Holding

The respondents are not entitled to claim plots at the 1992 policy rates and may only seek allotment under the 2016 policy, provided they file applications in the prescribed manner with the required earnest money.

Summary

The case concerned the allotment of residential and commercial plots to land owners (oustees) whose land was acquired by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) in 1992 for a residential development project. The oustees filed suits under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act seeking mandatory injunctions to compel HUDA to allot plots at rates prescribed by the 1992 policy, arguing that they had not been offered the benefit of the revised 2016 policy. HUDA contended that the oustees failed to submit applications in the prescribed format and deposit the required 10% earnest money, and that the suits were barred by limitation. The Supreme Court examined the applicability of the 1992 and 2016 policies, the requirements of Section 39, and the principles governing mandatory injunctions, ultimately deciding that the oustees could only claim benefits under the 2016 policy if they complied with its application procedures. The Court directed the respondents to file online applications with the requisite earnest money within four weeks and ordered HUDA to process eligible applications accordingly. All appeals were disposed of with these directions.

Issues considered

The oustees' entitlement to plots at rates prescribed by the 1992 policy versus the revised 2016 policy.
Whether the suits under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act are maintainable given the alleged non‑compliance with application requirements and limitation periods.
The interpretation of 'obligation' and the conditions for granting a mandatory injunction under the Specific Relief Act.
The effect of the policy revisions on the rights of oustees whose land was acquired in 1992.

Legislation cited

Haryana Development (Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulations, 1978s. Rule 5
Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977
Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Limitation Act, 1993s. Article 113
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. Section 2(a), s. Section 39

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The matter pertains to allotment of residential plots/commercial sites to the Oustees-respondents pursuant acquisition of their land for the purpose of development of the residential sector. The issue arose whether the respondents entitled to claim plots rate prescribed by the 1992 policy or at the rate prescribed by the revised policy of 2016. Headnotes† Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Haryana Development (Disposal of Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978 – rule 5 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.39 – Allotment of

Subjects

Land AcquisitionOusteeAllotment of plotsPolicy of 1992Earnest moneyMandatory injunctionObligation on the part of the defendantDetermination of Ratio DecidendiConditions for granting a Mandatory InjunctionJudicial discretionPrinciples of Ratio DecidendiTest for determination of Ratio DecidendiWambaugh’s Test/Inversion TestHalsbury’s testGoodhart’s TestRehabilitationCompensationPolicy of 2016

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 777 : 2025 INSC 843

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development
Authority and Ors.
v.
Nirmala Devi
(Civil Appeal No. 7707 of 2025)
14 July 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The matter pertains to allotment of residential plots/commercial
sites to the Oustees-respondents pursuant acquisition of their land
for the purpose of development of the residential sector. The issue
arose whether the respondents entitled to claim plots as oustees
at the rate prescribed by the 1992 policy or at the rate prescribed
by the revised policy of 2016.

Headnotes†
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Haryana Development (Disposal of
Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978 – rule 5 – Specific Relief
Act, 1963 – s.39 – Allotment of residential plots/commercial
sites to the oustees at the rate prescribed by the 1992 policy
or the revised policy of 2016 – Acquisition of land in the year
1992 by the Government for the public purpose-development
of residential sector – Policy of 1992 in force, governing the
resettlement and rehabilitation of the oustees and same got
revised in 2016 (Policy of 2016) – Failure of allotment of plots to
the oustees-respondents – Suits by the oustees u/s.39 seeking
mandatory injunction against the appellant – Appellant’s case
that the oustees failed to deposit 10 per cent of the earnest
money along with an appropriate application addressed to
the authority concerned in accordance with the Policy of
1992, and in the absence thereof, the benefits of the Policy of
1992 could not have been extended – In some of the cases,
the trial court dismissed the suits whereas few came to be
allowed – First appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial
court – High Court dismissed the Second Appeal – Special
Leave Petition thereagainst, wherein while issuing notice,

* Author
778 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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submission by the appellant that it would abide by the 2016
Policy and every single oustee would be accommodated as
per the said policy – Correctness:
Held: Respondents not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right
relying on the decision of Brij Mohan that they should be allotted
plots as oustees only at the price as determined in the 1992 policy –
Respondents entitled at the most to seek the benefit of the 2016
policy for the purpose of allotment of plots as oustees – Right
from the inception case of the appellant that none of the oustees,
at least the respondents, had applied in the requisite format for
allotment of plots with the deposit of the earnest money – If this
part of the obligation would have been performed or discharged
by the oustees in accordance with the scheme then perhaps
HUDA could have been called upon to perform its part of the
obligation – It is only if the plaintiff would have performed its part
of the obligation according to the scheme, then s.39 could have
been invoked to compel the HUDA as defendant to perform its
part of the obligation – When the scheme in question specifically
provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified
format with deposit of the requisite amount towards earnest money
then it is a part of the obligation on the part of the oustee to do so
before he calls upon the State to allot the plot in accordance with
the terms of the scheme – No explanation worth the name why it
took 14-20 years for the plaintiffs to institute their respective suits
for mandatory injunction u/s.39 of the Act 1963, when the land
of respective oustees came to be acquired in 1992 – However,
there is an inclination to grant the benefit of the scheme of 2016.
[Paras 63, 86, 95]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.39 – Suit filed u/s.39 for seeking
mandatory injunction for enforcement of the obligations –
Maintainability – Conditions for granting mandatory injunction:
Held: Mandatory injunction by its nature embodied u/s.39 is
discretionary – Granting of mandatory injunction is a matter of
judicial discretion of the court and it can be granted only in a
case which falls strictly within the four corners of the provision,
s.39 of the Act 1963 – It should be amenable for exercising
discretion by the Court – There must be a clear obligation on
the part of the defendant – Breach of that obligation must have
occurred or be reasonably apprehended – It must be necessary
to compel the performance of specific acts to prevent or rectify
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 779

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

the breach – Court must be able to enforce the performance of
those acts – Balance of convenience must be in favour of the
party seeking the injunction – Injury or damage caused by the
breach must be irreparable or not adequately compensable in
monetary term. [Paras 75, 76]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – ss.2(a), 39 – Term ‘obligation’ as
used in the Specific Relief Act – Interpretation:
Held: Specific relief may, in brief be explained as relief in specie – It
is the remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of the obligation –
Term ‘obligation’ as used in the Specific Relief Act in its wider juristic
sense covers duties arising either ex-construction or ex-delicto –
Every duty enforceable at law is obligation – Definition clause of
the Act of 1963 does not allow narrow interpretation of the word
‘obligation’ to restrict it to a contractual duty alone – Definition of
the word ‘obligation’ as used in the Act of 1963 is wide enough
and the definition cannot be equated with the definition of the
word ‘obligation’ used in the English Law – Obligation’ may be
said to be a bond or tie, which constrains a person to do or suffer
something, it implies a right in another person to which it is co-
related, and it restricts the freedom of the obligee with reference to
definite acts and forbearance; but in order that it may be enforced
by a Court, it must be a legal obligation – Definition of ‘obligation’
in s.2 is so wide that any breach of legal obligation may give a
cause to the affected party – Definition of the word ‘obligation’ in
s.2 should be interpreted in a way which may serve the cause of
the society. [Paras 77]

Judgment/order – Principles of Ratio Decidendi – Test for
determination of Ratio Decidendi – Invocation of Wambaugh’s
Test/Inversion Test, Halsbury’s test and Goodhart’s Test:
Held: Not every observation in a judgment of this Court is binding
as precedent – Only the ratio decidendi or the propositions of law
that were necessary to decide on the issues between the parties
are binding – Wambaugh’s Test/Inversion Test can be invoked to
determine whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated
as the ratio decidendi of a case – Test mandates that to determine
whether a particular proposition of law is part of the ratio decidendi
of the case, the proposition is to be inversed – Furthermore, the
mind of the Court should be clearly reflecting on the material in
issue with regard to the facts of the case – Reason and spirit of
780 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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case make law and not the letter of a particular precedent – As
per the Halsbury’s test, it is by the choice of material facts that
the Court create law – As per Goodhart’s Test, the ratio of a case
must be found in the reasons for the decision and that there is no
necessary connection between the ratio and the reasons – Ratio
decidendi is whatever facts the judge has determined to be the
material facts of the case, plus the judge’s decision as based on
those facts – It is by his choice of the material facts that the judge
creates law – Any court which considers itself bound by precedent
would come to the same conclusion as was reached in a prior case
unless there is in the case some further fact which it is prepared to
treat as material, or unless fact considered material in the previous
case is absent. [Paras 47, 50, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62]

Land acquisition – Rehabilitation and compensation –
Entitlement:
Held: When land is acquired for any public purpose the person
whose land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation
in accordance with the settled principles of law – It is only in the
rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider floating
any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons over and
above paying them compensation in terms of money – It is not
necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms
of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must – Any
beneficial measures taken by the Government should be guided
only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards
the landowners – Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for
those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss
of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition,
for people whose lives and livelihood are intrinsically connected
to the land. [Para 95]

Case Law Cited
Brij Mohan and Others v. Haryana Urban Development Authority
[2011] 1 SCR 12 : (2011) 2 SCC 29 – held inapplicable.
Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, 2003 INSC
391 : [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 474; Secunderabad Club v. CIT, 2023
INSC 736 : [2023] 12 SCR 979; State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’
Welfare Assn. [2018] 9 SCR 106 : (2018) 6 SCC 21; Nevada
Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2019] 15 SCR 223 :
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 781

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(2019) 20 SCC 119; State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors. [1986]
3 SCR 743 : AIR 1986 SC 2025; Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada
Bachao Andolan & Anr. [2011] 6 SCR 443 : (2011) 7 SCC 639;
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India [2000] Supp. 4
SCR 94 : (2000) 10 SCC 664; State of Kerala v. Peoples Union
for Civil Liberties [2009] 11 SCR 142 : (2009) 8 SCC 46; Jage
Ram & Others v. Union of India & Others [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 49 :
(1995) Supp. 4 SCC 615; Amarjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab
& Ors. [2010] 12 SCR 163 : (2010) 10 SCC 43; S. Gurdial Singh &
Others v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust [1997] 3 SCR 516 : (1995)
5 SCC 138 – referred to.
Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (2010) 10 P&H CK
0212 – referred to.
Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495 : [1901] UKHL 2 – referred to.

List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Haryana Development (Disposal of
Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978; Specific Relief Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Land Acquisition; Oustee; Allotment of plots; Policy of 1992;
Earnest money; Mandatory injunction; Oligation on the part of
the defendant; Determination of Ratio Decidendi; Conditions for
granting a Mandatory Injunction; Judicial discretion; Principles
of Ratio Decidendi; Test for determination of Ratio Decidendi;
Wambaugh’s Test/Inversion Test; Halsbury’s test; Goodhart’s Test;
Rehabilitation; Compensation; Policy of 2016.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7707 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2016 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2915 of 2012
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 7708, 7709, 7710, 7711, 7712, 7713, 7714,
7715, 7716, 7717, 7718, 7719, 7720, 7721, 7722, 7723, 7724,
7725, 7726, 7727, 7728, 7729, 7730, 7731, 7732, 7733, 7734
and 7735 of 2025
782 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties

Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., B.k. Satija, A.A.G., Vishwa Pal Singh,
B. K. Satija, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Samar Vijay Singh, Ms. Sabarni
Som, Fateh Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Narender Hooda, Sr Adv., Amit K. Nain, V. K. Verma, Siddharth
Mittal, Abhijeet Varshney, Darshan Sejwal, Sumit Kumar Sharma,
Mrs. Shilpa G Mittal, Rajiv Raheja, Ravi Ranjan, Anurag Jain, J K
Bhola, Sanjiv Raheja, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Abhijit Sengupta,
Sanjay Singh, Umang Shankar, Siddharth Jain, Vidyut Kayarkar,
Shalender Singh Negi, Shree Pal Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh, Ankit
Goel, Subhasish Bhowmick, D. Bharat Kumar, Ms. Pallvi Hooda,
Shiv Bhatnagar, Yuvraj N. Ms. Tannu, Aditya Soni, Rajat Sharma,
Shree Pal Singh, S.K. Pabbi, Ms. Disha Singh, Shivendu Gaur,
Ms. Nidhi Sharma.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the
following parts: -

INDEX*

A. HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION ............................................ 5

i. Few Salient Features of the Policy of 1992 ....................... 15

ii. Institution of the Suits under Section 39 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction for
Enforcement of The Policy. ........................................... 25

iii. Impugned Judgment of the High Court ....................... 32

iv. Filing of the Special Leave Petitions before this Court 36

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 783

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES ......................................... 37

i. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants ................... 37

ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents ............... 46

C. ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 49

i. Dictum as laid by this Court in Brij Mohan (Supra)
and the Ratio Decidendi ................................................. 53

a. Wambaugh’s Test / Inversion Test ............................. 57

b. Halsbury’s Test ........................................................... 58

c. Goodhart’s Test .......................................................... 60

ii. Maintainability of the Suit filed under Section 39 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory
Injunction for Enforcement of the Obligations in terms
of the Scheme of 1992 ................................................... 63

a. Conditions for granting a Mandatory Injunction .......... 66

D. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 84

1. Delay condoned in Diary No. 9756 of 2017. Leave granted in all the
Special Leave Petitions.
2. Since the issues involved in all the captioned appeals are same and
the challenge is also to the self-same judgment and order passed
by the High Court, those were taken up for hearing analogously and
are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. This batch of appeals arises from a common judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 12.08.2016
by which the Second Appeals filed by the appellant herein came to
be dismissed, affirming the judgment and order passed by the First
Appellate Court affirming the decrees passed by the trial court in
favour of the respondents herein.
784 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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A. HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
4. Our order dated 05.03.2025 by itself would give more than a fair
idea as regards the history of this litigation and the issues involved
in the matter. Our order dated 5.03.2025 reads thus:

“ ORDER
1. We heard Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the Haryana Urban
Development Authority i.e. the petitioners – herein and the
learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents
in each of the petitions before us.
2. Having heard the matter for quite some time, we have
been able to understand the controversy involved in this
litigation. What we have been able to understand prima
facie is that in the State of Haryana, there is a very unusual
policy with respect to land acquisition. If the Government
wants to acquire land for public purpose, it proceeds in
accordance with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act.
However, it has its own policy of even providing alternate
plots of land to the oustees. It all started in the year
1989 with the issue of Notification under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act. In 1990, the Section 6 Notification
came to be issued. In the year 1992, the awards were
passed.
3. We were taken through the relevant features of the
policy relating to allotment of residential plots/commercial
sites to the oustees. The same is at Annexure ‘P1’ in the
first matter before us.
4. Thereafter, we were taken through the various pleadings
in the plaint which is at Annexure ‘P6’.
5. Prima facie, it appears that the suits filed by the
individuals/oustees are one invoking Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.
6. We also take notice of the fact that in some of the
cases, the Trial Court dismissed the Suits whereas few
came to be allowed.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 785

