Holding

A declaration under Section 6 is deemed made when published in the Official Gazette, and that date must be used to compute the one‑year limitation, which in this case was satisfied.

Summary

The appellants challenged a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the ground that it was barred by the one‑year limitation prescribed in the proviso to Section 6(1)(ii). A notification under Section 4(1) was published in the Official Gazette on 6 August 1992; the declaration was made on 3 August 1993 and published in the Gazette on 5 August 1993, with a public notice on 28 August 1993. The Court examined whether the relevant date for computing the limitation was the date of making the declaration, the last local publication, or the Gazette publication. It held that a declaration is deemed made only when published in the Official Gazette, and that date fell within the one‑year period, rendering the declaration valid. While agreeing with the High Court that the declaration was within limitation, the Supreme Court corrected its reasoning, stating the Gazette publication, not the date of making, is the decisive date. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The appropriate date for computing the one‑year limitation under the proviso to Section 6(1)(ii) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Whether the modes of publication prescribed in Section 6(2) affect the limitation period
Whether the declaration was barred by limitation

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11-A, s. 4(1), s. 6(1), s. 6(1)(ii) proviso, s. 6(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionLimitation periodDeclarationOfficial GazetteSection 6Statutory interpretationPublic purpose

Judgment

A EUGENIO MISQUITA AND ORS.
v.
ST A TE OF GOA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1997

B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition' Act, 1894 : Sections 4(1) and 6(/)(ii)-Declaration
under-Limitation period-Computation of-Declaration made and published
C in Official Gazette within one year of notification-Whether declaration is
within limitation-Held, the dealaration is within limitation since the same
was published in Official Gazette within one year.

Section 6 (2), 1 IA-Modes of publication-Whether applicable for
computing the period prescribed under section 6(/)(ii)-The declaration
D under section (!)(ii) has nothing to do with the publication referred to in
section 6(2) which is for reckoning the limitation prescribed under section
II-A.

Section-6, and proviso to section 6(/)(i)&(ii)-Making of Declaration-
For the purpose of reckoning limitation-Completion of-Held, it is complete
E when published in Official Gazette.

Words and Phrases : 'Made' and 'hereinafter'meaning of

A Notification under section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
called the Act) was published in Official Gazette on 6.8.92. Thereafter
F declaration under section 6 of the Act was made on 3.8.93 and the same was
published in Official Gazette on 5.8.93. The public notice of the declaration
was put on 28.8.93.

The appellants challenged the validity of the declaration u/s. 6 on the
ground that the declaration was barred by limitation that the declaration must
G be taken to have been made/published for the purpose of proviso to section
6(1)(ii) on the date on which the last in the series of publications under section
6(2) was published i.e. on 28.8.93. The respondents contended that under
section 6(1) the relevant date for the purpose of limitation was the date on
which the declaration was made and the declaration having been made on 3.8.93
H was well within time from the date of publication of Notification U/s. 4(1) i.e.
362
EUGENIO MISQUITA. v. STATE 363
on 6.8.92. The High Court held that the Notification published in Official A
Gazette on 6.8.92 which was the last publication and the declaration u/s. 6
having been made on 3.8.93 is within limitation of one year.

In appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The declaration published under section 6 of the Act was B
well within one year and challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by
the High Court. The Notification was lastly published on 6.8.92 in the Official
Gazette and declaration under section 6 was published in the Gazette on 5.8.93
which is well within one year. [376-G; 377-A)

1.2. The view taken in the judgment of the High Court under appeal C
that the relevant date for reckoning the period oflimitation will be the date of
making of the declaration under section 6 is not correct. Mere making of
declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under section 6 is
complete for the purpose of Proviso to section 6(1)(i) & (ii) when it is published
in the Official Gazette. (375-H] D

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti & Anr. v. Makarand Singh & Ors., [19951
2 sec 497, relied on.

1.3. While Section 4(1) commands publication of Notification under that
section, Section 6 speaks of the declaration being made to the effect that any E
particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company. But for the
judicial decisions which have interpreted the word 'made' to mean 'published',
the date of making of the declaration under section 6(1) will be the relevant
date for reckoning the period oflimitation. Though the courts, in the interest
of general public have taken the view that declaration made will stand F
accomplished only when it is published, this publication, has nothing to do
with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a
different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under
section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the Language
employed in section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word 'hereinafter' used G
in section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication
referred to under section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter,
namely, for making award under section 11-A. The language employed in
second proviso to section 6(1) also supports this construction. [369-B-E]

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Makarand Singh & Ors., [1995) 2 SCC H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 497, relied on

· Lt. K. Padmadas v. State of Kera/a & Ors., AIR (1992) Kerala 158 and
State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995] 1SCC133, referred to.

Jagrup Singh v. Stale of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR (1993) Rajasthan 157,
B overruled.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 849 of 1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.93 of the Bombay High Court
C in W.P. No. 472of1993.

Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta, Fazlin Anam and Ms. Shobha Verma for the
Appellants.

Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. VENKATASWAMI, J. Though before the High Court of Bombay,
Panaji Bench (Goa) three questions were raised and answered, before us
E learned counsel for the appellants confined the argument to one of the
questions raised before the High Court, namely, whether the declaration
made/published under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the
'Act') was barred by limitation.

To appreciate the above question, certain dates are necessary. Initially
F a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring land for construction
and black topping of St. Sebastian Chapel Road was published on 8.11.90.
That Notification lapsed as no declaration as required under Section 6 of the ...
Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 was made. Therefore, a fresh Notification
was made under Section 4(1) of the Act for the same purpose on 23.6.92. The
G said Notification under Section 4(1) was first published in the English daily
"O Heraldo" on 29.6.92, and in the Marathi daily "Nav Prabha" on 2.7 .92.
Public Notice in the locality of the Notification was given on 8.7.92 as required
under Section 4 of the Act. Lastly, it was published in the Official Gazette of
the Goa Government on 6.8.92. Immediately the validity of the said Notification
was challenged in writ Petition No. 436/92 as "urgency provision" under
H Section 17(4) of the Act was also invoked. The High Court allowed the Writ [
EUGENIO MISQUITA. v. STATE [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.] 365
Petition on 25.11.92 by directing the appellants (writ petitioners before High A
Court) io file their objections under Section 5A on or before 4.12.92 and
directing the respondents to decide the said objections on or before 18.12.92
after hearing the aggrieved parties. After complying with the directions of the
High Court, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 3.8.93 and
it was published in the Official Gazette on 5.8.93. The same declaration was
published in Marathi daily "Gomantak" on 6.8.93 and in the English daily B
"Navhind Times" on 7.8.93 respectively. Public Notice of the declaration was
given in the locality on 28.8.93. Under these circumstances, the appellants
challenged the validity of the declaration under Section 6 on the ground that
the publication of the declaration was beyond one year taking 28.8.93 as the
date of publication and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings had lapse'd. C
The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants before the High
Court was that on a correct understanding and interpretation of Section 6(1)
& (2), of the Act, the declaration must be taken to have been made/published
for the purpose of proviso to Section 6(l)(ii) on the date on which the last
in the series of publications under Section 6(2) was published. In this case, D
it was on 28.8.93. Ifso understood on the facts of this case, according to the
appellants, the declaration having been published in the locality on 28.8.93
it Was beyond one year prescribed proviso to Section 6( 1) (ii) of the Act.
Therefore, that declaration was barred by limitation. On the other hand , it was
contended before the High Court on behalf of the authorities that under
Section 6(1) the relevant date for the purpose of limitation was the date on E
which the declaration was made and that declaration having been made on
3.8.93 was well within one year from the date of Notification published under
Section 4(1), namely, on 6.8.92. The High Court in the light of the earlier
Division Bench Judgment of the same Court held as follows:-

"Applying the ratio of these two decisions, it is clear that Section F
4 Notification was published in Government Gazette on 6th August
1992 and in fact that was the last of such publications. Admittedly,
Section 6 Notification is dated 3rd August 1993 and it is common
ground that it was published in the Government Gazette on 5th August
1993. It is, therefore, clear that regard being had to the date of making G
of the declaration under Section 6, which is 3rd August 1993, it falls
within the limitation prescribed and, therefore, it cannot be held that
the publication of the declaration is outside the limitation prescribed
under the Act."

Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants, elaborately argued H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A the matter bringing to our notice several judgments of the High Court and of
this Court both for and against the appellants. In short, the argument of
· learned counsel for the appellants was that having regard to the language
employed in sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act, the last in the series of
publication must be taken as the date of publication for calculating the
B limitation prescribed under proviso to section 6(l)(ii) of the Act. According
to learned counsel, the purpose of introducing the limitation of one year by
Act 68 of 1984 was to make the officials concerned to speed up the proceedings
and to avoid the delay. This object, according to him, cannot be achieved
unless the construction of Section 6 as advanced by him is accepted. He
heavily placed reliance on a judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Jagrup
C Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR (1993) Rajasthan 157. He also
brought to our notice. In all fairness, a recent judgment of this Court reported
in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti & Anr. v. Makrand Singh & Ors., (1995] 2
sec 497, which holds against the contention now advanced by the learned
counsel. He also brought to our notice a decision of the Kerala High Court
D which is also against the appellants.

We would have dealt with the matter elaborately but for the recent
judgment of this court in Krishi Mandi Samiti's case (supra), which is directly
on the point answering identical contentions raised before this court in the
said judgment.
E
Still, we would like to give our reasons in brief for reaching the same
conclusion.

Sections 4(1), 6(1) & (2) and Section 11-A read as follows:-

F "Section 4 Publication of preliminary notification and powers of
officers thereupon-

· (I) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in
any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose
-or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in
G
the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that
locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the
·collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification
to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the
dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being
H hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification."
EUGENIOMISQUITA. v. STATE [K. VENKATASWAMl,J.) 367
"Section 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose- A
(1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made
under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed
for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made
to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government B
or of some officer duly authorized to certify its order and different
declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different
parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section
4, sub-section (!), irrespectively of whether one report of different
reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section C
5-A, sub-section (2) :

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered
by the notification under Section 4. sub-section (1).-

(i) Published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition D
(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (I of 1967), but before
the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984,
shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the
publication: or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition E
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year
from the date of the publication of the notification:

Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless
the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by
company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund F
controlled or managed by a local authority.

Explanation I. : In computing any of the periods referred to in
the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub- G
section (1), is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.

Explanation 2. : Where the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be
compensation paid out of public revenues. H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (2) Every c.1eclaration shall be published in tht> Official gazette, and
in two daily newspaper circulating in the locality in which the land is
situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the
Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such
dec/aratiol:!. to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last Of t~e dates of such publication and the giving of such public
B notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of
the declaration), and such declaration shall state the district or other
territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which
it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan shall have been
made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected."
c "Section 11-A Period within which an award shall be made-

The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period
of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and
if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse:
D
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been
published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of
two years from such commencement.
E Explanation : ln computing the period of two years referred to
in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to
be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order
of a court shall be excluded.''

It is now well settled that the last of the dates in the series of the
F publications made under Section 4(1) of the Act is the relevant date to reckon
the starting point of limitation for the purpose of proviso to Section 6( I )(ii).
Now, the question is which is the relevant date to reckon the last date for the
purpose of proviso to Section 6(1 )(ii). In other words, whether the modes of
publication prescribed under Section 6(2) obviously for the purpose of
G reckoning limitation under Section 11-A of the Act have any part to play in
the matter of computing the period prescribed under proviso to section
6(1Xii).

According to the learned counsel, the limitation prescribed under proviso
to Section 6(1) ( 11) has to be construed with reference to the different dates/
H modes of publication presc·ribed under Section 6 (2) of the Act. In support
- EUGENIO MISQUITA. v. STATE [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.]

of this submission, learned counsel refers to the judgments of this Court
369
A
rendered on Section 4(1} of the Act holding that the last of the dates of such
publication in the series is (he relevant date for computing the period of
limitation under proviso to Section 6( 1)(ii).

Let us examine whether the leaned counsel is right in his submission.
As seen from the above extracts of relevant provisions, while Section 4 (1) B
commands publication oi notification under that Section, Section 6 speaks of
the declaration being made to the effect that any particular land is needed for
public purpose or for a company. There are judicial decisions that have
interpreted the word 'made' to mean 'published' for the reasons stated in
those decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions C
the date of making of thf declaration under Section 6(1) will be the relevant
date for reckoning the period of limitation. However, in the interest of general
public, the courts have taken the view that the declaration made will stand
accomplished only when it is published. This publication has, therefore,
nothing to do with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which
is for a different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed D
under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language
employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word "hereinafter" used
in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication
referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter,
namely, for making award under Section 11-A. The language employed in E
second proviso to Section 6( I) also supports this construction. Therefore, the
contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted.

This is also the view taken by this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti 's, case. The learned Judges framed the question thus:-

"The question, therefore, is that which date of the publications in
F
three steps i.e publications in the Gazette, two newspaper and local
publication to be the last date for the purpose of computing three
years' limitation prescribed in clause(!) of the proviso to Section 6(1)
of the Act."
G
It may be noted that this Court in that case was considering a case
which arose before the coming into force of the Amending Act 68 of 1984.
The case on hand has arisen after the Amending Act 68 of 1984 .. The only
difference is the period of limitation: for the cases arising before the Amending
Act it was three years and one year for the cases arising after the Amending
Act. Otherwise, the principle is the same. The learned judges after referring H
A
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

to the relevant provisions observed thus:-
-
"The question, therefore, is that which date of the publications in
three steps i.e, publication in the gazette, two newspapers aod local
publication to be the last date for the purpose of computing three
years' limitation prescribed in Clause (I) of the proviso to Section 6(1)
B of the Act. Prima facie, it gives an impression that the last of any of
the three steps puts in motion, the running of limitation of three years.

So it is necessary to understand the scheme and policy of the Act to
C get the crux of the question.

It would be seen that the purpose of notification under Section 4( I)
is an intimation to the owner or person having an interest in the land
that Government exercised the power of eminent domain in relation to
D his land and for public purpose his land is needed or likely to be
needed: puts an embargo on his freedom to deal with the land as an
unencumbered land and also pegs the price of.the land prevailing as
on that date. It also is a caveat to the Collector to make the award
under Section I I as well as to determine the market value prevailing
E as on the last of the dates to be the date and the award should be
made within a period prescribed by Section 11-A, lest the entire
acquisition shall stand lapsed. The word 'hereinafter' is for such
purposes as well as for the purpose of determination of the
compensation under Chapter III of the Act as well. Therefore, the
word hereinafter referred to as the last date of the publication of the
F notification is the date from which the prevailing prices of the land is
to be computed etc."

G
The last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the purposes
"hereinafter referred to "would be not for computing the period of
three years prescribed in clause (i) of proviso to Section 6( 1) of the
Act as it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter.
Otherwise language would have been "hereinbefore done." Sub-
H section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the
EUGENIO MISQUITA. v. STATE [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.) 371
declaration under Section 6(1) or other steps hereinafter to be taken, A
in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award
under Section I I or in computation of the period prescribed in Section
I I-A. The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers
having circulation in the locality one of which is in the regional
language and the publication of the substance of the declaration in
the locality are ministerial acts and is a procedural part. It appears that B
· these publications are required to be done to make the declaration
published in the manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public
purposes under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation to make the
award under Section 11 by the Collector. In other words, the limitation
prescribed under Section 11-A is for the purpose of making the award C
and if the Collector fails to do so, the entire proceeds under Sections
4(1) and 6(1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act
is understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the scheme
of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the
considered view that publication in the Official Gazette already made
under clause (i) of proviso to sub-section (I) of Section 6 is complete, D
as soon as the declaration under Section 6(1) was published in the
Official Gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of computation
of three years period from the last of the dates of the publication of
the notification under Section 4( I). The procedural ministerial acts
prescribed under sub-sections (2) are only for the purpose of the E
procedure to be followed 'hereinafter,' in other words, the steps to be
taken subsequent to the publication of the declaration under Section
6 (I) of the Act. We cannot agree with Shri Rana, the learned Senior
Counsel, that the date of making the declaration by the Secretary
to the Government or the authorised officer is the date for computing
period of three years. Equally, we cannot agree with the learned F
counsel for the respondents, Shri Upadhyay, that publication of the
substance being the last date from which the period of three years
needs to be computed. Acceptance of either contention would easily
defeat the public policy under the Act by skilful manner of management
with the lower level officials." G
In Lt. K. Padmadas v. State of Kera/a & Ors., AIR (I 992) Kerala 158,
a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court while answering an identical
question held as follows :-

"In this view of the matter, the last date of publication envisaged H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A by S.4(1) is 28.6.1989. Being so, the order of the Board of Revenue
made on 30.4.90 and the declaration under S.6 published in the gazette
on 29.5.1990 are within the period prescribed by the first proviso to
sub-section (1) of S.6, namely, one year from the date of publication
of the notification under S.4( 1).

B The questions then arises whether all the requirements of a valid
declaration as laid down in sub-section (2) of S.6, namely publication
in two daily newspapers and in the official gazette and the giving of
public notice in the locality should be complied with within the period
prescribed in sub-section. (7). It is stated that the sub-section defines

c the date of publication of the declaration as the last of the dates of
the publication in the gazette and the newspapers and the giving of
public notice and therefore unless all the publications and the public
notice fall within the one year period, the bar of the first provisio to
S.6(1) operates, The publication in the gazette was on 29.5.1990 and
in the Kerala Times and Mathrubhumi dailies on 29.5.1990 and 4.6.1990
D respectively. The counter affidavit of the third respondent does not
disclose as to when public notice was given in the locality.

We must even at the outset mention that a plea in this fonn has
not been put forward at the earlier stages. The contention before the
learned Single Judge (as evident from paragraph 7 of his judgement)
E was that the declaration under S.6 should have been made within one
year of the publication in the newspapers. The respondents did not
therefore have any opportunity of meeting the present case or of
placing before court the necessary details regarding the public notice
of the declaration in the locality. We need not however rest our
cjecision on this point as we are even otherwise of the opinion that
F
the declaration under S.6 was in time, in view of the publications
effected on 29.5.1990.

Sub-section (2) of S.6 reads:

"Every declaration shall be published in the official Gazette, and
G in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land
is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and
the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such
declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public
H notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of
EUGENIO MISQUIT A. v. ST A TE [K. VENKATASW AMI, J.] 373
the declaration) and such declaration shall state the district or other A
territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which
it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan shall have been
made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected."

It is evident from the parenthesis, which is relevant, that any reference
in the subsequent provisions of the Act, to the date of publication B
of the declarations is to be taken as the last of the dates of publication
and the giving of public notice. The use of the expression "hereinafter
referred to" makes it clear that the definition of the last date of
publication is for the purpose of the subsequent provi!.ions of the
Act. It is not possible to project it back for the purpose of sub-section C
(1). The High Court of Andhra Pradesh had taken the same view in
(1991) 2 Andh LT (Notes on Recent Cases) page 41(2) between the
Executive Officer. T. T.D. v. N.S. Venugopal, (to which one of us, the
Chief Justice, was a party). We are in agreement with this view. The
publication of the declaration in the gazette on 29.5.1990 is therefore
within the period prescribed by sub-section (I) and therefore the D
proceedings are not vitiated in any manner."

Undoubtedly, the judgement of Rajasthan High Court in Jagrup Singh
(supra) supports the contention raised by the learned coansel for the
appellants. A learned Single Judge of the High Court differing with the view
taken by the Kerala High Court held as follows : E
"Thus, viewing from any angle, whether applying the test of plain
literal dictionary meaning to the language used in the Act, or applying
the test of Mischief Rule of interpreting the Statute, or looking from
the point of view of legislative intention, the conclusion is irresistible
that the act of 'making declaration' by the appropriate Government F
that any particular land is needed for public purpose, includes the act
of making it known public in official manner and, that act has to be
performed within a 'period of one year from the date of notification
under S.4(1). The act of making declaration known in the official
manner had been prescribed under S.6(2) of the Act. The principle is G
well settled that where any statutory provision provides a particular
manner for doing particular act, then, that thing or act must be done
in accordance with the manner prescribed. Therefore, the act of making
declaration of Government's satisfaction in regard to the requirement
of the particular land for any public purpose is complete only when
the same is made known by publishing the said satisfaction in the H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A manner prescribed under S.6(2), for the purpose of further proceedings
in the matter of land acquisition, in terms of the other provisions of
the Act. It is only after the publication of the declaration in the
manner prescribed under S.6(2) that it becomes a declaration which is
conclusive proof of the fact that land is needed for public purpose
and it is only 'making ofsuch declaration', which furnishes conclusive
B proof of such satisfaction that authorises the appropriate Government
to acquire land in the manner thereafter provided under the Act. It is
only after making such declaration that the appropriate Government
can issue directions to the Collector to take orders for acquisition of
land under S. 7 of the Act. It is only after making of such declaration
c which includes publication thereof also, that provisions of S.11-A
becomes effective in suppressing the mischief for which it has been
enacted.

Summing up of aforesaid discussion, is that making of a declaration
u/s 6(1) within its ambit includes the act of making the document of
D declaration known ·or published officially. Sub-sec. (2) of S.6 provides
only the modes of publication of declaration, which is a part of the
act of making of a declaration and the publication of declaration in all
the modes prescribed under S.6(2) has to be made within the period
prescribed under S.6(1)."
E
The learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court is right to a limited
extent when he observed: 'the conclusion is irresistible that the act of 'making
declaration' by the appropriate Government that any particular land is needed
for public purpose, include the act of making it known public, in official
manner and, that act has to be performed within a period of one year from
F the date of notification under S.4(1 ). " However, the learned Judge erred in
holding thus: "It is only after the publication of the declaration in the manner
prescribed under S.6 (2) that it becomes a declaration which is conclusive
proof of the fact that the land is needed for public purpose and it is only
'making of such declaration', which furnishes conclusive proof of such
G satisfaction," 1because there is nothing in the statute to suggest by publishing
in the Official Gazette the 'making of declaration' has not been achieved nor
is there anything in the statute to show that the modes of publications
prescribed under section 6(2) notwithstanding the express language used in
that Section about which we have already pointed out, namely, 'hereinafter'
those modes also govern the publication at the prior stage, namely, under
H Section 6(1).
EUGENIO MISQUITA. v. STATE [K. VENKATASWAMI, J.] 375
Therefore , we hold that the judgement of the Rajasthan High Court A
does not correctly lay down the law.

In State of Haryana & Anr. v. Reghubir Dayal, [1995] I SCC 133, this
court had occasion to consider the effect of failure to publish the substance
of the declaration under Section 6 in the locality. This Court in that context B
held thus :

"The purpose of publication of the declaration is to give effect to the
conclusiveness of the extent of the land needed for the public purpose
or for a company as made under SectiOn 6(3) of the Act. Since there
is an opportunity already given to the owner of the land or persons C
having interest in the land to raise their objections during the enquiry
under Section 5-A or otherwise in case of dispensing with enquiry
under section 5-A unless they show any grave prejudice caused to
them in non-publication of the susbstance of the declaration under
section 6(1 ), the omission to publish the substance of the declaration D
under section 6( 1) in the locality would not render the declaration of
Section 6 invalid. We are not intending to say that the officer should
not comply with the requirement of law and it is their duty to do it.
But their dereliction to do so per se does not render the declaration
under Section 6 illegal or invalid."
E
The above view of this court lends support to the view that for the
purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed under proviso to section 6(i)
(ii), it is not the last of the publication in the series that should be taken into
account, but the publication that was made in the first instance under section
6. I<'
In the light of the law laid down by this court, we have no hesitation
to hold that the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act was well
within one year and the challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by
the High Court. However, the view taken in the judgment of the High Court
under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation will G
be the date of making of the declaration under section 6, may not be correct.
As held in krishi Utpadan Mandi samiti ' case, mere making of declaration is
not enough. The making of declaration under Section 6 is complete for the
purpose of proviso to Section 6(i) & (ii) when it is published in the official
gazette. H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 4 S.C R.

A On facts we have seen that the Notification was lastly published on
6.8.92 in the Official Gazette and declaration under Section 6 was published
in the Gazette on 5.8.93 which is well within one year. In the result, the appeal
fails and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

K.KT. Appeal dismissed.