FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR.versusNEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.

                 [2023] 14 S.C.R. 374 : 2023 INSC 790



                            CASE DETAILS
              FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR.
                                     v.
            NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.
                     (Civil Appeal No. 4713 of 2023)
                         SEPTEMBER 04, 2023
           [ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
                             HEADNOTES


      Issue for consideration: The order of the High Court setting aside
the order of the Commissioner awarding compensation in favour of legal
representatives of the deceased employee.
     Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 – Victim died as he was
tying up logs on trailer – The Commissioner directed insurer to pay
compensation of ₹3,94,120/- and the employer was directed to pay
₹1,97,060/-, i.e., 50% of the compensation amount as penalty – High
Court set aside the order of the Commissioner – Propriety:
      Held: A bare perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the High
Court did not frame any substantial question of law – The wording of the
Act indicates that the existence of such a question is a prerequisite to the
appeal being entertained – The difference, between the two judgments, i.e.,
the order of the Commissioner and the judgment in First Appeal, was on the
point of the employer-employee relationship having been established – The
Commissioner held such relationship to have been established however,
the appeal Court observed that “claimants have clearly failed to prove this
aspect” – The Commissioner had not returned any findings in respect of the
validity of non-availability of the license of the deceased nor was it one of
the questions framed by the Commissioner for consideration – In such a
situation, while exercising powers within the limited purview allowed by
section 30 of the Act, the Court below erred in making observations – It
is settled that Commissioner is the last authority on facts involved in a
case – The circumstances, i.e., the presence of the deceased at the spot;
the ownership of the trolley and the goods loaded therein; the presence
                                      374
   FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                             375
            ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.

of this supervisor of the employer company; and details mentioned in the
inquest panchnama form, when considered together, point to the aspect of
the deceased person being on the roll of the employer – Keeping with the
principles of the legislation being intended for social welfare and protection
of employees; the Commissioner being the last authority on facts; the scope
of an appeal under the said Act being limited only to substantial questions
of law; and no perversity could be demonstrated from the order of the
Commissioner. [Paras 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 32]
     Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 – s.30 – An appeal from an
order Commissioner – To be entertained if there exists a substantial
question of law:
      Held: The Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from an order of
Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists a substantial question
of law to be considered – It has been observed by the Supreme Court that
the phrase “substantial question of law” within this Act shall be understood
by its general meaning – When considering the general meaning of this
phrase, naturally, the reference is to the Code of Civil Procedure – The
rule therein is that framing of a substantial question of law is of cardinal
importance. [Para 17]
       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      North – East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha (2019)
11 SCC 514 : [2018] 13 SCR 1043; C. Manjamma v. New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. (2022) 6 SCC 206; K. Sivaraman v. P. Sathishkumar (2020) 4 SCC
594 : [2020] 4 SCR 480 – relied on.
     Om Prakash Batish v. Ranjit (2008) 12 SCC 212 : [2008] 6 SCR 938;
Golla Rajamma & Ors. v. Divisional Manager & Anr. (2017) 1 SCC 45 :
[2016] 9 SCR 469 – referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4713 of 2023.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2019 of the High Court of
Gujarat at Ahmedabad in FA No.3487 of 2013.
376             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2023] 14 S.C.R.


       Appearances:
    Shreyas Mehrotra, Ms. Savita Sinha, Rahul Gupta, Advs. for the
Appellants.
    Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Advs. for the
Respondents.
         JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                    JUDGMENT

       SANJAY KAROL J.,
      1. This appeal is filed at the instance of one Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav,
assailing the judgement passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
in First Appeal No.3487 of 2013 whereby the Court has set aside the order
of the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch),
Gujarat in W.C.F.C. No.08/10 awarding compensation in favour of legal
representatives of the deceased employee.
     2. Appellants herein1 are the mother and wife of one Ramakant Yadav2
who allegedly died on 31st October, 2009 as he was tying up logs on trailer
while in employment as its driver, when one such log fell on his left leg.
He died before any medical treatment could be given to him.
     3. The deceased, allegedly, was an employee of Kutch Carrier
(Sohansing & Sons3), drawing a salary of ₹4000 per month.
      4. Such employment of the deceased was denied by the insurer for
lack of production of documents of employment. Neither has any proof of
income of the deceased been produced.
     5. The claim of ₹3,94,120/- is denied in the above terms, by the Insurer-
respondents herein.
       Order of the Commissioner
       6. Feeling aggrieved by the denial of the claim, proceedings were


1     Hereinafter referred to as “the claimants”
2     Hereinafter referred to as “ the deceased”
3     Hereinafter referred to as “the employer”. Opponent 1 before the Commissioner
     FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                               377
      ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.]

initiated by the claimants herein before the Commissioner, Workmen
Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch), Gujarat in terms of W.C.F.C.No.08/10. The
Commissioner framed 8 issues for consideration. The tabular representation
below represents the issues framed, the reasoning thereon and the findings
returned.
S.No     Issue                         Order        Reasoning
1.       W h e t h e r p r e s e n t Affirmative      Claimants are dependants
         ap p li c a nts a re l e g al              and Legal heirs of
         heirs and dependant of                     deceased.
         deceased?
2.       Whether deceased was Affirmative             FIR in question reveals
         employee of Employer?                      name of the deceased as
                                                    a driver performing duty
                                                    of Employer.
3.       W h e t h e r a c c i d e n t Affirmative    No document contrary
         occurred during course                     shown by Employer.
         of employment? If yes,
         then deceased died due to
         injuries in accident?
4.       Whether age is proved 3 5 y e a r s &      Age affirmed by Driving
         at the time of accident? salary ₹4,000/-   License indicating date
         and monthly income of                      of birth as 01-05-74.
         ₹4,000/- is proved?                        Also no adverse evidence
                                                    shown by Insurer. On
                                                    salary being ₹4,000/-
                                                    p.m. reliance was placed
                                                    on deposition of Ex-19.
5.       Whether opponents are Affirmative            Awarded compensation
         liable to compensation                     of ₹3,94,120/- on the
         amount? If yes, then what                  ground that deceased
         amount?                                    died during the course
                                                    and out of employment
                                                    a s o w n e r s hi p t r u c k
                                                    was also insured by the
                                                    insurer as per documents
                                                    placed by the claimant.
378              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 14 S.C.R.



 6.          What is the responsibility Affirmative        Deceased was employed
             of insurance co.?                           as a driver with the
                                                         employer on vehicle
                                                         no. GJ-12w7670. The
                                                         vehicle being insured,
                                                         the insurer was to pay
                                                         9% interest from date of
                                                         accident.
 7.          W h e t h e r o p p o n e n t s Affirmative   Employer while being in
             are negligent to pay                        knowledge of accident
             compensation? If yes,                       did not pay compensation
             then are they liable to pay                 to claimant within 30
             penalty and interest?                       days of the accident
                                                         as per the Workmen
                                                         Compensation Act hence
                                                         Penalty @ 50% was
                                                         imposed amounting to
                                                         ₹1,97,060/-.
 8.          What is final order?             Affirmative   ₹3000/- for expenses
                                                         and ₹5000/- for funeral
                                                         expenses to be paid to the
                                                         claimant.

       7. In terms of the above, the Insurer-New India Assurance Co. Ltd.4 was
directed to pay as compensation₹3,94,120/-with interest accruing thereupon
from the date of the death of the deceased @9%. The same was to be paid
within 30 days of the order. The employer was directed to pay ₹1,97,060/-,
i.e., 50% of the compensation amount as penalty. Further, it was directed
that the latter would pay ₹8000/- (with breakup of ₹3,000/- and ₹5,000/-)
for expenses and funeral expenses, particularly.
       8. Only the Insurer appealed against this order.
       First Appeal-Impugned Judgement
     9. It may be noted that during the pendency of the First Appeal, vide
an order dated 25th June, 2014 passed in Civil Application No. 2822 of
2013 the Commissioner was directed to invest 80% of the amount that was


4     Hereinafter referred to as “Insurer”
    FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                           379
     ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.]

deposited with such authority in cumulative fixed deposits for an initial
period of three years, to be renewed from time to time and the remaining
20% to be disbursed to the claimants.
      10. Having considered the evidence on record such as an abstract of
the accidental death register of the Gandhigram “A” division police station,
and the cross-examination of the claimant i.e., wife of the deceased, as well
as the other documents produced, which, the learned Court concluded that
the deceased was neither working with the employer nor on the date of the
occurrence of the incident, received injuries and died, as a result thereof.
     11. Hence, the order of the Commissioner was set aside.
     12. Thus, the present appeal.
      13. By way of the special leave petition it has been urged amongst
other grounds, that the Court in First Appeal has transgressed the confines
of Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 19235; the vehicle
in which the logs were stored and thus were being untied, was insured
and therefore, the accident having taken place is within the ambit of the
insurance company’s responsibilities; that the impugned judgement has left
the Claimants remediless and sans any support since the sole breadwinner
of the family had passed away.
     Analysis and Consideration
     14. The act governing the present dispute, i.e., the Workmen
Compensation Act, 1923, has been, vide The Workmen’s Compensation
(Amendment) Act, 2009, amended, by which the word “workmen” has been
substituted by “employees” rechristened as the Employees Compensation
Act, 1923.
      15. What this Court must consider is whether the impugned judgement
is sustainable in law? On merits, the consideration would be whether the
order of the Commissioner, in light of the materials on record, can stand
or not? In other words, the impugned judgement must stand true on two
grounds, (i) statutory text; and (ii) whether the materials on record support
the conclusion drawn therein or not?


5   Hereafter, the Act
380           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 14 S.C.R.


     16. Appeals within the act are governed by Section 30 which is
extracted below for reference: –
      “30. Appeals. — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the
      following orders of a Commissioner, namely :—
      an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of
      redemption of a half monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a
      claim in full or in part for a lump sum;
      1 [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A;]
      (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;
      (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the
      dependants of a deceased 6 [employee], or disallowing any claim of
      a person alleging himself to be such dependant;
      (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an
      indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or
      (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or
      registering the same or providing for the registration of the same
      subject to conditions:
      Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial
      question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order
      other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount
      in dispute in the appeal is not less than 2 [ten thousand rupees or such
      higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the
      Official Gazette, specify]:
      Provided, further, that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the
      parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or
      in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement
      come to by the parties:
        3
          [Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause
      (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a
      certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has
      deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed
      against.]
    FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                             381
     ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.]

     (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be
     sixty days.
     (3) The provisions of section 5 of 4 [the Indian Limitation Act, 1963
     (36 of 1963)] shall be applicable to appeals under this section.”
                                                            (Emphasis Supplied)
      17. The Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from an order of
Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists a substantial question
of law to be considered. It has been observed by this Court that the phrase
“substantial question of law” within this Act shall be understood by its
general meaning.6 When considering the general meaning of this phrase,
naturally, the reference is to the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The
rule therein is that framing of a substantial question of law is of cardinal
importance.
     18. A bare perusal of the impugned judgement shows that the Court
did not frame any such question.
     19. The wording of the Act indicates that the existence of such a
question is a prerequisite to the appeal being entertained.
     20. Illustratively, in North – East Karnataka Road Transport
Corporation v. Sujatha7 (Two-Judge Bench) amongst numerous other
cases, this Court has observed:
     “12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act
     to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a
     regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
     1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate
     jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to
     examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case.”
      21. The other ground making the order under challenge, amenable
to interference when the scope of jurisdiction is circumscribed by it being
exercised only in cases of “substantial question of law”, is perversity in
the findings. Here, the impugned judgement does not, even remotely,


6   Om Prakash Batish v. Ranjit (2008) 12 SCC 212 (2 judge-bench)
7   (2019) 11 SCC 514
382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 14 S.C.R.


reflect the observation that the findings arrived at by the Commissioner
are perverse. The difference, between the two judgements, i.e., the order
of the Commissioner and the judgment in First Appeal, was on the point
of the employer-employee relationship having been established. The
Commissioner held such relationship to have been established however,
the appeal Court observed that “claimants have clearly failed to prove
this aspect”
      22. It may here only be noted that the Commissioner had not returned
any findings in respect of the validity of non-availability of the license of
the deceased nor was it one of the questions framed by the Commissioner
for consideration. In such a situation, while exercising powers within the
limited purview allowed by section 30 of the Act, the learned Court below
erred in making observations and giving a holding in that regard.
      23. It has also been observed by this Court that the Commissioner is
the last authority on facts involved in a case. In Golla Rajamma & Ors. v.
Divisional Manager & Anr.8 (2-Judge Bench) it was observed that “under
the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the
last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of
the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation.
Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited
jurisdiction and has ventured to reappreciate the evidence and recorded its
own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis.
The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence
of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.”
     24. Keeping in view the said principles, the impugned judgement,
ex-facie, appears to be in contravention thereto.
     25. On merits too, we find that the conclusions arrived at by the
Commissioner, were undoubtedly “a possible view”, therefore extinguishing
the possibility of perversity in findings.
     26. A Bench of two learned Judges observed in C. Manjamma v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd.9


8     (2017) 1 SCC 45
9     (2022) 6 SCC 206
   FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                                        383
    ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.]

      “15. That being the position, the view taken by the Commissioner
      had been a possible view of the matter in the given set of facts
      and circumstances; and there was no reason for the High Court to
      interfere with the same, particularly when the case did not involve
      any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 30 of
      Employees Compensation Act, 1933.”
      27. From the materials available on record before the Commissioner
as described in the order, it certainly will not be an improbable, much less
an impossible, conclusion that the deceased was on the pay-roll of the
employer. Prima facie, the question that arises and remains un-addressed
throughout was, as to what the deceased was doing with the trolley as also
the goods laden on it, which he was tying or untying at the time of his
death. Second, the affidavit placed before the Commissioner categorically
stated that deceased was an employee of the employer. It has been noted
by the Commissioner, in his consideration of the second issue that, no
written statement had been filed nor had the version of the Applicants been
challenged by the employer; and even though the Respondents herein had
denied the facts as stated in the petition and cross examined the Applicants,
“but no adverse facts proved” by and “no adverse document produced” by
the Insurer to rebut the contents of the claim petition
      28. Additionally, having gone through the record we find that in the
Panchnama of the place of occurrence10, it has been recorded that there
was only one person present at the spot. He was Sunilbhai Ramjibhai
Ahir and was serving as a supervisor in the company of the employer. The
inquest panchnama form11 also names the employer company. The address
mentioned, with which the deceased was associated as also the person who
has identified the corpse of the deceased, for both of them it corresponds to
that of the employer company.
      29. The circumstances, i.e., the presence of the deceased at the spot;
the ownership of the trolley and the goods loaded therein; the presence
of this supervisor of the employer company; and details mentioned in the


10 Annexure P – 1 at page 23
11 annexure P – 6 at page 9 of application to place on record additional documents
384           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 14 S.C.R.


inquest panchnama form, when considered together, point to the aspect of
the deceased person being on the roll of the employer.
      30. It is well-established that the Act is a social welfare legislation and,
therefore, it must be given a beneficial construction. Matters thereunder are
to be adjudicated with due process of law and also with a keen awareness of
the scope and intent of the act. This Court has, time and again, reiterated this
principle. We may refer to K. Sivaraman v. P. Sathishkumar12 wherein,
speaking for the Court, Dr. D.Y Chandrachud J., observed: –
      “25. The 1923 Act is a social beneficial legislation and its provisions
      and amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not
      deprive the employees of the benefit of the legislation. The object of
      enacting the Act was to ameliorate the hardship of economically poor
      employees who were exposed to risks in work, or occupational hazards
      by providing a cheaper and quicker machinery for compensating
      them with pecuniary benefits. The amendments to the 1923 Act have
      been enacted to further this salient purpose by either streamlining
      the compensation process or enhancing the amount of compensation
      payable to the employee.”
                                                           (Emphasis supplied)
      31. It may be noted that the Commissioner had not returned any findings
in respect of the validity or invalidity of the license of the deceased nor was it
one of the questions framed by the Commissioner for consideration. In such
a situation, while exercising powers within the limited purview allowed by
Section 30 of the Act, the learned Court below erred in making observations
and giving a holding in that regard.
      32. In the facts at hand, with the cumulative sum of circumstances
pointing to the employment of the deceased with the employer company;
in keeping with the principles of the legislation being intended for social
welfare and protection of employees; the Commissioner being the last
authority on facts; the scope of an appeal under the said Act being limited
only to substantial questions of law; and no perversity could be demonstrated


12 (2020) 4 SCC 594
   FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA                              385
    ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.]

from the order of the Commissioner, we set aside the order passed in First
Appeal No.3487 of 2013. The Appeal is allowed.
      33. As a consequence thereof, the order passed by the Commissioner,
Workmen Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch), Gujarat in W.C.F.C.No.08/10 is
restored. The amount as deposited, per this order (the remaining 80%, after
the release of 20% of the sum awarded being ordered by the Court below in
Civil Application No.12822 of 2013 vide order dated 25th June, 2014) and
placed in cumulative fixed deposits, shall become payable to the claimants
forthwith, in compliance of the terms and conditions set out therein.
      34. Parties to bear their own costs.
      35. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.




Headnotes prepared by:                                           Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan