Holding

The OA is the governing law, the High Court acted within its jurisdiction, the appellants' pleas of waiver, acquiescence, delay, impossibility and condonation lack legal basis, and the Collector's order is not vitiated by mala fides.

Summary

The appellants, descendants of original Portuguese "Alvara" holders in Dadra and Nagar Haveli, claimed perpetual lease rights over agricultural lands granted under the Organizacao Agraria (OA). The Collector rescinded these grants on 30 April 1974 invoking Article 12 of the OA for non‑cultivation, leading to a protracted litigation that reached the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the OA or the 1917 Law governed the rights, affirmed that the OA, a special law, prevailed, and rejected the appellants' fresh pleas of waiver, acquiescence, delay, impossibility and condonation. It also held that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC to overturn the lower courts' findings. Finally, the Court found no mala fides in the Collector’s order and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

What is the true nature of the rights in the land granted to the appellants?
Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with and reversing the concurrent findings of the courts below?
Whether the rescission of the grant on the ground of non‑cultivation under Article 12 of the OA can be vitiated by waiver, acquiescence, delay or condonation?
Whether the Collector's order dated 30.04.1974 is vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness or is otherwise unsustainable in law?

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The following issues arise for determination in the instant appeals: (i) What is the true nature of the rights in the land granted to the Appellants; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with and findings of the Courts below; (iii) Whether the recission of the grant on the ground of non- cultivation under Article 12 of the OA could be vitiated on the ground of waiver, acquiescence, delay or condonation; (iv) Whether the order of the Collector dated 30.04.1974 is vitiated by mala fides,

Subjects

LandAgricultural landEmphyteusisPortuguese lawOrganizacao AgrariaImmovable propertiesAlvarasPerpetual leaseContractSection 100 of CPCWaiverAcquiescenceDelayCondonationCultivationRescissionvigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniuntlex specialis derogat legi generaliPlea of reasonable period of timePlea of impossibilityDoctrine of waiverOverseas Council of Lisbon1971 land reforms regulation

Judgment

[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1303 : 2025 INSC 1145

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others
v.
Union of India and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 1479 of 2006)
24 September 2025
[Surya Kant,* Dipankar Datta and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The following issues arise for determination in the instant appeals:
(i) What is the true nature of the rights in the land granted to the
Appellants; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in interfering
with and reversing the concurrent findings of the Courts below;
(iii) Whether the recission of the grant on the ground of non-
cultivation under Article 12 of the OA could be vitiated on the ground
of waiver, acquiescence, delay or condonation; (iv) Whether the
order of the Collector dated 30.04.1974 is vitiated by mala fides,
arbitrariness, or otherwise unsustainable in law.

Headnotes†
Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – Appellants’
land rights were conferred under the erstwhile Portuguese legal
regime – Pursuant to Organizacao Agraria (OA), agricultural
lands were thus granted on the basis of perpetual lease rights
known as ‘Alvaras’ for indefinite periods of time, subject to
the payment of a fixed assessment or ‘land revenue’ – The
Appellants are descendants of original ‘Alvara’ holders – The
territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli were liberated from
Portuguese domination in 1954 – On 28.10.1969, the Collector,
exercising powers under the OA, issued orders rescinding the
grants made in favour of the Appellants’ predecessors and
directed that the lands stand reverted to the Administration,
free from all encumbrances – Writ Petitions – The High
Court quashed the order of recission of contract passed by
the Collector and remanded the matter back – The Collector
by order dated 30.04.1974 directed the rescission of the

* Author
1304 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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‘Alvaras’ for breach of the terms embodied in Art.12 – Civil
Suit by the Appellants’ predecessors – The Trial Court held
that each plaintiff therein was entitled to retain possession
of the lands covered under their respective ‘Alvaras’ and that
the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974 was illegal and void –
The First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 08.06.1983
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the Trial
Court – The High Court vide the impugned judgment allowed
the second appeals and judgments of the courts below were
held to be legally unsustainable – Correctness:
Held: i) The governing law for determining the nature and extent
of the rights in the lands granted to the Appellants is the OA, and
the inquiry must be confined to its provisions; ii) The High Court’s
reversal of the concurrent findings of the courts below does not
transgress the limits of its jurisdiction u/s.100 of the CPC; iii) The
Appellants’ pleas of waiver, acquiescence, delay, impossibility,
and condonation have no legal or factual basis, and none of
these principles render the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974
unsustainable; and iv) The Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974
was not tainted by mala fides and cannot be construed as having
been passed with the intent to disentitle the Appellants from the
statutory benefits under the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation – The
findings of the High Court in the Impugned Judgment suffer from
no infirmity, legal or factual, warranting interference. [Paras 95, 96]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Decree
No. 3602 Regimen for the grants of the lands of the State of
India (1917 Law) – Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms
Regulation, 1971 – The Appellants contend that the foundation
for rescission, as recorded in the Collector’s order dated
30.04.1974, could not have been Art.12 of the OA – Rather,
they argue, the governing provision was Art.307 of the 1917
Law – The Appellants’ alternative line of defence rests upon
their reliance on Decree No. 27:135 dated 20.10.1936 – What
is the true nature of the rights in the land granted to the
Appellants:
Held: These assertions advanced by the Appellants find no trace
in the pleadings before any of the courts below, be it the Trial
Court, or in the subsequent appellate proceedings – Neither the
issues framed, nor the written submissions filed, nor the oral
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1305

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

arguments addressed at those stages make any reference to such
contentions – Indeed, the claims appear to have surfaced for the
very first time before this Court – Notably, the plea concerning the
applicability of Decree No. 27:135 has been raised only through an
application filed before this Court on 13.07.2023 – It is settled that no
relief can be granted on a case not founded in the pleadings – This
Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the appellate stage
at the behest of either party and is strictly confined to adjudicate
the issues arising from the suit as framed by the pleadings of the
parties – Appellants’ plea that these additional grounds deserve
consideration on the footing that they raise substantial questions
of law, nevertheless such grounds would fail – The 1917 Law
appears to have operated as a general legislation governing the
grant of lands – By contrast, the OA seemed to have been a special
enactment, designed specifically to regulate immovable properties
within Dadra and Nagar Haveli and to govern the concessions
of such lands for specifically agricultural use and cultivation –
The principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali (a specific
law overrides a general law) becomes immediately applicable,
namely where a special enactment has been framed to deal with
a defined subject matter, its provisions must prevail over those of
the general law to the extent of any overlap – The OA, being a
special law enacted for the territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
with the specific object of regulating agricultural concessions,
would therefore govern the rights and obligations arising from the
‘Alvaras’ in question – Decree No. 27:135 cannot, therefore, be
construed as having the effect of wholly displacing the OA, or, for
that matter, effacing Art.12 thereof – Upon a careful interpretation
of the relevant provisions, it is evident that the Decree and the OA
operate independently, serving separate purposes, with no warrant
to suggest that one replaces or overrides the other – Therefore,
unable to accept the contentions advanced by the Appellants in
this regard, and are not inclined to assess the matter in the light
of any other law or statute beyond the OA. [Paras 17, 18, 21, 26,
31, 37, 38]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – The Appellants have further
assuaged that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a second
appeal u/s.100 of the CPC is narrowly circumscribed, and that
1306 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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it was not open to the High Court to interfere with concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court – Whether the High Court was justified in
interfering with and reversing the concurrent findings of the
Courts below:
Held: The High Court thereafter undertook a detailed examination
of the plea of waiver and, in doing so, identified material
inconsistencies in the findings returned by both the courts below –
In particular, it noted the undue reliance placed upon extraneous
considerations, such as the decision of the Overseas Council of
Lisbon, the testimony of PW-3 before the Trial Court, as well as
the alleged inaction on the part of the State authorities – Having
engaged in a careful dissection of the doctrine of waiver, in the
light of the jurisprudence of this Court on the subject, the High
Court came to the conclusion that the concurrent findings of the
courts below were unsustainable, and consequently deemed it fit
to set them aside – Insofar as the exercise of jurisdiction u/s.100
of the CPC by the High Court is concerned, this Court is unable
to discern any infirmity – The course adopted by the High Court,
viewed against the reasons recorded in the Impugned Judgment,
cannot be questioned – Consequently, the contention of the
Appellants on this score is devoid of merit and stands rejected.
[Paras 45, 46]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1,
7, 8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 –
Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – The
gravamen of the Appellants’ case rests upon the contention
that, irrespective of whether cultivation was in fact undertaken
by them, the failure of the authorities to act with promptitude
constituted a waiver of the statutory power vested in the
Respondents – Whether the recission of the grant on the
ground of non-cultivation under Art.12 of the OA could be
vitiated on the ground of waiver, acquiescence, delay or
condonation:
Held: Art.12 of the OA delineates the precise conditions under
which rescission may be effected in the event of non-compliance
by the ‘Alvara’ holders – It stipulates that rescission would be
warranted if: (i) agricultural operations are not commenced within
one year from the date of the contract; (ii) if, within two years from
the date of the contract, one-fourth of the cultivable land has not
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1307

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

been brought under cultivation; and (iii) if in each subsequent
year, the cultivated area is not increased by at least one-fifth of
one-half of the total area, save where prevented by unforeseen
circumstances – Any deviation from these prescribed conditions,
as explicitly provided, would attract rescission of the contract,
without entitlement to compensation, and as underscored, without
the necessity of independent proceedings – Art.12 of the OA
thus mandates rescission of the contract where the conditions
for cultivation stipulated therein are not fulfilled by the grantees/
landholders – The language of the provision, read with the public
policy objective animating the legislation, does not eschew any
such discretion or unbridled liberty upon the State or the erstwhile
Portuguese administration to voluntarily waive the enforcement of
such conditions – As far as plea of acquiescence is concerned,
what is noteworthy about this contention is that it was never raised
by the Appellants in their pleadings before the Trial Court, nor
does it find mention in the issues framed therein – Instead, it first
surfaces before the First Appellate Court, which, while dealing
with the issue of condonation, observed that the prolonged delay
and inaction by the authorities in not rescinding the contract under
Art.12 would amount to acquiescence rather than condonation – It
therefore appears that no specific plea or sustained emphasis was
ever placed by the Appellants on the contention of acquiescence
by the authorities – The High Court is correct in holding that the
inference drawn by the First Appellate Court pertaining to long
inaction by the authorities amounting to abandonment of the right
is untenable in law. [Paras 56, 57, 60, 61]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – The Plea
of reasonable period of time – Appellants contend that the
Collector failed to take action within a ‘reasonable period of
time’ and, therefore, must be construed to have waived the
right to invoke Art.12 of the OA:
Held: Mere delay or inaction on the part of the Respondents cannot
dilute or defeat the rights vested in them to rescind the grants in
accordance with the mandatory conditions enshrined under Art.12
of the OA – Even otherwise, the plea of inordinate delay cannot
be entertained unless the party invoking it is able to demonstrate
that such delay has occasioned serious prejudice – In the instant
case, the Appellants are themselves the beneficiaries of the grant,
1308 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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and it is difficult to see how delay, even of a decade, could have
operated to their detriment; if anything, such delay enured to their
advantage – What then remains for consideration is the efficacy of
the decision rendered by the Overseas Council of Lisbon, which
has been relied upon by both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court to support their conclusion that the Respondents had ‘waived’
their rights under Art.12 – At the outset, the judgment of the Council
itself, and the language employed therein, is extremely difficult to
discern, even if considered purely hypothetically – The Impugned
Judgment of the High Court, also categorically notes the difficulty
in ascertaining the precise ratio decidendi that the judgment
seeks to establish – The courts below not only proceeded on an
erroneous apriorism, but the First Appellate Court in particular
devolved the issue of alleged implied acquiescence on the part of
the Respondents – Furthermore, these courts were not ad idem
regarding the plea of ‘waiver’ and misinterpreted the decision
of the Council – There is thus no doubt that the decision of the
Overseas Council of Lisbon cannot serve as a sheet anchor to
advance the plea of waiver – Given its own findings, its ratio does
not bind the Indian Courts – In any event, such decisions carry
mere persuasive value only – The plea founded on the concept of
reasonable time is therefore also rejected. [Paras 63-65, 68, 70]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – The plea
of impossibility and condonation – The Appellants, albeit not
with the same force as their principal submissions, have also
contended that cultivation of the lands in question was an
impossibility – It is further their case that, upon intimation
to the then Portuguese Administration, such cultivation was
‘condoned’ and the grants were allowed to subsist:
Held: The argument itself stands in contradiction to the Appellants’
own assertions that they were engaged in the cultivation of
high-quality grass seeds and that no violation of the mandatory
conditions prescribed under Art.12 had occurred – Further, the
plea of impossibility has already been rejected by both the First
Appellate Court and the High Court – With respect to the plea
of condonation, the same was erroneously accepted by the Trial
Court on the basis of the Overseas Council’s view that rescission
had to be exercised within seven years from the grant, and on
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1309

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

the testimony of PW-3, who claimed that certain ‘Alvara’ holders
had been orally condoned by Portuguese authorities upon citing
impossibility of cultivation – However, the Trial Court does not
appear to have rendered any specific findings on the issue of
condonation – The First Appellate Court, however, held that the
Appellants, having accepted the grant for purposes of cultivation,
could not subsequently rely on impossibility as a defence – It
further found that no material evinced any condonation by the
authorities, and instead concluded that the matter was one of implied
acquiescence – Having independently examined the record, this
Court finds no material to suggest that any express condonation
was ever granted by the authorities – Accordingly, the pleas relating
to impossibility and condonation are rejected. [Paras 72-75]

Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 – Organizacao Agraria – Arts.1, 7,
8, 12, 16 – Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961 – Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 – Whether
the order of the Collector dated 30.04.1974 is vitiated by
mala fides, arbitrariness, or otherwise unsustainable in law:
Held: The Collector have drawn the findings by relying not merely
upon the inspection conducted, but also upon common knowledge
pertaining to the nature and condition of the ‘Alvara’ lands in that
territory – Such findings, in the Collector’s view, were of “quite
sufficient certainty to be acted upon,” and, therefore, warranted
rescission of the concessions – The Collector, thus, proceeded
to pass the order on the basis that: (i) the inspecting officers had
specifically identified and demarcated portions of land that were
genuinely uncultivable; and (ii) the officers had further noted
parcels where cultivation was possible, albeit requiring substantial
investment and effort – In respect of the latter category, the
Collector directed rescission of the contracts, observing that the
mandate of the law imposed a clear obligation upon the grantees
to effect improvements and bring the land under cultivation – The
absence of such effort, despite the statutory requirement under
Art.12 of the OA, was therefore construed to be sufficient ground
for rescission. there is no infirmity in the reasoning assigned by
the Collector, which appears to have been rendered after due
deliberation, consideration of the relevant circumstances, and
following the applicable rules and regulations – Consequently, it
would be far-fetched to infer that the order(s) of the Collector or the
actions of the Respondents were actuated by mala fides, undertaken
1310 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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solely to deprive the Appellants of statutory benefits, or that such
measures were in contravention of the underlying legislative intent
of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation. [Paras 91-93]

Pleadings – Fresh plea – New case at the appellate stage:
Held: A well-entrenched principle of law that no relief can be
granted on a case not founded in the pleadings – This rule has
been consistently affirmed across time and is rooted in the very
purpose of pleadings—namely, to define the scope of the dispute
and enable the court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties –
Pleadings, together with the issues framed thereon, serve to
crystallise the points of conflict, ensure that each side is apprised
of the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair opportunity
to lead evidence and advance submissions – To allow a party
to depart from this framework at a belated stage would not only
prejudice the opposite side but also undermine the principles of
predictability and consistency that the adjudicatory process seeks
to avow. [Paras 18, 19]

Case Law Cited
Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2006) 5
SCC 545; Shri Lalchoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam [1971] 3 SCR
693 : (1971) 1 SCC 619 – relied on.
Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 2
SCR 203 : (2014) 3 SCC 430; Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v.
Balasaheb Tukarama Shevale [2009] 13 SCR 1173 : (2009) 9 SCC
352; Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. [1959]
Supp. 2 SCR 217 : 1959 SCC OnLine SC 120; National Textile
Corporation Limited v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad [2011] 14
SCR 472 : (2011) 12 SCC 695; Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi
[2011] 2 SCR 216 : (2011) 11 SCC 786; Trojan and Co. v. Nagappa
Chettiar [1953] 1 SCR 789 : AIR 1953 SC 235; Neelakantan v.
Mallika Begum (2002) 2 SCC 440; Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v.
Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar [2019] 10 SCR 31 : (2020)
15 SCC 731; Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi [1957] 1
SCR 575 : AIR 1957 SC 425; Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal
Bhagwandas and Co. [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 217; All India Power
Engineer Federation & Ors. v. Sasan Power Limited & Ors. [2016]
9 SCR 901 : (2017) 1 SCC 487; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
Singh [1952] 1 SCR 889 : 1952 SCC OnLine SC 52; Ramanlal
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1311

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

Gulabchand Shah v. State of Gujarat [1969] 1 SCR 42 : 1968 SCC
OnLine 70; Forasol v. ONGC [1984] 1 SCR 526 : AIR 1984 SC
241; General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co. [1987] 3 SCR
858 : (1987) 4 SCC 137; State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh [1955] 1
SCR 893 : AIR 1955 SC 84; Jayantilal Amrathlal v. The Union of
India (1972) 4 SCC 174; Udai Singh Dagar and Others v. Union
of India [2007] 6 SCR 707 : (2007) 10 SCC 306; Koteswar Vittal
Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga and Co. [1969] 3 SCR 40 : (1969) 1
SCC 255; State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal [1996] Supp.
3 SCR 98 : (1996) 5 SCC 60; Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh
Punia [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 528 : (1988) 4 SCC 284 – referred to.

List of Acts
Portuguese Civil Code, 1867; Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act,
1961; Dadra and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971;
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Land; Agricultural land; Emphyteusis; Portuguese law; Organizacao
Agraria; Immovable properties; Alvaras; Perpetual lease; Contract;
Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Waiver; Acquiescence;
Delay; Condonation; Cultivation; Rescission; vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt; lex specialis derogat legi generali;
Plea of reasonable period of time; Plea of impossibility; Doctrine of
waiver; Overseas Council of Lisbon; 1971 land reforms regulation.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1479 of 2006
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.02.2005, 15.02.2005,
16.02.2005 and 17.02.2005 of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in SA No. 354 of 1985
With
Civil Appeal No(s). 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486,
1487, 1488, 1489 of 2006, and Civil Appeal No. 1181 of 2017

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Rahul Jain, C.A. Sundaram, Gopal Subramaniam, Manan Kumar
Mishra, Sr. Advs., Shivaji M. Jadhav, Ashwin N. Ramani, Brij Kishor
1312 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Sah, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Vignesh Singh, Aditya S. Jadhav, Amit
Kumar Gupta, Ms. Aditi Brijesh Shah, Ms. Preeti Gupta, Narendra.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G.,
Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Shradha
Deshmukh, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Siddhartha Sinha, Harish
Pandey, Shashwat Parihar, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Mukesh
Kumar Maroria, Smarhar Singh, Ms. Shweta Kumari, Pankaj
Prakash, Dhananjaya Kumar Tyagi, Mohd Asim, Manoj Kumar, D.
S. Mahra, Shamik Shirishbhai Sanjanwala, Anirudh Sharma, Ritik
Bhanot, Shyamal Kumar, Ms. Sukhdip Kaur, Ms. Vashudha Gupta,
Ms. Apoorva Pal, Smarhar Singh, Ms. Shweta Kumari, Pankaj
Prakash, Dhananjaya Kumar Tyagi, Mohd Asim, Manoj Kumar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Surya Kant, J.

1. The captioned appeals arise from a common judgment dated
11, 15, 16, 17.02.2005 (Impugned Judgment) delivered by the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay (High Court) in several Second
Appeals, in an issue pertaining to the recission of land grants relating
to properties situated in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
(Dadra and Nagar Haveli). The said properties were parcels of land
originally vested in the erstwhile Portuguese Government and were
granted to the Appellants’ predecessors-in-title between 1923 and
1930, subject to certain conditions for agricultural cultivation. These
grants were subsequently rescinded by the Collector, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli (Collector), vide an order dated 30.04.1974, thereby
setting in motion a protracted legal wrangle between the State and
the Appellants that has spanned several decades.
2. What is perhaps most striking about the instant case is not merely
that this Court is called upon to adjudicate a dispute originating
over half a century ago, rather, it is the deeper irony that, even after
seventy-eight years of independence, this Court remains engaged in
resolving a controversy arising out of land rights conferred by colonial
powers that once exploited this nation’s wealth and resources. Any
critique or disquiet this Bench may express regarding the colonial
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1313

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

legacy must nevertheless not be construed as a reflection on the
legitimacy of the Appellants’ claims or the rights they seek to assert.

A. Facts
3. Given that the Appellants’ land rights were conferred under the
erstwhile Portuguese legal regime, the matter necessitates a nuanced
understanding of the scope and import of those legal provisions as
they existed a century ago, examined through the lens of Indian
legal principles and established jurisprudence.
4. It therefore becomes imperative to methodically trace the sequence of
events from the outset, so as to ascertain the origins of the dispute,
the stakes involved for the respective parties, and the legal questions
that call for determination and analysis.
4.1. The Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 (Portuguese Civil Code)
was enforced upon the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu
on 01.07.1870. Decree No. 3602 Regimen for the grants of
the lands of the State of India (1917 Law) came into force
thereafter on 24.11.1917. It provided for the grants of lands
in the Portuguese-controlled territories of Goa, Daman and
Diu, either temporarily or permanently, through a contract of
‘emphyteusis’ or ‘aforamento’, for the cultivation of agricultural
lands, construction of buildings and other such activities.
4.2. Black’s Law Dictionary has defined the term ‘emphyteusis’ to be:
“A contract by which a landed estate was leased to a
tenant, either in perpetuity or for a long term of years,
upon the reservation of an annual rent or canon, and
upon the condition that the lessee should improve
the property, by building, cultivating, or otherwise,
and with a right in the lessee to alien the estate at
pleasure or pass it to his heirs by descent, and free
from any revocation, re-entry, or claim of forfeiture
on the part of the grantor, except for non-payment
of the rent.”
4.3. Under Portuguese law, the contract of ‘emphyteusis’ involved
the transfer of beneficial ownership (possessory rights) by the
owner of a property to another individual, subject to the latter’s
obligation to pay an annual sum—referred to as the ‘emphyteutic’
1314 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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pension or canon—to the former. This arrangement effectively
meant that the Portuguese State, which then possessed eminent
domain rights, conferred conditional ownership upon individuals
within its administered territories, while retaining the right to
receive annual ‘emphyteutic’ payments in recognition of its
continuing title to the land.
4.4. Thereafter, Government Regulation No. 985, referred to as
the Organic Structure of the Lands of Nagar Haveli or the
‘Organizacao Agraria’, was brought into force on 22.09.1919
(OA), to regulate the revenue administration of the Portuguese
State. Article 1 of the OA stipulated that, ‘all immoveable
properties situated at Pragana of Nagar Haveli, which
do not belong to either collective bodies or individuals
would vest in the domain of the State’. Pursuant to this OA,
agricultural lands were thus granted on the basis of perpetual
lease rights known as ‘Alvaras’ for indefinite periods of time,
subject to the payment of a fixed assessment or ‘land revenue’.
The rights conferred by way of such ‘Alvaras’ were expressly
made transferable, inheritable and capable of being partitioned,
and the same were accorded recognition by both the former
Portuguese Administration as well as the subsequent Indian
Administration.
4.5. The Appellants are descendants of original ‘Alvara’ holders who
had been granted land by the erstwhile Portuguese Government
under the OA in the territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli during
the period between 1923 and 1930. These ‘Alvaras’ were
granted for an indefinite duration, subject to the payment of a
fixed assessment as quantified by the OA. Upon the demise of
their predecessors, the Appellants became entitled to hold the
said lands by virtue of the inheritable nature of ‘Alvara’ rights.
In certain cases, portions of the ‘Alvara’ lands have also been
partitioned amongst some of the Appellants. Consequently,
each of the Appellants stands recognised either as a holder of
an ‘Alvara’ or as having a defined share in the land comprised
within the original ‘Alvara’.
4.6. The Appellants and their predecessors, as holders of these
‘Alvaras’ were bound by the conditions of ‘emphyteusis’ as set
out in Chapter IV of the OA. Notably, Article 7 of the OA put
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1315

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

forth that the contracts of ‘emphyteusis’ would be governed by
the Portuguese Civil Code, subject to certain modifications.
Article 7 was to the following effect:
“Art.7. The contracts of concessions are governed
by the Civil Code with the following changes:
1) The rent shall always be in cash.
2) The contract shall be made administratively.
3) In case of default in payment of rent, the state has
a right to produce of the land by virtue of No.1 of
Article 880 of the Civil Code and subsequently to
the immovable property as stipulated in No.1 of
the Article 887 of the above cited Code, in lieu of
the tax due to the National Revenue Department.
4) A concession holder is bound to preserve ways
tracks and other existing only after his application
to that effect has been granted by the Governor-
General.”
4.7. Similarly, Article 8 of the OA stated that ‘emphyteutic pensions
would have to be paid in the revenue office of the taluk from
November 1 to March 31 of each year’. Whereas Article 11 of
the OA elucidated that the ‘Alvara’ holder or ‘emphyteuta’ could
transfer and mortgage his beneficial ownership or encumber
it with any burdens or easements. However, the transferee
vis-à-vis the lands granted in ‘emphyteusis’ would nonetheless
stand subrogated in the same rights and obligations of the
‘emphyteuta’ towards the State.
4.8. In this vein, Article 12 of the OA imposed a clear obligation
upon ‘Alvara’ holders to cultivate the land in accordance
with the mandates prescribed therein. Non-compliance with
this obligation empowered the Administration to rescind the
contract of ‘emphyteusis’. To explain further, Article 12 of the
OA provided that:
“Art. 12. A contract of concession shall be
rescinded without any right for indemnity
(compensation) and without any formal procedure:
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a) When the agricultural works have not been started
within one year from the date of the contract;
b) When at the end of a period of two years
from the date of the contract one fourth of the
cultivable land has not been brought under regular
cultivation;
c) When during every year, after the one fourth
of land has been brought under cultivation the
area under cultivation has not been increased
by at least one fifth of the half of the remaining
area, except due to uncontrollable circumstances
duly proved the remaining half being free to be
reserved for irregular cultivation, pasture or have;
d) When, the land has been conceded for building
purposes, and when within one year from the
date of the contract no foundation has been laid,
and within three years the remaining work has
not been completed save due to uncontrollable
circumstances duly proved.
#1. For the purpose of the first three sub-clauses
of the present Article all that has been laid down
in table according to the classification of land is
considered to be regular cultivation as also that of
shrubs and bushes yielding produce economically
planted methodically in a line keeping in between
them necessary distance for their regular growth.
#2. In the cases foreseen in the sub-clauses the land
which· has not been brought under cultivation shall
be conceded a fresh, with the necessary mutations
in the original Alvaras (sanads) and a notice shall be
published in the official Gazette regarding the land
to be conceded.”
4.9. Article 16 of the OA, in turn, stipulated the treatment of any
buildings or materials belonging to the grantees that remain on
the land in the event of rescission under Article 12:
“Art. 16. In case of the rescission of the grants in terms
of the preceding articles, the grantee is permitted to
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1317

