DR. SUNIL KUMAR SINGHversusBIHAR LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (THROUGH SECRETARY) AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 264
- Decided
- 25 February 2025
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the petition is maintainable, the Ethics Committee's decision is subject to judicial review, the expulsion was disproportionate, and the Court may modify the punishment, reinstating the petitioner.
Summary
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh, an MLC from the RJD, was expelled from the Bihar Legislative Council after the Ethics Committee found his conduct unparliamentary and his subsequent refusal to cooperate with the Committee. He challenged the expulsion through a writ petition under Article 32, arguing that the Ethics Committee's proceedings were protected by Article 212(1) and that the punishment was disproportionate. The Supreme Court held that the petition was maintainable, that the Ethics Committee's administrative action is subject to judicial review, and that there is no absolute bar on reviewing the proportionality of legislative punishments. The Court found the expulsion excessive and violative of Articles 14 and 21, and, invoking its powers under Article 142, modified the punishment by treating the period of expulsion as a suspension and reinstating the petitioner. The bye‑election notification issued by the Election Commission was also set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable under Article 212(1) of the Constitution and whether the Ethics Committee's proceedings are amenable to judicial review
- Whether the Court can review the proportionality of the punishment imposed by the Legislature
- Whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and warrants interference
- Whether the Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment to be imposed
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.142, s. Art.208, s. Art.21, s. Art.212(1)
- Representation of People Act 1951s. 151A
Headnote
Issue for Consideration (1) Whether the instant writ petition is maintainable in view of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings of the ethics committee are amenable to judicial review? (2) Whether this court can review punishment imposed by the house in exercise of its writ jurisdiction? (3) If so, whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any interference? (4) If so, whether this court is empowered to determine the quantum of
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2130 : 2025 INSC 264
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh
v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 530 of 2024)
25 February 2025
[Surya Kant* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(1) Whether the instant writ petition is maintainable in view of Article
212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings
of the ethics committee are amenable to judicial review?
(2) Whether this court can review the proportionality of the
punishment imposed by the house in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction?
(3) If so, whether the petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate
to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits
any interference?
(4) If so, whether this court is empowered to determine the
quantum of punishment that may be imposed on the petitioner?
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.212(1) – Whether the instant Writ
Petition is maintainable in view of Art.212(1) of the Constitution
of India and whether the proceedings of the Ethics Committee
are amenable to judicial review:
Held: The protection u/Art.212(1) operates only with respect to
the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ on the grounds of ‘Procedural
Irregularities’ – It could not have been the intent of the lawmakers to
circumscribe Constitutional Courts unconditionally from scrutinising
the validity of the actions of the Legislature, which may encroach
upon the Fundamental Rights of the members and/or citizens –
The ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ comprise the formal steps,
debates, and motions undertaken to facilitate deliberations within
the House – Art. 212(1) of the Constitution provides immunity for
the manner of such proceedings, and hence, Constitutional Courts
would exercise restraint when such proceedings are called into
question on the grounds of procedural irregularity – A ‘Legislative
Decision’, on the other hand, is the culmination of the legislative
procedure—the formal expression of the will of the House on a given
* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2131
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
matter – These decisions of the Legislature, though emanating from
a coordinate branch of Government, are not immune from scrutiny
by Constitutional Courts – In the instant case, the Impugned Report
recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the
Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions –
The present action of the Ethics Committee is purely administrative
in nature, aimed at enforcing discipline and ethical standards
amongst the members of the House – It is well established that
administrative actions, even when undertaken by legislative bodies
or their committees, are subject to judicial review where they affect
the rights and interests of individuals – In this context, the present
action resulting in civil consequences for the Petitioner, cannot be
immune from judicial review under the pretext of legislative privilege.
[Paras 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21]
Punishment – Proportionality of punishment – Can the Courts
examine the proportionality of punishment imposed on a
member while reviewing the validity of the action taken by
the House:
Held: The doctrine of proportionality is fundamentally embedded
in the concept of fairness in action across domestic, foreign, and
international legal systems – This principle ensures that measures
taken are appropriate, necessary, and balanced in relation to the
objectives they seek to achieve – There is no absolute bar on the
Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of the punishment
imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of the action taken
by the House – By focusing on the proportionality of punishment,
courts must ensure that justice aligns with constitutional values and
societal norms, thereby upholding the integrity of the democratic
process – At this point, it must be added that the determination of
what constitutes a disproportionate measure is inherently complex
and context-dependent – Such assessment requires a nuanced
scrutiny of the specific circumstances surrounding each case –
This means that a one-size-fits-all definition is impractical while
adjudicating proportionality and the courts must exercise their
discretion in a prudent and judicious manner. [Paras 54, 62, 63]
Punishment – Proportionality of punishment – Guiding principles
for courts to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of
actions taken by the House against its member(s):
Held: These parameters are not exhaustive, as considerations
will inevitably vary from case to case – An indicative list of such
2132 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
parameters includes:(a) Degree of obstruction caused by the member
in the proceedings of the House; (b) Whether the behaviour of the
member has brought disrepute to the dignity of the entire House;
(c) The previous conduct of the erring member; (d) The subsequent
conduct of the erring member, such as expressing remorse,
cooperation with the institutional scrutiny mechanism; (e) Availability
of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the delinquent member; (f)
Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and motivated or a
mere outcome of language largely influenced by the local dialect; (g)
Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the desired
purpose; and (h) Balancing the interest of society, particularly the
electorates, with those of the erring members. [Para 64]
Punishment – Expulsion – Proportionality of Petitioner’s
Expulsion – Was the Petitioner’s expulsion proportionate to
the offence alleged against him, and whether it merits any
interference:
Held: The punishment of expulsion imposed on the Petitioner is
harsh and disproportionate – While the petitioner’s conduct in the
house was abhorrent and his subsequent demeanour before the
ethics committee was evasive and high-handed, the house ought
to exercise magnanimity as custodian of constitutional values – The
punishment of expulsion was highly excessive and disproportionate
to the nature of the misconduct – Disproportionate punishments
are violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in Arts.14 and
21 of the constitution – A more measured and balanced approach
would have sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the
dignity and decorum of the House. [Paras 68-71, 75-78]
Constitution of India – Art.142 – Quantum of Punishment –
Power of Supreme Court u/Art.142:
Held: In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate
to the gravity of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute
its own assessment of the appropriate penalty – Instead, the
established judicial approach is to remit the matter to the
disciplinary authority for reconsideration – In exercise of its powers
u/Art.142 of the constitution, this court is vested with the authority
to substitute the punishment where the facts and circumstances
so warrant – The expulsion of the Petitioner is disproportionate
and undoubtedly infringes his Fundamental Rights guaranteed
u/Art.14 of the Constitution – Furthermore, the expulsion also has
a direct impact on a vast number of stakeholders, particularly the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2133
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
electorates he represents – The Petitioner has already undergone
almost 7 months of expulsion – If this matter is now remanded
to the Ethics Committee for reconsideration of the appropriate
punishment, the ensuing process is likely to be protracted,
which might deprive the Petitioner in participating in the ensuing
Sessions – Balancing the competing considerations, the period of
expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to be
considered as a period of his suspension; and in view of this Court,
constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by
him – As a segue thereto, the Petitioner is directed to be reinstated
as member of the BLC with immediate effect. [Paras 79-84, 86]
Case Law Cited
Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. The Maharashtra Legislative Assembly
and Anr. [2022] 18 SCR 762 : (2022) 12 SCC 273; Dev Singh v.
