Holding

Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 are ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and are struck down, with the judgment made prospective in operation.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969, which required that candidates for direct recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service must have practiced for at least seven years in the Rajasthan High Court or its subordinate courts. The petitioners, who had practiced in courts outside Rajasthan, challenged the rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court held that the classification based on place of practice lacked an intelligible differentia and bore no reasonable relation to the purported object of securing knowledge of local laws and language, rendering the rules ultra vires. Applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, the Court struck down the rules but made the decision prospective so that appointments made before the judgment would stand. Consequently, the Court ordered the appointment of the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani to a vacancy, allowed the appeal in CA 6469/98 and CA 722/99, and dismissed CA 2411/99.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of requiring seven years of practice in the Rajasthan High Court or its subordinate courts for eligibility to the Higher Judicial Service.
Whether the classification based on place of practice satisfies the tests of intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus under Article 14.
Whether the decision should be applied prospectively to avoid disruption of existing appointments.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art. 14, s. Art. 16

Subjects

Service LawJudicial RecruitmentArticle 14Article 16Prospective OverrulingClassificationEligibility CriteriaRajasthan Higher Judicial Service

Judgment

A GANGA RAM MOOLCHANDANI
v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

JULY 17, 2001

B [G.B. PATTANAIK AND B.N. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

Service Law:

Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969: Rules 8(ii) and J5(ii).
c Higher Judicial Service~Recruitment to-Eligibility conditions-Rules
laid down that candidates must have practised for seven years in the State
High Court or courts subordinate thereto-Candidate with seven years'
practice in a court not subordinate to the State High Court rejected-
Validity of-Held: Such a condition is not based on an intelligible differentia
D ,having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved-Hence,
Rr. 8(ii) and J5(ii) struck down-However, judgment declared prospective in
operation-Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 14 and 16-Rajasthan Judicial
Service Rules, 1955, R. II.

Doctrines:
E
Doctrine of Prospective Overruling-Applied.

The respondent invited applications for filling up the posts in the cadre
of the State Higher Judicial Service. Rules 8(ii) and lS(iii) of the Rajasthan
Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 provided that a candidate for the said
F post must have practised as an advocate for a period of seven years in the State
High Court or the courts subordinate thereto. The appellant, who was a
practising advocate in a court not subordinate to the State High Court, was
selected by the Selection Committee and was placed in the select list. However,
the Full Court did not recommend the name of the appellant as be did not fulfil
G the conditions laid down in Rules 8(ii) and lS(ii) of the Rules. The ffigh Court
dismissed the appellant's writ petition. Hence these appeals.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that Rules 8(ii) and lS(ii) ·
were ultra vires as the same violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that Rules 8(ii) and 1S(ii)
H 992
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE 993
had a reasonable nexus with the object underlying the Rules, i.e. to secure. A
the services of persons having krwwledge of local laws and sufficient
/ 1
experience at the Bar with a view to securing a fair and efficient administration
of justice; and that if the Rules were held ultra vires, the decision should be
made prospective.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court B

HELD : 1. For recruitment to the post of Munsif under the Rajasthal)
Judicial Services Rules, 1955 there is no requirement that a person should
have knowledge of local laws and regional language. If for appointment in
subordinate judicial service, neither there is any requir~ment of knowledge C
of local laws nor regional language, one fails to understand how the same is
required for higher judicial service in the very same State. Thus the ground
taken by respondent No. 2, that the purpose of framing such a Rule is
knowledge of local laws and regional language in order to stand the test of
Article 14 of the Constitution, is fallacious. The classification on which the
Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 D
were founded is not based on an intelligible differentia and the same do not
have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved in framing the
same. [1003-D-E; 1004-E)

2.1. A lawyer is required to be well versed with the first principles of
law for practising in any court and even local laws are based upon first E
principles and the requirement can be met either by prescribing a written test
incorporating local laws as well or in cases where there is practice of ta~ng
interview alone, by putting questions in relation to local laws as well and in
that manner the knowledge of a person in relation to local laws can be tested.
y [1004-DJ F
J. Pandurangarao v. Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, [1963)
1 SCR 707, followed.

Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, AIR (1961) SC 816, referre~ to.
G
2.2. There should be no interference with the law laid down in the old
decisions merely on the ground that a different view is possible but the Court
would be justified in interfering if the decision is manifestly wrong or unfair.
Rules 8(ii) and lS(ii) of the Rules are ultra vii·es Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and liable to be struck down. Therefore, the decisions rendered
by the Division Bench and Full Bench of the High Court are manifestly wrong H
--.-
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A and if the law laid down therein is approved, the same would be unfair to
members of the Bar in all the courts throughout the country, excepting the
State ofRajasthan. [1006-D-E) 'r

CCE v. Mis. Standard Motor Products, [1989) 2 SCC 303; Kattite
Valappil Pathumma v. Taluk Land Board, AIR (1997) SC 1115; Andhra
B Pradesh State Road Transport Corpordtion v. M. Gurivi Reddy, [1992) 4 SCC
72; Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 ~CC 1; Thamma Venkata
Subbamma v. Thamma Rattamma, [1987) 3 SCC 2,94; Assistant District
Registrar, Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Vikrambhai Ratilal Dalal,
(1987] Supp. SCC 27; Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of UP., (1980) 3 SCC ....-

c 719 and Mahesh Kumar Saharia v. State of Nagaland, [1997) 8 SCC 176,
relied on.

Dau/at Raj Singhvi v. State ofRajasthan, (1970) Raj. LW 214 and Muni
Lal Garg v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1970) Raj. 164 (FB), overruled.

Attorney General of Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, AIR
D (1946) PC 88, referred to.

3. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court upholding the
Rules is set aside and Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) struck down being violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, it will not affect any +
appointment made prior to the date of this judgment under the Rules, which
E have been found to be invalid. Hence, the law decided in this case is declared
to be prospective in operation. [1008-D)

J.G. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, [1967) 2 SCR 762; Waman Rao v.
Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362; Atma Prakash·v. State of Orissa, [1991]
Supp.1SCC430; Union of India v. Mohd. Rainzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588
F and Managing Director, ECJL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, [1993) 4 SCC.
727, followed. '
Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, (1952) SCR 89 and
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965) 1 SCR 933, referred to.
G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6469 of
1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.11.98 of the Rajasthan High Court
~
in C.W.P. No. 1704of1998. "'--

H WITH F
r
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE [AGRAWAL, J.] 995
'\
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 722of1999. A
'. From the Judgment and Order dated 2.11.98 of the Rajasthan High Court
iii C. W.P. No. 2179 of 1998.

AND
B
·"· CIVILAPPEALNo.24tl of1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.11.98 of the Rajasthan High Court
iii C.W.P. No. 1010of1998.

Jagdeep Dbankbar, P.P. Rao, P.P. Malhotra, Dr. Sushi! Balwada, Devinder C
Siiigh, Prave~n Swarup, Rao Ranjit Sushi! Kr. Jain, A. Misra, A.P. Dhamija,
Ms. Pratibha Jain, Aruneshwar Gupta, {NP) Viiieet Malhotra and Shailendra
Sharma for the appeariiig parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
B.N. AGRAWAL, J. These appeals by spicial leave are agai.iist five
judges Full Bench judgment of Rajasthan High Court passed iii three different
writ applications whereby by a majority of3:2, the same have been dismissed.
In the writ petition out of which.Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998 arises, the .
selection of respondent Nos. 3 to 12 who were appoiiited to the cadre of E
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service by order dated 20th April, 1998 pursuant to
advertisement dated 21st December, 1996 and recommendation of the High
Court has been assailed by challenging the validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii)
· of The Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 (herei.iiafter referred to
as the 'Rules' making only those advocates eligible for consideration to the
· post of R:ijasthan Higher Judicial Service who are practisiiig iii the Rajasthan F ·
· High Court and courts subordiiiate thereto, on grounds, inter alia, that the
same were violative of Fundamental Right. guaranteed to a citiz~n _of India,
enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the writ petition,
out of which Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 arises, apart from challengiiig
validity of the said rules on th~ aforesaid grounds, the decision. of th~ High G
Court on its administrative side.was assailed whereby candidature. of the writ
. petitioner was not considered as he was full time-salaried Deputy District
Attorney in the State of Haryana and being in State service _was not eligible
for consideration under Article 233 of the Constitution, apart from the ground
, that he was not practisiiig iii any such court. In the third writ petitioO: o~t
·.of which Civil Appeal No.· 722 of 1999 arises, the selection was challenged H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A on the ground that the same was made in violation of the Rules.
The High Court issued an advertisement on 2 lst December, 1996 inviting
applications for filling up eleven posts in the cadre of Rajasthan Higher
Judicial Service to be filled up in terms of the Rules. The appellant in Civir'
Appeal No. 6469of1998, who w.,; a practising Advo~ate in the District Court,
B Bareilly, a Court subordinate to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
applied in response to the said advertisement considering himself to be
eligible though the said advertisement specifically provided that a candidate
must have practised for seven years in Rajasthan High Court or courts
suhordinate thereto: He submitted his application through the District Judge,
C Bareilly. His application was processed by ti\• Rajasthan High Court and he
was called for interview. After interview, the Selection Committee found him
meritorious and placed his name in the proposed select list However, the Full
Court, in its meeting held on 19th December, 1997, did not recommend the
name of the appellant as it was found to be de hors the Rules not being found
eligible for the reason that he had not practised for seven years in the High
D Court of Rajasthan or the Co~rts subordinate thereto, which ·necessitated.
filing of writ application before;tJie High Court.

Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 had applied in response to
the said advertisement but he was not called for interview and his candidature
was not considered by the High Court on the ground that he was iii· the
service of the State of Haryana; having been appointed there as a full-time-
salaried Deputy District Attorney. According to the appellant, the period
spent by him as Deputy District Attorney should have been treated to be
period spent as a practising Advocate. ' .· · ·

Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1999 is a practising Advocate in
F the Courts at Deeg (District Bharatpur) which is a court subordinate to the
Rajasthan High Court. He had applied for the post in response to the said
advertisement He was interviewed. The Selection Committee did not find him
suitable for appointment. His grievance is that two candidates, who had duly
been selected and appointed, viz., Shri Seeta Ram and Shri Ram Singh Meena
G had been selected by allowing relaxation in the minimum marks fixed _by the
Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee was llot competent to
relax the minimum marks, their appointments were void, being de hors the
Rules, and prayed that the entire selection process be quashed as the sa~e
stood vitiated.

H All the writ applications were contested by the High Court which was
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE [AGRA WAL, J.] 997

- ( ' -i
respondent no. 2 therein on grounds, inter alia, that the Rules in question A
, do not suffer from the vice of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the
condition of qualification of seven years practice as an Advocate in Rajasthan
High Court or courts subordinate thereto prescribed in the Rules had a
reasonable nexus with the object underlying the Rules in view of the fact that
seven years practice will enable a person to be recruited to have sufficient
knowledge of local laws, local conditions as well as regional language which B
are necessary for the discharge of duties of District and Sessions Judge
efficiently and thus the Rules were based upon a reasonable classification
.,... founded on intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus to the object
sought to be achieved and thus were valid. The claim of the appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 was resisted by the High Court on the ground that c
he being salaried employee ofHaryana Government was already in the service
of that State as such was not eligible for being considered on this ground
as well apart from the fact that he never practised in any such court. In Civil
appeal No. 722 of 1999, the High Court took the stand that there had been
no relaxation whatsoever in favour of any candidate as there was no minimum
marks fixed by the Committee. D

All the three writ applications were first placed before a Division Bench
of the High Court which having entertained doubt regarding correctness of
Division Bench judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dau/at Raj
Singhvi v. State of Rajasthan, (1970) Rajasthan Law Weekly 214 and three
judges Full Bench judgment of that Court in Muni Lal Garg v. State of
E
Rajasthan and others, AIR (1970) Raj. 164, wherein validity of the aforesaid
Rules had been challenged and upheld, as such the matter was referred to a
larger Bench and the same was accordingly placed before a Full Bench of five
judges. The Full Bench by a majority of 3:2 has approved the law laid down
by the High Court in its previous decisions upholding validity of the Rules F
and consequently, writ application filed by appellant of Civil Appeal No. 6469
of 1998 was dismissed. So far writ application filed by appellant of Civil
Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 is concerned, the High Court unanimously held that
an Advocate employed with the Government as its law officer, even on terms
of payment of salary would not cease to be an Advocate in terms of the Rules
if the condition is that such an Advocate is required to act or plead in courts G
_, on behalf of the employer and in the case on hand, it was held that as the
( appellant was engaged on payment of salary to act and plead on behalf of
,,,, the Government of Haryana in a court of law as an Advocate, he was eligible
to be called for interview inasmuch as the High Court was not justified in
refusing to call him for interview. Even after the majority dismissed the writ H
Q.

998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A application of this appellant as the Rules were held to be intra vires but the ~--~
Court refused to grant any relief to him in view of the fact that selected
candidates had joined their duties and this appellant was yet to be interviewed
r ·-..,~
and it was not certain that he would be selected in the interview. In view of
these facts, the Court did not think it proper to quash the entire selection and
upset the appointments and accordingly, no relief was granted in favour of
B this appella!J.t but. direction was given to the· Court on its administrative side
to process the applications of the candidates like him for direct recruitment
in Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service in future in the light of the aforesaid
observations. So far the writ application filed by appellant in Civil Appeal No. '""'f

c
722 of 1999 is concerned, the High Court unanimously dismissed the same
having found the same devoid of any substance. While dismissing the writ
-
"--·
~·

application, the Court has passed severe strictures against the appellant
observing that the writ application was filed by him without any sense of
responsibility as the appellant who was practising Advocate had filed the writ
application in a cavalier manner which was shocking to judicial conscience.
While dismissing the writ application, the Court awarded cost of Rs. 5000
D against this appellant. Hence, these appeals by special leave.

Shri Jagdeep Dhankhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998 submitted that Rules 8(ii) and
15(ii) of the Rules requiring that only those Advocates are entitled to be
considered for direct recruitment to Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service who
E
have practised in Rajasthan High Court or Courts subordinate thereto for
a period of not less than seven years and _thereby debarring all other Advocates
practising outside the State of Rajasthan though within the territory of India
are ultra vires as the same violates fundamental rights of a citizen guaranteed
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as such a classification
F was not reasonable as founded on no intelligible differentia having a
reasonable nexus sought to be achieved as laid down by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in J. Pandurangarao v. Andhra Pradesh Public Service
Commission, [1963] I SCR 707. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 submitted that the rejection of his
candidature on the ground that he was already in the service of the State of
G Haryana by holding a salaried post of Deputy District Attorney having been
found to be unjustified, the High Court should not have refused to grant relief
in his favour. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in Civil ~·

Appeal No. 722 of 1999 submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the
..
case, the High Court was not justified in passing severe strictures and
H awarding heavy costs against this appellant.
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE [AGRAWAL, J.] 999

Shri P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Rajasthan A
High Court (respondent No. 2). on the otht'.r hand, submitted that the aforesaid
Rules are valid piece of legislation which have been framed by the Governor
of Rajasthan in consultation with the High Court and the same cannot be said
to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as the classification
has a reasonable nexus with the object underlying the Rµles, i.e., to secure B
services of persons having knowledge of local laws as well as regional
language and sufficient experience at the Bar with a view to secure Iair and
efficient administration of justice and the Rules were framed in the year 1969,
i.e., six years after the law was laid down by a Constitution Bench of.this
., Court in the case of J. Pandurangarao (supra) incorporating a criteria expressly
approved therein as such the Rules cannot be questioned as constitutionally C
invalid. It has been further submitted that as validity of the Rules has been
repeatedly approved by the High Court and all the recruitments and
appointments have been made in accordance therewith, it would not be
expedient to unsettle the law which has been settled by several decisions of
the High Court. Shri Rao, in the alternative, submitted that in case this Court
comes to the conclusion that the aforesaid Rules are ultra vires, the operation D
of the decision may be made prospective as during this long period of 32
years, when the Rules remained in force, a number of selections have been
made in accordance with the Rules and even after the impugned judgment
passed by the High Court, one post which was kept vacant by virtue o_f the
interim order passed by the High Court in writ application filed by appellant E
in Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998 has been filled up by appointing one Shri
Uma Kant Aggarwal who has been confirmed also after completion of probation
period and has been discharging judicial functions. It was submitted that after
the impugned selection, one more selection process started and the same has
been also completed by making appointments. Thereafter, another process of
selection has also started and the same will cause complications and delay F
the further selection in case the decision of this Court is not made prospective.
In view of the rival submission, the question that calls for decision of this
Court is as to whether Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) are ultra vires Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution?

Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1969 have been framed by the
G
Governor of Rajasthan in consultation with the Rajasthan High Court and
· Rule 3(b) whereof defines 'the Court' as the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan. Rule 8(ii) and Rule 15(ii) of the Rules require that direct recruitment
to Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service is to be made from amongst the Advocates
who have practised in the Rajasthan High Court or courts I
subordinate !H
- ....

1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A thereto, for a period not less than seven years. The provisions in these Rules
thus debar all Advocates practising throughout the country, excepting those .
practising in the State of Rajasthan, even from applying to the post of
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service much less recruited. Under Rule 20,
applications received from eligible persons have to be scrutinized. Sub Rule
(2) of Rule 20 provides for the interview of eligible candidates by a Committee
B of Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan headed by its Chief Justice for
recruitment to the post in question and no written test at all has been
prescribed. Under Rule 20(3) of the Rules, recommendations made by a
Committee pursuant to the interview are required to be placed before full court
with relevant records which is required to make final selection of the candidate
C suitable for appointment to the service in order of merit. Under Rule 21, the
High Court is required to recommend names of the candidates to the Governor
of the State for their appointment to the service. For better appreciation, it will
be useful to refer to Rules 3(b), 8 and 15 of the Rules which run thus:-

"3(b): "Court" means the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan.
D
8: Sources of recruitment-Recruitment to the service shall be made-

(i) by promotion from amongst the members of the Rajasthan Judicial
Service; or
(ii) by direct recruitment from the advocates who have practised in
E the Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less
than seven years.

15: Qualifications:-A candidate for direct recruitment to the service-

(i) must be a citizen of India, and
F (ii) must be an advocate who has practiced in the Court or Courts
subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years."
[Emphasis added]

At this place, it may be relevant to refer to certain provisions ofRajasthan
G Judicial Service Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'Subordinate Judicial
Service Rules') which relates to appointment to Rajasthan Subordinate Judicial
Service, i.e., munsifs at the grass root level. Qualification for munsif is
prescribed by Rule 11 of the said Rules to be a person having at least three
years practice as a lawyer which would obviously mean that a lawyer of three
years standing irrespective of the. place of practice whether within the
H jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court or outside its jurisdiction. It further
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE (AGRAWAL, J.] 1001
prescribes that a candidate must possess thorough knowledge of Hindi written A
in Devnagari Script. For proper appreciation, it would be necessary to quote
..,, aforesaid Rule which reads thus:-

"11. Qualification:-( I) No candidate shall be eligible for recruitment
to the service unless:-
B
(a) he is a Bachelor of Laws (Two years Course uIJ.4,er the old
scheme) or Bachelor of Laws (Professional) of any University .
established by Law in India and recognised for the purpose by
the Governor or a Barrister of England or Northern Ireland or a
member of the faculty of Advocates in Scotland: and

(b) he has not less than three years practice as a lawyer.
c
(2) Every candidate must possess a thorough knowledge of Hindi
• written in Devnagri Script."
[Emphasis added]

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties have heavily D
relied upon Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of J.
Pandhurangarao (supra) in which it was noticed that all the High Courts
have the same status; all of them stand fqr the same highest traditions of the
Bar and the administration of justice, and Advocates enrolled in all of them
are presumed to follow the same standards and to subscribe the same spirit E
of serving the cause of the administration of justice. In that case, the appellant
J. Pandurangarao belonged to a family which has been settled in the district
of Guntur within the State of Andhra Pradesh for several generations past,
he was born, brought up and educated in the said district, he secured Bachelor
of Arts degree from a college within the State of Andhra Pradesh, whereafter,
he took his LL.B. degree from the Nagpur University and got himself enrolled F
as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court in the year 1954 and started
practice in a court within Guntur district in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In
January 1961, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission invited
applications for selection for the posts of District Munsifs in the State of
Andhra Pradesh for which the said appellant applied but his candidature was O
rejected on the ground that he did not fulfil the conditions set out in paragraph
4A( 1) of the Commission's Notification published on 17th December, 1960, by
which the applications were invited. According to said paragraph which was
based upon Rule l 2(b) of the Andhra State Judicial Service Rules framed by
the Governor of Andhra Pradesh for making appointment in subordinate
judiciary in the State of Andhra Pradesh according to which only those H
--'-{.·
\ ... /

1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A Advocates could apply for direct recruitment as District Munsifs who have
been practising as an Advocate in Andhra Pradesh High Court and actually
practising in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in India for a period not
less than three years. The appellant before the Supreme Court fulfilled only
second condition as he was practising in subordinate court but he did not
fulfil the first condition as he had never practised in the Andhra Pradesh High
B Court. As the candidature of the appellant J. Pandurangarao was rejected,
he moved this Court by filing a writ application under Article 32 of the
Constitution for striking down Rule 12(b) and Notification aforesaid on the
ground that the same were ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

C While considering the attack on the Rule, the Court observed that when
any Rule or a statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes
Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test
is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from
others left out of the group; and the second is that the differentia in question
D must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
Rule or a statutory provision in question. It was observed that the object of
the Rule was to recruit suitable and proper persons to the judicial service in
the State of Andhra Pradesh with a view to secure fair and efficient
administration of justice, and so there can be no doubt that it would be
E perfectly competent to the authority concerned to prescribe qualifications for
eligibility for appointment to the said service. Knowledge of local laws as well
as knowledge of regional language and adequate experience at the Bar may
be prescribed as a qualification which the applicants must satisfy before they
apply for the post. In that case, it was contended before this Court that the
Rules were framed to require an applicant to possess knowledge of local laws.
F Though this Court in the case of Pandurangaro (supra) has expressly laid (
down that validity of such a rule can be· sustained on the ground that the
object intended to be achieved thereby is that the applicant should have
adequate knowledge of local laws and regional language, but while saying so,
- ;
it has observed that for achieving this object, the proper course could be to
G prescribe a suitable examination which a candidate should pass whereby
knowledge of local laws can be tested.

In the case of Pandurangarao (supra), this Court found that even
according to stand of the State, the Rules could not be sustained as the ,_
object that a person must have adequate knowledge of local laws could not
H be achieved by the Rules in view of the fact that according to requirement,
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE[AGRAWAL,J.] 1003
only that person is entitled to apply for recruitment to the post of subordinate A
judicial service in the State of Andhra Pradesh who is practising as an
Advocate of Andhra Pradesh High Court and has been actually practising
in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction throughout the territory of India.

In the present case, the attack to the Rule has been resisted on the sole
ground that the classification, confining Advocates practising in the Rajasthan B
High Court or courts subordinate thereto for being eligible for consideration
to Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, has reasonable nexus that they have
knowledge of local laws and regional language. Question is whether, in fact,
this ground, exists or not? Rule 11 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules
which relates to appointment in subordinate Judicial Service in Rajasthan lays C
down that any Advocate who has practised in any court throughout the
territory. of India is eligible for the post of Munsif. For the post of Munsif,
knowledge oflocal law and regional language is much more required. The said
Rule 11 further lays down that a candidate must possess a thorough knowledge
of Hindi written in Devnagri Script. Thus for recruitment to the post of
Munsif, there is no requirement that a person should have knowledge of local D
laws and regional language. If for appointment in subordinate judicial service,
neither there is any requirement of knowledge of local laws nor regional
language, we really fail to understand how the same is required for higher
judicial seryice in the very same State, i.e., in the State of Rajasthan. Thus,
we find that the ground taken by respondent No. 2, that purpose of framing E
such a rule is knowledge of local law and regional language in order to stand
the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, is fallacious

Indian Constitution is basically federal in form and is marked by the
traditional characteristics of a federal system, namely, supremacy of the
Constitution, division of power between the Union and States and existence F
of an independent judiciary. From Kashmir to Kanyakumari, the country is one
and there is no intelligible differentia which distinguishes Advocates practising
within the State of Rajasthan and those practising outside Rajasthan but
within the territory of India. In the case of Pandurangarao ( supra ), this
Court observed that throughout the country in the curriculum, study of
important local laws is generally included apart from general laws, which G
would meet the requirement of knowledge of important local laws. In that very
case, as already stated, it was further observed that for knowledge of local
laws, a suitable examination may be conducted which a candidate should
pass. The Court thus observed in that case at page 717 which runs thus:-

"It is not clear that the impugned rule can effectively meet the alleged H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A requirement of the knowledge of local laws. If the object intended to
be achieved is that the applicant should have adequate knowledge. ,-·
,(
of local laws, the usual and proper course to adopt in that behalf
is to prescribe a suitable examination which candidates should pass,
or adopt some other effective method. No material has been placed
before us to show that the alleged requirement about the knowledge
B of local laws can be met on the two grounds suggested in support
of the validity of the rule. Besides, study of general laws prevailing
in the country as a whole, and the study of important local laws are
generally included in the curriculum prescribed for the law Degree,
and obtaining a Law Degree which would entitle a person to be
c enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement of the
knowledge of important local laws."
· [Emphasis added]

The matter may be examined from another angle as a lawyer is required
to be well versed with the first principles of law for practising in any court
D and even local laws are based upon first principles and the requirement can
be met either by prescribing a written test incorporating local laws as well or
in cases where there is practice of taking interview alone, by putting questions
in relation to local laws as well and in that manner knowledge of a person in
relation to local law can be tested. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6469 of
E 1998 was interviewed by Committee of Judges of the High Court headed by
its Chief Justice which found him fit for appointment to the post of Higher
Judicial Service in Rajasthan and made recommendations in his favour but his
candidature was rejected by Full Court of the High Court as he was not
eligible under the Rules. Thus, we find that none of the two tests enumerated
in the. case of J Pandurangarao to sustain validity of Rule on the ground
F of infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution is available as it could not be y

shown that the classification on which the Rules were founded was based on
an intelligible differentia and the same had a reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved in framing it.

G The view taken in the case of Pandurangarao (supra) is on the same
lines as decided by earlier Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Rameshwar Dayal v. State ofPunjab and others, AIR (1961) S.C. 816 in which
the appointment of five persons in Punjab Higher Judicial Service was
challenged before the Punjab High Court by filing writ application on the
ground that· these persons had not practised for a period of seven years in
H the Punjab High Court but out of the period of seven years, for few years,
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE [AGRAWAL, J.) 1005
they had practised in Lahore High Court before partition of the country and A
after partition, the Punjab High Court. The writ application was dismissed on
the ground that for reckoning the period of seven years, the period of practice
in both the High Courts shall be counted for the purpose of Article 233 of
the Constitution and against said judgment, when appeal was brought to this
Court, judgment of the High Court was upheld and it was laid down that for
reckoning seven years standing of a person at Bar, period of practice in both B
the High Courts shall be countel

Shri Rao appearing for the respondent No. 2 submitted that as the Rules
have been holding the field for the. last more than 32 years, the law settled
by Division Bench and Full Bench decisions of Rajasthan High Court in all C
these years should not be unsettled by reversing the ~ame. In support of his
submission, learned Counsel has placed reliance upon various decisions of
this Court as well as of Privy Council. In the case of Collector of Central
Excise, Madras v. Mis Standard Motor Products and others, [1989] 2 SCC
303, it has been laid down that long standing settled practice of the Court
would not be disturbed. In the case of Kattite Valappil Pathumma and others D
v. Taluk Land Board and others, AIR (1997) SC 1115, it has been observed
that no interference should be made with old decision unless and untit -it is
manifestly found to be wrong or unfair. In the case of Andhra Pradesh State
Road Transport Corporation v. M. Gurivi Reddy and others, [1992] 4 SCC
72, it was ruled that if Supreme Court by its interim orders permitted State E
Government to act on a scheme and also giving opportunities to the operators
to apply to the Government for modification of the scheme if they feel
aggrieved and the scheme remained in operation without any objection from
the operators, as such the interim order passed by this Court should not be
disturbed. In the case of Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 SCC
1, it has been laid down that where a settled law laid down by the High Court F
prevailing in an area for long and transaction completed in accordance with
the law so laid down, this Court would not normally interfere with it. In the
case of Thamma Venkata Subbamma (dead) by LR v. Thamma Rattamma and
others, [1987] 3 sec 294, it has been observed that there is long series of
decisions of High Courts laying down uniformly that a gift by a coparcener G
of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property either to a stranger or
to his relation without the consent of the other coparceners is void and as
this state of law has prevailed for decades, the Court should not upset such
law except under compelling circumstances. In the case of Assistant District
Registrar, Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Vikrambhai Ratilal Dalal
and others, [I 987] Supp. SCC 27, the vires of Section 96( l )( c) of the Gujarat H
1906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, was struck down by the High Court and this
Court whil~ finding no justification to interfere with the view taken by the
High Court observed that as the decision operated for sixteen years on this
ground as well no interference is called for. In the case of Attorney-General
of Ontario and others v. Canada Temperance Federation and others AIR
(1946) Privy Council 88, Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. and others
B [1980) 3 SCC 719 and Mahesh Kumar Saharia v. State of Nagaland and
others, [1997) 8 SCC 176, the Courts refused to reconsider correctness of its
own decisions on the ground that the same have been followed in several
cases.

C From a perusal of these decisions, it appears that the same do not
support the respondents much rather run more counter to their submission.
It has been observed that there should be no interference with the law laid
down in the old decisions merely on the ground that different view is possible
but the Court would be justified in interfering if decision is manifestly wrong
or unfair. In the present case, we have clearly held that the Rules are violative
D of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as such Division Bench and Full
Bench decisions of Rajasthan High Court are manifestly wrong and if the law
laid down therein is approved, the same would be unfair to members of the
Bar practising in all the courts throughout the country, excepting the State
of Rajasthan. Thus, we have no option but to hold that Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii)
E are ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and liable to be struck
down.

Last submission of Shri Rao is that in case the Rules are held to be ultra
vires, the decision may be made prospective in operation as for a period of
32 years, when the Rules remained in force, innumerable appointments have
F been made thereunder which should not be disturbed to avoid lot of
complications. It is now well settled that the courts can make the law laid
down by it prospective in operation to prevent unsettlement of the settled
positions and administrative chaos apart from meeting the ends ofjustice. In
the well-known decision of this Court in I. C. Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of
G Punjab & Anr., [1967) 2 SCR 762 the question had arisen as to whether the
decision in that case should be prospective or retrospective in operation and
the Court took into consideration the fact that between 1950 and 1967, as
many as twenty amendments were made in the Constitution and the legislatures
of various States had made laws bringing about an agrarian revolution in the
country which were made on the basis of correctness of the decisions in Sri
H Sankari Prasasd Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar, (1952} SCR
G.R. MOOLCHANDANI v. STATE [AGRAWAL, J.] 1007
89 and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965) 1 SCR 933 viz., that the A
Parliament had the powers to amend the Fundamental Rights and that Acts
in regard to estates were outside the judicial scrutiny on th,e ground they
infringed the said rights. To meet the then extraordinary situation that may
be caused by the said decision, the Court felt that it must evolve some
doctrine which had roots in reason and precedents so that the past may be B
preserved and the future protected. In that case it was laid down that the
doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising
under the Constitution and the same can be applied only by this Court in its
discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter
before it.
c
Accepting the lead given in the above decision, this Court has since
extended the doctrine to the interpretation of Ordinary statues as well. In the
, cases of Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (1981) 2 SCC 362, Atam
Prakash v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1986) 2 SCC 249, Orissa Cement Ltd.
v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1991) Supp. l SCC 430, Union of India v. Mohd.
Ramzan Khan, (1991) l SCC 588 and Managing Director, ECJL, Hyderabad D
& Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 727 the device of prospective
overruling was resorted to even in the case of Ordinary statutes. We find in
the fitness of things, the law decided in this case be declared to be prospective
in operation.
E
Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6469of1998 who was found eligible by
the Committee, appeared in the interview, found fit by it and recommended
for appointment to the Higher Judicial Service but could not be appointed as
the Full Court found that he was not eligible and one post for him was kept
reserved by virtue of interim order of the High Court but in view of dismissal
of the writ application, the said post has been filled up by appointing one Shri F
Uma Kant Aggarwal-respondent No. 13. We feel it would be just and proper
to direct the High Court to recommend his name to the Governor for
appointment to Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service against one of the existing
vacancies as according to the stand taken by the High Court, posts are still
vacant.
G
So far appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 is concerned, the High
Court has in view of decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 3021197
i Sushma Suri v. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi and another)

.leclined to grant relief in his favour. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant could not point out any error in the aforesaid judgment rendered H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A by the High Court. Therefore, it is not possible to grant any relief to him. We
may, however, observe that the High Court would process the applications
of the candidates like this appellant for direct recruitment to the Rajasthan
Higher Judicial Service in future as this appellant has been found eligible to
be considered.

B In Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1999, the only ground of attack is the
strictures passed by the High Court against the appellant and imposition of
costs. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it
will be just and proper to expunge the remarks against the appellant from the
impugned judgment and to upset the order awarding costs.
c In the result, Civil Appeal No. 6469 of 1998 is allowed, the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court upholding the Rules is set aside and
Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) are struck down being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution. It is made clear that this judgment will not affect ~ny
appointmeni. made prior to this date under the Rules which have been found
D to be invalid hereinabove. The High Court would be well advised to take up
the process of selection, already started, de novo in accordance with this
judgment and will now recommend name of the appellant-Ganga Ram
Moolchandani to the Governor of Rajasthan for making appointment to
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service against one of the existing vacancies. Civil
Appeal No. 722 of 1999 is allowed, the strictures passed in the impugned
E judgment against the appellant are expunged and the order, awarding costs
upon him, is set a-side. Civil Appeal No. 2411 of 1999 is dismissed subject to
the observations above. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to
costs.

F
v.s.s.
C.A. No. 6469/98 and C.A. No. 722/99 allowed.
C.A. No. 2411/99 dismissed.