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

remove all the building material from the land within
thirty days from the day he has been informed of the
annulment of the contract save when the Governor
General has made it known to the grantee within the
said period that the state intends to acquire for the
price to be determined according to the purpose of
general law all or part of such building (construction).”
4.10. Reverting to the factual developments, in purported compliance
with the obligations set forth under Article 12, the Appellants’
predecessors are stated to have undertaken considerable efforts
to bring 5/8th of the land under regular cultivation. However,
the land was allegedly of such poor quality that even the
cultivation of low-yield indigenous food grains such as Nagli,
Kodra, and Varai proved unviable. The question of whether the
land was, in fact, brought under cultivation remains fraught with
contradictions and shall be addressed in detail in the analysis
segment of this judgment.
4.11. Be that as it may, the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
were liberated from Portuguese domination in 1954 and were
subsequently integrated into the Union of India pursuant to
the Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961. The territory
of the newly freed Dadra and Nagar Haveli was designated
as a Union Territory with effect from 10.08.1961. Following
this integration, the newly established Indian administration
undertook a comprehensive land survey in Dadra and Nagar
Haveli, during which the total area of land held by each of
the Appellants was recorded in the revenue registers and
assigned distinct survey numbers. It is the Appellants’ specific
contention that, prior to the assumption of control by the Indian
administration, they had been regularly paying land revenue
assessments to the then Portuguese administration in respect
of the lands held under the ‘Alvaras’.
4.12. In fact, following the death of the Appellants’ predecessor,
namely Harisinh Mohansinh Parmar, a partition of the ‘Alvara’
land had been effected. Pursuant to an application made in this
regard, the Collector vide order dated 24.09.1965 had even
accorded sanction for the mutation of ‘Alvara’ lands in favour
of the members of the family, in accordance with the terms of
the partition deed dated 14.10.1960.
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4.13. On 28.10.1969, however, the Collector, exercising powers under
the OA, issued orders rescinding the grants made in favour of
the Appellants’ predecessors and directed that the lands stand
reverted to the Administration, free from all encumbrances. This
action was taken on the grounds of an alleged breach of the
conditions attached to the ‘Alvaras’, as contemplated under
Article 12 of the OA. The Appellants sought to challenge the
Collector’s order before the High Court through various Writ
Petitions, contending that ‘Alvara’ holders had been denied
an opportunity of being heard prior to the issuance of the
impugned order.
4.14. In the meantime, the President of India by powers conferred
under Article 240 of the Constitution, promulgated the Dadra
and Nagar Haveli Land Reforms Regulation, 1971 (1971 Land
Reforms Regulation) on 08.12.1971, which in turn provided
for: (i) the abolition of ‘Alvara’ and ‘Terem’ tenures; (ii) to confer
occupancy rights on ‘Alvara’ and ‘Terem’ holders and their
tenants; (iii) to impose a ceiling on the possession of agricultural
lands; (iv) to provide for the acquisition and distribution of land in
excess of such ceiling; and (v) to regulate the relation of landlords
and tenants, in Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Section 4 of the 1971
Land Reforms Regulation specifically adduced that lands in the
possession of ‘Alvara’ holders would be deemed to have been
granted to such holders. More pertinently, it prescribed a cut
off period of two years from the date of such vesting, within
which the land was required to be brought under cultivation.
4.15. Before the High Court, the Appellants contended that in the
year 1972, owing to the failure of monsoon, no crops could
be cultivated on the lands in question. In the subsequent
year, 1973, the Government is stated to have deputed certain
officers who, according to the Appellants, conducted only a
perfunctory enquiry and submitted a report founded on such
limited examination.
4.16. The High Court vide its common judgment dated 17.07.1973
disposed of some of the Writ Petitions preferred by the
Appellants, quashed the order of recission of contract passed by
the Collector and remanded the matters back to the Collector.
It, however, granted liberty to the Collector to take action under
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1319

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

Article 12 of the OA after giving a fair and reasonable opportunity
to the Appellants herein. A similar order was passed by the High
Court on 18.07.1973 in respect of the remaining Writ Petitions.
4.17. Consequently, it seems that the Collector proceeded to issue
showcause notices to the Appellants on 20.09.1973, calling upon
them to explain why the ‘Alvaras’ in respect of their lands should
not be rescinded under Article 12 of the OA. The Appellants
vide letter dated 08.10.1973 replied to the Collector’s notice
remonstrating that the land was ‘full of weeds and absolutely
uncultivable’. They stated that despite spending substantial
sums of money, they could not cultivate grains or other crops
because of the quality of the land and soil, and that only grass
could be cultivated by sowing seeds and exerting substantial
manual labour. They further stated that from the date of grant of
‘Alvara’ until 1968, the Government had neither taken any steps
nor issued notice to the Appellants, who, in turn, having held
the lands continuously and uninterruptedly for more than thirty
years, had become absolute owners by right of prescription,
thus rendering rescission impermissible.
4.18. Pursuant to these replies, the Collector vide order dated
23.10.1973, directed an inspection of these lands to ascertain
whether the grass claimed to be growing thereon was the
result of cultivation or merely natural growth. The inspection
was proposed to be carried out by the Mamlatdar, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli, along with the Agriculture Officer, Dadra and
Nagar Haveli, in the presence of the concerned ‘Alvara’ holder
or their representative. The Collector seems to have also
expressly noted that there was no prescribed procedure for such
circumstances and observed that the procedure adopted will be
one that does not deny natural justice to the ‘Alvara’ holders
and affords them a fair and reasonable opportunity to present
their case and produce evidence to safeguard their interests.
4.19. The Appellants once again addressed a letter to the Collector
on 20.11.1973, objurgating the proposed procedure. They
assailed the invocation of Article 12 of the OA as being wholly
inapplicable to the facts of their case and asserted that no
action could be undertaken pursuant to that provision. A few
days later, on 24.11.1973, the Collector passed another order
rejecting the contentions asserted by the Appellants and directing
1320 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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that action would continue to be taken in accordance with the
order dated 23.10.1973.
4.20. An inspection was accordingly conducted, and the Collector,
on 30.04.1974, issued a consolidated order holding that the
subject lands could not be treated as uncultivable. It was further
held that the lands, having been classified as cultivable lands
requiring improvement, the Appellants had failed to undertake
the requisite measures envisaged under Article 12 of the OA.
Consequently, the Collector held that the Appellants had not
complied with the clear conditions prescribed therein and, on
that basis, directed the rescission of the ‘Alvaras’ for breach
of the terms embodied in Article 12. It is clarified that some
of the Appellants before us have challenged the subsequent
orders of recission passed by the Collector dated 23.05.1974
and 05.07.1974.
4.21. At this stage, it is pertinent to highlight a parallel instance
concerning land held by one Dhanraj Quimchand, who was
recorded as the holder of Lot Nos. 964, 965, 968 and 969,
together with threefourths of Lot No. 967. By an order dated
13.03.1952, the then Government directed reversion of these
lands on the basis of an inspection conducted in that year, even
though the original grant had been made in 1923. Quimchand
challenged this order before the Overseas Council at Lisbon,
which came to be allowed vide judgment dated 26.07.1964. The
Overseas Council set aside the order of 13.03.1952, having
construed that Article 12 of the OA had been invoked incorrectly.
This decision has been heavily relied upon by the Appellants,
and its applicability in the present scenario has been considered
more in depth further in the analysis segment herein.
4.22. Turning back to the sequence of events, it is significant to note
that one day after the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974, the
1971 Land Reforms Regulation came into force on 01.05.1974.
Thereafter, on 15.07.1974, the Appellants issued statutory
notices under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(CPC) to the Respondents, calling upon them to recall and
cancel the order dated 30.04.1974 rescinding the ‘Alvaras’,
and to refrain from giving effect to or taking any further steps
pursuant to the said order.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1321

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

4.23. The Appellants’ predecessors subsequently assailed the order
of rescission dated 30.04.1974 by instituting a civil suit bearing
RCS No. 13/1974 (Suit) on 19.09.1974 before the Court of
the Civil Judge, Dadra and Nagar Haveli at Silvassa (Trial
Court). Other similarly situated landholders also filed suits
on substantially identical grounds and seeking analogous
reliefs. In the Suit, the plaintiffs (Appellants herein), inter alia,
contended: (i) that the lands granted under Article 12 of the OA
could not be rescinded due to the operation of the principles
of condonation or waiver; (ii) that Article 12 of the OA, under
which the impugned order had been passed, was inapplicable
to the plaintiffs’ lands inasmuch as the seven-year period from
the date of the original grant had long since elapsed, and there
was no material on record indicating non-cultivation during that
period; (iii) that the Collector and the Administration could not
retrospectively apply Article 12 by assessing the lands’ then-
current condition; and (iv) that the defendants (Respondents
herein) were estopped from invoking such provisions to rescind
the land grants. Accordingly, the Suit prayed for a declaration
that the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974 was mala fide,
void, and illegal, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to continue
holding and possessing the lands covered under their respective
‘Alvaras’. A permanent injunction was also sought to restrain
the defendants from initiating or continuing any action pursuant
to the impugned order.
4.24. The Trial Court, by its order dated 12.06.1976, granted an ad
interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. Subsequently, upon
detailed examination of the documentary evidence and witness
depositions, the Trial Court vide Judgment and Decree dated
19.06.1978 arrived at the following findings: (i) that the rights
conferred under the ‘Alvaras’ constituted occupancy rights,
encompassing the right to cultivate, transfer, mortgage, and
peacefully possess the lands for an indefinite duration, subject
to payment of fixed annual assessment; (ii) that the rights under
the ‘Alvaras’ were heritable and perpetual in nature; (iii) that
the conditions attached to the ‘Alvaras’ of each plaintiff had
either been duly fulfilled or ‘stood condoned’ by the erstwhile
Portuguese administration; (iv) that such condonation amounted
to a ‘waiver’, precluding the defendants from initiating any
1322 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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action for alleged breaches of the ‘Alvaras’; and (v) that the
plaintiffs were entitled to the reliefs of declaration and injunction
as prayed for.
4.25. The Trial Court accordingly held that each plaintiff therein
was entitled to retain possession of the lands covered under
their respective ‘Alvaras’, and that the Collector’s order dated
30.04.1974 was illegal and void. The interim injunction was
made absolute, and the defendants, including their officers,
agents, and subordinates, were permanently restrained from
taking any steps pursuant to the said order and from interfering
with the plaintiffs’ possession of the suit lands.
4.26. The Respondents herein assailed the judgment and decree of
the Trial Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 3/1978 before the
District Judge, Dadra and Nagar Haveli (First Appellate Court).
The First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 08.06.1983
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the Trial
Court, particularly with respect to the ‘condonation’ and ‘waiver’
of conditions under the ‘Alvaras’. It further recorded that on
account of long inaction, an inference of acquiescence could
be drawn. However, the First Appellate Court also observed
that it would not be open to the Appellants to contend that the
lands were uncultivable at the time of the original grant.
4.27. The Respondents once again challenged the decision of the
First Appellate Court before the High Court. Upon consideration
of the rival contentions and the material placed on record, the
High Court vide the Impugned Judgment allowed the second
appeals, holding inter alia that:
(i) Mere inordinate delay does not give rise to an inference
of ‘implied consent’ or ‘acquiescence’, and that such a
plea could not have been entertained for the first time at
the appellate stage;
(ii) The High Court, in a second appeal, is not barred from
drawing inferences from established facts, particularly
where the First Appellate Court has failed to apply the
law correctly to the proven facts—such action does not
amount to reappreciation of evidence by the High Court;
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1323

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

(iii) The judgment of the Overseas Council at Lisbon cannot
be said to lay down a binding ratio that would govern the
present case;
(iv) There can be no estoppel against the Government in the
exercise of its legislative, sovereign, or executive powers.
Mere inaction, without a clear intention to waive rights, is
insufficient to establish a plea of waiver. Consequently, the
First Appellate Court’s affirmation of the Trial Court’s decree
on the basis of waiver and acquiescence is unsustainable;
(v) The argument that the administration failed to exercise
its statutory powers within a reasonable time was not
raised before the courts below and therefore cannot be
entertained for the first time in second appeal;
(vi) Contentions regarding non-application of mind or
arbitrariness on the part of the Collector and inspecting
authorities were similarly not urged before the lower courts
and cannot be examined at the stage of second appeal; and
(vii) In light of the foregoing, the judgments of the courts below
were held to be legally unsustainable and were accordingly
quashed and set aside.
4.28. The aggrieved Appellants have preferred the instant appeals.
By order dated 12.09.2005, this Court issued notice in the
matter and directed that status quo be maintained between the
parties. Subsequently, by order dated 24.02.2006, the earlier
status quo order was modified to specifically restrain the parties
from alienating the property in question or altering the ‘property
in question as well as the user of it’.

B. Contentions on behalf of the Appellants
5. Mr. Aryama Sundaram and Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned Senior
Counsel, along with Mr. Shivaji Jadhav, Advocate on Record,
appearing on behalf of the Appellants, vehemently contended that the
High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the concurrent
findings of fact and law rendered by both the Trial Court and the
First Appellate Court. They further submitted that the actions of the
Respondents were in direct contravention of the objectives sought to
be achieved by the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation. In this context,
we have briefly summarised their submissions as follows:
1324 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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(a) The core issue that arises for consideration is whether, for the
purpose of rescission of the grant, any default on account of
alleged non-cultivation could relate only to the initial seven-
year period from the date of grant, and not to any alleged
non-cultivation thereafter. Once this seven-year period lapsed,
the 1917 Law and the OA did not contemplate rescission on
such grounds. In the absence of any finding of non-cultivation
within this period, the order of rescission is manifestly bad in
law, illegal, and unsustainable.
(b) As per Article 307 of the 1917 Law, the Directorate of Survey
and its officers were under a statutory obligation to conduct
periodical inspections and prepare reports to initiate action if the
conditions of the grant were not fulfilled. No such proceedings
were undertaken in the present case, which clearly indicates
that cultivation had been carried out and the grantees had
complied with the conditions. Even assuming that cultivation
was not undertaken, the failure to conduct such inspections
amounts to intentional abandonment or waiver of the statutory
power by the Respondents.
(c) Notwithstanding the above, by virtue of Decree No. 27:135 dated
20.10.1936, the provisions of Article 12 of the OA, particularly
clauses (b) and (c), ceased to be available to the Collector as
a basis for divesting the Appellants of the lands vested in them
under the OA. The said Decree expressly contemplated that the
properties were to be treated as concessions on ‘emphyteusis’
and, therefore, could not be alienated except in circumstances
of expropriation for public utility or in cases envisaged under
Article 7(3) of the OA.
(d) The High Court went beyond the scope of Section 100 of the
CPC in reversing the concurrent findings of fact recorded by
the courts below, and that too without framing any substantial
question of law. The jurisdiction of the High Court in a second
appeal is narrowly confined, and where there are concurrent
findings of fact, with no substantial question of law decipherable,
it is impermissible to reappreciate evidence merely on the basis
that an alternative view is possible.
(e) That being so, the Respondents cannot invoke Article 12 long
after the expiry of this period, thus rendering the Collector’s
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1325

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

order clearly arbitrary. This position is reinforced by the decision
of the Overseas Council of Lisbon in Appeal No. 2923 dated
26.07.1964, wherein the order of rescission of the grant was set
aside. This judgment further makes it clear that the recission of
an ‘Alvara’ could be an action only undertaken by the Governor
General and not an inferior authority such as the Collector.
(f) There was a failure to reasonably exercise power by the
Collector, as the enquiry into whether the lands were brought
under cultivation within seven years from the grant of the ‘Alvaras’
was conducted in 1973, nearly fifty years after the grant. No
scientific method was employed to ascertain cultivation within
that period, and the order dated 30.04.1974 was passed by the
Collector based upon superfluous inquiry done by eight officers,
without any supporting evidence, expert opinion, or disclosure
of search reports to the Appellants. This conduct amounts not
only to arbitrariness but also to a colourable exercise of the
powers vested in the Collector.
(g) At the time of the enquiries conducted by the appointed officers,
there were no standing crops on the lands, and hence a mere
visual inspection could not constitute a reliable basis for the
preparation of a report. It was not possible to reasonably infer
whether the grass observed was naturally growing or the result
of systematic cultivation. In fact, the Appellants had invested
significant effort in cultivating improved varieties of grass such
as Phool, Rohida, Musi, Baradi, and Bhelsel.
(h) In fact, the Appellants made genuine efforts to comply with the
conditions of the ‘Alvaras’ by attempting to cultivate the lands
during the Portuguese regime, incurring substantial labour and
expense. However, due to the poor quality of the lands, even
inferior food grains such as Varia, Nagali, and Kodra could
not be cultivated. In view of these difficulties, the Portuguese
administration ‘condoned’ and ‘waived’ the requirement of the
cultivation of these lands.
(i) The burden of proof to establish that the lands were not
brought under cultivation within the first seven years from the
date of grant rested entirely upon the Respondents. No oral
or documentary evidence has been adduced by them in this
regard, and on this ground alone, the High Court ought to have
dismissed the Respondents’ appeal.
1326 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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(j) The plea of ‘waiver’ or ‘acquiescence’ is further strengthened
when the scheme under Article 307 of the 1917 Law is
considered. A combined reading of Articles 12 and 146 of the
OA, along with Article 307 of the 1917 Law, reveals a structured
mechanism for the rescission of ‘Alvaras’—where Article 12
stipulates the grounds for rescission and Article 307 prescribes
the mandatory procedure. By virtue of Article 146 of the OA,
the procedure under Article 307 becomes applicable. The intent
of this scheme contemplated prompt action upon finding land
uncultivated, as opposed to measures being initiated nearly
fifty years later, based solely on presumptions. Thus, without
prejudice, there was ‘waiver’ if not ‘acquiescence’ on the part
of the Respondents.
(k) There was also no consideration of the implications of Article
11 of the OA, under which concession holders enjoyed rights
to transfer and mortgage their beneficial ownership in terms of
Portuguese law. Given the creation of such third-party rights,
forfeiture of land without any compensation is directly violative
of Article 300A of the Constitution. It was thus impermissible for
the Respondents to rescind the ‘Alvaras’ after a lapse of forty
years. Reliance was placed in this regard, on the judgments
of this Court in Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. V. State
of Maharashtra,1 and Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v.
Balasaheb Tukarama Shevale.2
(l) As already espoused, the Respondents are estopped from
invoking the provisions of the OA, as their predecessors,
namely the Portuguese Administration, had acquiesced in and
condoned the use of the lands during and after the expiry of
the period stipulated under the original Alvaras. It was therefore
not open to the Respondents to now deprive the Appellants of
their holdings at a highly belated stage. Since neither Article 12
nor Article 16 of the OA envisages any policy or guidelines for
the exercise of such power, the Collector’s order is manifestly
arbitrary and devoid of jurisdiction.

1 (2014) 3 SCC 430
2 (2009) 9 SCC 352
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1327

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

(m) The Respondents acted in a mala fide manner, as is evident
from the fact that although the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation
were promulgated in 1971 to take effect from 01.05.1974,
the Collector issued show cause notice(s) on 20.09.1973 for
rescission of the contract, and the order of rescission was
passed on 30.04.1974—just one day before the Regulation
came into force.
(n) This mala fide exercise of power was further evident from the
fact that the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation vide Sections 3 and
4 abolished the ‘Alvara’ system; granted ‘occupancy rights’ to
landholders, with a two-year period for cultivation; and further
provided for compensation for any land taken in excess of the
prescribed ceiling. The order of rescission, passed just one day
prior to the Regulation coming into force, was clearly intended
to deprive the Appellants of these statutory benefits.
(o) The issuance of show cause notices by the Collector on
09.01.1974 was in direct contravention of the 1971 Land
Reforms Regulation, which had already come into force on
15.12.1973 (specifically Section 21 of Chapter V and the entirety
of Chapter VIII). Section 57 of the Regulation categorically
provided that “the provisions of this Regulation shall have
effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in any other law, custom or usage or agreement or decree
or order of Court.” Accordingly, the proceedings culminating
in the order dated 30.04.1974 were wholly without authority
of law and vitiated by the express mandate of the 1971 Land
Reforms Regulation.
(p) The order of recission is protected under Section 57 of the 1971
Land Reforms Regulation, which is a ‘saving clause’ akin to
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This savings clause,
entrenched in the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, cannot be
read in a manner that defeats the very purpose of the statute
and prevents its true objectives from being achieved. It could
not have been the intent of the legislative drafters to take away
through Section 57(2) what was granted by virtue of Sections
3 and 4, that too on the ground of non-cultivation, which the
Regulation had itself deemed irrelevant.
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C. Contentions on behalf of the Respondents
6. Mr. Tushar Mehta, Learned Solicitor General of India, and Ms.
Aishwarya Bhati, Learned Additional Solicitor General of India,
opposed the assertions proffered by the Appellants and advanced
the following contentions:
(a) The Appellants derive their rights under the OA, which governs
concessions or leases, and their reliance on the 1917 Law
through Decree No. 27:135 is an entirely new plea raised for
the first time before this Court. Similarly, the contention that the
grants in question amounted to ‘emphyteusis’ is also a freshly
coined contention never urged earlier. In any event, Article 146
of the OA provides for the application of the 1917 Law only in
situations of casus omissus, whereas the present case falls
squarely within the ambit of Article 12 read with Article 16 of
the OA, leaving no scope for recourse to the 1917 Law.
(b) In both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the issue
of ‘waiver’ was specifically framed. The Trial Court, however,
erred in accepting such a plea by placing undue reliance on
the oral testimony of PW3, who claimed that he, along with
other ‘Alvara’ holders, had approached the then Administrator;
represented the impossibility of cultivation; and were orally
communicated condonation of breach of ‘Alvara’ conditions,
thereby being permitted to retain possession. Crucially, when
invited to reduce this claim into writing, PW3 declined to do so,
rendering his testimony unreliable. Moreover, reliance placed
on the judgment of the Overseas Council of Lisbon as well
as on the alleged inaction of State Officials to infer ‘waiver’ or
‘acquiescence’ was wholly misplaced, and the findings of the
courts below on this score were unsustainable.
(c) In this backdrop, the High Court was fully justified in interfering
with the concurrent findings of the courts below, which were
founded upon the misreading of various provisions and the
material on record. The High Court correctly appreciated the
evidence and considered the applicable legal framework, and
its conclusions are based on a proper application of law to the
facts on record.
(d) The contention that the Portuguese Government had ‘acquiesced’
or ‘waived’ the mandatory conditions of grant under Articles 12
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1329

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

and 16 of the OA is untenable. It is a settled principle that
mandatory statutory requirements, particularly those grounded
in public interest or public policy, cannot be waived by any
individual or authority. In this regard, reliance is placed on
Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co.3 and
Shri Lalchoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam.4 Hence, even if it is
assumed, without admitting, that the Portuguese Government
purportedly waived compliance, such waiver would be legally
untenable as it would exceed the authority vested in it.
(e) It is well settled that non-compliance with the conditions
stipulated under Article 12 of the OA entails repudiation of the
concession itself. The requirements prescribed therein are
mandatory, and failure to comply would unjustly enrich the
grantees while frustrating the very object of the enactment.
The underlying purpose of granting ‘Alvaras’ was to ensure
agricultural development, not to permit the land to remain barren
or to be diverted for construction or other non-agricultural uses.
Any such deviation undermines the public interest and defeats
the policy rationale that enriches the provision.
(f) In view of the settled legal position, the conditions prescribed
under Article 12 of the OA are rooted in considerations of
public interest and policy. Accordingly, strict compliance is
indispensable, and any condonation or waiver of such mandatory
requirements is impermissible in law.
(g) The contention of ‘abrogation’ raised by the Appellants is
misconceived, since abrogation does not arise where a law
is expressly saved. Under Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, the effect of repeal is that the repealed enactment
ceases to form part of the body of law unless expressly
preserved by a saving clause. In the case in hand, Section 57
of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation embodies such a saving
clause, which specifically preserves the operation of prior law
in certain cases, including pending proceedings. Accordingly,
Clause (d) of Section 57 of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation
squarely applies, and the instant proceedings are fully protected
thereunder.

3 1959 SCC OnLine SC 120
4 1971 (1) SCC 619
1330 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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(h) The Collector was fully empowered to invoke Articles 12 and
16 of the OA and rescind the grants on the ground of non-
cultivation. The authority to exercise such powers under the OA
stood delegated to him by virtue of Section 3(1) of the Dadra
and Nagar Haveli (Delegation of Powers) Regulation, 1964 (No.
10 of 1964), whereby the Administrator conferred power upon
the Collector to act in this regard.
(i) The orders passed by the Collector are neither mala fide nor
arbitrary but are reasonable, fair, and in due compliance with
the directions of the High Court dated 17.07.1973. While the
Appellants contended that they had been cultivating grass as
nothing else was cultivable, the Collector, after due consideration,
found that they had failed to make the requisite investments for
cultivating harvestable crops. The order thus reflects adherence
to due process and the principles of natural justice.

D. Issues
7. We have minutely scrutinised the factual background, the submissions
advanced by the parties and the legal provisions governing the
controversy. In our considered view, the following issues arise for
determination in the instant appeals:
i. What is the true nature of the rights in the land granted to the
Appellants?
ii. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with and
reversing the concurrent findings of the Courts below?
iii. Whether the recission of the grant on the ground of non-
cultivation under Article 12 of the OA could be vitiated on the
ground of waiver, acquiescence, delay or condonation?
iv. Whether the order of the Collector dated 30.04.1974 is vitiated
by mala fides, arbitrariness, or otherwise unsustainable in law?

