Supreme Court of India
DIGAMBAR AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1019
- Decided
- 19 December 2024
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the FIR did not prima facie disclose any offence against the appellants and therefore the High Court should have exercised its inherent power under section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings.
Summary
The complainant filed an FIR alleging that her husband and his parents-in-law subjected her to cruelty, forced her to consume poisonous food, and caused a miscarriage, invoking sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the IPC. The appellants filed a criminal application under section 482 of the CrPC seeking quash of the FIR, which the High Court dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the FIR contained specific, prima facie allegations sufficient to sustain the offences, noting that the allegations were vague, lacked concrete evidence of the parents-in-law’s involvement, and were filed after a divorce notice, suggesting an ulterior motive. The Court applied the principles from Bhajan Lal and recent precedents on misuse of section 498‑A, concluding that the FIR did not disclose a cognizable offence against the appellants. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court should have exercised its inherent power to quash the proceedings. The appeal was allowed, the High Court order was set aside, and the criminal proceedings were quashed.
Issues considered
- Whether the FIR under sections 498‑A, 312, 313 and 34 IPC discloses a prima facie case against the parents‑in‑law warranting continuation of criminal proceedings.
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent power under section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR.
- Whether the allegations in the FIR are vague, malicious and filed with an ulterior motive, constituting an abuse of process.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 312, s. 313, s. 34, s. 498-A
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court should have exercised its inherent powers u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings u/ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 – The complainant filed and her parents-in-law (appellants) u/ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 – The appellants along with their son filed a criminal application u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for quashing and setting aside of the FIR before the High Court – The said application was
Subjects
CrueltyMiscarriageFIR quashingInherent power of High CourtVague allegationsUlterior motive of pressurizingDivorce proceedingsConcocted complaintRevengeDiscord between couple
Judgment
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1533 : 2024 INSC 1019
Digambar and Another
v.
The State of Maharashtra and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 5542 of 2024)
20 December 2024
[B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court should have exercised its inherent powers
u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings u/ss.498-A,
312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code, 1860.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 – The complainant
filed FIR against her husband and her parents-in-law
(appellants) u/ss.498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the Penal Code,
1860 – The appellants along with their son filed a criminal
application u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for quashing and
setting aside of the FIR before the High Court – The said
application was dismissed by the High Court – During the
pendency of appeals before the Supreme Court, son of the
appellants herein expired, therefore his appeal was disposed
of as abated:
Held: The ingredients for an offence to be made out u/s.498-A of
IPC require that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim
which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury
to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health – The second part of this Section
refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his
relatives – In the present case, no allegations which would fulfill
the requirement of the second part are found – As far as first part of
the section is concerned, the allegations levelled in the FIR do not
reveal the existence of any such allegations – The only allegation
that referred to an injury being inflicted against the complainant
is a vague statement that the son of the appellants herein used
to beat her, but there is no specific allegation of any such injury
*Author
1534 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
being caused by the appellants herein – In the latter half of the
FIR, it is alleged that the complainant was given poisonous food
by the appellants herein and was coerced into consuming the
same – This led to the miscarriage – Through the perusal of the
statement of the doctor, it is revealed that the complainant herself
stated that the pregnancy was revealed to her when she tested
it herself using a pregnancy testing kit and this was stated to be
seven days before her visit to the hospital, i.e. on the day of the
alleged incident – It is mentioned in the FIR that the complainant
used to live in a separate house due to the alleged harassment
by the appellants and their son – Furthermore, there is not even
a whisper in the FIR about the complainant conveying the news
of the pregnancy to the appellants or their son – It is unusual that
when the allegations u/ss.312 and 313 of IPC are levelled against
the appellants, such an important fact surrounding her pregnancy
and its knowledge to the appellants is not to be found in the FIR –
Furthermore, the complaint was lodged after the notice of Divorce
was given by the complainant, wherein, there was no allegation of
the cruelty or the miscarriage caused by the appellants – These
facts lead to conclude that the proceedings were initiated with an
ulterior motive of pressurizing the son of the appellant herein to
consent to the divorce according to the terms of the complainant
and the proceedings were used as a weapon by the complainant
in the personal discord between the couple – Thus, this was a fit
case wherein the High Court should have exercised its inherent
powers u/s.482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings.
[Paras 18, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36]
Case Law Cited
Dara Lakshmi Narayana and Others v. State of Telangana and
Another, 2024 INSC 953 : [2024] 12 SCR 559 : 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3682; Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of
Gujarat, 2024 INSC 960 : [2024] 12 SCR 43 : 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3679; State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others,
1990 INSC 363 : [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC
335 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1535
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
List of Keywords
Cruelty; Miscarriage; FIR quashing; Inherent power of High
Court; Vague allegations; Ulterior motive of pressurizing; Divorce
proceedings; Concocted complaint; Revenge; Discord between
couple.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5542 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 859 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Shirish K. Deshpande, Ms. Rucha Pravin Mandlik, Mohit Gautam,
Apoorv Sharma, Rishi Didwania, Advs. for the Appellants.
Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Ms. Prachiti Deshpande, Dr. R. R. Deshpande,
Bhagwanr Deshpande, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment/Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated
23rd January 2020 passed in Criminal Application 859 of 2019, vide
which the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay at Aurangabad dismissed the application under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 for quashing and
setting aside the First Information Report2 No. 339 of 2018 dated 6th
November 2018 registered with Shivaji Nagar Police Station, Latur
for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 312, 313 and 34
1 “CrPC” hereinafter
2 “FIR” hereinafter
1536 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 filed against the husband of the
complainant-Madhav Suryawanshi and the present appellants-
Digambar Suryawanshi (Appellant No. 1) and Kashibai Suryawanshi
(Appellant No. 2) (Parents-in-law of the complainant)
3. Shorn of details, the facts leading up to the present appeal are as
under:
3.1. As per the FIR, the complainant and Madhav Suryawanshi
(Son of the appellants) were married on 26th March 2006.
Two daughters were born out of the wedlock. After the birth
of the second daughter in 2011, the complainant’s husband
and the appellants demanded a son from her. They berated
her and insulted her and inflicted physical and mental cruelty,
stating that she was giving birth to only daughters. Due to the
ill-treatment, she began residing separately from the month of
February 2018. It was further alleged that the appellants used
to instigate their son (Husband of the complainant) against the
complainant. He would beat her citing the reason that she was
not giving birth to a male child.
3.2. It is further alleged in the FIR that, on 28th November 2016,
the appellants along with the complainant’s husband visited
her in Latur. The appellants asked the complainant to eat a
meal prepared by them, which she refused to consume initially.
However, they coerced her to eat it despite her protests. On
the next day, she had stomach pain in the morning, and she
started bleeding. This led to her baby being aborted in her
womb. On 5th December 2016, she visited the doctor along
with her sisters and it was discovered that a piece of the foetus
is still in her womb, and she was treated for the same. Based
on these facts, alleging about the forced abortion and physical
and mental cruelty, the complaint was made.
3.3. The appellants along with their son filed a criminal application
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. praying for quashing and
setting aside of the FIR No. 339 of 2018 before the High Court.
3 “IPC” hereinafter
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1537
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
3.4. During its pendency, the Family Court at Latur vide order dated
20th May 2019 granted a decree of Divorce by mutual consent
and dissolved the marriage between the complainant and the
son of the appellants.
3.5. The High Court, vide impugned judgment and final order dated
23rd January 2020 dismissed the application filed under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR No. 339 of 2018.
3.6. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal was filed. Notice
was issued by this Court vide order dated 2nd June 2020. During
the pendency of the matter, the chargesheet came to be filed
on 8th February 2021.
4. We have heard Shri Shirish K. Deshpande, learned counsel for the
appellants, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, learned counsel for
Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra and Smt. Prachiti Deshpande
for Respondent No. 2- Complainant.
5. Shri Deshpande submits that the appellants before this Court have no
active role to play. They have merely been roped into the complaint
as they are the parents-in-law of the complainant.
6. It was further submitted that, if such a serious offence was committed
by the appellants on 28th November 2016, it should have been
mentioned in the notice of Divorce sent by the complainant on 15th
May 2018 as it is alleged in the FIR, that the son of the appellants
had also allegedly played a role in that incident. There is not even a
whisper of this incident in this notice. The complaint was filed after
the notice of Divorce, and it was merely filed to mount the pressure
on the appellants and their son. This clearly shows that the complaint
is concocted, and it was filed as an afterthought only with an intent
to take revenge on the appellants.
7. Shri Deshpande further submitted that even if it is believed that the
complainant allegedly found a piece of foetus in her womb after she
was examined by the doctor, it does not automatically mean that
some poisonous substance was given by the appellants to her as
there is not an iota of evidence to that effect.
8. It was further submitted that since the appellants and their son did
not succumb to the pressure applied through the complaint and did
1538 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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not favourably respond to the notice of Divorce, another FIR was
registered on 25th February 2019 against the son of the appellants
for offences punishable under Sections 307, 336 and 427 of the
IPC alleging that the son of the appellants had tried to kill her on
the road in broad daylight.
9. It was further submitted that these pressure tactics compelled the son
of the appellants to cooperate with the complainant and the Divorce
for mutual consent was granted on 20th May 2019 by the Family
Court at Latur. It was further submitted by Shri Deshpande, that after
a bare reading of the allegations levelled in the FIR, they seem to
be absurd and are inherently improbable. There is no circumstance
where a conclusion can be reached that there is sufficient material
to proceed against the appellants.
10. Lastly, it was submitted that the contents of the chargesheet clearly
reveal that the appellants herein had no role to play in the miscarriage
suffered by the complainant. The Doctor’s statement reproduced in
the chargesheet clearly states that the complainant had visited the
hospital due to severe abdominal pain and bleeding. The doctor
clearly stated that it was possible that the foetus became inanimate
due to the abortion pills in the woman’s diet and that seems to be
the reason for the excessive bleeding. No opinion was given as to
when the pills were ingested and in what form were they ingested,
and hence, no role of the appellants herein could be established.
11. Per contra, Shri Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, learned counsel
for Respondent No.1-State of Maharashtra submitted that the
allegations levelled in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission
of offences under Section 498-A, 312, 313 and 34 of the IPC.
The complainant was consistently harassed after the birth of the
second daughter as the appellants and their son wanted a male
child and therefore mental and physical cruelty was inflicted upon
the complainant.
12. It was further submitted by Shri Shinde that the appellants herein
instigated their son against the complainant and played a major role
in the harassment and the cruelty inflicted against the complainant.
The appellants herein also played a role in the miscarriage suffered
by the complainant.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1539
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
13. Shri Shinde further submitted that the reliability and the truthfulness
of the allegations cannot be examined at this stage. He submits that
the High Court has rightly held that, it cannot be presumed that the
complainant must have made false allegations to obtain divorce from
the appellants’ son. All of these points must be examined by the
competent Trial Court when the trial is being conducted. He therefore
submits, that no grounds for interference with the impugned order
passed by the High Court are made out.
14. Smt. Prachiti Deshpande, learned counsel for Respondent No.2-
Complainant has supported the contentions raised by the learned
counsel for Respondent No.1.
15. At the outset, it is relevant to mention that the son of the appellants,
i.e. the former husband of the complainant was also a petitioner in
the proceedings before the High Court, which were filed for quashing.
He had also filed a separate Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3298
of 2020 against the same which had been tagged with the present
appeal. However, the son of the appellants herein expired and
therefore his appeal was disposed of as abated vide order dated
10th December 2024.
16. In the present case, the allegations raised by the complainant in the
FIR will have to be examined to find out whether the allegations,
when taken at their face value, would constitute any offence or make
out a case against the appellants under Sections 498-A, 312, 313
and 34 of the IPC.
17. Firstly, the allegations under Section 498-A of the IPC must be
examined. The said provision reads as under:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”
means—
1540 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
18. The ingredients for an offence to be made out under Section 498-A
of IPC require that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim
which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to
herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health. The second part of this Section refers
to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives.
In the present case, no allegations which would fulfil the requirement
of the second part are found.
19. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the
complainant are that in the year 2015, the appellants inflicted mental
and physical cruelty upon her as she could not give birth to a male
child. Such allegations made by the complainant appear to be vague
as no specific instances of harassment are mentioned. No specific
role or allegation is levelled on either of the appellants and no specific
incident of physical or mental cruelty has been mentioned. A mere
omnibus statement has been made that the physical and mental
cruelty was afflicted because the complainant could not provide a
male child. Furthermore, it is merely mentioned that the appellants
would instigate the husband to harass the complainant, but again, no
specific or precise instances are mentioned as to how the appellants
instigated their son and what acts were committed by him as a direct
result of such instigation.
20. It would be appropriate to refer to a recent decision of this Court in
Criminal Appeal 5199 of 2024 titled as Dara Lakshmi Narayana and
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1541
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
Others vs. State of Telangana and Another.4 This court dealt with
the ingredients of Section 498-A and whether the same are attracted
through vague allegations raised by the complainant (wife). It was
observed that:
“17. The issue for consideration is whether, given the
facts and circumstances of the case and after examining
the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash
the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants
arising out of FIR No. 82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022
under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of
the Dowry Act.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations
made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other
than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that
appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent
No.2 has not provided any specific details or described
any particular instance of harassment. She has also not
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the
alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks
concrete and precise allegations.
19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on
03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant
No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the
police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed
a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close
the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter,
respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial
house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was
talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone
for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted
that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also
stated that she will not engage in such actions in future.
Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again
4 2024 INSC 953 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682
1542 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also
her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued
a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by
mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to
the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent
No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022
registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda
under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of
the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing
and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left
the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling
with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a
third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her
matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship
with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial
house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking
divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged
on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are
of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is
not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure
intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his
family members.
22. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 State contended
that a prima facie case was made out against the appellants
for harassing respondent No.2 and demanding dowry from
her. However, we observe that the allegations made by
respondent No.2 in the FIR seem to be motivated by a
desire for retribution rather than a legitimate grievance.
Further, the allegations attributed against the appellants
herein are vague and omnibus.
23. Respondent No.2 has not contested the present case
either before the High Court or this Court. Furthermore, it
is noteworthy that respondent No. 2 has not only deserted
appellant No. 1 but has also abandoned her two children
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1543
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
as well, who are now in the care and custody of appellant
No.1. The counsel for the appellants has specifically
submitted that respondent No.2 has shown no inclination
to re-establish any relationship with her children.
…….
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a
criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without
specific allegations indicating their active involvement
should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,
borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a
tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s
family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution.
Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent
misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid
unnecessary harassment of innocent family members.
In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the
members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living
in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial
house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein.
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution
and the same would be an abuse of the process of the
law in the absence of specific allegations made against
each of them.”
21. The facts in the said case are of similar nature when compared to
the present case. It was held by this Court that vague allegations
of cruelty were levelled by the complainant therein (wife) and the
relatives of the husband (including the parents-in-law) were dragged
into the crime without any reason. In paragraphs 18 and 21, it was
held that the contents of the FIR were vague and omnibus, that the
FIR lacked precise allegations, and it was lodged after the legal notice
for Divorce was sent by the complainant therein. It was therefore
concluded that the FIR came to be lodged as a retaliatory measure
intended to settle score with the husband and his relatives.
1544 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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22. In another recent judgment of this Court titled Jayedeepsinh
Pravinsinh Chavda and Others v. State of Gujarat,5 the guilt of
the appellant therein under Section 498-A of IPC was maintained,
however, the ingredients of 498-A of IPC were discussed. It was
observed thus:
“11. From the above understanding of the provision, it is
evident that, ‘cruelty’ simpliciter is not enough to constitute
the offence, rather it must be done either with the intention
to cause grave injury or to drive her to commit suicide
or with intention to coercing her or her relatives to meet
unlawful demands.”
23. Hence, it was clear that ‘cruelty’ is not enough to constitute the offence.
It must be done with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the
victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. In the present
case, the allegations levelled in the FIR do not reveal the existence
of any such allegations. The only allegation that referred to an injury
being inflicted against the complainant is a vague statement that the
son of the appellants herein used to beat her, but there is no specific
allegation of any such injury being caused by the appellants herein.
24. In the present case, in the latter half of the FIR, it is alleged that the
complainant was given poisonous food by the appellants herein and
was coerced into consuming the same. This led to the miscarriage
and therefore the offences under Sections 312 and 313 of IPC were
attracted. Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC read as under:
“312. Causing miscarriage.- Whoever voluntarily causes
a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage
be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the
life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick
with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
5 2024 INSC 960 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1545
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
Explanation.—A woman who causes herself to miscarry,
is within the meaning of this section.”
313. Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent.-
Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding
section without the consent of the woman, whether the
woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with
349[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
25. From a perusal of the provisions, it is clear that the ingredients
necessary for the offence under Section 312 of the IPC is that the
miscarriage must be voluntarily caused and must not be caused in
good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman. Section
313 of the IPC states that the offence is attracted if the offence under
Section 312 of the IPC is done without the consent of the woman.
26. The presence of the ingredients of the offences under Sections 312
and 313 of the IPC may be further examined through the perusal of
the chargesheet dated 8th February 2021. The statement given by
the Doctor who treated the complainant after the alleged incident
on 28th November 2016 is found in the chargesheet. Same is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“The complainant in this case, Pushpa Madhav Suryavanshi,
was came to our hospital on 05-12-2016 at 02.30 pm in
the OPD for treatment of a complaint of abdominal pain
and bleeding. I would have questioned the woman after
enrolling in the OPD; she told me that, she was diagnosed
with pregnancy when her urine was tested 7 days before
coming to the hospital. But she told me that the next day
after I was examined by kit, she told me that the abortion
pills must have been in my stomach. Having told me
that, I examined her and did sonography. While doing
this sonography, I noticed that she had a seven-week-
old lifeless fetus in her womb and was bleeding. Also,
the blood in her body was very low. There was a great
deal of abdominal pain as the lifeless fetus in the womb.
So I admitted her for further treatment at five o’clock that
1546 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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evening. I then injected her with sleep and surgically
removed the lifeless fetus by suction and evacuation.
And then I discharged her after further treatment and the
next day with a sonography to make sure the fetus was
completely gone and sent her home.
Due to the abortion pill was given to the woman and her
fetus became lifeless and because of the previous two
cesareans, the abortion was not completed at home. Her
excessive bleeding had reduced the amount of blood in
her body. Later she came to my hospital for treatment
as she was suffering from severe abdominal pain and
bleeding.
While she was admitted in our hospital, she was
accompanied by Sandhya Rathod. She was signed our
documents.
However, Pushpa Madhav Suryavanshi was in my hospital
05-12-2016 when she was seven weeks pregnant and she
was bleeding and having abdominal pain. Her sonography
showed that her fetus become lifeless as abortion pill had
ben inserted into her abdomen. I have treated her with
suction and evacuation.”
27. Through the perusal of the statement of the doctor, it is revealed
that the complainant herself stated that the pregnancy was revealed
to her when she tested it herself using a pregnancy testing kit and
this was stated to be seven days before her visit to the hospital, i.e.
on the day of the alleged incident. It is mentioned in the FIR that
the complainant used to live in a separate house due to the alleged
harassment by the appellants and their son. The appellants used to
live in a village far from Latur. However, no reason is given in the
FIR as to why the appellants and their son had visited her house in
Latur on that day. Furthermore, there is not even a whisper in the FIR
about the complainant conveying the news of the pregnancy to the
appellants or their son. It is unusual that when the allegations under
Sections 312 and 313 of IPC are levelled against the appellants, such
an important fact surrounding her pregnancy and its knowledge to the
appellants is not to be found in the FIR. It is categorically mentioned
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1547
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
in the FIR that the appellants brought the poisoned food pre-made
from their village and hence, it would mean that they would need
to have prior knowledge about the pregnancy of the complainant.
No such communication or intimation is alleged by the complainant
in the FIR that would even remotely lead to the conclusion that the
appellants were aware about the pregnancy of the complainant.
28. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan
Lal and Others,6 after considering all the earlier precedents, has
laid down principles which the High Court must consider while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of
proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations
of the court in Bhajan Lal:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
6 1990 INSC 363 : 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335
1548 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted
in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding
is instituted) to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance
of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fides and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1549
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
29. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that when the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
a case against the accused, the High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceedings. Further, it has been held that where the
uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose any offence and make out a
case against the accused, the Court would be justified in quashing
the proceedings.
30. In the present case also, as discussed above, the facts when taken
at face value, do not reveal any specific instance of cruelty committed
by the appellants herein. In our view, only stating that cruelty has
been committed by the appellants herein due to some reason,
would not amount to the offence under Section 498-A of IPC being
attracted. The next allegation regarding a specific incident relating to
the miscarriage being caused by the appellants herein has also been
discussed above. A bare perusal of the allegation and the analysis of
the same when compared with the statement of the Doctor reveals
that even if the allegations are accepted at the face value, it would
not prima facie make out a case against the present appellants.
31. Furthermore, the complaint was lodged after the notice of Divorce
was given by the complainant, wherein, there was not even a
whisper of the allegation of the cruelty or the miscarriage caused
by the appellants. The alleged incident took place in 2016, whereas
the complaint was filed after the notice of Divorce was given by the
complainant, i.e. in 2018. The latest alleged incident in the FIR is of
the year 2016, wherein the most serious allegations under Sections
312 and 313 of the IPC is raised. The explanation for the delay in filing
of the complaint given by the complainant is that she did not want to
spoil the marital relations. However, she has herself stated that she
began residing separately and had moved out of the matrimonial
house. Further, she had sent the notice of Divorce on 15th May
2018. This would certainly mean that she believed that the marriage
had broken down without there being any hope of reconciliation. It
is difficult to believe that despite the complainant taking such drastic
steps, she did not file the present FIR for another six months after
the notice of Divorce was sent. Moreover, the notice of Divorce was
1550 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
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completely silent about the allegations raised in the FIR which was
subsequently filed. The notice of Divorce on the other hand contained
allegations relating to the demand of money and jewellery from the
complainant by the son of the appellants. It also contained vague
allegations of physical assault inflicted by the son of the appellants.
No allegation of cruelty or the miscarriage allegedly caused by the
appellants was raised.
32. These facts lead us to conclude that the proceedings were initiated
with an ulterior motive of pressurizing the son of the appellant herein
to consent to the divorce according to the terms of the complainant
and the proceedings were used as a weapon by the complainant in
the personal discord between the couple.
33. It would again, be apposite to refer to the case of Dara Lakshmi
Narayana (supra) wherein this Court has discussed the objective of
Section 498-A of IPC and has also raised its concerns over the misuse
of this Section in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed thus:
“28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of
an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on
a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift
intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there
have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across
the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension
within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has
been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section
498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta
against the husband and his family by a wife. Making
vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial
conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal
processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting
tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse
is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the
husband and his family in order to seek compliance with
the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this
Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting
the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima
facie case against them.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1551
Digambar and Another v. The State of Maharashtra and Another
29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman
who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been
contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain
silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or
initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention
of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage
a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast
to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the
first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a
complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the
latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant
mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected
to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in
the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as
in the present case.”
34. We therefore hold that the continuance of the criminal proceedings
against the appellants would result in an abuse of process of law.
35. In the present case, the High Court has held that the allegations made
by the complainant cannot be presumed to be false and whether
they are believable or not will be examined by the Trial Court. We
hold that this was an erroneous approach taken by the High Court
as according to the principles laid down in the case of Bhajanlal
(supra), the allegations levelled in the complaint should at the very
least be given a prima facie consideration.
36. In the result, we find that, this was a fit case wherein the High Court
should have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings.
37. We are therefore inclined to allow the present appeal.
38. We accordingly pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 23 rd January
2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at
Aurangabad in Criminal Application No. 859 of 2019 is quashed
and set aside; and
1552 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(iii) The criminal proceedings against the appellants in FIR No. 339
of 2018 and Final Report No. 10 of 2021 on the file of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Latur and all subsequent proceedings arising
therefrom are quashed and set aside.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the Case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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