Holding

The ICC constituted in the aggrieved woman’s department has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint; the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” is procedural, not jurisdictional, and the ICC’s report must be sent to the respondent’s employer for disciplinary action.

Summary

The case involved an IAS officer (the aggrieved woman) who alleged that an IRS officer (the appellant) sexually harassed her at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi. She filed a complaint under the POSH Act before the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of her own department, the Department of Food and Public Distribution. The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of that ICC, arguing that Section 11’s phrase “where the respondent is an employee” required the complaint to be heard by the ICC of his own department. The Supreme Court examined the text, context, and purpose of the POSH Act, interpreting “where” as a procedural condition and holding that the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace can entertain complaints against employees of other departments. It further clarified that the ICC conducts a preliminary fact‑finding inquiry and, under Section 13, forwards its report to the respondent’s employer for disciplinary action, with no prejudice to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the ICC’s report was sent to the appellant’s department for appropriate action.

Issues considered

Whether an ICC constituted in one Central Government department has jurisdiction to entertain a POSH Act complaint against an employee of a different department.
Whether the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11 of the POSH Act mandates that the ICC proceedings be instituted at the respondent’s workplace.
If not, how should action be taken by the respondent’s department under Section 13 of the POSH Act.
Whether the proceedings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace caused any prejudice to the appellant.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. 14(2)
Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964s. 3C
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 204, s. 354, s. 354D, s. 506, s. 509
Information Technology Act, 2000s. 67
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013s. 11, s. 13, s. 19(f), s. 19(h), s. 2(o), s. 2(o)(v), s. 9

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the Internal Complaints Committee-ICC constituted in one department of the Central Government has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of the Central Government; the respondent is an employee’ as contained in s.11 of the POSH Act would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint was

Subjects

Internal Complaints Committee-ICCJurisdiction of ICCComplaint of sexual harassmentWhere the respondent is an employeeICC proceedingsWorkplace of the respondentInter‑departmental harassmentIAS officerIRS officerRole of ICC in conducting inquiryPrinciples of Statutory InterpretationRelevance of text and context of a statuteDuties of employer

Judgment

[2025] 12 S.C.R. 505 : 2025 INSC 1415

Dr. Sohail Malik
v.
Union of India & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024)
10 December 2025
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Vijay Bishnoi, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the Internal Complaints Committee-ICC
constituted in one department of the Central Government has the
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under
the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of
the Central Government; whether the use of the words ‘where the
respondent is an employee’ as contained in s.11 of the POSH Act
would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried
out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace
of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint
was made; and if not, under the scheme of s.13, how is action
supposed to be taken by the department of the ‘respondent’ in
pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved
woman’s department; and whether the proceedings of the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman, have caused
any prejudice to the appellant, warranting interference by this Court.

Headnotes†
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – ss.2(o), 2(o)(v), 9,
11 – Complaint of sexual harassment – Jurisdiction of
Internal Complaints Committee-ICC – ICC constituted in one
Government Department, if can entertain a complaint under the
Act against the appellant working at a different Government
Department at the relevant time – IAS officer alleged that the
appellant IRS officer, sexually harassed her at her workplace-
Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi – FIR by the aggrieved woman
against the appellant – Subsequently, complaint under the
POSH Act presented before the ICC constituted u/s.9 at the
aggrieved woman’s department/workplace-Department of Food
and Public Distribution – Pursuant thereto ICC issued meeting

* Author
506 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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notice/order to the appellant – Appellant filed application
before the tribunal challenging jurisdiction of ICC, however
the same was dismissed – High Court upheld the said order –
Correctness:
Held: Aggrieved woman can approach ICC of her own department
against harassment by an employee of another workplace –
Phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ in s.11, cannot be
interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against ‘respondent’ may
only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the ‘respondent’ – Such restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act
contrary to the scheme and object of the Act and its intent as a
social welfare legislation, specifically in light of the wide definition of
the term ‘workplace’ in s.2(o)(v) which include any place visited by
the employee ‘arising out of or during the course of employment’ –
U/s.13, recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to
the ‘employer’ which shall then take a decision with respect to
initiation of disciplinary action – In light of the OM dt 6.07.2025,
ICC has a dual-role-to conduct the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry
under POSH Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal
disciplinary proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965, since
nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department of the
aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry and upon receiving the report of the ICC, if the employer
initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the
Department of the ‘respondent’ shall act as the inquiry authority in
the disciplinary proceedings – In case the ICC constituted at the
aggrieved woman’s workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry
under the POSH Act, the employer of the ‘respondent’, even if it
is a different department, must abide its duties u/s.19(f) to swiftly
cooperate and make available information upon a request by the
ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace, which has duly been
complied with – ‘Respondent’ not shown that any prejudice has
been caused to him due to the proceedings being carried out by
the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman.
[Para 72]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.11 – Inquiry into the
complaint – Textual interpretation of s.11 – Meaning of the
word ‘where’ as used therein:
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 507

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

Held: s.11(1) envisages three distinct situations or contingencies,
followed by how inquiry into a complaint is to be carried out by the
ICC or Local Committee – Use of the word ‘where’ as it occurs in the
contingency (i) and (ii), refers to two different conditions precedent/
situations, where contingency (i) relates to a situation in case the
‘respondent’ is ‘employee’ under the meaning as prescribed under
the POSH Act, inquiry must be made by the ICC in accordance
with the service rules applicable to him, and contingency (ii) relates
to a situation in case no such rules exist, it shall be inquired into
by ICC in such manner as prescribed – Contingency (iii) is a
different situation altogether-in case the ‘respondent’ is a domestic
worker, the Local Committee shall, on taking a prima facie view
about the existence of a case against ‘respondent’, forward the
complaint to the police – Contingency (i) and (iii) operate in the
form of ‘either-or’ – Grammatical function of the word ‘where’ as
appearing in s.11 is that of a ‘conditional conjunction’– When the
section is read as a whole, it has been constructed in the form of
‘where and where or, detailing three different contingencies and
the procedure to be followed in each contingency – Merely the
phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ cannot be read in
isolation, all parts of the section must be read together to find out
a workable conclusion – In case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’,
the ICC is obligated to apply the service rules applicable to him,
but it does not mean that the ICC constituted at the workplace
of the aggrieved woman cannot exercise jurisdiction – As such,
the construction of s.11 is in the nature of a procedural section
rather than one that lays down jurisdictional restraints. [Paras 42,
43, 45, 46]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.11 – Inquiry into
the complaint – Respondent, if to be employee of the same
workplace as aggrieved woman:
Held: Definitions of the word ‘employee’ and ‘workplace’ are
completely neutral, as they do not suggest that the ‘respondent’
must necessarily be an employee of the workplace where the
aggrieved woman works – Expansive definitions of the words
“respondent, employee and workplace” enable the ICC constituted
at the aggrieved woman’s workplace to exercise jurisdiction over
an employee of a different workplace – None of these definitions
provide that the ‘respondent’ must necessarily be an employee of
508 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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the same workplace where the aggrieved woman works – It cannot
be said that in view of s.19(h), the only remedy available to the
aggrieved woman when the perpetrator of sexual harassment is
an outsider (employee of a different workplace) is to register a
complaint under the IPC through the employer, since s.19(h) makes
it a duty of the employer to facilitate the initiation of action under
the IPC if the aggrieved woman so desires, it is not in derogation
or exclusion of the power to initiate proceedings under the POSH
Act – Even where the ‘respondent’ is not an employee anywhere,
criminal proceedings may be initiated. [Paras 47, 49, 50]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Contextual Interpretation
of provisions of the POSH Act – Intent, purpose and context
of the Act:
Held: POSH Act was enacted by the legislature, recognizing the
legislative void – Its intent is to uphold women’s right to equality
u/Arts.14 and 15 and right to a dignified life u/Art.21 – POSH Act
does not merely punish acts of sexual harassment, but actively
imposes a legal duty on employers to prohibit and prevent
harassment – Narrow interpretation of provisions of the POSH Act, in
order to hold that only the ICC of the workplace of the ‘respondent’
has jurisdiction to inquire into complaints against him, irrespective
of where the workplace of the aggrieved woman is or where the
alleged act of sexual harassment took place, would undermine the
POSH Act’s remedial social welfare intent since it would create
significant practical hurdles for the aggrieved woman – POSH Act,
by introducing s. 2(o)(v) which enlarged the scope of ‘workplace’
to include any place visited by the employee during the course of
employment, including during transportation, has expanded the
scope of ‘workplace’ manifold – In such a case, the intent of the
legislature was clearly to prohibit acts of sexual harassment at any
place incidental to work and employment, at any place visited by
the employees during the course of employment – Taboo around
sexual harassment at the workplace and the fear of stigma which
may be attached to the aggrieved woman as a consequence of a
complaint regarding sexual harassment already poses a massive
psychological barrier for the aggrieved women which actively
dissuades them from pursuing their remedy in law – In view thereof,
the intent of the legislature behind giving such a wide meaning to
the word ‘workplace’ to go beyond the bounds of the traditional
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 509

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

meaning implying location of the office, cannot be brushed aside
by narrow construction of other provisions of the POSH Act – It
cannot be said that only the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the ‘respondent’ has the jurisdiction to entertain complaints and
not the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace.
[Paras 53, 54, 56, 57]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.13 – Inquiry
report – Construction and the scheme of s.13 – Role of ICC
in conducting inquiry – Action to be taken by the department
of the ‘respondent’ in pursuance of the findings of the ICC
constituted at the aggrieved woman’s department:
Held: Under the scheme of the POSH Act and particularly u/s.13,
nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the workplace of the
aggrieved woman from carrying out the preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry at the first stage – After completion of the fact-finding inquiry,
the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman
can send its recommendation and report to the employer of the
‘respondent’ – Upon receiving the findings and recommendations
of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace, the
employer of the ‘respondent’ and the Disciplinary Authority, upon
making a decision that disciplinary proceedings are warranted,
can then issue a charge-sheet to the ‘respondent’ and initiate
disciplinary proceedings against him – In this inquiry, the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ may conduct the
second stage formal inquiry, acting as the inquiring authority for
the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings – As such, the OM
dated 16.07.2015, in respect of employees of the Government
of India treats inquiry into complaints of sexual harassment as
a two-stage process where there is a preliminary/fact-finding
inquiry at first and then a disciplinary proceedings based on the
findings of the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry – Fact that ultimately
disciplinary action against the ‘respondent’ has to be taken by his
employer and his department cannot be an impediment for the
ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman to take
up the fact-finding inquiry u/s.11 when read with the OM – s.13(3)
(i) lays down that the ICC, upon reaching the conclusion that the
allegations against the ‘respondent’ are proved, shall recommend
to the employer to take disciplinary action for sexual harassment
as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service
rules of the ‘respondent’. [Paras 66, 67]
510 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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Interpretation of statutes – Principles of Statutory Interpretation –
Relevance of text and context of a statute:
Held: Language employed in a statute is the best aid for statutory
interpretation – Primary rule of construction is the intention of the
legislature and the same must be found in the words used by the
legislature itself – However, where there is doubt or ambiguity
about the meaning of the words used, interpretation must be made
keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statute – Thus,
both text and context of a statute have their own relevance while
interpreting provisions of a statute – Part of a section cannot be
read in isolation, the construction of the entire section must be
made as a sum of its parts and no word or phrase thereof can be
picked out in isolation to give a certain meaning to the section as
a whole. [Paras 32, 35]

Case Law Cited
Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya
(1987) 1 SCC 606 – held applicable.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 404 : (1997)
6 SCC 241; Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC
311; Kanai Lal Sur v.Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [1958] 1 SCR 360 :
1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; RBI v. Peerless General Finance &
Investment Co. Ltd. [1987] 2 SCR 1 : (1987) 1 SCC 424; Eera v.
State (NCT of Delhi) [2017] 7 SCR 924 : (2017) 15 SCC 133; S.G.
Glass Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE [1994] Supp. 5 SCR 305 : (1995) 1
SCC 680 – referred to.
Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of Taxes) [1968]
AC 1097 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Concise Oxford English Dictionary 10th Edition, 2002, Pg. 1629;
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases South Asian
Edition, 2008, Volume 3 at Pg. 3009; P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s
Advanced Law Lexicon 7th Edition, Volume 4, at Pg. 6754;
Justice C.K. Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon 2008/2009
Edition, Volume 4 at Pg. 5030 – referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860; Central Civil Services
(Conduct) Rules, 1964; Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 511

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013; Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965;
Information Technology Act, 2000.

List of Keywords
Internal Complaints Committee-ICC; Jurisdiction of ICC; Complaint
of sexual harassment; Where the respondent is an employee;
ICC proceedings; Workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the
workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and
complaint was made; Complaint of sexual harassment; Appellant
and aggrieved woman working at different Government Department;
IAS officer; IRS officer; Role of ICC in conducting inquiry; Principles
of Statutory Interpretation; Relevance of text and context of a
statute; Duties of employer.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2023 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP(C) No. 8624 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Vipin Sanghi, Sr. Adv., Piyush Sharma, Anuj Kumar Sharma, Aditya
Dikshit, Shivesh Srivastava, Piyush Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.Gs., Raj
Bahadur Yadav, Abhijeet Singh, Ms. Shivika Mehra, Ms. Harshita
Choubey, Hritik Kashyap, Noor Rampal, Shreekant Neelappa
Terdal, Abhay Kumar, Shagun Ruhil, Karan Chopra.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.K. Maheshwari J.

1. Assailing the final judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”)
in WP (C) 8624/2023 confirming the judgment dated 23.06.2023
512 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as “CAT”) in OA No. 1838/2023, the instant
appeal has been preferred.
2. The jurisdictional challenge by the Appellant in the present case,
inter alia relates to whether the Internal Complaints Committee
(hereinafter referred to as “ICC”) constituted at a certain Department
of the Government of India can entertain a complaint under the
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition
and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “POSH Act”)
against the Appellant who was working at a different Department of
the Government of India at the relevant time.

FACTS
3. The Appellant is a 2010 batch officer of the Indian Revenue Service
(hereinafter referred to as “IRS”) who, at the relevant point of time,
was posted as OSD, Investigation, Central Board of Direct Taxes,
Delhi. A 2004 batch Indian Administrative Service (hereinafter referred
to as “IAS”) officer (hereinafter referred to as “aggrieved woman”)
who was, at the relevant time, posted as Joint Secretary, Department
of Food and Public Distribution alleged that on 15.05.2023, the
Appellant sexually harassed her at her workplace, which was at
Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.
4. An FIR bearing No. 53/2023 was registered by the aggrieved woman
against the Appellant on 16.05.2023 under Sections 354, 354D,
506, 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”). As stated across the Bar, chargesheet has been filed in the
said case on 09.03.2024 under Sections 354, 354-D, 506, 509, 201
and 204 of IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 and the criminal case is pending.
5. Subsequently, a complaint under the POSH Act was presented
before the ICC constituted under Section 9 of the POSH Act at the
aggrieved woman’s department / workplace, i.e., the Department of
Food and Public Distribution on 24.05.2023.
6. Since the present appeal arises out of the challenge to the jurisdiction
of the ICC, we are not concerned with the fate of the criminal case
ensuing out of the incident and are not delving into the particular
facts and details as contained in the complaint.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 513

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

7. Pursuant to the complaint by the aggrieved woman, the ICC through
its Member Secretary issued a meeting notice/order bearing F No.
01/01/2023-ICC dated 13.06.2023 to the Appellant, scheduling a
hearing for the complaint, for him to appear on 22.06.2023 along
with a response to the complaint.
8. It was at this stage, the Appellant filed OA No. 1838/2023 before
the CAT seeking direction to set aside the order/notice dated
13.06.2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
The CAT dismissed the OA filed by the Appellant, which has been
upheld by the High Court vide the impugned order. Upon preferring
the present appeal before this Court, vide order dated 18.07.2023
it was directed that the inquiry may go on, but the final outcome of
the inquiry shall be kept in a sealed cover.
9. We have been informed across the Bar that the inquiry has since
concluded and we have also been supplied a copy of the inquiry
report and proceedings in sealed cover, which is awaiting subsequent
action, subject to outcome of the present appeal.

SCHEME OF THE POSH ACT
10. The scheme of the POSH Act itself is drawn from the monumental
judgment of this Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan1 in a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India filed by social
activists, NGOs and public-spirited persons, where this Court came
up with various guidelines to enforce the fundamental right of
‘gender equality’ and ‘right to life and liberty’ under Articles 14, 15,
19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. While coming up with
the guidelines, the Court interpreted Article 14, 42 and 52(A) of the
Constitution of India and also drew inspiration from recommendations
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (hereinafter referred to as “CEDAW”).
11. This Court, even prior to the POSH Act being legislated, through
an interim order dated 26.04.2004 in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union
of India2 clarified that the Complaints Committee envisaged by the
Court in Vishaka (Supra) shall be deemed to be an inquiry authority

1 (1997) 6 SCC 241.
2 (2013) 1 SCC 311.
514 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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for the purposes of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter referred to as “CCS (Conduct) Rules”.
“2. Notice had been issued to several parties including
the Governments concerned and on getting appropriate
responses from them and now after hearing the learned
Attorney General for UOI and the learned counsel, we
direct as follows:
“Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme
Court in its judgment in Vishaka case [(1997) 6 SCC
241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 932] , SCC at p. 253, will be
deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes
of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964
(hereinafter called the CCS Rules) and the report of
the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be
an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter
the disciplinary authority will act on the report in
accordance with the Rules.””
12. The POSH Act itself was notified on 09.12.2013. Along with the
said Act came to be enacted The Sexual Harassment of Women
at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as “POSH Rules”).
13. Section 2(a) of the POSH Act defines the term ‘aggrieved woman’:
“(a) “aggrieved woman” means -
(i) in relation to a workplace, a woman, of any age whether
employed or not, who alleges to have been subjected to
any act of sexual harassment by the respondent;
(ii) in relation to dwelling place or house, a woman of any
age who is employed in such a dwelling place or house;”
14. The term ‘employee’ has been defined in Section 2(f) of the POSH
Act as:
“(f) “employee” means a person employed at a workplace
for any work on regular, temporary, ad hoc or daily wage
basis, either directly or through an agent, including a
contractor, with or, without the knowledge of the principal
employer, whether for remuneration or not, or working
on a voluntary basis or otherwise, whether the terms of
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 515

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

employment are express or implied and includes a co-
worker, a contract worker, probationer, trainee, apprentice
or called by any other such name;”
15. The term ‘employer’ has been defined in Section 2(g) of the POSH
Act as:
“(g) “employer’ means –
(i) in relation to any department, organisation, undertaking,
establishment, enterprise, Institution, office, branch or
unit of the appropriate Government or a local authority,
the head of that department, organisation, undertaking,
establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit
or such other officer as the appropriate Government or
the local authority, as the case maybe, may by an order
specify in this behalf;
(ii) in any workplace not covered under sub-clause (i), any
person responsible for the management, supervision and
control of the workplace.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this sub-clause
“management” includes the person or board or committee
responsible for formulation and administration of polices
for such organisation;
(iii) in relation to workplace covered under sub-clauses
(i) and (ii), the person discharging contractual obligations
with respect to his or her employees;
(iv) in relation to a dwelling place or house, a person or a
household who employs or benefits from the employment
of domestic worker, irrespective of the number, time
period or type of such worker employed, or the nature of
the employment or activities performed by the domestic
worker;”
16. The word ‘respondent’ has been defined in Section 2(m) of the POSH
Act as “a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a
complaint under section 9”.
17. Most importantly, the word ‘workplace’ has been defined in Section
2(o) of the POSH Act as follows:
516 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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“(o) “workplace” includes –
(i) any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment,
enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit which is
established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially
financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the
appropriate Government or the local authority or a
Government company or a corporation or a co-operative
society;
(ii) any private sector organisation or a private venture,
undertaking, enterprise, institution, establishment, society,
trust, non-governmental organisation, unit or service
provider carrying on commercial, professional, vocational,
educational, entertainmental, industrial, health services
or financial activities including production, supply, sale,
distribution or service;
(iii) hospitals or nursing homes;
(iv) any sports institute, stadium, sports complex or
competition or games venue, whether residential or not
used for training, sports or other activities relating thereto;
(v) any place visited by the employee arising out of or
during the course of employment including transportation
by the employer for undertaking such journey;
(vi) a dwelling place or a house;
18. Section 2(h) of the POSH Act defines ‘Internal Committee’ as an
Internal Complaints Committee constituted under Section 4 of the
POSH Act, which, in turn, provides for constitution of the Internal
Complaints Committee, its composition, membership and manner
of removal of members.
19. The definition of the term ‘sexual harassment’ itself has been laid
down in Section 2(n) of the POSH Act, while Section 3(2) of the
Act further explains ‘acts’ or ‘circumstances’ which may amount to
sexual harassment. Section 3(1) of the POSH Act provides that ‘No
woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace’.
20. A complaint of sexual harassment may be made by an aggrieved
woman under Section 9 of the POSH Act, as quoted below:
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 517

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

“9. Complaint of sexual harassment.– (1) Any aggrieved
woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual
harassment at workplace to the Internal Committee if so
constituted, or the Local Committee, in case it is not so
constituted, within a period of three months from the date
of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within a
period of three months from the date of last incident:
Provided that where such complaint cannot be made
in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the
Internal Committee or the Chairperson or any Member of
the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render
all reasonable assistance to the woman for making the
complaint in writing:
Provided further that the Internal Committee or, as the case
may be, the Local Committee may, for the reasons to be
recorded in writing, extend the time limit not exceeding
three months , if it is satisfied that the circumstances were
such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint
within the said period.
(2) Where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a
complaint on account of her physical or mental in capacity
or death or otherwise, her legal heir or such other person
as may be prescribed may make a complaint under this
section.”
21. The ICC or the Local Committee, upon receiving a complaint, may,
at the request of the aggrieved woman, take steps to settle the
matter between the aggrieved woman and the respondent through
‘conciliation’ under Section 10 of the POSH Act.
22. In case an inquiry is to be made into the complaint filed by an
aggrieved woman, Section 11 of the POSH Act lays down the provision
for inquiry into the complaint. It is a major bone of contention in the
present case and is relevant, hence quoted as follows:
“11. Inquiry into complaint.– (1) Subject to the provisions
of section 10, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall, where the
respondent is an employee, proceed to make inquiry into
the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the
518 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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service rules applicable to the respondent and where no
such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed
or in case of a domestic worker, the Local Committee
shall, if prima facie case exist, forward the complaint to
the police, within a period of seven days for registering
the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860), and any other relevant provisions of the said
Code where applicable:
Provided that where the aggrieved woman informs the
Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case
may be, that any term or condition of the settlement
arrived at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has not been
complied with by the respondent, the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry
into the complaint or, as the case may be, forward the
complaint to the police:
Provided further that where both the parties are employees,
the parties shall, during the course of inquiry, be given
an opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings
shall be made available to both the parties enabling them
to make representation against the findings before the
Committee.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 509
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the court may,
when the respondent is convicted of the offence, order
payment of such sums as it may consider appropriate, to
the aggrieved woman by the respondent, having regard
to the provisions of section 15.
(3) For the purpose of making an inquiry under sub-section
(1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as
the case may be, shall have the same powers as are
vested in a civil court the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) when trying a suit in respect of the following
matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
documents; and
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(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(d) The inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be
completed within a period of ninety days.”
23. Thereafter, Section 13 of the POSH Act lays down the procedure
which is to be followed upon completion of an inquiry. The said
provision is also relevant and is therefore quoted herein:
“13. Inquiry report.— (1) On the completion of an inquiry
under this Act, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall provide a report of
its findings to the employer, or as the case may be, the
District Officer within a period of ten days from the date
of completion of the inquiry and such report be made
available to the concerned parties.
(2) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it
shall recommend to the employer and the District Officer
that no action is required to be taken in the matter.
(3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has been proved, it
shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer,
as the case may be—
(i) to take action for sexual harassment as a
misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the
service rules applicable to the respondent or where no
such service rules have been made, in such manner
as may be prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service
rules applicable to the respondent, from the salary or
wages of the respondent such sum as it may consider
appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or to
her legal heirs, as it may determine, in accordance
with the provisions of section 15:
Provide that in case the employer is unable to make
such deduction from the salary of the respondent due to
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his being absent from duty or cessation of employment
it may direct to the respondent to pay such sum to the
aggrieved woman:
Provided further that in case the respondent fails to pay
the sum referred to in clause (ii), the Internal Committee
or as, the case may be, the Local Committee may forward
the order for recovery of the sum as an arrear of land
revenue to the concerned District Officer.
(4) The employer or the District Officer shall act upon the
recommendation within sixty days of its receipt by him.”
24. The POSH Act, in Section 19, also imposes an active duty on the
‘employer’ to prohibit and prevent sexual harassment at the workplace
and to co-operate with the working of the ICC. The said provision is
relevant, and is therefore reproduced as under:
“19. Duties of employer.– Every employer shall –
(a) provide a safe working environment at the workplace
with shall include safety from the persons coming into
contact at the workplace;
(b) display at any conspicuous place in the workplace, the
penal consequences of sexual harassments; and the order
constituting, the Internal Committee under sub-section (1)
of section 4;
(c) organise workshops and awareness programmes at
regular intervals for sensitising the employees with the
provisions of the Act and orientation programmes for the
members of the Internal Committee in the manner as may
be prescribed;
(d) provide necessary facilities to the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee, as the case may be, for dealing
with the complaint and conducting an inquiry;
(e) assist in securing the attendance of respondent and
witnesses before the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be;
(f) make available such information to the Internal
Committee or the Local Committee, as the case be, as it
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may require having regard to the complaint made under
sub-section (1) of section 9;
(g) provide assistance to the woman if she so chooses to
file a complaint in relation to the offence under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time
being in force;
(h) cause to initiate action, under the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force,
against the perpetrator, or if the aggrieved woman so
desires, where the perpetrator is not an employee, in the
workplace at which the incident of sexual harassment
took place;
(i) treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the
service rules and initiate action for such misconduct;
(j) monitor the timely submission of reports by the Internal
Committee.”

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAT AND HIGH COURT
25. The thrust of the challenge as presented by the Appellant before the
CAT and the High Court, in short, was that since the Department
of Revenue was the controlling authority of the Appellant, the ICC
constituted under the Department of Food and Public Distribution
did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the
aggrieved woman under Section 9 of the POSH Act. As such, the
Appellant contended that it was only the ICC constituted under his
own Department which can institute ICC proceedings against him.
To buttress this argument, much emphasis was laid by the Appellant
on Section 11 of the POSH Act. The Appellant urged that use of the
words ‘where the respondent is an employee’ in Section 11 implies
that the inquiry into a complaint for sexual harassment must be
done by the ICC constituted at the workplace where the Appellant
is employed. Consequently, he argued that the workplace of the
aggrieved woman and the ‘respondent’ alleged of the act of sexual
harassment have to be the same, for the POSH Act to apply.
26. The CAT dismissed the challenge laid out by the Appellant and held
that the word ‘where’ used in Section 11 of the POSH Act relates to
difference in procedure to be followed by both types of committees
(ICC or Local Committee) when the ‘respondent’ is an employee
522 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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and when he is a domestic worker. The CAT also observed that
the word ‘workplace’ has been defined in the POSH Act in relation
to the aggrieved woman and the complaint under Section 9 of the
POSH Act may be enquired upon even when the ‘respondent’ has
no relation whatsoever with the workplace of the aggrieved woman.
27. The High Court, in the impugned order, engaged in purposive
interpretation of the POSH Act and held that if the provisions of
the POSH Act are interpreted in the manner as suggested by the
Appellant, it shall be contrary to the intent and purpose behind enacting
the POSH Act. The Court agreed with the interpretation of Section
11 of the POSH Act by the CAT and held that Section 11(1) does
not require that the aggrieved woman and the ‘respondent’ must be
working in the same Department. The High Court also interpreted the
phrase ‘service rules applicable to the respondent’ as mentioned in
Section 11 to hold that this phrase itself shows that the ‘respondent’
need not be an employee of the same workplace. The High Court
also interpreted Section 13 of the POSH Act and held that the ICC,
on finding that sexual harassment has been proved, may recommend
to the employer or District Officer of the ‘respondent’ to take action
in accordance with services rules applicable to them.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
28. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Vipin Sanghi appearing for the Appellant
has argued with vehemence that for civil servants, the CCS
(Conduct) Rules are a complete code on sexual harassment and
the correct recourse against a civil servant, therefore, is institution
of disciplinary proceedings in accordance with Rule 3C of the CCS
(Conduct) Rules. It is urged that such a disciplinary proceeding can
only be handled by the ICC constituted in his department, since his
controlling authority is different from the controlling authority of the
aggrieved woman where ICC proceedings have been instituted.
Placing heavy reliance on Section 13 of the POSH Act, he argues
that the ICC constituted where the appellant is an employee, solely
has jurisdiction to entertain complaints of sexual harassment, since
it is only his employer which may take action based on the findings
of the ICC. Learned Senior Counsel also urged that the use of
the phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ in Section 11
necessarily requires that the ICC proceedings must be instituted at
the workplace of the Appellant. It has been argued that as per Section
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19(h) of the POSH Act, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
woman when the perpetrator of an act of sexual harassment is not
an employee of the same department, is to initiate action under the
IPC or any other law.
29. Per contra, learned Assistant Solicitor General, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati
has argued that such an interpretation of Section 11 and other
provisions of the POSH Act would cause violence to the general
ethos of the POSH Act and defeat its very purpose. She has urged
that the POSH Act was legislated as a special law for women in
order to prevent the hardship faced by women at their workplace
and any interpretation of the Act must be done keeping this object
in mind. The wide ambit given to the word ‘workplace’ in Section
2(o) of the POSH Act and the word ‘employer’ in Section 2(g) of the
POSH Act shows the legislative intent to ensure sexual harassment
complaints by all women are duly addressed and enquired into. There
is no vacuum in the POSH Act for dealing with inter-departmental
enquiries of sexual harassment complaints. Under Section 13(3),
upon allegations of sexual harassment being proved, it has been
said that the employer or the district officer shall take necessary
action, which duly addresses the present situation. She argued
that the option to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 19(h)
cannot be read to be in derogation or exclusion of the proceedings
under the POSH Act.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
30. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal
of the facts and material placed on record, the following issues arise
for consideration:
(i) Whether the ICC constituted in one department of the Central
Government has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of
sexual harassment under the POSH Act against an employee
of a different department of the Central Government?
(ii) Whether the use of the words ‘where the respondent is an
employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act would
mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried
out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace
of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint
was made?
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(iii) If the answer to Issue No. 2 is in the negative, under the
scheme of Section 13, how is action supposed to be taken by
the department of the ‘respondent’ in pursuance of the findings
of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s department?
(iv) Whether the proceedings of the ICC constituted at the workplace
of the aggrieved woman, in the present case, have caused any
prejudice to the Appellant, warranting interference by this Court?

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES I and II
Since both issues are intertwined, we are appreciating and answering
contentions in respect of these issues collectively:
31. The dispute in the present case is confined to the jurisdictional
challenge made by the Appellant herein to the institution of ICC
proceedings against him by the ICC constituted at the workplace
of the aggrieved woman. We have gone through the documents on
record and heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. In
order to resolve the present case, we must engage in interpretation
of various provisions contained in the POSH Act.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation
32. Language employed in a statute is the best aid for statutory
interpretation. The first and primary rule of construction is the intention
of the Legislature and the same must be found in the words used
by the Legislature itself, as held in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan.3 However, where there is doubt or ambiguity about the
meaning of the words used, interpretation must be made keeping
in mind the object and purpose of the statute. Therefore, both text
and context of a statute have their own relevance while interpreting
provisions of a statute. This Court, in RBI v. Peerless General
Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.4 observed as thus:
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That

3 Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8.
4 (1987) 1 SCC 424.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 525

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interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation
match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we
know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute
must be read, first as a whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word.
If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment,
with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such
context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and
words may take colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the
context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a
whole and discover what each section, each clause, each
phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to
fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute
and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation.
Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a
place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the
definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by
reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons
for it that the Court construed the expression “Prize Chit”
in Srinivasa [(1980) 4 SCC 507 : (1981) 1 SCR 801 : 51
Com Cas 464] and we find no reason to depart from the
Court’s construction.”
33. More recently, in Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi),5 Dipak Misra, J.
in his separate concurring opinion, interpreted various judgments,
both domestic and international, and held that along with textual
interpretation, purpose, intent and context must also be seen,
especially when interpreting a social welfare legislation:
“64. I have referred to the aforesaid authorities to
highlight that legislative intention and the purpose of the
legislation regard being had to the fact that context has
to be appositely appreciated. It is the foremost duty of
the Court while construing a provision to ascertain the
intention of the legislature, for it is an accepted principle
that the legislature expresses itself with use of correct
words and in the absence of any ambiguity or the resultant

5 (2017) 15 SCC 133.
526 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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consequence does not lead to any absurdity, there is no
room to look for any other aid in the name of creativity.
There is no quarrel over the proposition that the method of
purposive construction has been adopted keeping in view
the text and the context of the legislation, the mischief it
intends to obliterate and the fundamental intention of the
legislature when it comes to social welfare legislations. If the
purpose is defeated, absurd result is arrived at. The Court
need not be miserly and should have the broad attitude to
take recourse to in supplying a word wherever necessary.
Authorities referred to hereinabove encompass various
legislations wherein the legislature intended to cover
various fields and address the issues. While interpreting a
social welfare or beneficent legislation one has to be guided
by the “colour”, “content” and the “context of statutes” and
if it involves human rights, the conceptions of Procrustean
justice and Lilliputian hollowness approach should be
abandoned. The Judge has to release himself from the
chains of strict linguistic interpretation and pave the path
that serves the soul of the legislative intention and in that
event, he becomes a real creative constructionist Judge.
65. I have perceived the approach in Hindustan Lever
Ltd. [Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, (1995) 6
SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1385] and Deepak Mahajan
[Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994)
3 SCC 440 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 785] , Pratap Singh [Pratap
Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 742] and many others. I have also analysed where
the Court has declined to follow the said approach as in
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla [R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v.
Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628] and other decisions. The
Court has evolved the principle that the legislative intention
must be gatherable from the text, content and context of
the statute and the purposive approach should help and
enhance the functional principle of the enactment. That
apart, if an interpretation is likely to cause inconvenience,
it should be avoided, and further personal notion or belief
of the Judge as regards the intention of the makers of the
statute should not be thought of. And, needless to say,
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for adopting the purposive approach there must exist the
necessity. The Judge, assuming the role of creatively
constructionist personality, should not wear any hat of
any colour to suit his thought and idea and drive his
thinking process to wrestle with words stretching beyond
a permissible or acceptable limit. That has the potentiality
to cause violence to the language used by the legislature.
Quite apart from, the Court can take aid of casus omissus,
only in a case of clear necessity and further it should
be discerned from the four corners of the statute. If the
meaning is intelligible, the said principle has no entry. It
cannot be a ready tool in the hands of a Judge to introduce
as and what he desires.”
34. R.F. Nariman, J. in his separate concurring opinion in Eera (Supra),
agreed with adopting principles of interpretation which duly address
both text and context of a statute. Relevant paragraphs of the said
judgment are quoted herein for ready reference:
“124. Indeed, the modern trend in other Commonwealth
countries, including UK and Australia, is to examine text
as well as context, and object or purpose as well as literal
meaning. Thus, in Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd. v. Ballard
(Kent) Ltd. [Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd. v. Ballard
(Kent) Ltd., 2000 Ch 12 : (1999) 3 WLR 57 : (1999) 2
All ER 791 (CA)] , Laws, L.J. stated the modern rule as
follows : (Ch p. 34)
“By way of introduction to the issue of statutory
construction I should say that in my judgment it is
nowadays misleading — and perhaps it always was —
to seek to draw a rigid distinction between literal and
purposive approaches to the interpretation of Acts of
Parliament. The difference between purposive and
literal construction is in truth one of degree only. On
received doctrine we spend our professional lives
construing legislation purposively, inasmuch as we
are enjoined at every turn to ascertain the intention
of Parliament. The real distinction lies in the balance
to be struck, in the particular case, between the literal
meaning of the words on the one hand and the context
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and purpose of the measure in which they appear
on the other. Frequently there will be no opposition
between the two, and then no difficulty arises. Where
there is a potential clash, the conventional English
approach has been to give at least very great and
often decisive weight to the literal meaning of the
enacting words. This is a tradition which I think is
weakening, in face of the more purposive approach
enjoined for the interpretation of legislative measures
of the European Union and in light of the House of
Lords’ decision in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart
[Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, 1993 AC 593 :
(1992) 3 WLR 1032 : (1993) 1 All ER 42 : 1992 UKHL
3 (HL)] . I will not here go into the details or merits
of this shift of emphasis; save broadly to recognise
its virtue and its vice. Its virtue is that the legislator’s
true purpose may be more accurately ascertained.
Its vice is that the certainty and accessibility of the
law may be reduced or compromised. The common
law, which regulates the interpretation of legislation,
has to balance these considerations.”
127. It is thus clear on a reading of English, US, Australian
and our own Supreme Court judgments that the “Lakshman
Rekha” has in fact been extended to move away from the
strictly literal rule of interpretation back to the rule of the
old English case of Heydon [Heydon case, (1584) 3 Co
Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] , where the Court must have recourse
to the purpose, object, text and context of a particular
provision before arriving at a judicial result. In fact, the
wheel has turned full circle. It started out by the rule as
stated in 1584 in Heydon case [Heydon case, (1584) 3
Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] , which was then waylaid by the
literal interpretation rule laid down by the Privy Council
and the House of Lords in the mid-1800s, and has come
back to restate the rule somewhat in terms of what was
most felicitously put over 400 years ago in Heydon case
[Heydon case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] .”
35. Another important principle which we must bear in mind is that a part
of a section cannot be read in isolation, the construction of the entire
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section must be made as a sum of its parts and no word or phrase
thereof can be picked out in isolation to give a certain meaning to
the section as a whole. This Court, in Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank
Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya6 held:
“…It is an elementary rule that construction of a section
is to be made of all parts together. It is not permissible to
omit any part of it. For, the principle that the statute must
be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts
of the same section…..”

Textual Interpretation of Section 11 of the POSH Act
36. Although we have quoted the entire provision of Section 11 of the
POSH Act above, in the interest of lucidity and easy comprehension,
Section 11(1) is reproduced as follows:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of section 10, the Internal
Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be,
shall, where the respondent is an employee, proceed to
make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the
provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent
and where no such rules exist, in such manner as may
be prescribed or in case of a domestic worker, the Local
Committee shall, if prima facie case exist, forward the
complaint to the police, within a period of seven days for
registering the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860), and any other relevant provisions of
the said Code where applicable:
Provided that where the aggrieved woman informs the
Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case
may be, that any term or condition of the settlement
arrived at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has not been
complied with by the respondent, the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry
into the complaint or, as the case may be, forward the
complaint to the police:

6 (1987) 1 SCC 606.
530 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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Provided further that where both the parties are employees,
the parties shall, during the course of inquiry, be given
an opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings
shall be made available to both the parties enabling them
to make representation against the findings before the
Committee.”
37. The Appellant’s primary argument is that ‘where the respondent is
an employee’ as mentioned in Section 11 of the POSH Act must
be read to mean that the ICC constituted at the workplace of the
‘respondent’ alone has jurisdiction to entertain a sexual harassment
complaint against him by the aggrieved woman and not the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman under the
provisions of the POSH Act.
38. To examine the said contention, the meaning of the word ‘where’
as used in the context of Section 11 becomes significant. If the
expression ‘where’ were to denote a certain place / location, only then
the argument of the Appellant would hold ground. On examination of
the colloquial meaning of the word ‘where’ as it is used in common
parlance, the Concise Oxford English Dictionary,7 defines the word
‘where’ as ‘in or to what place or position’ or ‘in what direction or
respect’.
39. Coming to the legal definition, however, the Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary
of Words and Phrases,8 refers to the judgement of the House of
Lords in Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of
Taxes)9 in which case a section reading ‘Subject to the provisions of
this section, where a company has a deficit for tax purposes during
any accounting period of the company, and receives a subvention
payment in respect of that period from an associated company having
a surplus for tax purposes in the corresponding period, then …’ was
being interpreted by the House of Lords, and the expression ‘where’
was interpreted in the following manner:
“The word “where” clearly does not refer to a place. It is
used in the sense of “if” or “whenever.”

7 10th Edition, 2002, Pg. 1629.
8 South Asian Edition, 2008, Volume 3 at Pg. 3009.
9 [1968] AC 1097.
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 531

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40. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon,10 and Justice C.K.
Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon,11 while defining the word
‘where’, both refer to the judgement of this Court in S.G. Glass
Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE,12 in which this Court was interpreting an
Excise notification which read as under –
‘“Glassware including tableware produced by semi-
automatic process, that is to say, where molten glass
is taken to the first mould manually and where either
compressed air or mechanically operated press is used. …”
In respect to use of the expression ‘where’, this Court interpreted
the notification as thus:
“ The use of the word ‘where’ before ‘molten glass’ and
‘compressed air’ is significant. According to dictionary the
word ‘where’ may mean ‘place or situation’. In the context
it has been used it is not descriptive of any place but has
been used in the sense of relation or situation. In other
words what the notification contemplates is that if the
glassware is manufactured by taking the molten glass
manually to the first mould and then the compressed air
or mechanically operated press is applied to it either in
the first or second mould then it would be covered in the
notification. If the intention would have been to confine
it to first mould then it was not necessary to use ‘where’
a second time. It is disjunctive and has been used to
denote the same meaning, namely, if in processing of it
compressed air is used then it is deemed to be a production
by semi-automatic process. The Tribunal in reading the
words ‘where either compressed air or mechanically
operated press’ along with the earlier expression ‘first
mould’ committed an error of law.”
41. Keeping in view the aforementioned judicial pronouncements and the
legal definition, when we look at the construction of Section 11(1) of
the POSH Act, the word ‘where’ is quite clearly used in the context
of a situation, rather than a place. In our interpretation, Section

10 7th Edition, Volume 4, at Pg. 6754.
11 2008/2009 Edition, Volume 4 at Pg. 5030.
12 (1995) 1 SCC 680.
532 [2025] 12 S.C.R.

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11(1) envisages three distinct situations or contingencies, followed
by how inquiry into a complaint is to be carried out by the ICC or
Local Committee (as the case may be):
(i) ‘Where’ (In case) the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’, the ICC shall
proceed to make inquiry into the complaint, in accordance with
the provisions of the service rules applicable to the ‘respondent’;
(ii) ‘Where’ (In case) no such rules exist, ICC shall proceed to make
inquiry into the complaint, in such manner as may be prescribed;
(iii) ‘Or’ (in case) of a domestic worker, the Local Committee shall,
if prima facie case exists, forward the complaint to the police,
within a period of seven days for registering the case under
Section 509 of the IPC and any other relevant provisions of
the said Code where applicable.
42. In our view, the use of the word ‘where’ as it occurs in the contingency
(i) and (ii) as denoted above, clearly refers to two different conditions
precedent / situations, where contingency (i) relates to a situation
in case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’ under the meaning as
prescribed under the POSH Act, inquiry must be made by the
ICC in accordance with the service rules applicable to him, and
contingency (ii) relates to a situation in case no such rules exist,
it shall be inquired into by the ICC in such manner as prescribed.
The contingency (iii) is a different situation altogether – in case the
‘respondent’ is a domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, on
taking a prima facie view about the existence of a case against the
‘respondent’, forward the complaint to the police.
43. It is pertinent to note that contingency (i) and contingency (iii) as
denoted above, operate in the form of ‘either-or’. If the ‘respondent’
is an employee, the inquiry shall be conducted by the ICC either in
accordance with the respondent’s service rules, or in case there are
no applicable service rules, in the manner as prescribed. Thereafter,
the word ‘or’ has been used, to lay down what must be the procedure
when the ‘respondent’ is a domestic worker. The grammatical function
of the word ‘where’ as appearing in Section 11 of the POSH Act is
that of a ‘conditional conjunction’ (similar to ‘in that case’ or ‘if’). It
introduces a scenario, contingency or condition and lays down the
action which follows.
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44. Section 11(1) essentially lays down what the ICC or the Local
Committee is supposed to do upon receiving a complaint from the
aggrieved woman. Use of the phrase ‘where the respondent is an
employee’ is essentially a procedural trigger, directing the ICC to
apply the service rules which are applicable to the ‘respondent’, it
is not a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the
complaint.
45. This interpretation of Section 11(1) is borne out of a plain reading of
the words used by the legislature in the said section. It is pertinent
to state that the principle as laid down in Balasinor Nagrik Coop.
Bank Ltd. (Supra) is squarely applicable to the present case and
the entire section has to be read as a whole. When the section is
read as a whole, it has been constructed in the form of ‘where….
and where….or….’, detailing three different contingencies and the
procedure to be followed in each contingency. Merely the phrase
‘where the respondent is an employee’ cannot be read in isolation
without taking into view the entire section, and all parts of the section
must be read together to find out a workable conclusion.
46. In view of the above, the inescapable conclusion, upon plain reading
of the text of Section 11(1) of the POSH Act is that the argument
advanced by the Appellant is liable to be rejected. As discussed above,
in case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’, the ICC is obligated to
apply the service rules applicable to him, but the use of the phrase
‘where the respondent is an employee’ does not mean that the
ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman cannot
exercise jurisdiction. As such, the construction of Section 11 is in
the nature of a procedural section rather than one that lays down
jurisdictional restraints.

Whether the ‘respondent’ must be an employee of the same workplace
as the ‘aggrieved woman’?
47. That being said, the requirement of Section 11(1) as we have
concluded above, is that in case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’,
the inquiry by the ICC must be in accordance with the service rules
applicable to him, if service rules do not exist, it shall be conducted as
may be prescribed, or if he is a domestic worker, the Local Committee
must forward the complaint to the police. The definitions of the word
‘employee’ and ‘workplace’ as quoted above in this judgement at their
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respective places are completely neutral, in the sense that they do
not suggest that the ‘respondent’ must necessarily be an employee
of the workplace where the aggrieved woman works.
48. The word ‘respondent’ has been defined in Section 2(m) of the POSH
Act as ‘a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a
complaint under Section 9’. It does not require the ‘respondent’ to be
someone working at the same workplace as the aggrieved woman,
rather the exact words used are ‘a person’ which can be any person
against whom complaint has been made. The word ‘employee’ as
defined in Section 2(f) of the POSH Act – further provides that it
means a ‘person employed at a workplace…’. The word ‘workplace’
itself which is defined in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, has been
given a wide meaning, particularly in clause (v) of Section 2(o), which
posits that the word ‘workplace’ also includes ‘any place visited by
the employee arising out of or during the course of employment
including transportation by the employer for undertaking such journey’.
49. The expansive definitions of these words enable the ICC constituted
at the aggrieved woman’s workplace to exercise jurisdiction over an
employee of a different workplace. None of these definitions provide
that the ‘respondent’ must necessarily be an employee of the same
workplace where the aggrieved woman works. Any person against
whom a complaint is filed by the aggrieved woman before the ICC
constituted at her workplace under Section 9, is a ‘respondent’
under the POSH Act and as per the scheme of Section 11(1), if the
‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’, his service rules shall apply and in the
absence of service rules, inquiry shall be conducted as prescribed,
but the ‘respondent’ need not necessarily be an employee of the
same ‘workplace’.
50. In this context, it was argued by the appellant that in view of Section
19(h) of the POSH Act, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
woman when the perpetrator of sexual harassment is an outsider
(employee of a different workplace) is to register a complaint under
the IPC through the employer. We are unable to agree with this
contention, since Section 19(h) makes it a duty of the employer to
facilitate the initiation of action under the IPC if the aggrieved woman
so desires, it is not in derogation or exclusion of the power to initiate
proceedings under the POSH Act. Even where the ‘respondent’ is
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not an employee anywhere, criminal proceedings may be initiated
and such initiation of criminal proceedings must be facilitated by
the employer.

Contextual Interpretation of provisions of the POSH Act
51. Even though we have held above that a plain textual reading of Section
11(1) of the POSH Act conveys the clear meaning that it creates
no bar on the jurisdiction of ICC constituted at the workplace of the
aggrieved woman to inquire into a complaint against a ‘respondent’
who is an employee of a different ‘workplace’, we also propose to
discuss the interpretation of the provisions of the POSH Act in light
of its intent, purpose and context, in line with the pronouncement of
this Court in Eera (Supra).
52. The long title of the POSH Act and its ‘Preamble’ are relevant internal
aid for the purpose of interpretation and are therefore quoted herein:
“An Act to provide protection against sexual harassment of
women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of
complaints of sexual harassment and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
WHEREAS sexual harassment results in violation of the
fundamental rights of a woman to equality under articles
14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and her right to life
and to live with dignity under article 21 of the Constitution
and right to practice any profession or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business with includes a right to a
safe environment free from sexual harassment;
AND WHEREAS the protection against sexual harassment
and the right to work with dignity are universally recognised
human rights by international conventions and instruments
such as Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women, which has been ratified
on the 25th June,1993 by the Government of India;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make provisions for
giving effect to the said Convention for protection of women
against sexual harassment at workplace.”
53. The POSH Act was enacted by the legislature, recognizing the
legislative void which was highlighted by this Court in its seminal
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judgment in Vishaka (Supra). Its intent is to uphold women’s right to
equality under Articles 14 and 15 and right to a dignified life under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The POSH Act does not merely
punish acts of sexual harassment, but actively imposes a legal duty
on employers to prohibit and prevent harassment, it ensures that
the women in each workplace have open access to a mechanism
for redressal of complaints of sexual harassment in the form of ICC.
It aims to bring about safety and accountability in the workplace in
order to enable women to pursue their career without the fear of a
hostile environment. It is thus seen that the POSH Act is a social
welfare legislation and it must be interpreted as thus.
54. Keeping in mind the object behind the enactment of the POSH Act,
if the aggrieved woman had to approach the ICC constituted at the
workplace of the ‘respondent’ for every third-party incident, it would
fall short of the aforesaid object. The ICC at the workplace of the
‘respondent’ would be tasked with inquiring into an incident that
may or may not have occurred on their employer’s premises or in
relation to their employer’s work environment. A narrow interpretation
of provisions of the POSH Act, in order to hold that only the ICC
of the workplace of the ‘respondent’ has jurisdiction to inquire into
complaints against him, irrespective of where the workplace of the
aggrieved woman is or where the alleged act of sexual harassment
took place, would undermine the POSH Act’s remedial social welfare
intent since it would create significant practical hurdles for the
aggrieved woman.
55. Such an interpretation would beget several procedural and
psychological barriers for the aggrieved woman. The aggrieved
woman, who has allegedly suffered an act of sexual harassment,
would be compelled to file a complaint before the ICC constituted at
the workplace of the ‘respondent’. It would create a situation where
the aggrieved woman would have to appear before the ICC at an
alien workplace in order to pursue her remedy in law.
56. Even more importantly, the POSH Act, by introducing Section 2(o)
(v) which enlarged the scope of ‘workplace’ to include any place
visited by the employee during the course of employment, including
during transportation, has expanded the scope of ‘workplace’
manifold. In such a case, the intent of the legislature was clearly to
prohibit acts of sexual harassment at any place incidental to work
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and employment, at any place visited by the employees during the
course of employment. If we were to interpret the provisions of the
POSH Act to hold that only the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the ‘respondent’ has the jurisdiction to entertain complaints and not
the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace, it would
defeat the purpose of such an expanded scope. It will also lead to
an absurd situation where it would be incumbent upon the aggrieved
woman to pursue her remedies, not at her own workplace, but at
some other workplace, irrespective of the distance. It would create
a further barrier preventing the aggrieved woman from seeking her
remedies in law.
57. The taboo around sexual harassment at the workplace and the fear
of stigma which may be attached to the aggrieved woman as a
consequence of a complaint regarding sexual harassment already
poses a massive psychological barrier for the aggrieved women
which actively dissuades them from pursuing their remedy in law.
In such view of the matter also, the intent of the legislature behind
giving such a wide meaning to the word ‘workplace’ to go beyond
the bounds of the traditional meaning implying location of the office,
cannot be brushed aside by narrow construction of other provisions
of the POSH Act. It is for the aforementioned reasons that we are
constrained to reject the argument of the Appellant and answer
Issues 1 and 2 in the above terms.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE III
58. It has been vehemently urged before us by the Appellant that another
reason why only the ICC of the Appellant’s department has jurisdiction
to entertain a complaint under Section 9 of the POSH Act is that it is
only his department which can take disciplinary action against him,
and so for the inquiry carried out by the ICC and its outcome to have
any sanctity, the inquiry must be conducted by the ICC constituted
under the aegis of the Appellant’s employer.
59. While at first blush the argument might seem persuasive, but we are
not impressed, since it is not in line with the scheme of the POSH
Act. The core issue with this argument is that it fails to differentiate
the authority to inquire into the facts and the authority to enforce or
act on the findings. While the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the aggrieved woman or the employer may not have the authority to
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impose a penalty / punishment on the ‘respondent’ as a consequence
of the proceedings under the POSH Act, its findings can certainly
be acted upon by the employer of the ‘respondent’. Such is the
construction and scheme of Section 13 of the POSH Act as quoted
above. Under Section 13, the inquiry report of the ICC along with its
recommendations must be sent to the ‘employer’ and it is obligated
to act upon the recommendations within sixty days. It is merely the
factual inquiry which is to be conducted by the ICC constituted at the
workplace of the aggrieved woman. It cannot be said, by any stretch of
imagination, that the ICC itself is to take disciplinary action against the
‘respondent’ in case the report suggests that the allegation has been
proved. As intended, the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s
workplace shall send its recommendations to the ‘employer’ of the
‘respondent’ for further necessary action, i.e., initiation of disciplinary
proceedings as per service rules, or to take action as prescribed.
Section 13 does not state therein that the employer of the aggrieved
woman and the ‘respondent’ must be one and the same. If a factual
conclusion is reached by the ICC constituted at one department, it
can very well be acted on by the employer of the ‘respondent’, even
if it is a different department. It goes without saying that the sanctity
of the report of the ICC is statutorily mandated and all employers
are required to act upon the said report. Even though the ICC is
constituted under a different department, it has a statutory backing
in its constitution and functioning. It is also pertinent to mention here
that if the recommendations of the ICC are brushed aside and not
acted on by the employer, a right to appeal has been provided under
Section 18 of the POSH Act.
60. In the present case, the Appellant, who is the ‘respondent’ under
the meaning as prescribed in the POSH Act and the aggrieved
woman are both Central Government employees, belonging to
different departments. As discussed above, during the operation of
the guidelines as laid down by this Court in Visakha (Supra) and
prior to the enactment of the POSH Act, this Court had directed in
Medha Kotwal Lele (Supra) that the Complaints Committee under
the guidelines shall be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the
purposes of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964. In pursuance of the
same, the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “CCS CCA Rules, 1965”)
also came to be amended by inserting a proviso below sub-rule 2 of
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Rule 14 relating to treatment of the Complaint Committee as Inquiring
Authority. This was notified vide Notification No. 11012/5/2001-Estt.A
dated 01.07.2004 published in Gazette of India vide G.S.R. No. 225
dated 10.07.2004.
61. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 14 of the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 and the proviso
thereto is relevant and is therefore quoted as under:
“(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion
that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a
Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint
under this rule or under the provisions of the Public
Servants(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an
authority to inquire into the truth thereof.
Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual
harassment within the meaning of rule 3 C of the Central
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the Complaints
Committee established in each Ministry or Department or
Office for inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed
to be the inquiring authority appointed by the disciplinary
authority for the purpose of these rules and the Complaints
Committee shall hold, if separate procedure has not been
prescribed for the Complaints Committee for holding the
inquiry into the complaints of sexual harassment, the inquiry
as far as practicable in accordance with the procedure laid
down in these rules.”
62. In order to further clarify the role of the ICC in conducting inquiry,
the Government of India’s Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training issued Office
Memorandum being F No. 11013/2/2014-Estt (A-III) dated 16.07.2015
(hereinafter referred to as “OM dated 16.07.2015”), after the POSH
Act had come into force, with the subject ‘Steps for conducting
inquiry in case of allegation of Sexual Harassment’, which is also
of much relevance. The said OM lays down the dual role of the
ICC / Complaints Committee and envisages a two-step inquiry into
an allegation of sexual harassment. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OM
dated 16.07.2015 provide for the investigative role played by the
ICC as follows:
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“Need for investigation
7. The Complaints Committees may act on complaints
of sexual harassment when they receive them directly or
through administrative authorities etc, or when they take
cognizance of the same suo-moto. As per Section 9(1) of
the Act, the aggrieved woman or complainant is required
to make a complaint within three months of the incident
and in case there has been a series of incidents, three
months of the last incident. The Complaints Committee may
however extend the time limit for reasons to be recorded
in writing, if it is satisfied that the circumstances were such
which prevented the complainant from filing a complaint
within the stipulated period.
8. As mentioned above, the complaints of sexual
harassment are required to be handled by Complaints
Committee. On receipt of a complaint, facts of the allegation
are required to be verified. This is called preliminary
enquiry/fact finding enquiry or investigation. The
Complaints Committee conducts the investigation. They
may then try to ascertain the truth of the allegations by
collecting the documentary evidence as well as recording
statements of any possible witnesses including the
complainant. If it becomes necessary to issue a Charge
Sheet, disciplinary authority relies on the investigation for
drafting the imputations, as well as for evidence by which
the charges are to be proved. Therefore this is a very
important part of the investigation.”
63. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the OM dated 16.07.2015 clarify the
dual role of the ICC as follows:
“Dual Role
9. In the light of the Proviso to the Rule 14 (2) mentioned
above, the Complaints Committee would normally be
involved at two stages. The first stage is investigation
already discussed in the preceding para. The second stage
is when they act as Inquiring Authority. It is necessary
that the two roles are clearly understood and the inquiry
is conducted as far as practicable as per Rule 14 of CCS
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(CCA) Rules, 1965. Failure to observe the procedure may
result in the inquiry getting vitiated.
10. As the Complaints Committees also act as Inquiring
Authority in terms of Rule 14(2) mentioned above, care has
to be taken that at the investigation stage that impartiality
is maintained. Any failure on this account may invite
allegations of bias when conducting the inquiry and may
result in the inquiry getting vitiated. As per the instructions,
when allegations of bias are received against an Inquiring
Authority, such Inquiring Authority is required to stay the
inquiry till the Disciplinary Authority takes a decision on
the allegations of bias. Further, if allegations of bias are
established against one member of the Committee on
this basis, that Committee may not be allowed to conduct
the inquiry.
11. In view of the above, the Complaints Committee when
investigating the allegations should make recommendations
on whether there is a prima facie substance in the
allegations which calls for conducting a formal inquiry. They
should avoid making any judgmental recommendations
or expressing views which may be construed to have
prejudiced their views while conducting such inquiry.”
64. After the fact-finding inquiry is conducted by the ICC, paragraphs
12, 13 and 14 of the OM dated 16.07.2015 provide for the power
of the Disciplinary Authority to examine the report and decide as
to whether formal charge sheet needs to be issued or not, and at
which stage an inquiry is to be conducted. The said paragraphs of
the OM are quoted herein:
“Decision to issue Charge sheet, and conducting
Inquiry
12. On receipt of the Investigation Report, the Disciplinary
Authority should examine the report with a view to see as
to whether a formal Charge Sheet needs to be issued to
the Charged Officer. As per Rule 14(3), Charge Sheet is
to be drawn by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. In
case the Disciplinary Authority decides on that course, the
Charged Officer should be given an opportunity of replying
to the Charge sheet. As per Rule 14(5), a decision on
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conducting the inquiry has to be taken after consideration
of the reply of the charged officer.
13. If the Charged Officer admits the charges clearly and
unconditionally, there will be no need for a formal inquiry
against him and further action may be taken as per Rule
15 of the CCS(CCA) Rules.
The Inquiry-stages
14. In case the Charged Officer denies the charges and
his reply is not convincing, the Charge sheet along with
his reply may be sent to the Complaints Committee for
formal inquiry, and documents mentioned in Rule 14 (6)
will be forwarded to the Complaints Committee. As per
Section 11(3) of the Act, for the purpose of making an
inquiry, the Complaints Committee shall have the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908when trying a suit in respect of the
following matters, namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any
person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of
documents; and
(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.”
65. It is clear from OM dated 16.07.2015 of the Central Government that
in respect of Central Government employees, inquiry into a complaint
of sexual harassment is to be conducted in two distinct stages.
Firstly, the ICC is to conduct a fact-finding inquiry or preliminary
inquiry, investigating the veracity of the complaint under the POSH
Act. Thereafter, the report or recommendation of the ICC is to be
sent to the Disciplinary Authority, which shall examine the report
and decide as to whether a formal chargesheet must be issued to
‘respondent’ / employee. Upon issuance of such a formal chargesheet
by the Disciplinary Authority against the employee, comes the second
stage, where the ICC is required to act as the inquiring authority
in the formal disciplinary inquiry under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965
in order to decide the disciplinary action which may or may not be
imposed upon the employee.
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66. It goes without saying that the OM dated 16.07.2015 does not
specifically address the situation which has arisen in the present
case. However, under the scheme of the POSH Act and particularly
looking to Section 13 of the POSH Act, nothing prevents the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman from carrying out
the preliminary / fact-finding inquiry at the first stage. After completion
of the fact-finding inquiry, the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the aggrieved woman can send its recommendation and report to
the employer of the ‘respondent’. Upon receiving the findings and
recommendations of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s
workplace, the employer of the ‘respondent’ and the Disciplinary
Authority, upon making a decision that disciplinary proceedings are
warranted, can then issue a chargesheet to the ‘respondent’ and
initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. In this inquiry, the ICC
constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ may conduct the
second stage formal inquiry, acting as the inquiring authority for
the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings. As such, the OM dated
16.07.2015, in respect of employees of the Government of India
treats inquiry into complaints of sexual harassment as a two-stage
process where there is a preliminary / fact-finding inquiry at first
and then a disciplinary proceedings based on the findings of the
preliminary / fact-finding inquiry.
67. Much emphasis has been laid by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellant on the fact that disciplinary action cannot
be taken against him on the basis of the recommendations of an
inquiry authority who is not from the same department. However, any
punishment which is to be imposed upon the errant employee after
completion of the disciplinary proceedings is to be imposed by the
‘employer’ or disciplinary authority of the ‘respondent’, based upon
the findings which come through in the second-stage disciplinary
proceedings. The fact that ultimately disciplinary action against the
‘respondent’ has to be taken by his employer and his department
cannot be an impediment for the ICC constituted at the workplace of
the aggrieved woman to take up the fact-finding inquiry under Section
11 of the POSH Act when read with the OM dated 16.07.2015. In
this context, particular reference must be made to Section 13(3)(i)
of the POSH Act quoted above, which lays down that the ICC, upon
reaching the conclusion that the allegations against the ‘respondent’
are proved, shall recommend to the employer to take disciplinary
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action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with
the provisions of the service rules of the ‘respondent’.
68. In view of the findings as recorded above in respect of Issue 3, we
find that the ICC proceedings instituted in the aggrieved woman’s
department can be considered the first-stage of inquiry which carries
out a preliminary / fact-finding inquiry, after which the report of the
ICC may be sent to the employer / department of the ‘respondent’.
Depending on the findings of the ICC (at the aggrieved woman’s
workplace) as the first stage, the ‘employer’ may then take a decision
to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the applicable service rules
and in such disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the
workplace of the ‘respondent’ shall be the inquiring authority. While
conducting the disciplinary proceedings against the ‘respondent’,
the ICC at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ shall have reference
to the report of the fact-finding inquiry by the ICC constituted at the
workplace of the aggrieved woman. Issue 3 is answered as such.

ISSUE IV
69. The present appeal originates out of the notice / order dated 13.06.2023
directing the appellant to appear before the ICC constituted at the
workplace of the aggrieved woman after institution of proceedings and
filing of complaint by the aggrieved woman under Section 9 of the
POSH Act. It is a challenge which was brought by the appellant at a
preliminary stage. While issuing notice vide order dated 18.07.2023
in the present appeal, it was directed by this Court that inquiry may
continue but the final outcome of the inquiry shall be kept in a sealed
cover. As mentioned above, we have been supplied with a copy of
the report of the ICC in sealed cover and we have perused the same.
We are not divulging any of the findings in the report, since it may
form the basis of a disciplinary proceedings against the appellant if
the same is initiated by his employer.
70. A concern was raised before us that since the appellant is an
employee of a different department, the ICC at the aggrieved woman’s
workplace will not be privy to details about the employee’s scope of
duty, work and service records, etc. However, from a bare perusal of
the report, we find that the ICC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace
has communicated with the employer of the ‘respondent’, i.e., his
Department and sought information with respect to the incident and
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scope of duty of the ‘respondent’, which the Department has provided.
The duty of the employer to co-operate in the ICC proceedings is
a statutory duty of the employer, which it has duly complied with.
Apart from this, the ‘respondent’ has not been able to show that any
prejudice has been caused to him due to the proceedings being
carried out by the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved
woman. In any case, the right and remedy of the aggrieved woman
to bring a complaint under the POSH Act must be juxtaposed and
balanced with the sacrosanct right of the ‘respondent’ to be heard
and for application of mind before imposing of any punishment. As
we have held above, after the conduct of a fact-finding / preliminary
inquiry by the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved
woman under the POSH Act, its recommendations shall be sent to
the Department being the ‘employer’ of the ‘respondent’, at which
stage the employer will take a decision about initiation of disciplinary
proceedings under the provisions of the CCS CCA Rules, 1965.
We are also cognizant of the fact that there might be administrative
lethargy resulting in delay of the ICC proceedings if the workplace
of the ‘respondent’ fails to co-operate with the factual inquiry being
conducted by the ICC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace, even
though in the facts of this case, the employer has duly complied
with requests from the aggrieved woman’s workplace. However, in
that respect, it will suffice to say that cooperating with the ICC in
conduct of inquiry is a statutory duty of the employer under Section
19(f) of the POSH Act, which shall be complied with.
71. Since the report of the ICC at the workplace of the aggrieved woman
is in the nature of a fact-finding / preliminary inquiry, which may
form the basis of a subsequent disciplinary proceedings against
the appellant, we are restraining from making any observations or
remarks, so as to permit the appellant to raise all contentions in the
disciplinary proceedings except the question of jurisdiction or validity
of the proceedings by the ICC constituted at the workplace of the
aggrieved woman. As such, the Issue No. IV is answered accordingly.

CONCLUSION
72. In the present case, considering the wide definition of the word
‘workplace’ under the POSH Act, particularly as contained in Section
2(o)(v), if we were to accept the contentions of the appellant, the
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said interpretation would run contrary to the object of the POSH Act
and its intent as a social welfare legislation. In the interest of clarity
and easy comprehension, the following are our conclusions in terms
of the above discussion:
(i) The phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained
in Section 11 of the POSH Act, cannot be interpreted to mean that
ICC proceedings against a ‘respondent’ may only be instituted
before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’;
(ii) Such a restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act will run
contrary to the scheme of the Act, specifically in light of the all-
encompassing and wide definition which has been given to the
term ‘workplace’ in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, particularly in
light of Section 2(o)(v) which expands the scope of ‘workplace’
to include any place visited by the employee ‘arising out of or
during the course of employment’;
(iii) Under Section 13 of the POSH Act, the recommendations and
report of the ICC are to be sent to the ‘employer’ which shall then
take a decision with respect to initiation of disciplinary action. In
light of the OM dated 16.07.2025, the ICC has a dual-role – to
conduct the preliminary / fact-finding inquiry under the POSH
Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal disciplinary
proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 as discussed,
since nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department
of the aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary /
fact-finding inquiry and upon receiving the report of the said
ICC, if the employer initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC
constituted at the Department of the ‘respondent’ shall act as
the inquiry authority in the disciplinary proceedings.
(iv) In case the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace
is conducting a fact-finding inquiry under the POSH Act, the
employer of the ‘respondent’, even if it is a different department,
must abide its duties under Section 19(f) of the POSH Act to
swiftly cooperate and make available information upon a request
by the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace.
73. In light of the above conclusions and the answers to the issues
as framed, the present appeal is dismissed. The report of the ICC
constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace shall be transmitted
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 547

Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

to the Department of the appellant forthwith, which shall take further
action as necessary under the POSH Act following the procedure
as prescribed in the relevant service rules.
74. All pending applications shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain