Holding

A lease of land that is agricultural in nature, irrespective of its present non‑agricultural use, is statutorily cancelled under Section 82 of the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, and the parties cannot invoke CPC pleading rules or claim lack of notice, while the Inams Abolition Act does not apply to the Mutt and Rule 15 of the 2003 Rules is inapplicable to agricultural land.

Summary

The case concerned a lease of 540 acres of land granted by the Sri Udasin Mutt, a charitable religious institution, to Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. The State of Telangana sought eviction on the ground that the land is agricultural and, under Section 82 of the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, any lease of agricultural land to a person other than a land‑less poor person is statutorily cancelled. The Supreme Court examined whether the land’s nature, not its present use, determines the applicability of Section 82, whether the parties were aware of the agricultural character of the land, and the effect of the Inams Abolition Act and Rule 15 of the 2003 Rules. It held that the land is agricultural, that the lease is therefore cancelled irrespective of its non‑agricultural use, that the parties proceeded with full knowledge of this fact, and that the Inams Abolition Act does not apply to the Mutt. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals challenging the eviction (Civil Appeals 7759‑7760) but allowed the appeal seeking to set aside the direction to consider the lease under Rule 15 (Civil Appeal 7761).

Issues considered

The land in question is agricultural land to which the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 applies, making the lease cancellable under Section 82(1).
Whether the lease granted to the lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act.
Whether the parties proceeded to trial with knowledge that the land was agricultural, thereby precluding claims of violation of natural‑justice or pleading rules.
The effect of the order dated 25 August 2007 passed by the Joint Collector under the Hyderabad (Telangana) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955.
The applicability of Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Immovable Properties (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and Licences Rules, 2003 to the land in question.
Whether prior governmental approval of the lease affects its cancellation under Section 82 of the 1987 Act.
Whether the Hyderabad (Telangana) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 applies to the Mutt.

Legislation cited

Subjects

agricultural landlease cancellationTelangana Endowments ActInams Abolition Actnatural justicestatutory interpretationRule 15 2003 Rulesland usecharitable religious institutions

Judgment

376 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 17 S.C.R. 376 [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014)
B SEPTEMBER 13, 2022
[HEMANT GUPTA AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Act, 1987– ss.75, 80, 82 – Telangana Charitable and
Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Properties
C
and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses
Rules, 2003– r.15– High Court inter alia ordered the appellant-lessee
to be evicted under the 1987 Act – Whether the land in question is
agricultural land to which the 1987 Act is applicable and the lease
in favor of the lessee stands cancelled in terms of s.82(1) of the
D Act; and whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge that
the land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings
between the parties before the Endowments Tribunal – Held: Nature
of land is distinct from the use of the land – Since the land is
agricultural land, its use for non-agricultural purposes would not
alter the nature of the land as an agricultural land – s.82 of the
E
1987 Act mentions “any lease of agricultural land….”, therefore,
the lease has to be of agricultural land irrespective of the use to
which the lessee may put such agricultural land to – Language of
the statute refers to nature of the land and not the use thereof –
Therefore, in the present case, even in terms of the written arguments
F raised by the lessee before the Tribunal, the use of land for non-
agricultural purposes would be irrelevant for statutory cancellation
of the lease of agricultural lands u/s.82 of the 1987 Act – Further,
1987 Act is a Code in itself providing for constitution of the
Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revision and review – The strict rule
of procedure contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
G
respect of pleadings and evidence cannot be extended to the Tribunal
constituted for specific purpose – In the instant case, since the
lessees were aware of the fact that the Mutt-The lessor claims the
land to be agricultural land and statutory cancellation of the lease
was being averred for the reason that the leased land was
H
376
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 377
TELANGANA & ORS.

agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannot complain of any violation A
of principles of natural justice or strict rules of pleading as is
required under the CPC – The parties were aware of the controversy
about the nature of the land – Thus, the lessee cannot be permitted
to turn around to dispute the nature of land leased to them – Further,
r.15 of the 2003 Rules will have no application to the agricultural
B
land in view of the fact that s.82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the
land and property which is not agricultural – Since the land has
been found to be agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be
applicable to the land in question – Thus, the direction in CA
No.7761 of 2014, to consider the request of the lessee to consider
the grant of lease u/r.15 is untenable and is set aside – Andhra C
Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments
Act, 1966 – Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908.
Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Applicability of –
Held: The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for the D
reason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the
religious institutions in terms of s.1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and
thereafter in terms of first proviso to s.4(1) of the Inams Abolition
Act – Thus, any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for
the purposes of negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder
claiming occupancy rights – It has been categorically held by the E
Joint Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt – Telangana
Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act,
1994.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
F
HELD: 1.1 What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007
passed by the Joint Commissioner under the Inams Abolition
Act?
The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) by
the Nizam. The Act contemplates adjudication of matters in G
relation to grant of occupancy rights and certificates in respect of
inam lands covered by the Act and vested with the Government,
inquiry into the nature and history of such lands, determination
of compensation payable to the Inamdar and apportionment

H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A thereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition Act came into
force on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of grant of occupancy rights under
the Inams Act. It appears that the Mutt entered into an agreement
with one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He filed an application for grant of
occupancy rights. Such application was allowed by the Revenue
Divisional Commissioner on 27.11.2004. The Revenue Divisional
B
Officer was considering an application for issuance of occupancy
rights certificate to the general power of attorney holder of the
Mutt. The application was allowed. In an appeal under Section
24 of the Inams Abolition Act, a finding was returned that the
land in question was converted into for nonagricultural use before
C 1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to the effect whether the land
in question was under agriculture as on the crucial date. The
finding on the said issue is that it was being used for non-
agricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted to
abolish the inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller.
Since the land was an inam land given to the charitable and
D
religious institutions, it was found to be exempt from the operation
of the Inams Abolition Act. The Joint Collector held that the land
is an inam land and in terms of proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act,
the inam was held by or for the benefit of charitable and religious
institutions, therefore, no person shall be entitled to be registered
E as an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitled to be
registered as the occupant. It is the said order of the Revenue
Divisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector.
[Paras 45 and 46][402-D-F; 403-B-D]
1.2 The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted
F to grant of occupancy rights which was negated for multiple
reasons including the fact that the land was not under agriculture
on the crucial date. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Act
in respect of abolition of inams and conferment of occupancy
rights, it is an order not by a Tribunal having a plenary jurisdiction.
The Tribunal under the Inams Abolition Act had limited
G jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under the Inams
Abolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in such
proceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any other
proceedings. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act were
initiated by a Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights
H on the basis of an agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 379
TELANGANA & ORS.

by a Power of Attorney holder who was claiming independent A
rights, therefore, the previous proceedings were not between
the same parties as the Mutt was not a party in its own rights but
through an attorney who was claiming independent right in
himself. Therefore, the findings recorded therein are not relevant
or binding in respect of proceedings under another statute,
B
enacted for different objective to protect the inam land given to
the charitable and religious institutions. The Inams Abolition Act
is not applicable to the Mutt for the reason that the Act itself is
not applicable to charitable and the religious institutions in terms
of Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter in terms of first
proviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Thus, any C
finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposes
of negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claiming
occupancy rights. It has been categorically held by the Joint
Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt. [Paras 47, 49
and 50][404-H; 405-A-B]
D
2.1 Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which
the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of the
lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act?
The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lessees E
is that there was no pleading that the land in question was
agricultural land, therefore, the lessees were not made aware of
the fact that the lease stands statutorily cancelled. The said
argument is not tenable for the reason that the Inspector in his
report dated 29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008 reported that the lands in
question are agricultural lands and that lease of such lands stands F
cancelled. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of
2010 challenging the continuation of proceedings before the
Endowments Tribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010
filed on behalf of the Mutt, it was stated that the leases have
become null and void under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The writ G
petition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Court also noticed
the argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, the leases
stood cancelled. The High Court had called for the record of the
fourth respondent i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment).
The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised by the
H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A Mutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it is
noted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land as
agricultural land. Such order of the High Court has attained finality.
The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that the land
in question is agricultural land. [Paras 51-56][406-B-D, F-G, H;
407-F-G]
B
2.2 A perusal of the written arguments shows that the lessees
have submitted that the land is being used for non-agricultural
purposes. The entire argument is based upon use of the land for
non-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct from the
use of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use for non-
C agricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land as an
agricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any lease
of agricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be of
agricultural land irrespective of the use to which the lessee may
put such agricultural land to. The language of the statute refers
D to nature of the land and not the use thereof. Therefore, even in
terms of the written arguments raised by the lessee before the
Tribunal, the use of land for non-agricultural purposes would be
irrelevant for statutory cancellation of the lease of agricultural
lands under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The distinction between
agricultural and non-agricultural land sought to be drawn from
E the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural
Assessments Act, 1963 repealed by the A.P Agricultural Land
(Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006, is not
tenable. The distinction between the categories of land leads to
consequence of higher assessment in the case of non-agricultural
F land. The lessee has not led any evidence that they are paying
levy as per the rates fixed under this statute as that of non-
agricultural land. In respect of the 1987 Act, the Division Bench
of the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of land for
non-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutory
cancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) of
G the said Act. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stood
withdrawn on 35 27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by the
Division Bench had attained finality. [Paras 57, 58, 60, 61][408-
G-H; 409-A-C; 410-B, F]

H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 381
TELANGANA & ORS.