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

7. However, the fact is that all these petitions arise from a
common Judgment and order passed by the High Court
dismissing in all 27 Second Appeals.
8. Today, Ms. Bhati, the learned Additional Solicitor General
invited our attention to the order passed by this Court
dated 8-5-2017, the same reads thus:-
“Delay condoned Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits
that the petitioner will abide by the policy framed
on 11.08.2016 and every eligible oustee will be
accommodated according to the said Policy. Issue
notice restricted to the question of correctness of
the general direction made by the High Court in
granting allotments to all claimants who may not be
similarly situated. In the meantime, there shall be
stay of execution.”
9. The plain reading of the aforesaid order would indicate
that at the relevant point of time, a statement was made
on behalf of the Authority that they were ready and willing
to consider the claims of the oustees in accordance with
the policy of 2016.
10. Therefore, this Court thought fit to issue notice limited
to the general direction which has been issued by the
High Court in its impugned judgment and order, referred
to above. To the aforesaid, there is a strong objection at
the end of the learned counsel appearing for the individual
oustees. Their claim is that they are entitled to the benefit
of the Policy of 1992 and not 2016.
11. To a very specific question put to them as to why they
are objecting to the Policy of 2016, the reply was that
the rates have been increased over a period of years.
They want allotment at the rate which were prevalent in
accordance with 1992 policy and not in accordance with
2016 policy. This aspect will have to be looked into.
12. Ms. Bhati put forward three contentions. First, all those
oustees who had actually not applied in accordance with
786 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the policy prevalent at the relevant point of time, could
not have instituted the suits invoking Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act. According to Ms. Bhati, such suits by
itself were not maintainable.
13. Her second contention is that each co-sharer is not
entitled to individual plots and the third contention is with
regard to limitation.
14. Before we proceed to hear these matters finally, we
want the following information to be placed on record for
better and effective determination of the issues falling for
our consideration:-
(i) in how many cases before us, the concerned
outstee(s) had not applied at all;
(ii) How many had actually applied;
(iii) the fine distinguishing features between the policy
of 1992 and 2016 respectively;
(iv) how many suits were allowed, whereas how many
were dismissed by the Trial Court.
15. We would also request Ms. Bhati, the learned ASG to
make us understand the purport of the judgment delivered
by this Court in “Brij Mohan and Others vs. Haryana Urban
Development Authority & Anr. (2011) 2 SCC 29 (Civil
Appeal No.1 of 2011), decided on 3-1-2011.
16. In the last paragraph of the impugned order passed
by the High Court, we find reference of Udai Singh’s case.
It appears that the entire impugned judgment is based on
the ratio of Udai Singh’s case.
17. We are informed that Udai Singh’s Judgment was
carried to this Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal
(Civil) Nos.8766-8767/2023 which came to be dismissed
by this Court vide order dated 24-11- 2025.
18. We would also like to know from Ms. Bhati whether
the High Court was justified in relying on the dictum as
laid in the Udai Singh’s case.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 787

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

19. Let the aforesaid information come on record by way
of an affidavit. 20. Post these matters on 25-3-2025 as
Item No.1 to be treated as Part-heard.”
5. In pursuance of our order dated 5.03.2025 referred to above, the
appellant through its Estate Officer has filed an additional affidavit
answering the four specific questions put by us.
6. To the first two questions put by us, the reply of the appellant is as
under:
“(i & ii) In reply to the information as sought for in para
14(i)(ii) of the order dated 05.03.2025, it is submitted that
from the subsequent paras it is evident that any of the
respondent did not submit application as per the specific
format provided in brochure issued seeking allotment of
plot under Oustees quota and further failed to pay 10% of
the earnest money as mentioned over there. Therefore, it
cannot be said any of the concerned oustees had applied
seeking allotment of plot under Oustees quota as per
the brochure issued by the petitioner authority inviting
applications for an allotment of plot. It is submitted that
as per condition of the brochure issued by the petitioner
authority the application shall be deemed to be valid only
in those cases where the application so submitted are
accompanied by earnest money. In present case any of
the respondent has not submitted the earnest money with
the application if any so submitted.
iv.) In respect to para 14(iv) of the order it is submitted that
in total 30 civil suit instituted (26 in respect to impugned
order dated 12.08.2016), (3 in respect to impugned
order dated 30.07.2019) & (1 in respect to impugned
order dated 07.01.2016) by the respondents and out of
30 civil suits, 12 civil suits were dismissed and 18 civil
suits decreed by the Ld. Civil Judge. A chart in respect
to each suit dismissed/decreed has been annexed with
this additional affidavit.

xxx xxx xxx
788 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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28. I say and submit that under all the policies framed
by petitioner HDUA from time to time and amended the
requirement of the public notice/advertisement to be
issued inviting applications from the interested persons
including the oustees and the applications are to be
submitted in the prescribed format along with earnest
money and terms and conditions of the brochure so
issued the application shall be deemed to be valid
application if the same has been submitted with earnest
money.

xxx xxx xxx
29. I say and submit that when the applications have not
been submitted in the prescribed format that to without
the earnest money therefore the respondents are not
entitled for any relief and it will amount to wind full gain
if the respondent to have been fully compensated in
accordance with statutory scheme for the land acquired
for public purpose by the state if despite have not paid a
single penny if they are giving their plot as per the 1992
rates.”
7. As regards the distinguishing features between the Policy of 1992 and
the revised Policy of 2016 respectively, the appellant has explained
the same in the following manner:
“DISTINGUISHING FEATURES BETWEEN THE POLICY
OF 1992 AND POLICY OF 2016
Terms and conditions of Terms and conditions Modifications done in
Policy dated policy dated 01.08.2016
of Policy dated
18.03.1992 as modified on
11.08.2018
08.05.2018
VI) Claims of the
oustees for allotment of
plots under this policy shall
be invited by the Estate
Officer, Haryana Urban
Development Authority
concerned before the
sector is floated for sale.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 789

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

2. An oustee shall be 2. An oustee shall be
entitled to seek allotment entitled to seek allotment
of plot in the same sector of plot in the same sector
for which land has been for which land has been
acquired for residential/ acquired for residential/
commercial purpose. commercial purpose and
However, where the land in case the plots are not
has only been acquired available in the same
for any non-residential sector for which land
purpose such as industrial has been acquired for
institutional group residential/commercial
housing sites, completely purpose, then such an
commercial sector etc. oustee may also be
then such an oustee considered for allotment
shall be entitled to seek in an adjoining sector
allotment of plot in the except where the land
adjoining sector. Adjoining was acquired prior
sector for this purpose to 10.09.1987. Where
shall mean the sector with the land has only been
boundaries abutting to the acquired for any non-
said sector. Where there residential purpose such
are more than one sector as industrial, institutional,
adjoining to the sector Group Housing sites and
for which land has been completely commercial
acquired in that case an sector etc. then such an
oustee shall be entitled oustee shall be entitled
to make an application to seek allotment of plot
in any one sector of his in an adjoining sector.
choice. However, where Adjoining sector for this
any such application is purpose shall mean any
made in more than one sector where boundary
sector then only his one abuts that of the said
application in any such sector. However, if no
sector at the discretion plot is available for one
of the HUDA Authority or more oustees in any
shall be considered and of the adjoining sectors,
earnest money in respect then a sector adjoining
of other applications to any of the original and
shall automatically stand adjoining sectors, may be
forfeited and no claim for considered for purpose
such forfeiture shall lie of allotment of plots. An
in future. oustee shall be free to
apply for allotment of an
ouste quota plot in one,
more or all the adjoining
sectors. It is clarified
that once any of these
applications is successful
all remaining applications
shall be automatically
assumed to have been
cancelled.
790 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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3. The application of 3. The application
an oustee shall be of an oustee shall be
considered against considered against
the plots determined the plots determine
under oustees quota under oustee quota
as per the instruction as per the instruction
issued vide memo issued vide Memo No.
no. UB-A-62016/2213 UB-A-6-2016/2213
dated 04.121.2015. The dated 04.12.2015. The
number of plots shall percentage of plots shall
be determined on basis be determined on the
of total available plots basis of plots in a sector
advertised. and it shall be ensured
that number of plots
allotted under all the
reserved categories shall
not exceed maximum
limit of 50% of the plots
in a sector. The charge
in number of plots in
a sector subsequently
should be taken into
account for determining
the reservation of oustees
quota plots.
4. An oustee shall have
the right to make such
application only till the
plots are available for
oustees in the sector as
per condition no. 2 and
3 above.
i) Plots to the 6. An oustee should have
been the owner of the land
oustees would be offered
as on the date when the
if the land proposed to
notification under Sec. 4
be acquired is under the
of the Land Acquisition
ownership of oustees prior
Act, 1894 is issued. Any
to the publication of the
subsequent purchaser of
notification under section
land after said notification
4 of the Land Acquisition
has been issued will
Act and if 75% of more of
not be entitled to make
the total land owned by the
such application. Any
land owners in that sector
application made by such
is acquired.
purchaser shall entail
automatic rejection of
application and forfeiture
o f e a r n e s t m o n e y.
However, the forfeiture
of earnest money will be
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 791

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

done only after giving
opportunity of hearing to
the defaulting applicant.
7. An oustee shall be
eligible to make such
application only if 75% or
more of his total land in
the concerned revenue
estate is acquired. For this
purpose, the total land to
be considered for such
determination will mean
the land comprised in the
same revenue
Estate(s) where the
concerned sector is
situated.
iii) The above policy shall 8. The eligibility of each
also apply in case there co-sharer for allotment of
are a number of co-sharers plot under oustees quota
of the land which has been shall be determined on
acquired. If the acquired the basis of his individual
land measures more holding i.e. each co-
than one acre. Then for sharer will be entitled to
the purpose of granting seek allotment of plot on
benefits under this policy, basis of his own individual
the determining factor holding.
should be the area
owned by each co sharer
respectively as per his her
share in the joint holding.
In case the acquired land
of the co sharer is less than
one acre, only one plot of
250 sqd would be allotted
in the joint name of the co
sharers.
(Amended vide Memo
No.A-11P-93/7996-8013
dated 12.03.1993 as
under:
2. Benefit under oustees
policy shall be restricted
to one plot according to
the size of the holding
irrespective of the number
of co-sharers.
792 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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v i i ) T h e c o m m e r c i a l 10. No commercial site
sites/building are sold by will be allotted to the
auction. The sites/buildings oustees
be also allotted to oustees
on reserve price as and
when the auction of the
same is held. While putting
such sites/buildings to
public auction, the oustees
who want to purchase
the sites /buildings could
represent before hand for
them. However, if the area
acquired of the commercial
site is equivalent or less
to the area of booth shop
cum flat being auctioned
by HUDA they may be
given a booth /SCO
sites keeping in view the
size of acquisition under
this policy. (Amended
vide Memo No.A-
11P-98/24402-22 Dated:
28.08.1998.)
13. A co-sharer in the
land will not be eligible to
claim allotment of plot if he
had given a no objection
certificate in favour of his
co-sharer and on account
of submission of such
no objection certificate
a plot was allotted to
such co-sharer in any
previous floatation of plots
for oustees.
v) As per the policy the 14. An o ustee who has
oustees shall be entitled already been allotted a
to a developed plot/plots, plot under the oustees
the size of which would policy on any previous
depend upon the area of occasion as a co-sharer
his acquired land subject shall not be entitled to
to a maximum of 500 stake claim for allotment
syd. The oustee shall of plot under oustees
be entitled to this benefit quota.
under this policy only once
in the same town where the
land of a person situated /
located. However, in cases
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 793

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

where the land of a person
situated in the same town
is acquired in pockets at
different times. The owner
shall be entitled to claim
the benefit on account of
the entire area acquired
at different times for
purposes of claiming the
benefit under this policy.
15. An oustee who has In Clause 15 of the
made an application for guidelines, following
allotment of plot under clause may be added
oustees policy on any 15(a). Where an
previous occasion and application is made
said application either by an oustee in an
is pending for decision advertisement issued
or was rejected on any afresh, the price of plot
ground and said rejection that may be charged from
order was impugned him if he is successful in
before any Court of law draw of lots out of plots
or authority or forum of reserved for oustees
any nature and matter shall be the rate as
has been remanded advertised in a new
back to the authority for advertisement in cases
fresh decision shall be where the allotment of
informed of the decision plot could not be effected
in Bhagwan Singh’s case despite determination
and Sandeep’s case and of his eligibility, the
may also be advised to prevalent price at the
apply for allotment of plot time of application by the
in fresh advertisement oustee in pursuance to
which will be issued an advertisement may be
after determination of charged alongwith simple
reservation and their interest @ 11% per annum
earnest money may till date. It is clarified that
be refunded along eligibility for the purpose
with interest @ 55% as aforesaid shall be
per annum from date treated as determine only
of deposit till date of when Sachin completed
payment. However, where and satisfied all the
litigation is pending then formalities/conditions as
the court of law authority per the applicable policy.
or forum where it is
pending may be informed
of the aforesaid decision
and efforts may be
made to get the litigation
disposed of in terms
specified herein.
794 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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16. The applications of
the oustees as received
shall be put in draw of
lots and eligibility of only
those oustees who are
successful in draw of
lots shall be determined.
Mere submission of such
application or success
in draw of lots shall not
create any vested right for
such allotment as eligibility
will be determined only
after oustee is declared
successful in draw of lots.
17. The list of applicants
shall be compiled within
a period of 15 days of
closing of the scheme
and draw shall be held
within a period of 30 days
of closing of scheme for
advertised plots. The
eligibility of the oustees
who are successful in draw
of lots shall be determined
within a further of if any
outstay who is declared
as successful in draw of
Lords is found in eligible
as per policy then his
draw shall be cancelled
the plot which will become
available on account of
such cancellation of draw
me again be put to draw
of lots out of remaining out
these who were earlier and
unsuccessful in the same
bro the earnest money of
successful applicants may
be refunded their after no
inter shell be payable on
the said amount if it is a
refunded within a. of from
closing of 1226 - HSVP
policies and structures the
scheme otherwise interest
@ 55% per annum may
be paid on earnest money
after expiry of 6 months till
date of payment.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 795

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

8. So far as the fourth question is concerned as to how many suits
were allowed and how many came to be dismissed, the information
provided by the appellant is as under:
“iv.) In respect to para 14(iv) of the order it is submitted that
in total 30 civil suit instituted (26 in respect to impugned
order dated 12.08.2016), (3 in respect to impugned order
dated 30.07.2019) & (1 in respect to impugned order dated
07.01.2016) by the respondents and out of 30 civil suits, 12
civil suits were dismissed and 18 civil suits decreed by the
Ld. Civil Judge. A chart in respect to each suit dismissed/
decreed has been annexed with this additional affidavit.”
(emphasis supplied)

i. Few Salient Features of the Policy of 1992
9. Although we have given a fair idea as regards the distinguishing
features of the Policy of 1992 and the Policy of 2016 as modified in
2018 referred to above, we are of the view that for better and effective
adjudication of the issue in question we must highlight few salient
features of the Policy of 1992. The salient features of the Policy of
1992 and in what manner the oustees were expected to apply for
the plot in accordance with the policy, has been highlighted by the
appellant in its written submissions as under:

“ISSUANCE OF BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT FOR
INVITING APPLICATIONS FOR ALLOTMENT OF PLOT
UNDER OUSTEES QUOTA
(i) BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT DATED 01.10.1992
The Petitioner Authority issued a brochure on 01.10.1992
for a free hold residential plot in Sector 19 Part – II and
Sector 20 in Kaithal. The salient features are:
(i) The application is to be addressed to the Estate Officer,
HUDA as:
“To
The Estate Officer,
Haryana Urban Development Authority,
Kurukshetra
796 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Dear Sir,
I/we request that I/WE may be allotted a residential site as
stated on reverse side in Sector 19(Part ii) & Sector 20. I/
We agree to conform to abide by the terms and conditions
as contained in the Haryana Urban Development Authority
Act, 1977 and in the rules and Regulations applications
thereunder. I/we own no residential plot/house in my / our
name(s) or in the name(s) of my/our dependent family/
member(s)/spouse in Kaithal Urban Estate if applying
under General Category or any Urban Estate of Haryana if
applying under any Gender Category or any Urban Estate
of Haryana if applying under any Reserve Category.
Yours faithfully,
Signature of Applicant(s)”
(ii) Terms and conditions for the allotment of Residential
Plot:
“1(i) Only such applications shall be deemed to be valid as
are accompanied by specified earnest money equivalent to
10% of the tentative sale price in the form of cash receipt/
demand draft in favour of the Estate Officer, Kurukshetra
drawn at the place at which the application is deposited.
However, Earnest Money shall not be accepted in cash
by the Estate Officer, Kurukshetra, Bank branches will
accept cash also.
(iii) The application form to be submitted was serial no.
ed and the price of
PRICE RS. 5/- AT THE COUNTER
Rs. 15/- by Registered Post.
Indian Postal Orders are not accepted.
No responsibility of postal delay.
(iv) The last date for receipt of application is 01.10.1992.

