Holding

Repeated temporary, project‑based appointments do not amount to an unfair labour practice unless the employer’s intention to deny permanent status is proved, which was not the case here.

Summary

Gangadhar Pillai was engaged by Siemens Ltd. on a series of temporary contracts for project work from 1978 to 2000, each appointment ending when the specific project was completed. She claimed that the employer’s practice of repeatedly hiring her as a temporary worker for over two decades amounted to an unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, seeking regularisation and permanent status. The Industrial Tribunal, the High Court and a writ petition all held that no unfair labour practice was proved, observing that the breaks in service were not artificial and the appointments were bona‑fide project‑based. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that mere long‑term temporary engagement does not, by itself, create a liability for unfair labour practice; the employee must prove the employer’s intention to deprive permanent status, which was not established. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The question whether repeated temporary appointments of an employee for project work over many years constitute an unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.
The allocation of the burden of proof in establishing that the employer’s intention was to deprive the employee of permanent status.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25-F, s. 2(oo)(bb)
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971s. 26, s. 27, s. 28, s. Schedule IV (Item 6)

Subjects

unfair labour practicetemporary employmentproject workMaharashtra Trade Union Actregularisationindustrial tribunalburden of prooftermination

Judgment

A GANGADHAR PILLAI
-
v.
MIS. SIEMENS LTD.

NOVEMBER l 0, 2006

B [S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ]

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971:

C Section 26-unfair labour practice-Held, on facts, no such case made
out.

Respondent used to engage temporary personnel in the category of
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Appellant had been appointed by
D Respondent on temporary basis for duration of the project site work and on
completion thereof his services used to be terminated. Indisputably, Appellant
used to be employed almost on a regular basis since 1978. Procedure followed
for availing the services of Appellant by Respondent had been that whenever
such contract was obtained and project work started at the instance of the
Head Office a telegram used to be sent to him for availing his services
E whereupon he was asked to join the site office. Appointment letters used to
be issued by the said office were in a prescribed proforma, a declaration used
to be given by the employee concerned that the contents thereof had been
explained to him and upon understanding the same he used to put his
signature. The appellan_t was temporarily appointed for different projects at a
Steel Plant which also came to an end. He filed a complaint petition before
F the Industrial Tribunal contending that Respondent herein has resorted to
unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item No. 6 of Schedule IV of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention-of Unfair Labour
Practices Act, 1971 which was held to be not sustainable. Writ petition as
well as an intra-court appeal was also rejected.
G
Hence, this appeal

It was contended by the appellant that he had regularly been working In
various projects of Respondent. It was also contended that the services of

H 900
GANGA DHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. 901

personnel junior to him had been regularized and despite the fact that in many A
years he had worked for 240 days, he used to be appointed for temporar~
periods. According to him, the very fact that he had been working continuously

- since 1978 is itself an indicator to the fact that the job was perennial in nature~
It was further contended that in the instant case a skilled workman of a
multinational corporation had been kept on temporary basis for 22 years b)I
giving artificial breaks in service and by engaging and disengaging him on B
regular basis. Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act covers work of a regular or:
perennial nature and yet the employer appointed Appellant merely on
temporary basis. The question of temporary appointment of a project related
work, it was urged, would not arise as: (i) the period is sufficiently large; (ii)
Respondent gets contract on regular basis and number of days for which C
services of the employee are taken correspond to the work of a regular
employee is more than 240 days a year; and (iii) no explanation has bee11i
offered b}Respondent as to why the appointments have to be of such a nature.
It was, therefore, urged that the refuse as regards lack of qualification on
.the part of Appellant could not have been a ground to regularize his services
as his e},.perience for a period of 22 years had made up the lack of educational D
1

qualification. Finally, it was contended that assuming that the termination of
the job was valid, Appellant could not have been denied the benefit of22 years'
of service in the event it is held that Respondent is guilty of taking recourse
to unfair labour practices within the meaning of the Act.
., E
It was-contended by the respondent that Appellant had never been
~ '

appointed in any continuous job and his services were taken as and when the
same became available. The appointment letters categorically stated about the
I

nature of job, the period of employment and the fact that on expiry of the said
period, his employment would come to an end. It was also stated that not only ,
the legal dues of Appellant had been paid, he had also been paid compensation F
which has been accepted by him without any demur.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD 1.1 Under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, only because 'G
an employee has been engaged as a casual or temporary employee or that he
had been employed for a number of years, the same by itself may not lead to ·
the conclusion that such appointment had been made with the object of
depriving him of the status and privilege of a permanent employee. Unlike
other statutes, the employer does not have any statutory liability to give H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A permanent status to an employee on completion of a period specified therein.
What is, therefore, necessary to be considered for drawing an inference in
terms of the said provisions would be to consider the entire facts and
circumstances of the case. (905-C; 909-B, CJ

Hary01:a State-Electronics Development Corporation Ltd v. Mamni,
B (2006) 5 SCALE 164: (2006) 9.SCC 434 and Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and
Ors v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001( 3 SCC 328, distinguished

1.2. The burden to prove that the respondent resorted to unfair labour
practice indisputably was on the workman. (909-D)

C 1.3. The breaks in service are not artificial Requirement to employ
employees on a temporary basis is writ large on the face of the nature of the
project undertaken by Respondent There was nothing on record to show that
it had been getting contract on regular basis. The period of employment had
all along been commensurate with the period of work undertaken by
D Respondent under the respective contracts. It may be a small contract or it
may be a big one. Period of contract in each case was indeed bound to be
different (90~D, E, G, HJ

1.4. Each site office of Respondent Company is also a separate
establishment. [909-H]
E
1.5. Once the period of contract was fixed and the same was done keeping
in view the nature of job, it cannot be said that the act of the employer in
terminating the services of appellant was actuated by.any malice. Such an act
on the part of the employer cannot be said to have been resorted to for
defrauding an employee. The object of such temporary employment was bona
F fide and not to deprive the concerned employee from the benefit of a permanent
status. (910-A, BJ

Madhyamik Siksha Parishad UP. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors., etc.
AIR (1994) SC 1638: (2005( 5 SCC 122 and MP. Housing Boardv. Manoj
Shrivastava, (2006) 2 SCC 702, relied upon ..
G
Chief Conservator of Forests and Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare
and Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 293 and Union of India and Ors v. Ramchander and
Anr., (2005) 9 SCC 365, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4769 of2006.
H
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. (S.B. SINHA, J.) 903
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 18.10.2005 of the High Court A
of Judicature at Bombay in LP.A. No. 44/2005.

Colin Gonsalves, Anuradha Singh and Jyoti Mendiratta for the
Appellants.

P.K. Rele, Rajinder Dhawan, Safali Dhawan and P.N. Jha for the B
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

Respondent has its own Engineering and Field Service department
c
which undertakes jobs of industrial project installation, erection, commissioning
of electrical/ electronic equipments which are supplied by it or the same are
directly brought by its clients at vafious projects/ sites as per their 1

requirements.
D
The services of Respondent are utilized for the aforesaid work as a
contractor which is a project/ site work required to be completed within the
stipulated period, time and quality being the essence of the contract entered ·
into by and between the parties.

Respondent used to engage temporary personnel in the category of 'E
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Appellant had been appointed by
Respondent on temporary basis for duration of the project/ site work and on
completion thereof his services used to be terminated.

Indisputably, Appellant used to be employed almost on a regular basis
since 1978. His services were availed by Respondent not only for its various F
projects in India but also in Iraq.

Procedure followed for availing the services of Appellant by Respondent
had been that whenever such contract was obtained and project work started
at the instance of the Head Office, a telegram used to be sent to him for G
availing his services whereupon he was asked to join the site office.
Appointment letters used to be issued by the said office were in a prescribed
proforma, the relevant portion from a sample copy whereof reads as under:

"LEITER OF APPOINTMENT FOR TEMPORARY PERSONNEL
H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006'"] SUPP.
\
~s\>.c.R.
•'. \

A Name : Mrs. R. Gangadharan Pillai •
Roll No. : 133
Local Address: : Room No. 148/4, Indhira Nagar,
Chambur, Bombay-74
Permanent Address: Saraswati Vilasm Ezhlcon
P.O. Anitose, Kerala
B Date of Birth : 22 years
Consolidated salary/
Wages per month : Rs. 200/-
Date of Joining : 22.5.78
Type of Employment: Helper
c
Dear Sir,

We have pleasure in appointing you on the terms mentioned above
and conditions stipulated herebelow:-

D Your services are required for execution of erection job at F.C.-1 on
purely temporary basis for a period of Three month (s) from 22.5. 78
to 21.8. 78, at the expiry of which your appointment will automatically
stand terminated without any notice, unless the period of appointment
is extended in writing. During the temporary period of your service
either party is at liberty to terminate the appointment without any
E notice and/ or assigning any cause or any compensation in lieu
thereof'

A declaration used to be given by the employee concerned that the
contents thereof had been explained to him and upon understanding the same
he used to put his signature.
F
Before us, a chart has been filed to show that Appellant had worked
for as little as 4 days in a project upto 365 days in a year.

It, however, appears that he was temporarily appointed for different
G projects at Rourkela Steel Plant, details whereof are as under:
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 905
S.No. Site From To No. of days A
worked

1. Rourkela Steel Plant 18.10.1992 31.03.1994 530

2. -do- 01.01.1994 27.08.1994 150
B
3. -do- 26.09.94 06.04.1996 558

4. -do- 14.05.1996 10.052000 1458

The services of Appellant came to an end on 10.5.2000. He filed a
'
C
complaint petition before the Industrial Tribunal contending that Respondent
herein has resorted to unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item No.
6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions 11nd
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short "the Act"). Before
the Industrial Tribunal, the parties adduced their respective evidences.
D
In his deposition, Appellant contended that he had regularly been
working in various projects of Respondent. It was contended that the services
of personnel junior to him had been regularized and despite the fact that in
many years he had worked for 240 days, he used to be appointed for temporary
periods. According to him, the very fact that he had beenworking continuously
since I 978 is itself an indicator to the fact that the job was perennial in nature. E
<::..<
The Industrial Tribunal by an award dated 4.8.2004, however, opined:
....
"Admittedly, as on this date, the Complainant has not been in the
employment of the Respondent. Therefore, no question arises of
giving any direction to the Respondent company to confer any status F
and privileges of permanent employee on the Complainant. Besides, if
the Complainant has miserably failed to prove that the break in two
appointments of the Complainant was "artificial break". The
appointment letter placed on file manifest that the engagement oftbe
Complainant was for a specific period as mentioned therein. Therefore, G
in my considered view, the substantial controversy emerging from the
instant complaint has been in respect of alleged illegality on the p~rt
of Respondent company in terminating his servic~ from 10.05.2000"

It further came to the conclusion that the substantial controversy
revolved round the termination of Appellant's services on 10.5.2000 and, thu$, H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A the same is required to be considered in terms of Item l of Schedule IV of
the Act and not under Item 9 of Schedule IV thereof.

It was observed:

"I may observe that the Complainant could have taken recourse to
B section 32 of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P Act, to make prayer before this Court
to decide the ·controversy pertaining to his alleged illegal termination of
service dated I 0.05.2000, had his services been terminated by the Respondent
company pending the complaint under items 5,6 and 9 of Schedule IV for
redressal of his grievances of giving permanency in the employment. However,
admittedly the Complainant has approached this Court under said items of
C unfair labour practice, praying for permanency after tennination of his services
w.e.f. 10.05.2000. I, therefore, find the instant complaint being highly
unsustainable as I find the substantial controversy in respect of admitted
termination of his services by the Respondent w.e.f. 10.05.2000 for which a
special forum viz. Labour Court has been provided under the M.R.T.U. &
D P.U.L.P. Act."

A writ petition was filed by Appellant aggrieved by and dissatisfied
therewith. The said writ petition was also dismissed by a learned Single Judge
by a judgment and order dated 8th December, 2004 opining:

E "It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court as well as of
the Apex Court that the project related employees cannot as a matter
of right, demand any status and privileges of permanent employee.
Considering the same merely because the Petitioner has been engaged
from time to time in relation to the projects undertaken by the
Respondent Company, no fault can be found in the impugned order
F ho:ding that there was no unfair labour practice on account of such
employment and non grant of status and privileges of permanent
employee to the Petitioner"

A Division Bench of the High Court in an intra-court appeal refused to
interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge stating:
G
"Then a reasoned order followed thereafter. The learned Judge of the
Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the unfair labour practices,
as alleged by the complainant present appellant, are not committed.
.{
The finding on the issue is given on appreciation of the evidence by
the learned Industrial Court. After giving such finding, in paragraph
H
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 907
13 the learned Industrial Judge has. observed that factually the services A
of the appellant were terminated on l 0.5.2000 and, therefore, unless he
seeks and gets reinstatement to the job, he again complained of an
unfair labour practice because the unfair labour practice committed
during the course of the employment. The observations in regard to
I
jurisdiction, therefore, were completely ancillary, and the learned
Industrial Judge gave a finding that the commission regarding m~fair B
labour practices was not proved. This order was challenged before the
learned Single Judge of this Court and the learned Judge,' on
appreciation of the contentions raised, rejected the writ petition. The
learned Single Judge had analysed the order passed by the Industrial
Court and has observed as under:-
c
"The Industrial Court, after hearing the parties on analysis of the
materials on record while dismissing the complaint, has held that
what has been reiterated in the complaint was that the complainant
was engaged at various sites of the respondents after giving
artificial breaks in the service."
D
Then, the learned Single Judge has given a finding that in such
circumstances, there is no question of adoption of an unfair labbur
practice and, therefore, declined to interfere under Article 227 of the
Corrstitution. That being so, the Letters Patent Appeal, obviously; is
not tenable. Even otherwise, we see no fault with the order impugn~d" E
Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
Appellar,t, in support of this appeal would contend that in the instant case
a skilled workman of a multinational corporation had been kept on tempor4ry
basis for 22 years by giving artificial breaks in service and by engaging and
disengaging him on regular basis. Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act, it -was p
submitted, covers work of a regular or perennial nature and yet the employer
appointed Appellant merely on temporary basis. The question of t~mporary
appointment of a project related work, it was urged, would not arise as:

(i) the period is sufficiently large;

(ii) Respondent gets contract on regular basis and number of days G
for which services of the employee are taken correspondent to
the work of a regular employee is more than 240 days a year; and

(iii) no explanation has been offered by Respondent as to why the
appointments have to be of such a nature.
H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A Drawing our attention to the evidence produced by Appellant before
the Tribunal, it was submitted that from the statements it was necessary to
draw an inference as regards existence of a critical case and, particularly, in
view of the fact that the juniors to Respondent were made permanent but the
same benefit was denied to him. It was urged that the recuse as regards lack
of qualification on the part of Appellant could not have been a ground to
B regularize his services as his experience for a period of 22 years had made up
the lack of educational qualification.

Lastly, it was contended that assuming that the termination of the job
was valid, Appellant could not have been denied the benefit of 22 years' of
C service in the event it is held that Respondent is guilty of taking recourse to
unfair labour practices within the meaning of the Act.

Mr. P.K. Rele, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent,
on the other hand, would draw our attention to the chart for the purpose of
showing that Appellant had never been appointed in any continuous job and
D his services were taken as and when the same became available.

Drawing our attention to the practice and procedure for such appointment,
as noticed hereinbefore, it was submitted that the appointment letters
categorically stated about the nature of job, the period of employment and
the fact that on expiry of the said period, his employment would come to an
E end.

The learned counsel pointed out that not only the legal dues of
Appellant had been paid, he had also been paid compensation which has
been accepted by him without any demur except the provident fund dues and,
thus, it was not open to him to take a different stand before the Tribunal.
F
The Act was enacted not only for recognition of trade unions but also
prevention of unfair labour practices. What is an 'unfair labour practice' has
been defined in Sec~ion 26 of the Act to mean all the practices listed in
Schedules II, III and IV. Section 27 of the Act prohibits engagement of an
employee by any employer or union in any unfair labour practice. Section 28
G provides for procedure for dealing with complaints relating thereto. Schedule
IV of the Act enumerates general unfair labour practices on the part of the
employers. Clause 6 of Schedule IV uf the Act reads as under:

"6. To employ employee as "badlis", casuals or temporaries an~ to
continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of
H
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 909
the status and privileges of pennanent employees." A
The question as to whether an employee had intermittently been engaged
as casual or temporary for a number of years is essentially a question of fact.
The issue as to whether unfair labour practices had been resorted to by the
employer or not must be judged from the entirety of the circumstances
brought on records by the parties. B
Only because an employee has been engaged as a casual or temporary
employee or that he had been employed for a number of years, the same by
itself may not lead to the conclusion that such appointment had been made
with the object of depriving him of tl1e status and privilege of a permanent
employee. Unlike other statutes, the employer does not have any statutory C
liability to give pennanent status to an employee on completion of a period
specified therein. What is, therefore, necessary to be considered for drawing
an inference in terms of the said provisions would be to consider the entire
facts and circumstances of the case.

A finding of fact has been arrived at, keeping in view the nature of D
engagement offered to Appellant by Respondent, by the Tribunal. The burden
to prove ·that Respondent resorted to unfair labour practice indisputably was
on the workman. There had been breaks in service but then it has rightly been
held that the same were not artificial ones. Requirement to employ employees
on a temporary basis is writ large on the face of the nature of the project E
undertaken by Respondent. There was nothing on record to show that it ha.d
been getting contract on regular basis. We have perused the charts filed b~
the parties herein wherefrom it appears that the contract awarded in favo~r
of Respondent by its various clients had not only been in different parts ~f
the country but also outside the country. It has also not been disputed before F
us that although the name of Appellant used to be recommended by the Head
Office of Respondent but for employing him, a telegram used to be sent from
the site office, in response whereto he would report at the place specified in
the telegram and would be offered appointment in the prescribed proforma as
noticed supra.
G
The period of employment had all along been commensurate with the
period of work undertaken by Respondent under the respective contracts. It
may be a small contract or it may be a big one. Period of contract in each case
was indeed bound to be different. Each site office of Respondent Company
is also a separate establishment.
H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A It has furthermore not been denied or disputed that services of the
employees engaged on such terms would come to an end on completion of
the period of contract. Such retrenchment would come within the purview of
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once the period of contract
· was fixed and the same was done keeping in view the nature of job, it c~nnot
B be said that the act of the employer in terminating the services of Appellant
was actuated by any malice. Such an act on the part of the employer cannot
be said to have been resorted to for defrauding an employee. The object of
such temporary employmentwas bona fide and not to deprive the concerned
employee from the benefit of a permanent status. We, having regard to the
fact situation obtaining herein, cannot infer that the findings of the Tribunal
C as also the learned Single Judge of the High Court were manifestly erroneous
warranting exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.

It is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service
in a year, the concerned employee becomes entitled to for regularization of
D his services and/ or permanent status. The concept of 240 days in a year was
introduced in the industrial law for a definite purpose. Under the Industrial
Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten a
statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay compensation to be computed
in the manner specified in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1Q47
before he is retrenched from services and not for any other purpose. In the
E
event a viol~tion of the said provision takes place, termination of services of
the employee may be found to be illegal, but only on that account, his
services cannot be directed to be regularized. Direction to reinstate the workman
would mean that he gets back the same status.

F In Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors
etc. AIR (1994) SC 1638 : [2005] 5 SCC 122, this Court has categorically held:

" ... The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself
out. It is difficult to envisage for them the status of workmen on the
analogy of the provisions of the lndustrial Disputes Act, 1947,
G importing the incidents of completion of 240 days' work. The legal
consequences that flow from work for that duration under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different from what, by way of
implication, is attributed to the present situation by way of analogy.
The completion of240 days' work does not, under that law import the
right to regularisation. It merely imposes certain obligations on the
H employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 911

to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged form A
here."

In MP. Housing Board v. Mano} Shrivastava [2006] 2 SCC 702, this
Court held:

"It is now well settled that only because a person had been working B
for more than 240 days, he does not derive any legal right to be
regularised in service. (See Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v.
Anil Kumar Mishra; Executive Engineer, ZP Engineering Divn. v.
Digambara Rao; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd v. Bhola Singh; Manager,
Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani and Neeraj Awasthi)"
c.
The learned senior counsel placed strong reliance upon a decision of
this Court in Chief Conservator of Forests and Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti
Kondhare and Ors., [1996] 2 SCC 293 wherein this Court was considering
the question of appointment of a person in the social forestry services. The
Bench inter alia noticing the decisions of this Court in State of Haryana v. D
Piara Singh [1992] 4 SCC 118 opined that they are entitled to regularization
of services. Piara Singh (supra) has since been overruled by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi
[2006] 4 sec 1.

It may, however, be noticed that in Chief Conservator of Forests (supra) E
the employer was the State. Respondent therein used to be employed at the
same place by the Conservator of Forests for the same purpose year after
year and in that factual· matrix, it was opined:

"We have given our due thought to the aforesaid rival contentions
and, according to us, the object of the State Act, inter alia, being p
prevention of certain unfair labour practices, the same ..would be
thwarted or get frustrated if such a burden is placed on a workman
which he. cannot reasonably discharge. In our opinion, it would be
permissible on facts of a particular case to draw the inference
mentioned in the second part of the item, if badlis, casuals or
temporaries are continued as such for years. We further state that the G
present was such a case inasmuch as from the materials on record we
are satisfied that the 25 workmen who went to the Industrial Court of
. Pune (and 15 to the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar) had been kept as
casuals for long years with the primary object of depriving them of
the status of permanent employees inasmuch as giving of this str.tus H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A would have required the employer to pay the workmen at a rate
higher than the one fixed under the Minimum Wages Act. We can
think of no other possible object as, it may be remembered, that the
Pachgaon Parwati Scheme was intended to cater to the recreational
and educational aspirations also of the populace, which are not
ephemeral objects, but par excellence permanent. We would say the
B same about environment-pollution-care work of Ahmednagar, whose
need is on the increase because of increase in pollution. Permanency
is thus writ large on the face of both the types of work. If even in
such projects, persons are kept in jobs on casual basis for years the
object manifests itself; no scrutiny is required. We, therefore, answer
c the second question also against the appellants."

Our attention was also drawn to Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Ramchander
andAnr., [2005] 9 SCC 365 wherein again engagement of the workman on
a regular basis for a period of 89 days on each occasion was held to be
impermissible in law stating:
D
"The respondents were appointed· against casual labourers but
nevertheless they continued in service for four spells and that too
their reappointments were made immediately within a few days of
termination on completion of 89 days. It shows that sufficient work
was available with the employer and had there been no termination
E on completion of 89 days, they would have completed 240 days of
continuous employment. In that view of the matter the appellants had
violated Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. We do not find
any error or illegality in the decision rendered by the Division Bench.
We direct the appellants to re-employ the respondents as daily-wagers"
F In that case, this Court did not lay down any law having universal
application. Directions were issued in the facts and circumstances of the case.
It is worthwhile to note that this Court did not di~ct regularisaton of services
of the workman but merely directed Appellants therein to reemploy
Respondents as daily wagers. The said decision, therefore, does not have any
G application in the instant case.

Yet again, reliance has been pl?ced on Haryana State Electronics
Development Corporation Ltd y. Mamni (2006) 5 SCALE 164 : [2006] 9
sec 434 wherein having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein the
action on the part of the employer to terminate the servkes of an employee
H on regular basis and reappoint after a gap of one or two days was found to
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTD. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 913
be infringing the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. A
This Court held:

"In this case the services of the respondent had been terminated
on a regular basis and she had been re-appointed after a gap of on~e
or two days. Such a course of action was adopted by the Appellant
with a view to defeat the object of the Act. Section 2(oo )(bb) of the B
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, is not attracted in the instant
case."

Unlike the Act, there is no provision for prevention of unfair labour
practices under the Industrial Disputes Act. The view of the High Court a5
upheld by this Court, merely negatived a contention that such appointment C
came within the purview of Section 2(oo )(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act
This Court noticed various decisions rendered by it as regards payment of
backwages and in stead and place of reinstatement in service, compensation
was directed to be paid.

In Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., [200 l] D
3 sec 328 wherein again reliance has been placed by the learned counsel,
has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case.

We, therefore, do not find any reason to differ with the findings of the
High Court. E
We may, however, notice that this Court by an order dated I ~.5.2006
observed:

"It. is seen from the papers placed before us that the worker, the
petitioner nerein, was in employment with the respondent Mis. Sieme!lSI F
Ltd. from 22/5/1978 to l 0.5.2000. The chart has also been placed
before us showing the order of appointment, period of work, days,
worked and total days in a year. It is seen from the Chart that the
petitioner was appointed on several times and terminated on a number
of occasions with some break. The petitioner was terminated from
service on l 0.5.2000. Since the petitioner was in employment with. G
the respondent herein from 1978 to 2000, we feel that the Management
may reconsider the plea of the petitioner on sympathetic grounds and
provide employment in the same or different project. The petitioner
will not claim any back wages if the Management provides some
suitable employment in any of the projects. The learned counsel for ' H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A the Management, respondent herein, submits that he will ascertain
from the respondent and report to this Court after summer vacation."

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent, however, states
that it is not possible for his client to offer any employment to Appellant as
B it has not been executing any contract job itself any more. According to it,
it is not economically viable to appoint an employee on permanent basis and
the work is now depleting. Our attention was further drawn to the following
statements made in this behalf:

" .... Engineering & Field Services Department has since discontinued
c engagement of direct workmen of the profile of the Petitioner at
project site/s as an outcome of re-engineering process and has started
outsourcing the said jobs in view of the competitive advantage in
terms of economy of operation and flexibility it offers. Also in view
of the complexity· involved in execution of the project execution job
combined with the demands of client demanding engagement of
D
personnel with formal qualifio•!ion Including the higher qualification
viz. BE, DEE, NCTVT, it is not possible for the Company to engage
people of the Petitioner's profile anymore."

Mr. Rele, learned senior counsel, however, submitted that although
E Appellant had been engaged on contract basis, Respondent was not averse to
using its good office with the contractors to see that he is engaged by it on
the site where work is going on. An affidavit in this behalf has been filed
before this Court stating:

"As stated in the counter affidavit that the Engineering & Field Services
F Department of the company has since discontinued engagement of
direct workmen of the profile of the petitioner at the project sites and
that the Company has started outsourcing the said jobs, therefore, I
talked to Mis. JT Engineering, proprietor Mr. John Thomas, having
its office at Standard CHS, 301, A Wing, Plot No. 394, Lokmanya
Nagar, Panvei Pin 4 I 0206 one of our contractors, who are handling
G the work of installation! erection of equipment currently at Enercon
Ltd., Windfarm Project at Ahmednagar, Maharashtra and the said
contractor has agreed to engage the petitioner at this site viz Enercon
Ltd., Ahmednagar, Maharashtra. The said contractor has further agreed
to pay the following emoluments to the petitioner : -
H
GANGADHAR PILLAI v. SIEMENS LTO. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 915

(a) Basic Pay Rs. 7500/- pm A
(b) Allowances Rs. 2500/- pm
Total Rs. 10000/- pm"

We, therefore, while dismissing the appeal must express our satisfaction
that Respondent has been able to provide some succour to Appellant. B

For the views we have taken, we are of the opinion that there is. no
merit in this case. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

B.K. Appeal dismissed. C