Punjab Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 9;
LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 488 : (2006) 13
SCC 613; Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western
Telecom Project BSNL & Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 430 : (2014) 14
SCC 731; Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, City & Industrial
Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Anr. v. Shishir
Realty (P) Ltd. & Ors. [2021] 13 SCR 190 : (2022) 16 SCC 527;
Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. [2003] Supp.
6 SCR 1235 : (2004) 2 SCC 130; Chairman, All India Railway
Recruitment Board & Anr. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. [2010] 6
SCR 291 : (2010) 6 SCC 614; Modern Dental College & Research
Centre & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. [2016] 3 SCR 579 : (2016) 7
SCC 353; Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. [2020] 1 SCR
812 : (2020) 3 SCC 637; Association for Democratic Reforms &
Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [2024] 2 SCR 420 : 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 150; Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank
of India [2020] 2 SCR 297 : (2020) 10 SCC 274; Shivu & Anr. v.
Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr. [2007] 2 SCR
555 : (2007) 4 SCC 713; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983]
1 SCR 145 : (1982) 3 SCC 24; Lehna v. State of Haryana [2002]
1 SCR 377 : (2002) 3 SCC 76; Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control
Bureau & Ors., 2024 INSC 479 : [2024] 7 SCR 97; Munish Bhasin
and Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [2009] 2 SCR
806 : (2009) 4 SCC 45; Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi
and Ors. [2022] 18 SCR 494 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 897; Parvez
Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2020] 11
SCR 117 : (2020) 10 SCC 77; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
[1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; Arnesh Kumar v. State of
2134 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Bihar & Anr. [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC 273; Raja Ram
Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha & Ors. [2007] 1 SCR
317 : (2007) 3 SCC 184; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.
[1988] 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; Deputy Commissioner,
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain [2013] 9 SCR
898 : (2013) 10 SCC 106; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and
Ors. [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 644 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 – relied on.
The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and
Secretary of State for Health ex parte Fedesa et al [1990]
ECR I-4023 [13] – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Cf. G. LübbeWolff, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Human Rights Law
Journal 2014, vol. 34, pg. 12; Sauter W. Proportionality in EU Law:
A Balancing Act? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
2013;15:439-466; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 61 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law 529–31 (Aspen Pub. 2001).
List of Websites
Principle of Proportionality, European Union, https://www.
google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=h
ttps://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of-
proportionality.html&ved=2ahUKEwjR9aun6NSLAxXhzDgGHTA
sHtcQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw14i3cuEILjPFx1jQZjNOuR.
List of Keywords
Article 212(1) of Constitution of India; Ethics Committee;
Judicial Review; Punishment; Proportionality of the punishment;
Maintainability of writ petition; Constitutional Courts; Misconduct;
Expulsion; Misdemeanour; Legislature; Proceedings in Legislature;
Legislative Decision; Immunity; Constitutional Supremacy;
Expression unius est exclusion alterius; Irregularity of procedure;
Administrative functions; Legislative function; Legislative privilege.
Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
530 of 2024
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2135
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Advs., Yash
Johri, Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Ms. Shristi Sinha, Vishal Sinha,
Pradyut Kashyap.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Navin Kumar Jha,
Aditya Prakash Sahay, Sushil Kumar Singh, Akash Dikshit, Chandan
Kumar, Divyansh Mishra, Chandratanay Chaube, Ankit Agarwal,
Ms. Viyushti Rawat, Ashish Shukla.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
1. The Petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, laying challenge to Report No.
1/2024 dated 14.06.2024 (Impugned Report), submitted by the Ethics
Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) recommending
his expulsion as a Member of Legislative Council (MLC). The
consequential notification dated 26.07.2024 relieving the Petitioner
from the membership of the BLC issued by the BLC’s Secretariat
(Impugned Notification), is also assailed.
A. Factual Matrix
2. The present controversy arises from allegations of unparliamentary
conduct by the Petitioner, including the use of derogatory expressions
in his capacity as an MLC within the House of the BLC. This conduct
of the Petitioner prompted the initiation of proceedings against him by
the Ethics Committee. The allegations were found to be substantiated,
leading the Ethics Committee to recommend the Petitioner’s expulsion
from the BLC. Subsequently, a resolution to that effect was passed
by a majority of the members of BLC, formalising the decision to
expel and relieve the Petitioner. The facts giving rise to the present
petition are set out hereinbelow:
2.1. The Petitioner is a member of the political party known as the
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). He was elected as a member of
2136 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the BLC on 29.06.2020 for a period of six years. The Petitioner
was also nominated as the Chief Whip by the RJD in the BLC.
2.2. The elections for the 17th Legislative Assembly in the State
of Bihar were held in November 2020, wherein a coalition
government, comprising the Janata Dal (United) (JDU) led by
the incumbent Chief Minister along with the RJD and the Indian
National Congress (INC), was formed. This coalition, however,
wedged apart in January 2024, and a new alliance between
the JDU and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was entered
into to form the Government in the State.
2.3. Following these developments, the Hon’ble Governor of Bihar
was scheduled to deliver his address on 13.02.2024, at the 206th
Session of the BLC. As soon as the Governor’s address was
completed and during the motion of thanks, the Petitioner and
another MLC, Md. Sohaib approached the well of the House
and hurled indecent slogans against the Chief Minister. They
mocked him as “Paltu Ram”, imitated his body language and
sarcastically remarked that “the man who has not contested a
single Mukhiya election till date is the Chief Minister of Bihar”.
The Petitioner then alluded to the Chief Minister as an ‘expert
in manipulations’ and insinuated that he was “just like a snake
sheds its skin every year”. This indecorous fracas led to the
proceedings of the House being indubitably obstructed, followed
by a complaint on 19.02.2024 lodged against the Petitioner and
Md. Sohaib before the Chairman of the BLC by a fellow MLC
belonging to the Ruling Party JDU.
2.4. The Chairman of BLC issued a letter to the Petitioner and Md.
Sohaib informing them about the complaint, which was then
forwarded to the Ethics Committee for necessary enquiry.
The letter also required both the MLCs to remain present and
join the enquiry proceedings on 03.05.2024 before the Ethics
Committee.
2.5. Md. Sohaib joined the enquiry proceedings on 03.05.2024 and
expressed regret for his conduct in writing and further assured
a display of restraint and caution in the future.
2.6. The Petitioner, in stark contrast, did not appear before the Ethics
Committee on the date fixed and instead sought exemption,
citing engagements and scheduling conflicts due to the onset
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2137
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
of the Lok Sabha elections. The Petitioner did not join even the
subsequent proceedings and continued seeking exemption from
appearing for one or the other reason, which are delineated for
the sake of convenience:
Date of Requests from Petitioner Response of the
proceedings Ethics Committee
03.05.2024 • The Petitioner was a star Exempted and
campaigner for his party directed to appear on
in the ongoing Lok Sabha 22.05.2024
elections and was in charge
of the Saran Constituency.
22.05.2024 • Busy on account of Exempted and
himself being a candidate directed to be present
in elections of the Board on 31.05.2024 as a
of Directors, National last opportunity.
Agricultural Cooperative
Marketing Federation of
India (NAFAED).
31.05.2024 • Tried to place the onus Exempted, but the
on the Ethics Committee request regarding the
by stating: “I do not know relevant documents
what is the hurry, haste was denied on
and impatience that the the grounds of
Committee has again fixed confidentiality;
the date 31.05.2025 to however, Petitioner
present the opinion”. was permitted to
peruse the same
• He demanded information
on the next date
regarding the charges
of proceeding, i.e.
against him and the
06.06.2024.
necessary evidence
corroborating such
allegations.
06.06.2024 • Sought exemption on the One last opportunity
grounds of his father’s was given to the
illness. Petitioner to present
his side, and the
Ethics Committee
resolved to take
action in case the
Petitioner did not turn
up for proceedings
scheduled on
12.06.2024.
