable to answer the claim of the
    licensor_;_ Therefore it cannot be said that such a cause of action is personal
    against the licensee and dies with him.

          Chinnan v. Ranjithammal, AIR (1931) Mad. 216, held inapplicable.

F         M Ranganatham Pillai v. T. Govindarajulu Naidu, (1950) 2 MLJ. 280,
    disapproved.

         Hirendra Bhushan v. Purnachandra, (19~3) 52 CWN 843 and Mrs.
    Sakinbai v. Salebhai Hasana/i, AIR (1967) Bombay 9, approved.

Q        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No.
    17918 of 1997.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.97 of the Gujarat High Court
    in C.R.A. No. 1231 of 1992.

         Yashank Adhyaru and Sanjay Kapur for the Petitioners.
H                                        398
              HA MALBAR!. v. NASIRUDDJN PIRMOHMAD                           399
      The following Order of the Court was delivered :                              A
      Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners we are inclined to
agree with the reasoning adopted by the High Court in the impugned order.
Mr. Adhyaru, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended
that on the death of the alleged licensee pending proceedings before the Trial
Court the proceedings abated. For that purpose he strongly relied upon a            B
Division Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Chinan v. Ranjithammal,
AIR ( 1931) Madras 216. In the said decision the Division Bench of the High
Court has taken the view that a licence granted under Section 59 of the
Easements Act is not annexed to property, it is not transferable or heritable
and once the licensor parts with the property or the licensee dies, the licence     C
comes to an end. Strictly speaking this decision can be of no avail on the
facts of the present case as the alleged licensee has died pending the
proceedings under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). However, he sought better sustenance
from a latter decision of the Madras High Court rendered by a learned Single
Judge in the case of M. Ranganatham Pillai v. T. Govindarajulu Naidu,               D
(1950) 2 M.L.J. 280. The said decision, of course, is rendered with reference
to the proceedings under Section 41 of the Act. In the said decision the
learned Judge of the High Court Madras has taken the view that once
summary proceedings are initiated against the alleged licensee by the licensor
under Section 41 of the Act and if the licensee dies pending the proceedings,       E
his heirs cannot be proceeded against and the proceedings ·abate.
The learned Judge for coming to the said conclusion has disagreed with the
contrary view of the Calcutta High Court in Hinrendra Bhushan v.
Puranchandra, (1948) 52 C.W.N. 843. In our view, the said decision of the
learned Judge, with respect, runs counter to the provision of Section 306 of
the Indian Succession Act which deals with only limited causes of action of         F
a personal nature which die with the person. When a licensor seeks possession
from the alleged licensee though in a summary manner, he seeks restoration
of the estate of immovable property which was permitted to be utilised by the
licensee during the currency of the licence. Once the licence is put to an end,
the right of reversion obviously survives for the licensor and whoever              G
intermeddles with the property after the death of the licensee would obviously
be liable to answer the claim of the licensor and in these procet:dings it cannot
be said that such a cause of action is personal against the licensee and dies
with him.

      In our view, therefore, the decision of learned Single Judge of Madras        H
    400                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   High Court cannot be sustained on the scheme of the Act and on the
    contrary, the view propounded by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid
    decision is the correct view. This very question was examined by a Division
    Bench of the Bombay High Court in its decision in the case of Mrs. Sakinbai
    v. Salebhai Hasanali, AIR (1967) Bombay 9. K.K. Desai, J., speaking for the
    Division Bench held :
B
            "Ejectment proceedings under Section 41 of the Presidency Small
            Cause Courts Act are for enforcing property rights and for recovery
            of properties. These are not proceedings relating to personal causes
            of action and they do not die with the death of a party to the
C           proceedings whether he be an applicant or opponent."

           The High Court also in this connection placed strong reliance on the
    express language of Section 306 of the India Succession Act. In out view, the
    aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court correctly analyses the scope
    and ambit of Section 41. Consequently, no fault can be found with the
D   decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court,
    impugned before us, when he took the view similar to the one that the High
    Court of Bombay has taken in this connection.

           Consequently, this Special Leave Petition is devoid of any merit and has
    to be rejected. However, before we do so, one request of learned counsel for
E   the petitioners has to be noted. He submitted that the petitioners are very
    poor persons, they are staying in the premises since their bread-winner had
    died since long and he was also getting a very small amount for maintenance.
    Hence, according to him, if the respondents are inclined to enter into some
    agreeable settlement with the petitioners it would reduce the sufferings of the
F   petitioners. On this request, therefore, notice is directed to be issued to the
    respondents with a view to exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement


          Notice is made returnable after six weeks. There will be ad interim stay
    of the order of dispossession till further orders.
G T.N.A.                                                       Petition dismissed.