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Supreme Court of India

DR. SUNIL KUMAR SINGHversusBIHAR LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (THROUGH SECRETARY) AND ORS.

Citation
2025 INSC 264
Decided
25 February 2025
Disposal
Case Allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the petition is maintainable, the Ethics Committee's decision is subject to judicial review, the expulsion was disproportionate, and the Court may modify the punishment, reinstating the petitioner.

Summary

Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh, an MLC from the RJD, was expelled from the Bihar Legislative Council after the Ethics Committee found his conduct unparliamentary and his subsequent refusal to cooperate with the Committee. He challenged the expulsion through a writ petition under Article 32, arguing that the Ethics Committee's proceedings were protected by Article 212(1) and that the punishment was disproportionate. The Supreme Court held that the petition was maintainable, that the Ethics Committee's administrative action is subject to judicial review, and that there is no absolute bar on reviewing the proportionality of legislative punishments. The Court found the expulsion excessive and violative of Articles 14 and 21, and, invoking its powers under Article 142, modified the punishment by treating the period of expulsion as a suspension and reinstating the petitioner. The bye‑election notification issued by the Election Commission was also set aside.

Issues considered

  • Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 212(1) of the Constitution and whether the Ethics Committee's proceedings are amenable to judicial review
  • Whether the Court can review the proportionality of the punishment imposed by the Legislature
  • Whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and warrants interference
  • Whether the Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment to be imposed

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration (1) Whether the instant writ petition is maintainable in view of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings of the ethics committee are amenable to judicial review? (2) Whether this court can review punishment imposed by the house in exercise of its writ jurisdiction? (3) If so, whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any interference? (4) If so, whether this court is empowered to determine the quantum of

Subjects

Article 212(1) of Constitution of IndiaEthics CommitteeJudicial ReviewPunishmentProportionality of the punishmentMaintainability of writ petitionConstitutional CourtsMisconductExpulsionMisdemeanourLegislatureProceedings in LegislatureLegislative DecisionImmunityConstitutional SupremacyExpression unius est exclusion alteriusIrregularity of procedureAdministrative functionsLegislative functionLegislative privilege

Judgment

                 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 2130 : 2025 INSC 264

                    Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh
                               v.
   Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
                    (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 530 of 2024)
                                25 February 2025
    [Surya Kant* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]


                             Issue for Consideration
       (1)   Whether the instant writ petition is maintainable in view of Article
             212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings
             of the ethics committee are amenable to judicial review?
       (2)   Whether this court can review the proportionality of the
             punishment imposed by the house in exercise of its writ
             jurisdiction?
       (3)   If so, whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate
             to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits
             any interference?
       (4)   If so, whether this court is empowered to determine the
             quantum of punishment that may be imposed on the petitioner?

                                    Headnotes†
       Constitution of India – Art.212(1) – Whether the instant Writ
       Petition is maintainable in view of Art.212(1) of the Constitution
       of India and whether the proceedings of the Ethics Committee
       are amenable to judicial review:
       Held: The protection u/Art.212(1) operates only with respect to
       the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ on the grounds of ‘Procedural
       Irregularities’ – It could not have been the intent of the lawmakers to
       circumscribe Constitutional Courts unconditionally from scrutinising
       the validity of the actions of the Legislature, which may encroach
       upon the Fundamental Rights of the members and/or citizens –
       The ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ comprise the formal steps,
       debates, and motions undertaken to facilitate deliberations within
       the House – Art. 212(1) of the Constitution provides immunity for
       the manner of such proceedings, and hence, Constitutional Courts
       would exercise restraint when such proceedings are called into
       question on the grounds of procedural irregularity – A ‘Legislative
       Decision’, on the other hand, is the culmination of the legislative
       procedure—the formal expression of the will of the House on a given
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                               2131

                        Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
        Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

     matter – These decisions of the Legislature, though emanating from
     a coordinate branch of Government, are not immune from scrutiny
     by Constitutional Courts – In the instant case, the Impugned Report
     recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the
     Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions –
     The present action of the Ethics Committee is purely administrative
     in nature, aimed at enforcing discipline and ethical standards
     amongst the members of the House – It is well established that
     administrative actions, even when undertaken by legislative bodies
     or their committees, are subject to judicial review where they affect
     the rights and interests of individuals – In this context, the present
     action resulting in civil consequences for the Petitioner, cannot be
     immune from judicial review under the pretext of legislative privilege.
     [Paras 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21]

     Punishment – Proportionality of punishment – Can the Courts
     examine the proportionality of punishment imposed on a
     member while reviewing the validity of the action taken by
     the House:
     Held: The doctrine of proportionality is fundamentally embedded
     in the concept of fairness in action across domestic, foreign, and
     international legal systems – This principle ensures that measures
     taken are appropriate, necessary, and balanced in relation to the
     objectives they seek to achieve – There is no absolute bar on the
     Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of the punishment
     imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of the action taken
     by the House – By focusing on the proportionality of punishment,
     courts must ensure that justice aligns with constitutional values and
     societal norms, thereby upholding the integrity of the democratic
     process – At this point, it must be added that the determination of
     what constitutes a disproportionate measure is inherently complex
     and context-dependent – Such assessment requires a nuanced
     scrutiny of the specific circumstances surrounding each case –
     This means that a one-size-fits-all definition is impractical while
     adjudicating proportionality and the courts must exercise their
     discretion in a prudent and judicious manner. [Paras 54, 62, 63]

     Punishment – Proportionality of punishment – Guiding principles
     for courts to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of
     actions taken by the House against its member(s):
     Held: These parameters are not exhaustive, as considerations
     will inevitably vary from case to case – An indicative list of such
2132                                                           [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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    parameters includes:(a) Degree of obstruction caused by the member
    in the proceedings of the House; (b) Whether the behaviour of the
    member has brought disrepute to the dignity of the entire House;
    (c) The previous conduct of the erring member; (d) The subsequent
    conduct of the erring member, such as expressing remorse,
    cooperation with the institutional scrutiny mechanism; (e) Availability
    of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the delinquent member; (f)
    Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and motivated or a
    mere outcome of language largely influenced by the local dialect; (g)
    Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the desired
    purpose; and (h) Balancing the interest of society, particularly the
    electorates, with those of the erring members. [Para 64]

    Punishment – Expulsion – Proportionality of Petitioner’s
    Expulsion – Was the Petitioner’s expulsion proportionate to
    the offence alleged against him, and whether it merits any
    interference:
    Held: The punishment of expulsion imposed on the Petitioner is
    harsh and disproportionate – While the petitioner’s conduct in the
    house was abhorrent and his subsequent demeanour before the
    ethics committee was evasive and high-handed, the house ought
    to exercise magnanimity as custodian of constitutional values – The
    punishment of expulsion was highly excessive and disproportionate
    to the nature of the misconduct – Disproportionate punishments
    are violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in Arts.14 and
    21 of the constitution – A more measured and balanced approach
    would have sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the
    dignity and decorum of the House. [Paras 68-71, 75-78]

    Constitution of India – Art.142 – Quantum of Punishment –
    Power of Supreme Court u/Art.142:
    Held: In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the
    punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate
    to the gravity of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute
    its own assessment of the appropriate penalty – Instead, the
    established judicial approach is to remit the matter to the
    disciplinary authority for reconsideration – In exercise of its powers
    u/Art.142 of the constitution, this court is vested with the authority
    to substitute the punishment where the facts and circumstances
    so warrant – The expulsion of the Petitioner is disproportionate
    and undoubtedly infringes his Fundamental Rights guaranteed
    u/Art.14 of the Constitution – Furthermore, the expulsion also has
    a direct impact on a vast number of stakeholders, particularly the
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             2133

                        Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
        Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

     electorates he represents – The Petitioner has already undergone
     almost 7 months of expulsion – If this matter is now remanded
     to the Ethics Committee for reconsideration of the appropriate
     punishment, the ensuing process is likely to be protracted,
     which might deprive the Petitioner in participating in the ensuing
     Sessions – Balancing the competing considerations, the period of
     expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to be
     considered as a period of his suspension; and in view of this Court,
     constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by
     him – As a segue thereto, the Petitioner is directed to be reinstated
     as member of the BLC with immediate effect. [Paras 79-84, 86]

                              Case Law Cited
     Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. The Maharashtra Legislative Assembly
     and Anr. [2022] 18 SCR 762 : (2022) 12 SCC 273; Dev Singh v.
     Punjab Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 9;
     LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 488 : (2006) 13
     SCC 613; Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western
     Telecom Project BSNL & Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 430 : (2014) 14
     SCC 731; Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, City & Industrial
     Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Anr. v. Shishir
     Realty (P) Ltd. & Ors. [2021] 13 SCR 190 : (2022) 16 SCC 527;
     Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. [2003] Supp.
     6 SCR 1235 : (2004) 2 SCC 130; Chairman, All India Railway
     Recruitment Board & Anr. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. [2010] 6
     SCR 291 : (2010) 6 SCC 614; Modern Dental College & Research
     Centre & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. [2016] 3 SCR 579 : (2016) 7
     SCC 353; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. [2020] 1 SCR
     812 : (2020) 3 SCC 637; Association for Democratic Reforms &
     Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024 SCC OnLine
     SC 150; Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank
     of India [2020] 2 SCR 297 : (2020) 10 SCC 274; Shivu & Anr. v.
     Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr. [2007] 2 SCR
     555 : (2007) 4 SCC 713; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983]
     1 SCR 145 : (1982) 3 SCC 24; Lehna v. State of Haryana [2002]
     1 SCR 377 : (2002) 3 SCC 76; Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control
     Bureau & Ors., 2024 INSC 479 : [2024] 7 SCR 97; Munish Bhasin
     and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [2009] 2 SCR
     806 : (2009) 4 SCC 45; Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi
     and Ors. [2022] 18 SCR 494 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 897; Parvez
     Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2020] 11
     SCR 117 : (2020) 10 SCC 77; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
     [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Arnesh Kumar v. State of
2134                                                          [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


    Bihar & Anr. [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC 273; Raja Ram
    Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha & Ors. [2007] 1 SCR
    317 : (2007) 3 SCC 184; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.
    [1988] 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; Deputy Commissioner,
    Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain [2013] 9 SCR
    898 : (2013) 10 SCC 106; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and
    Ors. [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 644 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 – relied on.
    The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and
    Secretary of State for Health ex parte Fedesa et al [1990]
    ECR I-4023 [13] – referred to.

                      Books and Periodicals Cited
    Cf. G. LübbeWolff, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law
    of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Human Rights Law
    Journal 2014, vol. 34, pg. 12; Sauter W. Proportionality in EU Law:
    A Balancing Act? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
    2013;15:439-466; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and
    Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 61 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky,
    Constitutional Law 529–31 (Aspen Pub. 2001).

                             List of Websites
    Principle of Proportionality, European Union, https://www.
    google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=h
    ttps://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of-
    proportionality.html&ved=2ahUKEwjR9aun6NSLAxXhzDgGHTA
    sHtcQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw14i3cuEILjPFx1jQZjNOuR.

                             List of Keywords
    Article 212(1) of Constitution of India; Ethics Committee;
    Judicial Review; Punishment; Proportionality of the punishment;
    Maintainability of writ petition; Constitutional Courts; Misconduct;
    Expulsion; Misdemeanour; Legislature; Proceedings in Legislature;
    Legislative Decision; Immunity; Constitutional Supremacy;
    Expression unius est exclusion alterius; Irregularity of procedure;
    Administrative functions; Legislative function; Legislative privilege.

                            Case Arising From
    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
    530 of 2024
    Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        2135

                          Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
          Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

                        Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Petitioner:
     Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Advs., Yash
     Johri, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Ms. Shristi Sinha, Vishal Sinha,
     Pradyut Kashyap.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Navin Kumar Jha,
     Aditya Prakash Sahay, Sushil Kumar Singh, Akash Dikshit, Chandan
     Kumar, Divyansh Mishra, Chandratanay Chaube, Ankit Agarwal,
     Ms. Viyushti Rawat, Ashish Shukla.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     Surya Kant, J.

1.   The Petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under
     Article 32 of the Constitution of India, laying challenge to Report No.
     1/2024 dated 14.06.2024 (Impugned Report), submitted by the Ethics
     Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) recommending
     his expulsion as a Member of Legislative Council (MLC). The
     consequential notification dated 26.07.2024 relieving the Petitioner
     from the membership of the BLC issued by the BLC’s Secretariat
     (Impugned Notification), is also assailed.

     A.     Factual Matrix
2.   The present controversy arises from allegations of unparliamentary
     conduct by the Petitioner, including the use of derogatory expressions
     in his capacity as an MLC within the House of the BLC. This conduct
     of the Petitioner prompted the initiation of proceedings against him by
     the Ethics Committee. The allegations were found to be substantiated,
     leading the Ethics Committee to recommend the Petitioner’s expulsion
     from the BLC. Subsequently, a resolution to that effect was passed
     by a majority of the members of BLC, formalising the decision to
     expel and relieve the Petitioner. The facts giving rise to the present
     petition are set out hereinbelow:
     2.1. The Petitioner is a member of the political party known as the
          Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). He was elected as a member of
2136                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports



         the BLC on 29.06.2020 for a period of six years. The Petitioner
         was also nominated as the Chief Whip by the RJD in the BLC.
    2.2. The elections for the 17th Legislative Assembly in the State
         of Bihar were held in November 2020, wherein a coalition
         government, comprising the Janata Dal (United) (JDU) led by
         the incumbent Chief Minister along with the RJD and the Indian
         National Congress (INC), was formed. This coalition, however,
         wedged apart in January 2024, and a new alliance between
         the JDU and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was entered
         into to form the Government in the State.
    2.3. Following these developments, the Hon’ble Governor of Bihar
         was scheduled to deliver his address on 13.02.2024, at the 206th
         Session of the BLC. As soon as the Governor’s address was
         completed and during the motion of thanks, the Petitioner and
         another MLC, Md. Sohaib approached the well of the House
         and hurled indecent slogans against the Chief Minister. They
         mocked him as “Paltu Ram”, imitated his body language and
         sarcastically remarked that “the man who has not contested a
         single Mukhiya election till date is the Chief Minister of Bihar”.
         The Petitioner then alluded to the Chief Minister as an ‘expert
         in manipulations’ and insinuated that he was “just like a snake
         sheds its skin every year”. This indecorous fracas led to the
         proceedings of the House being indubitably obstructed, followed
         by a complaint on 19.02.2024 lodged against the Petitioner and
         Md. Sohaib before the Chairman of the BLC by a fellow MLC
         belonging to the Ruling Party JDU.
    2.4. The Chairman of BLC issued a letter to the Petitioner and Md.
         Sohaib informing them about the complaint, which was then
         forwarded to the Ethics Committee for necessary enquiry.
         The letter also required both the MLCs to remain present and
         join the enquiry proceedings on 03.05.2024 before the Ethics
         Committee.
    2.5. Md. Sohaib joined the enquiry proceedings on 03.05.2024 and
         expressed regret for his conduct in writing and further assured
         a display of restraint and caution in the future.
    2.6. The Petitioner, in stark contrast, did not appear before the Ethics
         Committee on the date fixed and instead sought exemption,
         citing engagements and scheduling conflicts due to the onset
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           2137

                        Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
        Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

           of the Lok Sabha elections. The Petitioner did not join even the
           subsequent proceedings and continued seeking exemption from
           appearing for one or the other reason, which are delineated for
           the sake of convenience:

         Date of          Requests from Petitioner       Response of the
       proceedings                                       Ethics Committee
      03.05.2024      •   The Petitioner was a star     Exempted and
                          campaigner for his party      directed to appear on
                          in the ongoing Lok Sabha      22.05.2024
                          elections and was in charge
                          of the Saran Constituency.
      22.05.2024      •   Busy on account of            Exempted and
                          himself being a candidate     directed to be present
                          in elections of the Board     on 31.05.2024 as a
                          of Directors, National        last opportunity.
                          Agricultural Cooperative
                          Marketing Federation of
                          India (NAFAED).
      31.05.2024      •   Tried to place the onus       Exempted, but the
                          on the Ethics Committee       request regarding the
                          by stating: “I do not know    relevant documents
                          what is the hurry, haste      was denied on
                          and impatience that the       the grounds of
                          Committee has again fixed     confidentiality;
                          the date 31.05.2025 to        however, Petitioner
                          present the opinion”.         was permitted to
                                                        peruse the same
                      •   He demanded information
                                                        on the next date
                          regarding the charges
                                                        of proceeding, i.e.
                          against him and the
                                                        06.06.2024.
                          necessary evidence
                          corroborating such
                          allegations.
      06.06.2024      •   Sought exemption on the       One last opportunity
                          grounds of his father’s       was given to the
                          illness.                      Petitioner to present
                                                        his side, and the
                                                        Ethics Committee
                                                        resolved to take
                                                        action in case the
                                                        Petitioner did not turn
                                                        up for proceedings
                                                        scheduled on
                                                        12.06.2024.
2138                                                     [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                       Supreme Court Reports


    2.7.   The Petitioner eventually appeared before the Ethics Committee
           for the first time on 12.06.2024, when a copy of the charges
           was duly supplied to him. The Petitioner instead of addressing
           the Ethics Committee on those charges, started questioning
           its very authority and legitimacy. Having chosen to continue
           his pattern of defiance, the Petitioner communicated to the
           Ethics Committee that it was not competent to question him,
           given his position as the Opposition’s Chief Whip. Following
           a heated discussion between them, the Ethics Committee
           concluded the proceedings without the Petitioner having
           addressed any of the charges levelled against him. The next
           date of the proceedings was then fixed on 19.06.2024.
    2.8.   The Ethics Committee, in somewhat of an unusual manner,
           preponed the proceedings from 19.06.2024 to 14.06.2024
           without any notice to the Petitioner. The Ethics Committee
           then discussed the behaviour of the Petitioner during the
           previous proceedings and concluded that his conduct was
           wholly unjustified. The Ethics Committee further mooted the
           demeanour of both the MLCs, i.e. the Petitioner and Md.
           Sohaib and closed the proceedings.
    2.9.   The Ethics Committee thereafter submitted the Impugned
           Report, recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner from
           membership of the BLC. As regards to Md. Sohaib, the Ethics
           Committee recommended his suspension for two days in the
           upcoming Session.
    2.10. The Ethics Committee’s report, along with its recommendations
          for taking punitive measures against the Petitioner as well
          as Md. Sohaib was presented and discussed on 26.07.2024
          in the House. After due deliberations, the majority of the
          House accepted the recommendations and consequently,
          the Petitioner was expelled from his membership of the BLC
          forthwith. Md. Sohaib, on the other hand, was suspended for
          the first two days of the 208th Session of the House.
    2.11. As a sequel thereto, the Secretariat of BLC issued the
          Impugned Notification dated 26.07.2024, relieving the Petitioner
          from membership of the BLC and notifying the resultant
          vacancy caused by such expulsion. The aforesaid measures
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             2139

                          Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
          Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

             have prompted the Petitioner to approach this Court through
             these writ proceedings.
     2.12. We may hasten to add that during the pendency of this petition,
           Respondent No. 6, Election Commission of India (Election
           Commission), issued a Press Note dated 30.12.2024
           declaring the bye-election for the seat held by the Petitioner
           before his expulsion. The election process was resolved to
           be completed before 25.01.2025. Considering the impact of
           the notified election on the outcome of this petition, vide order
           dated 15.01.2025 the declaration of the result of such bye-
           election was stayed.

     B.     Contentions on behalf of the Petitioner
3.   Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, learned
     Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the Petitioner vehemently
     contended that the Impugned Report and the consequential
     Notification are illegal and unconstitutional. They argued that the
     actions against the Petitioner were actuated by mala fide and suffered
     from gross illegalities, both in procedure and substance.
4.   Dr. Singhvi and Mr. Sankarnarayanan canvassed the following
     grounds in support of their submissions:
     a)     The expulsion of the Petitioner from the membership of BLC
            was violative of the principles of natural justice, fair and just play,
            as the relevant material, including the video clip containing his
            transgressions were not furnished to him. The Petitioner was
            denied access to the material evidence on the pretext that the
            proceedings of the House are confidential and could only be
            perused by him during the meetings of the Ethics Committee.
            The Petitioner was thus caused inexorable prejudice in the
            matter of preparing his defence.
     b)     The Ethics Committee explicitly assured the Petitioner on
            12.06.2024 that charges would be framed only after receiving
            all the relevant material, for which the next date of proceeding
            was fixed on 19.06.2024. The Ethics Committee, however
            unilaterally and deliberately advanced the date of hearing to
            14.06.2024 without his knowledge. The Petitioner has thus been
            condemned unheard, and in a manner which reeks of malice
            and amounts to gross illegality.
2140                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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     c)   Not only this, the Ethics Committee’s report dated 14.06.2024
          was circulated selectively with the members belonging to the
          Ruling Party, and was kept confidential from the members
          belonging to the Opposition Parties. Such members being in
          the minority could not effectively participate in the proceedings.
     d)   In any event, the Petitioner has been hammered with severe
          punishment, disproportionate to the attributed misconduct and
          also in comparison to another MLC Md. Sohaib, who, despite
          facing somewhat similar allegations, was awarded suspension
          of two days from the upcoming Session.
     e)   It is settled law that a ‘graded’ approach is required where
          the House is disciplining its members. Deviation from such
          an approach in the case of the Petitioner is not based on any
          sufficient material, and the disproportionate punishment imposed
          on him falls foul of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles
          14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

     C.   Contentions on behalf of Respondents
5.   Contrarily, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing
     Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, strongly opposed the instant Writ Petition
     urging that the Impugned Report and Notification expelling the
     Petitioner from the BLC are based on concrete evidence. He submitted
     that the action against the Petitioner was taken following due process
     of law, which has been approved by the majority of the House and
     thus warrants no interference.
6.   In this vein, while opposing the Writ Petition, Mr. Kumar advanced
     the following submissions:
     a)   At the outset, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. It is liable
          to be dismissed in terms of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution
          of India, which states that ‘the validity of any proceedings in
          the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the
          ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure’.
     b)   It is the prerogative of the House to regulate its Business and
          Procedure, and the decision so taken cannot be tested on the
          bedrock of proportionality. The issue of proportionality should
          be left to the wisdom of the House. In other words, the Court
          cannot examine the quantum of punishment imposed upon the
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        2141

                          Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
          Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

            Petitioner, as such a recourse would amount to reviewing the
            validity of the proceedings of the House.
     c)     The Ethics Committee adhered to the principles of audi alteram
            partem as the Petitioner was given reasonable opportunity
            of being heard. Such a plea is fortified by the fact that the
            Ethics Committee asked the Petitioner to join its proceedings
            on 03.05.2024, 22.05.2024, 31.05.2024, 06.06.2024 and
            12.06.2024. In fact, it is the Petitioner who deliberately and for
            reasons best known to him, failed to avail such opportunity.
            He kept on either avoiding the proceedings or threatening the
            Ethics Committee with one or the other objection until 12.06.2024
            when he entered appearance for the first time.
     d)     The Petitioner was duly served with the list of charges as soon as
            he appeared on 12.06.2024. He, however instead of addressing
            the charges, questioned the very legality and the authority of
            the Ethics Committee itself. The Petitioner, being a member of
            the House, is deemed to have knowledge of the formation of
            the Ethics Committee under Article 208 of the Constitution and
            the manner in which its proceedings are conducted.
     e)     The Petitioner cannot raise the plea of proportionality and seek
            parity with the other MLC, Md. Sohaib for the reason that the
            latter duly appeared before the Ethics Committee and cooperated
            in the proceedings. On the other hand, the Petitioner remained
            defiant and disregarded the prescribed procedure. Being the
            Chief Whip of the Opposition, he held a greater responsibility
            towards the policies, rules and constitutional authority of the
            House.
     f)     The Petitioner has a habit of degrading the authority of the
            House through his indecent and unparliamentary acts for which
            he was earlier also suspended from the House on 28.03.2022
            in the 200th Session of the BLC.
7.   Mr. Ankit Agarwal, counsel for Respondent No. 6—the Election
     Commission, submitted that in view of Section 151A of the
     Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), the Commission was
     duty-bound to notify the elections as soon as the vacancy occurred.
     He further submitted that the Election Commission had nothing to
     add on the merits of the case.
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8.   Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel, entered appearance
     for the Intervener, Shri Lalan Prasad, who is the aspirant for election
     to the MLC seat declared vacant upon the expulsion of the Petitioner.
     She also asserted that the bye-election declared by the Election
     Commission for the vacant seat aligned with Section 151A of the
     RP Act. According to her Section 151A of the RP Act is triggered the
     moment a ‘legal vacancy’ occurs, mandating the immediate election
     to fill up the same.

     D.     Issues for Consideration
9.   Having traversed the sequence of events as they emanated, the
     contentions put forth on behalf of the parties as well as the material
     on record, we are of the considered view that the following vital
     issues require analysis:
     i.     Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view of Article
            212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings
            of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial review?
     ii.    Can this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction review the
            proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House?
     iii.   If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate
            to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any
            interference?
     iv.    If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this
            Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment
            that may be imposed on the Petitioner?

     E.     Analysis

     E.1. Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view
     of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the
     proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial
     review?
10. The Respondents have raised an objection against the very
    maintainability of the Writ Petition in view of Article 212(1) of the
    Constitution of India. Since this argument strikes at the core of the
    instant matter, we find it imperative to address this contention at
    the very outset. Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India bars any
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                     2143

                        Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
        Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

     enquiry regarding any proceeding in the Legislature on the grounds
     of alleged irregularity of procedure.
11. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we find ourselves unable
    to concur with the contentions asseverated by the Respondents that
    the decision of the Ethics Committee is shielded by the immunity
    proffered under Article 212(1). We say so because it is no longer
    res integra that there is no absolute bar on calling into question the
    decisions taken by the Legislature. The protection under Article 212(1)
    operates only with respect to the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’
    on the grounds of ‘Procedural Irregularities’. It could not have been
    the intent of the lawmakers to circumscribe Constitutional Courts
    unconditionally from scrutinising the validity of the actions of the
    Legislature, which may encroach upon the Fundamental Rights of
    the members and/or citizens.
12. To simplify the understanding of the embargo postulated under
    Article 212(1), we deem it appropriate to distinguish the terms—
    ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ and ‘Legislative Decision’. These
    terms represent distinct concepts, each serving a different function
    in the law-making process.
13. To further explicate, the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ comprise
    the formal steps, debates, and motions undertaken to facilitate
    deliberations within the House. It is a structured mechanism that
    ensures due consideration of a proposed measure, allowing for
    discussion, amendment, and scrutiny before reaching a final
    resolution. These procedural steps are not ends in themselves but
    are designed to channel legislative discourse towards a definitive
    outcome. Article 212(1) of the Constitution provides immunity for the
    manner of such proceedings, and hence, Constitutional Courts would
    exercise restraint when such proceedings are called into question
    on the grounds of procedural irregularity.
14. A ‘Legislative Decision’, on the other hand, is the culmination of the
    legislative procedure—the formal expression of the will of the House
    on a given matter. While Proceedings of the Legislature provide the
    framework within which members exercise their deliberative functions,
    the Legislative Decision is the authoritative determination that
    follows such deliberation. These decisions of the Legislature, though
    emanating from a coordinate branch of Government, are not immune
    from scrutiny by Constitutional Courts. Judicial review of Legislative
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     Decisions is not an encroachment upon legislative dominion but a
     necessary safeguard to uphold constitutional supremacy.
15. In this regard, we deem it apposite to underscore the applicability of
    the principle of ‘expression unius est exclusion alterius’, namely, that
    whatever has not been included has, by implication, been excluded.
    Applying the aforesaid principle, we have no doubt in concluding
    that the prohibition under Article 212(1) operates only with respect
    to the scrutiny of ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ on the touchstone
    of ‘Irregularity of Procedure’. It does not oust the power of judicial
    review of the decisions of the Legislature, whether Legislative or
    Administrative, on the grounds of illegality or unconstitutionality.
16. Constitutional courts are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring
    the lawfulness of the decisions of the Legislature rather than
    substituting their judgment to decide the rights of the parties. A
    decision-making authority, be it the Legislature or otherwise, while
    exercising its powers, must act within the limits prescribed by the
    Constitution. Any determination by the authority concerned, if found to
    be in excess of its constitutional authority or violative of Fundamental
    Rights, is subject to judicial probe. Such overarching decisions cannot
    be sustained to preserve integrity in the legal system by preventing
    excess and abuse of power.
17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, the Impugned Report
    recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the
    Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions.
    These functions have been assigned in the Rules framed by the
    State Legislature under Article 208 of the Constitution. The Rules so
    enacted govern the internal functioning, discipline of the House and
    the procedure by which the House regulates its affairs. However, such
    administrative actions, even though referable to the Rules formulated
    under Article 208 of the Constitution, do not constitute the legislative
    functions of the House. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
    the legislative functions pertain to law-making, deliberation, and policy
    formulation, whereas the present action of the Ethics Committee is
    purely administrative in nature, aimed at enforcing discipline and
    ethical standards amongst the members of the House.
18. The distinction between legislative and administrative functions is
    well recognized in constitutional jurisprudence. When a legislative
    body frames rules under Article 208 and subsequently enforces them
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                             2145

                          Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
          Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

     through disciplinary measures, such enforcement is an exercise of
     administrative power rather than legislative power.
19. It is well established that administrative actions, even when
    undertaken by legislative bodies or their committees, are subject to
    judicial review where they affect the rights and interests of individuals.
    In fact, this Court in Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. The Maharashtra
    Legislative Assembly and Anr.1 has held that the substantive
    disciplinary or rationality of the self-security measure inflicted upon
    the erring member is open to judicial review on the touch stone of
    being unconstitutional, grossly illegal, irrational or arbitrary.
20. There can thus be no doubt that if such an administrative decision is
    found to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of constitutional rights,
    it is open to judicial intervention in the same manner as any other
    executive action of the State. Determining whether an impugned
    action or breach is an exempted irregularity or justiciable illegality is
    a matter of judicial interpretation and would undoubtedly fall within
    the ambit of Constitutional Courts.
21. We also clarify here that the scrutiny in the instant Writ Petition
    pertains to the recommendation of the Ethics Committee subsequently
    ratified by the majority of the House. This Court is not concerned
    with the procedure adopted either by the Ethics Committee or the
    House while making or acting on such recommendation. In this
    context, the present action resulting in civil consequences for the
    Petitioner, cannot be immune from judicial review under the pretext
    of legislative privilege.
22. We cannot be ignorant that the grounds raised before us traverse
    beyond mere procedural irregularity and challenge the Petitioner’s
    expulsion on the footing of proportionality. Needless to say, the
    imposed punishment has a significant impact on the Petitioner’s
    Fundamental Rights and a chilling effect on the representative
    democratic framework of our society, issues that we have dealt with
    in greater detail, in the later parts of this judgement.
23. Consequently, on an overall consideration of legal position, we are of
    the view that the Respondent’s argument qua maintainability of the
    Writ Petition must fail. We hold that the action of the Ethics Committee


1   Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr. (2022) 12 SCC 273.
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     neither forms part of the ‘Proceedings of the Legislature’ nor is it
     tantamount to a ‘Legislative Decision’. Accordingly, entertaining the
     instant petition would not fall foul of the restrictions imposed by Article
     212 (1) of the Constitution.

     E.2. Can the Courts examine the proportionality of punishment
     imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of the action
     taken by the House?
24. Having held that the instant Writ Petition is maintainable, it would
    now be apposite to address the preliminary question of plausibility
    of judicial interference in the issue concerning the proportion of
    punishment, when examining the validity of the action taken by the
    House. We will undertake the analysis of this issue through a two-
    pronged approach: (i) the relevance and nature of the ‘doctrine of
    proportionality’; and (ii) the role of Constitutional Courts in reviewing
    a decision taken by the House.

     E.2.1. The Doctrine of Proportionality: A dynamic precept
25. The expression ‘proportion’ is derived from the Latin term proportio,
    which corresponds to comparative size, number or degree. The
    ‘doctrine of proportionality’ essentially signifies that any action should
    be steeped in reason or logic. This concept highlights the need
    for clear justification in decision-making, asserting that decisions
    made without sufficient objective reasoning are often at odds with
    intended goals. In order to holistically understand the ‘doctrine of
    proportionality’ and the manner in which it is applied, it is, therefore,
    imperative to examine its disposition in: (i) the domestic sphere; and
    (ii) in international jurisprudence.

     E.2.1.1 The Domestic Sphere
26. The doctrine of proportionality in Indian jurisprudence is guided by
    the principle of selecting the most appropriate and least restrictive
    measures to achieve the intended objective. The courts’ role is
    limited to ensuring a proper balance between the adverse effects of
    an action or penalty on an individual’s rights, liberties, or interests
    and the purpose it seeks to serve. In summary, while there may be
    a range of discretionary choices, it is within the courts’ purview to
    assess whether the chosen measure excessively infringes upon rights.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                      2147

                           Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
           Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

27. The test of proportionality, in this context, is satisfied by considering a
    myriad of factors such as fairness, justice, absence of vindictiveness,
    predominance of objectivity, adherence to natural justice, fair play, and
    the recognition of mitigating circumstances etc. These factors, while
    not exhaustive, are instrumental in maintaining the delicate balance
    between imposing consequences for wrongful actions and ensuring
    that such measures do not result in right-based transgressions.
28. In the Indian legal spectrum, the notion of proportionality finds its
    place in a multitude of legal issues. To instantiate:

     (i)     Service and Labour Laws
29. This Court has time and again highlighted the importance of
    proportionality when dealing with the question of punishment or
    disciplinary action for misconduct at the workplace, whether it be in
    public service or private organisations. The nature of the misconduct,
    the circumstances of the occurrence, the history and effect of the
    incident are all factors which ought to be taken into consideration.
30. For example, in Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corpn.
    Ltd.2, a public servant was penalised with dismissal from service
    for the offense of misplacing and losing an official file. This Court,
    in appeal, considered the facts that the employee was serving the
    Corporation for twenty years with a previously unblemished record,
    the misconduct was not deliberate or motivated, and the file was
    not shown to be of grave importance or sensitivity, reduced the
    punishment to withholding of increment of the employee. On the other
    hand, in a case involving a delinquent employee who did not join duty
    upon transfer, the Court considered his extended absence of over
    233 days and his refusal to visit the appointed doctor to substantiate
    his claim for medical absence, and concluded that the punishment
    of removal from service was proportionate to the misdemeanour.3
31. Thus, service laws in India are riddled with such like precedents,
    mandating employers, including the Government, to take all
    circumstances into account and undertake proportionate action
    against such offences.



2   Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 9.
3   LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani (2006) 13 SCC 613.
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     (ii)    Administrative Law
32. In similar parlance to service law, administrative law also places great
    importance on approaching decision-making with proportionality.
    For instance, blacklisting from Government tender auctions, which
    is a harsh punishment is considered proportionate in dire cases,
    such as where the contractor has embezzled funds in collusion with
    Government employees.4 However, this Court has also protected
    contract awardees from withdrawal of the contract on mere hyper-
    technical grounds.5
33. Even beyond government auction, proportionality ought to go to
    the root of decision making by the Government. The litmus test
    that needs to be administered is whether the harshest or strongest
    measure is necessarily required to be implemented in a given case.
    In a situation where a lessee was in default of lease premium, rent,
    and interest due to underdeveloped surroundings, this Court held that
    the harsh step of resumption of the land as well as forfeiture of the
    already paid sum would be too harsh, when recovery proceedings
    are available.6 On the other hand, this Court has also upheld the
    stronger step taken by the Railway Recruitment Board for re-test of
    limited candidates, when there was evidence of paper leaking and
    mass-cheating.7

     (iii) Constitutional Law
34. Constitutional law is perhaps the area of law where the term
    proportionality is used most commonly. This is so because the
    proportionality test, initially identified in Modern Dental College &
    Research Centre v. State of M.P.,8 is widely used to consider the
    vires of legislative as well as executive actions.
35. The test of proportionality, thus, applies to cases where action is
    brought to protect the right guaranteed by the Constitution or other



4   Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC
    731.
5   Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. &
    Anr. v. Shishir Realty (P) Ltd. & Ors. (2022) 16 SCC 527.
6   Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130.
7   Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board & Anr. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 614.
8   Modern Dental College & Research Centre & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                                  2149

                           Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
           Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

      laws. It largely seeks to identify whether the restriction sought to be
      placed on the right is proportionate to the objective sought to be
      achieved by the restriction. It often belies a comparison between
      the importance of the public purpose of the restriction on one hand
      and the public right on the other hand.
36. This comparison has played out distinctly in different circumstances.
    When dealing with the laws empowering the Executive to restrict
    internet in areas with underlying disturbances (like the Union Territories
    of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir), this Court has compared the
    importance of the right to speech and expression against that of
    national security concerns.9 On the other hand, when considering
    the arguments in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union
    of India10, a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
    compare the importance of the right to financial privacy and the right
    to political transparency, which also led to the evolution of what is
    called the ‘double proportionality standard’.
37. Perhaps the clearest application of proportionality principles on the
    touchstone of constitutional law has been in the case of Internet &
    Mobile Assn. of India v. RBI11. Here, this Court delved into various
    circumstances surrounding the use, merits, and demerits of virtual
    currencies, taking a view on the impact of its proliferation as well as
    curtailment on the economy, individual investors, and its exchanges,
    thus coming to the conclusion that the relevant RBI circulars had
    a disproportionate impact on the market vis-à-vis the RBI’s aim to
    regulate virtual currencies.

      (iv) Criminal Law
38. In criminal law, of course, the dispensation of justice strives to be ever
    more precise and perfect; this is doubtless because of the ramifications
    of a verdict in such trials, which militate against physical liberty and
    autonomy—an autonomy that is most dear to modern society. Even
    here, it is most noticeable that the principle of proportionality has
    been widely accepted and promulgated as the vital safeguard against
    prejudice, excessiveness, and unreasonableness.


9    Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 637.
10   Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 150.
11   Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274.
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39. We have consistently observed in cases of sentencing the
    considerations of proportionality taking centre stage, such as in
    Shivu v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka,12 which
    held as follows:
              “The principle of proportion between crime and
              punishment is a principle of just desert that serves
              as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is
              justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice it is hardly
              less familiar or less important than the principle that only
              the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed, the requirement
              that punishment not be disproportionately great, which is
              a corollary of just desert, is dictated by the same principle
              that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any
              punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal
              conduct is punishment without guilt.”
              …..
              Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
              respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions,
              it remains a strong influence in the determination
              of sentences. Anything less than a penalty of greatest
              severity for any serious crime is thought to be a measure of
              toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact quite
              apart from those considerations that make punishment
              unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime,
              uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very
              undesirable practical consequences.”
                                                                    [Emphasis Supplied]

40. In fact, this Court has consistently acknowledged that the degree of
    punishment should be commensurate to the gravity of the offence,
    such that it is consistent with the principle of proportionality. For
    illustration, nowhere in criminal law is the discourse on proportionality
    vaster than in cases of death penalty, where the mitigating and
    aggravating circumstances of the perpetrator are weighed in tandem




12   Shivu & Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 713.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                                  2151

                            Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
            Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

      and scrupulously studied.13 Thus, a sort of ‘balance sheet’ is drawn up
      which aids in undertaking the exercise of satisfying proportionality.14
      What emerges, therefore, is that the application of proportionality is
      not severable from the outcomes of that exercise.
41. We may also hasten to note the use of this principle in bail matters,
    where the Court seeks to restrict its own discretion by levying
    proportionality. In a catena of decisions,15 this Court has repeatedly
    cautioned against excessively stringent or disproportionate bail
    conditions as a side-effect of granting this important relief.

      (v)     Interpretation of Statutes
42. In our considered opinion, the principle of proportionality also
    finds purchase in something as fundamental as the interpretation
    of statutes, which, in turn, colours all the spheres of law we have
    previously laid out. Statutory interpretation is that unique tool a
    jurist possesses to give meaningful voice to the law enacted by
    the Legislature, and it has been our jurisprudence to always read
    proportionality into the laws we seek to interpret.
43. Indeed, many landmark judgments of this Court, which have
    interpreted key provisions of our legal code often operate with an
    in-built proclivity towards simulating proportionality. Take, for instance,
    the ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,16 wherein this Court
    held against excessive restrictions on liberty, especially those which
    are disproportionate to the State’s purported objectives. Thus, one
    might legitimately argue the Indian experience with ‘due process’
    began with the reading of proportionality into our grund norm, i.e.
    the Indian Constitution.
44. Interpreting statutory provisions involves understanding and giving
    effect to the Legislature’s intent, so as to avoid absurd or unjust
    outcomes—an idea that aligns with ensuring that the means
    adopted by a statute are commensurate with its ends. In essence,



13   Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 24.
14   Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 76.
15   Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors., 2024 INSC 479; Munish Bhasin and Ors v. State (Govt.
     of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2009) 4 SCC 45; Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. 2022
     SCC OnLine SC 897; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2020) 10 SCC 77.
16   Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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      an interpretation should not lead to outcomes that unduly burden
      individuals or contradict the broader objectives of justice and fairness.
      This concern reflects a proportional mind set: that the impact of
      a statute should be weighed against its intended purpose, much
      as Indian courts have done in cases like Maneka Gandhi (supra)
      and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. 17 These cases clearly
      demonstrate the wide prevalence of the principle of proportionality
      in the application and implementation of law.
45. The doctrine of proportionality is also firmly entrenched in our
    Legislative Policy. Some notable examples include: (a) the authority
    vested in Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial
    Disputes Act, 1947 to modify the quantum of punishment imposed
    on a workman; (b) the prescription of minimum and maximum
    sentences in Penal Laws, such as the Indian Penal Code, which
    is now succeeded by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (c) the
    Statutory Rules and Bye-laws etc. regulating the service conditions
    of government employees as also those working in entities deriving
    their status from Article 12 of the Constitution. These legal provisions
    meticulously calibrate the imbibing of proportionality principles by
    the Indian Legislature. Thus, while a minor infraction may warrant
    a ‘censure’, serious offences such as the misappropriation of public
    funds may justifiably result in ‘dismissal’ from service.

      E.2.1.2 International Jurisprudence
46. Beyond the spectrum of domestic laws, we find that the doctrine of
    proportionality is also widely applied in foreign jurisdictions, following
    a similar rationale to that employed by Indian courts. Some instances
    include:

      (i)     Germany
47. In similar parlance to that of Indian constitutional jurisprudence,
    the doctrine of proportionality in German law is applied to every
    case of a state act constituting an ‘eingriff’ or encroachment, into a
    constitutional freedom or property right.18 To satisfy the proportionality



17   Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273.
18   BVerfGE 16, 194 (at 201, 202).
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                                        2153

                              Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
              Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

       requirement, the act of state under scrutiny must be:19 (a) appropriate
       to promote its objective; (b) necessary to promote that objective; and
       (c) Adequate (balancing operation), i.e. the prejudice to the freedom
       or property right in question must not be inadequate in comparison
       with the weight of the interests supposed to justify the intervention.
48. To further demystify these factors, the suitability test (a) is fulfilled
    by demonstrating that the act in question be apt to promote the
    objective against which it is measured.20 The necessity requirement
    (b) mandates that, among several equally effective means to achieve
    the objective, the least restrictive one must be chosen. An act of
    the state is deemed unnecessary if its objective can be achieved
    through a less intrusive method.21 The adequacy test (c) assesses
    whether the benefit gained by restricting the right justifies the extent
    of the intrusion, ensuring that the objective’s value outweighs the
    resulting loss.

       (ii)     European Union
49. In this instance, the principle of proportionality is laid down in Article
    5(4) of the Treaty on the European Union (EU). It seeks to set
    actions taken by EU institutions within specified bounds. In EU law
    a proportionality test is applied both to EU acts and to acts of the
    Member States.22
50. Under this principle, EU when reviewing an act or a measure, analyses
    whether the same is:23 (a) an appropriate or suitable measure; (b) in
    pursuit of a legitimate objective; (c) among the appropriate measures
    constitutes the least restrictive means (LRM); and (d) not manifestly
    disproportionate in terms of a cost versus benefits balance.
51. It is pertinent to mention that not all of these steps are applied in
    every case. Albeit, the LRM test and the manifestly disproportionate


19   Cf. G. LübbeWolff, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal Constitutional
     Court, Human Rights Law Journal 2014, vol. 34, pg. 12.
20   BVerfGE 104, 337 (at 345).
21   BVerfGE 121, 317 (at 344).
22   Sauter W. Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
     2013;15:439-466.
23   Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health
     ex parte Fedesa et al [1990] ECR I-4023 [13]; Principle of Proportionality, European Union, available here:
     https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
     EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of-proportionality.html&ved=2ahUKEwjR9aun6NSLAxXhzDgGHTA
     sHtcQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw14i3cuEILjPFx1jQZjNOuR.
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      standard are often used as alternatives rather than in conjunction.
      Even when proportionality in the strict sense is applied, an explicit
      balancing of costs and benefits is uncommon. Instead, the manifestly
      disproportionate test serves as a rough measure of justice, as its
      terminology suggests.24 It is designed to allow a relatively wide margin
      of discretion to the authorities whose measures are under review.

      (iii) United States of America
52. American jurisprudence though it has made limited use of the term
    ‘proportionality’, notions akin to proportionality including balancing of
    constitutional values,25 often appear in the US system of substantive
    doctrinal standards of constitutional judicial review.26 Consequently,
    the US Courts have retained its two standards of strict scrutiny and
    rational basis scrutiny, when adjudicating challenges to State or
    Federal Legislation.
53. For the purposes of the present discussion, we will limit our analysis
    to the strict scrutiny test, which posits that a government action
    must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.27
    This method of constitutional analysis employs several inquiries
    that are also present in a traditional proportionality review. First, the
    Court must determine whether the Government action infringes on
    a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.28 If it
    does, the Court must invalidate the government action unless it is
    necessary for the attainment of a compelling Government interest.29
    The Government interest involved must be sufficiently important to
    justify a suspect classification or Government invasion of individual
    autonomy.30 The result is that the Government action is invalidated
    if the Court is able to find a less restrictive, yet equally effective,
    alternative to the proposed method.
54. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of proportionality is
    fundamentally embedded in the concept of fairness in action


24   Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd et al v Secretary of State for Health
     et al ECR I-10423 [80]–[84].
25   Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 61 (1992).
26   Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 529–31 (Aspen Pub. 2001).
27   Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–504 (1965).
28   Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
29   Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.
30   Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                       2155

                           Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
           Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

      across domestic, foreign, and international legal systems. This
      principle ensures that measures taken are appropriate, necessary,
      and balanced in relation to the objectives they seek to achieve.
      Proportionality is deeply intertwined with the principles of the Rule of
      Law and natural justice, as it guards against arbitrary or excessive
      actions. Consequently, it is interpreted as an implicit requirement
      in almost every legal provision, unless it is explicitly barred by the
      legislation itself.
55. In the specific context of the instant appeal, what must therefore be
    borne in mind is that when contemplating the decision of expulsion
    of a Legal or Public Representative such as the Petitioner, inflicting
    punishment beyond the necessary period may suffer from the vice of
    being irrational and arbitrariness. Such action then becomes prone
    to challenge on the grounds of being illegal and unconstitutional.

      E.2.2. Scrutinising the ‘Action’ of the House – The role of
      Constitutional Courts
56. In the aforesaid context, Constitutional Courts assume a crucial role
    in ensuring that the actions imposing punishments on members are
    proportionate and just. This is achieved through a structured approach
    that balances legislative authority with judicial oversight. This Court, in
    a recent decision in Ashish Shelar (supra), has eruditely held that:
              “The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern
              the action of dismembering a member from the House
              of the legislative assembly in the form of expulsion or
              be it a case of suspension by directing withdrawal from the
              meeting of the Assembly for the remainder of the Session”.
                                                                 [Emphasis supplied]

57. Insofar as the specific punishment of expulsion is concerned, this
    Court, in Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha,31
    recognised the power of the Legislature to expel a member. However,
    it laced the existence of such power with a word of caution. It was held
    that the “expulsion of a member is a grave measure and normally, it
    should not be taken”. Needless to say, the expulsion of a member



31   Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha & Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 184.
2156                                                        [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     from the House constitutes a higher degree of deprivation and must
     only be sustained in exceptional circumstances.
58. There is no gainsaid that imposing a disproportionate punishment
    not only undermines democratic values by depriving the member
    from participating in the proceedings of the House but also affects
    the electorates of the constituency who remain unrepresented. It is
    accurately stated that in our representative democracy, the main
    function of a legislator is to act as a reflection of the people’s will.
    That is to say, instead of being a free agent to follow their conviction,
    the legislator is an agent of the electorates and thus obligated to
    reflect the opinions and values of the people they represent.
59. The removal of a member from the House therefore is a significant
    issue for both the member and the constituency they represent.
    The democratic process relies on the active participation of all
    members, and even brief absences can impede a member’s ability
    to contribute to critical legislative discussions and decisions. This
    underscores the importance of their presence in all parliamentary
    activities, as their absence can have far-reaching implications on the
    legislative outcomes and the representation of their constituency’s
    interests. We clarify that while representation of the constituency is
    not the sole factor in determining the punishment to be imposed on
    a member, it nonetheless remains an important aspect that merits
    due consideration.
60. As stated, the absence of a duly elected representative disrupts
    the democratic process and undermines the voice of the electorate.
    In such a situation, if the punishment inflicted upon the member
    concerned appears to be prima facie harsh and disproportionate,
    Constitutional Courts owe a duty to undo such gross injustice and
    review the proportionality of such disqualifications or expulsions.
61. It is pertinent to add that the aforementioned responsibility involves
    a delicate balance where courts must act decisively to strike down
    excessively harsh actions that threaten our democratic fabric while
    simultaneously exercising restraint to avoid encroaching upon the
    legislative domain. We reiterate that courts must reflect a certain
    degree of deference to the legislative will and wisdom, intervening
    only when the action prescribed is so disproportionate that it shocks
    the intrinsic sense of justice.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        2157

                           Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
           Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

62. Given the foregoing discussion, we hold that there is no absolute
    bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of
    the punishment imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of
    the action taken by the House. By focusing on the proportionality of
    punishment, courts must ensure that justice aligns with constitutional
    values and societal norms, thereby upholding the integrity of the
    democratic process.
63. At this point, it must be added that the determination of what
    constitutes a disproportionate measure is inherently complex and
    context-dependent. Such assessment requires a nuanced scrutiny
    of the specific circumstances surrounding each case. This means
    that a one-size-fits-all definition is impractical while adjudicating
    proportionality and the courts must exercise their discretion in a
    prudent and judicious manner.
64. We deem it appropriate to outline a few guiding principles for courts
    to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of actions taken by
    the House against its member(s). We clarify that these parameters
    are not exhaustive, as considerations will inevitably vary from case
    to case. An indicative list of such parameters includes:
     (a)     Degree of obstruction caused by the member in the proceedings
             of the House;
     (b)     Whether the behaviour of the member has brought disrepute
             to the dignity of the entire House;
     (c)     The previous conduct of the erring member;
     (d)     The subsequent conduct of the erring member, such as
             expressing remorse, cooperation with the institutional scrutiny
             mechanism;
     (e)     Availability of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the
             delinquent member;
     (f)     Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and motivated
             or a mere outcome of language largely influenced by the local
             dialect;
     (g)     Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the
             desired purpose; and
     (h)     Balancing the interest of society, particularly the electorates,
             with those of the erring members.
2158                                                        [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


65. We are of the view that a scrutiny of the punishment given to the
    members by the House on the abovementioned framework will
    ensure that the legislative actions are justified, necessary, and
    balanced, protecting both the integrity of the legislative body and
    the rights of its members, as well as the larger societal objective.
    It is also imperative that such legislative action remains mindful of
    the fundamental principle that the purpose of imposing punishment
    is not to serve as a tool for retribution but rather to uphold and
    enforce discipline within the House. The primary objective should
    be to maintain decorum and foster an environment of constructive
    debate and deliberation. Any punitive measure must be proportionate
    and guided by considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and due
    process, ensuring that it does not unduly stifle democratic participation
    or undermine the representative nature of the institution.

     E.3. Was the Petitioner’s expulsion proportionate to the offence
     alleged against him, and whether it merits any interference?
66. Since we have reiterated the power which vests in this Court to
    scrutinise the proportionality of punishment imposed on a member
    while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House, we
    may now proceed to examine whether the punishment imposed on
    the Petitioner was proportionate or it merits any interference.
67. It needs no emphasis that there is no place for aggression and
    indecency in the proceedings of the Parliament or the Legislature.
    Members are expected to show complete respect and deference
    towards each other. This expectation is not merely a matter of tradition
    or formality; it is essential for the effective functioning of democratic
    processes. It ensures that debates and discussions are productive,
    focused on the issues at hand, and conducted in a manner that
    upholds the dignity of the institution. The right to speak inside the
    House cannot be harnessed as a tool to insult, humiliate or defame
    a fellow member, Ministers and most importantly, the Chair itself.
68. Based on the material placed on record, it is evident that the
    demeanour of the Petitioner in the House was abhorrent and
    unbecoming of a member of the Legislature. We are constrained
    to add that the Petitioner’s subsequent evasive and high-handed
    demeanour before the Ethics Committee was even more egregious.
    We have no hesitation in observing that the Petitioner actively
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        2159

                        Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
        Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

     attempted to delay and obfuscate the proceedings by refusing to
     cooperate with the Ethics Committee. We have already elaborated
     on how the Petitioner sought exemption from appearing before the
     Ethics Committee on some pretext or another. Such behaviour was
     nothing but a brazen attempt to circumvent the authority of the
     Ethics Committee.
69. Even when the Petitioner finally appeared before the Ethics
    Committee, instead of answering the charges against him, he deemed
    it appropriate to question the authenticity and legitimacy of the Ethics
    Committee itself. The Petitioner, who has served as his party’s Chief
    Whip in the BLC, cannot possibly claim that he was unaware of the
    provisions under which the Ethics Committee was constituted and
    conducted its proceedings. The haughtiness demonstrated by the
    Petitioner before the Ethics Committee is, no doubt, highly undignified
    of a Public Representative.
70. At this stage, it is essential to mention that the Petitioner cannot draw
    any parity with the other delinquent member, Md. Sohaib, who duly
    cooperated with the Ethics Committee and expressed remorse for
    his conduct. The behavioural pattern of the Petitioner, on the other
    hand, underscores a deliberate attempt to undermine the regulatory
    process and thwart the dispensation of justice. We are also mindful
    of the fact that the Petitioner has demonstrated similar misconduct
    previously as well, for which he was suspended from the House for
    a brief period.
71. Be that as it may, notwithstanding the conduct of the Petitioner as
    elaborated hereinabove, we are at the same time of the considered
    view that the House, as custodian of constitutional values and
    democratic principles, ought to exercise magnanimity and rise above
    petty criticism and unwarranted remarks against its members. In
    doing so, they would exemplify the virtues of tolerance, restraint,
    and institutional maturity, thereby reinforcing the dignity, impartiality,
    and respectability of their office.
72. While we do not discount the fundamental principle that an individual
    must bear the consequences of their actions, we are equally mindful
    that the ramifications of such a decision extend beyond the Petitioner
    alone. The actions prescribed against the Petitioner will inevitably
    have a direct and significant impact on a vast number of stakeholders,
    particularly the constituents who have reposed their faith in the
2160                                                                           [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                                 Supreme Court Reports


      Petitioner as their representative. Their voices, aspirations, and
      democratic rights cannot be disregarded, and it is in furtherance of
      these principles that the needs and interests of the electorate must
      take precedence in any decision that affects their representation in
      a democratic forum.
73. While dealing with individuals, such as the Petitioner, it is imperative
    that disciplinary measures are undertaken with due regard to the
    principles of proportionality and fairness. The House, in the exercise
    of its authority to regulate its own proceedings and maintain order,
    must not lose sight of the necessity for a calibrated and judicious
    approach.
74. In fact, this aspect is already prescribed in the Rules governing the
    procedure of the BLC. In this regard, our attention was drawn to Rule
    10, Chapter 36 of the Bihar Vidhan Parishad – Rules of Procedure
    and Conduct of Business, which provides for the penalties that the
    Ethics Committee may recommend. A perusal of the provision depicts
    that if the Committee finds a member violating the code/rules, it
    may recommend: (a) Censure, (b) Reprimand, (c) Suspension from
    the House for a specified period; and (d) any other punishment as
    deemed fit.
75. This Court, in a series of decisions, has consistently held that
    punishment disproportionate to the offence or action is in direct
    violation of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution
    of India, particularly Articles 14 and 21.32 The expulsion of the
    Petitioner from the House not only raises concerns about the
    violation of Fundamental Rights but also impacts the legal rights
    of his constituents. We find that the disproportionate nature of the
    punishment imposed by the House in expelling the Petitioner pricks
    the conscience of this Court compelling it to intervene on the sheet
    anchor of justice and fairness.
76. Given the applicable provisions and the underlying objective of
    imposing penalties on members of the House, we are of the view
    that the primary purpose of imposing penalties is to discipline the
    members and ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the


32   Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 611; Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya
     Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        2161

                           Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
           Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

      House. A more measured and balanced approach would have
      sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the dignity and
      decorum of the House.
77. We reiterate that the principle of proportionality is a cornerstone
    of our judicial system, and it mandates that the severity of the
    punishment must correspond to the gravity of the offence. Given the
    aforementioned analysis, we hold that the punishment meted out to
    the Petitioner was excessive and disproportionate to the nature of
    the offence he committed.

      E.4. If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this
      Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment
      that may be imposed on the Petitioner?
78. Having held that the punishment of expulsion imposed on the
    Petitioner is harsh and disproportionate, the only natural corollary
    would then be to consider the appropriate quantum of punishment
    that should be imposed on the Petitioner and whether this Court can
    undertake such determination.
79. In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the punishment
    imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the gravity
    of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute its own assessment
    of the appropriate penalty. Instead, the established judicial approach
    is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration.
80. This principle stems from the recognition that the authority imposing
    the punishment is best placed to evaluate the nature of the misconduct
    and determine an appropriate sanction within the framework of service
    rules and regulations. Judicial restraint in such matters ensures that
    courts do not usurp the role of administrative authorities by engaging
    in executive decision-making.
81. Having said that, it is equally important to underscore that this Court
    is not devoid of the power to intervene in exceptional circumstances.
    In order to curtail perpetuating illegality, abridge prolonged litigation,
    prevent unnecessary hardship to the parties involved and to do
    complete justice, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
    142 of the Constitution, is vested with the authority to substitute the
    punishment where the facts and circumstances so warrant.33


33   B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 749.
2162                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


82. We have already held that the expulsion of the Petitioner is
    disproportionate and undoubtedly infringes his Fundamental Rights
    guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
    expulsion also has a direct impact on a vast number of stakeholders,
    particularly the electorates he represents. We cannot be oblivious of
    the fact that the Petitioner has already undergone almost 7 months
    of expulsion. He has also missed the 208th Session of the BLC held
    between 25.11.2024 and 29.11.2024, and since his term is expiring
    in the year 2026, the Petitioner is left with a short duration.
83. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we are of the
    view that if this matter is now remanded to the Ethics Committee
    for reconsideration of the appropriate punishment, the ensuing
    process is likely to be protracted, which might deprive the Petitioner
    in participating in the ensuing Sessions.
84. In such situations, the constitutional mandate empowers this Court to
    transcend procedural limitations and provide equitable relief in cases
    where rigid adherence to legal provisions may result in injustice.
    When the established remedies fall short of addressing exceptional
    circumstances or fail to meet the demands of justice, this Court, as
    the final arbiter, must invoke its constitutional powers to bridge the
    gap and ensure a just, fair, and equitable resolution.
85. It is settled law that the extraordinary powers vested in this Court
    under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, may be invoked in
    cases where remitting the matter would result in undue delay and
    where the interests of justice demand a swift resolution. In view
    thereof, we are of the considered opinion that the exceptional situation
    before us warrants invocation of our powers under Article 142 of the
    Constitution to do complete justice between the parties.
86. Balancing the competing considerations, we hold that the period
    of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to
    be considered as a period of his suspension; and in our view,
    constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by
    him. Accordingly, the Impugned Report of the Ethics Committee and
    the subsequent Notification notifying the expulsion of the Petitioner
    deserves to be modified to that extent. As a segue thereto, the
    Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as member of the BLC with
    immediate effect.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                       2163

                          Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
          Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.

87. We may clarify that the indulgence extended by this Court in reducing
    the punishment imposed on the Petitioner should not be misconstrued
    as condonation of his conduct. This Court has exercised its discretion
    squarely in the interests of proportionality and fairness. Consequently,
    the Petitioner is expected to uphold the dignity of the House and
    adhere to the standards of discipline befitting its members. Henceforth,
    it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to conduct himself with decorum
    and responsibility in legislative proceedings. Any deviation from this
    expectation or recurrence of misconduct will not be viewed lightly,
    and the concerned authority shall be at liberty to take appropriate
    action in accordance with law.

     F.     Conclusion and Directions
88. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the totality of
    the facts and circumstances, we deem it appropriate to allow this
    Writ Petition in the following terms:
     a)     The objection raised by the Respondents against the
            maintainability of the instant petition is rejected. The issues
            raised in this Writ Petition do not fall within the restrictions
            outlined under Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India.
     b)     There is no absolute bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine
            the proportionality of the punishment imposed on a Member
            while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House.
     c)     The punishment meted out to the Petitioner was highly excessive
            and disproportionate to the nature of the misconduct committed
            by him.
     d)     The period of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner shall
            be deemed as a period of his suspension from the House and
            will amount to be sufficient punishment for his misdemeanour.
            Accordingly, we set aside the Impugned Report of the Ethics
            Committee as well as the Notification of the BLC, only to the
            extent of nature of punishment it recommends to be imposed
            on the Petitioner.
     e)     The Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as a member of the
            BLC with immediate effect. However, he shall not be entitled
            to claim any remuneration or other monetary benefits for the
            period of his disbandment. The Petitioner shall be entitled to
2164                                                              [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


              such other perks and privileges which any other similarly placed
              MLC is entitled to upon completion of their full tenure. For the
              limited purpose of post-tenure benefits, if any, the Petitioner
              shall be deemed to have served as MLC for the entire tenure.
     f)       Should the Petitioner indulge further in such misconduct upon
              his reinstatement, we leave it to the Ethics Committee or
              Chairperson of the BLC to take appropriate action, in accordance
              with law.
     g)       As an upshot of the foregoing, the Press Note dated 30.12.2024
              issued by Respondent No. 6, Election Commission, declaring
              the bye-election for the seat earlier held by the Petitioner is
              hereby quashed, and any action taken pursuant to such Press
              Note is annulled.
89. The Writ Petition is disposed of in the above terms.
90. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
    Ordered accordingly.

     Result of the case: Writ Petition allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Harshit Anand, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Ankit Gyan, Editor)


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