Holding

A requisition order, even if made for a permanent public purpose, cannot be continued indefinitely and must be limited to a reasonable period; a 30‑year continuance is unreasonable.

Summary

The petitioners, a coalition of cooperative societies running fair‑price ration shops and occupants of residential premises, challenged a State Government notice to vacate premises that had been requisitioned under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 more than four decades earlier. They argued that requisition could continue indefinitely in emergencies and that the Act was not a rent‑control law, so no time limit applied. The State contended that requisition is inherently temporary, that the Act does not compel the Government to provide alternate accommodation, and that a 30‑year continuation was unreasonable. The Court held that while a requisition order may be issued for a permanent public purpose, it cannot be continued indefinitely; the concept of requisition is temporary and must be limited to a reasonable period, making a 30‑year continuation unreasonable. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed, the interim protection extended only until 30‑Nov‑1994, after which occupants must vacate, and no order to provide alternate housing was imposed on the State.

Issues considered

The nature of requisition under the Bombay Land Requisition Act: whether it is a temporary or permanent measure.
Whether the Act is a rent‑control legislation and its implications for the duration of requisition orders.
Whether the State Government can be compelled to provide alternate accommodation to allottees of requisitioned premises.
The reasonableness of a 30‑year continuance of a requisition order.
The distinction between requisition and acquisition and the requirement of compensation.

Legislation cited

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948s. 1, s. 1A, s. 4(1), s. 4(3), s. 4(5), s. 5(1), s. 6(1), s. 6(3), s. 6(4), s. 8C, s. 9
Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Subjects

requisitiontemporary vs permanentBombay Land Requisition Actpublic purposecompensationderequisitioncooperative societiesfair price ration shopsconstitutional lawArticle 31

Judgment

A GRAHAK SANSTHA MANCH AND ETC. ETC.
v. ...__ ~

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

APRIL 27, 1994
B
[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, 0. J.S. VERMA, P.B. SAWANT,
S.C. AGRAWAL AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

•
•
Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948-Sections 1 & 6-Act being not a
rent control legislation-Purpose of a requisition order may be permanent-
c Requisition intended to be only a temporary a"angement-Requisition may
be continued only for a period of time-Continuance of order of requisition
for 30 years-Unreasonable-Desirability and feasibility of providing alternate
accommodation to allottee~ of requisitioned premises-ft is for State Govern-
ment to consider.
D
Premises were requisitioned under the Bombay Land Requisition
Act, 1948 for the purposes of residential use and also for commercial use
more than 45 years back. The Petitioners, an association of cooperative
societies running fair price ration shops in requisitioned premises, were
served with a notice by the State Government calling upon them to vacate
E the premises so that the premises might be de-requisitioned. The
petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Govern·
ment not to evict them from the requisitioned premises and also for
reconsideration of the judgment in H.D. Vora's case.

F The petitioners submitted that requisitioning was resorted to in
conditions of emergency and there had been an acute shortage of accom-
modation in the then Bombay State, and therefore, in such a situation.the
continuance of requisition orders could not be held to be bad in law, nor
'
could the court specify that requisitions could not continue beyond a
particular number of years; that no provision of the Constitution made
G invalid a law ofrequisitioning under which property could be requisitioned
for an indefinite period and the mere fact that requisitioning for a long
period might amount, in substance to acquisition did not impair the
validity of a provision which continued the requisition for an indefinite
period; that there was no reason why the requisition of the premises
~ "'
H occupied by the writ petitioners cooperative societies should not be con·
746
GRAHAKSANSTIIAMANCH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 747

tinned while they served the public purpose of supplying food grains and A
the like at fair price under the Public Distribution Scheme and the need
for requisitioning arising out of scarcity of accommodation in Bombay
continued; that the provisions for requisitioning of premises under the Act
had been made to control rents and the said Act was meant to cure the
mischief of scarcity of accommodation and it could not be said to be finite
in time; that 'land' and premises were separately defined for the purposes
B
of the Act so that there was no compulsion upon the State Government to
release from requisitioning 'premises', namely, any building or part of a
' building let or intended to be let and that, insofar as premises were
concerned, requisitioning was not intended to be a temporary arrange-
ment. c
The respondents submitted that the purpose of requisitioning could
be of permanent nature but not the period and it was inherent in the
concept of requisitioning that possession and user was limited in duration;
that in the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India on Acquisition
and Requisitioning of Land, the Law Commission was of the view that the D
power of requisitioning the property of a private owner was an extra
ordinary power and could justifiably be invoked only when an emergency
arose and the Law Commission recommended that the law of requisi-
tioning should be embodied in a permanent code but should be brought
into force by a notification only when such action was deemed necessary E
and that property should not be kept under requisition for a period longer
than live years.

Dismissing the writ petitions, this court

HELD : Per Majority (S.P. Bharucha, J. for himself and the M.N. F
Venkatachaliah, CJ. J.S. Verma, S.C.Agrawal).