Siddartha Academy of General and Technical A
Education v. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments
2010 SCC Online AP 461 – referred to.
3.1 Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge
that the land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings
between the parties before the Endowments Tribunal? B
The 1987 Act is a Code in itself providing for constitution
of the Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revision and review. The
strict rule of procedure contemplated by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 in respect of pleadings and evidence cannot be
extended to the Tribunal constituted for specific purpose. Since C
the lessees were aware of the fact that the Mutt claims the land
to be agricultural land and statutory cancellation of the lease was
being averred for the reason that the leased land was agricultural,
therefore, the lessees cannot complain of any violation of
principles of natural justice or strict rules of pleading as is required
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the parties D
were aware of the controversy about the nature of the land. Thus,
the lessee cannot be permitted to turn around to dispute the
nature of land leased to them. [Paras 63, 66][411-B-D; 412-A]
Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
491 : [2008] 14 SCR 621; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) E
by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. (1987) 2
SCC 555 : [1987] 2 SCR 805; Union of India v. Ibrahim
Uddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148 : [2012] 8 SCR 35;
Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. Surya Pratap & Ors.
(2020) 10 SCC 729 – held inapplicable. F
Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR
1963 SC 884 : [1963] SCR 208; Swamy Atmananda &
Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors. (2005) 10
SCC 51 : [2005] 3 SCR 556; Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v.
Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 1 : [2019] 10 SCR 88 – G
relied on .
3.2 There is merit in the argument raised by the lessees
that the lease executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Act
would not be annulled for the reason that there was no prior
H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A approval. The leases were granted prior to the commencement
of the 1987 Act but even under the 1966 Act, Section 70
prohibited lease of the inam land if its term exceeded six years.
The lease of land measuring 143 acres vide lease deed dated
23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease deed dated 14.9.1966
and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated 21.3.1969 were not
B
preceded with any prior approval of the competent authority.
Reliance is placed upon the note dated 24.2.1964 but such note
is part of the decision-making process as no approval was
communicated to either the lessee or the lessor or to any person.
In fact, the said communication is a note of Second Secretary to
C Government Home (Endowments-III) Department that lease for
a term of 99 years cannot be construed as a transfer of ownership
of the endowed lands by outright sale and is prohibited under
Rule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules and Regulations.
It is not a communication addressed either to the lessee or to
the lessor or to any other person or institution. The regulation
D
331 prohibits the possession over and transfer of the nuzli lands
(tax bearing lands) from generation to generation in future. The
note dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads to
approval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effective
and binding in view of the judgements of this Court. The only
E approval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntas is dated
10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication of
the Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect of
three previous lease deeds, but there is no communication to
the Mutt either of the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975.
Section 82 does not make any exception of the lease granted
F
with approval. The approval is mentioned only in Section 75 of
the 1987 Act. Even if such approval is treated to have been granted
in respect of the entire land, the lease granted with approval is
relevant only for the purposes of Section 75 of the 1987 Act and
not for the purposes of Section 82 of the said Act. [Paras 67-
G 69][412-B-G; 414-A-C]
3.3 Similarly, the argument that the land now falls within
the urban agglomeration in view of the enactment of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable.
Firstly, the said Act stands repealed on 22.3.1999. Still further,
H the mere fact that the land has come within the municipal limits
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 383
TELANGANA & ORS.

would not make the land as non-agricultural land. It only means A
that the land within the municipal limits can be utilized or the
buildings be constructed in terms of the provisions of the
Municipal Laws applicable thereto. Similarly, the argument that
the land in question falls with the Zonal Development Plan for
Kukatpally as per the communication of the Hyderabad Urban
B
Development Authority is again not tenable. The Zonal
Development Plan is future planning of the development of the
area. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to Zonal
Development Plan but that does not mean that the agricultural
nature of the land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the said
communication is also not tenable. [Paras 70, 71][414-C-F] C
3.4 In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction to
consider the request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of the
Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other than
Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003 will have D
no application to the agricultural land in view of the fact that
Section 82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the land and property
which is not agricultural. Since the land has been found to be
agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be applicable to
the land in question. Thus, the direction to consider the request
of the lessee to consider the grant of lease under Rule 15 is E
untenable and is set aside. [Paras 72, 73][414-F-H]
Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade
and Anr. (1999) 5 SCC 590 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 514;
Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge (Court
of Wards) (1976) 3 SCC 864 : [1977] 1 SCR 146; F
Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Gujrat (1993) 4 Supp SCC 707 : [1993] 2
Suppl. SCR 264; ITC Limited v. Blue Coast Hotels
Limited (2018) 15 SCC 99 : [2018] 5 SCR 516; Mahesh
Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 G
SCC 141 : [2009] 3 SCR 1122; State of A.P. v. Nallamilli
Rami Reddy & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.
SCR 287; Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao &

H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A Ors. AIR 1956 SC 593 : [1956] SCR 451; A.P. Punjabi
Sabha, Hyderabad v. Joint Collector, Hyderabad 2004
SCC OnLine AP 689 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 514 referred to Para 16
B
[1977] 1 SCR 146 referred to Para 18
[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 264 referred to Para 18
[2018] 5 SCR 516 referred to Para 18
[2009] 3 SCR 1122 referred to Para 22
C
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 287 referred to Para 27
[1956] SCR 451 referred to Para 37
[1963] SCR 208 relied on Para 38
[2005] 3 SCR 556 relied on Para 37
D
[2019] 10 SCR 88 relied on Para 68
[2008] 14 SCR 621 held inapplicable Para 17
[1987] 2 SCR 805 held inapplicable Para 17
[2012] 8 SCR 35 held inapplicable Para 21
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-
7760 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.03.2013 of the High Court
of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 31893 of
F 2011 and W.P. No. 8005 of 2012.
With
Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014.
Harish Salve, Parag P. Tripathi, Kapil Sibal, K. V. Vishwanathan,
C. S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Advs., Ms. Mumtaz Bhalla, Karan Dev Chopra,
G Neeraj Malik, Lakshya Kampani, Srinivasan Ramaswamy, Shagun Ruhil,
Abhay Kumar, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Manan Bansal, Ms. Shipra Jain, Nizan
Pasha, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Amartya Sharan, M. G. Aravind Raj,
Sivagnanam Karthikeyan, P. Venkat Reddy, Prashant Kumar Tyagi, P.
Srinivas Reddy for M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, Mahfooz Ahsan
H Nazki, Advs. for the appearing parties.
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 385
TELANGANA & ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 is to an
order dated 7.3.2013 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Petition No. 31893 of 2011 whereby the appellant herein i.e., Gulf Oil
Corporation Limited1 was ordered to be evicted under the provisions of B
The Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Act, 19872. The lessee claimed leasehold rights on the
land admeasuring 540 acres and 30 guntas situated at village Kukatpally,
Hyderabad.
2. Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 has been preferred by Sri Udasin C
3
Mutt , the lessor of the said land, arising out of Writ Petition No. 8005 of
2012. The said writ petition was decided along with the writ petition filed
by the lessee. The Mutt has claimed mesne profits in terms of Section
83(6) of the 1987 Act. However, the writ petition was disposed of with
a direction to consider the request of the lessee under Rule 15 of the D
Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land)
Leases and Licenses Rules, 20034, published vide Government Order
Memo No. 866 dated 8.8.2003.
3. The dry soil land measuring more than 540 acres and 30 guntas E
was granted as inam land by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the Mutt
somewhere in the year 1873. The Mutt entered into an agreement of
lease with M/s Indian Detonators, predecessor of the lessee, on
23.07.1964 in respect of 143 acres of inam lands, bearing survey no.
1010/8 to 1010/10. The lessee, claiming to be the successor-in-interest
of M/s Indian Detonators, relies on the permission said to be granted by F
the Government to enter into lease of the inam land on 24.02.1964.
4. The lessor thereafter entered into an agreement with M/s Indian
Detonators on 14.9.1966 to take on lease 257 acres and 19 guntas of the
inam land. The supplementary lease deed dated 21.03.1969 was also
executed for an area of 2 acres and 32 guntas of land. G

1
For short, the ‘Lessee’
2
For short, the ‘1987 Act’
3
For short the ‘Lessor’ or ‘Mutt’
4
For short, the ‘2003 Rules’ H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A 5. The Commissioner, Endowments Department communicated
to the Secretary to Government, Revenue (Endowments) Department
on 29.4.1975 to sanction proposed long lease of 99 years of 137 Acres
19 guntas of the land. It was also communicated that since the lease
was exceeding 6 years, therefore, sanction of the Government is
necessary under Section 70 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu
B
Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 19665. Section 70 of the 1966
Act reads thus:
“70. Lease, sale, etc., of inams to be void in certain cases:-
(1) Any lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift, sale,
C exchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for the
support or maintenance of a charitable or religious institution
or endowment or for the performance of a religious or public
charity or service, shall be null and void unless any such
transaction, not being a gift, is effected with the prior
sanction of the Government.
D
(2) Such prior sanction may be accorded by the Government
where they consider that the transaction is-
(i) necessary or beneficial to the institution or endowment;
(ii) consistent with the objects of the institution or
E endowment and;
(iii) the consideration thereof is reasonable and proper.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any inam
land in the Andhra Area of the State.”
F 6. It was on 10.05.1976, the Government of Andhra Pradesh
accorded sanction for lease of land measuring 137 acres and 19 guntas
to M/s. Indian Detonators Limited. Subsequently, on 20.04.1978, the
lessor entered into another lease deed with M/s Indian Detonators Limited
for a period of 99 years for land measuring 137 acres 19 guntas.
G 7. A perusal of the lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respect of 143
acres and the lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres and
19 guntas of land specifically mention that the lease are of inam land. A
summary of the various lease deeds executed by the lessor are produced
hereinunder:
5
H For short, the ‘1966 Act’
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 387
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

A

B

C

8. The 1987 Act came into force on 21.04.1987, repealing the
1966 Act. Section 82 of the 1987 Act has a non-obstante clause so as to D
override and cancel any lease of agricultural land other than lease to a
landless poor person. Section 82 of the 1987 Act reads thus:
“82. Lease of Agricultural Lands:-
(1) Any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given or
endowed for the purpose of any institution or endowment E
subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act shall,
notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being
in force, held by a person who is not a landless poor person
stands cancelled.
(2) xxx xxx xxx F
(3) The authority to sanction the lease or licence in respect of
any property or any right or interest thereon belonging to or
given or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or
religious institution or endowment, the manner in which and
the period for which such lease or licence shall be such as G
may be prescribed.
(4) Every lease or licence of any immovable property, other
than the Agricultural land belonging to, or given or endowed
for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution or
endowment subsisting on the date of the commencement H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A of this Act, shall continue to be in force subject to the rules
as may be prescribed under sub-section (3).
6
(5) [The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)
Tenancy Act, 1956 (Act XVIII of 1956) and the Andhra
Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
B Act, 1950 (Act XXI of 1950) shall not apply to any lease of
land belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of
any charitable or religious institutions or endowment as
defined in this Act.]”
9. The Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Bill (Bill No. XVIII of 1954)
C was published in Hyderabad Gazette Extraordinary No.86 on 10.04.1954.
One of the objects for the enactment of such legislation was the abolition
of all inams, other than village service inams and inams held by religious
and charitable institutions. In pursuance of such Bill, the Hyderabad
Abolition of Inams Act, 19557 came to be enacted. Such Act received
the assent of the President on 16.07.1955 and was published in the
D Hyderabad Gazette Extraordinary No. 90 of 20.07.1955. The enactment
is now known as the Telangana Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Initially,
the Inams Abolition Act was not applicable to inams held by or for the
benefit of charitable and religious institutions [Section 1(2)(i)]. The said
provision was however deleted by Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act,
E 1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) with effect from 26.12.1985. The Inams
Abolition Act was then subsequently amended vide Andhra Pradesh
(Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994), whereby a proviso was
inserted to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act with retrospective
effect from 26.12.1985, the date when Section 1(2)(i) was deleted. The
inserted clause and other relevant provisions of the said Inams Abolition
F Act read thus:
8
"[1(2) It extends to the whole of the Hyderabad State and shall
be applicable to all inams except –
(i) inams held by or for the benefit of charitable and religious
G institutions;

6
Added by Act No. 27 of 2002, w.e.f. 26-8-2002.
7
Inams Abolition Act
8
H omitted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) w.e.f. 26.12.1985
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 389
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

(ii) inams held for rendering village service useful to the A
Government or to the village community including
sethsendhi, neeradi and balutha inams.]
xx xx xx
3. Abolition and vesting of inams and the consequences thereof-
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any B
usage, settlement, contract, grant, sanad, order or other
instrument, Act, regulation, rules or order having the force of
law and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a
Civil, Revenue or Atiyat Court, and with effect from the date
of vesting, all inams shall be deemed to have been abolished C
and shall vest in the State.
(2) Save as expressely provided by or under the provisions of
this Act and with effect from the date of vesting, the following
consequences shall ensue namely:-
xxx xxx xxx D
(c) all such inam lands shall be liable to payment of land
revenue;
(d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and royalties,
accruing in respect of such inam lands, on or after the date of
E
vesting, shall be payable to the State and not to the Inamdar,
and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall
not be valid;
4((1) xxx xxx xxx
9
[Provided that where inams are held by or for the benefit of F
charitable and religious institutions no person shall be entitled to
be registered as an occupant under sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the
institution alone shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant
of all inam lands other than those specified in clauses (a) and (c)
above without restriction of extent to four and half times the family
holding and without the condition of personal cultivation: G

Provided further that where any person other than the
concerned charitable or religious institution has been registered
9
inserted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994) with retrospective
effect from 26.12.1985. H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A as an occupant under sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 after the
commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition
of Inams (Amendment) Act, 1985 such registration shall and shall
be deemed always to have been null and void and no effect shall
be given to such registration]”
B xxx xxx xxx
9. Vesting of certain buildings and inam lands used for non-
agricultural purposes.-
(1) Every private building, situated within an inam shall, with effect
from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it
C immediately before that date.
(2) Where an inam land has been converted for any purpose
unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be
entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not
void or illegal under any law in force.
D
(3) The vesting of private buildings or lands under sub-section (1)
or (2) shall be subject to the payment of non-agricultural assessment
that may be imposed by Government from time to time.”
10. Section 82 of the 1987 Act statutorily cancelled the lease deeds
if endowed for the purpose of any institution. Section 75 of the 1987 Act
E
declares that any lease and any gifts, sale, exchange or mortgage of an
inam land, granted for the support or maintenance of charitable or religious
institution, or endowment or for the performance of a religious or public
charity or service shall be null and void, unless such transaction, not
being a gift, is affected with prior sanction of the Government. A perusal
F of the facts would show that prior approval was only in respect of 137
acres 19 guntas of land on the basis of which registered lease deed was
executed on 20.04.1978. However, lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respect
of 143 acres, lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres 19
guntas and supplementary lease deed dated 21.3.1969 in respect of 2
Acres 32 guntas were not preceded with any prior sanction. Though
G
there is a note of the Second Secretary of the Government that lease for
99 years would not amount to transfer of property, but such note is on
the file of the Government and had not been communicated to any of the
interested parties.

H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 391
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

11. It is submitted that the lessee faced no issues till November A
2006 when the previous Mahant Baba Sagardas was unceremoniously
removed. It was on 24.08.2007, a notice on behalf of Sri Arun Das ji,
Mahant of the Mutt, for delivery of vacant possession, was served treating
lessee as an encroacher. It was later on 24.12.2007, the Mutt wrote to
the Assistant Commissioner (Endowments) for eviction of the lessee,
B
inter alia on the ground that a graveyard on a land measuring 20 acres
has come up and thus there is a violation of the terms of the lease. The
Assistant Commissioner called for an inspection report from the office
of the Inspector, Endowments Department. A report was submitted on
29.01.2008, communicating to the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments
Department that the three lease deeds are without prior Government C
approval. Only the lease deed dated 20.04.1978 was with prior approval.
It was communicated that the 4 lease deeds have totally become null
and void as per the 1966 Act, 1987 Act and the Rules framed under the
Government Order No.866 dated 08.08.2003.
12. The proceedings leading to the present appeals were initiated D
when a show cause notice dated 20.12.2008 was issued by Deputy
Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad. The proceedings
initiated in pursuance of show cause notice to the lessee was assigned
an Original Application No.21/2008 before the Deputy Commissioner,
Endowments Department, later renumbered as OA No. 579 of 2010
after the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal. The lessee was asked E
to remove the encroachment upon the land belonging to the Mutt.
13. It has been argued that the Endowments Tribunal passed a
patently perverse order of eviction on the ground that the leased land
was agricultural in nature and therefore, the lease deed was void as per
Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The writ petition against the order passed by F
the Endowments Tribunal remained unsuccessful. It is the said order
passed in the writ petition which is the subject matter of challenge in the
present appeals.
14. The argument of Mr. Harish Salve, appearing for the lessee,
is that it was neither asserted by the Mutt, nor any issue was framed G
regarding treating the land as agricultural land. Therefore, in the absence
of any evidence of the land being an agriculture land, the finding recorded
by the Endowments Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court suffers
from patent illegality as without any plea or evidence, a finding has been
H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A returned to declare the lease deed executed in favor of the appellant as
cancelled on the ground that the lease was of an agricultural land.
15. Mr. Salve referred to an order passed by the Joint Collector in
an appeal under Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)
Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, wherein a finding was returned that the
B land in question was converted into for non-agricultural use before 1973.
The order under challenge in appeal was an order passed by the Revenue
Divisional Officer dated 27.11.2004.
16. It is argued that the order of the Joint Collector is final and act
as an estoppel to the effect that the leased inam lands are non-agricultural
C in nature and the factum of the Endowments Tribunal having delved into
the same by giving a perverse finding is impermissible. Reliance is placed
upon the judgment of this Court reported as Hope Plantations Ltd. v.
Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Anr.10 that if an issue has been
finally determined, parties cannot dispute such finding.

D 17. The issue as to whether the land is agricultural land was raised
for the first time in the written arguments submitted by the Mutt before
the Endowments Tribunal relying upon a report of the Assistant
Commissioner (Endowments). It is submitted that the argument raised
by the Mutt was dealt with in the written arguments raised by the lessee
specifically contending that a new plea was raised for the first time in
E the written arguments that the land was agricultural land. Reliance is
placed upon judgment of this Court reported as Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima
Mandal & Anr.11 wherein it was held that once a particular plea is not
raised and the defendants had no opportunity to resist or oppose such a
relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. Reliance was also placed
F upon a judgment of this Court reported as Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead)
by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors.12 .
18. It is argued that the distinction between agricultural and non-
agricultural land is evident from the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra
Pradesh Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963, which provides for
G assessment of non-agricultural land. The A.P Agricultural Land
(Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006 repealed the 1963
Act by keeping the distinction between the agricultural and non-agricultural

10
(1999) 5 SCC 590
11
(2008) 17 SCC 491
12
H (1987) 2 SCC 555
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 393
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

land. Reference was made to Section 28 of the Andhra Pradesh A
(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli that the land in Section
1(b) includes all kinds of benefits pertaining to land and that land revenue
is paid for non-agricultural land as well. It has been argued that Section
82 would be applicable only if lease of land is used for agricultural purpose
alone. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of this Court reported
B
as Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge (Court of
Wards)13, Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, Gujrat14 and ITC Limited v. Blue Coast Hotels Limited15
dealing with the agricultural land in the taxation laws such as wealth tax
and income tax. It is further contended that the lease deeds executed
for a period of 99 years could not be terminated in violation of the terms C
of a notice period of 5 years, as well as on a non-existing ground of
termination of lease. It is also argued that the report of the Assistant
Collector, Endowments is on inquiry and not evidence before the Tribunal
which can be made basis of terminating the lease in favor of the lessee.
19. It is contended that the notice for termination of lease was D
issued on 11.10.2007 on the ground that Mutt had entered into lease
agreements with IDL and IDL Chemicals Limited and not with the
appellant; the appellant abandoned most of the land, thereby allowing
encroachers to occupy the land and that the land of Mutt is being converted
into burial grounds.
E
20. It was averred that eviction proceedings can only be in
consonance with the terms of the eviction notice which allows no room
for vagueness and ambiguity. In the notice, no issue qua the nature of
the leased inam lands was raised but was surreptitiously supplanted by
the Mutt in its written arguments. The same is erroneously considered
and decided by the Tribunal and upheld by the High Court. It is only F
Section 75 of the 1987 Act that would be applicable which contemplates
prior permission of the Government in the case of inam lands.
21. It is argued that evidence can be led in support of the plea
raised. Since there is no plea raised by the Mutt that the land is agricultural
land, therefore, no amount of evidence in absence of plea can be G
considered by the Court. Reliance is placed upon Union of India v.

13
(1976) 3 SCC 864
14
(1993) Supp 4 SCC 707
15
(2018) 15 SCC 99 H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A Ibrahim Uddin & Anr.16, and Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. Surya
Pratap & Ors.17.
22. The appellants further argued that any finding of a court of
law in the absence of evidence cannot be sustained. Such finding based
on a document which is not placed on record is violation of principles of
B natural justice, fair play and fairness. Reliance is placed upon Mahesh
Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra18. It is argued that since
the report of the Inspector dated 29.1.2008 was not placed on record,
therefore, the lessee was not given a chance to rebut the assertion that
the land is an agricultural land.
C 23. It has been further argued that the impugned order of the
High Court is perverse and that the judgment of the High Court in
Siddartha Academy of General and Technical Education v. Deputy
Commissioner of Endowments19 has been wrongly relied upon. In fact,
in the said judgment, the land was agricultural land. This Court in SLP
(Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 has permitted Siddartha Academy to
D withdraw the SLP after the Government passed the necessary orders,
i.e., granting permission to continue with the lease. It was contended
that Section 82 does not annul governmental permissions granted prior
to the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the same could not be
deemed to be cancelled in terms of the provisions of Section 82(1) of the
E 1987 Act. It is stated that the lease deeds dated 23.7.1964 and 20.4.1978
make it abundantly clear that the said lease deeds were entered into by
the appellant and Mutt with prior permission of the Government. It is
further argued that the lease deeds were for the purpose of construction
and running a factory, therefore, the land cannot be said to be an
agricultural land.
F
24. Mr. Salve further relied upon the communication dated
17.11.1994 from Hyderabad Urban Development Authority to contend
that the land falls within the Zonal Development Plan for Kukatpally
Zone approved on 25.04.1986 and is earmarked as an industrial area as
per the said Plan. Thus, it was argued that Endowments Tribunal wrongly
G held the land to be agricultural despite the reason that no issue was
framed. The finding is based on the basis of an observation in the order
16
(2012) 8 SCC 148
17
(2020) 10 SCC 729
18
(2009) 11 SCC 141
19
H 2010 SCC Online AP 461
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 395
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 filed by the A
lessee. It is also argued that the judgment of the High Court in Siddartha
Academy that the land is agricultural and lease stands terminated is
legally untenable. The said order was affirmed in appeal on 1.3.201320,
holding that the use of the land for non-agriculture purpose is immaterial
for the purpose of Section 82 of the 1987 Act.
B
25. It has been argued that Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Act, 1976 was passed in the year 1976 w.e.f. 17.2.1976 and that the
lands at Kukatpally became urban lands. Therefore, the urban lands are
the lands situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred
to as such in the master plan and where there is no master plan, any land
within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area C
included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called),
a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town
committee, a small-town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat.
Therefore, with the enactment of the aforesaid Act, the agricultural land
changed to non-agricultural urban land. D
26. It is contended that the term of payment of land revenue are
standard boiler plate clauses and no land revenue has ever been paid by
the lessee for the leased inam lands.
27. The arguments raised by the lessee has been controverted by
the Mutt that nature of land was agriculture and by operation of Section E
82 of the 1987 Act, the lease stands statutorily cancelled. It is argued
that the nature of land is important to be considered and not the purpose
to which the land is to put to use by the lessee. It is further pointed out
that validity of Section 82 has been upheld by this Court in a judgment
reported as State of A.P. v. Nallamilli Rami Reddy & Ors.21, wherein F
it was held that the object of Section 82 of the 1987 Act is to protect the
interests of the religious institutions and to safeguard such institutions
from the “grip of rich and powerful persons”.
28. It is also pointed out that the 1987 Act was preceded by a
report made by a Commission headed by Justice C. Kondaiah, former G
Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para 1.18.1 of the
report reads thus:

20
Writ Appeal Nos. 488, 489 and 490 of 2011
21
(2001) 7 SCC 708 H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A “It is stated that all concerned who are interested in the charitable
or religious institutions have stated that the temple authorities are
facing innumerable difficulties in the management of the landed
properties of the institutions, the income is very meagre, not worth-
mentioning, and in some cases it is nil, although the institution
owns large extent of lands. Reasons thereof is the provisions of
B
the Tenancy Act, attitude of the persons in possession and
enjoyment for several years, the lands belonging to these institutions
are mostly in the hands of the rich and powerful sections against
whom the concerned authorities are experiencing difficulties to
dispossess them from the lands. The trustees or archakas are in
C enjoyment of the lands kept Benami in the names of their relations,
etc. The authorities also are in the collusion with them. The rents
paid by the tenants are nominal fixed decades back. The Estimates
Committee also expressed the same opinion.”
29. It is averred that the Endowments Tribunal and the High Court
D have concluded that the lease stands statutorily terminated in terms of
Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The Khasra Pahanis are prepared only in
respect of agricultural land under Rule 8 of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana
Area) of Land Census Rules, 1954. Such Rules have been framed under
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1950. The Khasra Pahanis show the land as dry agricultural land and as
E cultivable and uncultivable. The nature of the land is described as “sand
soil”, “irrigability”, “trees” and “kharif”. The Khasra Pahanis for the
year 1954-55 and 2003-04 show that the land is dry agricultural land and
also shows as cultivable and uncultivable land. The land is described as
“sand soil”, “irrigability”, “trees”, “kharif”, which shows that reference
F is made to agricultural lands apart from the fact that the lands were
inam lands. It is further pointed out that land revenue of Rs.714-27 was
demanded from the lessee on 04-08-1980 by the Mutt in terms of the
lease deeds dated 23.07.1964, 14.09.1966, supplementary lease deed
dated 21.03.1969 and lease deed dated 20.04.1978.
G 30. The Mutt also relied upon notifications dated 25.04.1963 and
27.05.1975 published under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
intending to acquire the land for the purpose of Andhra Pradesh Housing
Board. The land therein is described as a dry land. It is further pointed
out that the acquisition has not been concluded but the notification has
been referred to for pointing out the nature of the land. The order dated
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 397
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

30.11.1976 passed by the A.P. Land Reforms Tribunal under Section A
8(1) of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,
1973 shows that the land was considered to be within the ambit of the
statute dealing with the ceiling of the agricultural land, though the land
was exempt from the surplus area proceedings under Section 23 of the
aforesaid Act.
B
31. The lease deeds further contemplate payment of land revenue
at the enhanced rate for use of land for non-agricultural purpose. The
use of land for non-agricultural purposes leads to enhance land revenue.
It is contended that the Assistant Commissioner has submitted a report
on 16.12.2008 wherein the land in question was found to be agricultural
and was the basis to proceed under the 1987 Act. C

32. It is also argued that the Competent Authority, the then Deputy
Commissioner could initiate suo moto proceedings under Section 82(1)
of the 1987 Act. It is also argued that no application was submitted by
the lessee to convert the land to non-agricultural use under Rule 70 of
the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules, 1951. It is D
also argued that the argument of the lessee before the Endowments
Tribunal was that the leased land in question, though registered as
agricultural land, but has been used for non-agricultural purposes. The
Tribunal thus held that even if land is being used for non-agricultural
purposes, it is still an agricultural land. The relevant extract from the E
order reads thus:
“6). (ii). (b). (i). (a). ……….On the other hand, the contest of the
Respondents is that the lease lands in question are though registered
as agricultural lands, from purpose of lease and in use by the
lessees for than agricultural as observed in Ex.83 order point-2 at F
pages 8 and 9, it is only a non-agricultural immovable property
lease to govern by Sec.82(4) of the Act, that there is no finding by
the High Court to hold the lands in question as agricultural in the
writ petition 24440/2010 order dated 20.1.2011 and in the absence
of which an observation even between the parties inter se is not
Res-Judicata or obiter or estoppel from disputing now the nature G
of the lease lands….
6). (ii). (b). (i). (d). In fact, the petition schedule lands of the 2nd
Applicant Math is recorded as per the Ex.A17 pahanies and A18
G.Os as Inam and Agricultural lands. Since the petition schedule
H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A lands are in use after Ex.A1-4 lease deeds by Respondents for
non-agricultural (commercial/industrial) purposes as observed in
Ex.83 order point-2 for consideration at pages 8 and 9, whether it
changes the nature of the land from agricultural to non-
agricultural……..Thus, the subject matter of the leases covered
by Ex.A1-4 are the agricultural lands though in other than
B
agricultural purposes in use by any of the Respondents and the
leases stand terminated by statutory operation of law from the
above as per Sec.82(1 and 2) of the Act from the time the Act,
30/87 came in to force for none of the Respondents are within the
meaning of landless poor agriculturists.”
C 33. It is contended that Section 160 of the 1987 Act gives it an
over-riding effect and that the provisions of 1987 Act shall apply
notwithstanding any compromise agreement, scheme, judgment, decree
or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. Thus, by necessary
implication, the leases would be governed by the statute.
D 34. It is argued that the lessees were fully aware of the issue
before the Tribunal that it is a statutory cancellation of lease of agricultural
land. The Mahant of the Mutt was confronted with the document Ex.R-
3, subsequently named Ex.B-3, which was an order passed by the Joint
Collector in appellate proceedings on the issue of grant of occupancy
E rights wherein the finding was returned that the use of land was for non-
agricultural purposes. In the evidence affidavit, no document was
produced showing that the nature of the land was non-agricultural. In
Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 filed by the lessee challenging the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the High Court dealt with the arguments
raised by the Mutt, respondent No. 5 in the said proceedings, that the
F lease is of agricultural land. The argument recorded is as under:
“9. …..The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and contend
that in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue of sub-section
(1) thereof, which provides that a lease of agricultural land held
by other than a landless poor person on the date of commencement
G of the Act shall notwithstanding any other law for the time being
in force stands cancelled……
10. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in reply would
submit that the previous W.P. No.9681 of 2008 was not concerned
with the issue relating to formation of opinion and if it is accepted
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 399
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

that the subject land is agricultural land, then the Rules issued in A
G.O.Ms. No.866 upon which earlier reference was placed have
no application to the subject lands……..”
35. Still further, the High Court had called for the record of the
Tribunal in the abovesaid writ petition (WP No. 24440 of 2010). It quoted
from the reports dated 29.1.2008 of the Inspector and dated 24.1.2008 B
of the Assistant Director and recorded as under:
“The lands and in question are agriculture lands. As per Section
82(1) any lease of the Agriculture land belong into any institution
are held by a person who is not a landless poor person stands
cancelled. This Section is upheld by the Honourable Supreme C
Court.”
Further I submit that during the scrutiny of the proposals submitted
u/s 83 the Amended Act 33/2007 has come into force and the
powers vested in the Deputy Commissioner U/s 83 of the Act 30/
87 are conferred to the Endowments Tribunal. Since it has not D
been constituted, the proposals have not been submitted to the
Deputy Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad for
initiating Action U/s 83.”
36. The order passed by the High Court on 20.1.2011 has attained
finality. The fact that the land is agricultural land was recorded in the E
order passed, therefore, the lessee cannot plead ignorance of the fact
that the land in question was not an agricultural land.
37. It is averred that in the written submissions submitted before
the Tribunal, the stand of the lessee is not that it was not aware of the
report of the Assistant Commissioner or that no issue was framed on the F
land being agricultural in nature, therefore, not covered under Section
82(1) of the 1987 Act. The specific issue framed by the Tribunal was
whether the leases are not in subsistence by virtue of Section 82 of the
1987 Act. It is further contended that the parties have gone to trial fully
aware of the real issues involved, then even assuming that the issue was
not framed, it is not open to the parties to challenge the procedure. Reliance G
is placed upon Swamy Atmananda & Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna
Tapovanam & Ors.22, Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba
Rao23, Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors.24.
22
(2005) 10 SCC 51
23
AIR 1963 SC 884
24
AIR 1956 SC 593
H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A 38. It is argued that the Tribunal has rightly held that the letter
dated 24.2.1964 (Ex.B-40) or the order dated 10.5.1976 (Ex.A-16) does
not amount to valid sanction as there is no application of mind to show
how it is necessary or beneficial for the Mutt. The letter dated 24.2.1964
(Ex.B-40) is not addressed to either of the parties and that in terms of
Rule 331 of the Hyderabad Endowment Rules, lease for 99 years could
B
not be granted. Moreover, it is stated that the order of the Joint Collector
under the Inams Abolition Act dated 25.7.2007 is erroneously relied upon
by the lessee. The finding that the land was being used for non-agricultural
purpose is an incidental finding in the context of a different legislation
and therefore cannot be applied to interpret Section 82 of the 1987 Act.
C It is also contended that the Inams Abolition Act has no application to
the land in question in view of Section 1(2)(i) of the said Act till 26.12.1985,
and thereafter by virtue of proviso to Section 4(1) of the said Act which
exempts the charitable and religious institutions from the operation of
the Inams Abolition Act.
D 39. It is also argued that the lessee has not made any application
for use of the land for non-agricultural purpose without prior permission
under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules, 1951
and that no document has been produced to prove the nature of the land
as non-agricultural.
E 40. The argument of the State is that the term ‘agricultural land’
as mentioned in Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act has nothing to do with the
purpose of which the leased lands were being used. Therefore, whether
the lands were being used for agricultural purpose or not is irrelevant for
the application of Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The object and purpose
of the 1987 Act is to safeguard the interests of the charitable and religious
F institutions and to revert and resume the agricultural lands of the religious
institutions to them for their own benefit and well-being. Therefore, the
legislature has sought to statutorily cancel all leases of ‘agricultural land’
belonging to charitable and religious institutions. Reliance was placed
upon judgment of the High Court in Siddartha Academy. It is also argued
G that Section 82(4) of the 1987 Act deals with lease of any immovable
property other than agricultural land belonging to or given or endowed
for the purpose of any charitable or religious institution subsisting on the
date of commencement of the 1987 Act and states that the same shall
continue to be in force subject to the rules as may be prescribed under
sub-section (3). Rule 15 of the 2003 Rules is to the following effect:
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 401
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

“15. Any lease or license granted, continued or allowed to be A
continued otherwise than in accordance with rules shall be null
and void:
Provided that, any lease or license subsisting by the date of
notification of these rules of any immovable property or right may
be continued according to such terms and conditions and also on B
the rent payable thereto, till the expiry of the period of the lease or
license as may be decided upon by the Additional Commissioner
on a proposal received from the Executive Officer or Chairman
or the Person-in-Management as the case may be.”
41. It is thus sought to be contended that in respect of agricultural C
land, the lease stands cancelled whereas in respect of land other than
agricultural land, the property can be used only in terms of Rule 15 of
the 2003 Rules.
42. The order of Joint Collector dated 25.8.2007 was argued to
not operate as estoppel as the issues are different. The issues before the D
Joint Collector were in respect of nature of lands as inam lands and if
the said lands were used as agricultural lands on the crucial date. The
issue was not whether the lands are agricultural lands on the appointed
date that is 1.11.1973.
43. It is therefore contended that the lessee had sufficient E
knowledge, awareness and opportunity to deal with and make
representations in respect of the issue relating to leased lands being
‘agricultural lands’ and hence, the leases stand statutorily cancelled. The
report of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowment referred to by the
High Court in Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 is relied upon. Even in the
written arguments, the issue was raised that the lands in question are F
agricultural lands. In fact, the lessee has referred to evidence with respect
to agricultural lands without ever attempting to lead evidence on this
issue. It is also argued that the Endowments Tribunal has framed an
issue as to whether the lease deeds are in subsistence owing to the
provisions of Section 82 of the 1987 Act. G
44. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The
question required to be examined is whether in terms of Section 82 of
the 1987 Act, lease of agricultural land stands statutorily cancelled. It is
not required to be examined at this stage as to whether the lessee is the
present lessee on account of change of the name of original lessee M/s
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A Indian Detonators Limited or IDL Chemicals Limited. To determine the
primary question, the following aspects need to be examined:
(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed by
the Joint Collector under the Inams Abolition Act?
(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which
B the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions
and Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in
favor of the lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section
82(1) of the Act?
(c) Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge that
C the land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings
before the Endowments Tribunal?
(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed by
the Joint Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act?

D 45. The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) by the
Nizam. The Act contemplates adjudication of matters in relation to grant
of occupancy rights and certificates in respect of inam lands covered by
the Act and vested with the Government, inquiry into the nature and
history of such lands, determination of compensation payable to the
Inamdar and apportionment thereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition
E Act came into force on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of grant of occupancy
rights under the Inams Act. It appears that the Mutt entered into an
agreement with one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He filed an application for
grant of occupancy rights. Such application was allowed by the Revenue
Divisional Commissioner on 27.11.2004. The Revenue Divisional Officer
F was considering an application for issuance of occupancy rights certificate
to the general power of attorney holder of the Mutt. The application was
allowed and it was concluded as under:
“In view of the aforesaid findings the case has been examined
with reference to the Act and Rules in force. It is revealed that as
per the material on record, the lands in question are inam lands
G
and the applicants are owners. In view of the aforesaid the
application seeking the issuance of Occupancy Rights Certificate
is allowed as prayer for.
In view of the above and also as per the Judgment of Honourable
High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in WP No. 9497 of 2003, dated
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 403
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

29-7-2004, the land in question, falls under section 9(2) of the AP A
(T.A) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Therefore, the applicants are
declared as owners of the land in question under section 9(2) of
the AP (T.A) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955.”
46. In an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, a
finding was returned that the land in question was converted into for B
non-agricultural use before 1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to the
effect whether the land in question was under agriculture as on the
crucial date. The finding on the said issue is that it was being used for
non-agricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted to abolish
the inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller. Since the land was
an inam land given to the charitable and religious institutions, it was C
found to be exempt from the operation of the Inams Abolition Act. The
Joint Collector held that the land is an inam land and in terms of proviso
to Section 4(1) of the Act, the inam was held by or for the benefit of
charitable and religious institutions, therefore, no person shall be entitled
to be registered as an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitled D
to be registered as the occupant. It is the said order of the Revenue
Divisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector. It was
held as under:
“The property was given by Nizam for the Mutt but not to Sagar
Das. It is clear that Mutt only can sell the property after taking E
prior permission from the Endowment Department but not the
Mahanth in his individual capacity. Baba Sagar Das is not an
institution and he is only a Mahanth appointed by Endowment
Department. The Revenue Divisional Officer has considered
irrevocable G.P.A. and the decree obtained by Kalayani Narsinga
Rao and concluded that Sagar Das is entitled to 60% and K. F
Narsinga Rao is entitled for 40% share in the properties of Mutt
and further held that the G.P.A. holder can maintain the case before
him under Rule 5 of the Rules under A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of
Inam Rules, 1955 declared the applicants K. Narsinga Rao and
Baba Sagar Das as owners of the properties belonged to Mutt. G
The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is based on
assumption and presumption and the orders speaks that there are
no documents marked and no evidence was adduced on either
side.

H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A The Commissioner of Endowment Department vide its
Proceedings No.F1/47775/2004-I dated 25-11-2006 has removed
the said Sagar Das from the post of Mahant of Udasin Mutt
Hussaini Alam, Hyderabad and framed charges for alienating the
properties including execution of the G.P.A. dated 1-9-1981 in
favour of K. Narsinga Rao and misleading the Revenue Divisional
B
Officer and acted adverse to the interest of the institution.
xxx xxx
Therefore in respect of Inams claimed by charitable and religious
institutions, no individual in entitled to maintain a claim and religious
C institution alone is entitled to have locus standi. Therefore, the
order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, declaring the GPA holder
of Mahanth as owner of the land U/s 9(2) of the Act, to say the
least, is mischievous, perverse and totally illegal.
In view of the above facts, the Revenue Divisional Officer has no
D jurisdiction to exercise powers U/s 9 of A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of
Inams Act, 1955 and declare a person as owner of inam lands,
much less a person who has no locus standi at all. Further inam
lands in question are being claimed by a religious institution and
will be covered by appropriate provisions of the Act. The impugned
Proceedings of Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella in Case
E No.L/76/2000 dated 27-11-2004 wherein the respondent No.1 is
declared as owner of the land in question U/s 9(2) of the A.P.
(T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 is perverse, without jurisdiction,
abinitio void, and hereby declared as a nullity.
The land in question being inam lands vest with the State upon
F abolition of Inams as per the Section 3 of the Act. Further as the
lands were converted to non-agricultural use as on the crucial
date and continue to remain so as on date, proceedings need to be
initiated before competent court, and not revenue authorities, under
the appropriate provisions of the Act. As the lands are claimed by
G religious institution a claim under inam abolition Act can be
maintained only in the name of the institution and not by individuals.
The appeal is accordingly disposed of.”
47. The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted to
grant of occupancy rights which was negated for multiple reasons
H including the fact that the land was not under agriculture on the crucial
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 405
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

date. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Act in respect of abolition A
of inams and conferment of occupancy rights, it is an order not by a
Tribunal having a plenary jurisdiction. The Tribunal under the Inams
Abolition Act had limited jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under
the Inams Abolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in such
proceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any other
B
proceedings.
48. In Hope Plantations Ltd., it was held that estoppel works in
the same proceedings, and also in subsequent suits between the same
parties in which the same issue arises. Reliance has been placed upon
the following part of the order, which reads thus:
C
“26. …….These two aspects are “cause of action estoppel” and
“issue estoppel”. These two terms are of common law origin.
Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannot
subsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adduce
further evidence directed to showing that the issue was wrongly
determined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum if D
available. The determination of the issue between the parties gives
rise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in any
subsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue had
been determined. It also operates in subsequent suits between
the same parties in which the same issue arises…..” E
49. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act were initiated
by a Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights on the basis of
an agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented by a Power of Attorney
holder who was claiming independent rights, therefore, the previous
proceedings were not between the same parties as the Mutt was not a F
party in its own rights but through an attorney who was claiming
independent right in himself. Therefore, the findings recorded therein
are not relevant or binding in respect of proceedings under another statute,
enacted for different objective to protect the inam land given to the
charitable and religious institutions.
G
50. The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for the
reason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the religious
institutions in terms of Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter in
terms of first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Thus,
any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposes of
negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A rights. It has been categorically held by the Joint Collector that the Act is
not applicable to the Mutt.
(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which the
Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of the lessee stands
B cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act?
51. The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lessees
is that there was no pleading that the land in question was agricultural
land, therefore, the lessees were not made aware of the fact that the
lease stands statutorily cancelled. The said argument is not tenable for
C the reason that the Inspector in his report dated 29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008
reported that the lands in question are agricultural lands and that lease of
such lands stands cancelled. It was also mentioned that the validity of
Section 82 has been upheld by this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi
wherein this Court held as under:
D “12. It is plain that religious institutions fall into a separate class
and lands held by them have a special character in respect of
which tenancies had been created and these tenancies are sought
to be put to an end to for resumption of lands for better
management thereof. It is clear that the tenants under the religious
institutions form a special class by themselves and such
E classification is made, so far as tenants are concerned, to achieve
the object of protecting the interests of the religious institutions.
Therefore, we do not think, any of the principles which result in
hostile discrimination would be applicable to the present case.”
52. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010
F challenging the continuation of proceedings before the Endowments
Tribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010 filed on behalf of the
Mutt, it was stated that the leases have become null and void under
Section 82 of the 1987 Act.
“2. …It is our case that the leases have been null and void under
G section 82 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious
Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 …”
53. The writ petition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Court
also noticed the argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, the
leases stood cancelled.
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 407
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

“The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and contend A
that in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue of sub-section
(1) thereof, which provides that a lease of agricultural land held
by other than a landless poor person on the date of commencement
of the Act shall notwithstanding any other law for the time being
in force stands cancelled.”
B
54. The High Court had called for the record of the fourth
respondent i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment) wherein, the
following statement was made:
“The lands and in question are agricultural lands. As per Section
82(1) any lease of the agriculture land belong into any institution C
are held by a person who is not a landless poor person stands
cancelled. This Section is upheld by the Honourable Supreme
Court.”
55. The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised by
the Mutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it is D
noted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land as agricultural
land. Such order of the High Court has attained finality. The following
point for consideration was culled down by the Endowments Tribunal:
“(1) Whether the leases for 99 years covered respectively, by
Ex.A1-3 in favour of R1 and by Ex.A4 in favour of R2, executed E
by the 2nd Applicant Math for the entire petition schedule property
are not in subsistence by virtue of the provisions of the
Endowments Act 30/87 (Sec.82 r/w. the rules made there under
vide GOMS. Nos. 866 & 379 of 2003 with amendments to it in
GOMS No. 160 of 2010)?”
F
56. The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that the
land in question is agricultural land. The precise argument raised by the
lessee in the written arguments submitted before the Endowments Tribunal
is as under:
“14. The contention of the Applicant No. 2 Mutt is that the land
G
covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. It is submitted that
the said contention is incorrect since the lands were taken by the
Respondents for non-agricultural purpose and for industrial use.
The Applicant No. 2 Mutt is aware of this fact. In page 2 of the
legal notice dated 24.08.2007 (Ex.P11) issued by the Counsel for
the Applicant No. 2 Mutt to Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. (R3), it was H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A stated that the lease agreements were permitted to be entered
between my client Sri Udasin Mutt, Hussaini Alam, Hyderabad
and M/s. Indian Detonators Limited/IDL Chemicals Limited. The
above said companies were entitled to use the lands totally
admeasuring an extent of Acs 539-38 guntas in terms of the lease
agreement which was more the less to be used as safety, testing
B
zone etc., as amended by the Government under the provisions of
the Explosives Act and Rules. The Pahanies for the year 2003-
2004 filed by the Applicant No. 2 Mutt vide Ex.P17 (A-D) say
that the lands covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are “dry” lands. There is
no mention in these documents to suggest that the said lands are
C “dry agricultural lands”. The Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55
filed by the Applicant No. 2 Mutt vide Ex.P20 say that the said
lands are “Isuka Nela”, which means sandy soil. It is common
knowledge that on “sandy soil”, it is not possible to do agriculture.
Except these two documents, the Applicant No. 2 Mutt has not
filed any other document(s) to establish that the lands covered by
D
Ex.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. On the other hand, the
Respondents have filed Ex.R33 which is a letter written by Dy.
Commissioner of Endowments to the Commissioner of
Endowments. In the said letter, it was stated that “…the proposed
land is neither cultivable nor useful for even grazing purpose, as it
E is covered by rocks…”. Apart from Ex.R33, the order dated
25.08.2007 of the Joint Collector, R.R. District has stated that
“…the land in question is used for non-agricultural purpose…It is,
therefore, submitted that the lands covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are
non-agricultural lands right from the commencement of the lease
and therefore, the contention of the Applicant No. 2 that the lands
F
are agricultural lands is devoid of merit.”
57. A perusal of the written arguments, as reproduced above,
shows that the lessees have submitted that the land is being used for
non-agricultural purposes. The entire argument is based upon use of the
land for non-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct from
G the use of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use for non-
agricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land as an
agricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any lease of
agricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be of agricultural land
irrespective of the use to which the lessee may put such agricultural
H land to. The language of the statute refers to nature of the land and not
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 409
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the use thereof. Therefore, even in terms of the written arguments raised A
by the lessee before the Tribunal, the use of land for non-agricultural
purposes would be irrelevant for statutory cancellation of the lease of
agricultural lands under Section 82 of the 1987 Act.
58. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land
sought to be drawn from the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh B
Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963 repealed by the A.P Agricultural
Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006, is not
tenable. The distinction between the categories of land leads to
consequence of higher assessment in the case of non-agricultural land.
The lessee has not led any evidence that they are paying levy as per the
rates fixed under this statute as that of non-agricultural land. C

59. A learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
a judgment reported as A.P. Punjabi Sabha, Hyderabad v. Joint
Collector, Hyderabad25 while considering the provisions of Inams
Abolition Act held that for the purpose of this Act, if the land is put to
non-agricultural purposes, it is not covered by the Act in question. The D
Collector would assume jurisdiction to decide the claims under Section
10 only if the lands were put to agricultural use. It was held as under:
“19. The term ‘agricultural or non-agricultural purposes’ is not
defined under the Act. However, for the purpose of Section 9, it is
sufficient if the land is put to non-agricultural purposes. The reason E
or justification is outside the scope of enquiry under the provisions
of the Act. The Collector will assume jurisdiction to decide the
claims under Section 10 only, if the lands were put to agricultural
use. Though in Form I, the relevant date is mentioned as 20.7.1955,
in view of subsequent legislative changes and judicial F
pronouncements, the crucial date now stands as 1.11.1973. In
Sections 4 and 5, the expression ‘cultivates personally’ is used,
whereas in Sections 6, 7 and 8, the expression ‘under his personal
cultivation’ is employed. They constitute the jurisdictional facts,
for exercise of power under Section 10. An inamdar, Kazim-e-
kadim or tenant may have an excellent ground or justification, for G
not undertaking activities of cultivation in the inam lands. But once
such land is found to be not under cultivation, the Collector ceases
to have power to deal with the same under Section 10. Further,

25
2004 SCC OnLine AP 689 H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A the contesting respondents clearly stated that the land is put to
non-agricultural purposes.”
60. On the other hand, in respect of the 1987 Act, the Division
Bench of the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of land
for non-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutory
B cancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) of the said
Act. It was held as under:
“A reading of the above provision would show that the essential
object and purpose of the provision is with regard to regulating
the leases of agricultural lands and all such leases except those
C held by landless poor persons stand cancelled. Explanation I also
defines the expression ‘landless poor person’. For applying Section
82, the test therefore is whether the lease is that of agricultural
lands. On the facts of the present case, it cannot be disputed that
the lease in favour of the appellant is that of agricultural land. The
mere fact that the appellant/lessee has put the said land for non-
D agricultural use therefore does not make any difference as the
purpose for which the leased property is used is immaterial for
the purpose of Section 82 of the Act. The leases therefore
statutorily stand cancelled with regard to all agricultural lands and
are only saved to the extent of leases in favour of landless poor
E persons. The learned Single Judge therefore has rightly held against
the writ petitioner and the orders of eviction passed against them
by applying Section 82(1) of the Act requires no interference.”
61. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stood withdrawn
on 27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by the Division Bench had attained
F finality.
(c) Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge that the
land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings between the
parties before the Endowments Tribunal?
62. The judgments in Bachhaj Nahar and Ram Sarup Gupta
G are not applicable to the facts of the present case wherein, it has been
held that it is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if
any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally
settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading
and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party
H
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 411
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is A
to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet.
63. The judgments relied upon by Shri Salve such as Ibrahim
Uddin, and Biraji alias Brijraji are not helpful to the arguments raised.
In fact, the lessees were aware of the controversy in respect of nature
of land and its statutory cancellation, therefore, the lack of pleadings or B
the evidence loses its significance. The 1987 Act is a Code in itself
providing for constitution of the Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revision
and review. The strict rule of procedure contemplated by the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of pleadings and evidence cannot be
extended to the Tribunal constituted for specific purpose. Since the lessees
were aware of the fact that the Mutt claims the land to be agricultural C
land and statutory cancellation of the lease was being averred for the
reason that the leased land was agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannot
complain of any violation of principles of natural justice or strict rules of
pleading as is required under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
64. In fact, this Court in Nedunuri Kameswaramma held that D
since parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the
evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of
those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was
fatal to the case. It was held as under:
“5. No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one, which was framed, E
could have been more elaborate; but since the parties went to
trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only
in support of their contentions but in refutation of those of the
other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal
to the case, or that there was that mistrial which vitiates F
proceedings. We are, therefore, of opinion that the suit could not
be dismissed on this narrow ground, and also that there is no need
for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is
sufficient to reach the right conclusion. Neither party claimed before
us that it had any further evidence to offer.”
G
65. In Swamy Atmananda, it was held that if the parties went to
the trial knowing fully well the real issues involved and adduced evidence
in such a case, without establishing prejudice, it would not be open to a
party to raise the question of non-framing of a particular issue.

H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A 66. Therefore, the parties were aware of the controversy about
the nature of the land. Thus, the lessee cannot be permitted to turn
around to dispute the nature of land leased to them.
67. We find merit in the argument raised by the lessees that the
lease executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Act would not be
B annulled for the reason that there was no prior approval. The leases
were granted prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act but even
under the 1966 Act, Section 70 prohibited lease of the inam land if its
term exceeded six years. The lease of land measuring 143 acres vide
lease deed dated 23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease deed dated
14.9.1966 and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated 21.3.1969 were
C not preceded with any prior approval of the competent authority. Reliance
is placed upon the note dated 24.2.1964 but such note is part of the
decision-making process as no approval was communicated to either
the lessee or the lessor or to any person. In fact, the said communication
is a note of Second Secretary to Government Home (Endowments-III)
D Department that lease for a term of 99 years cannot be construed as a
transfer of ownership of the endowed lands by outright sale and is
prohibited under Rule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules and
Regulations. It is not a communication addressed either to the lessee or
to the lessor or to any other person or institution. The regulation 331
prohibits the possession over and transfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearing
E lands) from generation to generation in future. The Regulation 331 is as
follows:
“331. In the light of experience regarding the possession over and
transfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearing lands) from generation to
generation in future endowed lands will not be let out on nuzul so
F that endowments may be safeguarded.”
68. The note dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads to
approval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effective and
binding in view of the judgements of this Court. Recently, this Court in
Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v. Union of India26, held as under:
G
“27. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar
Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395] a Constitution Bench
held that merely writing something on the file does not amount to
an order. For a file noting to amount to a decision of the
26
H (2019) 15 SCC 1
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 413
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

Government, it must be communicated to the person so affected, A
before that person can be bound by that order. Until the order is
communicated to the person affected by it, it cannot be regarded
as anything more than being provisional in character.
28. Similarly, in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [Shanti
Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5 B
SCC (Civ) 707] this Court held that notings recorded in the official
files, by the officers of the Government at different levels, and
even the Ministers, do not become a decision of the Government,
unless the same are sanctified and acted upon, by issuing an order
in the name of the President or Governor, as the case may be, and
are communicated to the affected persons. C

29. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [Sethi Auto Service
Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180] , this Court held that: (SCC
pp. 185-86, paras 14 & 16)
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not D
have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by
an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is
no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and
consideration of the other officials of the department and for
the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to
add that internal notings are not meant for outside E
exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable
order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it
reaches the final decision-making authority in the
department, gets his approval and the final order is [Ed.:
The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in F
original as well.] communicated [Ed.: The word between
two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] to
the person concerned.
***
16. To the like effect are the observations of this Court in G
Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra
[Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 5
SCC 413] , wherein it was said that a right created under an
order of a statutory authority must be communicated to the
person concerned so as to confer an enforceable right.”
H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 17 S.C.R.

A 69. The only approval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntas
is dated 10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication of
the Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect of three
previous lease deeds, but there is no communication to the Mutt either
of the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975. Section 82 does not make
any exception of the lease granted with approval. The approval is
B
mentioned only in Section 75 of the 1987 Act. Even if such approval is
treated to have been granted in respect of the entire land, the lease
granted with approval is relevant only for the purposes of Section 75 of
the 1987 Act and not for the purposes of Section 82 of the said Act.
70. Similarly, the argument that the land now falls within the urban
C agglomeration in view of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable. Firstly, the said Act stands
repealed on 22.3.1999. Still further, the mere fact that the land has come
within the municipal limits would not make the land as non-agricultural
land. It only means that the land within the municipal limits can be utilized
D or the buildings be constructed in terms of the provisions of the Municipal
Laws applicable thereto.
71. Similarly, the argument that the land in question falls with the
Zonal Development Plan for Kukatpally as per the communication of
the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority is again not tenable. The
E Zonal Development Plan is future planning of the development of the
area. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to Zonal
Development Plan but that does not mean that the agricultural nature of
the land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the said communication is also
not tenable.

F 72. In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction to consider
the request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitable
and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Properties
and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses
Rules, 2003 will have no application to the agricultural land in view of
the fact that Section 82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the land and
G property which is not agricultural. Since the land has been found to be
agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be applicable to the land in
question. Thus, the direction to consider the request of the lessee to
consider the grant of lease under Rule 15 is untenable.
73. Consequently, Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 are
H dismissed whereas Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 is allowed, setting
GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. v. THE STATE OF 415
TELANGANA & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

aside the direction to consider the request of the lessee under Rule 15 of A
the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other than
Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003.

Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar Appeals disposed of. B
(Assisted by : Ajay, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H