Holding

The prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the convictions were set aside.

Summary

The appellant Dinesh Kumar was convicted for murder, kidnapping and related offences based largely on circumstantial evidence, namely a "last seen" testimony and discoveries made after his police custody. The Supreme Court examined whether the "last seen" evidence, given a long interval before the estimated time of death, could alone establish guilt, and whether the disclosures by the appellant constituted a valid "discovery" under Section 27 of the Evidence Act when similar facts were already known. It also considered the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and the trial judge's duty under Section 165 to probe crucial issues such as the unexplained rigor mortis. Finding the prosecution’s case weak—no firm link between the accused and the crime, no distinct discoveries, and an unexplained post‑mortem finding—the Court held that the burden of proof was not met. Consequently, the convictions were set aside and the appellant was ordered to be released.

Issues considered

The adequacy of "last seen" evidence with a significant time gap in establishing guilt in a circumstantial case
Whether disclosures made by the accused constitute a valid "discovery" under Section 27 of the Evidence Act when the facts were already known to police
The applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused in this context
Whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt given the weak chain of circumstantial evidence
The trial judge's duty under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to question witnesses on critical matters such as rigor mortis

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 106, s. 165, s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364, s. 392, s. 394

Subjects

circumstantial evidencelast seen doctrineSection 27 Evidence Actburden of proofSection 165 Evidence Actrigor mortismurder convictionappellate review

Judgment

220 [2023]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 4 S.C.R. 220 [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A DINESH KUMAR
v.
THE STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 2022)
B MAY 04, 2023
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA AND SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.]
Penal Code,1860 – ss.302,364,392,394,201 and 34 –
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.27,101,106 and 165 – The case of
prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence i.e. the evidence
C
of ‘last seen’ and the ‘discoveries’ made from the information given
by the appellant – Appellant(accused) and one co-accused convicted
by Trial Court for the murder of the deceased – Two separate appeals
were filed before the High Court – During the pendency of the
appeal, the co-accused passed away, thus, his appeal stood abated
D – The appeal of the present appellant was dismissed, thus conviction
and sentence of the trial court was upheld by the High Court – On
appeal, held: In the present case, when there is no close proximity
between circumstances of last seen together and the approximate
time of death, the evidence of last seen becomes weak, such
circumstances by itself cannot form the basis of guilt – Further, the
E
evidence of recovery had already been disclosed by the co-accused
by the time the present appellant was arrested and thus the relevant
facts were already in the knowledge of the police – Thus, disclosure
and discovery made thereafter cannot be read against the present
appellant – There cannot be a “discovery” of an already discovered
F fact – As far as the recovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased
from the disclosure statement made by appellant, this evidence in
itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant – Prosecution
failed to establish important links in this case – Rigor mortis was
present in the body after 90 days remained unexplained –
Prosecution did not explain – Defence did not question –
G
Prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
– Judgment of trial court and High court set aside.
Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 165 – Judge’s power to put questions
or order production – Held: The duty of the presiding judge of a
criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a
H
220
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 221

recording machine but he has to participate in the trial ‘by envincing A
intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order
to ascertain truth.’
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The recovery of the stolen tractor, the place where
the murder was committed and the place where body was thrown B
in the canal were facts which were already in the knowledge of
the police, since it is the case of the prosecution that the co-
-accused, who was arrested by the police 2 days preceding the
arrest of the present appellant, had earlier led to the same
discoveries on 12th, 13th & 14th of May, 2000. So, this disclosure C
and discovery made thereafter cannot be read against the present
appellant. There cannot be a “discovery” of an already discovered
fact! What remains is the discovery of currency notes, wrist watch,
‘Parna’ and hair. The forensic report of hair only says that it
belongs to ‘human’. The currency notes cannot be really identified
with the deceased. What remains is the watch and the ‘Parna’, D
which has been identified with the deceased. The second is the
evidence of “last seen”. This is in the form of PW-10 who is the
neighbour of the complainant and who had seen the appellant
along with co-accused with the deceased on 08.05.2000 at about
7.30 PM in the evening. [Para 8][229-F-H; 230-A-B] E
2. The prosecution has failed to establish important links
in this case, which is so vital in a case of circumstantial evidence.
Rigor mortis present in the body after 90 hours is unusual, though
possible under certain circumstances. It was the duty of the
prosecution to explain it. The defense too failed to question it F
and the Court remained silent. [Para 11][233-D-E]
3. The evidence of last seen becomes an extremely
important piece of evidence in a case of circumstantial evidence,
particularly when there is a close proximity of time between when
the accused was last seen with the deceased and the discovery of G
the body of the deceased, or in this case the time of the death of
the deceased. This does not mean that in cases where there is a
long gap between the time of last seen and the death of the
deceased the last seen evidence loses its value. It would not, but

H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A then a very heavy burden is placed upon the prosecution to prove
that during this period of last seen and discovery of the body of
the deceased or the time of the death of the deceased, no other
person but the accused could have had an access to the deceased.
The circumstances of last seen together in the present case by
itself cannot form the basis of guilt .The circumstances of last
B
seen together does not by itself lead to an irrevocable conclusion
that it is the accused who had committed the crime. The
prosecution must come out with something more to establish
this connectivity with the accused and the crime committed.
Particularly, in the present case when there is no close proximity
C between circumstances of last seen together and the approximate
time of death, the evidence of last seen becomes weak. [Para
12][233-E-G; 234-A-B]
4. As per the post-mortem which was conducted on
12.05.2000 at 4:15 P.M, the death was 48 hours prior to the post
D mortem, which means it was before 4:00 P.M. on 10.05.2000.
Even assuming that the death has taken place, a day earlier i.e.
09.05.2000, still there is a long gap between the last seen which
is at 7:00 pm on 08.05.2000 and the morning of 09.05.2000. In
this case, even if this court take the time between the last seen
and the approximate time of death as per the post-mortem, which
E would go beyond 48 hours preceding the time of post-mortem
and the time of death can be stretched to the morning of May 9,
2000, which still begs an explanation from the prosecution as to
the time gap, as the deceased was last seen with the two accused
on 08.05.2000 at 7:00 P.M. [Para 12][234-E-F, G; 235-A]
F 5. The burden of proof is always with the prosecution. It is
the prosecution which has to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Section 106 of the Act does not alter that position. It only
places burden for disclosure of a fact on the establishment of
certain circumstances. This Court have no reason to doubt the
G testimony of PW-10, the sole witness of last seen. In his statement
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the
appellant was questioned about being in the company of the
deceased on 08.05.2000 along with co-accused, no explanation
was given by the appellant about his whereabouts. It is for this

H
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 223

reason that it has been held that the accused has not been able to A
discharge his burden under Section 106 of the Act and therefore
this has to be read as an additional link in the chain of evidence
against the appellant. However, Section 106 of the Act would not
even come to play here under the facts and circumstances of the
present case. What has to be kept in mind is that Section 106 of
B
the Act, only comes into play when the other facts have been
established by the prosecution. In this case when the evidence
of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap
of time between last seen by PW-10 and the time of death of the
deceased, Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable under
the peculiar facts and the circumstances of the case. [Paras 12, C
13][235-H; 236-A-D]
6. As far as the recovery is concerned, the recovery is again
weak. The so-called alleged place of crime and the recovery of
tractor or the place where the tractor was abandoned had already
been disclosed by the co-accused by the time the present D
appellant was arrested. Therefore, making a disclosure about the
place of occurrence or the place where the tractor was abandoned
is of no consequence. As far as the recovery of watch, currency
notes of Rs. 250/-, hair and ‘Parna’ from the residence of the
appellant are concerned, the currency notes and hair have not
been identified with the deceased. In a criminal trial, the E
prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. This
heavy burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. It becomes
even more difficult in a case of circumstantial evidence. In the
present case, the nature of circumstantial evidence is weak. In
order to establish a charge of guilt on the accused, the chain of F
evidence must be completed and the chain must point out to one
and only one conclusion, which is that it is only the accused who
have committed the crime and none else. This Court was afraid
the prosecution has not been able to discharge this burden. [Para
14][236-E-H]
G
7. In the present case the prosecution has not been able to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of last
seen, only leads upto a point and no further. It fails to link it
further to make a complete chain. All this court have here is the
evidence of last seen, which as this court have seen looses much
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A of its weight under the circumstances of the case, due to the long
duration of time between last seen and the possible time of death.
What this court can call as discovery here under Section 27 of
the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased.
This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant.
B In a case where there is no direct eye witness to the crime, the
prosecution has to build its case on the circumstantial evidence.
It is a very heavy burden cast on the prosecution. The chain of
circumstances collected by the prosecution must complete the
chain, which should point to only one conclusion which is that it
is the accused who had committed the crime, and none else. Each
C evidence which completes the chain of evidences must stand on
firm grounds. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
evidence placed by the prosecution in this case does not pass
muster the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence.
[Para 15][237-E-H; 238-A]
D
Ram Chander v. State of Haryana 1981 AIR 1036 :
[1981] 3 SCR 12; Anjan Kumar Sarma & Ors. v. State
of Assam (2017) 14 SCC 359; Malleshappa v. State of
Karnataka (2007) 13 SCC 399 : [2007] 10 SCR 153;
Nizam & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 1 SCC 550 :
E [2015] 10 SCR 786; State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran
(2007) 3 SCC 755 : [2007] 3 SCR 507; Ajit Singh v.
State of Maharashtra (2011) 14 SCC 401 : [2011] 13
SCR 1000 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
F
[1981] 3 SCR 12 referred to Para 11
(2017) 14 SCC 359 referred to Para 12
[2007] 10 SCR 153 referred to Para 12
G [2015] 10 SCR 786 referred to Para 12
[2007] 3 SCR 507 referred to Para 12
[2011] 13 SCR 1000 referred to Para 12