(ii) BROCHURE/ADVERTISEMENT DATED 22.12.1999
The salient features are:
(i) there is prescribed application with serial no.
seeking allotment of residential plot.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 797

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(ii) The application is to be addressed in the prescribed
format to the Estate Officer, HUDA.
(iii) Terms and Conditions:
“1(i) Only such applications shall be deemed to
be valid as are accompanied by specified earnest
money equivalent to 10% of the tentative sale price
in the form of a cash receipt/demand draft in favour
of the concerned Estate Officer, HUDA drawn at the
place at which the application is deposited. However,
earnest money shall not be accepted in cash by the
concerned Estate Officer, HUDA Bank branches will
accept cash also.
3. The price is tentative to the extent that any enhancement
in the cost of land awarded by the Competent authority
under the Land Acquisition Act shall also be payable
proportionately, as determined by the Authority, within 30
days or in such specified period of its demand.

OTHER NOTES:
1. No interest shall be payable on the money for the
applicant for the period for which the same remains lying
with the authority.
3. An application without the prescribed earnest money
shall not be entertained and is liable to be rejected outright.
4. The applicants under the reserved categories shall not
be eligible without the requisite certificates/documents.

xxx xxx xxx
6. Affidavit, wherever required, shall be furnished on judicial
stamp paper worth Rs. 3/- duly attested by a Magistrate
1st Class/Executive Magistrate.
7. Allotment of plots and all matters connected therewith
shall be governed by the provisions contained in the
HUDA Act and Rules /Regulations framed thereunder as
amended from time to time.
798 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

8. Dispute if any regarding allotment related matters should
be settled within the jurisdiction of the concerned Estate
Officer, HUDA.”
The price of the brochure mentioned as Rs. 20.00

(iii) PUBLIC NOTICE / ADVERTISEMENT DATED
13.03.2025
(i) Oustees to apply alongwith application money Rs.
50,000/- for the concerned sector.
(ii) the claims of the oustees will be decided in terms of
the policy dated 11.08.2016 and 08.05.2018.
(iii) The terms and conditions available on HSVP website.
1. Any land owner whose land is acquired prior to
10.09.1987 by Urban Estate Department are not
eligible against the advertisement at hand for which
separate advertisement has been issued.
3. As held by Hon’ble High Court in Rajiv
Manchanda’s case (supra), the policy applicable
to an oustee is the one which is in force when an
application is made pursuant to an advertisement
issued by HUDA and in pursuance of which the
plot is allotted. Therefore, for deciding the claims
of oustees the applicable policy would be policy
dated 04.12.2015, 11.08.2016 and 08.05.2018 as
per which only the entitlement and eligibility shall
be decided.
4. the allotment shall be made on the current reserve
price mentioned in the table attached and in case
finalization of allotment takes time, for any reason
in that eventuality bank rate of interest be charged
till the date of allotment on the rate mentioned in the
advertisement.
(v) It is pertinent to mention here that in regard to
advertisement dated 13.03.2025 number of oustees have
already applied online paying Rs. 50,000.00.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 799

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(vi) That earlier as per advertisement, the closing date
was 31.03.2025 and now the same has been extended
to 31.05.2025.
(vii) It is submitted that from the above, it is evident that
there is a prescribed form of application with serial no. and
the same is to be submitted with earnest money.
(True copies of the advertisement dated 01.10.1992,
22.12.1999 and public notice dated 13.03.2025 are
being annexed marked as ANNEXURE A-7, Pg.
68-82.)
(viii) At the outset it is submitted that in regard to
advertisement/brochure dated 01.10.1992 and 22.12.1999
any of the respondents did not submit any application as
per prescribed format and even did not deposit the earnest
money. Therefore, any application submitted by any of
the respondents not in the prescribed form with earnest
money cannot said to be submission of application and
once they failed to comply with the mandatory condition
of the policy/advertisement cannot claim entitlement of a
plot under oustee policy.”
10. In addition to the aforesaid, the appellant has narrated the following
facts as regards the applicability of the policy etc. The same reads thus:
“The Petitioner Authority introduced a scheme whereby
a plot is offered to the oustees whose land has been
acquired. Size of the plot is decided as per criteria and the
area of land acquired. The person whose land has been
acquired may apply to the Estate Officer, concerned as
and when oustees claim for sector are invited along with
copy of Award, Nakaljamabi or registry as the case may
be alongwith 10 % earnest money.
(i) It is submitted that the petitioner Authority from time to
time issued policies for the allotment of residential plots/
commercial sites to the land owners those have become
oustees due to acquisition of their respective land. The
relevant oustees policies in regard to the present batch
of SLP’s are as under:
800 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Petitioner-HUDA vide Memo No. A-2-92/2076 dated
18.03.1992 (policy) decided to offer a plot to the Oustees
in case where the land has been acquired (P-1 Pg. 31-33
with SLP No. 15148 of 2017 Paper Book). The relevant
terms and conditions as mentioned in the said policy are
as under:
(i) Plots to the oustees would be offered if the land proposed
to be acquired is under the ownership of oustees prior to
the publication of the notification under section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act and if 75 % or more of the total land
owned by the Landowners in that sector is acquired.
(ii) Oustees whose land acquired is:
(a) Less than 500 sq. yards would be offered a plot of
50 sq. yards.
(b) Between 500 sq. yds. And one acre would be offered
a plot of 250 sq. yds.
(c) From 1 acre and above would be offered a plot of
500 sq. yds where 500 or where 500 sq. yds. Plots are
not provided in the layout plan two plots of 250 sq. yds.
Each may be given.
(iii) The above policy shall also apply in case there are
no. of co-sharers of the land which has been acquired.
If the acquired land measures more than one acre. Then
for the purpose of granting benefits under this policy, the
determining factor should be the area owned by each
co-sharer respectively as per his/her share in the joint
holding. In case the acquired land of the co-sharer is less
than one acre, only one plot of 250 yds. Would be allotted
in the joint name of the co-sharers.
(vi) Allotment of plots to the oustees will be made at
the allotment rate advertised by the Haryana Urban
Development Authority for that sector, Land owners will
be given compensation for their land which is acquired.
(vii) Claim of the oustees for allotment of plots under this
Policy shall be invited by the Estate Officer, Haryana Urban
Development Authority concerned before the Sector is
floated for sale.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 801

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(viii) …
(A true copy of Memo dated 18.03.1992 is annexed
herewith marked as ANNEXURE A-1, PG. 46-48)
(ii) It is submitted that the Petitioner Authority in its 55th
meeting held on 29.01.1993 approved the procedure
for inviting, scrutinizing and finally accepting the claims
of oustees and further modified the earlier policy dated
18.03.1992 on 12.03.1993 (P-3 Pg. 40-41) to the effect that
(i) Benefit under the policy is not to be allowed to those
oustees who have got residential/commercial plot from
HUDA in the urban estate.
(ii) Benefit shall be restricted to one plot according to the
size of the holding irrespective of the no. of co-sharers.
(A true copy of memo dated 12.03.1993 is annexed
herewith marked as ANNEXURE A-2, pg. 49-50.)
(iii) It is submitted that after passing of the judgment by the
Hon’ble High Court in the case of HUDA v. Sandeep Kumar,
during the pendency of the SLP’s issued a Memo dated
11.08.2016, i.e., another policy called as Policy of 2016.
(iv) In the said memo it was specifically mentioned that
the judgment dated 25.04.2012 passed by the Hon’ble
High Court in LPA No. 2096 of 2011 titled as HUDA v.
Sandeep has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
vide order dated 06.03.2014 passed in SLP © No. 27256
of 2012 titled as HUDA v. Sandeep whereby the special
leave petition has been dismissed and as such the order
passed by the Hon’ble High Court has been affirmed.
(v) It is submitted that in order to ensure the implementation
of the directions as issued in the case of Sandeep Kumar
(supra) by the Hon’ble High Court and to ensure settlement
of the oustees claim the Memo dated 11.08.2016 was
issued. The relevant salient features of the said memo
dated 11.08.2016(Policy of 2016) are as follows:
1. An oustee shall have to submit an application for
allotment of plot under the oustees quota alongwith earnest
802 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

money in pursuance of advertisement inviting claim for
such allotment.
2. … (amended subsequently vide memo dated 08.05.2018)
3. …(amended subsequently vide memo dated 08.05.2018)
4. ….
5. The allotment of plot to the oustees will be made through
draw of lots.
6. And oustee should have been the owner of the land
as on the date when the notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is issued. Any subsequent
purchase of land after said notification has been issued will
not be entitled to make such application. Any application
made by such purchaser shall entail automatic rejection
of application and for feature of earnest money. However,
the forfeiture of earnest money will be done only after
giving opportunity of hearing to the defaulting applicant.
7. …
8. The eligibility of each co-sharer for allotment of plot
under oustee quota shall be determined on the basis of his
individual holding each co-sharer will be entitled to seek
allotment of plot on basis of his own individual holding.
9. ….
10. ….
11. ….
12. An oustee who has already got the benefit of allotment
of plot from Haryana Urban Development Authority in any
reserved category including under oustee policy shall not
be eligible to seek allotment of plot under oustee quota.
13. A co-sharer in the land will not be eligible to claim
allotment of plot if he had given a no objection certificate
in favour of his co-sharer and on account of submission
of such no objection certificate, a plot was allotted to
such co-sharer in any previous flotation of plots for
oustees
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 803

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

14. An oustee who has already been allotted a plot under
the oustees policy on any previous occasion as a co-sharer
and shall not be entitled to stake claim for allotment of
plot under oustees quota.
15. … (amended subsequently vide memo dated
08.05.2018)
16. The applications of the oustees as received shall be
put in draw of lots and eligibility of only those oustees who
are successful in draw of lots shall be determined. Mere
submission of such application or success in draw of lots
shall not create any vested right for such allotment as
eligibility will be determined only after oustee is declared
successful in draw of lots.
17. …
18. …
(A true copy of memo dated 11.08.2016 is annexed herewith
marked as ANNEXURE A-3, PG. 51-57)
(vi) It is submitted that the policy dated 11.08.2016 was
clarified vide Memo dated 08.11.2016. (A true copy of
memo dated 08.11.2016 is annexed herewith marked as
ANNEXURE A-4 PG. 58-59.
(vii) It is submitted that the said policy dated 11.08.2016 was
amended vide Memo dated 08.05.2018 where clause 2, 3,
11 and 15 of the guidelines dated 11.08.2016 amended and
clause 19 was added. A true copy of memo dated 08.05.2018
is annexed herewith marked as ANNEXURE A-5 PG. 60-64.
(viii)It is submitted that the petitioner authority has already
filed a comparative chart distinguishing the policies of 1992
and 2016 as asked for by this Hon’ble Court in Para 14(iii)
of its order dated 05.03.2025 with the additional affidavit
filed on 25.03.2018 (A-2, pg 29-31 with the additional
affidavit), however, another copy of being annexed herewith
marked as Annexure A-6 pg. 65-67.
(ix) It is submitted that a bunch of special leave petition
listed for hearing on 08.05.2017 and the Hon’ble court
pleased to pass the order as:
804 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“Delay condoned.
Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner will abide
by the Policy framed on 11.08.2016 and every eligible
oustee will be accommodated according to the said policy.
Issue notice restricted to the question of correctness of
the general direction made by the High Court in granting
allotments to all claimants who may not be similarly
situated.
In the meantime, there shall be stay of execution.”
(x) It is submitted that the said policy dated 11.08.2016
was formulated in view of the directions issued by the
Hon’ble Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar and even
the advertisement of public notice issued in 2025 inviting
the applications for allotment of plots is also based on the
policy dated 11.08.2016.
(xi) It is submitted that even in the judgment dated
22.11.2017 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh Manchanda vs. HUDA 2018
(2) PLR 422 there was issue in regard to the policy dated
11.08.2016. The said question NO. 14 is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:
“Whether the policy dated 11.08.2016 or any part of the
thereof is illegal?
(xii) It is submitted that the Hon’ble High court while passing
the judgment dated 21.11.2017 dealt with all the clauses
of the policy dated 11.08.2016 and upheld the same.
(xiii) It is submitted that in the case of HUDA vs. Sandeep
Kumar & Ors. the Hon’ble High court while answering
question No. 3 arrived at the finding that the condition for
allotment of a plot for the reason that 75% of the land has
been acquired cannot be said to be unjustified and the
landowner is the owner of the remaining land, the policy
makers has found as a part of rehabilitation process and
it to the object of rehabilitate.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 805

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(xiv) It is submitted that in regard to applicability of the
oustees policy, the Hon’ble High court in the case of Rajiv
Manchanda vs. HUDA passed in Writ Petition No. 22252
of 2016 in Para 72 held that the policy applicable to an
oustee is 1 which is in force when an application is made
pursuant to an advertisement issued by HUDA and in
pursuance to which the plot is allotted.
In present case, the respondents have not submitted
the applications seeking allotment of plot and the latest
advertisement in 2025 has been issued where it has
been mentioned that the policy dated 11.08.2016 will be
applicable, therefore, in the case of respondents also the
said policy will be applicable.”

ii. Institution of the Suits under Section 39 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction for
Enforcement of The Policy.
11. It appears from the materials on record that suits were instituted
with almost stereotyped plaints. One such plaint of Suit No. 538 of
2007 instituted by one Smt. Nirmala Devi w/o Shishpal Verma r/o
Kaithal reads thus:

“Suit For Mandatory Injunction
It is submitted as under:
1. The plaintiff was the absolute owner in possession of
the land measuring 225 sq. yards being 15/1518 share out
of the total land mesuring 37 kanal 19 Marla comprised in
Khewat no. 416 mn, khatoni No. 549 min, Rect. No. 117,
Killa No. 6/2, 11, 12, 13/1, 13/2, 14/1, 14/2/1, 15/1 situated
within the revenue estate of Patti Kaiseth seth Kaithal vide
regd sale deed no. 2629/1 dated 21/9/89.
2. Hereinafter the land fully detailed and described in para
no. 1 of the plaint shall be called the suit land for the aske
of the brevity.
3. That the suit land is situate within the Municipla limits
of Kaithal Distt kaithal.
806 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

4. That total land of plaintiff i.e. suit land fully mentioned in
para no. 1 of the plaint has been acquired by defendants
for the purose of devleopment of sector 19 & 20 of HUDA
Kaithal as residential sector and plaitiff is not having any
other land in sector 19 & 20 HUDA Kaithal.
5. That the plaintiff has been totally ousted from the suit
land.
6. That the suit land has been acquired in the year 1992
by defendants for the purpose of developmnet of sector
19 & 20 of HUDA, Kaithal as residential sector.
7. That there is policy of the defendant vide memo no.
2/92/2082 dated 18.03.1992 and vide advertisement of
defendants for the allotment of freehold residential house
at Kaithal.
8. That the policy dated 18.03.1992 vide memo no.
2/92/2082 is reproduced as under:
i. The plots to the oustees would be offered in the
land proposed to be acquired is under the ownership
of oustees prior of the publication of the notification
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, and if
75% of the total land owned by the land owner in
that sector is acquired.
ii. Oustees whose land acquired is:
a. Less than 500 sq. yards should be offered a
plot of 250 yards.
b. Between 500 and one acre should be offered
a plot of 250sq. yards.
c. From one acre and above should be allotted
a plot of 500 sq. yards or where 500 sq. yards
plots are not provided to the layout plan, two
plots of 250 sq. yards each may be given.
iii. That the above said policy shgall be applied in
case there area no. of cosharers of the land which
has been acuired, if the acquired land measures more
than one care then for the purose of granting benefit
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 807

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

under the policy, the determing factor should be the
area owned by the each cosharers respectively, as
per his/her share in the joint holding. In case the
acquired land of the cosharers is less than one acre
only one plot of 250 sq. yards would be allotted in
the joint name of cosharers.
iv. That if the land of any landowner is released from
acquisition, he would not be eligible to avail of any
benefit under this policy (in respect of the area of
land released).
v. That as per the policy, the oustee shall be entitled
to develop a plot/plots the size of which would
depend upon area of his acquired land subject to
a maximum of 500 sq. yards. The oustee shall be
entitled to this benefit under this policy only one the
same town where the land of a person is situated
located. However, in case where the land of a person
sitauted in the same town is acquired in pockets at
different times, the owner shall be entitled to claim
the beneift on account of the entire land acquired
at differne times, for the purposes of claiming the
benfits under this policy.
vi. The claim of the oustees of allotment of plot under
this policy shall be invited by the Estate Oficer, HUDA
concerned before the sector is floated for sale
vii. The commercial sites/buildings are sold by the
auctions. The sites/buildings be also allotted to
the oustees on reserved price, as and when the
auction of the said is held. While puttingh such sites/
buildings to public auction to the oustees who wants
to purchase the sites/building would represent before
hand for them. However, if the area acquried of the
commercial site is equivalent or less to the area of
booth/shop cum flat being auctioned by HUDA, they
may be given a booth/SCO site keeping in view the
size of acqusition under this policy.
9. That the defendants have reserved the plot no. 175 to
200, of 500 sq. yards for the oustees in sector 20 HUDA
808 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Kaithal and plot nos. 930, 936, to 948, 778, 772 in sector
19(2) U/E Kaithal of 500 sq. yards for the oustees, and
the plots, of 250 sq. yards bearing no. 10, 20, 30, 40 ,
120 ,130, 150, 160, 170, 263, 273 , 283, 300, 344, 354,
364, 369, 406, 434, 438, 516 has been reserved for the
oustees in sector 20.
10. That in the year 1992, the application were invited from
the plaintiff for release of free holder presidential develop
plots HUDA Kaithal. And the plainitff in accordance with the
policy full detailed in para no. 7 of the plaint duly applied for
the release of freehold residential develop plot vide regd.
Notice dated 19.12.2006 and vide reg. dated 19.12.2006
which have been duly received by the defendants.
11. That the defendants have already allotted the plot to
one Ravinder Parkash and one Kavinder Parkash sons of
Manohar Lal Jain under the similar circumstances as that
of the plaintiff and which Act of the defendants is totally
discriminatory.
12. That the defendants in spite of submissions as stated
above, failed to take any action for rerlease of ree hold
residential develop plot.
13. That the defendants again invited the application from
the plaintiff for release of free hold residential develop
plot in Jan, 2000 and the plaintiff duly applied with all the
formalities.
14. That the plaintiff in accordance with the policy and
advertisement fully detailed and described above, applied
to the defendants for release of ree hold residential
develpo plots vide red. Notices stated above which was
duly received by the defendants.
15. That the total land of the plaintiff is 225 sq. yds. has
been acquired and the plaintiff is entitled to the plot of
50 sq. yard as per the policy dated 18.03.1992 on the
reserved price of 1992.
16. The plaintiff is not goverened by the policy dated
12.03.1993.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 809

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

17. That the defendants are under legal obligations to allot
the freehold residential plot of 50 sq. yard to the plaintiff as
per the policy dated 18.03.1992 and for which the plaintiff
represented the defendants many time as stated above,
but defendants have failed to take any action and have
finally refused and hence this suit.
18. That the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff
and against the defendants within the territorial jurisdiction
on this learned court as therefore got the jurisdiction to
entertain and try this suit.
19. That the value of the suit for the purposes of court
fee and jurisdiction is Rs. 200/- and accordingly court fee
is affixed.
20. That the plaintiff prays a decree for mandatory injection
directing the defendants to deliver the free hold residential
develop plot of 50 sq. yards as mentioned in Para no. 7
of the plaint be passed with costs in favour the plaintiff
and against the defendants.
Any other relief to which plaintiff is found entitled to may
also be granted to him.”
12. By and large identical written statements were filed by the appellant
herein as defendants. One such written statement filed in the above
referred suit reads thus:

“ Written Statement on behalf of defendants.
The defendants submit as under:
Preliminary objections:
1. That the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in
the eye of law. The plaintiff is not entitled to any plot as
per oustees policies of HUDA.
2. That the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present
suit in the Hon’ble court because he has not deposited
10 % earnest money along with his application which was
mandatory to be deposited as per brochure issued by
HUDA for inviting applications for allotment of residential
810 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

plots to the landowners whose land was acquired for
floating the HUDA sector. In one Writ Petition No. 13548
of 2001 the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana
Chandigarh has held that such oustees who did not deposit
the earnest money alongwith their application they have
no legal right to claim allotment of plots and the rule of
estoppels stands against them as they had waived the
relinquished their right.
3. That the suit of the plaintiff is time barred.
Reply on Merits:
1. That para no.1 of the plaint relates to description of
land which is a matter of record. The plaintiff be directed
to prove the alleged facts by cogent evidence.
2. That para no.2 of the plaint needs no reply.
3. That para no.3 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
plaintiff be directed to prove the alleged facts by cogent
evidence.
4. That para no.4 of the plaint is wrong hence denied.
5. That para no.5 of the plaint is wrong and denied and
not admitted to be correct.
6. That para no.6 of the plaint is a matter of record.
7. That para no.7 of the plaint is also a matter of record.
8. That para no.8 of plaint along with its sub clauses (i) to
(vii) are matter of record, needs no reply.
9. That para no.9 of the plaint is also matter of record and
needs no reply.
10. That para no.10 of the plaint is wrong and denied. The
plaintiff did not deposit the earnest money along with his
application, so he has no legal right to claim the allotment
of plot and he had waived and relinquished his right.
11. That para no.11 of the plaint is wrong and denied.
The case of the plaint is not similar as that of Ravinder
Parkash mentioned in this para.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 811

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

12. That para no.12 of the plant is wrong and denied. The
complete and detailed reply has already been given in
above in pre objection same may kindly be read as part
of reply of this para.
13. Para no.13 of the plant is wrong and denied.
14. That para no.14 of the plaint is wrong and denied.
The plaintive has not deposited the 10% money with his
application, so he has waived his right if any.
15. The para no.15 of the plaint is a matter of record. The
plaintiff be directed to prove the alleged facts by cogent
evidence.
16. Para no.16 of the plant is wrong and denied.
17. Para no.17 of the plant is wrong and denied. The plaintiff
is not entitled to any free hold residential plot as he had
waived and relinquished his right as he had no deposited
the 10 % earnest money with the application form.
18. Para no.18 of the plant is wrong and denied. The
plaintiff has got no cause of action against the defendants.
19. That para no.19 of the plaint is legal needs no reply.
20. That para no.20 of the plaint is wrong and denied.
The suit of the plaintiff is against law and facts, false and
frivolous the same may kindly be dismissed with special
costs.”
(emphasis supplied)

13. Thus, what is discernible from the averments made in the written
statement is that the plaintiffs failed to deposit 10 per cent of the
earnest money along with an appropriate application addressed to
the authority concerned in accordance with the Policy of 1992. In the
absence of any application with deposit of 10 per cent earnest money
the benefits of the Policy of 1992 could not have been extended.
Such was the stance of the appellant herein as defendants before
the trial court.
14. On the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs before the trial court was
that it was not mandatory to deposit 10 per cent of the earnest money.
812 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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However, the fact remains that the suits came to be instituted almost
after a period of fifteen years from the date of the Policy of 1992.

iii. Impugned Judgment of the High Court
15. The High Court in its impugned judgment took the view that the
entire controversy could be said to be covered by the decision of
this Court rendered in the case of Brij Mohan (supra) and the Full
Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jarnail
Singh (supra). Saying so, the High Court though fit to dismiss all
the Second Appeals thereby affirming the original decree passed by
the trial court in favour of the plaintiffs (oustees) & some cases the
judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court allowing the
appeals filed by the original plaintiffs.
16. However, what is important for us to take notice of something in the
impugned judgment are the submissions canvassed by the learned
Advocate General, State of Haryana. The High Court in its impugned
judgment has recorded the submissions canvassed by the learned
Advocate General as under:
“Mr. B.R. Mahajan, learned Advocate General, Haryana,
assisted by Mr. Deepak Balyan, Advocate, in support of
grounds of appeal has raised the multifold arguments
which reads thus:
i) the pre-requisites of the policy dated 18.03.1992
had not been fulfilled by the plaintiff for allotment of
a plot under the oustee policy as the court below has
not gone into that question and without any reason
ordered for allotment of plot to the plaintiff.
ii) the court below has filed to take into consideration
the fact that the case of the plaintiff was not
considered due to non-compliance of Rule 5 of
Haryana Development (Disposal of Land and
Buildings) Regulations 1978 (hereinafter referred to
as 1978 Regulations) which deals with the procedure
in case of sale or lease of land or building by
allotment, in essence, the purchaser is required to
make an application to the Estate Officer concerned
and it should be accompanied by 10% of the price/
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 813

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

premium in the form of a demand draft table to the
Estate officer.
iii) The intended allottees under the oustee policy had
not fulfilled the essential terms and conditions of the
advertisement, brochure and 1978 Regulations. In
the instant case, there was no advertisement against
which the plaintiff had sought allotment of the plot.”
(emphasis supplied)

17. Thus, the main plank of the submission canvassed on behalf of
the State was that the oustees had failed to abide by the essential
terms and conditions of the advertisement, brochure of the 1978
Regulations etc. In short, the argument before the High Court was
that the oustees had failed to duly apply in a prescribed format with
the Estate Officer in accordance with the Scheme with deposit of
10 per cent price/premium in the form of a demand draft payable
to the Estate Officer.
18. In the aforesaid context, we may only observe that none of the
submissions canvassed by the State have been dealt with by the High
Court in its impugned judgment. When it was the specific case of the
State that no applications in the prescribed format were preferred by
the oustees with 10 per cent deposit of the requisite amount then
it was expected of the High Court even while considering Second
Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC to look into this aspect of the
matter. Even the trial court does not seem to have considered this
aspect of the matter including the First Appellate Court.
19. It was also brought to our notice by the learned counsel appearing
for the respondents (oustees) that allotment letters were issued at
the rate prescribed in accordance with the 1992 Policy subject to
the outcome of the Special Leave Petitions and once such allotment
letters are issued then there is no question in saying that the oustees
had failed to apply in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the scheme. In what circumstances such allotment letters were
issued by the Estate Officer has been explained by the appellant in
its written submissions. The same reads thus:
“16. It is submitted that after passing of the order by Ld.
District Judge and Ld. Civil Judge, some of the respondents
814 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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filed Execution Petition before the Executing court for the
execution of the order passed by the Trial court.
17. It is submitted that the Ld. Civil Judge issued warrant of
arrest of the Estate Officer of the Petitioner Authority. The
said letter is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
“To
Director General of Police
Panchkula (Haryana)
Whereas the Judgment Debtor Lajpat Rai S/o
Shiv Dayal R/o Kaithal, Tehsil and Distt. Kaithal
was adjudged by a decree of the Court in Suit No.
RBT382/2007 on 11.11.2011 to order that the suits
of plaintiffs are decreed with costs to the effect that
the plaintiffs of CS -I and C-II are held entitled for
separate freehold residential plots measuring 250
sq. yards each and the plaintiffs or CS-I to CS-III
are liable to deposit the prices of the respective plots
as were applicable at the time of floating of Sec 19,
Urban Estate, Kaithal formalities for allotment of plots
be completed by defendants within two months from
the even date under initiation to plaintiffs in writing.
But defendants fail to comply all the condition which
were imposed on them, executing this process to
bring the said defendant before the court with all
convenient speed.
You are hereby directed to arrest the said Estate
Officer HUDA and produce before me. Here fail
not. If the Estate Officer HUDA fulfil the above said
condition, he shall not be arrested. Youa re further
commanded to return this warrant on or before the
31.05.2019 with an endorsement certifying the day
on which and manner in which it has been executed
or the reason why it has not been executed.
Given under my hand and the seal of the court, this
28.05.2019.
Amit Sharma
Civil Judge (Senior Div) Kaithal”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 815

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

It is submitted that the application have not submitted in
the prescribed format and even the earnest money was
not paid but due to the order passed by the Civil Judge
in regard to the arrest of the Estate Officer, the petitioner
authority under compulsion issued allotment letter at the
current rate subject to outcome of The special leave petitions
pending before this Hon’ble Court. (A true copy of the one
of such applications arrest warrant and allotment letter is
annexed herewith marked as Annexure A-12 pg. 126-132.
18. It is submitted that similarly in some other cases
also, where the application has not been submitted in the
prescribed format, the earnest money has not been paid but
since, the suit has been decreed therefore, the Execution
petition filed and in Execution petition since the Ld. Civil
judge issued the warrant of arrest, therefore the Petitioner
Authority under compulsion issued allotment letter at the
current price subject to outcome of the special leave petition.”

iv. Filing of the Special Leave Petitions before this Court
20. What is now important for us to note is the order passed by a
coordinate bench dated 08.05.2017 at the time of issuing notice.
The order reads thus:
“Delay condoned. Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that
the petitioner will abide by the Policy framed on 11.08.2016
and every eligible oustee will be accommodated according
to the said Policy. Issue notice restricted to the question
of correctness of the general direction made by the High
Court in granting allotments to all claimants who may not
be similarly situated. In the meantime, there shall be stay
of execution.”
(emphasis supplied)

21. Thus, the appellant made itself explicitly clear before this Court that
it would abide by the policy framed on 11.08.2016 and every eligible
oustee would be accommodated according to the said policy. On
such statement being made, this Court issued notice restricted to
the question of correctness of the general directions issued by the
816 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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High Court in its impugned judgment as regards granting allotments
to all claimants who may not be similarly situated. This Court also
stayed the execution of the decree.
22. The controversy before us as on date is in a limited compass, i.e.,
whether the respondents as oustees are entitled to the benefit of
the scheme of 1992 or the scheme of 2016 as further modified in
2018 referred to above.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

i. Submissions on behalf of the Appellants
23. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned A.S.G., appearing for the appellants
vehemently submitted that only those oustees are entitled to seek
allotment of a plot under the policy who had filed appropriate
application in a prescribed format, seeking allotment of plot with the
deposit of the requisite earnest money. As regards this submission
of Ms. Bhati, the following has been highlighted in the written
submissions filed by the appellant:
“(i) The Petitioner Authority issued advertisement inviting
applications for allotment of plot under oustees quota in
1992 and 2000 whereas it has been mentioned in the
preceding paras and as is evident from the documents
placed on record that the application was to be submitted
in the prescribed format alongwith the earnest money.
(ii) It is submitted that from the perusal of the brochure so
issued in 1992 and in 2000, it is evident that the application
form is to be purchased upon payment as the same is
serial no. ed also. Not only this, even in the brochure
itself, the letter is to be addressed to the Estate Officer
for the submission of the
(ix) It is submitted that even in the procedure so prescribed
by the Petitioner Authority in respect to allotment of plot
under oustees quota, there is a condition of the inviting
applications to be submitted in the prescribed format.”
24. The second submission canvassed by Ms. Bhati is as regards the
price of the plot under the policy. This argument has been elaborated
in the following manner:
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 817

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

“(i) It is submitted that as far as price of plot so allotted
under oustees quota is concerned, the Hon’ble High Court
in the case of Rajiv Manchanda vs HUDA in question no. 8
and that in a case where the land was acquired in 1992 the
oustees is liable to pay the price fixed in the advertisement
by which the applications are invited and pursuant to which
advertisement the plot is actually allotted to the oustees.
(ii) It is submitted as far as the present specially petitions
are concerned the respondents as mentioned here in above
failed to submit the application in the prescribed format
and even failed to deposit the earnest money therefore
in fact the application submitted if any cannot be set to
be submission of application as per advertisement/policy
(iii) It is submitted that in the case of HUDA and ors. v.
Sandeep and Ors. decided on 25.04.2012, the Hon’ble
Court while deciding the issue in regard to the price to be
charged under Question No. 8 held that the price that can
be charged is the price prevailing at the time of allotment.
The extract from the judgement reads as under:
“17. Where there is a scheme but it does not regulate
the allotment price it may be possible for the court to
direct the State Government/Development Authority
to allot plots to land-losers at a reasonable cost, in
special and extraordinary circumstances, it may also
indicate the manner of determining the allotment
price. But where the scheme applicable specifies the
price to be charged for allotment its terms cannot be
ignored. If any land loser has any grievance in regard
to such scheme, he may either challenge it or give a
representation for a better or more beneficial scheme.
But he cannot as the code to ignore the terms of an
existing or prevailing scheme and demand allotment
at cost price.”
(iv) It is submitted that the judgment passed by this
Hon’ble court in Brij Mohan vs. HUDFA 2011(2) SCC
29 is of no help to the oustees. Two questions arose
for consideration in that case before this Hon’ble
Court.
818 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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In respect of first question i.e. whether HUDA
should charge only the actual land cost plus
development charges for the plots allotted to
an oustee and not the market price/normal
allotment price; the court returned a finding that
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 contemplates
only benefits like solatium, additional amount
and higher rate of interest to the oustees and
not allotment of plots at cost p rice. HUDA or the
State Government does not have any scheme
providing for allotment of plots at actual cost
of oustees. Therefore, it is not possible for
the Court to direct the State Government or
the Development Authority to allot plots to the
oustees at a reasonable cost.
In respect of second question i.e. what is the
meaning of the words ‘normal allotment rate’, the
court found that as a matter of fact the land-loser
has made an application in the year 1990 for
allotment of plot. A direction was issued by the
Court in the year 1992 but the HUDA delayed
allotment to the appellants. Therefore, the rate for
which plots were initially offered was ordered to be
charged. The said Question has been answered
keeping in view the facts of the aforesaid case,
wherein application was submitted by an oustee
but still plot was not allotted to him. The said
judgment does not lay down that the ‘normal
allotment rate’ in all circumstances shall be the
rate when the sector is first floated for sale. As a
matter of fact, the norma allotment rate would be
the rate advertised by the HUDA in pursuance of
which applications are invited from the general
public and the oustees, in pursuance of which
the plots are allotted.
(v) It is submitted that even otherwise in the case
of Brij Mohan the applications submitted by the
applicants but in present case no application in
the prescribe format with earnest money has been
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 819

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

submitted therefore it cannot be said that the
respondents submitted any application in view of this
the case of Bridge Mohan is distribution from the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
(vi) It is submitted that admittedly none of the
respondent have deposited the earnest money as
per the advertisement of 1992 and/or 2004 cannot
claim the price as per 1992.
(vii) it is submitted that in view the above and as per
the policy in existence the respondents cannot claim
the price of 1992.
(viii) It is submitted that the Hon’ble court in the case of
Rajiv Manchanda v. HUDA while passing the judgment
dated 22.11.2017 in Civil writ petition no. 22252 of
2016 while answering the question no. 8 in regard
to fixation of price in para 57 held that an oustee
including 1 whose land was acquired prior to 1987
is liable to pay the price fixed in the advertisement
by which the applications are invited from the oustee
and pursuant to which advertisement of the plot is
actually allotted to the oustee.
(ix) It is submitted that since, no application in the
prescribed format has been submitted by any of
the respondents and even otherwise the earnest
money has not been paid therefore, the respondents
cannot ask for any price of 1992 especially when
the no application has been submitted or if any
application has been submitted, the same is not in the
prescribed format with the earnest money which was
the precondition for entitlement of allotment of plot.
(x) It is submitted that when the respondents have not
submitted the applications in the prescribed format
that too without the earnest money therefore, the
respondents are not entitled for any relief and it will
amount to wind full gain if the respondent to have
been fully compensated in accordance with statutory
scheme for the land acquired for public purpose by
820 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the state if despite have not paid a single penny if
they are giving their plot as per the 1992 rates.
(xi) It is submitted that as it has been mentioned
hereinabove the petitioner authority has already
issued public notice inviting the applications from
the oustees and the application is to be submitted
online with Rs.50,000.00. It is submitted that any
of the respondent can submit the application if so
desired to avail the benefit of oustees policy dated
11.08.2016.”
25. The third submission of Ms. Bhati is that the respondents could not
have instituted a civil suit after a period of almost 14 to 20 years of
passing of the final award. She would submit that the suits filed by
the individual respondents under Section 39 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 were not maintainable, more particularly, when none of
the respondents had applied for the plot in a prescribed format with
deposit of earnest money. This argument has been further elaborated
as under:
“(i) It is submitted that admittedly the acquisition proceedings
concluded in 1992 upon passing of the award and the
State Government issued and advertisement inviting the
application for allotment of plot under the oustees quota
in 1992 itself but the respondents instituted Civil suit after
14-20 years which is barred by Article 113 of the Limitation
Act where the limitation of 3 years for the institution of the
suit has been provided
(ii) It is submitted that the respondents field to comply
with the terms and conditions as a numerated in the
advertisement issued from time to time inviting the
applications for allotment of plot under out these Kota
their food the suit instituted under section 39 of Specific
Relief Act for mandatory injunction not maintainable and
the Ld. Civil Court dismissed one civil suits on the ground
of maintainability and limitation.
(iii) It is further submitted that even the Appellate court in
some of the cases dismissed the appeals affirmming the
order pass by the Civil judged dismissing the Civil suit.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 821

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(iv) It is submitted that there is bar under section 50(2) of
Haryana Development Authority Act, 1977 to the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in
any matter
(v) It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court in Regular
Second Appeal being RSA No. 3833 of 2010 titled as
HUDA vs. Kashmiri Lal vide its judgment dated 06.08.2012
arrived at the conlusion that the suit is barred by limitaion
because the plaintiff applied for the allotment of plot in the
year 1992 and the suit was filed after 15 years.
(vi) It is submitted that the Special leave petitoins preferred
against he said order dated 06.08.2012 being SLP C
NO. 8766-8767 of 2013 titled as Kashmiri lal vs. EO
HUDA dismissed by this Hon’ble court vide order dated
15.07.2016.0
(vii) It is submitted that suit for mandatory injunction under
Section 39 was not maintainable as there was no breach
of an obligation. Ld. Civil judge ought not to have directed
to allot a plot especially when the terms and conditions
in regard to submission of application in the prescribed
format with earnest money has not been complied with
and further there is a bar of jurisdiction in the Act itself.
(viii) It is submitted that this Hon’ble court in the caose
State of Kerala vs. UOI 2024 (7) SCC 183, has discucsed
about section 39 of the Specific Relief Act and held that
there should be test in regard to (i) Prima facie case (ii)
balance of convenience (iii) irreparable injury.
In the present case, although there was no prima facie
case, yet the Ld. Civil Judge erroneously decreed the Civil
Suit in some of the cases, whereas in other similar cases
the Civil Suit so instituted were dismissed.”
26. The fourth submission of Ms. Bhati is as regards the status of a
co-sharer in respect to allotment of plot under the scheme. This
submission has been elaborated in the following manner:
“(i) It is submitted that in regard to the allotment of plot
under oustees quota to the co-sharer it is submitted that
822 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

initially in the policy dated 18.03.1992 wherein clause (iii)
of the said policy it is mentioned that in case there are no.
of co-sharer of the land which has been acquired and if
the acquired land measures more than 1 acre than for the
purpose of granting benefit under this policy the determining
factor would be the area of co-sharer respectively as per
his/her shareholding and in case the acquired land of the
co-sharer less than only one plot of 200 sq. yards in the
joint name of co-sharers.
(ii) It is submitted that subsequently the said policy dated
18.03.92 was amended and the same was modified to the
effect that “benefit under oustees policy shall be restricted
to 1 plot according to the holding irrespective of co-sharers”.
(iii) It is submitted that in the policy dated 18.03.1992 in
regard to offering of the plot to the land owners it was
mentioned that:
(a) Less than 500 sq. yards would be offered a plot
of 50 sq. yards.
(b) Between 500 sq. yds. And one acre would be
offered a plot of 250 sq. yds.
(c) From 1 acre and above would be offered a plot
of 500 sq. yds. Where 500. Where 500 or where 500
sq. yds. Plots are not provided in the layout plan, two
plots of 250 sq. yds. Each may be given.
(iv) It is submitted that in the policy dated 11.08.2016 in
clause 8 about the eligibility of co-sharer it is mentioned
that the eligibility of each co-sharer for allotment of plot
under oustees quota shall be determined on the basis of
individual holding i.e. each co-sharers will be entitlement
to seeking allotment of plot on the basis of his owned
individual holding. Further in Clause 13 of the said policy
in regard to the eligibility of co-sharer who has given no
objection certificate in his co-sharer it has been mentioned
that a co-sharer in the land will not be eligible to claim
allotment of plot if had given a no objection certificate in
favour of the co-sharer and on account of submission
of such no objection certificate a plot was allotted such
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 823

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Nirmala Devi

co-sharer in prevailing flotation of plot for the oustees. It
has also been made in case of any previous occasion a
plot under the oustees policy has been allotted in that a
co-sharer will not be entitled for allotment of plot under
oustees quota.”
27. In the last, Ms. Bhati invited our attention to few relevant provisions
of law. The same read thus:
“(i) The Specific Relief Act, 1963
“Section 39. Mandatory injunction – When, to prevent
the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the
performance of certain acts which the Court is capable of
enforcing, the Court may in its discretion grant an injunction
to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel
performance of the requisite acts.”
(ii) Limitation Act

Article Any suit for which no Three When
113 period of limitation is years the right
provided elsewhere in to sue
this Schedule accrues

Section 3: Bar of limitation – (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted appeal preferred, and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation
has been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act-
(a) A suit is instituted:
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application
for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company
which is being wind up by the court, when the
claimant first sends in his claim to the official
liquidator;
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(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim,
shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be
deemed to have been instituted:
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as
the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date
on which the counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court
is made when the application is presented to the
proper officer of that court.
(iii) HUDA Act and Rules.
“Section 50 of HUDA Act, 1977.
(i) Save as of otherwise expressly provided in the
Act, every order passed or direction issued by the
State government or order passed or notice issued
by the Authority or its officer under this Act shall be
final and shall not be questioned in any suit or legal
proceeding.
(ii) No Civil Court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain
any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter the
cognizance of which can be taken and disposed of
by the authority empowered by this Act or the rules
or regulations made thereunder.
Regulation 5 of Haryana Urban Development (disposal of
Land and Buildings) Regulations 1978, which lays:
“5. Procedure in case of sale or lease of land or building
by allotment:
(i) In the case of sale or lease of residential and
industrial land or building by allotment the intending
purchaser shall make an application to the State
Officer concerned in the prescribed form (annexed
to these regulations) as given in Forms A and B
respectively.
(ii) No application under sub-regulation (1) shall be
valid unless it is accompanied by such amount may
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 825

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Nirmala Devi

be determined by the Authority, which shall not be
less than ten per cent of the price/premium in the
form of a demand draft payable to the Estate Officer,
and drawn on any scheduled bank situated at the
local place of the Estate Officer concerned or any
other such place as the Estate Officer may specify”
(iii) xxxx”
28. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Bhati very fairly
submitted that although the suits were liable to be dismissed yet the
appellant is ready and willing to allot the plots to the respondents if
eligible otherwise, in accordance with the scheme of 2016.
29. She would submit that the appellant has already issued a public
notice inviting appropriate applications from the oustees and such
applications are to be submitted online with payment of Rs. 50,000/-
towards earnest money.
30. What we have been able to gather from the aforesaid is that allotment
letters were issued to the oustees but at the revised rate of Rs. 1122
per sq. yd. in accordance with the 2016 policy.
31. In such circumstances referred to above, Ms. Bhati submitted that
this Court may pass an appropriate order, directing the appellant
to consider the applications that may be filed online in accordance
with the policy of 2016.

ii. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
32. Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondents in SLP No. 4787 of 2018 vehemently submitted
that this Court may not interfere or rather disturb the concurrent
findings recorded by three courts below. So far as the entitlement of
the oustees to claim plots in accordance with the scheme of 1992 is
concerned, the entire controversy is squarely covered by a decision of
this Court in the case of Brij Mohan and Others v. Haryana Urban
Development Authority reported in (2011) 2 SCC 29.
33. He further submitted that the issue as regards restricting the allotment
of one plot to the oustees who have a joint holding came to be
concluded by a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
in the case of Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab reported
in (2010) 10 P&H CK 0212.
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34. Dr. Hooda submitted that so far as his matter is concerned, the
same is distinguishable on facts with the other connected matters.
He pointed out that his client had submitted an application with the
appellant authority for allotment of plot under 1992 scheme. Even a
draw was held where the application of his client’s father was cleared
successfully and a plot in Sector 20 was earmarked.
35. He further pointed out that the suit filed by his client came to be
decreed. The decree came to be affirmed right up to the High Court.
The principal argument of Dr. Hooda is that if the policy of 2016 is
applied it would impose a substantial financial burden on the oustees.
36. Relying on the decision of this Court rendered in Brij Mohan (supra)
referred to above, he would submit that the oustees are entitled to
allotment of plots in accordance with the policy that was floated and
advertised at the time of the land acquisition proceedings i.e. 1992
and not as per any subsequent revised policy.
37. Mr. Rajiv Raheja, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
in SLP No. 20614 of 2017 and connected matters submitted that no
error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been
committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment and
order. His principal argument is that the policy of 2016 cannot be
applied with retrospective effect.
38. Mr. Sidharth Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
in SLP No. 20640 of 2017 would submit that so far as the price of
allotment of plots is concerned, the same has been settled by this
Court in Brij Mohan (supra).
39. The sum and substance of the submissions canvassed on behalf
of the respondents is that they are ready and willing to deposit the
requisite amount for the purpose of allotment of plots in accordance
with the policy of 1992. In short, their case is that they are ready
and willing to deposit the amount of Rs. 863 per sq. yd. but the
demand of the revised rate of Rs. 1122 per sq. yd. is not tenable
in law.
40. In such circumstances referred to above, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents prayed that there being no merit in these appeals
those may be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court may be affirmed.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 827

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Nirmala Devi

C. ANALYSIS
41. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record the only question that falls for
our consideration is whether the respondents herein are entitled to
claim plots as oustees at the rate prescribed by the 1992 policy or
at the rate prescribed by the revised policy of 2016?
42. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into the two judgments; one of this Cout in Brij Mohan
(supra) and the other of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in the case of Jarnail Singh (supra).
43. In Brij Mohan (supra), this Court dealt with the following two
questions:
(i) Whether HUDA should charge only the actual land cost plus
development charges for the plots allotted to oustees/land-
losers, and not the market price/normal allotment price?
(ii) What meaning should be ascribed to the words ‘normal allotment
rate’ used in the scheme for allotment to oustees?
44. In Brij Mohan (supra), this Court elaborately interpreted the policy
dated 18.03.1992 and answered the aforesaid two questions as such:
“10. No doubt, the contention that allotment of plots to
land losers should be at actual cost (acquisition cost of
land plus development cost), appears to be reasonable
and attractive. That should be the ultimate goal in a
changing scenario favouring acquisitions which are
land loser- friendly. The arguments of the appellants do
certainly make out a case for such a scheme to create
a better settlement and rehabilitation policy in regard to
land acquisitions. If there was any statutory provision in
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (`Act’ for short) or other
scheme, providing for allotment at cost price, a land loser
could certainly claim allotment in terms of the scheme.
But the Statute contemplates only benefits like solatium,
additional amount and higher rate of interest to the land
losers and not allotment of plots at cost price. Nor does the
State Government or HUDA have any scheme providing
for allotment of plots at actual cost to land losers. We
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are informed that State of Haryana is now proposing
to introduce a more attractive and land-loser friendly
rehabilitation and resettlement policy, which contemplates
allotment of bigger residential/commercial/industrial plots
to land losers and oustees. But that is for the future.
11. Where there is a scheme but it does not regulate the
allotment price, it may be possible for the court to direct
the State Government/Development Authority to allot
plots to land losers at a reasonable cost, and in special
and extraordinary circumstances, it may also indicate the
manner of determining the allotment price. But where the
scheme applicable specifies the price to be charged for
allotment, its terms cannot be ignored. If any land loser has
any grievance in regard to such scheme, he may either
challenge it or give a representation for a better or more
beneficial scheme. But he cannot ask the court to ignore
the terms of an existing or prevailing scheme and demand
allotment at cost price. The scheme of HUDA contemplates
allotment of plots only in terms of the scheme, that is at
normal allotment rates. This benefit is extended in addition
to the benefits under sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the
Act, and therefore the scheme provides for allotment at
normal allotment rate. Necessarily, the allotment and the
price to be charged, will have to be strictly in accordance
with such HUDA Scheme. In this case the HUDA scheme
requires the land loser-allottee to pay the normal allotment
rates for the plots to be allotted to them under the scheme.
Therefore, a land loser cannot claim allotment of a plot at
acquisition cost of land plus development cost or at any
other lesser price. The decision in Hansraj H. Jain was a
case where the scheme did not provide for any allotment
price, and the price demanded was Rs.13,200/- per sq.m.
as against the compensation of Rs.4 per sq.m. which in
effect was 3300 times the acquisition price. It was on those
peculiar facts and circumstances, this court thought it fit
to direct the respondents therein to adopt the acquisition
cost plus development cost as the allotment price. That
principle will not apply where there is a specific scheme
which provides the rate of allotment.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 829

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Re : Question (ii)
11. As noticed above, the scheme requires the allottees
under the scheme for land-losers/oustees, to pay the
normal allotment rates for the allotted plots. The question
is what is the meaning of the term `the normal allotment
rate’. No doubt, the term would ordinarily refer to the
allotment rate prevailing at the time of allotment. If an
acquisition is made in 1985 and the developed layout in the
acquired lands is ready for allotment of plots in 1990, and
allotments are made in the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993,
1994 and 1995 at annually increasing rates, a land-loser
who is allotted a plot in 1990 will naturally be charged a
lesser price. But if his application is kept pending by the
Development Authority for whatsoever reason and if the
allotment is made in 1992, he may have to pay a higher
price; and if the allotment is made in 1995 he may have
to pay a much higher price. The question is whether any
discrimination should be permitted depending upon the
whims, fancies and delays on the part of the authority in
making allotments. To take this case itself, the application
for allotment was made in 1990. On 9.9.1991, HUDA
advertised the residential plots in the sectors developed
from the acquired lands for allotment, wherein the allotment
rate was shown as Rs.1032 per sq.m. (Rs.863/- per sq.yd)
for plots of 300 sq. m. In the year 1993, the allotment
price was increased to Rs.1342/- per sq.m. (Rs.1122/-
per sq.yd.) and the appellants are required to pay the
1993 price instead of paying the rate in vogue when the
layout was ready for allotment. Should the land loser who
promptly made the application in 1990 be made to suffer,
because of the inaction on the part of HUDA in making the
allotment? We get the answer in the HUDA scheme itself.”
45. In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court held that every co-sharer is entitled to a plot as per his
entitlement, although his land is joint with others. The Full Bench
held that every co-sharer has an independent right to allotment to
plot under the oustee quota. It is the share of the co-sharers which
is acquired, and the compensation is paid independently to all co-
sharers and the entire compensation is not paid to one co-sharer
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on behalf of all. In such circumstances, a co-sharer is entitled to
separate plot as per his share, if eligible, in accordance with law.
In Jarnail Singh (supra), the Full Bench struck down Clause 6(V)
of the Policy dated 26.09.1994 and held that it had no reasonable
nexus with the object to be achieved, as the basic purpose of the
policy of HUDA is to rehabilitate the oustees.
46. The Writ Petitions ultimately came to be disposed of with the following
orders and directions:
“1. The oustees, whose land is compulsorily acquired for
a public purpose, form a class in itself, having a rational
basis with the object of re-settlement;
2. Clause 6(v) of the Policy dated 26.9.1994 is struck
down as it has no reasonable nexus with the objective
to be achieved;
3. A co-owner, as per the eligibility criteria fixed by the
State Government, shall be entitled to be considered for
allotment of plot irrespective of the fact that his holding
of land is joint with other co-owner;
4. However, the oustees, as a class in themselves, would
be entitled to reservation of plots to such an extent as the
State Government may deem appropriate;
5. That the State Government shall be at liberty to reframe
policy for reservation of plots to constitutionally permissible
classes and within limit of 50% of plots; and
6. That till such time an appropriate policy is framed, the
State Government or its instrumentalities shall not allot
plots under the oustees quota.”

i. Dictum as laid by this Court in Brij Mohan (Supra) and the
Ratio Decidendi.
47. This Court has rendered plethora of decisions explaining how to
cull out the ratio decidendi of a judgment and identify the principles
which have precedential value. It is now well settled that not every
observation in a judgment of this Court is binding as precedent. Only
the ratio decidendi or the propositions of law that were necessary to
decide on the issues between the parties are binding. Observations
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by the judge, even determinative statements of law, which are not
part of her reasoning on a question or issue before the court, are
termed obiter dicta. Such observations do not bind the Court. More
simply, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
48. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Islamic Academy of
Education v. State of Karnataka reported in 2003 INSC 391
pithily observed:
“2. …The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found
out only on reading the entire judgment. In fact, the ratio
of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself.
The answer to the question would necessarily have to
be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment
and not in isolation. In case of any doubt as regards any
observations, reasons and principles, the other part of the
judgment has to be looked into. By reading a line here and
there from the judgment, one cannot find out the entire
ratio decidendi of the judgment. …”
(emphasis supplied)

49. In Secunderabad Club v. CIT reported in 2023 INSC 736 this Court,
had the occasion to delineate how to cull out the ratio decidendi of a
judgment and identify the principles which have precedential value.
This Court observed:
“14….According to the well-settled theory of precedents,
every decision contains three basic ingredients:
(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An
inferential finding of fact is the inference which the judge
draws from the direct or perceptible facts ;
(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to
the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and
(iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii)
above.
For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies,
ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision, for,
it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation
to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that
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estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However,
for the purpose of the doctrine of precedent, ingredient
(ii) is the vital element in the decision. This is the ratio
decidendi. It is not everything said by a judge when
giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The
only thing in a judge’s decision binding a party is the
principle upon which the case is decided and for this
reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate
from it the ratio decidendi.”
(emphasis supplied)

50. Further, a simple test that has been invoked by this Court to determine
whether a particular proposition of law is to be treated as the ratio
decidendi of a case is the “inversion test” formulated by Professor
Eugene Wambaugh. The test mandates that to determine whether
a particular proposition of law is part of the ratio decidendi of the
case, the proposition is to be inversed. This means that either that
proposition is hypothetically removed from the judgment, or it is
assumed that the proposition was decided in reverse. After such
removal or reversal, if the decision of the Court on that issue before
it would remain the same then the observations cannot be regarded
as the ratio decidendi of the case.
51. In State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn. reported in
(2018) 6 SCC 21, the test was explained thus:
“113. In order to determine this aspect, one of the well-
established tests is “the Inversion Test” propounded inter
alia by Eugene Wambaugh, a Professor at The Harvard
Law School, who published a classic text book called The
Study of Cases [ Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1892).] in the year 1892.
This textbook propounded inter alia what is known as the
“Wambaugh Test” or “the Inversion Test” as the means
of judicial interpretation. “the Inversion Test” is used to
identify the ratio decidendi in any judgment. The central
idea, in the words of Professor Wambaugh, is as under:
“In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully
the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in
the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him
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then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new
proposition to be good, and had it in mind, the decision
could have been the same. If the answer be affirmative,
then, however excellent the original proposition may be,
the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if
the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the
original proposition and possibly for other propositions
also. [ Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1892) at p. 17.] ”
114. In order to test whether a particular proposition of
law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case,
the proposition is to be inversed i.e. to remove from the
text of the judgment as if it did not exist. If the conclusion
of the case would still have been the same even without
examining the proposition, then it cannot be regarded as
the ratio decidendi of the case. This test has been followed
to imply that the ratio decidendi is what is absolutely
necessary for the decision of the case. “In order that an
opinion may have the weight of a precedent”, according
to John Chipman Grey [ Another distinguished jurist who
served as a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.], “it
must be an opinion, the formation of which, is necessary
for the decision of a particular case”.
(emphasis supplied)

52. The test was affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nevada
Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 20
SCC 119 wherein it was held thus:
“13. It follows from the aforesaid discussion that the
decision in Tapas D. Neogy [State of Maharashtra v. Tapas
D. Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1352] did
not go into and decide the issue: whether immovable
property would fall under the expression “any property”
under Section 102 of the Code. We say so by applying
the inversion test as referred to in State of Gujarat v. Utility
Users’ Welfare Assn. [State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’
Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21] , which states that the
Court must first carefully frame the supposed proposition
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of law and then insert in the proposition a word reversing
its meaning to get the answer whether or not a decision
is a precedent for that proposition. If the answer is in the
affirmative, the case is not a precedent for that proposition.
If the answer is in the negative, the case is a precedent for
the original proposition and possibly for other propositions
also. This is one of the tests applied to decide what can
be regarded and treated as ratio decidendi of a decision.
Reference in this regard can also be made to the decisions
of this Court in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey [U.P.
SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey, (2007) 11 SCC 92 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 736], CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd.
[CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363] and
other cases which hold that a decision is only an authority
for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a
decision is its ratio. Not every observation found therein
nor what logically flows from those observations is the
ratio decidendi. Judgment in question has to be read as
a whole and the observations have to be considered in
light of the instances which were before the Court. This
is the way to ascertain the true principles laid down by a
decision. Ratio decidendi cannot be decided by picking out
words or sentences averse to the context under question
from the judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)

a. Wambaugh’s Test / Inversion Test
53. The Inversion Test propounded by Wambaugh is based on the
assumption that the ratio decidendi is a general rule without which
a case must have been decided otherwise. Inversion Test is in the
form of a dialogue between him and his student. He gave following
instructions for this:
1. Frame carefully the supposed proposition of law.
2. Insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning.
3. Inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition
to be good and had had it in mind, the decision could have
been the same.
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4. If the answer is affirmative, then, however, good the Original
Proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that
proposition.
5. But if the answer be negative, the case is a precedent for the
Original Proposition and possibly for other propositions also.
54. Thus, when a case turns only on one point the proposition or doctrine
of the case, the reason for the decision, the ratio decidendi, must
be a general rule without which the case must have been decided
otherwise. A proposition of law which is not ratio decidendi under the
above test must, according to Wambaugh, constitute a mere dictum.
55. However, Rupert Cross criticized the Inversion Test on the ground
that “the exhortation to frame carefully the supposed proposition of
law and the restriction of the test to cases turning on only one point
rob it of most of its value as a means of determining what was the
ratio decidendi of a case, although it has its uses as a means of
ascertaining what was not ratio”.
56. Thus, the merit of Wambaugh’s test is that it provides what may
be an infallible means of ascertaining what is not ratio decidendi. It
accords with the generally accepted view that a ruling can only be
treated as ratio if it supports the ultimate order of the court.

b. Halsbury’s Test
57. The concept of precedent has attained important role in administration
of justice in the modern times. The case before the Court should
be decided in accordance with law and the doctrines. The mind of
the Court should be clearly reflecting on the material in issue with
regard to the facts of the case. The reason and spirit of case make
law and not the letter of a particular precedent.
58. Lord Halsbury explained the word “ratio decidendi” as “it may be
laid down as a general rule that that part alone of a decision by
a Court of Law is binding upon Courts of coordinate jurisdiction
and inferior Courts which consists of the enunciation of the reason
or principle upon which the question before the Court has really
been determined. This underlying principle which forms the only
authoritative element of a precedent is often termed the ratio
decidendi”.
59. In the famous case of Quinn v. Leathem, Lord Halsbury said that:
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“Now, before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood and
what was decided therein, there are two observations
of a general character which I wish to make, and one is
to repeat what I have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are not intended to
be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified
by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions
are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority
for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be
quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically
from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law
is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must
acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
(emphasis supplied)

60. Thus, according to Lord Halsbury, it is by the choice of material facts
that the Court create law.

c. Goodhart’s Test
61. In 1929, Goodhart had argued that the ratio of a case must be
found in the reasons for the decision and that there is no necessary
connection between the ratio and the reasons. He laid down following
guidelines for discovering the ratio decidendi of a case:
1. Ratio decidendi must not be sought in the reasons on which
the judge has based his decision.
2. The reasons given by the judge in his opinion are of peculiar
importance, for they may furnish us with a guide for determining
which facts he considered material and which immaterial.
3. A decision for which no reasons are given does not necessarily
lack a ratio; furthermore, the reasons offered by a court in
reaching a decision might be considered inadequate or incorrect,
yet the court’s ruling might be endorsed in later cases – a ‘bad
reason may often make good law’.
4. Thus, ratio decidendi is whatever facts the judge has determined
to be the material facts of the case, plus the judge’s decision
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as based on those facts. It is by his choice of the material facts
that the judge creates law.
62. If we accept Goodhart’s conception of ratio decidendi, we could
explain why hypothetical instances are unlikely to be accorded the
same weight as judicial precedents as hypothetical instances are
by definition obiter dicta. Also, this conception of ratio decidendi
links the doctrine of precedent with the principle that like cases be
treated alike. Any court which considers itself bound by precedent
would come to the same conclusion as was reached in a prior case
unless there is in the case some further fact which it is prepared to
treat as material, or unless fact considered material in the previous
case is absent.
63. Applying the three tests referred to above, so as to understand the
ratio of the decision of the Court rendered in Brij Mohan (supra)
and its binding effect we have no hesitation in taking the view that
the case on hand is not covered by the dictum as laid in Brij Mohan
(supra). We find it difficult to accept the vociferous submission
canvased on behalf of the respondents that so far as the rate at
which the allotment is to be made is squarely covered by the dictum
as laid in Brij Mohan (supra).
64. Ms. Bhati the learned ASG is right in her submission that so far as
the first question answered by this Court in Brij Mohan (supra) is
concerned i.e. whether HUDA should charge only the actual land
cost plus development charges for the plots allotted to an oustee and
not at the market price/normal allotment price; this Court returned a
finding that the land acquisition Act, 1894 contemplates only benefits
like solatium, additional amount and higher rate of interest to the
oustees and not allotment of plots at cost price. HUDA or the State
Government does not have any scheme providing for allotment of plots
at actual cost of oustees. In such circumstances, it is not permissible
for the Court to direct the State Government or the development
authority to allot plots to the oustees at the reasonable price.
65. In so far as the second question answered by this Court in Brij
Mohan (supra) is concerned i.e. what is the meaning of the
expression “normal allotment rate”, this Court found that as a matter
of fact the land-loser had made an application in the year 1990 for
allotment of plot. A direction was issued by this Court in the year
1992 but HUDA delayed the allotment to the appellants therein. In
838 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

such circumstances, the rate for which the plots were initially offered
was to be charged.
66. The second question answered in Brij Mohan (supra) is keeping in
mind the facts of the case wherein the application was submitted
by an oustee but still the plot was not allotted to him.
67. Ms. Bhati is right in her submission that the dictum as laid in Brij
Mohan (supra) should not be read as laying down an absolute
proposition of law that the “normal allotment rate” in all circumstances
shall be paid when the sector is first floated for sale. As a matter
of fact, the normal allotment rate would be the rate advertised by
HUDA in pursuance of which the plots are allotted. In the case on
hand the picture is hazy in so far as the fact whether appropriate
applications in the prescribed format were preferred in accordance
with the Policy of 1992 with deposit of the earnest money as stipulated
in the scheme itself.
68. However, with all that has been said by us as aforesaid we are
still inclined to direct the appellant to allot the plots to the eligible
oustees in accordance with the Policy of 2016. It shall be open for
the eligible oustees i.e., the respondent herein to apply online in
accordance with the Policy of 2016 with the requisite deposit of the
amount. If such application is filed online with the deposit of the
requisite amount, the appellant shall consider the same and process
the online application accordingly.

ii. Maintainability of the Suit filed under Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 for seeking Mandatory Injunction
for Enforcement of the Obligations in terms of the Scheme
of 1992.
69. Although it is not necessary for us to look into Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, the Act, 1963) or consider whether
the suits instituted by the respondents herein invoking Section 39
of the Act were maintainable in law, yet for the benefit of the courts
below we would like to explain the scope and purport of Section 39
of the Act, 1963. We say so because irrespective of the question
whether suits were maintainable in law or not we have decided to
give the respondents herein the benefit of the 2016 Scheme.
70. Section 39 of the Act 1963 reads thus:
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 839

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

“39. Mandatory injunctions.—When, to prevent the breach
of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance
of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the
court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent
the breach complained of, and also to compel performance
of the requisite acts.”
71. The term “obligation” in Section 39 referred to above has been
defined under Section 2(a) of the Act 1963. The same reads thus:-
“obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law;”
72. Obligation is a tie or bond which obliges one to do or suffer something.
The term as defined in the Act 1963, means any duty enforceable
by law and, therefore, excludes all imperfect obligations, such as
moral, social and religious duties, as the performance of those duties
cannot be enforced by law. As the present definition includes any
duty enforceable by law, it includes:-
(a) Obligations arising out of law of torts as well as of contract.
(b) Obligations arising out of trust.
(c) Obligations arising out of a statute.
73. In the case on hand, the suits were instituted by the respondents
herein for mandatory injunction seeking allotment of plots in
accordance with the scheme of 1992 floated by the State of
Haryana.
74. This Section requires that the defendant or the party concerned must
be prevented from breach of an obligation under the contract. It further
requires that certain special acts, which flow from such obligation,
must be specifically proved. The acts must have reference to an
enforceable obligation. The breach of obligation and performance
and compulsion to perform certain acts in relation to such obligation
must be specifically established before a mandatory injunction can
be granted. The plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section
39 of the Act 1963 is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate
pleadings and cogent evidence that the defendant is committing
breach of a particular obligation which is binding on him and there
are certain acts which are capable of being enforced by the court
in view of the terms of the policy of allotment of plot so far as the
case on hand is concerned.
840 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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75. Mandatory injunction by its nature embodied under Section 39 of the
1963 Act is discretionary. The granting of mandatory injunction is a
matter of judicial discretion of the court and it can be granted only
in a case which falls strictly within the four corners of the provision -
Section 39 of the Act 1963. The two elements which govern Section
39 of the Act 1963 for the grant of mandatory injunction are (i) the
necessity to prevent breach of an obligation by the intervention of
the court and (ii) that such acts should be of that nature capable of
enforcement by the court. Yet another ingredient is also available
which is crucial in the matter of grant of mandatory injunction that it
should be ‘amenable for exercise of judicial discretion’. A relief which
is not amenable for exercising judicial discretion of the Court cannot
be granted by way of a mandatory injunction. It should satisfy not only
breach of an obligation and the necessity of its prevention, but also
the availability of judicial discretion to be exercised. A mere breach
of an obligation or necessity to prevent the same alone cannot be
brought under the purview of mandatory injunction unless the same
is amenable for exercising discretion by the Court.

a. Conditions for granting a Mandatory Injunction.
76. The Conditions for granting a mandatory injunction as developed
over time by a catena of decisions of this Court may be summarized
as under:
i) Obligation: There must be a clear obligation on the
part of the defendant.
ii) Breach: A breach of that obligation must have occurred
or be reasonably apprehended
iii) Necessity: It must be necessary to compel the
performance of specific acts to prevent or rectify the breach.
iv) Enforceability: The court must be able to enforce the
performance of those acts.
v) Balance of Convenience: The balance of convenience
must be in favour of the party seeking the injunction.
vi) Irreparable Injury: The injury or damage caused by the
breach must be irreparable or not adequately compensable
in monetary terms.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 841

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

77. Specific relief may, in brief be explained as relief in specie. It is the
remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of the obligation. The
term ‘obligation’ as used in the Specific Relief Act in its wider juristic
sense covers duties arising either ex-construction or ex-delicto.
Every duty enforceable at law is obligation. The definition clause
of the Act of 1963 does not allow narrow interpretation of the word
‘obligation’ to restrict it to a contractual duty alone. The definition
of the word ‘obligation’ as used in the Act of 1963 is wide enough
and the definition cannot be equated with the definition of the word
‘obligation’ used in the English Law. ‘Obligation’ may be said to be
a bond or tie, which constrains a person to do or suffer something,
it implies a right in another person to which it is co-related, and it
restricts the freedom of the obligee with reference to definite acts
and forbearance; but in order that it may be enforced by a Court, it
must be a legal obligation. The definition of ‘obligation’ in Section 2 of
the Specific Relief Act is so wide that any breach of legal obligation
may give a cause to the affected party. The definition of the word
‘obligation’ in Section 2 of the Act of 1963 should be interpreted in
a way which may serve the cause of the society.
78. Before we talk about the legal rights of the oustees and the legal
obligations on the part of the authorities, so far as the enforcement
of the scheme for allotment of plots is concerned, we must look into
some law on this subject:
i. The question of allotment of the plots to the oustees,
came up for consideration before this Court in State of
U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors. reported in AIR 1986
SC 2025, wherein the Court was called upon to consider
the acquisition of land by Meerut Development Authority.
The Court directed that where large tracts of land for the
purposes of land development in urban areas is acquired,
the developing authority should provide a house or shop
site of reasonable size on reasonable terms to each of
the expropriated persons, who have no houses or shops/
buildings in the urban area in question. The said direction
was issued in view of the provisions of Section 21(2) of
the Delhi Development Act, 1957, which contemplates
settlement of those land-owners, whose land has been
acquired.
842 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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ii. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan
& Anr. reported in (2011) 7 SCC 639, this Court negated
the argument that in case of land acquisition, the plea
of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 is
sustainable. It was held to the following effect:
“26. It is desirable for the authority concerned to
ensure that as far as practicable persons who
had been living and carrying on business or other
activity on the land acquired, if they so desire,
and are willing to purchase and comply with any
requirement of the authority or the local body, be
given a piece of land on the terms settled with
due regard to the price at which the land has
been acquired from them. However, the State
Government cannot be compelled to provide
alternate accommodation to the oustees and it
is for the authority concerned to consider the
desirability and feasibility of providing alternative
land considering the facts and circumstances
of each case.
27. In certain cases, the oustees are entitled
to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is meant only
for those persons who have been rendered
destitute because of a loss of residence or
livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition.
The authorities must explore the avenues of
rehabilitation by way of employment, housing,
investment opportunities, and identification of
alternative lands.
“10.... A blinkered Vision of development,
complete apathy towards those who
are highly adversely affected by the
development process and a cynical
unconcern for the enforcement of the
laws. lead to a situation where the rights
and benefits promised and guaranteed
under the Constitution hardly ever reach
the most marginalised citizens.” (Mahanadi
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 843

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Mathias Oram (2010)
11SCC 269)
For people whose lives and livelihoods
are intrinsically connected to the land, the
economic and cultural shift to a market
economy can be traumatic. (Vide State. of
UP. v. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025, Narpat
Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority AIR
2002 SC 2036, Land Acquisition Officer v.
Mahaboob (2009) 14 SCC 54, Mahanadi
Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Dram (2010)
11see 269 and. Brij Mohan v. HUDA (2011)2
see 29.) The fundamental right of the farmer
to cultivation is a part of right to livelihood.
“Agricultural land is the foundation for a
sense of security and freedom from fear.
Assured possession is a lasting source
for peace and prosperity.” India being a
predominantly agricultural society, there
is a “strong linkage between the land and
the person’s status in [the] social system”.
28. However, in case of land acquisition, “the
plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under
Article 21 is unsustainable”. (Vide Chameli
Singh v. State of U’P. (1996) 2 sec 549 and
Samatha v. Slate of A.P. (1997) 8 SCC191).
This Court has consistently held that Article
300-A is not only a constitutional right but also
a human right. (Vide Lachhman Dassv, Jagat
Ram (2007) 10 see 448 and Amarjit Singh v.
State of Punjab (2010) 10 see 43). However,
in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat
1995 Supp. (1) scc 596, this Court held: (SCC
pp. 620 & 632, paras 30 & 58)
“30. Thus it is clear that right to property
under Article 300- A is not a basic feature
or structure of the Constitution. It is only
a constitutional right. ....
844 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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58. ...The principle of unfairness of the
procedure attracting Article 21 does not
apply to the acquisition or deprivation of
property under Article 300-A giving effect
to the directive principles.”
(Emphasis supplied)

iii. This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of
India reported in (2000) 10 SCC 664 held as under: (SCC
pp. 702-03, para 62)
“62. The displacement of the tribals and other
persons would not per se result in the violation of
their fundamental or other rights. The effect is to see
that on their rehabilitation at new locations they are
better off than what they were. At the rehabilitation
sites they will have more and better amenities than
those they enjoyed in their tribal hamlets. The gradual
assimilation in the mainstream of the society will lead
to betterment and progress.”
(Emphasis supplied)

iv. In State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties
reported in (2009) 8 SCC 46, this Court held as under:
(SCC p. 95, paras 102-03)
“102. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty.
Would it bring within its umbrage a right of tribals
to be rehabilitated in their own habitat is the
question?
103. If the answer is to be rendered in the affirmative,
then, for no reason whatsoever even an inch of land
belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe can ever
be acquired. Furthermore,’ a distinction must be
borne between a right of rehabilitation, required to
be provided when the land of the members of the
Scheduled Tribes are acquired vis-a-vis a prohibition
imposed upon the State from doing so at all.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 845

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

79. In the Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), under the head ‘land
for land’, this Court observed that Constitution requires removal of
economic inequalities and provides for provision of facilities and
opportunities for a decent standard of living and protection of economic
interests of the weaker segments of the society. Every human has
a right to improve his standard of living. The Court concluded that
allotment of land in lieu of land acquired in view of the Rehabilitation
& Resettlement Policy (for short ‘R&R ‘Policy’), the State Authorities
are under obligation to allot land to the allottees as far as possible.
The expression ‘as far as possible’ has been explained in para 38,
which reads as under:
“38. The aforesaid phrase provides for flexibility, clothing
the authority concerned with powers to meet special
situations where the normal process of resolution cannot
flow smoothly. The aforesaid phrase can be interpreted
as not being prohibitory in nature. The said words rather
connote a discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It
is thus discretion and not compulsion. There is no hard-
and-fast rule in this regard as these words give a discretion
to the authority concerned. Once the authority exercises
its discretion, the court should not interfere with the said
discretiori/decision unless it is found to be palpably arbitrary.
(Vide Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2005)
2 see 145 and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v.
Veena Verma (2009) 14 SCC 734). Thus, it is evident
that this phrase simply means that the principles are to
be observed unless it is not possible to follow the same
in the particular circumstances of a case.”
80. The Court further held that the Government has the power and
competence to change the policy on the basis of ground realities
and that State Government is competent to frame policy and a public
policy can be challenged, where it offends some constitutional or
statutory provisions. It observed as under:
“35. In State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga (1998)
4 SCC 117, this Court while examining the State policy
fixing the rates for reimbursement of medical expenses
to government servants held: (SCC pp. 129-30, paras
25-26 & 29)
846 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“25. ...When Government forms its policy, it is based
on a number of circumstances on facts, law including
constraints based on its resources. [t is also based
on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if court is
asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy
or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits.
The court “would dissuade itself from entering into
this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within
this matrix that it is to be seen whether the new policy
violates Article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on
account of its financial constraints.
26.... For every return there has to be investment.
Investment needs resources and finances. So even
to protect this sacrosanct right, finances are an
inherent requirement. Harnessing such resources
needs toр priority.
29. No State of any country can have unlimited
resources to spend on any of its projects. That is
why it only approves its projects to the extent it is
feasible.”
36. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken
by the Government merely because it feels that another
decision would have been fairer or more scientific or
logical or wiser. The wisdom and advisability of the policies
are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless the
policies are contrary to statutory or constitutional provisions
or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power. (See Ram
Şingh Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (2007) 6 SCC 44,
Villianur 1yarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India
(2009) 7 sec 561 and State of Kerala v. Peoples Union
for Civil Liberties (2009) 8 see 46.)
37. Thus, it emerges to be a settled legal proposition
that the Government has the power and competence
to change the policy on the basis of ground realities. A
public policy cannot be challenged through PIL where
the State Government is competent to frame the policy
and there is no need for anyone to raise any grievance
even if the policy is changed. The public policy can only
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 847

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

be challenged where it offends some constitutional or
statutory provisions.”
(emphasis supplied)

81. This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra) has held that it is
impermissible in law to read a part of the document in isolation. The
document is to be read as a whole. (see para 44). In Jage Ram &
others v. Union of India & others reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC
615, this Court considered the earlier judgment in Pista Devi’s case
and held that since the acquisition is only for defence purposes, the
allotment of alternative ‘site would create innumerable complications
and that allotment of alternative sites ‘depends upon the purpose of
acquisition as well. It was held to the following effect:
“1. The only question raised in these two writ petitions is
whether an observation is to be made by this Court to the
effect that the petitioners would be entitled to allotment
of alternative sites by the Delhi Development Authority; It
is true that the lands of the petitioners were acquired for
a defence purpose, viz., establishment of Radar. They
were duly paid the compensation demanded of. One of
the reliefs sought in the writ petitions is that since they
have been displaced from their holdings, they need some
site for construction of their houses and that, therefore the
Government of India may make an effort to provide them
alternative Sites. We are aware of the decision rendered
by this Court in State of UP, vs. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC
2025 (See at p. 260). But it depends upon the acquisition
for which it was made. In that case, acquisition related
to planned development of housing scheme by Meerut
Development Authority. Therefore, though no scheme was
made providing alternative sites to those displaced persons
whose lands were acquired and who themselves needed
housing accommodations, a direction was given to the
Meerut Development Authority to provide alternative sites
for their housing purpose. Since the acquisition is only for
defence purpose and if the request is acceded to, it would
create innumerable complications, we are constrained not
to accede to forceful persuasive argument addressed by
Mr. RP. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners.”
848 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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82. In S. Gurdial Singh & others v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust
reported in (1995) 5 SCC 138, considering Pista Devi’s case, this
Court observed that the benefit of providing alternative sites should
not be uniformly and mechanically extended to all the cases unless
there is any express scheme framed by appropriate authorities and
the scheme is in operation. This Court was considering the allotment
of alternative sites for commercial purposes, as a local displaced
persons in terms of acquisition of land by the Improvement Trust. It
was observed as under:
“4. It is then contended, relying upon-the decision of this
Court in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi AIR 1986 SC 2025
that the appellants are entitled to allotment of alternative
sites for commercial purpose. Therein, the land was
acquired for housing development and the persons whose
properties were sought to be displaced were directed to
be provided housing accommodation under the schemes
formed thereunder. The general ratio therein cannot be
uniformly and mechanically extended to all the cases
unless there is any express scheme framed by appropriate
authorities and the scheme is in operation. Under these
circumstances, we cannot give any express direction in
this behalf. However, when the grievance was made by
the appellants, an admission was made in the counter-
affidavit filed in the High Court thus:“The petitioners could
get a plot of land as local displaced persons in lieu of their
acquired land according to rules on the subject.”
(Emphasis supplied)

83. In Amarjit Singh & ors. v. State of Punjab & ors. reported in (2010)
10 SCC 43, it has been held that rehabilitation is not a recognized
right either under the Constitution or under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. Any beneficial measures taken by the Government
are, therefore, guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness
and equity towards the landowners. The rehabilitation of the property
owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution and that acquisition made in exercise of power
of eminent domain for public purpose and that individual right of
ownership over land must yield place to the larger public good. It
was held as under:
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 849

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

“16. As regards the question of rehabilitation of the
expropriated landowners, Mr. Subramanium, submitted that
rehabilitation was not a recognised right either under the
Constitution or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act. Any, beneficial measures taken by the Government
are, therefore, guided only by humanitarian considerations
of fairness and equity towards the landowners. The benefit
of such measures is however subject to the satisfaction of
all such conditions as may be stipulated by the Government
in regard thereto. The policy relied upon by the appellants
being only prospective cannot be made retrospective by
a judicial order to cover acquisitions that have since long
been finalised.

xxx xxx xxx
49. We must, in fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he
did not suggest that rehabilitation of the oustees was an
essential part of any process of compulsory acquisition so
as to render illegal any acquisition that is not accompanied
by such measure. He did not pitch his case that high and
in our opinion rightly so. The decisions of this Court in
New Reviera. Coop. Housing Society v. Land Acquisition
Officer (1996) 1 SCC 731 and Chameli Singh v. State of
U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 have repelled the contention that
rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right
to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as
to render any “compulsory acquisition for public purpose
bad for want of any such measures.
50. In New Reviera case (supra). this Court held that
if the State comes forward with a proposal to provide
alternative sites to the owners, the Court can give effect
to any such proposal by issuing appropriate directions in
that behalf. But a provision for alternative sites cannot be
made a condition precedent for every acquisition of land.
In Chameli Singh case (supra) also the Court held that
acquisitions are made in exercise of power of eminent
domain for public purpose, and that individual right of
ownership over land must yield place to the larger public
good. That acquisition in accordance with the procedure
850 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

sanctioned by law is a valid exercise of power vested
in the State hence cannot be taken to deprive the right
to livelihood especially when compensation is paid for
the acquired land at the rates prevailing on the date of
publication of the preliminary notification.
51. There is, thus, no gainsaying that rehabilitation is
not an essential requirement of law for any compulsory
acquisition nor can acquisition made for a public purpose
and in accordance with the procedure established by law
upon payment of compensation that is fair and reasonable
be assailed on the ground that any such acquisition violates
the right to livelihood of the owners who may be dependent
on the land being acquired from them.”
(emphasis supplied)

84. Thus, from the above-referred judgments, it is evident that acquisition
of land does not violate any constitutional/ fundamental right of the
displaced persons. However, they are entitled to resettlement and
rehabilitation as per the policy framed for the oustees of the project
concerned.
85. We looked into one of the judgments of the trial court rendered in
Civil Suit No. 538 of 2007 titled “Smt. Nirmala Devi, W/o Sh. Shishpal
Varma, resident of Kaithal vs. The Estate Officer, Haryana Urban
Development Authority, Kaithal & Ors.”. We take notice of the fact that
the said suit came to be dismissed by the trial court essentially on
two grounds. First on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to apply
with the authorities concerned in a specified format with deposit of
the earnest money at the rate of 10% of the total price as mentioned
in the details provided in the brochure, and secondly on the ground
that the suit was hopelessly time-barred as the same came to be
instituted after a period of 14 years from the date of the advertisement/
notice. The relevant findings recorded by the trial court read thus:-
“12. However, as per the brochure issued by the defendants
in the year 1992, placed on record as Ex.P6, the prospective
applicants, including the outees, were required to apply in
a specified format with deposit of earnest money at the
rate of 10% of the total cost as mentioned in the details
provided in the said brochure. However, the plaintiff never
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 851

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

applied for the said plot under the oustees quota in the
year 1992 in response to the said advertisement/brochure
before the last date of application. As per the averments of
the plaintiff herself, as contained in the plaint, the plaintiff
had applied for the said plot only on 19.12.2006, i.e. after
about 14 years of the said advertisement/notice. Although
the plaintiff has submitted in her plaint that she had applied
for the release of a free-hold residential developed plot in
January 2000, no documentary evidence in the form of a
copy of application or postal receipt etc., has been placed
on record. In the case titled as Smt. Bhagwanti vs. HUDA
2002 (4) RCR (Civil) 21 (P&H) a division Bench of the
Hon’ble High Punjab and Haryana High Court has held
that where the petitioners submitted their application for
allotment of plots after the prescribed date, the authority is
not expected to wait for more than four years to apply at
his/her convenience and then proceed to make allotment
to others. In the present case too, a fair opportunity was
granted to all concerned to apply. However, the plaintiff
failed to avail of that opportunity. That being the case,
the plaintiff has to thank herself for failure to get any plot.
13. Besides, as per a mandatory condition, as mentioned
in the brochure, the applicants were supposed to deposit
earnest money at the rate of 10% of the total cost of the
plot. Rule 5 of the Haryana Urban Development (Disposal
of Land and Buildings) Regulations, 1978, requires that
the intending purchaser shall make an application to the
Estate Officer concerned in the prescribed form (annexed
to the regulation) and no application shall be valid unless
it is accompanied by such amount as may be determined
by the authorities which shall not be less than 10% of the
price/premium. In the present case, the plaintiff has neither
pleaded the payment of the earnest money nor placed on
record any evidence regarding the payment of earnest
money at the rate of 10%.

x x x x
17. It is an admitted fact that the land of the plaintiff had
been acquired by the defendants in the year 1992 and
852 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the plaintiff had applied for the release of a free-hold
residential developed plot under the oustees quota on
19.12.2006 and the present suit was filed on 1.8.2007.
In other words, the plaintiff had applied for the plot after
14 years of the acquisition of her land and has filed the
present suit after 15 years of the said acquisition. As
per article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1993, the period of
limitation for an injunction suit is three years from the date
when the right to sue accrues to the plaintiff. I find merit
in the contention of Ld. Counsel for the defendants that
the cause of action had arisen in favour of the plaintiff
in the year 1992 itself when her land had been acquired
by the defendants. It is pertinent to mention here that
throughout her plaint, the plaintiff has not specified the
date as to when the cause of action accrued in her favour.
Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff having been filed after
15 years of the cause of action having arisen in her
favour, the same is not only hopelessly time-barred but
the plaintiff is also guilt of delay, laches and acquiescence
on her part and is therefore not entitled to the equitable
and discretionary relief of injunction. Therefore, issue
No. 4 is also decided in favour of the defendants and
against the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)

86. The plaintiff Smt. Nirmala Devi preferred civil appeal in the court of
the Additional District Judge bearing Civil Appeal No. 47 of 2012.
The First Appeal came to be allowed. The matter of concern is that
there is no discussion worth the name by the first appellate court as
regards the findings recorded by the trial court referred to above. The
reason for us to say that it is a matter of concern is because right
from the inception the appellant herein has been saying that none of
the oustees, at least the respondents before us, had applied in the
requisite format for allotment of plots with the deposit of the earnest
money. If this part of the obligation would have been performed or
discharged by the oustees in accordance with the scheme then
perhaps HUDA could have been called upon to perform its part of
the obligation. It is only if the plaintiff would have performed its part
of the obligation according to the scheme, then Section 39 of the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 853

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

Specific Relief Act, 1963 could have been invoked to compel the
HUDA as defendant to perform its part of the obligation. This aspect
unfortunately has not been looked into even by the High Court.
87. We also looked into one of the judgments of the trial court allowing
the suit filed by one Dixit Lal s/o Sh. Sunder Lal resident of Kaithal.
We are referring to the judgment rendered by the trial court in Civil
Suit No. 228/1 of 2009 decided on 21.11.2009.
88. In the said suit the entire line of reasoning is different. The trial court
while decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff held as under:
“10. Plaintiff has claimed that no plot was allotted to him
despite various requests made by him. Smt. Bimlesh
mother of the plaintiff examined as PW-1 has deposed
that plaintiff had applied for allotment of plot under the
oustees quota, but the copy of the application was not
readily available with him. She has further deposed that in
the year 2007 as well she had approached the defendants
at the time of allotment of plots in Sector-19 and 20
HUDA, Kaithal but her request was not considered by the
defendants; whereas similarly placed persons had been
allotted plots under the court orders. Shri Lakhi Ram, Clerk
from the office of Haryana Urban development Authority.
Kaithal examined as DW-1. Has deposed that plaintiff had
not applied for allotment of plot nor had she deposited
10% of the earnest amount despite advertisement Ex. D3.
11. Admittedly, there is no proof on record to show that
the plaintiff had applied for a plot under the oustees
quota. A perusal of Ex. D3 shows that the booking of
the plots was open for general category as well as the
oustees from 02.09.1992 till 01.10.1992. No doubt the
earnest money has been specified against each category
of land, but the said advertisement cannot be said to be
in consonance with the policy of 1992 of Haryana Urban
Development Authority which is applicable. According to
the said policy, Haryana Urban Development Authority
was required to offer to the oustees in proportion to their
acquired land. Only after making an offer, the Haryana
Urban Development Authority could take the plea that
the offer has not been accepted by the oustees by not
854 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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applying for the plot within the given time. The oustees
who make the application pursuant to such advertisement
can be asked by Haryana Urban Development Authority
to deposit 10% of the earnest money. Any revision or
modification in the policy of 1992 cannot bar the claim of
the persons whose land had been acquired two prior to
the said modification. In the present suit the land of the
plaintiff was acquired in the year 1989 and award was
passed on 26.02.1992 and the modification in the policy
made by Haryana Urban Development Authority in the
year 1993 cannot have a retrospective effect.
12. In Civil Writ Petition No. 19927 of 2009 titled as
Sandeep Vs. State of Haryana and others decided on
16.05.2011 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Raniit Singh, Judge
Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, it
has been observed as under:-
“Majority of the claim are being denied on the ground
that application is not sent with 10% of the price of
the plot. This is also not in conformity with the policy
so formulated. The HUDA concededly has not kept in
register to keep the claims of the allottees live. The
requirement of depositing 10% of the price would arise
only if the claims are first invited as per the policies
and it has to be through press a newspaper, the price,
as per the policy instructions dated 12.03.1993, is to
be deposited once the claim is finally accepted by
the competent authority and when the sector scheme
is floated. It is on account of these violations that
majority of the oustees are being made approach
this court through various writ petitions. In order to
set the position right and as one time measure it is
appropriate to direct HUDA to invite claims of all the
oustees through an advertisement in the newspaper
giving them sufficient time to make applications.
Those who make applications pursuant to such an
advertisement may be asked to deposit 10% of the
price, if the plots are still available. Their claims be
considered in the light of the policies formulated by
HUDA.”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 855

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

13. The Haryana Urban Development Authority has
not performed its obligation in inviting the claim of
oustees as laid down in the policy dated 19.03.1992 and
subsequent policy. The said policy required. Haryana Urban
Development Authority to invite the claim of the oustees
separately before floating any Sector. The land looser
have option to buy first before applications are invited
from general public. In the present case as well as the
claim of the oustees were invited while inviting the claim
of the general public. It cannot be denied that once the
claim of the oustees is invited along with general public,
the possibility of first satisfying the claim of the oustees
would stand defeated. Merely because the plaintiff has
not produced any proof with regard to his application for
allotment of plot would not defeat her right as it was the
duty of the Haryana Urban Development Authority to first
make a clear offer with regard to allotment. The land of
the plaintiff was admittedly acquired by the defendants and
no plot has been allotted to the plaintiff till date in lieu of
the said acquisition. The plaintiff has a right to receive the
preferential plot under the oustees quota and in order to
redress his grievance plaintiff has filed the present suit.
The plaintiff has a locus standi to file the present suit and
the suit is maintainable.”
89. Thus, while allowing the suit the trial court in no uncertain terms
observed that there was no proof or any evidence worth the name
on record to indicate that the plaintiff had applied for a plot under the
oustee quota yet it proceeded to say that the advertisement issued by
HUDA was not in any conformity with the policy of 1992 and in such
circumstances the oustees were not obliged to prefer any application
in the prescribed format with deposit of 10 per cent of the price.
90. Although we are not convinced with the line of reasoning adopted
by the trial court while allowing the suit as referred to above, as
affirmed upto the High Court yet even assuming for the moment
that the advertisement was not in conformity with the Scheme of
1992 there is no explanation worth the name at the end any of the
oustees why the suits were instituted after a lapse of almost 14 to
20 years, more particularly, when the land of respective oustees
came to be acquired in 1992.
856 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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91. Well, it may be argued and quite legitimately that the term “obligation”
in Section 39 of the Act, 1963 may not be always mutual. Section 39
deals with mandatory injunctions, which can be used to prevent the
breach of an obligation and at times compel the performance of
specific acts necessary to prevent that breach. The obligation, in
this context, refers to a duty enforceable by law, and while it can be
reciprocal in some cases (like a contract), it can also be a unilateral
duty such as a trustee’s obligation to a beneficiary. However, it would
all depend on the individual facts of each case. When the scheme in
question specifically provides that an oustee shall file an application
in a specified format with deposit of the requisite amount towards
earnest money then it is a part of the obligation on the part of the
oustee to do so before he calls upon the State to allot the plot in
accordance with the terms of the scheme.
92. There is no explanation worth the name why it took 14-20 years for
the plaintiffs to institute their respective suits for mandatory injunction
under Section 39 of the Act 1963. Whether Article 58 of the Limitation
Act would apply or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation would be 3 years. By no stretch of imagination, it can be
said that the case on hand is one of recurring cause of action so
as to bring the suit within the period of limitation though instituted
almost after a period of 14-20 years.
93. In such circumstances referred to above, we could have taken the
view that the suits themselves were not maintainable as they should
have been dismissed only on the ground of limitation far from being
not maintainable under Section 39 of the Act 1963.
94. However, as observed earlier, since we are inclined to grant the
benefit of the scheme of 2016, we are not non-suiting the respondents
(original plaintiffs) completely.

D. CONCLUSION
95. We summarise our final conclusion and dispose of all the appeals
with the following directions:
(i) The respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right
relying on the decision of Brij Mohan (supra) that they should
be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in
the 1992 policy.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 857

Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and Ors. v.
Nirmala Devi

(ii) The respondents are entitled at the most to seek the benefit of
the 2016 policy for the purpose of allotment of plots as oustees.
(iii) We grant four weeks time to all the respondents herein to prefer
an appropriate online application with deposit of the requisite
amount in accordance with the policy of 2016. If within a period
of four weeks any of the respondents herein prefer any online
application in accordance with the scheme of 2016 then in
such circumstances the authority concerned shall look into
the applications and process the same in accordance with the
scheme of 2016. We clarify that it will be up to the authority
to look into whether the respondents are otherwise eligible for
the allotment of plots or not.
(iv) We make it clear that there shall not be any further extension
of time for the purpose of applying online with deposit of the
requisite amount.
(v) We understand that some of the respondents may be very rustic
and illiterate and may not be in a position to apply online, in
such circumstances we permit them to apply by preferring an
appropriate application or otherwise addressed to the competent
authority with deposit of the requisite amount.
(vi) We make it clear that the entire exercise shall be completed
within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipt of
the online application that may be filed by the respondents.
(vii) The State of Haryana as well as HUDA shall ensure that land
grabbers or any other miscreants may not form a cartel and
try to take undue advantage of the allotment of plots. At the
end it should not happen that unscrupulous elements ultimately
derive any benefit or advantage from allotment of land to the
oustees. In this regard the State and HUDA will have to remain
very vigilant.
(viii) We believe that since the allotment of plot is with a laudable
object and not for any monetary gain, a condition should be
imposed at the time of allotment that the allotee shall not
be entitled to transfer the plot to any third party without the
permission of the competent authority and in any case not
within five years from the date of the allotment.
858 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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(ix) This litigation is an eye opener for all States in this country.
If land is required for any public purpose law permits the
Government or any instrumentality of Government to acquire
in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
or any other State Act enacted for the purpose of acquisition.
When land is acquired for any public purpose the person whose
land is taken away is entitled to appropriate compensation in
accordance with the settled principles of law. It is only in the
rarest of the rare case that the Government may consider
floating any scheme for rehabilitation of the displaced persons
over and above paying them compensation in terms of money.
At times the State Government with a view to appease its
subjects float unnecessary schemes and ultimately land up
in difficulties. It would unnecessarily give rise to number of
litigations. The classic example is the one at hand. What we
would like to convey is that it is not necessary that in all cases
over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation
of the property owners is a must. Any beneficial measures taken
by the Government should be guided only by humanitarian
considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners.
(x) Ordinarily, rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons
who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence
or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition. In other
words, for people whose lives and livelihood are intrinsically
connected to the land.
(xi) We have made ourselves very explicitly clear that in cases of
land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood
under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable.
96. All the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
97. The Registry is directed to circulate one copy each of this judgment
to all the High Courts.

Result of the case: Appeals disposed of with directions.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain