DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCESversusUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

                         [2015] 9 S.C.R. 81


       DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES                       A
                                  v.
                  UNION OF INDIAANDANOTHER
                 (Writ Petition (C) No. 441 of 2015)
                                                                      B
                           JULY 23, 2015
              [M.Y. EQBALANDARUN MISHRA, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950 -Art. 32 - Jurisdiction under
    - Invoked by Medical Institute challenging refusal of Medical     c
    Council of India-MC/ to recommend the renewal of
    permission for admitting students for academic year in the
    MBBS Course of the petitioner institutes and consequent
    refusal of Union Government to renew such permission -
    Held: Supreme Court u!Art 32 would not interfere with an          D
    administrative order where the constitutionality of the statute
    or the order made thereunder is not challenged on the ground
    of contravention of Fundamental Rights - If the validity of
    the provisions of statute is challenged on the ground other
    than the contravention of fundamental rights, this Court would    E
    not entertain that challenge in a proceeding u!Art. 32 - On
    facts, decision to grant permission of renewal was based on
    the inspection reports submitted by the teams of MCI -
    Jurisdiction of MCI or Central Government to grant or refuse
    to grant permission has not been challenged - Under Art.          F
    32, the Court is not supposed to go into findings of facts
    recorded by the Authorities - Moreover, Medical Institute
    though have right to establish institutions for imparting
    medical and technical education, but the rights so claimed
                                                                      G
    by them are not fundamental rights, hence, cannot be
    agitated directly before this Court u!Art. 32.

         Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court


-                                81
                                                                      H
82       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A      HELD: 1.1 The sole object of Article 32 is the
  enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the
  Constitution. It follows that no question other than
  relating to the Fundamental Right will be determined in
  a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. The
B difference between Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution
  is that while an application under Article 32 lies only for
  the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Court
  under Article 226 has a wider power to exercise its
  jurisdiction not only for the enforcement of Fundamental
C Rights but also ordinary legal right. [Para 17] (89-H; 90-
  A-C]

       1.2 This Court under Article 32 would not interfere
  with an administrative order where the constitutionality
D of the statute or the order made thereunder is not
  challenged on the ground of contravention of
  Fundamental Rights. At the same time if the validity of
  the provisions of statute is challenged on the ground
  other than the contravention of Fundamental Rights, this
E Court would not entertain that challenge in a proceeding
  under Article ~2 of the Constitution. [Para 18] (90-D-E]

       1.3 The petitioners have challenged the decision of
  MCI and the Central Government refusing to grant
F permission or renewal to carry on their courses for the
  Academic Session 2015-16. The decisions are based on
  the inspection reports submitted by the teams of MCI.
  The jurisdiction of MCI or the Central Government to grant
  or refuse to grant permission has not been challenged.
G Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of MCI which is
  statutory body to take a decision based on the
  inspection of the college to satisfy itself the compliance
  of various provisions of the acts, rules and regulations.
H [Para 26)(97-G-H; 98-A]                          ·
                                                                -
      DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.               83
                    UNION OF INDIA

         1.4 Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is A
    not supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the
    authorities and to come to a different conclusion. The
    petitioners, even though have a right to establish
    institutions for imparting medical and technical
    education, such right is not a fundamental right, hence, B
    the same cannot be agitated directly before th_is Court
    under Article 32 of the Constitution. The writ petitions
    are dismissed. However, this would not prevent the
    petitioners from agitating their grievances before the
    appropriate forum including the High Court having c
    jurisdiction to deal with the matter. [Paras 27 and 28) (98-
    8-D]
      Priyadarshini Dental College and Hospital vs. Union
      of India & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 623: 2011 (2) SCR 945;       D
      Northern Corporation VS. Union of India (1990) 4 sec
      239: 1990 (3) SCR 621; Kanubhai Brahmbhatt vs. State
      of Gujarat AIR 1987SC1159: 1987 (2) SCR 314; Ram
      Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC
      549:(1955) 2 SCR 225; Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs.         E
      Union of India (1990) 2 SCC 352: 1990 (1) SCR 588;
      J. Fernandes. & Co. vs. Dy. Chief Controller oflmports
      and Exports (1975) 1 SCC 716: 1975 ( 3) SCR 863;
      Ujjam Bai vs. State ofU.PAIR 1962 SC 1621: (1963) 1
                                                                F
      SCR 778 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
    2011 (2) SCR 945             referred to.       Para 10
    1990 (3) SCR 621             referred to.       Para 19
                                 referred to.       Para 20     G
    1987 (2) SCR 314
    (1955) 2 SCR 225             referred to .      Para 21
•   1990 (1) SCR 588             referred to.       Para 22
    1975 (3) SCR 863             referred to.       Para 23
    (1963) 1 SCR 778             referred to.       Para 24
                                                                H
84         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A        CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No.
     441 of2015

          Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

                                  WITH
B
     Writ Petition (C) Nos. 448 of 2015

           Kapil Sibal, Nizam Pasha, Shadan Farasat for the
     Petitioner.
c
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           M. Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Knocking the doors of this Court in
     the first instance under the garb of a petition under Article 32
     of the Constitution, instead of approaching the High Court, for
D
     the enforcement of right claimed in these writ petitions is the
     preliminary question we are deciding herein.

          2. In these two writ petitions, the petitioners have invoked
    the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
E of India challenging the refusal of the Medical Council of India
    (MCI) to recommend the renewal of permission for admitting
    students forthe academic year2015-16 in the MBBS Course
    of the petitioner institutes and the consequent refusal of the
  . Union Government to renew such permission.
F
          W.P; (Civil) No. 441 of2015:

       3. The petitioner institute was said to have been granted
  permission for admitting 150 students in the MBBS course for
G the academic year 2013-14 and permission was renewed for
  the academic year 2014-15. The petitioner applied for renewal
  of permission for the academic year 2015-16 pursuantto which            •
  the assessors from the MCI conducted an inspection on 12th
  and 131h December, 2014 and submitted a report dated
H 15.12.2014 in which no deficiencies were alleged to have been
  pointed out.
   DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES               v.    85
          UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

       4. However, the assessors from MCI were alleged to have A
  made another surprise inspection on 5tti February, 2015 at 3. 00
  PM and directed the Dean to call for a faculty meeting at 3.30
  PM. Many teachers could not attend the meeting alleged to
  have left the college for lunch or Friday prayers or having gone
  home for the weekend while many others who came after 3.30 B
  PM from different parts of the campus were not allowed to
· attend the meeting. Many of the Resident Doctors were stated
  to have been absent on account of the imminent State Level
  PG Entrance Test. Another inspection was conducted on 7th
  February, 2015. The inspection report was alleged to have C
  been inaccurate and signed in protest by the Dean.

      5. The aforesaid report was considered by the Executive
Committee of the MCI on 101h February, 2015 and it was
decided not to recommend the renewal of the permission of D
the petitioner and the same was communicated to the Union
Government, which sent letter dated 04.03.2015 to the
petitioner to appear for a hearing. After the hearing where the
petitioner was said to have justified the deficiencies that were
pointed out, the Central Government sent letter dated E
22.05.2015 directing the MCI to conduct a reassessment.
However, the MCI was alleged to have not done a re-inspection
as directed on the ground that a decision had already been
made not to recommend the renewal by invoking Regulation 8 F .
(3) (1) (a) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations,
1999.
      6. Thereafter, the Union Government published a list on
17.06.2015 stating that the permission of the petitioner college
for the academicyear2015-16 had not been renewed and a G
letter dated 15.06.2015 was sent to the petitioner informing
the same.

     7. The petitioner filed the present petition praying for
declaring the second inspection conducted on 5th and 7th        H
86          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A    February, 2015 to be illegal and for directing the MCI to
     recommend the renewal of the approval of the petitioner college
     for the academic year 2015-16 on the basis of the first
     inspection conducted on 12th and 13th December, 2014. A
     prayer has also been made for directing the Central
B    Government to issue the letter of renewal accordingly.

          W.P. (Civil} No.448 of 2015

           8. The petitioner-college was granted provisional affiliation
c    for starting the MBBS course for the academic session
     2014-15 with 150 students. It appears that a surprise
     inspection was made by MCI and many deficiencies were
     pointed out. The Executive Committee of MCI after
     considering the inspection report recommended disapproval
o    of the college. The Central Government directed the MCI to
     reconsider the matter. However, the MCI reiterated its stand
     of not recommending the renewal of permission for the
     sessions 2015-16. The petitioner has challenged the decision
     of the Medical Council of India.
E
           9. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel
     appearing in W.P. (Civil) No.441 of 2015 and Mr. V. Giri,
     learned senior counsel appearing in W.P.(Civil) No. 448 of
     2015 on the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32
.F   of the Constitution of India.

         10. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the
 . petitioner, submitted that because of the time schedule fixed
   in Priya Gupta's case, 2012 (7) SCC 433, the petitioner has
G no option but to move this Court in order to get the relief by
   issuance of appropriate directions to the respondents.
   Learned senior counsel also drawn our attention to para 13 of
   the judgment rendered by this Court in Priyadarshini Dental
   College and Hospital vs. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 4
H    sec 623.
  DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                         87
         UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

     11. Mr. V. Giri,. learned senior counsel appearing in one        A
of the writ petitions, advanced the same arguments for filing
the writ petition before this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution instead of approaching the High Court.

      12. Both the learned senior counsel, however, claimed           B
their right guaranteed under Article 19( 1)(g) of the Constitution
of India.

      13. At the very outset, we wish to extract the relevant
portion of Article 19 of the Constitution which reads as under:-      c
  "19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of
  speech etc
  ill All citizens shall have the right
  .(fil to freedom of speech and expression;                          D
  .(Q1 to assemble peaceably and without arms;
  {fil to form associations or unions;
  @to move freely throughout the territory of India;
  .(fil to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India;
                                                                      E
  and
  .ill omitted
  .{gl to practise any profession, or to carry on any
  occupation, trade or business
  .(21------                                                          F
  .@l-------
  .(£------~

  !fil------~
  !fil Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect      G
 . the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes,
   or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in
   the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions
   on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub
   clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause
                                                                      H
88        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A      shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
       relates to, or prevent the State from making any law
       relating to,
       ill the professional or technical qualifications necessary
       for practising any profession or carrying on any
B      occupation, trade or business, or
       ® the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned
       or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry
       or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,
c      of citizens or otherwise."
        14. From a bare reading of the provision contained in
  Article 19( 1)(g) it is evidently clear that the citizens have been
  conferred with the right to practice any profession or carry on
  any occupation, trade or business, but such right is subject to
D the restriction and imposition of condition as provided under
  Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

       · 15. In Unni Krishnan's case, 1993 (1) SCC 645, the
  right guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(g) has been elaborately
E discussed by the five Judges Constitution Bench. The Court
  held that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or
  business. Trade or business normally connotes an activity
  carried on with a profit motive. This Court observed that
  education has never been nor can it be allowed to become
F commerce in this country. Education has always been treated
  in this country as religious and charitable activity and making
  it commercial is opposed to the ethos, tradition and
  sensibilities of this nation. A citizen of this country may have a
G rightto establish an educational institution but no citizen, person
  or institution has a right much less of fundamental right to
  affiliation or recognition. Their Lordships observed:-

      "67. Even on general principles, the matter could be
      approached this way. Educational institutions can be
H     classified under two categories:
  DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                        89
         UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

   1. Those requiring recognition by the State and                   A

   2. Those who do not require such a recognition.

   67a. It is not merely an establishment of educational
   institution, that is urged by the petitioners, but, to run the
                                                                     B
   educational institution dependent on recognition by the
   State. There is absolutely no fundamental right to
   recognition in any citizen. The right to establishment and
   run the educational institution with State's recognition
   arises only on the State permitting, pursuant to a policy         c
 · decision or on the fulfilment of the conditions of the statute.
   Therefore, where it is dependent on the permission under
   the statute or the exercise of an executive power, it cannot
   qualify to be a fundamental right. Then again, the State
   policy may dictate a different course.                            D
  xxx          xxx             xxx
  72. Accordingly, it is held that there is no fundamental
  right under Article 19(1 )(g) to establish an educational
  institution, if recognition or affiliation is sought for such      E
  an educational institution. It may be made clear that
  anyone desirous of starting an institution purely for the
  purposes of educating the students could do so but
  Sections 22 and 23 of the University Grants Commission
                                                                     F
  Act which prohibits the award of degrees except by a
  University must be kept in mind."

     . 16. Considering the facts of the case as averred by the
petitioners and the rights claimed therein, we are of the
considered opinion that the petitioners, even though have a G
right to establish institutions for imparting medical and technieal
education, such right is not a fundamental right.

     17. From reading of Article 32, it is manifest that clause
1(i) of Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme          H
90          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A Court for an appropriate writ for the purpose of enforcing the
  Fundamental Rights included in Part-Ill of the Constitution. The
  sole object of Article 32 is the enforcement of Fundamental
  Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It follows that no
  question other than relating to the Fundamental Right will be
B determined in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution.
  The difference between Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution
  is that while an application under Article 32 lies only for the
  enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Court under
  Article 226 has a wider power to exercise its jurisdiction not
C only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also
  ordinary legal right.

        18. It is equally well settled that this Court under Article
  32 will not interfere with an administrative order where the
D constitutionality of the statute or the order made thereunder is
  not challenged on the ground of contravention of Fundamental
  Rights. At the same time if the validity of the provisions of
  statute is challenged on the ground other than the contravention
  of Fundamental Rights, this Court will not entertain that
E challenge in a pr9ceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution.

           19. In the case of Northern Corporation vs. Union of
     India, (1990) 4 SCC 239, a petition under Article 32 of the
     Constitution of India was moved by the transferee licence
F    holder. The maintainability of the application under Article 32
     of the Constitution of India was seriously objected by t~e Union
     of India. Writing the judgment, Hon'ble Sabyasachi Mukherjee,
     the then CJI, held:-

G      "11. However, there is a far more serious objection in
       entertaining this application under Article 32 of the
       Constitution, Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the
       right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of
       fundamental rights. If there is breach of the fundamental
H      rights, the petitioner can certainly have recourse to Article
DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                        91
       UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

 32 of the Constitution provided other conditions are              A
 satisfied. But we must, in all such cases, be circumventive
 of what is the right claimed. In this case. the petitioner as
 such has no fundamental right to clear the goods imported
 except in due process of law. Now in the facts of this
 case, such clearance can only be made on payment of               B
 duty as enjoined by the Customs Act. In a particular
 situation wheth_er customs duty is payable at the rate
 prevalent on a particular date or not has to be determined
within the four corners of the Customs Act, 1962. The
 petitioner has no fundamental right as such to clear any          c
goods imported without payment of duties in accordance
with the law. There is procedure provided by law for
determination of the payment of customs duty. The
revenue has proceeded on that basis. The petitioner
                                                                   D
contends that duty at a particular rate prevalent at a
particular date was not payable. The petitioner cannot
seek to remove the goods without payment at that rate
or without having the matter determined by the procedure
envisaged and enjoined by the law for that determination.          E
The petitioner without seeking to take any relief within
the procedure envisaged under the Act had moved this
Court for breach of fundamental right. This is not
permissible and should never be entertained. In a matter
of this nature where liability of a citizen to pay a particular    F
duty depends on interpretation of law and determination
of facts and the provision of a particular statute for which
elaborate procedure is prescribed, it cannot conceivably
be contended that enforcing of those provisions of the
Act would breach fundamental right which entitle a citizen         G
to seek recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution. We
are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that relief under Article
32 of the Constitution is wholly inappropriate in the facts
and the circumstances of this case. It has further to be
reiterated that for enforcement of fundamental rig ht which        H
92         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C..R.


A      is dependent upon adjudication or determination of
       questions of law as well as question of fact without taking
       any resort to the provisions of the Act, it is not permissible
       to move this Court on the theoretical basis that there is
       breach of the fundamental right. Whenever a person
B      complains and claims that there is a violation of law, it
       does not automatically involve breach of fundamental
       right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the
       Constitution is attracted. It appears that the facts of this
       nature require elaborate procedural investigation and this
c      Court should not be moved and should not entertain on
       these averments (sic) oftheArticle 32 of the Constitution.·
       This position is clearly well settled, but sometimes we
       are persuaded to accept that an allegation of breach of
       law is an action in breach offundamental right."
D
           20. In the case of Kanubhai Brahmbhatt vs. State of
     Gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 1159, this Court took serious concern
     of the litigants coming to this Court under Article 32 of the
     Constitution instead of first moving the appropriate High Court
E    for the redressal of their grievances. This Court observed as
     under:

       "3 .. lf this Court takes upon itself to do everything which
       even the High Court can do, this Court will not be able to
F      do what this Court alone can do under Article 136 of the
       Constitution of India, and other provisions conferring
       exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. There is no reason to
       assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice.
       Or that this Court alone can do justice. If this Court
G      entertains writ petitions at the instance of parties who
       approach this Court directly instead of approaching the
       concerned High Court in the first instance, tens of
       thousands of writ petitions would in course of time be
       instituted in this Court directly. The inevitable result will
H
       be that the arrears pertaining to matters in respect of
  DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                        93
         UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

   which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under           A
   the Constitution will assume more alarming proportions.
   As it is, more than ten years old civil appeals and criminal
   appeals are sobbing for attention. It will occasion great
   misery and immense hardship to tens of thousands of
   litigants if the seriousness of this aspect is not sufficiently   B
   realized. And this is no imaginary phobia. A dismissed
   government servant has to wait for nearly ten years for
   redress in this Court. Kashinth Dikshita v. Union of India,
   (1986) 3 SCC229: (AIR 1986) SC 2118).Alitigantwhose
   appeal has been dismissed by wrongly refusing to                  c
   condone delay has to wait for 14 years before ~is wrong
   is righted by this Court. Shankarrao v.
  Chandrasenkunwar, Civil Appeal No.1335(N) of 1973
   decided on January 29, 1987. The time for imposing self-
                                                                     D
  discipline has already come, even if it involves shedding
  of some amount of institutional ego, or raising of some
  eyebrows. Again, it is as important to do justice at this
  level, as to inspire confidence in the litigants that justice
  will be meted out to them at the High Court level, and             E
  other levels. Faith must be inspired in the hierarchy of
  courts and the institution as a whole, not only in this Court
  alone. And this objective can be achieved only this Court
  showing trust in the High Court by directing the litigants
  to approach the High Court in the first instance. Besides,         F
  as a matter of fact, if matters like the present one are
  instituted in the High Court, there is a likelihood of the
  same being disposed of much more quickly, and equally
  effectively, on account of the decentralisation of the
  process of administering justice. We are of the opinion            G
  that the petitioner should be directed to adopt this course
  and approach the High Court."

    21. In the case of Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of
                             =
Punjab, AIR ·1955 SC 549 (1955) 2 SCR 225, the petitioner H
94         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A was carrying on business of printing, publishing books for sale
  including text books used in the schools of State of Punjab.
  The State of Punjab decided in furtherance of their policy of
  nationalization of text books for the school students. According
  to the Policy, all recognized schools had to follow the course
B of studies approved by the Government. The petitioners
  alleged in support of their petitions under Article 32 that the
  Punjab Government has in pursuance of their policy of
  nationalization of text books issued a series of notifications
  regarding the printing, publication and sale of these books and
C thereby ousted them from the business altogether. Dismissing
  the writ petitipn, a five Judges Constitution Bench, headed by
  the then Chief Justice observed:-

       "21. As in our view the petitioners have no fundamental
D      right in the present case which can be said to have been
       infringed by the action of the Government, the petition is
       bound to fail on that ground. This beingthe position, the
       other two points raised by Mr Pathak do not require
       consideration at all. As the petitioners have no
E      fundamental right under Article 19(1 )(g) of the
       Constitution, the question whether the Government could
       establish a monopoly without any legislation under Article
       19(6) of the Constitution is altogether immaterial.
F      Again a mere chance or prospect of having particular
       customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to
       any interest in an undertaking within the meaning of Article
       31 (2) of the Constitution and no question of payment of
       compensation can arise because the petitioners have
G      been deprived of the same. The result is that the petition
       is dismissed with costs."

         22. In the case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti vs. Union of
     India, (1990) 2 SCC 352, a similar question relating to the
H maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the
        DM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                         95
               UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.]

     Constitution came for consideration before a three Judges'             A
      Bench of this Court for the enforcement of any Government
     policy. In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for issuance of
     the writ of mandamus directing Central Government to hold
     pre-medical and pre-dental examination in Hindi and regional
     languages, which according to the petitioner is mandated by            B
     Article 29(2) of the Constitution of India. While permitting the
     petitioner to withdraw its petition, the Court observed that Article
     32 of the Constitution guarantees enforcement of Fundamental
     Rights but violation of Fundamental Right is the sine qua non
     for seeking enforcement of those rights by the Supreme Court.          c
     In order to establish the violation of fundamental right, the Court
     has to consider the direct and inevitable consequences of the
     action which is sought to be remedied or the guarantee of
     which is sought to be enforced. Where the existence of
                                                                            D
     fundamental right has to be established by acceptance of a
     particular policy, or a course of action for which there is no
     legal compulsion or statutory imperative and on which there
     are divergent views, the same cannot be sought to be enforced
     by Article 32 of the Constitution.                                     E
            23. In the case of J. Fernandes & Co. vs. Dy. Chief
      Control/erof/mportsandExports, (1975) 1SCC716, this
      Court, while considering writ petition under Article 32 of the
    . Constitution, observed that a petition under Article 32 will not
                                                                        F
      be competent to challenge any erroneous decision of an
      authority. A wrong' application of law would not amount to a
      violation of fundamental right. If the provisions of law are good
      and the orders passed are within the jurisdiction of the
      authorities, .there is no infraction of fundamental right if the G
      authorities are right or wrong on facts.

•        24. In the case of Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P, AIR 1962
     SC 1621=(1963) 1 SCR 778, before the seven Judges'
     Constitution Bench, a question came for consideration as to
                                                                            H
96         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015) 9 S.C.R.


A    whether an assessment made by an authority under the taxing
     statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its
     jurisdiction can be challenged under Article 32 of the
     Constitution of India? Answering the question, Their Lordships
     held as under:
B
        "21. In my opinion, the correct answer to the two questions
       which have been referred to this larger Bench must be in
       the negative. An order of assessment made by an
        authority under a taxing statute which is intra vi res and in
c      the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be
       challenged on the sole ground that it is passed on a
        misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification
        issued thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order
       be questioned in a petition under Article 32 of the
D      Constitution. The proper remedy for correcting an error
        in such an order is to proceed by way of appeal, or if the
       error is an error apparent on the face of the record, then
        by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. It
       is necessary to observe here that Article 32 of the
E      Constitution does not give this Court an appellate
       jurisdiction such as is given by Arts 132 to 136. Article
       32 guarantees the right to a constitutional remedy and
       relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by
       Part Ill of the Constitution. Unless a question of the
F
       enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does
       not apply. There can be no question of the enforcement
       of a fundamental right if the order challenged is a valid
       and legal order, in spite of the allegation that it is
G      erroneous. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that
       no question of the enforcement of fundamental right arises
       in this case and the writ petition is not maintainable."

          25. Their Lordships further observed:

H      38. As I have said above, the submission of the learned
      OM WAYANAD INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL SCIENCES v.                     97.
             UNION OF INDIA[M. Y. EQBAL, J.)

      Additional Solicitor General is well founded. It has the        A
      support of the following decisions of this Court which I
      shall now deal with. In Gulabdas v. Assistant Collector of
      Custom 1957 AIR(SC) 733, 736.) it was held that ifthe
      order impugned is made under the provisions of a statue
      which is intra vires and the order is within the jurisdiction   B
      of the authority making itthen whether it is right or wrong,
      there is no infraction of the fundamental rights and it has
      to be challenged in the manner provided in the Statute
      and not by a petition under Article 32. In that case the
      petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the Assistant          c
      Collector of Customs who assessed the goods imported
      under a licence under a different entry and consequently
      a higher Excise Duty· was imposed. The petitioners
      feeling aggrieved by the order filed a petition under Article
                                                                      D
      32 and the objection to its maintainability was that the
      application could not be sustained because no
      fundamental right had been violated by the impugned
      order it having been properly and correctly made by the
      authorities competent to make it. The petitioner there          E
      contended that the goods imported, which were called
      &'Lyra&' brand Crayons were not crayons at all and
      therefore imposition of a higher duty by holding them to
      be crayons was an infringement of fundamental right
      under Article 19( 1)(f) & (g)."                                 F

          26. Coming back to the instant writ petitions, indisputably,
    the petitioners have challenged the decision of MCI and the
    Central Government refusing to grant permission or renewal
    to carry on their courses for the Academic Session 2015-16. G


-
    The decisions are based on the inspection reports submitted
    by the teams of MCI. The jurisdiction of MCI or the Central
    Government to grant or refuse to grant permission has not been
    challenged. Hence, it is well within the jurisdiction of MCI which

-   is statutory body to take a decision based on the inspection of H
98          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A the college to satisfy itself the compliance of various provisions
  of the acts, rules and regulations.

        27. Under Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court is not
  supposed to go into finding of facts recorded by the authorities
B and to come to a different conclusion. Moreover, having regard
  to the law settled by Constitution Bench of this Court in number
  of decisions, in our considered opinion, the rights so claimed
  by the petitioners are not fundamental rights; hence the same
  cannot be agitated directly before this Court under Article 32
C of the constitution.

           28. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions filed under
     Article 32 of the Constitution. However, this will not prevent
     the petitioners from agitating their grievances before the
o    appropriate forum including the High Court having jurisdiction
     to deal with the matter.

     NidhiJain                                  Writ Petitions dismissed.




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