1.1. The Bombay Land Requisition Act as originally enacted, em-
powered the State Government to require landlords to let out premises. The
provisions in that regard were deleted. Therefore, the Act as it stands is not
a rent control legislation. That the said Act as originally enacted had G
contemplated both the requisitioning of premises and compulsory letting
out thereof indicates the legislative intent that whereas letting out was
intended to be only a pern1anent arrangement, requisitioning was intended
to be only a temporary arrangement. The purpose of a requisition order
may be a permanent. But an order of requisitioning cannot be continued H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A indefinitely or for a period of time longer than that which is, in the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, reasonable. That the concept of requi-
sitioning is temporary is also indicated by the Law Commission in its Tenth
Report and by the terms of the said Act itself, as it originally stood and as
amended from time to time. There is no contradiction in concluding that
while a requisition order can be issued for a permanent public purpose, it
B cannot be continued indefinitely. The concept of acquisition and requisition
are altogether different as are the consequences that flow therefrom. A
landlord cannot, in effect and substances, be deprived of his right and title
to property without being paid due compensation, and this is the effect of
prolonged requisitioning. Requisitioning may be continued only for a
C reasonable period; what that period should be would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case and it would ordinarily, be for the Govern-
ment to decide. The continuance of an order of requisition for as long as 30
years is unreasonable. [760-D-E, 761-B-F, 762-A]

Collector of Ako/a & Ors. v. Ramacltandra & Ors. [1968] 1 SCR 401
D and Mangila/ Ka1Wa v. State of M.P., ILR (1955) Nag 34, approved.

H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, [1984] 2 SCC 337, partly over-
ruled.

E 1.2. The State Government cannot be compelled to provide alternate
accommodation to the allottees of all the requisitioned premises. It is for r
the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of provid-
ing alternate accommodation to such of them as would be in the interest
of the administration. [762-F-G]

F 1.3. Having regard to the known difficulty of finding alternate accom·
modation in Bombay and other large cities in Maharashtra tlie protection
of interim orders passed by the High Court would be continued nntil
30-11-1994, on which date all occupants of premise" the continued requi-
sition of which had been quashed shall be bound to vacate and hand over
G vacant possession to the State Government. (763-B-C]

Per Sawant, !. Agreeing with findings on questions oflaw but dissent·
ing from the proposed order.

1.1. Those allottees who availed of the fair price ration shops were
H mostly drawn from the middle and low income groups. They were large in
GRAHAKSANSTHAMANCH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 749

) , number. The allottee-consumer cooperative societies among themselves A
also employed sizable number of employees who will have overnight to face
unemployment when the shops were required to be vacated and as a
consequences, the societies may have to wind up. It is, therefore, necessary
that the State Government should, for the benefit of the consumers, first,
make suitable arrangement for housing the ration shops in the shops run
by others in the same localities where at present the allottee-consumer
B
cooperative societies were running their shops, before they were evicted
from the present shops. Secondly, the consumer societies should have
sufficien.t .time to search for new premises and the employees of the
societies should also have sufficient time to find out alternative employ·
ment. Hence, the State Government should not derequisition and evict the C
consumer cooperative societies from the allotted premises before 31st
May, 1996. [764-B·D]

1.2. As regards the allottees of the requisitioned residential premises,
they belonged to different strata of the society, and the requisitioned D
premises also differed in size. Most of the allottees belonged to the middle
and low income groups and they were identifiable by the criteria laid down
by the State Government and other authorities for allotting houses for such
groups. The premises in their occupation were also small in size. ~ven
among the MIG and LIG, some may have secured other residential
premises either in their own name or in the name of the spouses and E
dependents. As a result of this decision, it was only those allottees belonging
to the MIG and LIGwho had not acquired other premises in the meanwhile,
who would be hit hard inasmuch as they will be dishoused and thro)Vll on
the street with their families overnight. The State Government should,
therefore, give preference to such MIG and LIG allottees in providing F
)
residential accommodation. It was possible for the State Government to do
so (a) by giving priority in the allotment of its own plots of land, (b) by
requiring or making suitable arrangement with the City and Industrial
Development Corporation of Maharasbtra Ltd. and Maharashtra State
Housing Board for giving them priority in the allotments of plots, and
tenements which are either already constructed or are proposed to be G
constructed by them, (c) by requiring the said organization to construct
tenements specially for such allottees, or (d) in any other manner the State
Government deems fit. The State Housing Board has at present sufficient
number of residential premises (about 6000) available for being allotted on
hire-purchase as well as on rental basis to the MIG and LIG. The allottees H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A of the requisitioned premises were not more than about 3000. Since for j,
•
making the premises available to the eligible among these groups sufficient
lime will be required, the State Government should not derequisition, and
evict the said allottees from, the present premises till they are offered
suitable alternative premises. The State Government should make such
premises available at the latest before 31st May, 1996. [764-E-H, 765-A-B]
B
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 53 of
1993 etc. etc. • '
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

c F.S. Nariman, Ex. Joseph, Vijay Kumar Mehta, Pawan K. Bahl and
Mithilesh K. Singh for the Petitioner in W.P. (C} No. 27/94.

V.M. Tarkunde, V.M. Ganpule, Umesh Bhagwat and V.B. Joshi for
the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 53/93.
D V.B. Joshi for the Petitioner in WP (C} No. 1023/86.

Mrs. Indira Jai Singh, R.N. Keswani, B.Y. Kulkarni and Ms. Aparna
Bhat for the Petitioner in W.P. (C} No. 404/86.

S.K. Dholakia and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents in WP (C} No.
E
53/93, 1023/86 & 404/86.

R.F. Nariman, Kirti Dharnani, Anip Sachthey, H. Munshi and Vidya
Sagar for the Respondents Nos. 3-4.

Soll J. Sorabjee, P.H. Parekh and S. Fazal for the Respondents No.
F
2-3. ~

Krishan Mahajan and P.H. Parekh for the Respondents No. 4-5.

Y. Adhyaru and K.V. Sreekumar for the Intervenor.
G
The Judgment of the Court were delivered by

BHARUCHA, J. Writ Petition (C) No. 404 of 1986. President Associa-
tion of Al/ottees of Requisitioned Premises, Bombay v. State of Maharashtra,
>~'
originated upon a letter written to the then Chief Jnstice of India. It was
H treated as· a writ petition and numbered accordingly. On 21st July,_ 1986
GRAHAKSANSTIIA MANCH "·STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BHARUCHA, J.] 751

, rule
., was issued upon the writ petition and it was referred to a five Judge A
' llench for hearing. Accordingly, it comes to be heard by us. The writ
. petition, in effect, seeks reconsideration of the decision in H.D. Vora v.
State of Maharashtra, (1984] 2 S.C.C. 337, which was decided by a bench
of two learned Judges of this Court.

While the aforementioned writ petition concerns premises requisi- B

.• tioned for the purposes of residential use under the Bombay Land Requi-
sition Act, 1948 (hereinafter called "the said Act"). Writ Petition No. 53 of
1953, Grahak Sanstha Manch and ors. v. State of Maharashtra, concerns
premises requisitioned under the said Act for commercial use. Therein the
petitioners are an associatfon of cooperative societies running fair price c
ration shops in Bombay in premises requisitioned under the said Act. Some
of its members are also petitioners and others are respondents. Each of
these premises was requisitioned more than 45 years back. Some of these
cooperative societies have now been served with a notice by the State
Government calling upon them to vacate the premises on or before 26th
December, 1992 so that the premises may be derequisitioned. The writ
D
petition prays for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government
not to evict. the petitioners from the requisitioned premises, in effect, this
writ petition too seeks reconsideration of the judgment in H.D. Vora's case.

Both writ petitions have been heard together and may conveniently E
be disposed of by a common judgment.

In H.D. Vora's case a flat in a residential building was requisitioned
by an order dated 9th April, 1951, by the State Government in exercise of
powers conferred by section 6(4)(a) of the said Act. The flat was allotted F
) to the appellant, H.D. Vora, who was neither a Government servant nor a
homeless person. The allotment was made despite an earlier refusal by the
State Government to do so. The ownership of the building having changed
hands, the new owner requested the State Government to derequisition the
flat on the ground that its allotment in favour of the appellant could not
be said to be for a public purpose. This not having been done, the owner G
filed a writ petition in the High Court at Bombay challenging the con-
tinuance of the order requisitioning the flat on the ground that it could not
survive for such a long period of time. Upon an examination of the material
that was placed before it the High Court held that there was no material
which showed the public purpose for which the order of requisition of the H
I
~

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1994] 3 S.C.R.

A flat was made and there was no denial on the part of the State Government
of the averment that the appellant was neither a Government servant nor
' .,
a homeless person. This _Court, in appeal, found the High Court's view well
founded and held that it was not possible to say on the material on record
that the order of requisition had been made for a public purpose. But it
was contended on behalf of the appellant that even if the order of requi-
B sition was invalid as having been made for a purpose other than a public
purpose, the owner of the building was not entitled to challenge, the same
after a lapse of over 30 years and the writ petition ought, therefore, to have ••
been dismissed. This Court said :

c "Now if the only ground on which the order of requisition was
challenged in the writ petition was that it was not made for a public
purpose and was therefore void, perhaps it might have been
possible to successfully repel this ground of challenge by raising
an objection that the High Court should not have entertained the
D writ petition challenging the order of requisition after a lapse of
over 30 years. But we find that there is also another ground of
challenge urged on behalf of respondent 3 and that is a very
formidable ground to which there is no answer. The. argument
urged under this ground of challenge was that an order of requi-
sition is by its very nature temporary in character and it cannot
E endure for an indefinite period of time and the order of requisition ...
in the present case therefore ceased to be valid and effective after
the expiration of a reasonable period of time and that it could not,
m;tder any circumstances, continue for a period of about 30 years
and hence it was liable to be quashed and set aside or in any event
F the State Government was bound to revoke the same and to ~

derequisition the flat. This contention has, in our opinion, great (

force and must be sustained. There is a basic and fundamental
distinction recognised by law between requisition and acquisition.
The Constitution itself in Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule makes a distinction between acquisition and requisi-
G tioning of property. The original Article 31 clause (2) of the
Constitution also recognised the distinction between compulsory
acquisition and requisitioning of property. The two concepts, one
of requisition and the other of acquisition are totally distinct and ,,.
independent. Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of
H the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title
~.
/

GRAHAKSANSIHAMANCH v. SfATE OFMAHARASIITRA [BHARUCHA, J.] 753

may be. The entire bundle of rights which was vested in the original A
holder passed on acquisition to the acquired leaving nothing to the
former, vide : Observations of Mukherjee, J. in Chiranjit Lal case.
The concept of acquisition has an air of permanence and finality
in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to
the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves
merely taking of "domain or control over property without acquir-
B
ing rights of ownership" and must by its very nature be of temporary
duration. If requisitioning of property could legitimately continue
for an indefinite period of time, the distinction between requisition
and acquisition would tend to become blurred, because in that
event for all practical purposes the right to possession and enjoy- c
ment of the property which constitutes a major constituent element
of the right of ownership would be vested indefinitely without any
limitation of time in the requisitioning authority and it would be
possible for the authority to substantially take over the property
without acquiring it and paying full market value as compensation D
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the
Government can under the quise of requisition continued for an
indefinite _period of time, in substance acquire the property, be-
cause that would be a' fraud on the power conferred on the
Government. If the Government wants to take over the property
for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the E
property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving
that object."

This Court observed that the power of requisition was exercisable only for
a public purpose which was of a transitory character. If the public purpose F
) for which the premises were required was of a perennial, to permanent
character from the very inception, no order could be passed requisitioning
the premises. Where the purpose for which the premises was required was
of such a character that from the very inception it could never be served
by requisitioning the premises but could be achieved only by acquiring the
same, which would be the case where the purpose was of a permanent G
character or likely to subsist for an indefinite period of time, the Govern-
ment could acquire the premises but it certainly could not requisition the
same and continue the requisitioning indefinitely. It was also observed by
this Court that it was not necessary to decide what period of time may be
regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an order of requisition in a H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994)3 S.C.R.

A given case, because, ultimately, the answer to this question depended on
the facts and circumstances of such cash; but there could be no doubt, that,
whatever to the public purpose for which an order of requisition was made.
the period of time for which it could be continued could not be an
unreasonably long period such as thirty years. This Court, therefore, upheld
the view of the High Court that the order of requisition could not survive
B any longer, that the State Government was bound to revoke it and to
derequisition the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from it and
to hand over its vacant possession to the owoer. •.
Before we proceed to discuss the provisions of the Act and submis-
C sions of counsel it is convenient to notice three judgments of this Court
concerning the said Act.

In State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munj~ (1955) 1 S.C.R. 777, t..c validity
of the said Act was upheld by a Constitution Bench. This Court noted that
D at the time the said Act was passed the housing situation in Bombay was
acute largely due to the influx of refugees. The question of public decency,
public morals, public health and the temptation to lawlessness and crime,
which such a situation brought in its train, at once arose; and the public
conscience was aroused on the ground of plain humanity. A race of
proprietors in the shape of rapacious landlords who thrived. on the misery
E of those who could find no decent roof over their heads sprang· into being.
The efficiency of the administration was threatened because Government
servants could not find proper accommodation. Milder efforts to cope with
the evil proved ineffective. It was necessary, therefore, for Government to
take more drastic steps in the form of the said Act, and in doing so it had
F acted for the public weal. There was, consequently, a clear public purpose
and an undoubted public benefit.

In Collector of Ako/a & Ors. v. Ramchandra & Ors., (1968] 1 S.C.R.
401, land owned by the respondents was requisitioned under the said Act
for the public purpose of establishing a new village site to resettle flood
G victims. The requisition was challenged on the ground that an order passed
for a permanent purpose was outside the scope of the said Act, which, at
that time, was a temporary Act. This Court held that the words of Section
5(1) of the said Act, namely, 'any land for any public purpose' were
sufficiently wide to include any public purpose, whether temporary or
H otherwise. To read, it was said, into the section a limitation that the t

.,_
~-

GRAHAKSANS'lllAMANCH v. SfATEOFMAHARASIITRA [BHARUCHA,J.) 755

purpose contemplated by it was only temporary was to confound the A
-. • temporary life of the statute with the charac.ter of the purpose for which
the power thereunder could be exercised. The .life of the power of requi-
sitioning and the purpose for which it was exercised were two distinct
ingredients, which were not to be confused. The words "for any public
purpose" were wide enough to include any public purpose and did not
B-
contain any restriction regarding the nature of that purpose. They placed
no limitation on the competent authority as to the kind of public purpose
• necessary for the valid exercise of its power nor .did they confine the
exercise of that power to a purpose which was only temporary. Except.for
the limitation that the purpose must be a public purpose, no restriction was
imposed as to the manner in which the land which was requisitioned was c
to be used. It could be used for a temporary purpose or for a purpose
which was not temporary, if the requisitioning authority used the land for
a purpose which was not temporary, such as setting up a new village site
and for construction of houses thereon, it was for the Government and
those who put up the structures to contemplate the possibility of having to
D
return the land to the owner in its original state, but that did not mean that
the power was restricted only to a temporary purpose.

Next, we turn to a judgment subsequent to that in H.D. Vora's case.
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who was one of the two learned judges who heard.
H.D. Vora's case, spoke for a bench of three learned Judges. He said that E
there was no contradiction between the decision in the cases of Collector
of Ako/a and H.D. Vora. In the Collector of Ako/a's case no question was
raised as to whether the order of requisition could continue for an in-
definite duration. In H.D. Vora's case no one contended that the purpose
of housing homeless persons was not a temporary purpose but a permanent
F
purpose and, therefore, the order of requisition was bad. The principal
)
argument that was advanced was that though the order of requisition was
good when made, it had ceased to be valid and effective because it could
not legitimately be continued for an indefinite length of time. The order of
requisition had been allowed to continue for a period of almost 30 years
and that is why it was said that the order of requisition had ceased to be G
valid and effective and the premises must therefore be derequisitioned. The
Court said:

~ "It is no doubt true that some observations have been made in the
judgment in that case with regard to the permanent or temporary H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A character of the purpose for which an order of requisition could
be made and to that extent what is said in that judgment may have
' ..-
to be slightly modified, but the principal decision in that c_ase was
that an order of requisition is by its very nature temporary in
character and cannot be allowed to continue for an indefinite
length of time, because then it would tantamount to an order of r
B acquisition and would amount to a fraud on the exercise of the
power of requisition, especially where there is no impediment in
making the acquisition and no effort was made to acquire, must •
•
b~ regarded as a correct enunciation of the law which does not in
any way conflict with what was laid down in the case of Collector
c of Aka/a v. Ramchandra."

The Court approved the observations of the Nagpur High Court in Man-
gila/ Karwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, I.L.R. 1955 Nag. 34, which read
thus:

D
"If the term 'requisition' has acquired any technical meaning during
the two World Wars it has been used in the sense of taking
possession of property for the purpose of the State or for such
purposes as may be specified in the statute authorizing a public
servant . to take possession of private property for a specified
E purpose for a limited period in contradistinction to acquisition of
property by which title to the property gets transferred from the
individnal to the State or to a pnblic body for whose benefit the
property is acquired. In 'requisition' the property .dealt with is not
acquired by the State but is taken out of the control of the owner
for the time being for certain specified purposes. Even for this
F
limited purpose, however, the owner becomes entitled to compen-
sation, because 'requisition' of the property amounts at least to a
temporary deprivation of the property."

The Court observed that, normally, the expression 'requisition' meant the
G taking of possession of property for a limited period in contradistinction
to acquisition. This popular meaning had to be kept in mind in judging
whether in a particular case there had been in fact any abuse of power.
Orders of requisition and acquisition had different consequences. The two
concepts were different. In one title passed to the acquiring authority and
,.
H in the other, while title remained with the owner, possession was taken over
GRAHAK SANSillA MANCH '· STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BHARUCHA J. J 757

...__ by the requi~itioning authorit:· A
•
Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the writ petitioners in Writ
Petition No. 53 of 1993, submitted that requisitioning was resorted to in
conditions of emergency. An Ordinance passed in 1947 had preceded the
said Act, which had been passed in the next year. There had then been an
a.cute shortage of accommodation in several cities in the then Bombay B
State. That stringency of accommodation had not diminished but had
become more acute. In such a situation the continuation of requisition
' orders could not be held to be bad in law, nor could the court specify that
requisitions could not continue beyond a particular number of years. The
Constitution did not lay down any maximum period for which a requisition c
could continue. No provision of the Constitution made invalid a law of
requisitioning under which property could be requisitioned for an in-
definite period. The mere fact that requisitioning for a long period might
amount, in substance, to acquisition did not impair the validity of a
provision which continued the requisition for an indefinite period. H.D.
Vara's case was, therefore, incorrectly decided. There was ·no reason why
D
the requisition of the premises occupied by the writ petitioner cooperative
societies should not be continued while they served the public purpose of
supplying food grains and the like at fair prices under the Public Distribu-
tion Scheme and the need for requisitioning arising out of scarcity of
accommodation in Bombay continued. The said Act had been extended E
until 31st December, 1994 and ought to be extended further.

Ms. Indira Jaisingh, learned counsel for the petitioners' in Writ
Petition No. 404 of 1986, contended that the provisions for requisitioning
of premises under the said Act had been made to control rents. The said F
)
Act was meant to cure the mischief of scarcity of accommodation and it
could not be said to be finite in time. In this behalf reference was made to
certain provisions of the Act to which we shall presently advert.

Mr. Nariman, appearing for the writ petitioners in a newly-filed,
unadmitted writ petition (being The Maharashtra State Government G
Employees' Confederation through its General Secretary Shri R. G. Kamik
and ors. v. The State of Maharashtra through Chief Secretary to the Govern-
ment of Maharashtra, WP(C) No. 27 of 1994) was permitted to intervene,
. and he submitted that the judgments in the cases of Bhanji Manji and
Collector of Ako/a bound the Bench that decided H.D. Vora's case and that H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] 3 S.C.R.

A the judgment in H.D. Vora was inconsistent therewith.

The principal argument on behalf of the respondents was addressed
by Mr. S.J. Sorabji, learned counsel for the landlords in writ petition No.
404/86. He did not dispute that the purpose of requisitioning could be of
a permanent nature. His submission was that the period of requisitioning
B could not be permanent. It was inherent in the concept of requisitioning
that possession and use was limited in duration and he emphasised the
judgment in the case ofliwani Devi Panaki {ibid). Mr. Sorabji also referred
to the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India on Acquisition and
Requisitioning of Land. The Law Commission was of the view that the
C power of requisitioning the property of a private owner was an extraordi-
nary power and could justifiably be invoked only when an emergency arose.
That was perhaps the reason why most of the Requisitioning Acts were
temporary. The Law Commission recommended that the law of requisi-
tioning should be embodied in a permanent code but should be brought
D into force by a notification only when such action was deemed necessary.
It was also recommended that property should not be kept under requisi-
tion for a period longer than five years. If before the expiry of that period,
Government thought it necessary to acquire the property it was at liberty
to do so; if, however, it was decided not to acquired it then it was not
proper for it to keep the property indefinitely in its possession. It was
E pointed out by Mr. Sorabji that the said Act as also the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, had been amended accord-
ingly. Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for the State Government adopted, in
the main, the submissions of Mr. Sorabji.

F The said Act, as it now stands on the statute book, defines "land" in
section 4(1) to include benefits that arise out of land and buildings and all
things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to the buildings or
'·
things attached to the earth. "Premises" are defined in section 4(3) to mean
any building or part of a building let or intended to be let. The expression
!Ito requisition11 is defined in section 4(5) to mean, in relation to any land,
G to take possession of the land or to require the land to be placed at the
disposal of the State Government. Section 5(1) empowers the Government
to requisition any land for any public purpose by order in writing if in its
opinion it is necessary or expedient so to do. The proviso thereto states
that no building or part thereof wherein the owner, the landlord or the
H tenant, as the case may be, has actually resided for a continuous period of
GRAHAKSANSTHA MANCH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (BHARUCHA, J.] 759

six months immediately preceding the date of the order shall be requisi- A
tioned. Sub-section 2 of section 5 requires an enquiry in this behalf to be
made. Section 6(1) obliges the landlords of premises situated in any area
specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette
to give intimation in the prescribed form to the State Government of any
vacancy therein. Sub-section 3 of section 6 preclndes the landlord, without
the permission of the State Government, from letting, occupying or per-
B
mitting to be occupied such premises before giving such intimation and for
a period of one month from the date on which the intimation is given.
Under sub-section 4 the State Government may, whether or not an intima-
tion under sub- section (i) has been given and notwithstanding anything
contained in section 5, requisition premises for any public purpose and use, c
them in such manner as may appear to it as expedient. Section S provides
for payment of compensation when any land is requisitioned under the said
Act. It contemplates, inter a/ia, payment of compensation in a lump sum.
Section SB empowers the State Government to appoint a competent
authority for the purposes of the said Act. Under Section 8C that com- D
petent authority, if satisfied after holding such inquiry as it deems fit, that
an allottee of requisitioned land or premises has not paid the due monthly
compensation or has sub-let the whole or any part thereof without permis-
sion or has committed any acts in contravention of the terms and conditions
of the allotment or has been in unauthorised occupation thereof. or that
some other person is in unauthorised occupation or that snch land or E
premises are to be released from requisition, may order the allottee to
vacate the same. Section SE makes it clear that the allotment of requisi-
tioned land or premises shall be deemed to be a licence in favour of the
allottee for its use and occupation. Section 9 authorises the State Govern-
ment to release at any time from requisition any requisitioned land Sub-
)
F
section 1A thereof states that the State Government shall release from
requisition, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 1, any land
requisitioned under the said Act on or before 31st December, 1994, and
by reason of sub-section 2 such land must be restored, as far as possible,
in the same condition in which it was when the State -Government was put
in possession thereof. With the other provisions of the Act we are not here G
concerned. We need only note that the said Act repealed the provisions of
the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947 and sub-section 2 of section
20 stated that, notwithstanding the repeal of the Ordinance, any land
requisitioned or continued to be subje~t to requisition under the Ordinance
H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A would be deemed to be subject to requisition under the said Act.

When.the said Act was originally enacted it provided (section 3) that
it would remain in force upto 31st March, 1950. Section 6(4)(B) of the said
Act as originally enacted empowered the Provincial Government, as it then
was, to "require the landlord to let the premises to specified persons or
B class of persons or in specified circumstances". The said Act was amended
so that section 3 stood deleted by section 2 of Maharashtra Act 51 of 1~73.
At the same time sub-section 1A was introduced in section 9, which obliged
the State Government to release land from requisition on the expiry of a
stated period. That period was extended from time to time by successive
c amendments and, as the said Act presently stands, the period expires on
31st December, 1994. Section 6(4)(b) was deleted by section 3(2) of the
Bombay (Amendment) .Act 5 of 1952 and consequential amendments in
the proviso to sub-section 4 were made.

D The said Act as originally enacted, therefore, empowered the State
Government to require landlords to let out premises. The provisions in
that regard were deleted. It is, therefore, not possible to accept Ms.
Jaisingh's submission that the said Act as it stands is rent control legisla-
tion. That the said Act as originally enacted had contemplated both the
requisitioning of premises and compulsory letting out thereof indicates the
E legislative intent that whereas letting out was intended to be a permanent
arrangement, requisitioning was intended to be only a temporary arrange-
ment. Emphasis was laid by counsel for the petitioners upon the fact that
section 9 authorises the State Government to release "land" from requisi-
tion and under the provisions of sub-section 1A thereof obliges it to do so
F before the period stated therein. It was urged that "land" and "premises"
were separately defined for the purposes of the Act so that there was no
compulsion upon the State Government to release from requisitioning
"premises", namely, any building or part of a building let or intended to be
let and that, insofar as premises were concerned, requisitioning was not
intended to be a temporary arrangement. "Land" has been defined to
G include benefits that arise out of land and buildings and all things attached
to the earth or permanently fastened to the buildings or things attached to
the earth and "premises" to mean any building or part of a building let or
intended to be let. The definition of land is, in our view, wide and clearly
includes a building or part thereof let or intended to be let. Premises would
H appear to separately defined only because the said Act as originally
I

' GRAHAK SANSTHA MANCH v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [BHARUCHA, J.) 761

. enacted empowered the State Government not only to requisition premises A
" but also to compel landlords to let out premises. It is, therefore, not
possible to accept the contention that under sub-section lA of section 9
the State Government is not obliged to release premises from requisition
within the period stated therein.

We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken in the cases of B
Collector of Ako/a and Jiwani Kumar Paraki that the purpose of a requisi-
' • tion order may be permanent. But that is not to say that an order of
requisitioning can be continued indefinitely or for a period of time longer
than that which is, in the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
reasonable. We note and approve in this regard, as did this Court inliwani c
Kumar Paraki's case, the observations of the Nagpur High Court in the case
of Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.P., I.LR. 1955 Nag. 34, which have been
reproduced above. That the concept of requisitioning is temporary is also
indicated by the Law Commission in its Tenth Report and, as pointed out
earlier, by the terms of the said Act itself, as it originally stood and as D

- amended from time to time. There is no contradiction in concluding that
while a requisition order can be issued for a permanent public purpose, it
cannot be continued indefinitely. R,equisitioning might have to be resorted
to for a permanent public purpose, to give an example, to bde over the
period of time required for making permanent premises available for it.
E
The concepts of acquisition and requisition are altogether different as are
the consequences that flow therefrom. A landlord cannot, in effect and
substance, be deprived of, his right and title to property without being paid
due compensation, and this is the effect of prolonged requisitioning. Req-
uisitioning may be continued only for a reasonable period; what that
period should be would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each F
;
case and it would ordinarily, be for the Government to decide.

For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the decision in H.D. Vora's
case does not require reconsideration. We, however, do not approve the
observations therein that requisition orders under the said Act cannot be G
made for a permanent purpose. We make it clear that the said decision
does not lay down, as has been argued, a period of 30 years as the oilier
limit for which a requisition order may continue. The period of 30 years

-· ~
was mentioned in the decision only in the context of the date of the
requisition order there concerned. An order of requisition can continue H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A for a reasonable period of time and it was held, as we hold, that the • <'
continuance of an order of requisition for as long as 30 years was un-
reasonable.

The position in respect of requisitioned premises in the State is set
out in the affidavit filed on 21st April, 1986 by Vasant J. Patwardhen on
B behalf of the State Government in Writ Petition No. 404 of 1986 thus ;

"After requisitioning the premises, the Government of
Maharashtra has been allotting such requisitioned premises to
State Government servants/State Government Offices/other
c category of persons/offices permissible under the policy of Govern-
ment. The residential requisitioned premises in the State of
Maharashtra has not only been allotted to the State Government
servants but also to persons of other categories such as homeless
persons. At present, there are about 2300 requisitioned residential
and about 247 non-residential premises in Maharashtra. Out of
D
these about 1928 residential premises are in Bombay alone and
out of which 1779 premises were requisitioned in or before 1960
i.e. have already been under requisition for over 25 years. In
-
Bombay, about 1404 premises stand allotted to Government Ser-
vants and about 276 of them are continued in possession of
E Government Servants who have ceased to be Government Ser-
vants. About 497 of the residential premises stand allotted to
persons of other categories like victims of house collapse, homeless
persons etc. 11

F We may add that of these residential premises some are large flats in the
best localities of Bombay city.

The State Government cannot, in our opinion, be compelled to
pfovide alternate accommodation to the allottees of all the requisitioned
premises and we reject the plea of counsel for the petitioners in this behalf.
G It is for the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of
providing alternate accommodation to such of them as would be in the
interests of the administration.
J ..
The continuance of requisition orders made in the late 1940's and
H early 1950's and thereabouts, particularly of residential premises, have been
GRAHAKSANSIHAMANCH v. SfATEOFMAHARASHIBA[SAWANT,J.J 763

struck down by the Bombay, High Court it numerous cases following the A
judgment in H.D. Vora's case. There are no appeals thereagainst except
one which was, by a separate order of this bench, dismissed. The allottees
of these requisitioned premises (except retired Government servants al-
lotted premises requisitioned for the purpose of housing Government
servants) and their legal representatives have continued in occupation B
thereof by reason of the interim orders of this Court passed from time to
"\ time in Writ Petition No. 404 of 1986. Having regard to the known difficulty
of finding alternate accommodation in Bombay and other large cities in
Maharashtra, the protection of these interim orders is hereby continued
until 30th November, 1994, on which date all occupants of premises the
continued requisition of which has been quashed as afore-stated shall be
c
bound to vacate and hand over vacant possession to the State Government
so that the State Government may, on or before 31st December, 1994,
derequisition such premises and hand back vacant possession thereof to
the landlords.
D
The Writ Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.

SAWANT, J, I have had the benefit of perusing the draft of the
judgment prepared by Bharucha, J, While I agree with the findings on the E
questions of law, I am unable to agree with the proposed order. I am of
the view that notwithstanding the legal position, the following directions
can be given to mitigate the hardship of the allottees of the requisitioned
premises. These directions will in no way prejudice the interests of the
landlords of the premises. At present that are receiving the same rent from
) the allottees as from the other tenants. On account of the Rent Act, they
F
will not receive more rent from the new tenants whom they may induct
after the premises are released from requisition. It is in rare cases that the
premises would be required by the landlords for bona fide personal re-
quirement. All that, therefore, they will be deprived of for some time more,
on account of these directions, is the right to induct new tenants of their G
choice. It is a notorious fact that such choice is, more often than not,
exercised in favour of those who can offer competing illegal consideration,
commonly known as npugree 11 which is escalating with passage of time.

I would,·therefore, pass the following order: H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 3 S.C.R.

A There are two sets of allottees before us:- (a) Consumer Cooperative
Societies which are allotted premises to run fair price ration shops and (b)
individuals who are allotted residential premises.

Those who avail of the fair price ration shops are mostly drawn from
the middle and low income groups. They are large in number. The allot-
B
tee-consumer cooperative :-.ocieties among themselves also employ a size_-
able number of employees who will have overnight to face unemployment
when the shops are required to be vacated and as a consequence, the
societies may have to wind up. It is, therefore, necessary that the Stale
Government should, for the benefit of the consumers, first, make suitable
c arrangements for housing the ration shops in the shops run by others in
the same localities where at present the allottee-consumer cooperative
societies are running their shops, before they are evicted from the present
shops. Secondly, the cunsumer societies should have sufficient time to
search for new premises and the employees of the societies should also
D have sufficient time to find out alternative employment. Hence, the State
Government should not derequi.sition and evict the consumer cooperative
societies from the allotted premisys before 31st May, 1996.

As regards the allottees of the requisitioned residential premises,
they belong to different strata of the society, and the requisitioned premises
E also differ in size. Most of the allottees belong to the middl" and low
income groups (hereinafter referred to as 'MIG and LIG') and they are
identifiable by the criteria laid down by the State Government and other
authorities for allotting houses for such groups. The premises in their
occupation are also small in size. Even among the MIG and LIG, some
F may have secured other residential premises either in their own name or
in the name of their spouses and dependents. As a result of this decision,
it is only those allottees belonging to the MIG and LIG who have not
acquired other premises in the meanwhile, who would be hit hard inasmuch
as they will be dishoused and thrown on the street with their families
overnight. The State Government should, therefore, give preference to such
G MIG and LJG allottees in providing residential accommodation. It is
possible for the State Government to do so (a) by giving priority in the
allotment of its own plots of land, (b) by requiring or making suitable
arrangements with the City and Industrial Development Corporation of
Maharashtra Ltd. and Maharashtra State Housing Board for giving them
H priority in the allotments of plots, and tenements which are either already
--1·.

GRAHAKSANSIHAMANCH v. SfATEOFMAHARAS!ITRA (SAWANT,J.) 765

constructed or are proposed to be constructed by them, ( c) by requiring A
the said organisations to construct tenements specially for such allottees,
or ( d) in any other manner the State Government deems fit I understand
that the State Housing Board has at present sufficient number of residen-
tial premises (about 6000) available for being allotted on hire-purchase as
well as on rental basis to the MIG and LIG. The allottees of the requisi- B
tioned premises are no more than about 3000. Since for making the
premises available lo the eligible among these groups sufficient time will
be required, the State Government should not derequisition, and evict the
said allottees from, the present premises till they are offered suitable
alternative premises. The State Government should m;>ke such premises
available at the latest before 31st May, 1996. C
The other premises may be derequisitioned as directed in the order
proposed by the majority.

I dismiss the writ petitions subject to the above order.

RA. Petitions dismissed.

)