2138 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2.7. The Petitioner eventually appeared before the Ethics Committee
for the first time on 12.06.2024, when a copy of the charges
was duly supplied to him. The Petitioner instead of addressing
the Ethics Committee on those charges, started questioning
its very authority and legitimacy. Having chosen to continue
his pattern of defiance, the Petitioner communicated to the
Ethics Committee that it was not competent to question him,
given his position as the Opposition’s Chief Whip. Following
a heated discussion between them, the Ethics Committee
concluded the proceedings without the Petitioner having
addressed any of the charges levelled against him. The next
date of the proceedings was then fixed on 19.06.2024.
2.8. The Ethics Committee, in somewhat of an unusual manner,
preponed the proceedings from 19.06.2024 to 14.06.2024
without any notice to the Petitioner. The Ethics Committee
then discussed the behaviour of the Petitioner during the
previous proceedings and concluded that his conduct was
wholly unjustified. The Ethics Committee further mooted the
demeanour of both the MLCs, i.e. the Petitioner and Md.
Sohaib and closed the proceedings.
2.9. The Ethics Committee thereafter submitted the Impugned
Report, recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner from
membership of the BLC. As regards to Md. Sohaib, the Ethics
Committee recommended his suspension for two days in the
upcoming Session.
2.10. The Ethics Committee’s report, along with its recommendations
for taking punitive measures against the Petitioner as well
as Md. Sohaib was presented and discussed on 26.07.2024
in the House. After due deliberations, the majority of the
House accepted the recommendations and consequently,
the Petitioner was expelled from his membership of the BLC
forthwith. Md. Sohaib, on the other hand, was suspended for
the first two days of the 208th Session of the House.
2.11. As a sequel thereto, the Secretariat of BLC issued the
Impugned Notification dated 26.07.2024, relieving the Petitioner
from membership of the BLC and notifying the resultant
vacancy caused by such expulsion. The aforesaid measures
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2139
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
have prompted the Petitioner to approach this Court through
these writ proceedings.
2.12. We may hasten to add that during the pendency of this petition,
Respondent No. 6, Election Commission of India (Election
Commission), issued a Press Note dated 30.12.2024
declaring the bye-election for the seat held by the Petitioner
before his expulsion. The election process was resolved to
be completed before 25.01.2025. Considering the impact of
the notified election on the outcome of this petition, vide order
dated 15.01.2025 the declaration of the result of such bye-
election was stayed.
B. Contentions on behalf of the Petitioner
3. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Gopal Sankarnarayanan, learned
Senior Counsels appearing on behalf of the Petitioner vehemently
contended that the Impugned Report and the consequential
Notification are illegal and unconstitutional. They argued that the
actions against the Petitioner were actuated by mala fide and suffered
from gross illegalities, both in procedure and substance.
4. Dr. Singhvi and Mr. Sankarnarayanan canvassed the following
grounds in support of their submissions:
a) The expulsion of the Petitioner from the membership of BLC
was violative of the principles of natural justice, fair and just play,
as the relevant material, including the video clip containing his
transgressions were not furnished to him. The Petitioner was
denied access to the material evidence on the pretext that the
proceedings of the House are confidential and could only be
perused by him during the meetings of the Ethics Committee.
The Petitioner was thus caused inexorable prejudice in the
matter of preparing his defence.
b) The Ethics Committee explicitly assured the Petitioner on
12.06.2024 that charges would be framed only after receiving
all the relevant material, for which the next date of proceeding
was fixed on 19.06.2024. The Ethics Committee, however
unilaterally and deliberately advanced the date of hearing to
14.06.2024 without his knowledge. The Petitioner has thus been
condemned unheard, and in a manner which reeks of malice
and amounts to gross illegality.
2140 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
c) Not only this, the Ethics Committee’s report dated 14.06.2024
was circulated selectively with the members belonging to the
Ruling Party, and was kept confidential from the members
belonging to the Opposition Parties. Such members being in
the minority could not effectively participate in the proceedings.
d) In any event, the Petitioner has been hammered with severe
punishment, disproportionate to the attributed misconduct and
also in comparison to another MLC Md. Sohaib, who, despite
facing somewhat similar allegations, was awarded suspension
of two days from the upcoming Session.
e) It is settled law that a ‘graded’ approach is required where
the House is disciplining its members. Deviation from such
an approach in the case of the Petitioner is not based on any
sufficient material, and the disproportionate punishment imposed
on him falls foul of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles
14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
C. Contentions on behalf of Respondents
5. Contrarily, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing
Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, strongly opposed the instant Writ Petition
urging that the Impugned Report and Notification expelling the
Petitioner from the BLC are based on concrete evidence. He submitted
that the action against the Petitioner was taken following due process
of law, which has been approved by the majority of the House and
thus warrants no interference.
6. In this vein, while opposing the Writ Petition, Mr. Kumar advanced
the following submissions:
a) At the outset, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. It is liable
to be dismissed in terms of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution
of India, which states that ‘the validity of any proceedings in
the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure’.
b) It is the prerogative of the House to regulate its Business and
Procedure, and the decision so taken cannot be tested on the
bedrock of proportionality. The issue of proportionality should
be left to the wisdom of the House. In other words, the Court
cannot examine the quantum of punishment imposed upon the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2141
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
Petitioner, as such a recourse would amount to reviewing the
validity of the proceedings of the House.
c) The Ethics Committee adhered to the principles of audi alteram
partem as the Petitioner was given reasonable opportunity
of being heard. Such a plea is fortified by the fact that the
Ethics Committee asked the Petitioner to join its proceedings
on 03.05.2024, 22.05.2024, 31.05.2024, 06.06.2024 and
12.06.2024. In fact, it is the Petitioner who deliberately and for
reasons best known to him, failed to avail such opportunity.
He kept on either avoiding the proceedings or threatening the
Ethics Committee with one or the other objection until 12.06.2024
when he entered appearance for the first time.
d) The Petitioner was duly served with the list of charges as soon as
he appeared on 12.06.2024. He, however instead of addressing
the charges, questioned the very legality and the authority of
the Ethics Committee itself. The Petitioner, being a member of
the House, is deemed to have knowledge of the formation of
the Ethics Committee under Article 208 of the Constitution and
the manner in which its proceedings are conducted.
e) The Petitioner cannot raise the plea of proportionality and seek
parity with the other MLC, Md. Sohaib for the reason that the
latter duly appeared before the Ethics Committee and cooperated
in the proceedings. On the other hand, the Petitioner remained
defiant and disregarded the prescribed procedure. Being the
Chief Whip of the Opposition, he held a greater responsibility
towards the policies, rules and constitutional authority of the
House.
f) The Petitioner has a habit of degrading the authority of the
House through his indecent and unparliamentary acts for which
he was earlier also suspended from the House on 28.03.2022
in the 200th Session of the BLC.
7. Mr. Ankit Agarwal, counsel for Respondent No. 6—the Election
Commission, submitted that in view of Section 151A of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), the Commission was
duty-bound to notify the elections as soon as the vacancy occurred.
He further submitted that the Election Commission had nothing to
add on the merits of the case.
2142 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel, entered appearance
for the Intervener, Shri Lalan Prasad, who is the aspirant for election
to the MLC seat declared vacant upon the expulsion of the Petitioner.
She also asserted that the bye-election declared by the Election
Commission for the vacant seat aligned with Section 151A of the
RP Act. According to her Section 151A of the RP Act is triggered the
moment a ‘legal vacancy’ occurs, mandating the immediate election
to fill up the same.
D. Issues for Consideration
9. Having traversed the sequence of events as they emanated, the
contentions put forth on behalf of the parties as well as the material
on record, we are of the considered view that the following vital
issues require analysis:
i. Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view of Article
212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the proceedings
of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial review?
ii. Can this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction review the
proportionality of the punishment imposed by the House?
iii. If so, whether the Petitioner’s expulsion is disproportionate
to the misconduct attributed to him and whether it merits any
interference?
iv. If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this
Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment
that may be imposed on the Petitioner?
E. Analysis
E.1. Whether the instant Writ Petition is maintainable in view
of Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India and whether the
proceedings of the Ethics Committee are amenable to judicial
review?
10. The Respondents have raised an objection against the very
maintainability of the Writ Petition in view of Article 212(1) of the
Constitution of India. Since this argument strikes at the core of the
instant matter, we find it imperative to address this contention at
the very outset. Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India bars any
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2143
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
enquiry regarding any proceeding in the Legislature on the grounds
of alleged irregularity of procedure.
11. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we find ourselves unable
to concur with the contentions asseverated by the Respondents that
the decision of the Ethics Committee is shielded by the immunity
proffered under Article 212(1). We say so because it is no longer
res integra that there is no absolute bar on calling into question the
decisions taken by the Legislature. The protection under Article 212(1)
operates only with respect to the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’
on the grounds of ‘Procedural Irregularities’. It could not have been
the intent of the lawmakers to circumscribe Constitutional Courts
unconditionally from scrutinising the validity of the actions of the
Legislature, which may encroach upon the Fundamental Rights of
the members and/or citizens.
12. To simplify the understanding of the embargo postulated under
Article 212(1), we deem it appropriate to distinguish the terms—
‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ and ‘Legislative Decision’. These
terms represent distinct concepts, each serving a different function
in the law-making process.
13. To further explicate, the ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ comprise
the formal steps, debates, and motions undertaken to facilitate
deliberations within the House. It is a structured mechanism that
ensures due consideration of a proposed measure, allowing for
discussion, amendment, and scrutiny before reaching a final
resolution. These procedural steps are not ends in themselves but
are designed to channel legislative discourse towards a definitive
outcome. Article 212(1) of the Constitution provides immunity for the
manner of such proceedings, and hence, Constitutional Courts would
exercise restraint when such proceedings are called into question
on the grounds of procedural irregularity.
14. A ‘Legislative Decision’, on the other hand, is the culmination of the
legislative procedure—the formal expression of the will of the House
on a given matter. While Proceedings of the Legislature provide the
framework within which members exercise their deliberative functions,
the Legislative Decision is the authoritative determination that
follows such deliberation. These decisions of the Legislature, though
emanating from a coordinate branch of Government, are not immune
from scrutiny by Constitutional Courts. Judicial review of Legislative
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Decisions is not an encroachment upon legislative dominion but a
necessary safeguard to uphold constitutional supremacy.
15. In this regard, we deem it apposite to underscore the applicability of
the principle of ‘expression unius est exclusion alterius’, namely, that
whatever has not been included has, by implication, been excluded.
Applying the aforesaid principle, we have no doubt in concluding
that the prohibition under Article 212(1) operates only with respect
to the scrutiny of ‘Proceedings in the Legislature’ on the touchstone
of ‘Irregularity of Procedure’. It does not oust the power of judicial
review of the decisions of the Legislature, whether Legislative or
Administrative, on the grounds of illegality or unconstitutionality.
16. Constitutional courts are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring
the lawfulness of the decisions of the Legislature rather than
substituting their judgment to decide the rights of the parties. A
decision-making authority, be it the Legislature or otherwise, while
exercising its powers, must act within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution. Any determination by the authority concerned, if found to
be in excess of its constitutional authority or violative of Fundamental
Rights, is subject to judicial probe. Such overarching decisions cannot
be sustained to preserve integrity in the legal system by preventing
excess and abuse of power.
17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, the Impugned Report
recommending the expulsion of the Petitioner was made by the
Ethics Committee in the discharge of its administrative functions.
These functions have been assigned in the Rules framed by the
State Legislature under Article 208 of the Constitution. The Rules so
enacted govern the internal functioning, discipline of the House and
the procedure by which the House regulates its affairs. However, such
administrative actions, even though referable to the Rules formulated
under Article 208 of the Constitution, do not constitute the legislative
functions of the House. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
the legislative functions pertain to law-making, deliberation, and policy
formulation, whereas the present action of the Ethics Committee is
purely administrative in nature, aimed at enforcing discipline and
ethical standards amongst the members of the House.
18. The distinction between legislative and administrative functions is
well recognized in constitutional jurisprudence. When a legislative
body frames rules under Article 208 and subsequently enforces them
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Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
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through disciplinary measures, such enforcement is an exercise of
administrative power rather than legislative power.
19. It is well established that administrative actions, even when
undertaken by legislative bodies or their committees, are subject to
judicial review where they affect the rights and interests of individuals.
In fact, this Court in Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. The Maharashtra
Legislative Assembly and Anr.1 has held that the substantive
disciplinary or rationality of the self-security measure inflicted upon
the erring member is open to judicial review on the touch stone of
being unconstitutional, grossly illegal, irrational or arbitrary.
20. There can thus be no doubt that if such an administrative decision is
found to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of constitutional rights,
it is open to judicial intervention in the same manner as any other
executive action of the State. Determining whether an impugned
action or breach is an exempted irregularity or justiciable illegality is
a matter of judicial interpretation and would undoubtedly fall within
the ambit of Constitutional Courts.
21. We also clarify here that the scrutiny in the instant Writ Petition
pertains to the recommendation of the Ethics Committee subsequently
ratified by the majority of the House. This Court is not concerned
with the procedure adopted either by the Ethics Committee or the
House while making or acting on such recommendation. In this
context, the present action resulting in civil consequences for the
Petitioner, cannot be immune from judicial review under the pretext
of legislative privilege.
22. We cannot be ignorant that the grounds raised before us traverse
beyond mere procedural irregularity and challenge the Petitioner’s
expulsion on the footing of proportionality. Needless to say, the
imposed punishment has a significant impact on the Petitioner’s
Fundamental Rights and a chilling effect on the representative
democratic framework of our society, issues that we have dealt with
in greater detail, in the later parts of this judgement.
23. Consequently, on an overall consideration of legal position, we are of
the view that the Respondent’s argument qua maintainability of the
Writ Petition must fail. We hold that the action of the Ethics Committee
1 Ashish Shelar and Ors. v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and Anr. (2022) 12 SCC 273.
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neither forms part of the ‘Proceedings of the Legislature’ nor is it
tantamount to a ‘Legislative Decision’. Accordingly, entertaining the
instant petition would not fall foul of the restrictions imposed by Article
212 (1) of the Constitution.
E.2. Can the Courts examine the proportionality of punishment
imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of the action
taken by the House?
24. Having held that the instant Writ Petition is maintainable, it would
now be apposite to address the preliminary question of plausibility
of judicial interference in the issue concerning the proportion of
punishment, when examining the validity of the action taken by the
House. We will undertake the analysis of this issue through a two-
pronged approach: (i) the relevance and nature of the ‘doctrine of
proportionality’; and (ii) the role of Constitutional Courts in reviewing
a decision taken by the House.
E.2.1. The Doctrine of Proportionality: A dynamic precept
25. The expression ‘proportion’ is derived from the Latin term proportio,
which corresponds to comparative size, number or degree. The
‘doctrine of proportionality’ essentially signifies that any action should
be steeped in reason or logic. This concept highlights the need
for clear justification in decision-making, asserting that decisions
made without sufficient objective reasoning are often at odds with
intended goals. In order to holistically understand the ‘doctrine of
proportionality’ and the manner in which it is applied, it is, therefore,
imperative to examine its disposition in: (i) the domestic sphere; and
(ii) in international jurisprudence.
E.2.1.1 The Domestic Sphere
26. The doctrine of proportionality in Indian jurisprudence is guided by
the principle of selecting the most appropriate and least restrictive
measures to achieve the intended objective. The courts’ role is
limited to ensuring a proper balance between the adverse effects of
an action or penalty on an individual’s rights, liberties, or interests
and the purpose it seeks to serve. In summary, while there may be
a range of discretionary choices, it is within the courts’ purview to
assess whether the chosen measure excessively infringes upon rights.
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Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
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27. The test of proportionality, in this context, is satisfied by considering a
myriad of factors such as fairness, justice, absence of vindictiveness,
predominance of objectivity, adherence to natural justice, fair play, and
the recognition of mitigating circumstances etc. These factors, while
not exhaustive, are instrumental in maintaining the delicate balance
between imposing consequences for wrongful actions and ensuring
that such measures do not result in right-based transgressions.
28. In the Indian legal spectrum, the notion of proportionality finds its
place in a multitude of legal issues. To instantiate:
(i) Service and Labour Laws
29. This Court has time and again highlighted the importance of
proportionality when dealing with the question of punishment or
disciplinary action for misconduct at the workplace, whether it be in
public service or private organisations. The nature of the misconduct,
the circumstances of the occurrence, the history and effect of the
incident are all factors which ought to be taken into consideration.
30. For example, in Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corpn.
Ltd.2, a public servant was penalised with dismissal from service
for the offense of misplacing and losing an official file. This Court,
in appeal, considered the facts that the employee was serving the
Corporation for twenty years with a previously unblemished record,
the misconduct was not deliberate or motivated, and the file was
not shown to be of grave importance or sensitivity, reduced the
punishment to withholding of increment of the employee. On the other
hand, in a case involving a delinquent employee who did not join duty
upon transfer, the Court considered his extended absence of over
233 days and his refusal to visit the appointed doctor to substantiate
his claim for medical absence, and concluded that the punishment
of removal from service was proportionate to the misdemeanour.3
31. Thus, service laws in India are riddled with such like precedents,
mandating employers, including the Government, to take all
circumstances into account and undertake proportionate action
against such offences.
2 Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 9.
3 LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani (2006) 13 SCC 613.
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(ii) Administrative Law
32. In similar parlance to service law, administrative law also places great
importance on approaching decision-making with proportionality.
For instance, blacklisting from Government tender auctions, which
is a harsh punishment is considered proportionate in dire cases,
such as where the contractor has embezzled funds in collusion with
Government employees.4 However, this Court has also protected
contract awardees from withdrawal of the contract on mere hyper-
technical grounds.5
33. Even beyond government auction, proportionality ought to go to
the root of decision making by the Government. The litmus test
that needs to be administered is whether the harshest or strongest
measure is necessarily required to be implemented in a given case.
In a situation where a lessee was in default of lease premium, rent,
and interest due to underdeveloped surroundings, this Court held that
the harsh step of resumption of the land as well as forfeiture of the
already paid sum would be too harsh, when recovery proceedings
are available.6 On the other hand, this Court has also upheld the
stronger step taken by the Railway Recruitment Board for re-test of
limited candidates, when there was evidence of paper leaking and
mass-cheating.7
(iii) Constitutional Law
34. Constitutional law is perhaps the area of law where the term
proportionality is used most commonly. This is so because the
proportionality test, initially identified in Modern Dental College &
Research Centre v. State of M.P.,8 is widely used to consider the
vires of legislative as well as executive actions.
35. The test of proportionality, thus, applies to cases where action is
brought to protect the right guaranteed by the Constitution or other
4 Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC
731.
5 Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. &
Anr. v. Shishir Realty (P) Ltd. & Ors. (2022) 16 SCC 527.
6 Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130.
7 Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board & Anr. v. K. Shyam Kumar & Ors. (2010) 6 SCC 614.
8 Modern Dental College & Research Centre & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353.
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laws. It largely seeks to identify whether the restriction sought to be
placed on the right is proportionate to the objective sought to be
achieved by the restriction. It often belies a comparison between
the importance of the public purpose of the restriction on one hand
and the public right on the other hand.
36. This comparison has played out distinctly in different circumstances.
When dealing with the laws empowering the Executive to restrict
internet in areas with underlying disturbances (like the Union Territories
of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir), this Court has compared the
importance of the right to speech and expression against that of
national security concerns.9 On the other hand, when considering
the arguments in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union
of India10, a Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
compare the importance of the right to financial privacy and the right
to political transparency, which also led to the evolution of what is
called the ‘double proportionality standard’.
37. Perhaps the clearest application of proportionality principles on the
touchstone of constitutional law has been in the case of Internet &
Mobile Assn. of India v. RBI11. Here, this Court delved into various
circumstances surrounding the use, merits, and demerits of virtual
currencies, taking a view on the impact of its proliferation as well as
curtailment on the economy, individual investors, and its exchanges,
thus coming to the conclusion that the relevant RBI circulars had
a disproportionate impact on the market vis-à-vis the RBI’s aim to
regulate virtual currencies.
(iv) Criminal Law
38. In criminal law, of course, the dispensation of justice strives to be ever
more precise and perfect; this is doubtless because of the ramifications
of a verdict in such trials, which militate against physical liberty and
autonomy—an autonomy that is most dear to modern society. Even
here, it is most noticeable that the principle of proportionality has
been widely accepted and promulgated as the vital safeguard against
prejudice, excessiveness, and unreasonableness.
9 Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 637.
10 Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 150.
11 Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India (2020) 10 SCC 274.
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39. We have consistently observed in cases of sentencing the
considerations of proportionality taking centre stage, such as in
Shivu v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka,12 which
held as follows:
“The principle of proportion between crime and
punishment is a principle of just desert that serves
as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is
justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice it is hardly
less familiar or less important than the principle that only
the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed, the requirement
that punishment not be disproportionately great, which is
a corollary of just desert, is dictated by the same principle
that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any
punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal
conduct is punishment without guilt.”
…..
Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions,
it remains a strong influence in the determination
of sentences. Anything less than a penalty of greatest
severity for any serious crime is thought to be a measure of
toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact quite
apart from those considerations that make punishment
unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime,
uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very
undesirable practical consequences.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
40. In fact, this Court has consistently acknowledged that the degree of
punishment should be commensurate to the gravity of the offence,
such that it is consistent with the principle of proportionality. For
illustration, nowhere in criminal law is the discourse on proportionality
vaster than in cases of death penalty, where the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances of the perpetrator are weighed in tandem
12 Shivu & Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr. (2007) 4 SCC 713.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2151
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
and scrupulously studied.13 Thus, a sort of ‘balance sheet’ is drawn up
which aids in undertaking the exercise of satisfying proportionality.14
What emerges, therefore, is that the application of proportionality is
not severable from the outcomes of that exercise.
41. We may also hasten to note the use of this principle in bail matters,
where the Court seeks to restrict its own discretion by levying
proportionality. In a catena of decisions,15 this Court has repeatedly
cautioned against excessively stringent or disproportionate bail
conditions as a side-effect of granting this important relief.
(v) Interpretation of Statutes
42. In our considered opinion, the principle of proportionality also
finds purchase in something as fundamental as the interpretation
of statutes, which, in turn, colours all the spheres of law we have
previously laid out. Statutory interpretation is that unique tool a
jurist possesses to give meaningful voice to the law enacted by
the Legislature, and it has been our jurisprudence to always read
proportionality into the laws we seek to interpret.
43. Indeed, many landmark judgments of this Court, which have
interpreted key provisions of our legal code often operate with an
in-built proclivity towards simulating proportionality. Take, for instance,
the ruling in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,16 wherein this Court
held against excessive restrictions on liberty, especially those which
are disproportionate to the State’s purported objectives. Thus, one
might legitimately argue the Indian experience with ‘due process’
began with the reading of proportionality into our grund norm, i.e.
the Indian Constitution.
44. Interpreting statutory provisions involves understanding and giving
effect to the Legislature’s intent, so as to avoid absurd or unjust
outcomes—an idea that aligns with ensuring that the means
adopted by a statute are commensurate with its ends. In essence,
13 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 24.
14 Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 76.
15 Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors., 2024 INSC 479; Munish Bhasin and Ors v. State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2009) 4 SCC 45; Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. 2022
SCC OnLine SC 897; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2020) 10 SCC 77.
16 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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an interpretation should not lead to outcomes that unduly burden
individuals or contradict the broader objectives of justice and fairness.
This concern reflects a proportional mind set: that the impact of
a statute should be weighed against its intended purpose, much
as Indian courts have done in cases like Maneka Gandhi (supra)
and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. 17 These cases clearly
demonstrate the wide prevalence of the principle of proportionality
in the application and implementation of law.
45. The doctrine of proportionality is also firmly entrenched in our
Legislative Policy. Some notable examples include: (a) the authority
vested in Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to modify the quantum of punishment imposed
on a workman; (b) the prescription of minimum and maximum
sentences in Penal Laws, such as the Indian Penal Code, which
is now succeeded by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (c) the
Statutory Rules and Bye-laws etc. regulating the service conditions
of government employees as also those working in entities deriving
their status from Article 12 of the Constitution. These legal provisions
meticulously calibrate the imbibing of proportionality principles by
the Indian Legislature. Thus, while a minor infraction may warrant
a ‘censure’, serious offences such as the misappropriation of public
funds may justifiably result in ‘dismissal’ from service.
E.2.1.2 International Jurisprudence
46. Beyond the spectrum of domestic laws, we find that the doctrine of
proportionality is also widely applied in foreign jurisdictions, following
a similar rationale to that employed by Indian courts. Some instances
include:
(i) Germany
47. In similar parlance to that of Indian constitutional jurisprudence,
the doctrine of proportionality in German law is applied to every
case of a state act constituting an ‘eingriff’ or encroachment, into a
constitutional freedom or property right.18 To satisfy the proportionality
17 Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 273.
18 BVerfGE 16, 194 (at 201, 202).
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Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
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requirement, the act of state under scrutiny must be:19 (a) appropriate
to promote its objective; (b) necessary to promote that objective; and
(c) Adequate (balancing operation), i.e. the prejudice to the freedom
or property right in question must not be inadequate in comparison
with the weight of the interests supposed to justify the intervention.
48. To further demystify these factors, the suitability test (a) is fulfilled
by demonstrating that the act in question be apt to promote the
objective against which it is measured.20 The necessity requirement
(b) mandates that, among several equally effective means to achieve
the objective, the least restrictive one must be chosen. An act of
the state is deemed unnecessary if its objective can be achieved
through a less intrusive method.21 The adequacy test (c) assesses
whether the benefit gained by restricting the right justifies the extent
of the intrusion, ensuring that the objective’s value outweighs the
resulting loss.
(ii) European Union
49. In this instance, the principle of proportionality is laid down in Article
5(4) of the Treaty on the European Union (EU). It seeks to set
actions taken by EU institutions within specified bounds. In EU law
a proportionality test is applied both to EU acts and to acts of the
Member States.22
50. Under this principle, EU when reviewing an act or a measure, analyses
whether the same is:23 (a) an appropriate or suitable measure; (b) in
pursuit of a legitimate objective; (c) among the appropriate measures
constitutes the least restrictive means (LRM); and (d) not manifestly
disproportionate in terms of a cost versus benefits balance.
51. It is pertinent to mention that not all of these steps are applied in
every case. Albeit, the LRM test and the manifestly disproportionate
19 Cf. G. LübbeWolff, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, Human Rights Law Journal 2014, vol. 34, pg. 12.
20 BVerfGE 104, 337 (at 345).
21 BVerfGE 121, 317 (at 344).
22 Sauter W. Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
2013;15:439-466.
23 Case C-331/88 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health
ex parte Fedesa et al [1990] ECR I-4023 [13]; Principle of Proportionality, European Union, available here:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of-proportionality.html&ved=2ahUKEwjR9aun6NSLAxXhzDgGHTA
sHtcQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw14i3cuEILjPFx1jQZjNOuR.
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standard are often used as alternatives rather than in conjunction.
Even when proportionality in the strict sense is applied, an explicit
balancing of costs and benefits is uncommon. Instead, the manifestly
disproportionate test serves as a rough measure of justice, as its
terminology suggests.24 It is designed to allow a relatively wide margin
of discretion to the authorities whose measures are under review.
(iii) United States of America
52. American jurisprudence though it has made limited use of the term
‘proportionality’, notions akin to proportionality including balancing of
constitutional values,25 often appear in the US system of substantive
doctrinal standards of constitutional judicial review.26 Consequently,
the US Courts have retained its two standards of strict scrutiny and
rational basis scrutiny, when adjudicating challenges to State or
Federal Legislation.
53. For the purposes of the present discussion, we will limit our analysis
to the strict scrutiny test, which posits that a government action
must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.27
This method of constitutional analysis employs several inquiries
that are also present in a traditional proportionality review. First, the
Court must determine whether the Government action infringes on
a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.28 If it
does, the Court must invalidate the government action unless it is
necessary for the attainment of a compelling Government interest.29
The Government interest involved must be sufficiently important to
justify a suspect classification or Government invasion of individual
autonomy.30 The result is that the Government action is invalidated
if the Court is able to find a less restrictive, yet equally effective,
alternative to the proposed method.
54. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of proportionality is
fundamentally embedded in the concept of fairness in action
24 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA Ltd et al v Secretary of State for Health
et al ECR I-10423 [80]–[84].
25 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 61 (1992).
26 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 529–31 (Aspen Pub. 2001).
27 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–504 (1965).
28 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
29 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.
30 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504.
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across domestic, foreign, and international legal systems. This
principle ensures that measures taken are appropriate, necessary,
and balanced in relation to the objectives they seek to achieve.
Proportionality is deeply intertwined with the principles of the Rule of
Law and natural justice, as it guards against arbitrary or excessive
actions. Consequently, it is interpreted as an implicit requirement
in almost every legal provision, unless it is explicitly barred by the
legislation itself.
55. In the specific context of the instant appeal, what must therefore be
borne in mind is that when contemplating the decision of expulsion
of a Legal or Public Representative such as the Petitioner, inflicting
punishment beyond the necessary period may suffer from the vice of
being irrational and arbitrariness. Such action then becomes prone
to challenge on the grounds of being illegal and unconstitutional.
E.2.2. Scrutinising the ‘Action’ of the House – The role of
Constitutional Courts
56. In the aforesaid context, Constitutional Courts assume a crucial role
in ensuring that the actions imposing punishments on members are
proportionate and just. This is achieved through a structured approach
that balances legislative authority with judicial oversight. This Court, in
a recent decision in Ashish Shelar (supra), has eruditely held that:
“The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern
the action of dismembering a member from the House
of the legislative assembly in the form of expulsion or
be it a case of suspension by directing withdrawal from the
meeting of the Assembly for the remainder of the Session”.
[Emphasis supplied]
57. Insofar as the specific punishment of expulsion is concerned, this
Court, in Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha,31
recognised the power of the Legislature to expel a member. However,
it laced the existence of such power with a word of caution. It was held
that the “expulsion of a member is a grave measure and normally, it
should not be taken”. Needless to say, the expulsion of a member
31 Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker of Lok Sabha & Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 184.
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from the House constitutes a higher degree of deprivation and must
only be sustained in exceptional circumstances.
58. There is no gainsaid that imposing a disproportionate punishment
not only undermines democratic values by depriving the member
from participating in the proceedings of the House but also affects
the electorates of the constituency who remain unrepresented. It is
accurately stated that in our representative democracy, the main
function of a legislator is to act as a reflection of the people’s will.
That is to say, instead of being a free agent to follow their conviction,
the legislator is an agent of the electorates and thus obligated to
reflect the opinions and values of the people they represent.
59. The removal of a member from the House therefore is a significant
issue for both the member and the constituency they represent.
The democratic process relies on the active participation of all
members, and even brief absences can impede a member’s ability
to contribute to critical legislative discussions and decisions. This
underscores the importance of their presence in all parliamentary
activities, as their absence can have far-reaching implications on the
legislative outcomes and the representation of their constituency’s
interests. We clarify that while representation of the constituency is
not the sole factor in determining the punishment to be imposed on
a member, it nonetheless remains an important aspect that merits
due consideration.
60. As stated, the absence of a duly elected representative disrupts
the democratic process and undermines the voice of the electorate.
In such a situation, if the punishment inflicted upon the member
concerned appears to be prima facie harsh and disproportionate,
Constitutional Courts owe a duty to undo such gross injustice and
review the proportionality of such disqualifications or expulsions.
61. It is pertinent to add that the aforementioned responsibility involves
a delicate balance where courts must act decisively to strike down
excessively harsh actions that threaten our democratic fabric while
simultaneously exercising restraint to avoid encroaching upon the
legislative domain. We reiterate that courts must reflect a certain
degree of deference to the legislative will and wisdom, intervening
only when the action prescribed is so disproportionate that it shocks
the intrinsic sense of justice.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2157
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
62. Given the foregoing discussion, we hold that there is no absolute
bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine the proportionality of
the punishment imposed on a member while reviewing the validity of
the action taken by the House. By focusing on the proportionality of
punishment, courts must ensure that justice aligns with constitutional
values and societal norms, thereby upholding the integrity of the
democratic process.
63. At this point, it must be added that the determination of what
constitutes a disproportionate measure is inherently complex and
context-dependent. Such assessment requires a nuanced scrutiny
of the specific circumstances surrounding each case. This means
that a one-size-fits-all definition is impractical while adjudicating
proportionality and the courts must exercise their discretion in a
prudent and judicious manner.
64. We deem it appropriate to outline a few guiding principles for courts
to consider while scrutinising the proportionality of actions taken by
the House against its member(s). We clarify that these parameters
are not exhaustive, as considerations will inevitably vary from case
to case. An indicative list of such parameters includes:
(a) Degree of obstruction caused by the member in the proceedings
of the House;
(b) Whether the behaviour of the member has brought disrepute
to the dignity of the entire House;
(c) The previous conduct of the erring member;
(d) The subsequent conduct of the erring member, such as
expressing remorse, cooperation with the institutional scrutiny
mechanism;
(e) Availability of lesser restrictive measures to discipline the
delinquent member;
(f) Whether crude expressions uttered are deliberate and motivated
or a mere outcome of language largely influenced by the local
dialect;
(g) Whether the measure adopted is suitable for furthering the
desired purpose; and
(h) Balancing the interest of society, particularly the electorates,
with those of the erring members.
2158 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
65. We are of the view that a scrutiny of the punishment given to the
members by the House on the abovementioned framework will
ensure that the legislative actions are justified, necessary, and
balanced, protecting both the integrity of the legislative body and
the rights of its members, as well as the larger societal objective.
It is also imperative that such legislative action remains mindful of
the fundamental principle that the purpose of imposing punishment
is not to serve as a tool for retribution but rather to uphold and
enforce discipline within the House. The primary objective should
be to maintain decorum and foster an environment of constructive
debate and deliberation. Any punitive measure must be proportionate
and guided by considerations of fairness, reasonableness, and due
process, ensuring that it does not unduly stifle democratic participation
or undermine the representative nature of the institution.
E.3. Was the Petitioner’s expulsion proportionate to the offence
alleged against him, and whether it merits any interference?
66. Since we have reiterated the power which vests in this Court to
scrutinise the proportionality of punishment imposed on a member
while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House, we
may now proceed to examine whether the punishment imposed on
the Petitioner was proportionate or it merits any interference.
67. It needs no emphasis that there is no place for aggression and
indecency in the proceedings of the Parliament or the Legislature.
Members are expected to show complete respect and deference
towards each other. This expectation is not merely a matter of tradition
or formality; it is essential for the effective functioning of democratic
processes. It ensures that debates and discussions are productive,
focused on the issues at hand, and conducted in a manner that
upholds the dignity of the institution. The right to speak inside the
House cannot be harnessed as a tool to insult, humiliate or defame
a fellow member, Ministers and most importantly, the Chair itself.
68. Based on the material placed on record, it is evident that the
demeanour of the Petitioner in the House was abhorrent and
unbecoming of a member of the Legislature. We are constrained
to add that the Petitioner’s subsequent evasive and high-handed
demeanour before the Ethics Committee was even more egregious.
We have no hesitation in observing that the Petitioner actively
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2159
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
attempted to delay and obfuscate the proceedings by refusing to
cooperate with the Ethics Committee. We have already elaborated
on how the Petitioner sought exemption from appearing before the
Ethics Committee on some pretext or another. Such behaviour was
nothing but a brazen attempt to circumvent the authority of the
Ethics Committee.
69. Even when the Petitioner finally appeared before the Ethics
Committee, instead of answering the charges against him, he deemed
it appropriate to question the authenticity and legitimacy of the Ethics
Committee itself. The Petitioner, who has served as his party’s Chief
Whip in the BLC, cannot possibly claim that he was unaware of the
provisions under which the Ethics Committee was constituted and
conducted its proceedings. The haughtiness demonstrated by the
Petitioner before the Ethics Committee is, no doubt, highly undignified
of a Public Representative.
70. At this stage, it is essential to mention that the Petitioner cannot draw
any parity with the other delinquent member, Md. Sohaib, who duly
cooperated with the Ethics Committee and expressed remorse for
his conduct. The behavioural pattern of the Petitioner, on the other
hand, underscores a deliberate attempt to undermine the regulatory
process and thwart the dispensation of justice. We are also mindful
of the fact that the Petitioner has demonstrated similar misconduct
previously as well, for which he was suspended from the House for
a brief period.
71. Be that as it may, notwithstanding the conduct of the Petitioner as
elaborated hereinabove, we are at the same time of the considered
view that the House, as custodian of constitutional values and
democratic principles, ought to exercise magnanimity and rise above
petty criticism and unwarranted remarks against its members. In
doing so, they would exemplify the virtues of tolerance, restraint,
and institutional maturity, thereby reinforcing the dignity, impartiality,
and respectability of their office.
72. While we do not discount the fundamental principle that an individual
must bear the consequences of their actions, we are equally mindful
that the ramifications of such a decision extend beyond the Petitioner
alone. The actions prescribed against the Petitioner will inevitably
have a direct and significant impact on a vast number of stakeholders,
particularly the constituents who have reposed their faith in the
2160 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Petitioner as their representative. Their voices, aspirations, and
democratic rights cannot be disregarded, and it is in furtherance of
these principles that the needs and interests of the electorate must
take precedence in any decision that affects their representation in
a democratic forum.
73. While dealing with individuals, such as the Petitioner, it is imperative
that disciplinary measures are undertaken with due regard to the
principles of proportionality and fairness. The House, in the exercise
of its authority to regulate its own proceedings and maintain order,
must not lose sight of the necessity for a calibrated and judicious
approach.
74. In fact, this aspect is already prescribed in the Rules governing the
procedure of the BLC. In this regard, our attention was drawn to Rule
10, Chapter 36 of the Bihar Vidhan Parishad – Rules of Procedure
and Conduct of Business, which provides for the penalties that the
Ethics Committee may recommend. A perusal of the provision depicts
that if the Committee finds a member violating the code/rules, it
may recommend: (a) Censure, (b) Reprimand, (c) Suspension from
the House for a specified period; and (d) any other punishment as
deemed fit.
75. This Court, in a series of decisions, has consistently held that
punishment disproportionate to the offence or action is in direct
violation of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution
of India, particularly Articles 14 and 21.32 The expulsion of the
Petitioner from the House not only raises concerns about the
violation of Fundamental Rights but also impacts the legal rights
of his constituents. We find that the disproportionate nature of the
punishment imposed by the House in expelling the Petitioner pricks
the conscience of this Court compelling it to intervene on the sheet
anchor of justice and fairness.
76. Given the applicable provisions and the underlying objective of
imposing penalties on members of the House, we are of the view
that the primary purpose of imposing penalties is to discipline the
members and ensure the smooth and orderly functioning of the
32 Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 611; Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sangthan & Ors. v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2161
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
House. A more measured and balanced approach would have
sufficed to address the misconduct while upholding the dignity and
decorum of the House.
77. We reiterate that the principle of proportionality is a cornerstone
of our judicial system, and it mandates that the severity of the
punishment must correspond to the gravity of the offence. Given the
aforementioned analysis, we hold that the punishment meted out to
the Petitioner was excessive and disproportionate to the nature of
the offence he committed.
E.4. If Issue No. (iii) is answered in the affirmative, whether this
Court is empowered to determine the quantum of punishment
that may be imposed on the Petitioner?
78. Having held that the punishment of expulsion imposed on the
Petitioner is harsh and disproportionate, the only natural corollary
would then be to consider the appropriate quantum of punishment
that should be imposed on the Petitioner and whether this Court can
undertake such determination.
79. In ordinary course, when a court concludes that the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority is disproportionate to the gravity
of the misconduct, it does not generally substitute its own assessment
of the appropriate penalty. Instead, the established judicial approach
is to remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration.
80. This principle stems from the recognition that the authority imposing
the punishment is best placed to evaluate the nature of the misconduct
and determine an appropriate sanction within the framework of service
rules and regulations. Judicial restraint in such matters ensures that
courts do not usurp the role of administrative authorities by engaging
in executive decision-making.
81. Having said that, it is equally important to underscore that this Court
is not devoid of the power to intervene in exceptional circumstances.
In order to curtail perpetuating illegality, abridge prolonged litigation,
prevent unnecessary hardship to the parties involved and to do
complete justice, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
142 of the Constitution, is vested with the authority to substitute the
punishment where the facts and circumstances so warrant.33
33 B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 749.
2162 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
82. We have already held that the expulsion of the Petitioner is
disproportionate and undoubtedly infringes his Fundamental Rights
guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
expulsion also has a direct impact on a vast number of stakeholders,
particularly the electorates he represents. We cannot be oblivious of
the fact that the Petitioner has already undergone almost 7 months
of expulsion. He has also missed the 208th Session of the BLC held
between 25.11.2024 and 29.11.2024, and since his term is expiring
in the year 2026, the Petitioner is left with a short duration.
83. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we are of the
view that if this matter is now remanded to the Ethics Committee
for reconsideration of the appropriate punishment, the ensuing
process is likely to be protracted, which might deprive the Petitioner
in participating in the ensuing Sessions.
84. In such situations, the constitutional mandate empowers this Court to
transcend procedural limitations and provide equitable relief in cases
where rigid adherence to legal provisions may result in injustice.
When the established remedies fall short of addressing exceptional
circumstances or fail to meet the demands of justice, this Court, as
the final arbiter, must invoke its constitutional powers to bridge the
gap and ensure a just, fair, and equitable resolution.
85. It is settled law that the extraordinary powers vested in this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, may be invoked in
cases where remitting the matter would result in undue delay and
where the interests of justice demand a swift resolution. In view
thereof, we are of the considered opinion that the exceptional situation
before us warrants invocation of our powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution to do complete justice between the parties.
86. Balancing the competing considerations, we hold that the period
of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner is deemed to
be considered as a period of his suspension; and in our view,
constitutes sufficient punishment for the misconduct displayed by
him. Accordingly, the Impugned Report of the Ethics Committee and
the subsequent Notification notifying the expulsion of the Petitioner
deserves to be modified to that extent. As a segue thereto, the
Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as member of the BLC with
immediate effect.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 2163
Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v.
Bihar Legislative Council (Through Secretary) and Ors.
87. We may clarify that the indulgence extended by this Court in reducing
the punishment imposed on the Petitioner should not be misconstrued
as condonation of his conduct. This Court has exercised its discretion
squarely in the interests of proportionality and fairness. Consequently,
the Petitioner is expected to uphold the dignity of the House and
adhere to the standards of discipline befitting its members. Henceforth,
it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to conduct himself with decorum
and responsibility in legislative proceedings. Any deviation from this
expectation or recurrence of misconduct will not be viewed lightly,
and the concerned authority shall be at liberty to take appropriate
action in accordance with law.
F. Conclusion and Directions
88. In view of the foregoing discussion and considering the totality of
the facts and circumstances, we deem it appropriate to allow this
Writ Petition in the following terms:
a) The objection raised by the Respondents against the
maintainability of the instant petition is rejected. The issues
raised in this Writ Petition do not fall within the restrictions
outlined under Article 212 (1) of the Constitution of India.
b) There is no absolute bar on the Constitutional Courts to examine
the proportionality of the punishment imposed on a Member
while reviewing the validity of the action taken by the House.
c) The punishment meted out to the Petitioner was highly excessive
and disproportionate to the nature of the misconduct committed
by him.
d) The period of expulsion already undergone by the Petitioner shall
be deemed as a period of his suspension from the House and
will amount to be sufficient punishment for his misdemeanour.
Accordingly, we set aside the Impugned Report of the Ethics
Committee as well as the Notification of the BLC, only to the
extent of nature of punishment it recommends to be imposed
on the Petitioner.
e) The Petitioner is directed to be reinstated as a member of the
BLC with immediate effect. However, he shall not be entitled
to claim any remuneration or other monetary benefits for the
period of his disbandment. The Petitioner shall be entitled to
2164 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
such other perks and privileges which any other similarly placed
MLC is entitled to upon completion of their full tenure. For the
limited purpose of post-tenure benefits, if any, the Petitioner
shall be deemed to have served as MLC for the entire tenure.
f) Should the Petitioner indulge further in such misconduct upon
his reinstatement, we leave it to the Ethics Committee or
Chairperson of the BLC to take appropriate action, in accordance
with law.
g) As an upshot of the foregoing, the Press Note dated 30.12.2024
issued by Respondent No. 6, Election Commission, declaring
the bye-election for the seat earlier held by the Petitioner is
hereby quashed, and any action taken pursuant to such Press
Note is annulled.
89. The Writ Petition is disposed of in the above terms.
90. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.
Ordered accordingly.
Result of the case: Writ Petition allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Harshit Anand, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Ankit Gyan, Editor)
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