H
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 225
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. A
530 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2017 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA No. 650 of 2003.
A. Sirajudeen Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar (SCLSC), Keerthik Vasan,
Rajaseker, Xavier Felix, Advs. for the Appellant. B

Dinesh Chander Yadav, AAG, A S Rishi, Ishwar Chand, Manoj
Gautam, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J. C
1. The appellant, and one Mange Ram, were convicted in Sessions
Trial No. 47 of 2000, for offences under Sections 302/364/392/394/201
read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’), by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, Haryana. They were awarded life
sentence under Section 302 IPC, and lesser sentence on the remaining D
convictions, vide order dated 11.07.2003. The two then filed separate
appeals before Punjab and Haryana High Court. During the pendency
of his appeal the co-accused Mange Ram passed away on 24.10.2004,
and his appeal stood abated vide order dated 11.05.2017. The appeal of
the present appellant was dismissed and the conviction and sentence of E
the trial court was upheld by the High Court, vide its order dated
31.05.2017. His SLP before this Court was given leave on 28.03.2022.
We have heard at length, the learned senior counsel Mr. A.
Sirajudeen for the appellant and Mr. Dinesh Chander Yadav, learned
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana. F
2. The case of the prosecution is entirely based on circumstantial
evidence. The ‘evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from
the information given by the appellant. The facts of the case are as
under:-
3. The deceased Gurmail Singh was a resident of village-Dhimo, G
District, Yamuna Nagar, Haryana. On the morning of 08.05.2000, he left
his village on his tractor, for the nearby village of ‘Dadupur’, (which is at
a distance of 15-20 kilometers). In Dadupur he was to meet his sister
and his brother-in-law. He was with his sister and brother-in-law between
2.00 P.M. to 5.30 P.M on 08.05.2000 and according to his brother-in-law
H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A (PW-1) he left their house at about 5.30 P.M on 08.05.2000. Gurmail
Singh never returned to his village. Meanwhile, Harbans Singh, the brother
of the deceased (the two brothers were staying together with their families
in village Dhimo), goes to village Dadupur on 11.05.2000 i.e. after 3
days, to enquire from his sister about the whereabouts of their brother,
when he is told that the deceased had left their house on 08.05.2000
B
itself at about 5.30 P.M.!
Harbans Singh then lodges the F.I.R. at P.S Buria, District Yamuna
Nagar (Haryana), at 4.00 p.m on 11.05.2000. He states in the F.I.R. that
Gurmail Singh is his brother, and the two live together as a joint family in
village Dhimo. Then he narrates how his brother left his village in the
C morning on 08.05.2000 on his tractor to meet their sister, but has since
not returned. He states that while he was searching for his brother, he
met his neighbour Karanjit Singh, at the petrol pump of village Dadupur,
who informed him that he had seen Gurmail Singh on his tractor on
08.05.2000 at around 7.00 pm with Mange Ram and Dinesh (the two
D accused), who were residents of nearby villages. He promptly went to
those villages to find out about the where about of these two persons,
when he was informed that they were missing since 08.05.2000. He
then states in his F.I.R. that these two persons Mange Ram and Dinesh
are known to be vagabonds and they have kidnapped his brother in order
to rob him of his tractor. A case was then registered by Police on
E 11.05.2000 under Section 364 IPC.
The body of the deceased was recovered next day i.e. on
12.05.2000, at 1.30 P.M. from a canal. The inquest was conducted the
same day and the body was sent for post-mortem. The post-mortem
was conducted at about 4:15 P.M. on 12.05.2000 by Dr. Sumesh Garg
F (PW-4) and Dr. Ashok Kumar Sharma at Civil Hospital, Jagadhri. The
body was found to be swollen with the skin peeling off from many places.
Rigor mortis was found to be present in all four limbs of the deceased,
but was absent in the neck. The tongue and lips of the deceased was
dark red in colour and swollen and further there was red coloured froth
coming out from the mouth and nostrils. There was a ligature mark of 53
G
cm x 8 cm around the neck, over the thyroid and hyoid cartilage. The
base of the ligature mark was hard and the margins of the ligature mark
were pale and parchment like. The post-mortem report further states
that the ligature marks present on the body disclosed an ante-mortem
strangulation. The Pericardium was found to be congested, with the left
H chamber of the heart to be empty and the right chamber of the heart
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 227
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

was found to have little blood. Ultimately the cause of death was asphyxia A
due to strangulation which was ante-mortem in nature.
The post mortem examination of the body shows that rigor mortis
was present in all the four limbs of the body, but was not there in the
neck. This was indicative of the fact that rigor mortis was receding
from the body. Generally speaking, rigor mortis sets in one to two hours B
after the death, and develops from head to foot in about 12 hours. Rigor
mortis then disappears in the same sequence i.e. first from the head,
then neck and then to the lower part of the body. In northern India, rigor
mortis lasts about 24 to 48 hours in winters and 18 to 36 hours in summers.
All the same, there are many variables. The body structure, and the
health of the deceased, the fact that it was kept in cold water and away C
from heat will all slow down the process of rigor mortis1.
Rigor mortis disappears late in bodies which are immersed in
cold water.2 In the case at hand, the body of the deceased was recovered
from a canal, and therefore the possibility that rigor mortis would still
remain in the body cannot be entirely ruled out, but this has nowhere D
been explained. Although the exact time when the deceased died has
not come out but the prosecution case is that he was murdered by the
accused (Dinesh Kumar and Mange Ram) on 08.05.2000 itself. If this is
so, then the rigor mortis has remained in the body for about 90 hours,
which is unusual. Moreover, the prosecution has not explained this factor, E
and the defense has definitely not questioned Dr. Sumesh Garg (PW-4)
on this aspect. But considering the importance of this aspect this question
should have been put to the prosecution and particularly to the doctor
who had done the post mortem. If not by the defense then this question
ought to have been put to the witness by the Court under the powers
vested with the Court under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, F
1872 (for short ‘Act’). But we will come to this in a while.
4. Meanwhile the co-accused Mange Ram was arrested on
12.05.2000 and the next day i.e., 13.05.2000, on the information given
by him to the police he was taken to the place which was disclosed to be
the place where he and Dinesh Kumar had killed the deceased. From G
this place, two pairs of “chappals” (slippers) one belonging to the appellant
(Dinesh Kumar) and the other, belonging to the co-accused Mange Ram,

1
A textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi (Chapter 15, Pg. 342)
2
Ibid (Chapter 15, Pg. 342) H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A were recovered. Some burnt hair of the deceased were also recovered
from this place. Mange Ram then took the police party to the canal from
where the dead body was dropped.
5. On 14.05.2000 (i.e., the next day) Mange Ram led the police
party to the place where the tractor of the deceased was abandoned by
B him and Dinesh Kumar. All the same, by the time the police party reached
that place, the tractor had already been discovered by the local Police,
and was in their custody at Rampur Police Station, Saharnpur, Uttar
Pradesh. The possession of the tractor was taken from the local police,
by the Investigating Officer.
C 6. The present appellant was arrested on 14.05.2000, from
‘Nandgarh’ village. On his disclosure a wrist watch, ‘Parna’ (turban)
and currency notes amounting to Rs. 250/- allegedly belonging to the
deceased were recovered from his residence. He then took the Police
to the same place as the co-accused Mange Ram had earlier taken
them to the two places i.e., the place where the deceased was killed and
D the place where the tractor was abandoned3.
7. The evidence of last seen is of Karanjit Singh (PW-10) who is
the neighbour of the complainant (PW-11). PW-10 had seen the deceased
along with the two accused i.e., Dinesh Kumar and Mange Ram at
about 7:00 P.M. on 08.05.2000. According to the witness the deceased
E was driving the tractor and the two i.e., the appellant and Mange Ram
were sitting on the mudguard of the tractor.
8. As we can see the case of the prosecution rests on two
circumstantial evidences: (A) The disclosure given in the police custody
and the discovery on its basis and (B) The evidence of last seen in the
F form of PW-10. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive too is of
significance. As far as motive is concerned, the prosecution case is that
the two accused killed the deceased only to steal his tractor. The deceased
in this case was a 42-year-old well-built man of 6 feet 2 inches in height
(Post Mortem report dated 12.05.2000). The prosecution case is that
G the deceased was kidnapped and murdered by the two accused, for his
tractor which they had robbed from the deceased, after putting him to
death. Now this tractor the accused had in any case abandoned, and did
nothing to recover it till one of them was caught on 12.05.2000. In short,
the ‘motive’ is not very convincing.
3
H Meanwhile S.392/394/302 along with S.34 were added in the F.I.R. (dated 11.05.2000)
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 229
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

The disclosure made by the appellant while in police custody, A
which led to certain discoveries, such as the place where the stolen
tractor was abandoned, the place where the alleged crime was
committed, and the place where the body was thrown in the canal, and
also the discovery of ‘Parna’, burnt hair, wrist watch, and currency notes
of Rs.250/-.
B
Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under :-
“How much of information received from accused may be
proved—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received from a
person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police C
officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts
to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered, may be proved.”
The above provision shows that discovery should be of a distinct
fact, the fact which has been discovered by disclosure of the one in D
police custody. All the same, these facts were already in the knowledge
of the police in the earlier discovery made by the co-accused Mange
Ram. The co-accused Mange Ram was arrested on 12.05.2000 and
had led to these discoveries on 12th, 13th& 14th May. The present appellant
was arrested on May 14, 2000, and the alleged discoveries made by him
were later in time. The discoveries which were made on the pointing out E
of co-accused Mange Ram cannot be read against the present appellant.
If the disclosure has been made by the accused to the police while he
was in their custody and such a disclosure leads to discovery of a fact
then that discovery is liable to be read as evidence against the accused
in terms of Section 27 of the Act. All the same, the distinguishing feature F
of such a discovery must be that such a disclosure must lead to the
discovery of a “distinct fact”. The recovery of the stolen tractor, the
place where the murder was committed and the place where body was
thrown in the canal were facts which were already in the knowledge of
the police, since it is the case of the prosecution that the co-accused
Mange Ram, who was arrested by the police 2 days preceding the arrest G
of the present appellant, had earlier led to the same discoveries on 12th,
13th & 14th of May, 2000. So, this disclosure and discovery made thereafter
cannot be read against the present appellant. There cannot be a
“discovery” of an already discovered fact! What remains is the discovery
of currency notes, wrist watch, ‘Parna’ and hair. The forensic report of H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A hair only says that it belongs to ‘human’. The currency notes cannot be
really identified with the deceased. What remains is the watch and the
‘Parna’, which has been identified with the deceased.
The second is the evidence of “last seen”. This is in the form of
PW-10 Kartar Singh who is the neighbour of the complainant and who
B had seen the appellant along with co-accused Mange Ram with the
deceased on 08.05.2000 at about 7.30 PM in the evening.
9. The admitted position is that the body of deceased was
discovered from the canal four days later i.e. on 12.05.2000 in the
afternoon and the post-mortem was conducted at about 4.15 PM on the
C same day i.e.12.05.2000. According to Post-mortem report the death
had taken place more than 48 hours prior to the post-mortem, which
would mean that death took place approximately before 4.00 PM on
10.05.2000. Although the autopsy reports normally do not give precise
time of death, but only indicate an approximate time or duration, yet
under normal circumstances in the present case, death should have been
D on May 10, 2000 or May 9, 2000. All the same, the case of the prosecution
is that the deceased was killed on May 8, 2000 itself. If this be so then it
was the duty of the prosecution to explain as to how rigor mortis
remained present in the body, even after four days of the death. The
possibility of the rigor mortis remaining in the body for 90 hours cannot
E be ruled out completely, but this was never explained by the prosecution.
It was the duty of the prosecution to explain the unusual circumstances
under which rigor mortis remained present in the body, even for 90
hours, in the month of May.
The High Court has only relied upon the evidence of PW-4 Dr.
F Sumesh Garg who had conducted the post-mortem, who gave his opinion
that the death occurred more than 48 hours before the time of the post-
mortem and therefore the deceased was killed by Mange Ram and
present appellant on 08.05.2000 this is what has been said by the High
Court: -

G “According to PW-4 Dr. Sumesh Garg, who alongwith Dr.
Ashok Kumar Sharma had conducted post-mortem
examination on dead body of Gurmail Singh on 12.05.2000.
The probable duration between injuries and death was within
minutes and between death and post-mortem more than 48
hours. Thus, it comes out that Gurmail Singh was murdered
H by accused-Mange Ram and Dinesh Kumar on 08.05.2000.”
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 231
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

10. The trial court was conscious of this aspect but then it did not A
go into this aspect for the reason that no question was put on this by the
defense, this is what was said by the trial court: -
“I have gone through the post mortem report. Perusal of the
same reveals that the rigor mortis was present in all the four
limbs due to swelling and not in normal course. It was the B
duty of the defence to ask the doctor who had conducted
post mortem on the dead body, whether the presence of rigor
mortis was suggestive of the fact that the deceased was killed
within thirty-six hours of his post mortem examination. But
no such question was put to doctor. The doctor in his statement
had stated that the time between death and post mortem C
examination was more than forty-eight hours and this
statement of the doctor was not challenged in his cross-
examination. Therefore, the plea of the ld. defence counsel
cannot be accepted.”
11. We are afraid that by pointing out the weakness in the cross D
examination of the defense the presiding judge indirectly admits to the
weakness in the trial itself. We say this for the reasons that under Section
165 of the Act, a trial judge has tremendous powers to “ask any question
he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties
about any fact relevant or irrelevant”. It is in fact the duty of the Trial E
Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and crucial question was
left from being asked from a witness. The purpose of the trial is after all
to reach to the truth of the matter. Section 165 of the Act reads as under:
“165. Judge’s power to put questions or order production. ––
The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof F
of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at
any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact
relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any
document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents
shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question
or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine G
any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such
question: Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts
declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided
also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel
any witness to answer any question, or to produce any H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to
answer or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive,
if the question were asked or the document were called for by
the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which
it would be improper for any other person to ask under section
148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of
B
any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.”
The powers of a presiding judge in a criminal trial and his duty to
get to the truth of the matter have been laid down in a seminal judgement
of this Court authored by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, which is Ram
Chander v. State of Haryana4. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in the said
C judgment refers to his earlier Judgment5 given by him as a Judge of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court, where it was said :
“Every criminal trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth
is the quest. It is the duty of a presiding judge to explore
every avenue open to him in order to discover the truth and
D to advance the cause of justice. For that purpose he is
expressly invested by Section 165 of the Evidence Act with
the right to put questions to witnesses. Indeed the right given
to a judge is so wide that he may, ask any question he pleases,
in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties
E about any fact, relevant or irrelevant. Section 172(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure enables the court to send for the
police-diaries in a case and use them to aid it in the trial. The
record of the proceedings of the Committing Magistrate may
also be perused by the Sessions Judge to further aid him in
the trial.”
F
The duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch
the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to
participate in the trial “by evincing intelligent active interest by putting
questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.” While referring
to a decision of Lord Denning in Jones v. National Coal Board6 the
G learned Judge had said that it is the duty of the judge to ask questions to
the witnesses when it becomes necessary to clear up any point that has
been overlooked or left obscure, then he goes on to say as under:
4
1981 AIR 1036
5
Sessions Judge, Nellore v. Intha Ramana Reddy, ILR 1972 AP 683; 1972 Cri LJ 1485
H 6
(1957) 2 All ER 155: (1957) 2 WLR 760
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 233
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

“We may go further than Lord Denning and say that it is the A
duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he
may “ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness,
or of the parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant”
(Section 165, Evidence Act). But this he must do, without
unduly trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor
B
and the defence counsel, without any hint of partisanship
and without appearing to frighten or bully witnesses. He must
take the prosecution and the defence with him. The Court,
the prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose
goal is justice, a team whose captain is the judge. The judge,
‘like the conductor of a choir, must, by force of personality, C
induce his team to work in harmony; subdue the raucous,
encourage the timid, conspire with the young, flatter and (sic
the) old’.”
In our considered opinion the prosecution has failed to
establish important links in this case, which is so vital in a case of D
circumstantial evidence. Rigor mortis present in the body after 90
hours is unusual, though possible under certain circumstances. It
was the duty of the prosecution to explain it. The defense too failed
to question it and the Court remained silent. Let us now revert to
the evidence of last seen.
E
12. The evidence of last seen becomes an extremely important
piece of evidence in a case of circumstantial evidence, particularly when
there is a close proximity of time between when the accused was last
seen with the deceased and the discovery of the body of the deceased,
or in this case the time of the death of the deceased. This does not mean
F
that in cases where there is a long gap between the time of last seen and
the death of the deceased the last seen evidence loses its value. It would
not, but then a very heavy burden is placed upon the prosecution to
prove that during this period of last seen and discovery of the body of
the deceased or the time of the death of the deceased, no other person
but the accused could have had an access to the deceased. The G
circumstances of last seen together in the present case by itself cannot
form the basis of guilt (See: Anjan Kumar Sarma & Others v. State
of Assam7).

7
(2017) 14 SCC 359 -para 19 H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A The circumstances of last seen together does not by itself lead to
an irrevocable conclusion that it is the accused who had committed the
crime. The prosecution must come out with something more to establish
this connectivity with the accused and the crime committed. Particularly,
in the present case when there is no close proximity between
circumstances of last seen together and the approximate time of death,
B
the evidence of last seen becomes weak (See: - Malleshappa v. State
of Karnataka8).
In Nizam & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan9 where the time gap
between the last seen together and the discovery of the body of the
deceased was long, it was held that during this period the possibility of
C some other interventions could not be ruled out. Where time gap between
the last seen and time of death is long enough, as in the present case,
then it would be dangerous to come to the conclusion that the accused is
responsible for the murder. In such cases it is unsafe to base conviction
on the “last seen theory” and it would be safer to look for corroboration
D from other circumstance and evidence which have been adduced by the
prosecution. The other circumstances here is the so called discovery,
and most of these, as we have already discussed, fail to meet the
requirement of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
As per the post-mortem which was conducted on 12.05.2000 at
E 4:15 P.M, the death was 48 hours prior to the post mortem, which means
it was before 4:00 P.M. on 10.05.2000. Even assuming that the death
has taken place, a day earlier i.e. 09.05.2000, still there is a long gap
between the last seen which is at 7:00 pm on 08.05.2000 and the morning
of 09.05.2000. In the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran10, where
in the evidence of last seen, the recovery of dead body was only a few
F hours before “last seen”, it was not considered reliable.
The same was again emphasized by this Court in Ajit Singh v.
State of Maharashtra11 where it was emphasized that the time between
victim last seen alive and the discovery of the body of the deceased has
to be of close proximity, so that any other person being the author of the
G crime cannot be ruled out. In this case,even if we take the time between
the last seen and the approximate time of death as per the post-mortem,
8
(2007) 13 SCC 399 – para 23
9
(2016) 1 SCC 550
10
(2007) 3 SCC 755
H 11
(2011) 14 SCC 401
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 235
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

which would go beyond 48 hours preceding the time of post-mortem and A
the time of death can be stretched to the morning of May 9, 2000, which
still begs an explanation from the prosecution as to the time gap, as the
deceased was last seen with the two accused on 08.05.2000 at 7:00
P.M.
The trial court as well as the High Court have lost sight of the B
vital aspect of the matter. Both the Courts have relied on Section 106 of
the Act and have held that since the accused was last seen with the
deceased and he has not been able to give any reasonable explanation
of his presence with the deceased in his statement under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C., it has to be read against the accused and therefore it has to
be counted as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. C
In present case in the findings of the trial court and High Court this
appears to be the most important aspect which weighed with the trial
court as well as the High Court in establishing the guilt of the accused.
We are, however, afraid this is a complete misreading of Section 106 of
the Act. D
Section 101 of the Act places the burden of proof on the
prosecution. It reads as under :-
101. Burden of proof –– Whoever desires any Court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the
existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts E
exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any
fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
Section 106 of the Act creates an exception to Section 101 and
reads as under :-
F
106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge ––
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Section 106 of the Act is an exception to the rule which is Section
101 of the Act, and it comes into play only in a limited sense where the
G
evidence is of a nature which is especially within the knowledge of that
person and then the burden of proving that fact shifts upon him that
person.
The burden of proof is always with the prosecution. It is the
prosecution which has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A Section 106 of the Act does not alter that position. It only places burden
for disclosure of a fact on the establishment of certain circumstances.
We have no reason to doubt the testimony of PW-10 (Karanjit Singh),
the sole witness of last seen. In his statement under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, when the appellant was questioned about
being in the company of the deceased on 08.05.2000 along with co-
B
accused Mange Ram, no explanation was given by the appellant about
his whereabouts. It is for this reason that it has been held that the accused
has not been able to discharge his burden under Section 106 of the Act
and therefore this has to be read as an additional link in the chain of
evidence against the appellant. To our mind, however, Section 106 of the
C Act would not even come to play here under the facts and circumstances
of the present case.
13. What has to be kept in mind is that Section 106 of the Act,
only comes into play when the other facts have been established by the
prosecution. In this case when the evidence of last seen itself is on a
D weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen by
PW-10 and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Act
would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances
of the case.
14. As far as the recovery is concerned, the recovery is again
E weak. The so-called alleged place of crime and the recovery of tractor
or the place where the tractor was abandoned had already been
disclosed by the co-accused by the time the present appellant was
arrested. Therefore, making a disclosure about the place of occurrence
or the place where the tractor was abandoned is of no consequence.
As far as the recovery of watch, currency notes of Rs. 250/-, hair and
F ‘Parna’ from the residence of the appellant are concerned, the currency
notes and hair have not been identified with the deceased. In a criminal
trial, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
This heavy burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. It becomes
even more difficult in a case of circumstantial evidence. In the present
G case, the nature of circumstantial evidence is weak. In order to establish
a charge of guilt on the accused, the chain of evidence must be
completed and the chain must point out to one and only one conclusion,
which is that it is only the accused who have committed the crime and
none else. We are afraid the prosecution has not been able to discharge
this burden.
H
DINESH KUMAR v. THE STATE OF HARYANA 237
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.]

The factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Court A
in a case of circumstantial evidence, are too well settled to be stated but
nevertheless these factors which are being reproduced from Anjan
Kumar Sarma (supra) are as under :-
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to
be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances B
concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established;
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty; C
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved; and
D
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
E
15. In our considered view, in the present case the prosecution
has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
evidence of last seen, only leads upto a point and no further. It fails to
link it further to make a complete chain. All we have here is the evidence
of last seen, which as we have seen looses much of its weight under the
circumstances of the case, due to the long duration of time between last F
seen and the possible time of death. What we can call as discovery here
under Section 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the
deceased. This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the
appellant.
In a case where there is no direct eye witness to the crime, the G
prosecution has to build its case on the circumstantial evidence. It is a
very heavy burden cast on the prosecution. The chain of circumstances
collected by the prosecution must complete the chain, which should point
to only one conclusion which is that it is the accused who had committed
the crime, and none else. Each evidence which completes the chain of
H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.

A evidences must stand on firm grounds. In our considered opinion, the
evidence placed by the prosecution in this case does not pass muster-
the standard required in a case of circumstantial evidence.
16. This appeal therefore succeeds. The orders of the trial court
and the High Court dated 11.03.2007 and 31.05.2017, respectively are
B hereby set aside. Appellant is in jail shall now be released forthwith
unless his presence is required in any other case.

Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H