E. Analysis

E.1 Issue No. 1: The true nature of the rights in the land granted
to the Appellants
8. At the very threshold, it becomes exigent to examine the nature
of the rights in the subject lands conferred upon the Appellants’
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1331

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

predecessors under the Portuguese regime, and to determine the
body of law from which such rights emanate and by which they are
regulated.
9. It is pertinent to highlight that the courts at all prior stages have
examined the matter exclusively through the prism of the OA. Their
analysis has proceeded on the footing that the concessions or
‘Alvaras’ granted by the Portuguese administration were governed by
the provisions of the OA, particularly Article 12. As already discussed
in paragraph 4.8, Article 12 categorically required the grantees to
bring the lands under cultivation within the stipulated period, failing
which the grant was liable to be rescinded without payment of
compensation. There is also no divergence of judicial opinion on the
purpose underlying such grants, namely, the promotion of cultivation
and the enhancement of agricultural productivity. Consequently, the
validity of the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974 came to be tested
solely with reference to Article 12 of the OA.
10. The Appellants, however, have directly asseverated the very
invocation of Article 12 of the OA in the Collector’s order dated
30.04.1974. Their case rests on the assertion that the rescission of
the grants could have only been effected in accordance with: (a) the
procedure prescribed under Article 307 of the 1917 Law; and (b) the
mandate of Decree No. 27:135 dated 20.10.1936, which, according
to them, the Collector’s order plainly fails to comply with.
11. With respect to the 1917 Law, the Appellants contend that the Alvaras
conferred upon them under the OA are, in substance, governed by the
said Law. Their argument proceeds on the premise that, by virtue of
Article 1 of the OA, the lands in question had originally vested in the
Portuguese Administration under the 1917 Law, and were thereafter
granted to the Appellants. They further assert that Article 146 of the
OA explicitly provides that, in matters not expressly covered under the
OA, the provisions of the 1917 Law would apply, thereby attracting
the operation of the ‘doctrine of statutory incorporation’.
12. In consequence, the Appellants contend that the foundation for
rescission, as recorded in the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974,
could not have been Article 12 of the OA. Rather, they argue, the
governing provision was Article 307 of the 1917 Law, which specifically
delineates the conditions attached to Alvaras, prescribes the grounds
for rescission, and stipulates the procedure to be followed for such
action. For clarity, Article 307 is extracted hereinbelow:
1332 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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“307. It is incumbent upon the Directorate of the Land
Survey, aided by the authorities concerned, to supervise
whether or not the emphyteutas fulfil the conditions of the
contracts referred to in the previous articles, for which
purpose periodically and whenever such condition may
be necessary, it should be directed to be verified through
their staff whether such conditions are fulfilled or not.
1. When the conditions referred to in the preceding article
are not fulfilled, a report shall be drawn signed by the
employee of the Land Survey office, by the Administrator
of Taluka or Patel of the locality, where the land is situated.
and by two witnesses; such report, shall be immediately
forwarded to the General Secretariat and it shall serve
as a basis for the reversion, which, when finally ordered,
shall be published by way of notification in the Government
Gazette.
2. Before the publication referred to in the preceeding
para, the interested party shall be intimated within 10 days
to take notice of the ground or grounds which are given
rise to reversion.”
13. The Appellants’ alternative line of defence rests upon their reliance
on Decree No. 27:135 dated 20.10.1936, which introduced
modifications in the regime governing immovable properties granted
on ‘emphyteusis’ under the OA. Significantly, Article 2 of the said
Decree stipulated that properties so conceded by way of ‘emphyteusis’
were rendered inalienable, save in two limited contingencies—first,
where expropriation was necessitated on grounds of public utility,
and second, in circumstances envisaged under Article 7(3) of the OA,
namely, default by the concessionaire in the payment of emphyteutic
pension.
14. On the strength of the aforesaid Decree, the Appellants contend
that the recourse to Article 12 of the OA stood foreclosed, and that
the Collector was divested of any authority thereunder to annul the
grants. It was urged that, post-promulgation of Decree No. 27:135,
the rights vested in them under the OA could not be defeated on
the basis of Article 12.
15. The Respondents, on the other hand, have urged that the reliance
placed by the Appellants on the 1917 Law and Decree No. 27:135
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1333

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

is wholly misconceived, as such grounds have been advanced for
the first time in the present proceedings and did not form part of
their case before the courts below. It is contended that at no earlier
stage had the Appellants asserted that the grants were in the nature
of ‘emphyteusis’. On the contrary, their consistent position was to
trace their rights exclusively to the OA, which governed concessions
or leases. The invocation of the 1917 Law, being in essence a
Land Revenue Code, is, according to the Respondents, a new
and inadmissible ground that has been sought to be raised at the
appellate stage.

E.1.1. Contentions raised afresh at the appellate stage
16. Having considered these arguments, we are constrained to observe
that although the submissions advanced by the Appellants may, at
first blush, appear to carry some force, a closer perlustration of the
pleadings and grounds urged before the courts below makes it evident
that such claims are being canvassed for the very first time before
this Court. The Respondents are, therefore, correct insofar as they
are asserting that these contentions had neither been pleaded nor
pursued at any prior stage of the proceedings.
17. These assertions advanced by the Appellants find no trace in the
pleadings before any of the courts below, be it the Trial Court, or in
the subsequent appellate proceedings. Neither the issues framed,
nor the written submissions filed, nor the oral arguments addressed
at those stages make any reference to such contentions. Indeed,
the claims appear to have surfaced for the very first time before this
Court. Notably, the plea concerning the applicability of Decree No.
27:135 has been raised only through an application filed before this
Court on 13.07.2023 seeking leave to urge additional grounds, being
I.A. Nos. 132155 and 132156 of 2023.
18. In this regard, we place our reliance on the well-entrenched principle
of law that no relief can be granted on a case not founded in the
pleadings.5 This Court cannot entertain an entirely new case at the
appellate stage at the behest of either party and is strictly confined
to adjudicate the issues arising from the suit as framed by the
pleadings of the parties.

5 National Textile Corporation Limited v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695.
1334 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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19. This rule has been consistently affirmed across time and is rooted
in the very purpose of pleadings—namely, to define the scope of
the dispute and enable the court to adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Pleadings, together with the issues framed thereon, serve to
crystallise the points of conflict, ensure that each side is apprised of
the case it has to meet, and afford both parties a fair opportunity to
lead evidence and advance submissions.6 To allow a party to depart
from this framework at a belated stage would not only prejudice the
opposite side but also undermine the principles of predictability and
consistency that the adjudicatory process seeks to avow.
20. This position also finds statutory expression in Order XLI Rules
1 and 2 of the CPC. Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances
contemplated under Order XLI Rule 27, an appellate court may
permit the production of additional evidence—such as where the
trial court has wrongly refused to admit evidence, or where, despite
the exercise of due diligence, the party concerned was genuinely
unaware of the existence of such evidence and therefore could not
produce it earlier.
21. In the present case, however, no such impediment or hindrance
is discernible which would justify permitting the Appellants to raise
fresh pleas or grounds at this belated stage. Having regard to the
prolonged history of these proceedings, it is inconceivable that any
circumstance beyond the Appellants’ control could have prevented
them from advancing these submissions or from leading evidence
in support thereof before the courts below. The Appellants, in their
application seeking to incorporate these additional grounds, have
also failed to make out a case to entertain such a plea at this
belated stage. Further, there is nothing on record to suggest that
the Appellants had in fact produced this before the courts below,
and the same was not allowed to be admitted.
22. Such grounds, if at all they were to be relied upon, should have been
taken at the first possible instance. After all, these were decrees and
laws that predated both the Collector’s orders and the institution of
the Suit before the Trial Court, and any reliance upon them ought
to have been examined in the Suit itself. It is, in a certain sense,

6 Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. CP Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786; Trojan and Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953
SC 235.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1335

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

ironic that much of the Appellants’ case hinges upon alleged delays
by the authorities, when, in truth, such delay and inaction precisely
underscore why these grounds cannot be entertained by this Court.
23. We are thus of the considered view that a situation cannot arise
where, after such an extended passage of time, the Appellants
beckon us to return to the drawing board, reappraise evidence
long since concluded, and attempt, in effect, to put the proverbial
genie back into the bottle. Courts ought to curb such fishing/roving
inquiries on the mere asking of a party. After all, the law assists only
the wakeful and not those who sleep on their rights: vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt.
24. At this juncture, such a course is thus neither feasible nor permissible.
Even if this Court were to embark upon such an ambitious exercise,
it would cause grave prejudice to the Respondents. Given the nature
of the dispute and considering that the instant appeal arises out of a
civil suit, allowing such additional grounds to be raised at this stage
would thus be wholly impermissible.

E.1.2. Whether such fresh submissions, if considered, hold
good?
25. Be that as it may, even if, as an arguendo, we were to accept the
Appellants’ plea that these additional grounds deserve consideration
on the footing that they raise substantial questions of law, such
grounds would nevertheless fail. This conclusion follows upon an
assessment of (i) the true import and effect of Article 307 of the 1917
Law; and (ii) the implications of Decree No. 27:135.

E.1.2.1 True import and effect of Article 307 of the 1917 Law
26. The 1917 Law appears to have operated as a general legislation
governing the grant of lands across all erstwhile Portuguese territories,
including Goa, Daman and Diu, for varied purposes, including for
cultivation and construction of buildings. By contrast, the OA seemed
to have been a special enactment, designed specifically to regulate
immovable properties within Dadra and Nagar Haveli and to govern
the concessions of such lands for specifically agricultural use and
cultivation. The OA thus functioned as a special law tailored to the
peculiar requirements of the territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli,
particularly in relation to the conferment of ‘Alvaras’ under the scheme
of ‘emphyteutic’ contracts.
1336 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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27. Article 12 of the OA, very simply put forth that an ‘emphyteutic’ contract
would come to be rescinded ‘without right to any compensation
and without any independent proceedings’ should cultivation
not have commenced in the manner prescribed under clauses (a)
to (d). Article 307 of the 1917 Law, on the other hand, elaborated
upon the manner in which authorities are to undertake measures to
ascertain whether ‘emphyteutas’ fulfil the conditions of the contract,
in a periodic manner. It further provided the process to be followed
in the event that such conditions were not followed.
28. However, what decisively distinguishes Article 12 of the OA as the
operative provision is its categorical stipulation that no independent
proceedings were required for the rescission of the contract where the
prescribed conditions remain unfulfilled. This feature is of particular
significance when contrasted with Article 76 of the 1917 Law,
which, though substantially analogous to Article 12 of the OA, had
some material distinctions. For instance, it introduced the additional
caveat that recission of an ‘emphyteutic’ contract must follow a prior
administrative inquiry, albeit still without any right to compensation.
Additionally, the provisos or paragraphs to Article 76 also seem to
have been in substantial variance from the language encapsulated
in Article 12. Paragraph 2 of Article 76 allowed for rescission of only
those parts of the land not brought under cultivation, whereas there
was no such exception envisaged in the language of Article 12 of
the OA. Article 76 reads as follows:
“Article 76. The contract of the emphyteusis shall
be rescinded, except in case of superior force, after
a prior administrative enquiry, without right to any
compensation:-
(a) When the works of cultivation have not begun within
the time limit of one year, from the date of the contract;
(b) When at the end of two years, at lease one fifth part
of the land is not brought under regular cultivation;
(c) When in each year, after one fifth part of the land is
brought under regular cultivation, the area under cultivation
is not increased at least by one tenth of the total area,
until complete cultivation;
(d) When, it being case of lands destined for buildings, at
lease the foundations are not concluded within one year
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1337

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

from time to time of the contract and within three years,
all the remaining works.
Paragraph 1st. For the purposes of first three clauses
of this article, it shall be considered regular cultivation
that a paddy, sugar cane, pulses and the like, grown by
dividing the land horizontal table lands separated by small
bunds and that also of the trees of shrubs bearing fruits
and of economic value, methodically planted in rows,
maintaining among them the distance necessary for their
regular growth.
Paragraph 2nd. In the cases provided in clause (b)
and (c) the contract shall be rescinded only in relation
to the part not actually cultivated, if the emphyteuta
is agreeable to bind himself to the payment of initial
emphyteutic pension.
Paragraph 3rd. In the case of the preceding paragraphs the
lands not cultivated shall be granted again in emphyteusis,
and the annual emphyteutic pension paid by the new
emphyteuta shall revert in favour of old one.
Paragraph 4th. The taluka administrators shall send to
the General Secretariat, the list of the lands which are
successively reverted to the possession of the State; such
lists shall be time to time published in the Government
Gazette for the knowledge of those who wish to have the
same lands on grant.”
[Emphasis supplied]

29. It thus emerges that Article 307 of the 1917 Law was confined in
its application to the ‘preceding articles’ of that statute itself viz.
Article 76 and other such provisions, and cannot be transposed
so as to have governed Article 12 of the OA, which embodied a
self-contained scheme. Article 12, being the operative and special
provision, unequivocally provided that no independent proceeding
was required for the rescission of a concession once the stipulated
conditions stand breached. The provision left no ambiguity in vesting
the Collector (previously the Governor General) with the authority to
act directly upon such a violation.
1338 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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30. There being no casus omissus within the scheme of the OA, recourse
to Article 146 is therefore equally foreclosed, for that provision merely
envisaged that omissions in the OA would be supplemented by the
1917 Law.
31. In light of the above, the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali
(a specific law overrides a general law) becomes immediately
applicable, namely where a special enactment has been framed to
deal with a defined subject matter, its provisions must prevail over
those of the general law to the extent of any overlap. The OA, being
a special law enacted for the territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
with the specific object of regulating agricultural concessions, would
therefore govern the rights and obligations arising from the ‘Alvaras’
in question. The 1917 Law, notwithstanding its wider sweep, would
have to yield in application insofar as the field was expressly occupied
by the OA.

E.1.2.2 Implications of Decree No. 27:135
32. Turning then to the effect and import of Decree No. 27:135, it is seen
that the said Decree which was issued on 20.10.1936 introduced
certain modifications to the OA. Significantly, Article 1 thereof
unequivocally stipulated that:
“Article 1.0. The immoveable properties in the Pargana of
Nagar Haveli, of the district of Daman, State of India, owned
by the State in terms of Article 1 of the Decree no. 3602
of 24 of November of 1917, may be given on emphyteusis
(aforamento), the respective contracts of emphyteusis
(aforamento) continuing to be governed by Organizacao
Agraria of Nagar Haveli, approved by Portaria No. 985 of
22 of September of 1919, save the modifications in terms
of the subsequent articles”
33. A plain reading of the above provision leaves no manner of doubt
that the OA stood modified by Decree No. 27:135. The controversy,
however, pivots upon the construction and scope of Article 2 of the
said Decree. It is the specific case of the Appellants that the lands
granted under the OA could thereafter be rescinded only in accordance
with the conditions prescribed under Article 2. For ready reference,
Article 2 provides as follows:
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1339

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

“Article 2.0. The properties conceded on emphyteusis
(aforamento) are inalienable, except:
1° In the cases of expropriation for public utility;
2° In the cases contemplated in no. 3 of article 7 of the
Organizacao Agraria already referred.”
34. Article 2 of the Decree, therefore, stipulated that properties conceded
under an emphyteutic contract would be rendered inalienable, save in
two limited contingencies: first, where expropriation was necessitated
for a public purpose; and second, in circumstances contemplated
under Article 7(3) of the OA, namely, default by the concessionaire in
the payment of the emphyteutic pension to the State. To appreciate
the true ambit of Article 2, it becomes necessary to examine the
import of the expression ‘inalienable’, which, as defined in Black’s
Law Dictionary, connotes:
“INALIENABLE. Not subject to alienation; the characteristic
of those things which cannot be bought or sold or
transferred from one person to another, such as rivers and
public highways, and certain personal rights; e.g., liberty.”
35. In the same vein, it is also apposite to consider the meaning of the
term ‘rescission’ as employed in Article 12 of the OA. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘rescission’ means:
“RESCISSION OF CONTRACT. Annulling or abrogation
or unmaking of contract and the placing of the parties to
it in status quo.”
36. Having regard to the import of the term ‘inalienable’ when placed in
juxtaposition with that of ‘rescission’, we are not persuaded by the
Appellants’ submission that Article 2 of the Decree has, in effect,
supplanted or replaced Article 12 of the OA, thereby confining the
Collector’s authority only to the conditions contemplated therein. The
concept of inalienability ordinarily refers to restrictions on the voluntary
transfer or alienation of property rights by the act of parties, such as
sale, assignment, or conveyance of title. Rescission, on the other
hand, denotes the annulment of an existing contractual arrangement
on account of breach of its stipulations and entails the reversion of
rights to the grantor by operation of law.
1340 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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37. Decree No. 27:135 cannot, therefore, be construed as having the
effect of wholly displacing the OA, or, for that matter, effacing Article
12 thereof. Upon a careful interpretation of the relevant provisions, it
is evident that the Decree and the OA operate independently, serving
separate purposes, with no warrant to suggest that one replaces or
overrides the other.
38. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contentions advanced by the
Appellants in this regard, and are not inclined to assess the matter
in the light of any other law or statute beyond the OA.

E.2 Issue No. 2: The High Court’s reversal of the concurrent
findings of the courts below
39. The Appellants have further assuaged that the jurisdiction of the High
Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is narrowly
circumscribed, and that it was not open to the High Court to interfere
with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the
First Appellate Court. On this basis, the Appellants have sought that
the High Court’s findings be set aside.
40. At the very outset of our analysis on this issue, it becomes necessary
to peruse Section 100 of the CPC, which provides that an appeal
would lie before the High Court, from every decree passed in appeal
by any court subordinate to the High Court, if it is satisfied that the
case involves a ‘substantial question of law’. The provision further
elucidates that “…nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
41. The legislative intent underlying Section 100 of the CPC is therefore
unambiguous. It demarcates the jurisdiction of the High Court in
second appeal to instances where a substantial question of law is
involved, thereby precluding interference with concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the courts below. This Court has, through a
consistent line of authority, clarified that such a restriction is not
absolute. The High Court may justifiably exercise its jurisdiction in
a second appeal where the findings of the subordinate courts are
vitiated by perversity, misreading of evidence, or a manifest disregard
of settled legal principles.7

7 Neelakantan v. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1341

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

42. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal,8 this Court has eruditely delineated
the contours of interference with concurrent findings of fact in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. It was expounded that
where findings of fact are arrived at by ignoring material evidence, by
taking into account inadmissible evidence, or where the conclusions
are so perverse that no reasonable or prudent person could have
reached them, a substantial question of law would arise, thereby
warranting interference. This Court held thus:
“19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived
at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court.
It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily
reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of
credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses
accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for
interference in second appeal when it is found that the
appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing
so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances
two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the
lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High
Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is
not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere
where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the
lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary
to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its
settled position on the basis of pronouncements made
by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible
evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence.

(xxxx) (xxxx) (xxxx)
24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant
for this case may be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a
document is a question of fact.
But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a
question of law. Construction of a document involving

8 (2006) 5 SCC 545
1342 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the application of any principle of law, is also a question
of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a
document or wrong application of a principle of law
in construing a document, it gives rise to a question
of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere
question of law. A question of law having a material
bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question,
answer to which affects the rights of parties to the
suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not
covered by any specific provisions of law or settled
legal principle emerging from binding precedents,
and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial
question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where
the legal position is clear, either on account of express
provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below
has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary
to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the
substantial question of law arises not because the law is
still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a
material question, violates the settled position of law.
(iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere
with the concurrent findings of the courts below.
But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-
recognised exceptions are where
(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence
or acted on no evidence;
(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from
proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or
(iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.
When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it
not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth
of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the
evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable
of supporting the finding.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1343

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

43. What thus emerges from the above extracted case law is that, as a
general rule, the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 100 CPC, would not be justified in interfering with the
concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in a civil
suit. Such interference is permissible, however, in the exceptional
circumstances carved out in Hero Vinoth (supra), including where
the findings on material aspects suffer from perversity, are founded
on no evidence, or are vitiated by reliance on considerations wholly
irrelevant to the matter in issue.9
44. In the instant case, while adjudicating upon the plea of waiver
advanced by the Appellants, the High Court in the Impugned Judgment
noted the submission of the learned counsel that, in view of the
concurrent findings rendered by the courts below, the High Court
was proscribed from interfering therewith by reason of the limited
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. Having considered the
submission, the High Court nonetheless proceeded to observe as
follows:
“24. There is no absolute prohibition against interfering with
the findings of fact in a the Second Appeal under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As held by the
Apex Court in a Judgment reported in (1996) 8 S.C.C.
page No.365 (D.S.Thimmappa Vs. Siddaramakka), where
the first Appellate Court failed to draw the proper inference
and to apply law in proper perspective to the proved facts,
the High Court in Second Appeal was justified in drawing
proper inference from the such proved facts and the said
course adopted will not amount to appreciation of evidence
in Second Appeal.”
45. The High Court thereafter undertook a detailed examination of the
plea of waiver and, in doing so, identified material inconsistencies in
the findings returned by both the courts below. In particular, it noted
the undue reliance placed upon extraneous considerations, such
as the decision of the Overseas Council of Lisbon, the testimony of
PW-3 before the Trial Court, as well as the alleged inaction on the
part of the State authorities. Having engaged in a careful dissection
of the doctrine of waiver, in the light of the jurisprudence of this

9 Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar, (2020) 15 SCC 731.
1344 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Court on the subject, the High Court came to the conclusion that
the concurrent findings of the courts below were unsustainable, and
consequently deemed it fit to set them aside.
46. Insofar as the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
CPC by the High Court is concerned, we are unable to discern any
infirmity. The course adopted by the High Court, viewed against the
reasons recorded in the Impugned Judgment, cannot be questioned.
Consequently, the contention of the Appellants on this score is devoid
of merit and stands rejected. That said, we consider it appropriate to
proceed to an examination of the substantive issues arising on the
merits, which we undertake in the ensuing parts of this judgment.

E.3 Issue No. 3: The Collector’s order of recission of the grant
47. As we turn to the substantive aspects of the present appeal, it
becomes necessary to note that this issue has perhaps been the
most mercurial, owing to the inherent contradictions embedded
in the submissions advanced by the Appellants. A survey of the
litigation history reveals a persistent tendency on their part to alter
positions and project fresh concerns before successive fora, thereby
engendering uncertainty and obfuscation around what is, at its core,
a singular question: whether the lands in question were cultivated or
not. This question embodies the very nucleus of the dispute between
the parties, for it constitutes the basis of the Collector’s order dated
30.04.1974.
48. The Appellants, rather than maintaining consistency in their narrative,
have chosen to advance shifting and often incongruous versions
with respect to the status of cultivation upon the lands in question.
Such vacillation has not only prolonged the course of litigation but
has also rendered it virtually impossible, at this stage, to ascertain
with certainty the true state of affairs.
49. What emerges is a veritable Meinong’s Jungle of possibilities. The
record is replete with competing narratives: that the land was indeed
cultivated; or that cultivation was attempted but rendered impossible
owing to the poor quality of the soil; or that, despite such impossibility,
considerable labour and resources were nonetheless expended to
cultivate grass of varying kinds; or that nothing at all was grown and
the land lay barren; and alternatively, that the land had long remained
fallow but has now been tilled and made cultivable, as sought to be
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1345

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

demonstrated through the photographs belatedly produced before
this Court.
50. Nonetheless, the onus now rests upon this Court to dispel the
prevailing confusion and bring quietus to the controversy. The
most appropriate manner of addressing these competing claims is
to undertake a systematic examination of the record, proceeding
seriatim through each strand of contention. Accordingly, we are of
the view that these contentions may be categorised as: (i) the plea
of waiver and acquiescence; (ii) the plea of reasonable period of
time; and (iii) the plea of impossibility and condonation.

E.3.1. The plea of waiver and acquiescence
51. The gravamen of the Appellants’ case rests upon the contention that,
irrespective of whether cultivation was in fact undertaken by them,
the failure of the authorities to act with promptitude constituted a
waiver of the statutory power vested in the Respondents. It is urged
that rescission of ‘Alvaras’ under Article 12 of the OA contemplates
a structured mechanism, read in consonance with Article 307 of the
1917 Law, whereby upon a finding of non-cultivation, action must be
initiated forthwith, followed by a fresh grant of the land under Article
16. The Appellants contend that this scheme cannot, by any stretch,
extend to the initiation of proceedings nearly half a century after the
original grant, and that such prolonged inaction amounts to waiver
and acquiescence on the part of the Respondents.
52. The term waiver connotes the voluntary and intentional relinquishment
of a known legal right or advantage, and necessarily presupposes
full knowledge of such right by the person waiving it.10 The doctrine
of waiver, firmly rooted in the principles of contract law, operates
to enable parties to a transaction to abandon rights that inhere in
them. However, this doctrine is not without bounds. It is well settled
in Indian jurisprudence that waiver cannot be invoked so as to efface
statutory obligations or to defeat matters grounded in public policy.11
53. The decision of this Court in Shri Lalchoo Mal (supra) directly
addresses this point of waiver vis-à-vis public policy, while considering

10 Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425.
11 Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 217.
1346 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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whether the tenant therein could claim the benefit of Section 3 of
the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The
Court held that where a statute is enacted to protect public interest,
the benefit or protection conferred thereby cannot ordinarily be
waived by an individual, since the larger public purpose underlying
the enactment would stand defeated. The relevant portions are
extracted hereinbelow:
“6. The general principle is that everyone has a right
to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law
or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity which may be
dispensed with without infringing any public right
or public policy. Thus the maxim which sanction the
non observance of the statutory provision is cuilibet
licat renuntiare juri pro se introducto. (See Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, pages 375
& 376.) If there is any express prohibition against
contracting out of a statute in it then no question can
arise of any one entering into a contract which is so
prohibited but where there is no such prohibition it will
have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a
more extensive operation ‘as a matter of public policy.
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 8, Third Edition,
it is stated in paragraph, 248 at page 143 :
“As a general rule, any person can enter into a binding
contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act
of Parliament, or, as it is said, can contract himself out of
the Act, unless it can be shown that such an agreement is
in the circumstances of the particular case contrary to public
policy. Statutory conditions may, however, be imposed in
such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and,
in certain circumstances, the legislature has expressly
provided that any such agreement shall be void.”
[Emphasis supplied]

54. This principle has been consistently reiterated in a catena of decisions,
including All India Power Engineer Federation & Ors. v. Sasan
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1347

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

Power Limited & Ors.,12 wherein this Court categorically held that
if any element of public interest is involved, a waiver by one of the
parties to an agreement cannot be given effect to where it militates
against such public interest. It thus stands firmly established that the
doctrine of waiver finds no application in matters concerning public
interest or public policy.
55. There is no gainsaying that the grant of land by the State for the
purposes of cultivation and agriculture is, by its very nature, an act
rooted in public interest. Indeed, this Court has, on several occasions,
observed that State intervention in matters concerning agricultural
land, particularly to secure proper cultivation, is an exercise
undertaken in furtherance of public interest and to subserve a public
purpose.13 Article 12 of the OA must be read in this very light, as a
provision embodying and effectuating the same legislative intent.
56. In the context of the case at hand, as we have already discussed ad
nauseam, Article 12 of the OA delineates the precise conditions under
which rescission may be effected in the event of non-compliance by
the ‘Alvara’ holders. It stipulates that rescission would be warranted
if: (i) agricultural operations are not commenced within one year from
the date of the contract; (ii) if, within two years from the date of the
contract, one-fourth of the cultivable land has not been brought under
cultivation; and (iii) if, in each subsequent year, the cultivated area
is not increased by at least one-fifth of one-half of the total area,
save where prevented by unforeseen circumstances. Any deviation
from these prescribed conditions, as explicitly provided, would attract
rescission of the contract, without entitlement to compensation, and
as underscored, without the necessity of independent proceedings.
57. Article 12 of the OA thus mandates rescission of the contract where
the conditions for cultivation stipulated therein are not fulfilled by the
grantees/landholders. The language of the provision, read with the
public policy objective animating the legislation, does not eschew any
such discretion or unbridled liberty upon the State or the erstwhile
Portuguese administration to voluntarily waive the enforcement of
such conditions.

12 (2017) 1 SCC 487
13 State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952 SCC OnLine SC 52; Ramanlal Gulabchand Shah v. State of
Gujarat, 1968 SCC OnLine 70.
1348 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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58. In fact, we are in complete agreement with the observations made
by the High Court in the Impugned Judgment that there can be no
estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its Legislative,
Sovereign, or Executive functions. When pressed against the
Government, the plea of waiver faces an especially high threshold
and rarely succeeds. It is, therefore, pertinent to extract the relevant
portions of these observations:
“27. ………
Apart from affirming well known principles that there
can be no question of estoppel against the Government
in exercise legislative, sovereign or executive power,
the Apex Court held that the plea of waiver when
it is pressed against the Government has an uphill
journey to make for success. The Apex Court held
that the for establishing the plea of waiver, case of
intentional relinquishing the plea of waiver, case of
intentional relinquishment of a known right by the
Government will have to be made out and in absence
of such voluntary and intentional abandonment of a
known advantage, waiver cannot be postulated. Another
decision of the Supreme Court on this point is reported in
A.LR. 1989 S.C. page No.1834 (Provash Chandra Dalui
Vs. Bishwanath Banerjee). The paragraph No.21 of the
said Judgment which reads thus:
“21. The essential element of waiver is that
there must be a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right or such conduct
as warrants the inference of relinquishment of
such right. It means the forsaking the assertion
of a right at the proper opportunity. The first
Respondent filed suit at the proper opportunity
after the land was transferred to him, and
no covenant to treat the appellants as Thika
tenants could be shown to have run with the
land is distinct from estoppel in that in waiver
the essential element is actual intent to abandon
or surrender right, while in estoppel such intent
is immaterial.”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1349

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

The Apex Court has emphasized that in waiver, there is
an existence of intention to abandonment or surrender
of right while estoppel such intention is immaterial. I am
not going into the question of estoppel as it is settled
that there cannot be estoppel against the exercise of
statutory power. But what is to be seen here is that
intention is an essential element of wavier.”
[Emphasis supplied]

59. Additionally, Article 12 of the OA, or for that matter the OA itself, does
not prescribe any specific timeline within which rescission must be
effected. Having regard to the nature of these grants, which were
in the form of long-term and virtually permanent landholding rights
conferred for the purpose of cultivation, it is only logical that the
provision vested the administration with ample authority to rescind
such contracts whenever a violation of the subsisting conditions came
to light. We cannot conceive a situation where the administration,
having conferred transferable and heritable rights of a virtually
perpetual character, would at the same time relinquish the very
conditions circumscribed within Article 12.
60. This brings us to the plea of acquiescence. What is noteworthy
about this contention is that it was never raised by the Appellants
in their pleadings before the Trial Court, nor does it find mention in
the issues framed therein. Instead, it first surfaces before the First
Appellate Court, which, while dealing with the issue of condonation,
observed that the prolonged delay and inaction by the authorities
in not rescinding the contract under Article 12 would amount to
acquiescence rather than condonation. It therefore appears that no
specific plea or sustained emphasis was ever placed by the Appellants
on the contention of acquiescence by the authorities.
61. On this contention as well, we find ourselves in agreement with
the reasoning of the High Court, which, relying upon the settled
decisions of this Court, has rightly clarified that mere delay cannot,
by itself, constitute acquiescence so as to divest a party of its
legal rights. The High Court is correct in holding that the inference
drawn by the First Appellate Court pertaining to long inaction by the
authorities amounting to abandonment of the right is untenable in law.
Acquiescence cannot be presumed solely on the basis of delay, and
no such conclusion can be sustained without clear and unequivocal
1350 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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conduct amounting to voluntary relinquishment. The relevant findings
of the High Court in this regard merit reproduction as under:
As stated earlier, the finding on the issue of acquiescence
is not a concurrent finding as there was no issue framed
on the acquiescence by the Trial Court and there is no
specific finding recorded by the Trial Court on that aspect.
In paragraph No.52 of its judgment, the Appellate Court
held that inordinate delay leads to legitimate inference
of implied consent to the irregular act or violation of the
material conditions of Alwara in question. Even in paragraph
No.53 of the Judgment, the Appellate Court relied upon the
inference of implied consent which can be drawn only on,
the basis of inordinate delay. As held by the Apex Court
mere inordinate delay does not lead to inference of
implied consent or acquiescence. There is no finding
recorded by the Appellate Court that acquiescence
exists because there is something more than inaction
or lack of initiative. The finding recorded by the
Appellate Court is at highest of long inaction. Such
long inaction will not amount to abandonment or right.
Only on the basis of a finding that there was a long
delay in taking action, inference of acquiescence could
not have been drawn. In my view, the finding recorded
by the Appellate Court on the issue of acquiescence
will have to be set aside both on and on the ground
that the plea of acquiescence could not have been
considered for the first time in the Appeal.
[Emphasis supplied]

62. We, therefore, discern no infirmity in the observations recorded in
the Impugned Judgment on this score. The assertions advanced by
the Appellants on the grounds of waiver and acquiescence stand
devoid of merit and are accordingly liable to fall.

E.3.2. The plea of reasonable period of time
63. The next argument advanced by the Appellants, is also inextricably
linked with the previous segment comprising ‘the plea of waiver
and acquiescence’. In this respect, the Appellants contend that the
Collector failed to take action within a ‘reasonable period of time’
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1351

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

and, therefore, must be construed to have waived the right to invoke
Article 12 of the OA. To bolster this submission, reliance has been
placed upon a decision of the Overseas Council of Lisbon, wherein
it was observed that such action ought to be taken within a period
of seven years. However, as already delineated in the preceding
portions of this judgment, mere delay or inaction on the part of the
Respondents cannot dilute or defeat the rights vested in them to
rescind the grants in accordance with the mandatory conditions
enshrined under Article 12 of the OA. Even otherwise, the plea of
inordinate delay cannot be entertained unless the party invoking
it is able to demonstrate that such delay has occasioned serious
prejudice. In the instant case, the Appellants are themselves the
beneficiaries of the grant, and it is difficult to see how delay, even of
a decade, could have operated to their detriment; if anything, such
delay enured to their advantage.
64. What then remains for our consideration is the efficacy of the decision
rendered by the Overseas Council of Lisbon. It is pertinent to note
that this decision has been heavily relied upon by both the Trial
Court and the First Appellate Court to support their conclusion that
the Respondents had ‘waived’ their rights under Article 12.
65. At the outset, the judgment of the Council itself, and the language
employed therein, is extremely difficult to discern, even if considered
purely hypothetically. It remains unclear whether this opacity arises
from the manner in which the decision was originally framed or is
the result of an erroneous translation. This observation is mirrored
in the Impugned Judgment of the High Court, which categorically
notes the difficulty in ascertaining the precise ratio decidendi that
the judgment seeks to establish.
66. Regardless, as reflected in the Impugned Judgment, it appears that
both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have erroneously
relied upon the Council’s judgment. Their reliance seems to be
predicated on the contentions advanced by the landholders therein,
which essentially asserted that at the end of a seven-year period,
reversion could not be effected because the predecessors of the
Appellants had complied with the conditions enumerated in Article
12 of the OA, and consequently, no reversion could be ordered over
the entirety of the land, even if portions remained uncultivated. Acting
upon this purported finding, which in reality was only the submissions
made by the parties, the Trial Court concluded that no reversion
1352 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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of lands could take place and affirmed that the Respondents had
waived their rights under Article 12. The portion of the decision of
the Council relied upon in this regard is reproduced herein:
“Since after the end of seven years the reversion was not
ordered to be effected it is because the lessee effectively
carried out all the conditions laid down in the cited article
12 and as such no reversion can take place even after
this the lots remain totally uncultivated.
If the lands had not been brought under cultivation in-due
time and in a required manner the order for reversion
should have been effected in 1930 and not in 1952 after
a lapse of about twenty nine years.”
67. This reasoning was subsequently adopted by the First Appellate
Court, which relied upon it to suggest that there had been implied
acquiescence on the part of the Respondents due to the delayed
nature of their actions. The First Appellate Court, while placing reliance
on the decision of the Overseas Council of Lisbon, held that the right
of rescission under Article 12 of the OA could not be exercised after
an inordinate lapse of time, as such delay amounted to acquiescence
by the Administration. It reasoned that though the judgment did not
expressly advert to the doctrines of waiver or condonation, the ratio
therein was clearly premised on those principles.
68. Thus, as already held, the courts below not only proceeded on
an erroneous apriorism, but the First Appellate Court in particular
devolved the issue of alleged implied acquiescence on the part of the
Respondents. Furthermore, these courts were not ad idem regarding
the plea of ‘waiver’ and misinterpreted the decision of the Council.
69. On the contrary, a perusal of the decision of the Overseas Council
reveals that its ratio clearly establishes that recission could have been
effected after the purported period of seven years, provided that until
such time the landholder had not complied with the conditions imposed
under Article 12. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow:

“It is certain that the rescission could have been
effected after 1930 but for that it would have to
(be) shown that up till that date the tenant had not
fulfilled the obligations imposed by Article 12 which
are effectively illegal and should be taken into
consideration. [Sic]
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1353

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

Meanwhile, and even if it was to be discussed whether the
rescission at any time in respect of the uncultivated area
was legal, it is certain that the order under appeal covers
the whole concession which is contrary to the precepts
established in para 2 of article 16 of the mentioned Agrarian
organization which says that the contract may be rescinded
in relation to the uncultivated portion.”
[Emphasis supplied]

70. There is thus no doubt that the decision of the Overseas Council of
Lisbon cannot serve as a sheet anchor to advance the plea of waiver
or postulate that recission could only be carried out within seven
years from the date of grant. Given its own findings, its ratio does
not bind the Indian Courts, nor is it directly applicable to the facts of
the instant case. In any event, such decisions carry mere persuasive
value only.14 The plea founded on the concept of reasonable time is
therefore also rejected.

E.3.3. The plea of impossibility and condonation
71. The Appellants, albeit not with the same force as their principal
submissions, have also contended that cultivation of the lands in
question was an impossibility. They assert that despite substantial
efforts, financial investment, and labour undertaken by them, the land
did not yield crops. It is further their case that, upon intimation to
the then Portuguese Administration, such cultivation was ‘condoned’
and the grants were allowed to subsist.
72. Insofar as this contention is concerned, we do not deem it necessary
to advert to it in great depth. We say so firstly for the reason that
the argument itself stands in contradiction to the Appellants’ own
assertions that they were engaged in the cultivation of high-quality
grass seeds and that no violation of the mandatory conditions
prescribed under Article 12 had occurred. Further, the plea of
impossibility has already been rejected by both the First Appellate
Court and the High Court.
73. It is also imperative to note that the Collector’s order itself, in
paragraph 8, expressly considered the category of uncultivable lands,

14 Forasol v. ONGC, AIR 1984 SC 241; General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1987) 4 SCC 137.
1354 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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and classified them as those not cultivated owing to ‘uncontrollable
circumstances duly proved’. Such lands were excluded from
consideration only after inspection established that they were
genuinely uncultivable. Accordingly, the very ground now urged
by the Appellants has already been examined and negatived by
the Collector, since the lands in question were not categorised as
falling within this exception. The Collector has on this issue made
the following observations:
“The third contention raised in the replies which in
considered it necessary to discuss here is that the
uncultivable nature of the land in many cases justifies
the failure to cultivate It article ***of the Organizaco
a Agraria does relax the reequip emend of bringing
additional land under cultivation annually once on
fourth of the area has been cultivated, in the case of
“uncontrollable” circumstances duly proved”. The
applicability of this provision is not clear but it was further
held by the High Court that the Collector “must take into
consideration the factors which have made it impossible
for the holder of the lands to cultivate thelands.” it may be
added, that the Government has in any case no interest is
taking over lands which, even if granted to another person,
would remain uncultivated. I have therefore excluded
from consideration any lands found in site inspection
to be uncultivable. This has been done even though it
has not been claimed in the replies that any particular
piece of land in question is uncultivable. (All the land
is in fact claimed to have been cultivated.) It may be
added here, whether or not a particular piece of land is
cultivable can be ascertained satisfactorily by inspecting
it and consider the demand that has been made for the
setting up of a commission to go into this matter to be
vexations in intent)”
[Emphasis supplied]

74. With respect to the plea of condonation, the same was erroneously
accepted by the Trial Court on the basis of the Overseas Council’s
view that rescission had to be exercised within seven years from
the grant, and on the testimony of PW-3, who claimed that certain
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1355

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

‘Alvara’ holders had been orally condoned by Portuguese authorities
upon citing impossibility of cultivation. However, the Trial Court does
not appear to have rendered any specific findings on the issue
of condonation. The First Appellate Court, however, held that the
Appellants, having accepted the grant for purposes of cultivation,
could not subsequently rely on impossibility as a defence. It further
found that no material evinced any condonation by the authorities, and
instead concluded that the matter was one of implied acquiescence.
75. Having independently examined the record, we find no material
to suggest that any express condonation was ever granted by the
authorities. We therefore do not consider it necessary to dwell
any further upon this contention. Accordingly, the pleas relating to
impossibility and condonation are rejected.

E.4 Issue No. 4: The validity of the Collector’s order of recission
of the grant
76. The final issue urged by the Appellants pertains to the very nature
of the order itself. It is their emphatic claim that the order dated
30.04.1974 passed by the Collector was invalid, illegal and mala fide,
and was unsustainable in view of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation.
The Appellants specifically contend that by virtue of the Regulation,
which came into force on 01.05.1974, the ‘Alvaras’ stood abolished
and, in their stead, ‘Occupancy Rights’ were conferred upon the
‘Alvara’ holders together with other statutory benefits enshrined
under Sections 3 and 4 thereof. According to the Appellants, the
order of the Collector is vitiated by mala fides, for it was passed on
30.04.1974, just one day prior to the coming into force of the 1971
Land Reforms Regulation, with the deliberate intent of depriving
them of the statutory benefits they would otherwise have become
entitled to under the said Regulation.
77. The Appellants have further contended that the repeal of the OA was
effected by way of re-enactment and that the present case squarely
raises the issue of repugnancy between the enacting clause and the
saving clause. It is urged that Section 57 of the 1971 Land Reforms
Regulation, which embodies the savings provision, cannot be so
construed as to frustrate the very object and purpose of the legislation
or to stand in the way of achieving its true intent. Reference was
made in this vein to the decisions of this Court in State of Punjab v.
1356 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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Mohar Singh,15 Jayantilal Amrathlal v. The Union of India16 and
Udai Singh Dagar and others v. Union of India.17
78. In addition, reliance has also been placed by the Appellants on
Sections 21 and 51 of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation and that
these provisions had already come into force on 15.12.1973. On the
strength of these provisions, it is their contention that the issuance
of show-cause notices by the Collector on 09.01.1974 was wholly
without jurisdiction and in direct contravention of the mandate of the
1971 Land Reforms Regulation.
79. The Respondents, on the other hand, have refuted these claims
and urged that the instant case does not involve abrogation of law,
nor is it a question of when a law stands saved. Their submission
is that the effect of repeal is well settled—once an enactment is
repealed, it ceases to be part of the body of law and must be treated
as if it had never existed, save to the extent preserved by a saving
clause. A saving clause, by its very nature, merely preserves the
operation of the repealed legislation in specified circumstances or
for a limited purpose, and cannot be construed so broadly as to
negate the repeal itself.
80. In this light, it becomes imperative to analyse the issue along two
distinct prongs: (i) the applicability and effect of the 1971 Land
Reforms Regulation; and (ii) the validity and sustainability of the
Collector’s order.

E.4.1. Applicability of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation
81. At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of repeal, savings,
and the applicability of Sections 21 and 51 of the 1971 Land Reforms
Regulation has been raised for the first time before this Court. These
aspects find no mention in the pleadings or submissions before any
of the courts below. As already discussed at length under ‘Issue
No. 1’, a party cannot be permitted to set up an entirely new case at
the appellate stage, and consideration must remain confined to the
issues arising from the pleadings framed at the time of the civil suit.

15 AIR 1955 SC 84
16 (1972) 4 SCC 174
17 (2007) 10 SCC 306
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1357

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

82. Nevertheless, we have considered these submissions advanced
by the Appellants. In this regard, we must first duly understand the
import of Section 57 of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, which
reads as follows:
“Section 57. Repeal and Savings.
(1) On and from the date on which any provision of this
Regulation is. brought into force, all laws and orders or
any part thereof as are relatable to the matters covered
by such provision shall stand repealed.
(2) The repeal of any law or order or part thereof by sub-
section (1) shall not affect-
(a) the previous operation of such law or order or part
thereof or anything done or suffered thereunder;
(b) any right, privilege or, liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under such committed against such law or order;
(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect
of any offence committed against such law or order;
(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid: and any
such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be
instituted or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if such law or order or
part thereof had not been repealed.
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), anything
done or any section taken under any of the laws or orders
or part thereof as would stand repealed under sub-section
(1) shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with any such
provision of this Regulation as is brought into force, be
deemed to have been done or taken under such provision.
(4) Any custom or usage prevailing at the time of the
commencement of any provision of this Regulation and
having the force of law shall, if such custom or usage
is repugnant to or inconsistent with such provision,
cease to be operative to the extent of such repugnancy
or inconsistency.”
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83. The doctrine of repeal and savings of a statute, within the confines
of Indian jurisprudence, is primarily governed by Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897. The settled principle in this regard is that
the effect of repeal is to efface the repealed law altogether, as if it
had never existed, save for the limited purpose of preserving actions
that were initiated, prosecuted, and concluded while the law was in
force.18 At the same time, it is equally well settled that repeal does
not imply that the deleted provisions never existed to begin with,
so as to preclude the continuance of proceedings that had already
been instituted under the repealed statute.19
84. Having considered this and upon a careful reading of Section 57
of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, it becomes evident that the
Regulation repeals the OA and applies to all situations, save and
except those concerning ‘any investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment’. In such cases, the OA is deemed
not to have been repealed and continues to operate for the limited
purpose of sustaining those proceedings.
85. What is of significance is that the inquisition undertaken by the
Collector predates both the coming into effect of Section 21 and
Chapter VIII of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation on 15.12.1973,
as well as the commencement of the Regulation, which came into
force on 01.05.1974. It is not the case that such an investigation into
the cultivation of lands was initiated in anticipation of the Regulation;
rather, the very first order of the Collector rescinding the ‘Alvaras’,
invoking Articles 12 and 16 on the grounds of non-cultivation of
lands, dates back as far as 28.10.1969.
86. As already noted, the aforesaid order was assailed before the High
Court, which proceeded to interpret the provisions of the OA, with
particular emphasis on Article 12. The High Court in its order dated
03.10.1973 observed that the manner in which the Collector had
passed the impugned order, as well as the enquiry leading to it,
suffered from a violation of the principles of natural justice, for no
opportunity had been afforded to the Appellants to demonstrate that
portions of the land—where only grass was found growing—remained
uncultivated owing to uncontrollable circumstances. Stressing upon

18 Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga and Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255; State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal
Pindwal, (1996) 5 SCC 60.
19 Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1359

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

the inviolable principle of audi alteram partem, the High Court directed
the Collector to conduct a fresh inquiry strictly in accordance with the
principles of natural justice and the conditions postulated in Article
12. The operative direction of the High Court order states that:
“In these circumstances, the orders passed by the collector
which are challenged in all these petitions deserve to be
quashed. This, however, will not prejudice the rights of the
Respondents to take proper action under Article 12 after
giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to the Petitioners.
Rule absolute. The order impugned in the Petitions are
quashed and the Respondent No.2 shall not give effect to
any of them. In the Circumstances of the case, no order
as to costs.”
87. What also emerges from the above is that the High Court did not make
any observation on the aspect of purported delay in the exercise of
power under Article 12 of the OA. Its reasoning was confined to the
requirement that any action sought to be undertaken under Article
12 must necessarily conform to the principles of natural justice.
88. It thus becomes amply clear to us that the proceedings initiated by
the Collector, as well as the High Court’s initial order, preceded the
coming into force of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, including
specifically, Section 21 and Chapter VIII. Even otherwise, the
Appellants’ contentions, if accepted, would be in the teeth of Section
57 of the Regulation, given that these proceedings would come within
the ambit of the exception carved out in clause 1(d). The applicability
of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, in this scenario, is therefore
a moot question.

E.4.2. Nature of the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974
89. Turning to the next facet of this issue, upon a closer examination of
the Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974, we find that it invoked Articles
12 and 16 of the OA and proceeded to rescind the ‘Alvaras’ held by
the Appellants on the ground of non-cultivation of lands. The order
is reasoned in detail, setting out the nature of the lands in question
and the process adopted to ascertain whether cultivation had, in fact,
taken place. Significantly, the order records that even those parcels
of land which were found to be cultivated to the extent of 5/8th were
excluded from rescission, and no adverse action was taken in respect
thereof. The reasoning of the Collector also reflects due regard to the
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difficulty in ascertaining cultivation at an earlier stage, a contention
that the Appellants have persistently advanced before us.
90. In this regard, the order makes explicit exceptions for lands that
could not be cultivated owing to ‘uncontrollable circumstances
duly proved’, as already delineated in paragraph 73 herein. Having
extended such exceptions, the Collector proceeded to hold that a
substantial and complex aspect of the inspection lay in determining
whether the lands had, in fact, been cultivated during the seven
years from the date of grant. It was noted that genuine cultivation
ordinarily leaves behind discernible traces which remain visible
even years after such activity ceases, whereas no such indications
were found in the present case. The Collector further recorded that
the Appellants’ claim of failed attempts at cultivation was not bona
fide and that they could not demonstrate that such lands had been
brought or attempted to have been brought under cultivation. In this
connection, the Collector made the following pertinent observations:
This cycle styled reply is not bona fide [sic]; in fact
considerable areas of the lands in respect of which
this reply has been given have been found in site
inspection to actually be under cultivation. Some
khajuri trees were also found growing naturally in
many cases, indicating that such trees could have been
raised and cultivated systematically. I cannot believe
that the holder had all tried to cultivate paddy, nagli,
varai and undid, incurring heavy expenditure but failed.
Many of these lands in facts and reported to still require
investment before they can be cultivated. I consider that
the very clearly false statements made in the replies
deprive them of any readability and that the alwara
holders, on whom the burden of proof lies, have failed
the show that the lands in question were brought or
were attempted to be brought under cultivation. [Sic]
[Emphasis supplied]

91. The Collector seems to have drawn these findings by relying not
merely upon the inspection conducted, but also upon common
knowledge pertaining to the nature and condition of the ‘Alvara’
lands in that territory. Such findings, in the Collector’s view, were of
“quite sufficient certainty to be acted upon,” and, therefore, warranted
rescission of the concessions. The Collector, thus, proceeded to
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1361

Divyangnakumari Harisinh Parmar (Dead) and Others v.
Union of India and Others

pass the order on the basis that: (i) the inspecting officers had
specifically identified and demarcated portions of land that were
genuinely uncultivable; and (ii) the officers had further noted parcels
where cultivation was possible, albeit requiring substantial investment
and effort. In respect of the latter category, the Collector directed
rescission of the contracts, observing that the mandate of the law
imposed a clear obligation upon the grantees to effect improvements
and bring the land under cultivation. The absence of such effort,
despite the statutory requirement under Article 12 of the OA, was
therefore construed to be sufficient ground for rescission.
92. Given the above analysis, we are inclined to hold that there is no
infirmity in the reasoning assigned by the Collector, which appears
to have been rendered after due deliberation, consideration of the
relevant circumstances, and following the applicable rules and
regulations.
93. Consequently, it would be far-fetched to infer that the order(s) of
the Collector or the actions of the Respondents were actuated by
mala fides, undertaken solely to deprive the Appellants of statutory
benefits, or that such measures were in contravention of the underlying
legislative intent of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation.
94. We are, therefore, not persuaded by the Appellants’ contention as to
the applicability of the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation, and the same
stands rejected. There is also nothing on record to suggest that the
Respondent’s actions were malicious or unsustainable.

F. Conclusion and directions
95. Having reached the culmination of this judgment, and before setting
out our final conclusions, it is necessary to briefly recapitulate our
findings on the issues that have engaged our consideration:
i. The governing law for determining the nature and extent of the
rights in the lands granted to the Appellants is the OA, and the
inquiry must be confined to its provisions;
ii. The High Court’s reversal of the concurrent findings of the
courts below does not transgress the limits of its jurisdiction
under Section 100 of the CPC;
iii. The Appellants’ pleas of waiver, acquiescence, delay,
impossibility, and condonation have no legal or factual basis,
1362 [2025] 9 S.C.R.

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and none of these principles render the Collector’s order dated
30.04.1974 unsustainable; and
iv. The Collector’s order dated 30.04.1974 was not tainted by mala
fides and cannot be construed as having been passed with the
intent to disentitle the Appellants from the statutory benefits
under the 1971 Land Reforms Regulation.
96. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the findings of the
High Court in the Impugned Judgment suffer from no infirmity, legal
or factual, warranting interference under our appellate jurisdiction.
97. Consequently, the appeals are devoid of merit and stand dismissed.
The earlier status quo order dated 24.02.2006 stands vacated. There
shall be no order as to costs.
98. Additionally, we deem it necessary to observe that if some of the
Appellants, as was sought to be projected before us during the course
of hearing, have not been granted or have not been considered
for the grant of occupancy rights under the 1971 Land Reforms
Regulation, liberty is reserved to them to approach the Collector
within a period of six (6) weeks. Such applications, notwithstanding
the expiry of limitation, shall be entertained and adjudicated upon
in accordance with law.
99. Furthermore, in so far as the plea for acquisition as proposed by
the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) for the purposes of
development of the Delhi–Mumbai Expressway is concerned, the
relevant Interlocutory Applications stand disposed of, with liberty
reserved to the parties to work out their remedies in accordance
with law.
100. All other pending applications also stand disposed of in terms of
the above.
101. Ordered accordingly.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan