Holding

A bail order must be based on a prima facie assessment of the case and provide reasoned findings; an order that delves into evidentiary merits and effectively records an acquittal is a non‑application of mind and must be set aside.

Summary

The appellant's daughter died within five months of her marriage, leading to FIRs under Sections 498A, 304B, 302, 406 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Multiple bail applications under Section 438 of the CrPC were filed by the accused, initially rejected by the Sessions Judge and the High Court, but later the High Court granted bail to several accused, including the respondent No.2. The appellant challenged these bail orders before the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had failed to apply its mind, had given detailed evidentiary findings tantamount to an order of acquittal, and had not merely indicated a prima facie case. The Supreme Court held that while a bail order need not delve into the merits, the court must be satisfied of a prima facie case and must give reasoned findings; the High Court's order lacked such application of mind and effectively amounted to an acquittal. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's bail orders and allowed the appeals. The judgment reiterated the factors to be considered while granting bail in serious offences.

Issues considered

Whether a court granting bail under Section 438 CrPC must merely indicate the existence of a prima facie case without detailed analysis of evidence.
Whether the High Court's bail order demonstrated non-application of mind and amounted to an impermissible order of acquittal.
What factors must be considered by a court while exercising discretion to grant bail in serious offences such as dowry death.
Whether detailed evidentiary findings in a bail order prejudice the trial and violate procedural requirements.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(8), s. 438, s. 82, s. 83
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304B, s. 34, s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

bailSection 438 CrPCprima facie casedowry deathnon‑application of mindorder of acquittalcriminal procedureevidencehigh courtSupreme Court

Judgment

A GAJANAND AGARWAL
v. r
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.

APRIL 12, 2007

B [DR. ARIJITPASAYAT AND LOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1993:
/

. s.438-Whi/e dealing with bail application in case of alleged dowry
c death, order must show proper application of mind by the Judge-Passing
an order of acquittal by commenting on the evidence is impermissible-It
should only indicate whether there was a Prima facie case in view of settled
principles about nature of crime and manner of commission of offence-Bail.

s.438-Bail-Grant of-Determining factor-Discussed.
D
Prosecution case was that daughter of appellant-complainant was
married to respondent No.2-accused. Within 5 months of marriage, she was
•.
found dead. The case was registered against respondent no.2 and his family
members u/ss. 498A, 304 8, 302, 406 r.w. s.34 IPC and s.4 of the Dowry
E Prohibition Act, 1961. Respondent No.2 was arrested and other accused
persons were found to be absconding.

The accused persons filed bail applications number of times before
Sessions Judge and under s.438 Cr.P.~. before High Court which were
rejected.
F
The Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet before the SDJM
indicating that Prima facie case has been made out against the accused
persons. These accused persons again filed bail applications which was
rejected.

G High Court granted bail to parents-in-law. Thereafter bail was also
granted to respondent no.2 by High Court. The same was challenged before
this Court. This Court set aside the order on several grounds. The High Court
reconsidered the matter and by impugned orders accepted the prayer for bail. \/,.

H 68
GAJANANDAGARWALv. STATEOFORJSSA 69
In appeals to this court; appellants contended that basic ground on which A
' the earlier orders granting the bail were set aside, were that the earlier orders
rejecting prayer were not taken into consideration; that the orders were
practically non-reasoned; that the High Court has not only tried to justify the
grant of bail on the earlier occasion, but also has practically recorded order
of acquittal to the accused respondent no.I in each case and that while dealing
with the bail application, view on merits is not to be expressed and it was only B
necessary to indicate reasons for grant of bail and not detailed analysis of
the evidence on record, with regard to the nature of the offence and the
evidentiary value of the materials on record.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: 1. The cursory perusal of High Court's order shows complete
non-application of mind. Though detailed examination of the evidence and
elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court
while passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the bail
application should be satisfied as to whether there is a Primafacie case, but D
exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court
dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. [Para 11) [75-G; 76-AJ

2. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for Prima facie
concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was E
charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts
dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the
following factors also before granting bail, they are - 1 the nature of
accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature
of supporting evidence; 2 - reasonable apprehension of tampering of the F
. \ witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; - 3 Prima facie
satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. Any order dehors of such
reasons suffers from non-application of mind. [Para 12 and 13) [76-B-D)

Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 598;
Puran etc. v. Rambilas and Anr. etc. [20011 6 SCC 338; Kalyan Chandra G
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu & Anr., JT [2004) 3 SC 442; Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P. and Anr., JT [2004) 6 SC 540; Kamal) it Singh v. State of
Punjab and Anr., [2005) 7 SCC 326; Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul and
Anr. JT [2004) 2 SC 176 and V.D. Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Anr.. (2005) 7 SCALE 68, relied on.
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A 3. The High Court has given findings which could have been given at ,
the trial. In fact, some of the conclusions are contradictory. The High Court
has noted that the post mortem report coupled with chemical examination
report Primafacie reveals that the death was neither homicidal nor suicidal.
The same single judge had earlier concluded about the blood stains on the
B pillow that the death might have been homicidal. (Para 15) (76-F-G; 77-A-BJ

4. The reasoning given by the High Court that only the family members
earlier did not lodge reports and, therefore, Primafacie throws doubt about
alleged torture, is another conclusion which was not required to be given while
dealing with the bail application. The High Court was factually wrong in
C saying that the persons of the locality had not alleged regarding torture meted
out on account of dowry. Even otherwise merely because the family members
of the deceased spoke about the alleged dowry demand and not others that
cannot be ce11ainly a ground to conclude that same throws doubt on the alleged
torture. (Para 16) (77-C)

D 5. The High Court has virtnally written an order of acquittal by
commenting on the evidentiary value of evidence on record. This is
impermissible. Only broad features of the case are to be noted. Elaborate
analysis of the evidence is to be avoided. [Para 18) [77-E)

Imran Ali v. Habibullah and Anr., SLP (Crl.) 3986 of (2006) disposed
E by S.C. on 19th March, 2007, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 543 of
2007.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.11.2006 of the High Court of
F Orissa, Cuttack in BLAPL Case No. 4575 of2006.
WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 544 of2007.

G Uday U. Lalit, Sanjay Sen, Rana S. Biswas, Manish P.S. Choudhan,
Vishal Anand, Ruchika Rathi and Sarla Chandra for the Appellants.

K.T.S. Tulsi, Suresh C. Gupta, J.K. Mahapatra, Sidharth Srivastava,
Kuber Boddh and Sunil Kumar Jain for the Respondents.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GAJANANDAGARWALv. STATEOFORISSA[PASAYAT,J.] 71

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. A
I. This is a second journey of the appellant to this Court. Earlier the
appellant had questioned grant of bail to the respondent no.2 in each case
by learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court. This Court held the
impugned orders to be indefensible by the judgment dated 18.9.2006 in
Gajanand Agarwal v. State of Orissa and Ors., AIR (2006) SC 3248 and the B
orders were nullified. The High Court again considered the bail applications
and passed the impugned order in each case reiterating its view that the
') respondent no.2 in ·each case was entitled to grant of bail.

2. Background fact~ in a nutshell are as follows: c
Bimal (respondent No.2 in appeal relating to SLP (Crl.) No.49 of2007)
was married to the daughter of the appellant-accused i.e. Manisha (hereinafter
referred to as 'deceased'). The marriage between the deceased and the said
accus~d took place on 9.5.2005. Within five months of marriage, the deceased
was found dead on 1.10.2005. The appellant lodged FIR at the Jharsuguda D
police station and on that basis a case was registered and investigation was
undertaken. The offences indicated were punishable under Sections 498A,
304B, 302, 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the 'IPC') and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (in short 'the
Act') Respondent no.2 was arrested on 3.10.2005. Rest of the accused persons E
were found to be absconding and police having failed to arrest them in spite
of issuance of non-bailable warrants of arrest. An application in terms of
Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.')
was filed. On 16.12.2005 father-in-law of the deceased Kailash Khetan and
mother-in-law Kanta Khetan filed application in terms of Section 438 Cr.P.C.
before the High Court which was rejected. Process under Section 82 of the F
Cr.P.C. was issued by the leamedADJM on 19.12.2005. On 16.1.2006 respondent
no.2 filed application for bail which was rejected on the ground that investigation
was still in progress. Liberty was granted to the accused to move the Sessions
Judge for bail after completion of investigation and submission of final form.
On 24.1.2006 application in terms of Section 438 was filed by Sunil Kumar G
(respondent no.2 in the connected appeal) and Sujata Khetan. The same was
rejected by order dated 24.1.2006. An application under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
was filed by Kailash and Kanta. The same was again rejected by the High
Court. On 27.1.2006 the Trial Court issued orders in terms of Section 83 Cr.P.C.
to attach the moveable properties of the accused. On 30.1.2006 the H
investigating officer submitted the charge-sheet/final report before the learned
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A SDJM indicating that a Prima facie case has been made against the respondent
No.2, Kailashnath (father-in-law), Kanta Devi (mother-in-law), Sunil (brother-
,
in-law) the respondent no.2 in the connected appeal under Sections 498A,
304B, 302, 406 read with Section 34 !PC and Section 4 of the Act. The
prosecution made a further prayer to permit investigation in terms of Section
B 173(8) Cr.P.C. since some of the accused persons were still absconding and
were not arrested. After surrendering, Kanta Khetan and Sujata Devi filed
application for bail. The same was rejected by learned SDJM. The applications
filed by Kailashnath and Sun ii were also subsequently rejected. On 13 .2.2006,
respondent no.2 filed fresh bail application before the Sessions Court, which
was rejected. The learned Additional Sessions Judge took note of factual
C position which according to him was relevant for the purpose of rejecting the
bail application. It was noted that strong case under Sections 302.'304B !PC
is made out. Sujata Devi filed bail petition before the High Court after rejection
of bail application by the Sessions Judge. The High Court by order dated
6.3.2006 granted bail to her. Interestingly, it was noted that the order was not
D to be treated as a precedent so far as other accused persons are concerned.
It is to be noted that on 22.3.2006 Kanta Devi moved the High Court for bail.
The High Court granted the bail imposing conditions similar to those which
were stipulated ir. case of Sujata Devi. Accused Sunil Kumar moved the High
Court for regular bail. By order dated 7.4.2006 the prayer was rejected but
liberty was granted to renew his prayer for bail after the case was committed
E to the Court of Sessions. On 21.4.2006 the High Court granted bail to
Kailashnath on the ground that he was aged and sick. Here again, the High
Court passed an order to the effect that same was not to be treated as a
precedent so far as other accused persons are concerned. On 3.5.2006 accused
Sunil Kumar moved the Sessions Court for bail on the ground that his father
F requires further treatment at Apollo Hospital and there was no male member
to accompany him. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the prayer of bail by
f-
order dated 3.5.2006 suspecting genuineness of the documents filed. It was
noted that report was dated 30.6.2006 i.e. date put on the advisory report,
while the application was made earlier. Because of this suspicious document,
G the application for bail was rejected.
3. The date for framing of charges was fixed on 6.6.2006. Accused Bimal
filed bail application before the High Court. By order dated 22.6.2006 bail was
granted. The same was the subject matter of challenge in the earlier matter.
This Court set aside the order on several grounds as noted in the order.
H
4. The High Court has reconsidered the matter after the earlier orders
GAJANANDAGARWAL v. STATEOFORISSA [PASAYAT,J.] 73
were set aside and by the impugned orders the prayer for bail has been A

''
accepted.

5. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that basic ground on which the earlier orders granting of bail were set aside
were (a) since earlier orders rejecting prayer have not taken into consideration
(b) in case of accused Sun ii lack of genuineness of documents as noted by B
the Additional Sessions Judge were not considered (c) the orders were
practically non-reasoned. The High Court has not only tried to justify the
grant of bail on the earlier occasion, but also has practically recorded order
of acquittal to the accused respondent no.2 in each case. While dealing with
the bail application, final view is not to be expressed. It was only necessary C
to indicate reasons for grant of bail and not detailed analysis of the evidence
on record, with regard to the nature of the offence and the evidentiary value
of the materials on record.

6. The High Court lost sight of the fact that it was not dealing with any
appeal on merits. It was considering bail application. Even otherwise several D
irrelevant aspects have been taken into consideration and this Court's view
regarding use of non-genuine documents by respondent Sunil have been
lightly brushed aside. Curiously, the High Court has treated the documents
which were treated non-genuine by this Court to be minor circumstances. It
is also pointed out that factually certain conclusions recorded are contrary E
to the evidence on record. Merely because the relatives of the deceased
spoke out about the dowry demand that cannot be a ground to come to the
conclusion that the allegations relating to dowry demand are Prima facie
untenable and "Prima facie throws doubt about the alleged torture". Learned
Single Judge has also put great emphasis on the alleged non mention of any
person other than family members regarding alleged torture. It is pointed out F
.) that the same is also factually incorrect. Merely because the doctor who
conducted the post mortem examination has not been examined by the
investigating agency and statement has not been recorded under Section 161
of the Cr.P.C., that cannot be a ground to grant bail to the accused persons.
It has been held by the learned Single Judge that the accused persons were G
permanent residents and there was no question of their absconding or there
being problem in ensuring their presence. It is submitted that at least accused
Sunil had absconded for a long time, more than once his application in terms
of Section 438 Cr.P.C. was rejected by the High Court. He was absconding
and, therefore, action of attachment property in terms of Sections 82 and 83 H
of the Cr.P.C. were taken. It is stated that charges have not been framed as
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 5 S.C.R.

A yet because proceedings have been stayed by the High Court at the instance
of the respondents-accused persons. f

7. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the High Court not only
acted on erroneous premises but completely overlooked the fact that
undisputedly accused Bimal and deceased went to the bed together, the latter
B died under suspicious circumstances. Charge sheet has been filed therefore,
the grant of bail is not proper. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court
in Gajanand Agarwal's case (supra) more particularly what is stated in para
19. r'

c submitted
8. In response, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2- accused
that the accused persons are unnecessarily being hounded by the
complainant. Though the High Court need not have gone beyond giving
reasons and should not have recorded findings which are matters of trial, that
cannot be a ground to deny bail to the accused (Respondent no.2 in each
case). The unnecessary findings may be set aside. But the order granting bail
D should not be interfered with as that was perfectly legitimate. The Court may
have exceeded what was required to be done while dealing with the bail
application. But that is no ground to cancel the bail. On reading of the inquest
report, the post-mortem report and FSL report one thing is clear that the death
was natural and was certainly not homicidal as is being presented by the
E prosecution and the complainant. On the earlier occasion the High Court had
not considered the effect of the FSL report. The report clearly rules out
homicidal angle and, therefore, the presence of blood in the mouth cannot be
attributed to any homicidal action. Because of the informant's interference the
investigation has not been done in a fair manner, and the whole family of the
husband's family has been roped in. The damage already done to their
F reputation and dignity cannot be adequately compensated even if in trial the
accused persons are acquitted. In view of the strong possibility of death f-
being natural, the High Court has ri.ghtly granted bail.. It is not a case as if
accused Sunil was absconding. He was running from pillar to post to prove
his innocence for grant of bail. The mere fact that there has been some
G mistake in the date of the certificate, that cannot be considered to be vital.
It appears to be a genuine and bona fide mistake. The reports clearly establish
that the death was natural. Since the complainant has acted with motives to
unleash personal vendetta that should not be permitted.

9. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to take note of a decision
H
of this Court in Omar Usman Chamadia v. Abdul and Anr., JT (2004) 2 SC
GAJANANDAGARWALv. STATEOFORISSA[PASAYAT,J.] 75

176. In para 10, it was observed as follows: A
"However, before concluding, we must advert to another aspect of
this case which has caused some concern to us. In the recent past,
we had several occasions to notice that the High Courts by recording
the concessions shown by the counsel in the criminal proceedings
refrain from assigning any reason even in orders by which it reverses B
the orders of the lower courts. In our opinion, this is not proper if
such orders are appealable, be it on the ground of concession shown
by learned counsel appearing for the parties or on the ground that
assigning of elaborate reasons might prejudice the future trial before
the lower courts. The High Court should not, unless for very good C
reasons desist from indicating the grounds on which their orders are
based because when the matters are brought up in appeal, the court
of appeal has every reason to know the basis on which the impugned
order has been made. It may be that while concurring with the lower
court's order, it may not be necessary for the said appellate court to
assign reasons but that is not so while reversing such orders of the D
lower courts. It may be convenient for the said court to pass orders
without indicating the grounds or basis but it certainly is not
convenient for the court of appeal while considering the correctness
of such impugned orders. The reasons need not be very detailed or
elaborate, lest it may cause prejudice to the case of the parties, but E
must be sufficiently indicative of the process of reasoning leading to
the passing ofthe impugned order. The need for delivering a reasoned
order is a requirement of law which has to be complied with in all
appealable orders. This Court in a somewhat similar situation has
deprecated the practice of non-speaking orders in the case of State
of Punjab and Ors. v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, AIR (1984 )SC 444". F
(underlined for emphasis)

10. These aspects were recently highlighted in V.D. Chaudhary v. State
ofUttar Pradesh and Anr., [2005] 7 SCALE 68.
G
11. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court's order shows complete
non-application of mind. Though detailed examination of the evidence and
elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the
Court while passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the
bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a Prima facie case, H
but exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 5 S.C.R.

A court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion f
in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.

12. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for Prima facie
concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was
charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts
B dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the
fo Bowing factors also before granting bail, they are:

I. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case /
of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;

C 2 Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or
apprehension of threat to the complainant;

3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.

13. Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-application of
D mind as was noted by this Court, in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh and Ors., [2002] 3 SCC 598; Puran etc. v. Ram bi/as and Anr. etc., [2001]
6 SCC 338 and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu
Yadav & Anr., JT (2004) 3 SC 442.

14. The above position was highlighted by this Court in Cha.man Lal
E v. State of U.P. and Anr., JT (2004) 6 SC 540, and in Kamaljit Singh v. State
of Punjab and Anr., [2005] 7 SCC 326.

15. As has been rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant,
the High Court has given findings which could have been given at the trial.
F In fact, some of the conclusions are contradictory. Jn para 9 of the judgment
the High Court has noted as follows:

"Be that as it may, the post-mortem report is a Prima facie piece of
material the evidentiary value can be considered at the time of trial."

G But indicating "peculiar features of the case", the High Court has observed
that "the post-mortem report coupled with chemical examination report Prima
facie reveals that the death of Manisha was neither homicidal nor suicidal".
Interestingly, earlier the same learned Judge concluded as follows about the
blood stains on the pillow by order dated 24.1.2006 in Crl.MC No.25 of2006:

H "xx xx xx xx
, GAJANANDAGARWAL v. STATEOFORISSA [PASA YAT,J.] 77
I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have A

' perused the materials available in the Case Diary. The post-mortem
report reveals that blood mixed with fluid was detected from both the
nostrils and mouth of the deceased. It is also submitted by the learned
counsel for the State that a pillow cover stained with blood has also
been recovered by police. All these facts Prima facie reveal that the
death in question might have been homicidal." B

16.The reasoning given by the High Court that only the family members
earlier did not lodge reports and, therefore, Prima facie throws doubt about
alleged torture, is another conclusion which was not required to be given
while dealing with the bail application. The High Court was factually wrong
in saying that the persons of the locality had not alleged regarding torture
c
meted out on account of dowry. Even otherwise merely because the family
members of the deceased spoke about the alleged dowry demand and not
others that cannot be certainly a ground to conclude that same throws doubt
on the alleged torture.
D
17. The High Court was also not correct in saying that there was no
likelihood of the accused persons absconding in view of what has been
pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant about his not surrendering
requiring issuance notice in terms .of Sections 82 and 83 of the Act.

18. The High Court has virtually written an order of acquittal by E
commenting on the evidentiary value of evidence on record. This is
impermissible. Only broad features of the case are to be noted. Elaborate
analysis of the evidence is to be avoided.

19. In lmran Ali v. Habibullah and Anr., SLP (Crl.) 3986 of (2006)
disposed of on 19th March, 2007 it has been held as follows: F
--'>
"It is no doubt true that the High Court felt persuaded to grant
bail to the respondents in the pending appeal before it. The High
Court however, went on to record a very detailed reasoned order
virtually holding that the prosecution case has no merit. Such
observations either for or against the prosecution, made in orders G
disposing ofbail applications may prejudicially affect the interests of
the parties because in case a trial is pending before the Sessions
Court, the trial Judge may consider itself bound by the observations
made in such an order. In any event, such observations are bound to
influence its mind. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases G
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 5 S.C.R.

A particularly in serious matters, the High Court may record reasons, but
the High Court while recording reasons must take care to safeguard
against prejudicing the case of the parties. The recording of reasons,
wherever necessary, is only to indicate the considerations that may
have weighed with the Court in passing the order and the Court must
do so in a manner that may not prejudice the case of the parties. The
B trend recently noticed, to virtually write a judgment while disposing
of an application for grant of bail must be discouraged."

20. Looked from any angle the impugned orders of the High Court are ,''
indefensible and are set aside. The appeals are allowed.
c D.G. Appeals allowed.

,_