Holding

An evidentiary admission shifts the burden of proof to the party making it and remains effective unless the party can produce clinching evidence to rebut it.

Summary

The appellant insurer disputed a claim for damage to a taxi when a tree fell on it, arguing that the loss was caused by a storm and therefore excluded under the policy. The complainant initially admitted the storm in his claim and in a letter from his brother, but later produced a meteorological certificate asserting that no storm occurred. The District Consumer Forum, State Commission, and National Commission all held that the damage was covered, ignoring the earlier admission. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary effect of admissions, holding that such admissions shift the burden of proof to the party making them and are not overturned unless clinching evidence disproves them. Since the complainant failed to produce such evidence, the Court remitted the matter to the National Commission for fresh adjudication and disposed of the appeal without costs.

Issues considered

Whether the complainant's admission that the accident was caused by a storm is conclusive evidence against his later claim of no storm.
Who bears the burden of proof when an admission has been made under the Evidence Act.
Whether the exclusion clause for "storm" in the insurance policy applies to the present case.
Whether the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission erred in holding the loss was covered.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Consumer ProtectionInsurance ClaimExclusion ClauseStormAdmissionBurden of ProofEvidence ActNational Consumer Disputes Redressal CommissionRemand

Judgment

DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD. AND ANR. A
v.
SAMIR CHANDRA CHAUDHARY

JULY 14, 2005
B
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986:

Claim for damages of vehicle-Admission by complainant that accident C
was caused on account of storm-Loss due to storm not covered by Insurance
Policy-Later plea of complainant that theJactum of storm wrongly stated-
Certificate to the effect of non-existence of storm by meteorological authority
produced-The same neither exhibited nor witness examined to prove it-
Claim al/owed by Courts below-On appeal, held: since the fact of accident
due to storm was admitted by the complainant, the onus to_ prove to the D
contrary was on him-Hence matter remitted to N~tional Commission for
fresh adjudication-Evidence Act, 1872. .

Evidence Act, 1872-Admission-Evidentiary value and nature of-
Held: Evidentiary admissions are ofconclusive proof of the facts admitted but E
they raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof on the person making
admission or his representative-in-interest-Unless shown or explained to be
wrong they are efficacious proof of the facts admitted.

A vehicle owned by the respondent-complainant, was rented out. While
the vehicle was parked under a tree, the same got damaged because a tree F
fell on it. Respondent made two claims, one on account of loss of hiring charges
and second for repairing the vehicle. Appellant-insurance Company repudiat~
the claim. Complainant filed claim before District Consumer Forum. In the
letter making claim to the appellant-Company as well as in the complaint it
was mentioned that the tree fell on the vehicle due to storm. Complainant's
plea was that 'storm' was wrongly mentioned. He produced a certificate from G
Meteorological authority to the effect that there was no storm at the relevant
time. District Forum by majority held that in view of the certificate by
Meteorological authority it was established that there was no storm and hence
the damage was covered by the insurance policy and directed the appellant-
. .
613 H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.C.R.

Disposing of the appeal and remitting it to National Commission, the
Court.

HELD: 1. Though evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of
D the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong, but they do
raise ail estoppel and shift the burden of proof placing it on the person making
the admission or his representative-in-interest. Unless shown or explained to
be wrong, they are an efficacious proof of the facts admitted. As the weight of
an admission depends on the circumstances under which it was made, these
circumstances may always be proved to impeach or enhance its credibility.
E The effect of admission is that it shifts the onus on the person admitting the
fact on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably
be presumed to be so, and. until the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted
must be taken to be established: An admission is the best evidence that an
opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive is decisive of the
matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.
F
Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 861 and
Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosayi Balajiwae v. Gopal Vinayak Gosayi and Ors.,
AIR (1960) SC 100, relied on. (618-G; 619-A-C]

G Law of Evidence by Phipson (1963) Edition 678, referred to.

2. Contemporaneous documents clearly show that the complainant right
from the beginning had accepted the position that the branch had got knocked
off the tree because of storm. If he wanted to explain the admission, the onus
was on him to adduce material to show the contrary. Such material has to be
H of clinching nature so as to outweigh the admission. The National Commission
DIV.MANAGERUNITEDINDIAINSURANCECO.LTD. v. S.C. CHAUDHARY [PASAYAT,J.j 615

did not consider these aspects. The State Commission's approach was also A
not in the correct direction. In the aforesaid background it would be in the
interest of justice to remit the matter to the National Commission for hearing
the matter afresh. (619-C, D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3663 of2005.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.2004 of the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in R.P. No. 1223 of2004.

A.K. De, S.K. Bharti and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellants.

Ranjan Mukherjee for the Respondent. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT P ASAY AT, J. Leave granted.

The United Insurance Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as the D
"insurer") and its Branch Manager, Purulia Branch call in question legality of
the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
(in short the "National Commission") upholding the order of the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (in short the "State Commission").
The revision filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the E
"Act") was dismissed. The respondent (hereinafter referred to as the
"complainant") had lodged a complaint before the District Consumers Disputes
Redressal Forum, Purulia (in short the "District Forum")·alleging that the
appellants had erroneously repudiated the claim made by him for the damage
suffered by him on account of an accident covered by the policy of insurance
taken by him. F

The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:

The complainant is the owner of an Ambassador Diesel Car which was
registered as a taxi and was hired by the Executive Engineer, Agri-Make
Division, Purulia for official use. The vehicle was the subject matter of insurance G
under an insurance pqlicy for the period from 5.2.1992 to 4.2.1993. On 28.4.1992
at about 5.30 p.m. an Eucalyptus tree under which the car was parked fell on
the car and extensive damage was caused and without repairing the vehicle
could not have been made road worthy. The incident was reported to the
Insurance Company who repudiated the claims on the ground that it was not H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A covered by the policy.
Two claims were made; one related to the loss on account of loss of
hiring charges and the other related to the expenses incurred for repairing the
damaged vehicle. The Insurance Company resisted the complaint before the
District Forum on the ground that the loss was caused due to a storm which
B resulted in falling of the branch of the Eucalyptus tree on the car. Reference
was made to the letter written by the complainant's brother and the claim
petition lodged. There was a difference of opinion amongst the members of
the District Forum. While the President was of the view that the complainant's
plea regarding wrong mention about the storm and the reliance on the letter
C of Meteorological authority were without substance, the other two members
held that the document i.e. letter of the Meteorological authorities clearly
established that there was no ~torm and, therefore, the damage \vas ·covered
by the terms of the insurance policy. The insurer was directed to pay Rs.
80,000 towards the repairing charges and a sum of Rs. 1,62,000 for loss of
hiring charges. The District Forum al5o directed the payment of interest
D @18% p.a. from the date of receipt of its order till the realization of the
I
....
awarded amount in full.

The insurer carried the matter in appeal before the State Commission.
The State Commission was of the view that the majority judgment suffers from
E no infirmity. The letter-certificate issued by the Meteorological authority
clearly established that there was no storm. It however held that on the basis
of Surveyor's report that the actual dal11age caused, the amount was to be
fixed at Rs.50, 753 and there was no warrant for awarding any amount for the
loss of hiring. The rate of interest was also reduced from 18% to 12% p.a.

The insurer moved the National Commission in revision. The National
F
Commission in the impugned order held that on hearing learned counsel for-
the insurer it was clear that damage to the vehicle which occurred on account
of falling of Eucalyptus tree was covered under the policy.

Le,arned counsel for the appellants submitted that the terms of the
G policy were clear that if any accident occurred to the vehicle which was the
subject matter of insurance on account of a storm, the insurer had no liability.
The first information about the accident was given by complainant's brother
clearly stating that the vehicle was damaged as branch of an Eucalyptus tree
fell down ,on the car due to storm. This letter of the complainant's brother was
H issued on the next date of the alleged accident i.e. 29.4.1992. Even in the Claim .- .
DIV.MANAGERUNITEDINDIAINSURANCECO.i.TD. V. S.C.CHAUDHARY [PASAYAT,J.J 617

Petition it was clearly stated that the car was standing under a tree and A
·because of heavy storm a road side tree fell down on the car which was badly
damaged. Only after repudiation, the complainant cannot take a new plea that
in fact there was no storm. For the first time he produced before District
Forum the letter-Certificate. The same was not exhibited and no witness was
examined to prove its authenticity. Therefore, the finding to the effect that the B
accident was covered by the terms of the policy cannot be maintained.

Learned counsel for the complainant-respondent submitted that the
facts were not known to the complainant's brother and, therefore, the letter
was written and the Claim Petition was filed on the basis of wrong information.

In view of the clinching evidence in. the shape of the Meteorological C
Department's letter, the insurer had erroneously rejected the claim.

Certain facts are undisputed. Firstly in the letter dated 29 .4.1992 i.e. the
next date of the accident it has been categorically noted that the car was1

· damaged because of the fallin.g of a branch of the tree and the branch fell due
D
to storm and in the Claim Petition also it was categorically so stated. The
terms of the policy of insurance to which reference has been made by learned
-counsel.for both the parties read as follows:
-:
"Section I: Loss or damage
l. The Company will indemnify the insured against loss or damage E
to the Motor Vehicle and/or its accessories whilst thereon
(a) by fire, explosion, s.elf opinion or lighting
(b) by burglary, housebreaking or theft
-(
(c) by riot and strike F
(d) by earthquake (fire and shock damage)
(e) by flood, typhoon, tempest, Hurrican, storm, Inundation, Cyclone,
Hailstorm, frost.
(f) by accidental external means G
(g) by malicious act
(h) by terrorism
(i) whilst in transit by road, rail, inland waterway, lift, elevator, or air
H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. I S.CR.

A (j) rock slide/land slide.

IMT23-Exclusion of Special Perils (Flood Typhoon etc.):

In consideration of an appropriate discount under the policy it is
B hereby understood and agreed that the . words "Flood Typhoon
Hurricane Storm Tempest Inundation Cyclone Hailstorm Frost in
Section l(ltem 'e' of the policy) are hereby deleted and the company
shall not be liable for accidental loss or damage caused by or liability
directly arising out of the above perils.

c In the event of any claim the insured shall prove that the accident
loss, damage or liability arose independently of and was in no way
connected with or occasioned by or contributed to by or traceable to
any of the said occurrence or any consequences thereof and in
default of such proof the company shall not be liable to make any
payment in respect of such a claim."
D
The question therefore is whether the exclusion clause of special perils
applies. This has to be factually adjudicated. On the one hand the statements
made by the complainant's brother and the claim petition and on the other
in a letter purported to have been written by the Meteorological authorities
E were pressed into service by the parties. It was rightly noted by the President
of the District Forum in his minority order that the document was not exhibited
and it was not clear as to who was the person who had given the certificate,
and his authority to issue such a certificate. It is also not clear from the record
as to whether the document in question was exhibited before the District
Forum and if so, by whom. The complainant's brother had admitted before the
F District Forum that he had heard about the storm from a Khalasi. The said
Khalasi was als? not examined. Prima facie therefore, at the fust available
instance the scenario as projected by the complainant's brother was that the
branch had fallen off because of a storm. On the other hand exists the so
called letter-certificate purported to have been issued by the Meteorological
G authorities. It cannot be lost sight of that nobody was examined by the
complainant about the subsequent version that there was no storm. Admission
is the best piece of evidence against the persons making admission. As was
observed by this Court i~ Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal and Ors., AIR
( 1979) SC 861 in the backdrop of Section 31 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short the 'Evidence Act') it· is true that evidentiary admissions are not
H conclusive proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be
DIV. MAN., UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. S.C. CHAUDHARY [PASAYAT,J] 619

wrong; but they do raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof placing A
it on the person making the admission or his representative-in-interest. Unless
shown or explained to be wrong, they are an efficacious proof of the facts
admitted. As observed by Phipson in his Law of Evidence ( 1963 Edition, Para
678) as the weight of an admission depends on the circumstances under
which it was made, these circumstances may always be proved to impeach or
enhance its credibility. The effect of admission is that it shifts the onus on B
the person admitting the fact on the principle that what a party himself admits
to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, and until the presumption
is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established. An admission
is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not
conclusive is decisive of matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved C
erroneous. (See Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak
Gosavi and Ors., AIR (1960) SC 100). Contemporaneous documents clearly
show that the complainant right from the beginning had accepted the position
that the branch had got knocked off the tree because of storm. If he wanted
to explain the admission, the onus was on him to adduce material to show
the contrary. Such material has to be of clinching nature so as to outweigh D
the admission. The National Commission did not consider these aspects. The
State Commission's approach was also not in the correct direction. In the
aforesaid background it would be in the interest of justice to remit the matter
to the National Commission for hearing the matter afresh. It shall permit the
parties to place such evidence in support of their respective stands if they E
want to adduce such evidence. We make it clear that we have not expressed
any opinion on either ofthe respective stands. The appeal is accordingly
disposed of with no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeal disposed of.