GEETA DEVIversusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.

428                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    1 S.C.R. 428               [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A                                GEETA DEVI
                                       v.
                            STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
                        (Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 2022)
B                             JANUARY 18, 2022
              [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378 – Appellate Power
      of High Court in case of acquittal – In the instant case, trial court
      convicted respondents for the offences punishable under ss.452,
C
      323/34 and 325/34 of the IPC, however, acquitted them for the
      offences punishable under ss.354, 504, 506 of the IPC, ss.3(1)(x)
      and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
      (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – High Court dismissed victim’s
      appeal without elaborate reappreciation of the entire evidence on
D     record – On appeal, held: High Court only made general
      observations on the deposition of the witness examined and did not
      re-appreciate the entire evidence – Against an order of acquittal
      passed by trial court, the High Court, being a first appellate Court,
      ought to have re-appreciated the evidence independently, and come
      to its own conclusion – High Court’s order is quashed – Matter
E
      remitted to High Court to decide the appeal afresh.
           Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High court,
      the Court
            HELD: This is not the manner in which the High Court
F     should have dealt with the appeal against an order of acquittal
      which as such is a first appeal against the order of acquittal. The
      High Court has only made general observations on the deposition
      of the witness examined. However, there is no re-appreciation of
      the entire evidence in detail which exercise ought to have been
      made by the High Court while dealing with the judgment and
G     order of acquittal. Being the first appellate court, the High Court
      was required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and
      also the reasoning given by the Trial Court. [Para 6][430-G-H;
      431-A-B]

H
                                      428
               GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                           429


      Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. The State of Gujarat (1978) 1                   A
      SCC 228 : [1978] 2 SCR 471; Guru Dutt Pathak v.
      State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 6 SCC 116 – relied on.
                        Case Law Reference
[1978] 2 SCR 471                 relied on                 Para 6
                                                                            B
(2021) 6 SCC 116                 relied on                 Para 6.1
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
78 of 2022.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No.            C
2356 of 2019.
      T.V. George, Adv. for the Appellant.
     Adarsh Upadhyay, Amit Singh, Amol Chitravanshi, Md. Shahid
Anwar, Aryan P. Nanda, Mushtaq Khan, Intakhab Alam, Advs. for the
                                                                            D
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.
      1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 06.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at        E
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2019 by
which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal preferred by the
victim of the offence, which was filed against the judgment and order
dated 13.09.2019 passed by the learned Special Court, acquitting the
respondent accused under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC, Section         F
3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the victim – original appellant has
preferred the present appeal.
       2. That the learned Special Court/Trial Court convicted respondent
Nos.2 to 4 – accused for the offences punishable under Sections 452,        G
323/34 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code, however, acquitted them
for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 504, 506 of the IPC,
Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Special
                                                                            H
430             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A     Court acquitting the respondents – accused for the aforesaid offences,
      the victim preferred an appeal before the High Court by way of Criminal
      Appeal No.2356 of 2019 and by the impugned one page/paragraph
      judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the said appeal, which
      is the subject matter of the present appeal before this Court.
B            3. We have heard Shri T.V. George, learned counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellant, Shri Adarsh Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing
      on behalf of the State – Respondent No.1 and Shri Shahid Anwar, learned
      counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 to 4 – accused.
             4. Number of submissions have been made by the learned counsel
C     appearing on behalf of the respective parties. However, for the reasons
      stated hereinbelow we propose to remand the matter to the High Court
      and hence we refrain from dealing with any of the submissions made by
      the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties on
      merits as any observation made by this Court may affect either the
      prosecution or the defence.
D
             5. We have gone through the judgment and order passed by the
      High Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the victim – appellant. As
      already noted, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
      Court as such is one page/paragraph order. After observingin paragraph
      3 that “I have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial Court
E     carefully” thereafter without further elaborate re-appreciation of the
      entire evidence on record the High Court has dismissed the appeal by
      observing in paragraph 4 as under: -
            “4. Trial Court has considered the statement of P.W.-2 carefully
            and has found that the testimony of P.W.-2 cannot be relied on for
F           offence under Sections 354, 504, 506 IPC, 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi)
            S.C./S.T. Act. There is no corroboration to the testimony of P.W.-
            2 when the trial Court itself has found the testimony of P.W.2
            doubtful. There is no ground to interfere with the well considered
            judgment of trial Court and, therefore, I find this appeal without
G           merit and substance. The appeal is thus, dismissed.”
             6. We are constrained to observe that this is not the manner in
      which the High Court should have dealt with the appeal against an order
      of acquittal which as such is a first appeal against the order of acquittal.
      The High Court has only made general observations on the deposition of
      the witness examined. However, there is no re-appreciation of the entire
H
                GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                               431
                        [M. R. SHAH, J.]

evidence in detail which exercise ought to have been made by the High            A
Court while dealing with the judgment and order of acquittal. The High
Court ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record as it
was dealing with a first appeal. Being the first appellate court, the High
Court was required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and
also the reasoning given by the learned Trial Court. How to deal with
                                                                                 B
and decide an appeal in the case of an acquittal passed by the learned
Trial Court is dealt with in the case of Umedbhai Jadavbhai Vs. The
State of Gujarat (1978) 1 SCC 228. It was observed therein and held
by this Court that once the appeal is entertained against the order of
acquittal, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court         C
would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the
same were arrived at after a proper appreciation of the evidence. Against
an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court the High Court would be
justified on re-appreciation of the entire evidence independently and come
to its own conclusion that acquittal is perverse and manifestly erroneous.
                                                                                 D
       6.1 How to deal with, decide and dispose of the criminal appeal
against an acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC has been elaborately dealt
with by this Court and after considering the earlier catena of decisions
of this Court in the case of Guru Dutt Pathak Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 116, in paragraphs 15 to 20 it has been observed
as under: -                                                                      E

      15. In Babu v. State of Kerala [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010)
      9 SCC 189, this Court has reiterated the principles to be followed
      in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras
      12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 196-199)
                                                                                 F
              “12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines
          for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of
          acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should
          not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where
          two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court
          may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment            G
          of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire
          evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether
          the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise
          unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether
          in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take   H
432   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A     into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into
      consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law.
      Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a
      subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak
      Ram v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3
      SCC 219], Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar [Shambhoo
B
      Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17] , Shailendra
      Pratap v. State of U.P. [Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.,
      (2003) 1 SCC 761], Narendra Singh v. State of
      M.P. [Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC
      699], Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [Budh Singh v. State of
C     U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731], State of U.P. v. Ram Veer
      Singh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC
      102], S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. Rama
      Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535], Arulvelu
      v. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206], Perla
      Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla Somasekhara
D
      Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98] and Ram
      Singh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2
      SCC 445)
         13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v.
      King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42], the Privy Council
E     observed as under: (SCC OnLine PC)
         ‘… the High Court should and will always give proper
      weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of
      the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
      presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
F     presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
      been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the
      benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court
      in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had
      the advantage of seeing the witnesses.’
G         14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been
      followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [Tulsiram
      Kanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ 225] , Balbir
      Singh v. State of Punjab [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab,
      AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. State
H     of Maharashtra [M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra,
     GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                             433
             [M. R. SHAH, J.]

AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235] , Khedu                      A
Mohton v. State of Bihar [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar,
(1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479] , Sambasivan v. State
of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412
: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan Singh v. State of
M.P. [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 :
                                                                    B
2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. Sanjay
Thakran [State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC
755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .)
    15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa
v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415] , this Court reiterated
the legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42)                 C

    ‘42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order
of acquittal is founded.
   (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
                                                                    D
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
   (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
                                                                    E
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise
the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence       F
and to come to its own conclusion.
    (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence       G
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial court.
                                                                    H
434   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A         (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
      of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb
      the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’
          16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [Ghurey Lal v. State
      of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60] , this
B     Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court
      in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted
      the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal
      bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court
      must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the
      trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of
C     watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better
      position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
         17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [State of
      Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
      1069] , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this
D     Court and laid down that : (SCC p. 374, para 20)
         ‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered
      with even if the Court believes that there is some evidence
      pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
         18. In State of U.P. v. Banne [State of U.P. v. Banne,
E     (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] , this Court gave
      certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be
      justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High
      Court. The circumstances include : (Banne case [State of
      U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] ,
F     SCC p. 286, para 28)
         ‘28. … (i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally
      erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
         (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence
      and documents on record;
G         (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with
      the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage
      of justice;
          (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and
      unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record
H     of the case;
         GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                              435
                 [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      (v) This Court must always give proper weight and                  A
   consideration to the findings of the High Court;
      (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering
   with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court
   have recorded an order of acquittal.’
       A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal      B
   v. State [Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1
   SCC (Cri) 336] .
       19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the
   effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
   circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be           C
   perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
   acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the
   presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the
   trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence.
   Interference in a routine manner where the other view is              D
   possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for
   interference
16. When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to
be perverse has been dealt with and considered in para 20 of the
aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v.           E
State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] ,
SCC p. 199)
       “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held
   to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring
   or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration        F
   irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said
   to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the
   finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
   of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
   Admn. [Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4
   SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officer-            G
   cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise &
   Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath &
   Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber &
   Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994
   Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya
                                                                         H
436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A        Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501], Arulvelu v.
         State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC
         (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of
         A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009)
         10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )”
B            It is further observed, after following the decision of this
         Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep
         Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S)
         429], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence
         or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person
         would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is
C        some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could
         be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse
         and the findings would not be interfered with.
      17. In the decision of this Court in Vijay Mohan Singh v. State
      of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka,
D     (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court again had
      an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the
      interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This
      Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from
      1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (Vijay
E     Mohan Singh case, SCC pp. 447-49)
             “31. An identical question came to be considered before
         this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v.
         State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] .
         In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with
F        the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on
         reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the
         High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the
         reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the
         accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court
         observed and held in para 10 as under : (SCC p. 233)
G
            ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the
         order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate
         the entire evidence independently and come to its own
         conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
         importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same
H
      GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                              437
              [M. R. SHAH, J.]

were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This       A
rule will not be applicable in the present case where the
Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a
very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances
of the case.’
    31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v.             B
State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] ,
the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the
learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation
of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did
not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach
of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently          C
illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable.
Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the
accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial
court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by
the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from                D
infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of
conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the
order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court
observed in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416)
    ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain        E
whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned
principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded
in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal
Doshi v. State of Gujarat [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State
of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first
recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach         F
of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable,
which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal
though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment
duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will      G
this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment
under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the
approach of the court which is considering the validity of the
judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order
of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself
                                                                      H
438   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A     if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence
      was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are
      demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the
      appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that
      the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case,
      there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment
B
      should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes
      to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not
      suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the
      interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal
      was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the
C     appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable
      views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand.
      Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to
      examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’
          31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of
D     Kerala [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala,
      (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing that
      though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned
      counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court
      has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for
      according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside
E     the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having
      found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the
      order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at
      by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was
      unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions
F     Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material
      evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court,
      therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and
      record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence
      of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the
      trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses
G     were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the
      evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was
      manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High
      Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the
      learned Sessions Judge.
H
     GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                             439
             [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR     A
1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in para 5, this Court observed
and held as under : (AIR pp. 809-10)
   ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of
acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere      B
appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution
unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial
Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that
unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC
came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under
appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.              C

    It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review
the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption
of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened        D
by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which
had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses
whose evidence has been recorded in its presence.
    It is also well-settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an          E
order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order
of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of
innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial
court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the
appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the      F
trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
    If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this
connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal        G
Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC
1207] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State
of U.P., 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no substance
in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High
Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and
coming to its own conclusions.’                                     H
440     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A            31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. Gopal
         Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
         305] , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows
         itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy
         evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence
         which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High
B
         Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration
         of justice be brought to ridicule.”
      18. In Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of
      Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] , in para 10, it
      is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 233)
C
            “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the
         order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate
         the entire evidence independently and come to its own
         conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
         importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same
D        were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This
         rule will not be applicable in the present case where the
         Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a
         very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances
         of the case.”
E     19. In Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955
      SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , this Court has observed and held as
      under : (AIR pp. 809-10, para 5)
            “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the
         appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of
F        acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere
         appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution
         unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial
         Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that
         unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC
G        came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under
         appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.
             It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
         High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review
         the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
         keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption
H
                GEETA DEVI v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                            441
                        [M. R. SHAH, J.]

          of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened        A
          by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which
          had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses
          whose evidence has been recorded in its presence.
              It is also well-settled that the court of appeal has as wide
          powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an          B
          order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order
          of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of
          innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial
          court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the
          appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the
          trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.                  C

             If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
          principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
          judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this
          connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal
          Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207]             D
          ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of
          U.P., 1951 SCC 898] ) In our opinion, there is no substance in
          the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High
          Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and
          coming to its own conclusions.”                                     E
      20. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [K. Gopal Reddy v. State
      of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court has
      observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with
      fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons
      and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is    F
      the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of
      justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.”
      7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions of this Court to the facts of the case on hand and while
considering the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court,         G
we find the same is unsustainable. On perusal of the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, we find that decision of the High
Court is totally erroneous as it has ignored the settled legal position. As
observed hereinabove, the High Court has not at all discussed and/or re-
appreciated the entire evidence on record. In fact, the High Court has
only made the general observations on the deposition of the witnesses         H
442              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 1 S.C.R.


A     examined. However, there is no re-appreciation of entire evidence on
      record in detail, which ought to have been done by the High Court, being
      a first appellate court. Under the circumstances on the aforesaid ground
      alone, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves
      to be quashed and set aside and the same is to be remanded back to the
      High Court to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and on
B
      its own merits being mindful of the observations made hereinabove.
             8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and
      without expressing anything on the merits of the case, the present appeal
      is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
      in Criminal Appeal No.2356 of 2019 is hereby quashed and set aside.
C     The appeal before the High Court is ordered to be restored to its original
      file. The High Court to decide and dispose of the appeal in accordance
      with law and on its own merits, bearing in mind the observations made
      hereinabove. The High Court is requested to decide and dispose of the
      appeal on merits at the earliest.
D
      Devika Gujral                                               Appeal allowed.




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