DR. AMARAGOUDA L PATILversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                  [2025] 2 S.C.R. 574 : 2025 INSC 201

                          Dr. Amaragouda L Patil
                                     v.
                           Union of India & Ors.
                    (Civil Appeal No(s.) 301-303 of 2025)
                               12 February 2025
                [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the challenge to the appointment of the third
       respondent as the Chairperson of the National Commission for
       Homeopathy on the ground of not fulfilling the requisite experience
       of working for ten years as a ‘leader’ in the area of health care.

                                   Headnotes†
       National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020 – s.4
       Explanation – Appointment to the post of Chairperson of the
       National Commission for Homeopathy – Eligibility criteria that
       the Chairperson to have experience of not less than twenty
       years in the field of homeopathy out of which at least ten years
       shall be as a leader in the area of health care, as the Head of a
       Department or the Head of an Organisation – Third respondent,
       serving as the Director General of Central Council for Research
       in Homeopathy, appointed as Chairperson – Challenged by the
       appellant on the ground that the third respondent lacked the
       requisite experience of working for ten years as a ‘leader’ –
       Single Judge of the High Court quashed the appointment of
       the third respondent – However, the Division Bench set aside
       the order of the Single Judge – Correctness:
       Held: In the matter of essential qualifications prescribed by the
       statute, there should neither be any deviation from the statutory
       requirements nor the advertisement inviting applications while
       conducting any selection process, unless power to relax the
       qualifications is shown to exist – Interference in matters relating
       to selection and appointment must be limited and the Court must
       not generally substitute the findings of the Search Committee – On
       facts, the Division Bench erred in holding that this was not a case to


* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                  575

             Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


     interfere in, considering, the clear violation of the applicable statutory
     rules – Selection process suffers from gross illegality and, thus, fails
     for serious breach of the statutory requirements – There was total lack
     of procedural fairness – No material before the Search Committee
     to hold that the third respondent was eligible, having had 10 years’
     experience as the ‘Head of a Department’ – Third respondent fell
     short of the requisite experience – Third respondent misrepresented
     his work experience for being considered for the coveted position of
     Chairperson of the Commission – Division Bench grossly erred in
     failing to consider that mala fides, malice in fact-actual malice, not
     the only condition for interference, it is open to a Court to interfere
     when legal malice or malice in law is demonstrated to exist – Act of
     appointing the third respondent as Chairperson despite he not having
     the requisite experience suffers from malice in law – Tested on the
     touchstone of Art.16, the appointment of the third respondent fails
     to pass muster – Furthermore, it amounts to a fraud on the public to
     make appointments in departure of either the statutory requirements
     or a public advertisement, the fraud unravels everything – Thus, the
     appointment of third respondent quashed – Judgment of Division
     Bench set aside. [Paras 13, 21, 22, 35, 41, 46, 51, 52, 56, 57, 59, 60]

     Public appointments – Selection procedure – Selection by
     experts – Scope of judicial review:
     Held: Court not to sit in appeal over decisions of selecting
     bodies, whatever be the nature of the post/office – If the selection
     made by the selectors-experts in the field, is challenged, a merit
     review is forbidden – Limited scrutiny of ascertaining the eligibility
     of the aspirants and the procedure followed, is permissible –
     However, merely because the Search Committee is chaired by
     the Cabinet Secretary and such committee consists of experts,
     does not automatically make its recommendation immune from
     judicial scrutiny; rather, in an appropriate case warranting such
     scrutiny, the writ court would be justified in its interference with
     the process – If any of the grounds on which judicial review of
     administrative action is shown to exist, interference on such
     ground is permissible – It is not an arena in which intervention is
     completely barred. [Paras 20, 21, 49]

     Public appointment – Selection procedure – Eligibility criteria –
     Essential qualifications prescribed by the statute – Relaxation,
     if permissible:
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       Held: Whenever appointment to a public office is sought to be
       made, irrespective of the nature of the office, the rules prescribing
       mandatory eligibility criteria must be applied in a strict manner –
       Every public appointment u/Art. 16 must be fair, non-arbitrary and
       reasonable – In the matter of essential qualifications prescribed
       by the statute, there should neither be any deviation from the
       statutory requirements nor the advertisement inviting applications
       while conducting any selection process, unless power to relax the
       qualifications is shown to exist. [Paras 51, 57]

       Interpretation of statutes – Purposive interpretation, when –
       Meaning of ‘Head’, in the National Commission for Homeopathy
       Act, 2020:
       Held: When there is doubt as to the meaning of a word in the
       provisions of a statute, the rules of statutory interpretation call upon
       to interpret the words in a statute by giving a purposive interpretation
       having regard to the subject and object of the enactment –
       Explanation to s.4 of the 2020 Act defines the meaning of ‘leader’
       as ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’ – Meaning
       of ‘Head’ not defined in the Act – ‘Head’ in general parlance can be
       considered to mean an elevated position among other subordinate
       roles, often in the position of leadership – Taking into account the
       object and subject of the NCH Act read with s. 4, ‘Head’ must refer
       to a position held by an incumbent who performs the role of a leader
       and is tasked with making substantive decisions for the department/
       organisation – Any claim for being ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head
       of an Organisation’ is strengthened if the incumbent exercises
       administrative or supervisory responsibilities – However, this is not
       the only factor to be considered – Any such determination must be
       on a case-to-case basis – National Commission for Homeopathy
       Act, 2020. [Paras 24, 25, 29]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare
       Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [1990] 2
       SCR 559 : (1990) 3 SCC 655 – relied on.
       Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958]
       1 SCR 1156 : AIR 1958 SC 353; Alka Ojha v. Rajasthan Public
       Service Commission (2011) 9 SCC 438; N.P. Verma v. Union of
       India [1989] 1 SCR 362 : (1989) Supp. 1 SCC 748; University of
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                              577

             Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


     Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao [1964] 4 SCR 575 : 1963 SCC OnLine
     SC 15; Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India [2009] 10 SCR
     921 : (2009) 8 SCC 273; Veer Pal Singh v. Ministry of Defence
     [2013] 10 SCR 579 : (2013) 8 SCC 83; Tajvir Singh Sodhi v. State
     of Jammu and Kashmir [2023] 3 SCR 714 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC
     344; Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand [2024] 2
     SCR 217 : (2024) 6 SCC 162; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant
     Vimalnath Narichania [2010] 10 SCR 971 : (2010) 9 SCC 437;
     R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : (2006) 6
     SCC 430; Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB [2009] 7 SCR
     1084 : (2009) 13 SCC 758 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961; National
     Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020; Constitution of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Post of Chairperson, National Commission for Homeopathy; Public
     employment; Eligibility criteria; Requisite experience; Power to
     relax qualifications; Selection by experts; Purposive Interpretation;
     Judicial review of administrative action; Actual malice; Legal malice;
     Malice in fact; Malice in law; Head of Department/Office; Search
     Committee; Misrepresentation of work experience; Fraud in public
     employment.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303
     of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2024 of the High Court
     of Karnataka at Bengaluru in W.A. Nos. 242 and 366 of 2024 and
     WA. CROB No. 2 of 2024

                         Appearances for Parties
     Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Nishanth Patil, Nishanth Patil,
     Mv Mukunda, Ayush P Shah, Revanta Solanki, Hruday Bajentri,
     Arijit Dey, Mehul Kumar Garg, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Devashish Bharuka, Sr. Adv., Gurmeet
     Singh Makker, Ishaan Sharma, Saransh Kumar, Annirudh Sharma-
     ii, Raghavendra M Kulkarni, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi, Avnish
578                                                           [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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       Dave, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Raghav Sharma,
       Ms. Sanjeevani Shandilya, Vaibhav Diwedi, Shreyas Balaji,
       Shivendra Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.

                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Dipankar Datta, J.

1.     A manifestly flawed process of selection, which was rightly interdicted
       by the writ court, has since been reversed by the writ appellate
       court premised on a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the
       Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 19611 framed
       under Article 77 of the Constitution of India and an utterly mistaken
       notion of the scope of interference in matters relating to selection and
       appointment. It has, thus, not surprised us at all that Mr. Vikramjeet
       Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, representing the
       first respondent-Union of India2 and the second respondent-Search
       Committee, and Mr. Devashish Bharuka, learned senior counsel
       appearing for the third respondent, have made little effort to sustain
       the selection of the third respondent with reference to and/or relying
       on the said appellate judgment. Instead, the effort has been more
       towards sustaining the selection and appointment of the third
       respondent by highlighting the limited scope of judicial review in
       matters where the experts in the relevant field are the selectors and
       the process of selection is conducted by them. Much of this later,
       while we deal with their contentions.
2.     The present lis concerns appointment to the high office of ‘Chairperson’
       of the National Commission for Homeopathy.3
3.     Facts giving rise to these three appeals from the appellate judgment
       and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka,4
       which are undisputed, lie in a narrow compass.



1    Business Rules
2    UoI
3    Commission
4    High Court
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                               579

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


     I.       The National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 20205 is an
              enactment of recent origin. Section 4(1) of the NCH Act ordains
              that the Commission shall be comprised of a Chairperson,
              seven ex-officio Members and nineteen part-time Members.
              Section 4(2) specifically mandates that the Chairperson of
              the Commission shall be a person of outstanding ability,
              proven administrative capacity and integrity, possessing a
              postgraduate degree in Homoeopathy from a recognised
              University and having experience of not less than twenty
              years in the field of Homoeopathy, out of which at least ten
              years shall be as a leader in the area of healthcare delivery,
              growth and development of Homoeopathy or its education
              (emphasis supplied by us). The Explanation to Section 4
              defines the term “leader” as the Head of a Department or the
              Head of an Organisation (emphasis supplied by us). Section
              5, inter alia, prescribes that the Central Government shall
              appoint the Chairperson on the basis of the recommendation
              of a Search Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary
              as the Chairperson [clause (a)], three expert members to be
              nominated by the Central Government [having qualifications
              as described in clauses (b) and (c)], a nominee of the Central
              Government [having qualifications as described in clause (d)]
              and the Secretary to the Government of India,6 in charge of
              AYUSH to be the convenor-member [clause (e)].
     II.      Vide Notification F. No. 21011/12/2020-EP(III) dated January 16,
              2021, the Ministry of AYUSH invited applications for the post
              of Chairperson of the Commission. Inter alia, the Notification
              while indicating the eligibility criteria provided that the applicant
              must have not less than 20 years of experience in the field of
              Homeopathy, out of which at least 10 years as the Head of the
              Department or Head of an Organisation in the area of Health
              Care delivery, growth and development of Homeopathy or its
              education. This was entirely in consonance with the relevant
              statute and all concerned understood what the requirements
              were.



5   NCH Act
6   GoI
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       III.   Responding to this notification, 37 (thirty-seven) aspirants
              applied for appointment to the office of the Chairman. The
              appellant and the third respondent, who was serving as the
              Director General, Central Council for Research in Homeopathy7
              were two of the several aspirants.
       IV.    For a ready reference, the profile of the third respondent is
              reproduced hereinbelow:

                  Office/       Post Held        From              To
                Institution/
               Organisation
              CCRH             Research       07.09.1987    21.12.1995
                               Assistant
              CCRH             Assistant      22.12.1995    01.01.1996
                               Research
                               Officer
              CCRH             Research       01.01.1996    07.05.2008
                               Officer
              CCRH             Assistant      May 2008      June 2014
                               Director
              CCRH             Deputy         10.06.2014    27.12.2016
                               Director
                               (Tech.)
              CCRH             Deputy         28.01.2016    13.09.2020
                               Director
                               General
              CCRH             Director       14.09.2020    Till the Date of
                               General                      Application

       V.     The Search Committee, constituted for selection and appointment
              of the Chairperson of the Commission, upon scrutiny of the
              applications received from the several aspirants in response to
              the Notification dated January 16, 2021, resolved in its meeting


7   CCRH
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          581

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


             held on May 7, 2021 to recommend a panel of three aspirants
             in order of merit. In such panel, the third respondent figured
             at the top.
      VI.    The recommendation was accepted and after seeking the
             requisite approvals, the Central Government vide Notification No.
             S.O. 2694(E) dated July 5, 2021 constituted the Commission in
             purported compliance with the provisions of the NCH Act and,
             inter alia, conveyed the appointment of the third respondent as
             the first Chairperson of the Commission.
      VII. The third respondent accepted the appointment and commenced
           a new innings of his life as Chairperson of the Commission.
           Since the term of his appointment is for 4 (four) years, the
           appellant is due to demit office on July 4, 2025.
      VIII. Aggrieved by the selection and appointment of the third
            respondent as Chairman as well as his non-appointment in
            such office, the appellant preferred a writ petition8 before the
            High Court. The primary and the sole ground of challenge
            to such appointment was that the third respondent, despite
            not satisfying the eligibility criteria, came to be selected and
            appointed. According to the appellant, the third respondent
            lacked the requisite experience of working for 10 (ten) years
            as a ‘leader’ in terms of the Explanation to Section 4 of the
            NCH Act and, therefore, could not have entered the zone of
            consideration.
4.    The Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated
      January 10, 2024, accepted the contention of the appellant and held
      that the third respondent “did not possess the requisite experience
      as a ‘leader’ and therefore, his appointment as the Chairperson
      cannot be accepted as being in conformity with the provisions of the
      statutes”. The appointment of the third respondent was, accordingly,
      quashed. However, the Single Judge did not accept the contention
      of the appellant that he was eligible and meritorious and hence a
      direction should be issued to appoint him. It was reasoned that once
      an appointment is found to be illegal, all that the Court can do is to
      direct the Search Committee to re-do the process of appointment


8    W.P. No. 15859/2021
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       as per the statutory procedure. While allowing the writ petition, the
       Single Judge directed the Central Government to take necessary
       action to appoint a Chairperson of the Commission afresh, in the
       manner prescribed by the statute and also keeping in mind the
       observations made regarding the eligibility of the candidates vis-à-
       vis the meaning of the word ‘leader’.
5.     Aggrieved, the UoI and the third respondent carried the said judgment
       and order in separate appeals. The appellant filed a cross-objection
       challenging that part of the order of the Single Judge by which his
       contention, as noticed above, was rejected.
6.     The Division Bench, vide judgment and order dated July 31, 2024
       overturned, the decision of the Single Judge and allowed the intra-
       court appeals. It was, inter alia, held by the Division Bench that:
            “20. The workflow of the AYUSH Department, Government
            of India (Allocation of Business Rules, 1961) provides
            for organizational set up. The same is reflected at Page
            No.433 of the appeal. As per the Allocation of Business
            Rules, the Assistant Director is having independent control
            over the particular division. When the organizational set up
            does not provide for a head of the department, it is for the
            Court to examine whether a particular post would be head
            of that division. On consideration of the organizational set
            up in that view, Assistant Director though below the rank of
            Director General, the work and responsibilities entrusted
            to the Assistant Director are independent.
            21. The Search Committee having examined the
            qualification and eligibility found that the different positions
            held by the appellant would be in the capacity of the head
            of the department. It is not open to the Court to substitute
            its opinion unless mala fides are being demonstrated in
            the process of selection. … ”
7.     Consequently, the appeals of the UoI and the third respondent were
       allowed and the cross-objection dismissed. By presenting these three
       appeals, the said judgment and order has been called in question
       by the appellant.
8.     Noticing the observations made in the judgment rendered by the
       Single Judge, to nullify the selection of the third respondent, we
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          583

                 Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


      had called upon Mr. Banerjee to place before us the relevant file
      pertaining to the selection in question in a sealed cover.
9.    The file, which was placed, reveals that the third respondent had not
      submitted supporting documents to support his claim of possessing
      the requisite experience. The Search Committee after considering the
      application of the third respondent had, thus, remarked that it was
      “not clear” whether the third respondent possesses experience of 10
      (ten) years as ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’.
      It was also observed that the third respondent “may be eligible
      subject to submission and Verification of documents of experience
      as Head of Department from Competent Authority, cadre clearance
      & Certification of not having Major/Minor Penalties.”
10. While perusing the file, we came across a Departmental Order9
    of the Secretary to the Government of India,10 Ministry of AYUSH,
    dated May 6, 2021. The second and final paragraph of the letter
    reads as follows:
              “In this regard, I have got the matter examined in the
              Ministry of Ayush and after verifying the documents of
              experience, it is confirmed that Dr. Anil Khurana, DG,
              CCRH is having the requisite experience of 10 years
              equivalent to Head of Department. He, therefore, fulfils
              the eligibility requirements for the post in terms of the
              provisions of the Act.”
                                            (emphasis supplied by us)

11. Since we could not trace in the file the precise ‘documents of
    experience’ which the Secretary, GoI in the aforesaid letter claimed
    to have verified, Mr. Banerjee was requested to throw light on it.
    He expressed regret having not been provided access to the file
    since the officers of the Ministry felt that it was directly to be placed
    before the Court in a sealed cover. However, at the same time, he
    submitted (upon receiving instructions from the officers present in
    Court) that the ‘documents of experience’, if not in the file, could lie
    somewhere else in a separate file. Assuring that such documents
    would also be placed before the Court, Mr. Banerjee added a caveat


9    D.O.
10   Secretary, GoI
584                                                          [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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        that access to the file and the other documents to be produced may
        not be allowed to counsel for the appellant.
12. Having proceeded to hear the parties, we closed arguments and while
    reserving judgment on January 23, 2025, we required the officers of
    the UoI, who were present in Court, to produce the ‘documents of
    experience’ referred to in the D.O. of the Secretary, GoI.
13. Next morning, a sealed envelope was handed over to the Court
    Master for being placed before us. Such envelope had the handwritten
    inscription “Documents of Experience” as well as reference to these
    appeals. We record having devoted sufficient attention to all the
    papers in the file as well as the bunch of documents in the sealed
    envelope which, of course, on the ground of confidentiality claimed
    by Mr. Banerjee, was not given access to Mr. Kamath, learned senior
    counsel for the appellant. However, nothing much turns on such non-
    accessibility since, the reasons to follow would demonstrate how the
    selection process suffers from gross illegality and, thus, has to fall
    through for serious breach of the statutory requirements, thereby
    supporting what we have said at the beginning of this judgment.
14. We have recorded above, what was the initial reaction of the members
    of the Search Committee. Had it been a clean and clear case where
    the members had no reason to object to the candidature of the third
    respondent, the present exercise need not have been undertaken,
    thereby yielding no difference in the outcome of the selection process.
15. At the outset, we cannot but express our dismay at the manner
    of appreciation of the organizational set up of CCRH11 by the writ
    appellate court and construing it to be part of the Business Rules.
    The page bearing the organizational set up of CCRH admittedly
    was part of the CCRH’s Annual Report of 2012-2013. Neither Mr.
    Banerjee nor Mr. Bharuka has attempted to justify the appellate
    judgment with reference to the Business Rules and, in fact, submitted
    that the Division Bench proceeded on a mistaken notion. We do not
    see it as a mistake, but as a blunder; and, for reasons of propriety,
    say no more.
16. We would assume, as submitted by Mr. Banerjee, that while issuing
    the D.O., the Secretary, GoI (who himself was a member of the Search


11     reproduced at the end of the judgment.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           585

             Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


     Committee) must have looked into the ‘documents of experience’ and
     what the same recorded must have weighed with the Chairperson
     and the members of the Search Committee to ultimately hold the
     third respondent eligible in all respects. However, two aspects appear
     to be truly striking. We may, at once, say that although in normal
     circumstances the first aspect of discussion might not have made
     a significant impact, it becomes relevant and the situation does call
     for a little deliberation in light of the initial observations made by the
     Search Committee regarding qualifications of the third respondent.
17. What has struck us, on perusal of the minutes of the meeting held
    on May 7, 2021, is that the Search Committee made no reference at
    all in its resolution to the D.O. dated May 6, 2021. Anyone, reading
    the minutes, would have no idea at all that at a previous stage of
    the process the members of the Search Committee themselves had
    doubted whether the third respondent was duly qualified or not and
    how such doubt came to be cleared. No explanation is proffered
    in regard to this omission. Obviously, this could not have been an
    inadvertent error.
18. According to Mr. Banerjee, the Secretary, GoI had referred to in the
    D.O. that the ‘documents of experience’ had been considered; and,
    having regard thereto, the Court ought not to sit in appeal over the
    satisfaction reached by the members that the third respondent was
    duly qualified.
19. The bunch of documents handed over to us have been duly looked
    into. We record having perused each and every page. What the
    bunch contains are documents mainly comprising office orders
    detailing the third respondent’s work allocation along with certain
    certificates of conferences attended and papers authored by him.
    Our examination of the documents yielded no conclusive evidence
    to prove the third respondent’s experience. On the contrary, there
    is one document in the bunch which is sufficient to seal the fate of
    the third respondent. We propose to refer to this document at a later
    stage of this judgment.
20. We preface further discussion recording our consciousness of what
    the law is. It is not for the Court to sit in appeal over decisions of
    selecting bodies, whatever be the nature of the post/office. If the
    selection made by the selectors, who are experts in the field, is
    laid to a challenge, a merit review is forbidden; what is permissible
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       is, inter alia, a limited scrutiny of ascertaining the eligibility of the
       aspirants and the procedure followed, that is, whether a duly qualified
       aspirant has been selected and whether the procedure followed was
       fair and in consonance with statutory rules or not. However, merely
       because the Search Committee is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary
       and such committee consists of experts, does not automatically
       make its recommendation immune from judicial scrutiny; rather, in
       an appropriate case warranting such scrutiny, the writ court would
       be justified in its interference with the process.
21. What appears to be disturbing is the total lack of procedural fairness
    in the present case. If indeed a doubt had lingered in the mind of
    the members of the Search Committee as to whether an aspirant is
    eligible in terms of the requirements of the statute, is it not the duty
    of the Search Committee, in order to remain above board, to write
    even a single sentence and record its satisfaction in the minutes that
    the doubt has been cleared? The answer to this question cannot
    be in the negative.
22. We would not have given this aspect too much of an importance
    had the UoI been able to justify by placing relevant documents that
    the Secretary, GoI had, indeed, given a correct opinion as regards
    eligibility of the third respondent upon looking into all relevant
    documents. The contents of the D.O. as well as the relevant file and
    the other documents in the sealed cover are far from revealing what
    specific documents the Secretary, GoI had looked into for concluding,
    with a measure of assurance, that the third respondent possessed
    the required 10 years’ experience as ‘Head of a Department’. When
    attention to this was drawn, we were presented with the bunch of
    documents which, as stated before, cause more harm than good to
    the cause of the UoI and the third respondent. We have no hesitation
    to hold, based on reasons assigned hereafter, that there was no
    material before the Search Committee on the basis of which the
    third respondent could have been held to be eligible, having had 10
    years’ experience as the ‘Head of a Department’.
23. This is considered sufficient to nullify the selection. But, having regard
    to the erudite arguments advanced at the Bar, we have ourselves
    proceeded to examine whether the common contention advanced
    by the UoI and the third respondent of the latter having the requisite
    experience, is acceptable or not.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             587

               Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


24. The explanation to Section 4 serves as a guiding principle in
    this dispute, which defines the meaning of ‘leader’ as ‘Head of a
    Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’. What remains undefined
    in the NCH Act is the meaning of ‘Head’.
25. When there is doubt as to the meaning of a word in the provisions
    of a statute, the rules of statutory interpretation call upon us to
    interpret the words in a statute by giving a purposive interpretation
    having regard to the subject and object of the enactment. This Court
    in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate,12
    observed that:
             “9. …Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the
             context of the subject-matter and scheme of the Act, and
             consistently with the objects and other provisions of the
             Act. It is well settled that ‘the words of a statute, when
             there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood
             in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject
             of the enactment and the object which the legislature has
             in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly
             grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor
             even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion
             on which they are used, and the object to be attained’.
             (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 55).”
26. An examination of the NCH Act reveals that it was enacted to
    provide for various aspirational objectives, inter alia, a medical
    education system that improves access to quality and affordable
    medical education, ensuring availability of adequate and high quality
    homoeopathy medical professionals in all parts of the country,
    promoting equitable and universal healthcare, making services of
    homoeopathy medical professionals accessible and affordable to all
    the citizens as well as promoting national health goals. Section 10
    of the Act provides for the powers and functions of the Commission
    and, inter alia, provides that the Commission is responsible for
    laying down policies for maintaining high quality and standards in
    the education of homeopathy and to make necessary regulations in
    this behalf, laying down policies for regulating medical institutions,
    medical research and to make necessary regulations in this behalf,


12   AIR 1958 SC 353
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       assessing the requirements in healthcare, as well as framing
       guidelines and policies for the necessary and proper functioning of
       the Commission, Autonomous Boards and the State Medical Councils
       of Homeopathy. Under Section 9 of the Act, the Chairperson shall
       preside at the meeting of the commission.
27. Therefore, the appointment of the Chairperson, who is the head of
    the Commission carries significant importance and affects various
    stakeholders in the field of homeopathy. Apart from this, the
    appointment falls within the field of public employment covered under
    Article 16 of the Constitution read with Article 14 thereof.
28. Section 4 clearly lays down that the candidate must have minimum
    twenty years of experience in the field of homeopathy, out of which
    at least ten must be as a ‘leader’. These eligibility requirements
    cannot be waived off by the administration, since they are mandatory
    requirements. This Court in Alka Ojha v. Rajasthan Public Service
    Commission13 laid down that the qualifications prescribed in the
    Rules and the advertisement were mandatory:
             “14. The use of the word ‘shall’ in Rule 11 makes it clear that
             the qualifications specified in the Schedule are mandatory
             and a candidate aspiring for appointment as Motor Vehicle
             Sub-Inspector by direct recruitment must possess those
             qualifications and must have working knowledge of Hindi
             written in Devnagri script and knowledge of Rajasthani
             culture. A conjoint reading of Rule 11, the relevant entries of
             the Schedule and Para 13 of the advertisement shows that
             a person who does not possess the prescribed educational
             and technical qualifications, working experience and a
             driving licence authorising him to drive motorcycle, heavy
             goods vehicles and heavy passenger vehicles cannot
             compete for the post of Motor Vehicle Sub-Inspector.
             15. The question whether the candidate must have the
             prescribed educational and other qualifications as on the
             particular date specified in the Rule or the advertisement
             is no longer res integra…”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)


13   (2011) 9 SCC 438
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           589

             Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


29. No precedent has been placed before us which previously considered
    the meaning of the term ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an
    Organisation’ nor are we aware of any such decision and are therefore
    tasked with providing a definition to these terms in line with the relevant
    facts of this case. ‘Head’ in general parlance can be considered to
    mean an elevated position among other subordinate roles, often in
    the position of leadership. With no specific legal definition of the
    noun ‘Head’, taking into account the object and subject of the NCH
    Act read with Section 4, ‘Head’ must refer to a position held by an
    incumbent who performs the role of a leader and is tasked with
    making substantive decisions for the department/organisation. Any
    claim for being ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’ is
    strengthened if the incumbent exercises administrative or supervisory
    responsibilities. However, this is not the only factor to be considered.
    Any such determination must be on a case-to-case basis.
30. In the instant case, the contention of the third respondent, supported
    by the UoI is that he was in a position that would grant him the
    position of ‘Head’ since May 2008. They contend that as per the
    organisational set up of CCRH, the Assistant Director (Homeopathy)
    is responsible for various sections and cells of the organisation.
    However, a perusal of the organisational set up reveals that the
    Assistant Director is not the ‘Head’ of the Technical Section. The
    ‘Head’ of the Technical Section is clearly the Deputy Director
    General who controls the entire Technical Section. The Assistant
    Director (Homeopathy) reports to the Deputy Director General. The
    office orders brought on record show that the third respondent was
    tasked with certain responsibilities, albeit including administrative and
    supervisory duties; however, he was not given tasks that resemble
    the duties associated with the ‘Head of a Department’. Discharge
    of mere supervisory duties will not result in being referred to as the
    ‘Head of a Department’, if the overall organisational set up does
    not reveal such a position. Moreover, the third respondent was not
    the only Assistant Director (Homeopathy) in the said organisation,
    weakening the stance raised by him considerably.
31. We may now shift our attention to the document which we have
    referred to in paragraph 19 (supra). It is an Office Order No.
    906/2012-13 dated July 11, 2012 issued by the Director General,
    CCRH in exercise of power delegated to him under the memorandum
    of Association and Rules, Regulations and Bye-Laws thereof [Rule
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       50(i)]. Thereby, the third respondent was declared as the “Head of
       Office” while he was holding the post of AD (H) [that is, Assistant
       Director (Homeopathy)].
32. The aforesaid office order has to be read together with two other
    office orders, referred to by Mr. Kamath. The first is Office Order
    No. 638/2011 dated October 5, 2011 issued by the Director General
    in-charge, CCRH requiring Dr. Vikram Singh, Deputy Director,
    (Homeo), working in CCRH, to hand over the entire charge of the
    Technical Section to the third respondent. The second is Office Order
    No.23/2014 issued by the Director General, CCRH January 22,
    2014 on reallocation of duties among Technical Officers of CCRH, in
    supersession of all previous orders, to take effect from January 27,
    2014. In terms thereof, the third respondent was made the second
    in command “after DG and Vigilance” and one Dr. B.S. Arya was
    made the “Head of Office”.
33. All these office orders, read cumulatively, leads one to the only
    logical and perceivable conclusion that the third respondent was
    the “Head of Office” from July 2012 to January, 2014 or, at the very
    least, was never the “Head of Office” prior to July, 2012. Also, he
    became second in command only from January 27, 2014.
34. Therefore, even if we choose to liberally construe the term ‘Head of a
    Department’ and consider October 5, 2011 as the date on which the
    work of the Technical Section was transferred to the third respondent,
    he fell short of the requirement of 10 years’ experience as the ‘Head
    of a Department’ by a little less than a year. He had experience of
    9 years, 3 months and 11 days on the date of the Notification dated
    January 16, 2021; 9 years 4 months and 10 days on the date of his
    application, i.e., February 15, 2021; and exactly 9 years 9 months
    on the date of his appointment as the Chairperson on July 5, 2021.
35. On the basis of the three above referred office orders, the position
    seems to be clear as crystal that the third respondent was never the
    “Head of a Department” at least any time before taking over entire
    charge of the Technical Section in terms of the Office Order dated
    October 5, 2011 and, therefore, fell short of the requisite experience.
36. The conclusion recorded by the Secretary, GoI that the third respondent
    did have the requisite experience as ‘Head of a Department’, which
    is nothing but his ipse dixit, is plainly suspect and vulnerable on
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                591

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


      the face of all these three orders and has to be declared to be a
      conclusion which suffers from gross perversity.
37. This apart, the D.O. dated May 6, 2021 reflected an opinion of the
    Secretary, GoI of the third respondent’s requisite experience of 10
    years being equivalent to ‘Head of a Department’. We are left to
    wonder who determined equivalence and how such equivalence
    was determined.
38. It is apt to reproduce the decision rendered in N.P. Verma v. Union
    of India,14 wherein this Court on the aspect of equivalence held:
             “20. As against this, the contention of HPCL is that the two
             Committees that were appointed by the Chairman of HPCL
             considered the different methods of fitment and equivalence
             of different pay scales of ESSO, LIL and CORIL with the pay
             scales of IOC. Except the bare allegation, no material has
             been produced before us on behalf of HPCL to show that
             the said Committees had, as a matter of fact, considered the
             question of equation of posts on the basis of the principle
             as laid down by the Central Government while referring
             the matter to the Tandon Committee, namely, functional
             similarity and co-equal responsibility. In the affidavits filed
             on behalf of HPCL, no particulars have been given with
             regard to the functional equivalence or otherwise of the
             different grades of these officers of CORIL, ESSO and LIL.
             It is also not stated what happened to the consideration
             by the Government of the Tandon Committee’s Report.
             There can be no doubt that the Government is not bound
             to accept the recommendation of the Tandon Committee
             but, at the same time, the equation of posts has to be
             made on the principle of functional equivalence and co-
             equal responsibility. As no materials have been produced
             in that regard on behalf of HPCL, it is difficult for us to hold
             that the different grades of posts have been compared
             before placing the officers of these companies in the IOC/
             HPCL scales of pay. While it is not within the domain of
             the court to make the equation of posts for the purpose of
             integration, it is surely the concern of the court to see that


14   1989 Supp (1) SCC 748
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          before the integration is made and consequent fitment of
          officers in different grades/scales of pay is effected, there
          must be an equation of different posts in accordance with
          the principle stated above. As there is no evidence or
          material in support of such equation of posts, it is difficult
          to accept the rationalisation scheme with regard to the
          placing of the officers of CORIL in different IOC/HPCL
          grades of pay.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

39. What follows from the aforesaid view taken by this Court is that
    there should be some material on the basis whereof equivalence is
    determined. Generally speaking, equivalence of two posts may be
    attempted to be determined by factors such as (1) qualifications and
    requirements; (2) job responsibilities and duties; (3) work environment
    and conditions including workload and pressure; (4) accountability
    and impact; and (5) evaluation of the above and comparison.
40. Even though not doubting the authority and competence of the
    Secretary, GoI to determine such equivalence (assuming that he
    is competent by reason of the office he holds), such determination
    lacks creditworthiness in the absence of any material, far less
    cogent material, having been placed before us for our consideration.
    We have no hesitation to hold that the determination made is not
    backed by any concrete evidence and is, therefore, wholly without
    any basis.
41. The instant case showcases an egregious departure from the
    mandatory requirements prescribed in Section 4 of the NCH Act
    and the advertisement for the said position and leaves no option
    but to interfere with the said selection of the third respondent. The
    Division Bench faulted the Single Judge by noting that the scope of
    interference in service matters is extremely limited and that unless
    mala fides are shown, the Court must not interfere. While we are in
    agreement with the broad proposition of the law that interference in
    matters relating to selection and appointment must be limited and
    the Court must not generally substitute the findings of the Search
    Committee, we respectfully disagree with the Division Bench that
    this was not a case to interfere in, considering, the clear violation
    of the applicable statutory rules.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           593

               Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


42. A Constitution Bench in University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao,15
    perhaps the first decision in the long line of decisions following it
    on judicial review in matters of selection by individuals holding high
    positions, provides a clear picture on the scope of interference, albeit
    limited, in matters of the present kind. Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.
    (as the Chief Justice of India then was) speaking for the Constitution
    Bench observed :
             “12. ……Boards of Appointments are nominated by the
             Universities and when recommendations made by them
             and the appointments following on them, are challenged
             before courts, normally the courts should be slow to
             interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts.
             There is no allegation about mala fides against the experts
             who constituted the present Board; and so, we think, it
             would normally be wise and safe for the courts to leave
             the decisions of academic matters to experts who are
             more familiar with the problems they face than the courts
             generally can be………What the High Court should have
             considered is whether the appointment made by the
             Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule
             or ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should
             have shown due regard to the opinion expressed by the
             Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor
             has acted. In this connection, the High Court has failed to
             notice one significant fact that when the Board considered
             the claims of the respective applicants, it examined them
             very carefully and actually came to the conclusion that
             none of them deserved to be appointed a Professor.
             These recommendations made by the Board clearly show
             that they considered the relevant factors carefully and
             ultimately came to the conclusion that Appellant 2 should
             be recommended for the post of Reader. Therefore, we
             are satisfied that the criticism made by the High Court
             against the Board and its deliberations is not justified.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)




15   1963 SCC OnLine SC 15
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43. This case pertains to eligibility of the third respondent and therefore
    scope of judicial review, even though limited, is open. Hon’ble S.H.
    Kapadia, J. (as the Chief Justice of India then was) speaking for
    the Court in Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India16 neatly
    delineated the applicability of judicial review in cases of eligibility
    and suitability, thus:
             “43. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. ‘Eligibility’
             is an objective factor. Who could be elevated is specifically
             answered by Article 217(2). When ‘eligibility’ is put in
             question, it could fall within the scope of judicial review.
             However, the question as to who should be elevated,
             which essentially involves the aspect of ‘suitability’, stands
             excluded from the purview of judicial review.
             44. At this stage, we may highlight the fact that there is a
             vital difference between judicial review and merit review.
             Consultation, as stated above, forms part of the procedure
             to test the fitness of a person to be appointed a High Court
             Judge under Article 217(1). Once there is consultation,
             the content of that consultation is beyond the scope of
             judicial review, though lack of effective consultation could
             fall within the scope of judicial review….”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

44. In Veer Pal Singh v. Ministry of Defence,17 this Court held that:
             “10. Although, the courts are extremely loath to interfere
             with the opinion of the experts, there is nothing like
             exclusion of judicial review of the decision taken on the
             basis of such opinion. What needs to be emphasised is
             that the opinion of the experts deserves respect and not
             worship and the courts and other judicial/quasi-judicial
             forums entrusted with the task of deciding the disputes
             relating to premature release/discharge from the army
             cannot, in each and every case, refuse to examine the
             record of the Medical Board for determining whether or


16   (2009) 8 SCC 273
17   (2013) 8 SCC 83
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           595

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


             not the conclusion reached by it is legally sustainable.”
45. We are, at this stage, also reminded of what this Court in Distt.
    Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential
    School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi 18 observed. The
    instructive passage therefrom is quoted below:
             “6. It must further be realised by all concerned that when
             an advertisement mentions a particular qualification and
             an appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is
             not a matter only between the appointing authority and
             the appointee concerned. The aggrieved are all those
             who had similar or even better qualifications than the
             appointee or appointees but who had not applied for
             the post because they did not possess the qualifications
             mentioned in the advertisement. It amounts to a fraud
             on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications
             in such circumstances unless it is clearly stated that the
             qualifications are relaxable. No court should be a party to
             the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. We are afraid
             that the Tribunal lost sight of this fact.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

46. It would also be pertinent to highlight that though the third respondent
    averred in his application (in pursuance to the Notification) that he
    was the head of the department/organisation since May 2008, a
    contention which we have rejected, it is also plain and clear that
    he misrepresented his work experience for being considered for
    the coveted position of Chairperson of the Commission. What the
    consequence of an illegal appointment could be, needs no emphasis.
47. The only escape route, which could have potentially saved the
    selection of the third respondent from interference, is conferment
    of a power by the statute on the appointing authority to relax the
    essential qualification(s). Responding to our query, Mr. Banerjee
    frankly submitted that the NCH Act did not confer any such power
    of relaxation on the appointing authority. This obliterates the final
    beacon of hope for the third respondent.


18   (1990) 3 SCC 655
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48. The Division Bench has referred to the case of Tajvir Singh Sodhi
    v. State of Jammu and Kashmir19 delivered by this Court to hold
    that the scope of interference is limited. Paragraph 66 has been
    referred to, which reads thus:
             “66. Thus, the inexorable conclusion that can be drawn is
             that it is not within the domain of the Courts, exercising
             the power of judicial review, to enter into the merits of a
             selection process, a task which is the prerogative of and is
             within the expert domain of a Selection Committee, subject
             of course to a caveat that if there are proven allegations of
             malfeasance or violations of statutory rules, only in such
             cases of inherent arbitrariness, can the Courts intervene.”
49. While there can be no gainsaying that interference should be limited,
    particularly when a merit review is sought as in Tajvir Singh Sodhi
    (supra), the decision does acknowledge that interference could still be
    made if there are proven allegations of malfeasance or violations of
    statutory rules, laying bare inherent arbitrariness in the process. This
    decision too reinforces the legal position that if any of the grounds
    on which judicial review of administrative action is shown to exist,
    interference on such ground would be well-nigh permissible. It is
    not an arena in which intervention is completely barred.
50. In the case of Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand,20
    this Court while considering the departure from the statutory rules
    midway through the selection procedure held that the statutory rules
    must be given primacy in any selection process.
             “22. We find from Rule 18 of the 2001 Rules, the task of
             setting cut-off marks has been vested in the High Court
             but this has to be done before the start of the examination.
             Thus, we are also dealing with a situation in which the
             High Court administration is seeking to deviate from
             the Rules guiding the selection process itself. We have
             considered the High Court’s reasoning for such deviation,
             but such departure from statutory rules is impermissible.
             We accept the High Court administration’s argument that


19   2023 SCC OnLine SC 344.
20   (2024) 6 SCC 162
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             597

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


             a candidate being on the select list acquired no vested
             legal right for being appointed to the post in question. But
             if precluding a candidate from appointment is in violation
             of the recruitment rules without there being a finding on
             such candidate’s unsuitability, such an action would fail
             the Article 14 test and shall be held to be arbitrary. The
             reason behind the Full Court Resolution is that better
             candidates ought to be found. That is different from a
             candidate excluded from the appointment process being
             found to be unsuitable.”
51. We hold that in the matter of essential qualifications prescribed
    by the statute, there should neither be any deviation from the
    statutory requirements nor the advertisement inviting applications
    while conducting any selection process, unless power to relax the
    qualifications is shown to exist.
52. Having said that, there is one other aspect which needs to be
    briefly dealt with. The Division Bench observed that unless mala
    fides are proved, the Courts should adopt a hands-off approach.
    Broadly speaking, there could be little quarrel with such proposition.
    However, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances, we hold that
    the Division Bench grossly erred in failing to consider that mala
    fides, in the sense of malice in fact, i.e., actual malice, is not the
    only condition for interference; it is open to a Court to interfere when
    legal malice or malice in law is demonstrated to exist.
53. In Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania,21 this
    Court discussed the concept of ‘malice in law’. Profitable reference
    may be made to the following passages:
             “25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill
             will or malice— in fact or in law. ‘Legal malice’ or ‘malice
             in law’ means something done without lawful excuse. It
             is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable
             or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from
             ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to
             the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the
             State, it can never be a case of personal ill will or spite


21   (2010) 9 SCC 437
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             on the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with an
             oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory
             power for ‘purposes foreign to those for which it is in law
             intended’. It means conscious violation of the law to the
             prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part
             of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which
             intent is manifested by its injurious acts. …
             26. Passing an order for an unauthorised purpose
             constitutes malice in law. … ”
54. Again, in the case of R.S. Garg v. State of U.P.,22 this Court applied
    this principle to service disputes by holding as follows:
             “26. “Malice” in its legal sense means malice such as
             may be assumed for a wrongful act done intentionally but
             without just cause or excuse or for one of reasonable or
             probable cause. The term “malice on fact” would come
             within the purview of the aforementioned definition. Even,
             however, in the absence of any malicious intention, the
             principle of malice in law can be invoked as has been
             described by Viscount Haldane in Shearer v. Shields
             [1914 AC 808 : 83 LJPC 216 : 111 LT 297 (HL)] AC at
             p. 813 in the following terms:
             ‘A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in
             contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he
             did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the
             law, and he must act within the law. He may, therefore,
             be guilty of malice in law, although, so far as the state
             of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that
             sense innocently.’
             ……”
55. Furthermore, in the case of Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB,23
    this Court held that non-compliance of the State’s own directions
    would constitute malice in law. We quote the relevant passage
    hereunder:


22   (2006) 6 SCC 430
23   (2009) 13 SCC 758
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                         599

             Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


           “8. It is furthermore well settled that when the State lays
           down the rule for taking any action against an employee
           which would cause civil or evil consequence, it is
           imperative on its part to scrupulously follow the same.
           Frankfurter, J. in Vitarelli v. Seaton [3 L Ed 2d 1012 :
           359 US 535 (1958)] stated: (US pp. 546-47)
           ‘An executive agency must be rigorously held to the
           standards by which it professes its action to be judged.
           … Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on
           a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the
           requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must
           be scrupulously observed. … This judicially evolved rule
           of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I
           may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword
           shall perish with that sword.’
           …
           18. In a case of this nature the appellant has not alleged
           malice of fact. The requirements to comply with the
           directions contained in the said Circular Letter dated
           14-8-1981 were necessary to be complied with in a case
           of this nature. Non-compliance wherewith would amount
           to malice in law……Thus, when an order suffers from
           malice in law, neither any averment as such is required
           to be made nor strict proof thereof is insisted upon. Such
           an order being illegal would be wholly unsustainable.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

56. Based on the above, there is little doubt that the State, here the
    UoI, has exercised a power for a purpose which is foreign to that for
    which the power in law is intended. Viewed from this perspective,
    the act of appointing the third respondent as Chairperson despite
    he not having the requisite experience suffers from malice in law.
57. We hasten to add that whenever appointment to a public office is
    sought to be made, irrespective of the nature of the office, the rules
    prescribing mandatory eligibility criteria must be applied in a strict
    manner; after all, every public appointment under Article 16 of the
    Constitution must be fair, non-arbitrary and reasonable. Tested on
600                                                       [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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       this touchstone, the appointment of the third respondent fails to
       pass muster.
58. Mr. Banerjee has appealed to the conscience of the Court referring
    to the third respondent having effectively and capably discharged
    the duties and performed the functions of his office over the last
    42 (forty-two) months and that less than 6 (six) months remain for
    him to demit office.
59. Having regard to the dictum in M. Tripura Sundari Devi (supra), it
    amounts to a fraud on the public to make appointments in departure
    of either the statutory requirements or a public advertisement.
    Fraud unravels everything. This Court, under the Constitution, is
    the protector of the rights of citizens; to allow a proven fraud to be
    continued is unthinkable since it goes against reason as well as
    morality. We are afraid, Mr. Banerjee’s appeal to our conscience
    does not commend acceptance.

       CONCLUSION
60. The appeals, insofar as they are directed against the impugned
    judgment and order of the Division Bench reversing the judgment
    and order of the Single Judge, are accepted. While we set aside the
    former, the latter is restored, meaning thereby, the appointment of
    the third respondent stands quashed. The third respondent shall step
    down from the office of Chairperson of the Commission forthwith.
    By forthwith, we mean a week from date to enable him complete
    his pending assignments without, however, taking any policy
    decision or decision involving finances. Fresh process be initiated
    for appointment to the office of Chairperson of the Commission
    expeditiously. We hope and trust that the selection process will be
    taken to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law.
61. Benefits received by the third respondent are not touched; however,
    no future benefit shall enure to him on the basis of the service
    rendered by him as Chairperson, which stands quashed, beyond
    seven days from date.
62. The appeal preferred by the appellant questioning rejection of his
    cross-objection is, however, dismissed.
63. No order as to costs.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                  601

                Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.


                    ORGANISATIONAL SET UP OF CCRH




     Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain