DR. JANET JEYAPAULversusSRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.

                   [2015] 10 S.C.R. 1049


                  DR. JANET JEYAPAUL                            A
                             v.
                 SRM UNIVERSITY &ORS.
              (Civil Appeal.No. 14553 of 2015)
                                                                B
                   DECEMBER 15, 2015
      [J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR
                   SAPRE JJ.]
     Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226, 12 - Writ
jurisdiction - Amenability to - Writ petition u!Art.226 by      C
appellant-Senior lecturer against respondent No. 1-University
- Maintainability of - Held: Writ petition u!Art. 226 against
respondent No. 1 is maintainable - Respondent No. 1 is
discharging "public function" by way of imparting education     D
- It is notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central
Government and as such all the provisions of the UGC Act
are made applicable to respondent No. 1, which provides for
effective discharge of the public function, education for the
benefit of public - Once respondent No. 1 is declared as        E
 "Deemed University" whose all functions and activities are
governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities' then it is
an "authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 and thus, is
amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court u!Art. 226 -
University Grants Commission Act, 1956.                         F
       Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 The Division Bench of the High Court
erred in holding that respondent No. 1 is not subjected
to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article G
226 of the Constitution. In other words, it should have
been held that respondent No.1 is subjected to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Firstly, resporident No. 1 is engaged in H
                           1049
1050     . SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A imparting education in higher studies to students at
   large. Secondly, it is discharging "public function" by
   way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is notified as a
   "Deemed University" by the Central Government under
   Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act.
 B Fourthly, being a "Deemed University", all the provisions
   of the UGC Act are made applicable to respondent No. 1,
   which inter alia provides for effective discharge of the
   public function - namely education for the benefit of
   public. Fifthly, once respondent No. 1 is declared as
 C "Deemed University" whose all functions and activities
   are governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then
   it is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the
   Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an "authority"
   as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary
 0
   consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction
   of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus,
   the finding rendered· by the Division Bench cannot be
   concurred and accordingly while setting aside the
 E finding it is held that the appellant's writ petition under
   Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent No.1
   is maintainable. [Paras 21-23] [1063-G-H; 1064-A-F]

        1.2 In normal course, the submission that even
 F assuming that the appellant's writ petition is
   maintainable, yet it should not be entertained for hearing
   on merits and instead the appellant be granted liberty to
   approach the tribunal would have been accepted. But
   in the instant case, the Single Judge not only entertained
 G the appellant's writ petition but allowed the writ petition
   on merits whereas the Division Bench held the writ
   petition as not maintainable and thus declined to
   examine the merits of the controversy involved in the
   writ petition. It is not proper to direct the appellant at this
 H stage to approach the tribunal and file a dispute before
   DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                   1051


the tribunal. Instead, it is just and proper to remand the A
case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide
the respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to
whether the Single Judge was justified in allowing the·
writ petition on merits. The impugned order is set aside.
[Paras 25, 26 and 28] [1065-C-H]                           B

     Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
     (2005) 4 sec 649 - relied on.

     Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas                    c
     Swami Suvama Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust
     & Ors. vs. \I. R. Rudani & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691 :
     1989 (2) SCR 697; T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors.
     VS. State of Kamataka & Ors. (2002) 8 sec 481 -:
     referred to.                                                D
     Breen vs. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175; R. vs. Panel
     on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Pie
     and another (Norton Opax Pie and another
     intervening) (1987) 1 All ER 564; E.S. Evans vs.            E
     Charles E. Newton 382 US 296 (1966)-referred
     to.

     Judicial Review by De Smith 7th Edn. pp 127, 135;
     Administrative law by H. W.R. Wade and C.F.
                                                                 F
     Forsyth 101h Edn. - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference

1989 (2) SCR 697                 Referred to    Para 8, 17, 19
                                                                 G
2005 (1) SCR 913                 Relied on.     Para 21

2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587          Referred to. Para 24


                                                                 H
1052         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
       14553of2015

           From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2013 of the
       High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 932 of
 B     2013

           Dr. Janet Jeyapaul, Appellant-In-Person

          Sanjay R. Hegde, S. Nithin, Anil Kumar Mishra-I for the
       Respondents.
 c
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. Leave granted.

 D         2: This appeal is filed by the appellant-in-person against
       the judgment and order dated 04.07.2013 passed by the High
       Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013
       whereby the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ
       appeal filed by the respondents herein against the order
 E     dated 08.04.2013 passed by the Single Judge of the High
       Court in W.P. No.12676 of 2012 and, in consequence,
       dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein as
       being not maintainable.

 F          3 .. ln order to appreciate the controversy involved in this
       appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, it is necessary to set
       out the relevant facts.                                        ·

        (a) The S.R.M.University-respondent No.1 herein is the
   lnstitutionengaged in imparting high education in various
 G subjects. The Central Government has, therefore, on the advise
   of University Grants Commission (in short "UGC") declared
   respondent No.1 as "Deemed University" by issuing a
   notification under Section 3 of the University Grants
 H Commission Act, 1956 (in short "the UGC Act"). Respondent
   DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                      1053
           [ABHAY MANOHAR SAP RE, J.]

No.1 is, therefore, subjected to ensuring compliance of all the     A
provisions of UGCAct in its functioning.

     (b) The appellant is holding M.Sc. and P.hd. in applied
     Biology. She was appointed as a Lecturer in the
     Department of Bio-technology in the Faculty of Sciences        B
     and Humanity in the SRM University-respondent No.1.
     By order dated 05.05.2010, she was promoted as Senior
     Lecturer w.e.f. 01.04.2010.

     (c) On 14.02.2012, the appellant was served with a             c
     memo calling· upon her to show cause as to why
     disciplinary action should not be taken against her for
     the alleged failure to take classes of the students of B.Sc.
     Third Year degree course and M.Sc. First Year degree
     course. The appellant submitted her replies ori                D
     15.02.2012 and 20.02.2012 denying the allegations
     and claiming that she took classes for both the courses.

     (d) Thereafter, another memo dated 22.02.2012 was
     issued by the Registrar in-charge of the University            E
     referring certain complaints given against her by the
     students. Refuting the charges, the appellant submitted
     her reply on 29.02.2012.

     (e) Dissatisfied with the explanation given by the             F
     appellant, respondent No.1-SRM University constituted
     an Enquiry Committee and the appellant appeared
     before the said Committee on 02.03.2012 and stated
     that she was not furnished the documents and the copies
     of the complaints. Thereafter she submitted a detailed         G
     explanation on 26.03.2012.

     (f) Thereafter the appellant received a notice dated
     04.04.2012 mentioning therein that the same shall be
     treated as one month's notice and she would be relieved
                                                                    H
1054         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A          from the services w.e.f. 04.05.2012. According to the
            appellant, she received the notice on 16.04.2012.
            (g) Challengi_ng the said notice, the appellant filed Writ
            Petition No. 12676 of 2012 before the High Court. By .
            order dated 08.04.2013, the Single Judge of the High
 B
            Court allowed the writ petition, quashed tl]e termination
            notice and directed the respondents to reinstate the
            appellant into service.
            (h) Against the said order, respondent No.1 herein filed
 c          Writ Appeal No. 932 of 2013 before the High Court. By
            impugned judgment dated 04.07.2013, the Division
            Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal. It was held
            that the writ petition filed by the appellant against
            respondent No.1 was not maintainable as according
 D          to the Division Bench, respondent No.1 is neither a State
            nor an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of
            the Constitution of India and hence it cannot be subjected
            to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of
            the Constitution to examine the legality and correctness
 E
            of the dismissal order. The Division Bench, therefore,
            did not examine the merits of the case made out by the
            appellant successfully before the Single Judge. The
            Division Bench, however, granted liberty to the appellant
            to approach the Tribunal for ventilating of her grievance
 F
            on merits.
            (i) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has
            preferred this appeal by way of special leave before
            this Court.
 G
           4. Heard appellant-in-person and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde,
       learned senior counsel for the respondents.

       5. Since the appeal involved a legal issue and the
   appellant had no legal assistance, we requested Mr. Harish
 H Salve, learned senior counsel, who was present in Court, to
   DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                    1055
           [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

assist the Court to enable us to properly appreciate and          A
decide the issues arising in the case.

    6. We record our deep sense of appreciation for the
valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Harish Salve with his
usual fairness and industry and also for submitting his written   B
note on the conclusion of the case on our request.

     7. Submissions of Mr. Harish Salve were many fold.
According to him, while deciding the question as to whether
the writ lies under Article 226 of the Constitution of India c
against any person, juristic body, organization, authority
etc., the test is to examine in the first instance the object and
purpose for which such body/authority/organization is formed
so also the activity which it undertakes to fulfill the said
object/purpose.                                                   D

     8. Pointing out from various well known English
commentaries such as De Smith's Judicial Review, 7tti
Edition, H.W.R.Wade and C.F. Forsyth Administrative
law, 10th Edition, Michael J. Beloff in his article. Pitch, E
Pool, Rink, ...... Court? Judicial Review in the Sporting
World, 1989 Public Law 95, English decisions in Breen
vs. A.E.U. (1971) 2 QB 175, R. vs. Panel on Take-overs
and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Pie and another (Norton
Opax Pie and another intervening) ( 1987) 1 All ER 564, F
E.S. Evans vs. Charles E. Newton 382 US 296 (1966)
and of this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee
Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust
& Ors. vs. V.R. Rudani & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 691 and Zee
Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649, Mr. G
Harish Salve submitted that perusal -of these authorities/
decisions would go to show that there has been a consistent
view of all the learned authors and the Courts all over the world
including in India that the approach of the Court while deciding
such issue is always to test as to whether the concerned body H
1056       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A Is formed for discharging any "Public function" or "Public
   duty" and if so, whether it is actually engaged in any public
   function or/and performing any such duty.

        9. According to _learned counsel, if the aforesaid twin
 B test is found present in any case then such person/body/
   organization/a'uthority, as the case may be, would be
   subjected to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
   226 of the Constitution.

 c      10. Learned senior counsel elaborated his submission
    by pointing out that the expression "any person or
   authority" used in Article 226 are not confined only to
   statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State but
    may in appropriate case include any other person or body
 o performing "public function/duty". Learned counsel urged
   that emphasis is, therefore, always on activity undertaken and
   the nature of the duty imposed on such authority to perform
   and not the form of such authority. According to Mr. Harish
   Salve, once it is proved that the activity undertaken by the
 E authority has a public element then regardless of the form
   of such authority it would be subjected to the rigor of writ
   jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution.

         11. Learned counsel then urged that in the light of several
 F decisions of this Court, one cannot now perhaps dispute that
   "imparting education to students at large" is a "public
   function" and, therefore, if any body or authority, as the
   case may be, is found to have been engaged in the
   activity of imparting education to the students at large then
 G irrespective of the status of any such authority, it should be
   made amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
   Article 226 of the Constitution.

       12. Learned counsel further pointed out that the case in
 H hand clearly shows that respondent No. 1 - a juristic body is
    DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                         1057
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

engaged in imparting education in higher studies and what is            A
more significant is that respondent No. 1 is conferred with a
status of a "Deemed University" by the Central Government
under Section 3 of the UGCAct. These two factors, according
to Mr. Harish Salve, would make respondent No. 1 amenable
to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 because        B
it satisfies the twin test laid down for attracting the rigor of writ
jurisdiction of the High Court.

     13. In reply, Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel
for respondent No. 1 while supporting the impugned order                C
contended that if this Court holds that respondent No. 1 is
amenable to writ jurisdiction then apart from employees
even those who are otherwise dealing with respondent No. 1
would start invoking writ jurisdiction which, according to learned
counsel, would open the flood gate of litigation in courts.             D

    14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of the record of the case, we find force in the
submissions urged by Mr. Harish Salve.
                                                                        E
    15. To examine the question urged, it is apposite to take
note of what De Smith, a well-known treaty, on the subject
"Judicial Review" has said on this question [See De
Smith's Judicial Review, 7th Edition, page 127 (3- 027)
and page 135 (3-038)].                                                  F
      "AMENABILITY TEST BASED ON THE SOURCE OF
      POWER

      The courts have adopted two complementary
      approaches to determining whether a function falls G
      within the ambit of the supervisory ·jurisdiction.
      First, the court considers the legal source of power
      exercised by the impugned decision-maker. In
                                                      •
      identifying the "classes of case in which judicial H
1058    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A     review is available", the courts place considerable
       importance on the source of legal authority
       exercised by the defendant public authority.
       Secondly and additionally, where the "source of
       power" approach does not. yield a clear or
 B     satisfactory outcome, the court may consider
       the characteristics of the function being performed.
       This has enabled the courts to extend the reach
       of the supervisory jurisdiction to some activities
       of non-statutory bodies (such as self-regulatory
 c     organizations). We begin by looking at the first
       approach, based on the source of power."
       "JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS
       The previous section considered susceptibility to
 D
       judicial review based on the source of the power:
       statute or prerogative. The courts came to
       recognize that an approach based solely on the
       source of the public authority's power was too
       restrictive. Since 1987 they have developed an
 E
       additional approach to determining susceptibility
       based on by the type of function performed by
       the decision-maker. The "public function"
       approach is, since 2000, reflected in the Civil
 F     Procedure Rules: CPR.54.1(2)(a)(ii), defines a claim
       for judicial review as a claim to the lawfulness of
       "a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the
       exercise of a public function." (Similar terminology
       is used in the Human Rights Act 1998 s.6(3)(b)
 G     to define a public authority as "any person certain
       of whose functions are functions of a public
       nature", but detailed consideration of that
       provision is postponed until later). As we noted at
       the outset, the term "public" is usually a synonym
 H     for "governmental"."
   DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                   1059
           [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

