DHEERAJ SINGHversusGREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS

126               [2023] COURT
               SUPREME   10 S.C.R.REPORTS
                                   126 : 2023 INSC 594
                                                   [2023] 10 S.C.R.


A                              DHEERAJ SINGH
                                        v.
             GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
                       AUTHORITY & ORS.
B                        (Civil Appeal No. 4172 of 2023)
                                 JULY 04, 2023
           [KRISHNA MURARI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
             Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.41, r.22 – Cross objections
      filed by the appellants for enhancement of compensation, not
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      considered by High Court – Held: Cross objections, unlike a regular
      appeal, are filed within an already existing appeal – However, as
      per O.41, r.22, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular
      appeal and therefore, must be considered in full by the court
      adjudicating upon the same – Court of appeal has a duty to apply
D     its mind to all the issues raised before it and in cases where the
      High Court fails to do the same, the matter must be remanded to the
      same court for fresh adjudication – In the present case, the issues
      raised by the appellants in their cross objections were not considered
      by the High Court – While, the High Court gave a detailed analysis
      of all other issues raised in the appeal and both the lower court
E
      orders, the cross objections in specific found no discussion, much
      less even a mention – High Court was under an obligation to
      consider the cross objections filed by the appellants – Since such
      an obligation was not discharged, matter is remanded to the High
      Court for fresh adjudication – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4(1),
F     6, 17, 18.
             Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O.41, r.22 – Held: In cases
      where the decree is partly in favour of the respondent, but is also
      partly against the respondent, two remedies within O.41, r.22 remain
      with the respondent, to file their cross objections and to support the
G     decree in whole – The third remedy in law is the right to file a cross
      appeal within the limitation period so prescribed, which in essence
      is a separate appeal in itself, challenging part or whole of the
      original decree, independent of the appeal filed by the other party
      – The respondent also has the right to fully support the original
      decree passed by the lower court in full.
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                                       126
        DHEERAJ SINGH v. GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL                           127
             DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS.

      Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs.                  A
      (2001) 2 SC 407; Madhukar and Ors. vs. Sangram and
      Ors. (2001) 4 SCC 756:[2001] 3 SCR 138; Jitendra
      Prasad Nayak vs. Anant kumar Sah and Anr. (1998) 9
      SCC 383 – relied on.
                        Case Law Reference                                  B
(2001) 2 SC 407                    relied on                 Para 19
[2001] 3 SCR 138                   relied on                 Para 20
(1998) 9 SCC 383                   relied on                 Para 21
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4172                   C
of 2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CA No. nil/2023.
      With
                                                                            D
      Civil Appeal Nos. 4174, 4173, 4175, 4176 and 4177 of 2023.
      S. K. Patri, Haraprasad Sahu, Ms. Velasree S., Mrs. Kiran
Mohanto, Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, Advs. for
the Appellant.
     Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Adv., Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das,           E
Ms. Neha Das, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      KRISHNA MURARI, J.
         Delay condoned.                                                    F
      2. Leave granted.
       3. The present Appeals are directed against the impugned order
and judgment dated 05.01.2017 passed by the High Court of Allahabad
at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”), whereby, the
appeal preferred by the appellants herein was dismissed.                    G

      FACTS
      4. The relevant facts necessary for the adjudication of the present
appeals, for the sake of convenience, the Respondent State Government
of UP had issued a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17     H
128             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 10 S.C.R.


A     of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 30.04.1993 whereby a large tract
      of land, including the land of the appellants herein was acquired for the
      purpose of Greater Noida. The declaration of the said lands under Section
      6 of the Act was issued on 25.06.1993, and the possession of the aforesaid
      lands was taken on different dates between 13.08.1993 and 31.05.1994.
B           5. Subsequent to the possession of the said lands being acquired,
      the Special Land Acquisition Officer, by order dated 27.08.1994,
      determined the market value of the plots at three different rates i.e.,
      Rs.32.52/-, Rs.22.44/- and Rs. 16.46/- paisa per square yard.
             6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellants herein sought
C     reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and claimed
      compensation at the rate of Rs. 350/- to Rs. 500/- per square yard on
      grounds of parity to other lands acquired in the vicinity. The Learned
      District Judge, in the aforesaid reference, vide its judgment dated
      09.05.2002, determined the market value of the said lands at Rs. 400/-,
      but deducted 1/3rd amount for development charge, and fixed the market
D
      value at Rs. 267/- per square yard and granted Rs. 80/- as solatium per
      square yard with interest at the rate of 9% and 15% per annum, and an
      additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the market
      value with effect from the date of transfer of possession.
             7. As against this, the Respondent Greater Noida filed an appeal
E     in the High Court, to which the appellants herein filed their cross appeals
      seeking a further enhancement.
             8. Subsequently, the High Court, vide order and judgment dated
      04.01.2017, confirmed the compensation determined by the Learned
      District Judge. It is the contention of the appellants herein that the High
F     Court, while passing its judgment, did not consider the cross objections
      filed by them.
            9. The Appellants, aggrieved by the fact that their cross objection
      for enhancement was not properly considered, filed a review, however,
      the same was dismissed vide impugned order and judgment dated
G     05.01.2017. Hence, the present Special Leave Petition.
            10. For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to mention that the
      acquisition of the land itself is not being challenged by way of the present
      appeals, and the limited challenge is only confined to the extent of the
      quantum of compensation granted for the acquisition of the said lands.
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      DHEERAJ SINGH v. GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL                                 129
   DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

       11. To appreciate the issue at hand and to come to a correct             A
conclusion, we must analyze the impugned order passed by the High
Court, to see whether there has been any application of mind by the
High Court on the cross objections filed by the appellants herein, and if
such consideration has not been taken into account, then to what extent
can this Court grant relief.                                                    B
      ANALYSIS
        12. Order 41 Rule 22, which is the governing law in the present
case, elaborates on the remedies available to a respondent in the court
of first appeal where an original decree has been challenged. An analysis
of the said provision, in our opinion, is essential to adjudicate upon the      C
present case.
        13. In cases where the decree passed by the court of first instance
is in favor of the respondent in whole, in such circumstance, no remedy
exists in favour of the respondent to appeal such decree, since no right
                                                                                D
to appeal can be vested onto a party, which is successful.
        14. However, in cases where the decree given by the court of
first instance, is partly in favour of the respondent, but is also partly
against the respondent, two remedies within Order 41 Rule 22 remain
with the respondent, which are (i) To file their cross objections and, (ii)
                                                                                E
To support the decree in whole. A third remedy in law also exists,
which is the right to file a cross appeal, which will also be discussed in
brief.
        15. In cases where the opposing party files a first appeal against
part or whole of the original decree, and the respondent in the said first      F
appeal, due to part or whole of the decree being in their favour, abstains
from filing an appeal at the first instance, in such cases, to ensure that
the respondent is also given a fair chance to be heard, he is given the
right to file his cross objections within the appeal already so instituted by
the other party, against not only the contentions raised by the other party,
but also against part or whole of the decree passed by the court of first       G
instance.
       16. In a similar circumstance, where the other party in the first
instance has preferred an appeal, apart from the remedy of cross
objections, the respondent can also file a cross appeal within the limitation
                                                                                H
130                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 10 S.C.R.


A     period so prescribed, which in essence is a separate appeal in itself,
      challenging part or whole of the original decree, independent of the
      appeal filed by the other party. The respondent also has the right to fully
      support the original decree passed by the lower court in full.
            17. In the present case at hand, the appellants herein, in the
B     court of first appeal filed a cross objection. It is the claim of the
      appellants herein that his cross objection was not considered by the
      High Court while passing the impugned judgment. At this stage, it must
      be noted that while cross objections, unlike a regular appeal, are filed
      within an already existing appeal, however, as per Order 41 Rule 22 of
C     the CPC, cross objections have all the trappings of a regular appeal,
      and therefore, must be considered in full by the court adjudicating upon
      the same.
             18. A bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the
      issues raised by the appellants in their cross objections have not been
D     considered by the High Court. No mention of the cross objections filed
      by the appellants herein have been found in the said judgment. While the
      High Court has given a detailed analysis of all other issues raised in the
      appeal and the both the lower court orders, however, the cross objections
      in specific, finds no discussion, much less even a mention.
E            19. In the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari
      (Dead) by LRs.1, this Court held that the court of appeal has a duty to
      apply its mind to all issues raised before it, and to discharge such duty, it
      must also record its findings against all such issues raised. For the sake
      of convenience, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being
      extracted herein:
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                “The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm
                the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right
                of the parties and unless restricted by law. the whole case is
                therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
                The judgment of the Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect
G
                its conscious application of mind, and record findings
                supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the
                contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision
                of the Appellate Court.
      1
H         (2001) 2 SC 407
         DHEERAJ SINGH v. GREATER NOIDA INDUSTRIAL                          131
      DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

         While reversing a finding of fact the Appellate Court must         A
         come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the
         trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a
         different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing a
         further appeal that the First Appellate Court had discharged
         the duty expected of it.”                                          B
      20. In the case of Madhukar and Ors. Vs. Sangram and Ors.2,
this Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in the Santosh
Hazari Judgment (Supra), observed that the court of first appeal has
a duty to record its findings qua all the issues raised before it, and in
cases where the High Court fails to do the same, the matter must be         C
remanded to the same court again for fresh adjudication.
       21. Further, in the case of Jitendra Prasad Nayak Vs. Anant
kumar Sah and Anr.3, this Court, in an identical circumstance wherein
the cross objections filed by the appellant therein was not considered by
the court of first appeal, held that remanded the case back to the High     D
Court and observed as under:
         “....Admittedly, a cross-objection was filed by the appellant-
         landlord against the rejection by the first appellate court of
         the existence of one of the two grounds of eviction. However,
         while deciding the appeal of the respondent-tenant in his          E
         favour against the decision of the first appellate court on the
         other ground, the existance of the cross objection appears to
         have been missed by the High Court with the result that there
         is no decision given on the cross objection. The impugned
         judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained inter alia for this
         reason. We are also of the opinion that the question relating      F
         to existence of the ground of bona fide need which has been
         decided in favour of the tenant requires a fresh determination
         by the High Court along with the other point relating to default
         in payment of rent which was the subject mater of cross-
         objection.......”                                                  G
      22. The abovementioned discussions and judgments, when
contextualized to the present case, would show that the High Court

2
    (2001) 4 SCC 756
3
    (1998) 9 SCC 383                                                        H
132              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 10 S.C.R.


A     was under an obligation to consider the cross objections filed by the
      Appellants herein. Since such an obligation was not discharged while
      passing the judgment in appeal, we are of the considered opinion that
      the matter is fit for remand to the High Court for fresh adjudication on
      the grounds raised in the cross objections during appeal by the appellants
B     herein. Accordingly, the present appeals are therefore allowed to such
      an extent.

      Divya Pandey                                               Appeals allowed.
      (Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

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