     16. The English Courts applied the aforesaid test in R. A
vs. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin
Pie and another (Norton Opax Pie and another
intervening) (1987) 1 All ER 564, wherein Sir John
Donaldson MR speaking for three-judge Bench of Court of
Appeal (Civil Division), after examining the various case law B
on the subject, held as under:

      "In cletermining whether the decisions of a
     particular body were subject to judicial review, the
     court was not co~fined to considering the source C
     of that body's powers and duties but could also
     look to their nature. Accordingly, if the duty imposed
     on a body, whether expressly or by implication, was
     a public duty and the body was exercising public
     law functions the court had jurisdiction to D
     entertain an application for judicial review of that
     body's decisions ....... "

     17. In Andi Mukta's case (supra), the question before
this Court arose as to whether mandamus can be issued at E
the instance of an employee (teacher) against a Trust
registered under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 which was
running an educational institution (college). The main legal
objection of the Trust while opposing the writ petition of their
employee was that since the Trust is not a statutory body and F
hence it cannot be subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court. The High Court accepted the writ petition and
issued mandamus directing the Trust to make payments
towards the employee's claims of salary, provident fund and
other dues. The Trust (Management) appealed to this Court. G

    18. This Court examined the legal issue in detail. Justice
K. Jagannatha Shetty speaking for the Bench agreed with the
view taken by the High Court and held as under:
                                                                 H
1060   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A     "11. Two questions, however, remain for
       consideration: (i) The liability of the appellants to
       pay compensation under Ordinance 120~E and
       (ii) The maintainability of the writ petition for
       mandamus as against the management of the
 B     college ........ .

       12. The essence of the attack on the maintainability
       of the writ petition under Article 226 may now be
       examined. It is argued that the management of the
 c     college being a trust registered under the Bombay
       Public Trust Act is not amenable to the writ
       jurisdiction of the High Court. The contention in
       other words, is that the trust is a private institution
       against which no writ of mandamus can be issued.
 D     In support of the contentic;>n, the counsel relied
       upon two decisions of this Court: (a) Executive
       Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v.
       Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 and (b) Deepak
       Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instructions,
 E     (1987) 2 SCC 252. In the first of the two cases, the
       respondent institution was a Degree College
       managed by a registered cooperative society. A
       suit was filed against the college by the dismissed
       principal for reinstatement. It was contended that
 F
       the Executive Committee of the college which
       was registered under the Cooperative Societies Act
       and affiliated to the Agra University (and
       subsequently to Meerut University) was a
 G     statutory body. The importance of this contention
       lies in the fact that in such a case, reinstatement
       could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation
       of statutory obligation. But this Court refused to
       accept the contention. It was observed that the
 H     management of the college was not a statutory
DR. JANET JEY1-\PAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.             1061
        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,J.]

 body since not created by or under a statute. It A
 was emphasised that an institution which adopts
 certain statutory provisions will not become a
 statutory body and the dismissed employee
 cannot enforce a contract of personal seritice
 against a non-statutory body.                    B
 15. If the rights are purely of a private character no
 mandamus can issue. If the management of the
 college is purely a private body with no public
 duty mandamus will not lie. These are two                c
 exceptions to mandamus. But once these are
 absent and when the party has no other equally
 convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied.
 It has to be appreciated that the appellants trust
 was managing the affiliated college to which public      D
 money is paid as government aid. Public money
 paid as government aid plays a major role in the
 control, maintenance and working of educational
 institutions. The aided institutions like government
 institutions discharge public function by way of         E
 imparting education to students. They are subject
 to the rules and regulations of the affiliating
 University. Their activities are closely supervised
 by the University authorities. Employment in such
 institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public      F
 character.3 So are the service conditions of the
 academic staff. When the University takes a
 decision regarding their pay scales, it will be
 binding on the management. The service                   G
 conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not
 purely of a private character. It has super-added
 protection by University decisions creating a
 legal right-duty relationship between the staff
 and the management. When there is existence of           H
1062       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A        this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused
          to the aggrieved party.
           20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the
          ·context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the
 B         term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for
           the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights
           under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the
           High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the
           fundamental ~ights as well as non-fundamental
 c         rights. The words "any person or authority" used
           in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only
           to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the
           State. They may cover any other person or body
           performing public duty. The form of the body
 D         concerned is not very much relevant. What is
           relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the
           body. The duty must be judged in the light of
           positive obligation owed by the person or authority
           to the affected party. No matter by what means the
 E         duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists
           mandamus cannot be denied."

        19. This issue was again examined in great detail by the
   Constitution Bench in Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union
 F of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 649 wherein the question
   which fell for consideration was whether the Board of Control
   for cricket in India (in short "BCCI") falls within the definition
   of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. This Court
   approved the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta's case(supra)
 G but on facts of the case held, by maj~rity, that the BCCI does
   not fall within the purview of the term State. This Court,
   however, laid down the principle of law in Paras 31 and 33 as
   under:

 H
   DR. JANET JE:. ./,f';'\ 1 IL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.     1063
           [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

     "31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the    A
     Board does discharge some duties like the
     selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the
     activities of the players and others involved in the
     game of cricket. These activities can be said to be
     akin to public duties or State functions and ifthere    B
     is any violation of any constitutional or statutory
     obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved
     party may not have a relief by way of a petition
     under Article 32. But that does not mean that the
     violator of such right.would go scot-free merely        C
     because it or he is not a State.Under the Indian
     jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the
     violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy
     under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party
                                                             0
     can always seek a remedy under the ordinary
     course of law or by way of a writ petition under
     Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much
     wider than Article 32.

     33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body E
     exercises its public functions even if it is not a
     State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only
     under the ordinary law but also under the
     Constitution, by way of a writ petitio~ under Article F
     226 ...................... "

     20. It is clear from reading of the ratio de~idendi of
judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra) that firstly, it is held
therein that the BCCI discharges public duties and secondly,
an aggrieved party can, for this reason, seek a public law G
remedy against the BCCI under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India.

    21. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of
the case in hand, we are of the considered view that the H
1064         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 10 S.C.R.


 A Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that
   respondent No. 1 is not subjected to the writ jurisdiction of
   the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In other
   words, it should have been held that respondent No.1 is
   subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
 B Article 226 of the Constitution.

         22. This we say for the reasons that firstly, respondent
   No. 1 is engaged in imparting education in higher studies to
   students at large. Secondly, it is discharging "public
 C function" by way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is
   notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central Government
   under Section 3 of the UGC Act. Fourthly, being a "Deemed
   University", all the provisions of the UGC Act are made
   applicable to respondent No. 1, which inter alia provides for
 D effective discharge of the public function - namely education
   for the benefit of public. Fifthly, once r~spondent No. 1 is
   declared as "Deemed University" whose all functions
   and activities are governed by the UGC Act, alike other
   universities then it is an "authority" within the meaning of
 E Article 12 of the Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an
   "authority" as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary
   consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of
   High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

 F         23. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot
       concur with the finding rendered by the Division Bench and
       accordingly while reversing the finding we hold that the
       appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
       against respondent No. 1 is r.naintainable.
 G
       24. This takes us to the next argument urged by learned
   counsel for the respondents. Placing reliance on para 231 of
   the decision of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors.
   vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481, learned
 H counsel contended that even assuming that the appellant's writ
   DR. JANET JEYAPAUL v. SRM UNIVERSITY & ORS.                     1065
           [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.)

petition is maintainable, yet it should not be entertained for A
hearing on merits and inste-ad the appellant be granted
liberty to approach the District Judge/Additional District
Judge of the concerned District which is designated as
Tribunal till formation of regular Tribunal for redressal of her
grievances as directed by the Constitution Bench in Para B
231 ofT.M.A. Pai's case (supra).

     25. In normal course, we would have been inclined to
accept this submission made by learned counsel for the
respondents and would have also granted liberty to the C
appellant to approach the Tribunal in term of the directions
given by the Constitution Bench of this Court. But since in this
case, the Single Judge not only entertained the appellant's
writ petition but he allowed the writ petition on merits whereas
the Division Bench held the writ petition as not maintainable D
and thus declined to examine the merits of the controversy
involved in the writ petition.

     26. We do not consider it proper to direct the appellant
at this stage to approach the Tribunal and file a dispute before   E
the Tribunal. Instead, we consider it just and proper to remand
the case to the Division Bench of the High Court to decide the
respondent's appeal on merits on the question as to whether
the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition on
merits.                                                            F

     27. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that
we have not examined the controversy raised by the appellant
in her writ petition on merits and confined our examination
to the question whether the writ petition against respondent G
No. 1 was maintainable or not.

    28. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. WritAppeal
No. 932 of 2013 out of which this appeal arises is restored        H
1066          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 10 S.C.R.

 A     to its original number. The Division Bench is requested to
       decide the appeal expeditiously on merits in accordance
       with law without being influenced by any of our observations.

       Nidhi Jain                                      Appeal allowed.