DEV GUPTAversusPEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ORS.

                  [2023] 11 S.C.R. 232 : 2023 INSC 695



                             CASE DETAILS

                               DEV GUPTA
                                      v.
         PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ORS.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 5013 of 2023)
                            AUGUST 09, 2023
       [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]

                              HEADNOTES

      Issue for consideration : Order of the High Court rejecting
the appellant’s Writ Petition which had questioned the imposition of a
minimum 75% aggregate marks as an eligibility condition (in the qualifying
examination) for enabling a candidate to claim admission in engineering
courses under the 2% sports quota.
      Education Institution – Sports quota – Imposition of a minimum
75% aggregate marks as an eligibility condition (in the qualifying
examination) for enabling a candidate to claim admission in engineering
courses under the 2% sports quota – Discriminatory or not:
        HELD : The objective of introducing the sports quota i.e. 2% of
intake, was to promote and encourage those who excelled and gained
a certain degree of prescribed proficiency and achievement in defined
competitive sports – The objective of introducing sports quota, however,
is not to accommodate academic merit, but something altogether different:
promotion of sports in the institution, the university, and ultimately, in
the country – In the instant case, the record indicates that except for the
academic years 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2023-24, for all the previous years,
the eligibility prescribed was lower; indeed, for 2020-21, 2021-22 and
2022-23, the criterion was “10+2 Pass” – Lastly, the sports policy, itself
underlines that the quota would be available to students who “pass their
qualifying examination from schools/colleges recognised by the Chandigarh
administration” or had studied in Chandigarh for two preceding years – The
imposition of the minimum 75% eligibility condition, therefore, does not
subserve the object of introducing the sports quota, but is, rather destructive

                                     232
        DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                            233
                          AND ORS.

of it; the criterion, in that sense subverted the object and is discriminatory; it
therefore, falls afoul of the equality clause, in Article 14 of the Constitution
– Therefore, the exclusion of the petitioner and other like candidates, on the
ground of their securing less than 75% in the qualifying examination, was
unwarranted and discriminatory. [Paras 17 and 18]
       Education Institution – Sports quota – Rejection of candidature
on the ground of ineligibility due to their securing less than 75% marks
in the qualifying examination – Direction issued:
       HELD : Seventeen (17) seats were earmarked for the sports category
(under the 2% quota) – The university received a total of 34 applications, of
which 28 applicants fulfilled the eligibility criterion -of securing 75% marks
and above – Further, 16 out of the total 17 seats in the Sports Category were
allocated to eligible candidates and only 1 seat was vacant – In view of the
findings, direction issued to fill the remaining seat or seats by application
of the standards spelt out in the sports policy of the UT of Chandigarh, as
applied by the respondent university to determine inter se sports merit of
the candidates who had applied, but whose candidature was rejected on
the ground of ineligibility due to their securing less than 75% marks in the
qualifying examination – These candidates however should have qualified
in terms of the immediately preceding academic year’s criterion, applicable
for the balance sports quota seat(s) – At the same time, candidates who were
selected and given admission not to be disturbed. [Paras 4 and 19]
      Constitutional Law – Constitutional jurisprudence – Doctrine of
equality and classification – Discussed.

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Manish Kumar v Union of India (UOI) & Ors [2021] 14 SCR 895;
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan [2002] 2 SCR 649; Venkateshwara
Theatre v. State of A.P [1993] 3 SCR 616; Roop Chand Adlakha v Delhi
Development Authority [1988] Supp 3 SCR 353 – relied on.
      State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa [1974] 1 SCR 771; Deepak Sibal
v Punjab University [1989] 1 SCR 689; Subramanian Swamy v Central
Bureau of Investigation [2014] 9 SCR 283 – referred to.
234           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      Jagatpreet Kaur And Ors. vs Punjab University (2004) 138 PLR
896 – referred to.

        OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
               ORDER AND APPEARANCES

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.5013 of
2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 14.07.2023 of the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.14594 of 2023.
        Appearances:
     P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Ms. Natasha Dalmia, Ms. Anisha Jain, Shivam
Pundhir, Advs. for the Appellants.
      Sanchar Anand, Devendra Singh, Anant K Vatsya, Aman Kumar
Thakur, Arjun Rana, Ms. Sumbul Ausaf, Vatsal Joshi, Krishna Kant Dubey,
Advs. for the Respondents.

        JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                  JUDGMENT
        S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
       1. Special leave granted. This appeal challenges an order of the
Punjab & Haryana High Court.1 The High Court rejected the appellant’s
Writ Petition which had questioned the imposition of a minimum 75%
aggregate marks as an eligibility condition (in the qualifying examination)
for enabling a candidate to claim admission in engineering courses under the
2% sports quota. The appellant had contended that the sudden imposition
of such an eligibility condition defeated the purpose of the quota itself and
was consequently arbitrary. The High Court, however, rejected the petition
requiring the authorities to consider an issue.
      2. The Secretary Technical Education, Chandigarh Administration
(hereafter “UTC”) by letter dated 07.01.2016 accorded approval to the
respondent university (hereafter “the University”) to admit students through
the Central Counselling System at the National level from 2016-2017
(hereafter referred to as “JOSSA”). The UT had consistently followed the
1   Dated 14.07.2023 in CWP No. 14594 of 2023.
        DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                        235
              AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

process, and admission to institutions within Chandigarh were regulated
by its rules. The rules for the current academic year 2023-24 for JOSSA
were issued through a brochure on 07.06.2023. Those rules apply to UT
institutions, including the respondent- whose name finds mention at Serial
No. 25.
      3. The eligibility criterion provided for admission to engineering
courses and the same reads as under:
     “1. Must have secured at least 75% aggregate marks in the Class XII
     (or equivalent) Board Examination. The aggregate marks for SC, ST
     and PwD candidates should be at least 65%.’’
       The respondent issued the admission brochure for academic year
2023-24 for four reserved categories. The eligibility criterion applicable,
inter alia, to sports candidates was mentioned in clause 1(b) which is
extracted below:
     “b. The candidate has secured minimum 75% marks in the Class XII
     (or equivalent) examination of respective stream and Board.”
       4. Seventeen (17) seats were earmarked for the sports category (under
the 2% quota). The university received a total of 34 applications -of which
28 applicants fulfilled the eligibility criterion -of securing 75% marks and
above. The remaining six applications included that of the appellant who
did not secure the basic 75% marks. Further, 16 out of the total 17 seats
in the Sports Category have already been allocated to eligible candidates
and only 1 seat has fallen vacant as on date in Materials and Metallurgical
Engineering branch for which the counselling is scheduled to be held on
10.08.2023. It is acknowledged that the applicable Sports Policy for the UT
had been published earlier.
       5. The brochure listed out several categories, to indicate how the
candidates were to be classified for the purposes of admission. This did not
include the sports quota candidates. As a matter of fact, the Union Territory
of Chandigarh followed JoSAA for purposes of admission; however, the
sports quota category was kept out of the JoSAA programme. Likewise
the quota set apart for three other categories i.e. Kashmiri Migrants, Sons/
Daughters/Spouses of Military/Para Military Personnel and children and
grand children of freedom fighters were treated and dealt with separately.
236           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      6. After publication of the brochure on 24.06.2023, the respondent
issued an advertisement calling upon eligible candidates to apply. The
appellant represented to the authorities complaining that the eligibility
condition was unrealistically high, on 27.06.2023. Upon receiving no
response, he filed a Writ Petition, which was rejected by the impugned order.
       7. It is contended by Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel that
the threshold minimum eligible condition of having acquired 75% marks,
defeats the objective of providing a sports quota because it assumes that
sports persons -like other general candidates would also have the degree of
academic excellence which is required of all candidates. It was submitted
that those participating in sports have to be treated differently and the 2%
quota was specifically carved out for this purpose. In this context, it is
pointed out that as far as sports quota candidates are concerned, the brochure
itself makes a distinction so far as candidates who are eligible to apply for
vertical reservations; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) have
to possess 65% marks to be considered eligible. It was submitted that in the
past too, the UT had not imposed high criterion for candidates to be admitted
in the sports quota for qualifying in the examination.
        8. Learned counsel also pointed out that in the past, sports quota
guidelines had prescribed what specified sports would be graded for the
purpose of determining inter se rankings and furthermore, the types of events,
and the conditions guiding the eligibility and assessment criterion (such as
for instance, the minimum number of participants in the concerned sports, the
level of participation, i.e. the district, state, national and international event(s)
organized by the concerned regulating board or organization/federation,
etc). These guide and regulate both the determination of inter se ranking of
sports candidates, to ensure that those who achieve higher proficiency in the
concerned sports, rather than academic qualification, are duly accommodated.
       9. Mr. Sanchar Anand, appearing on behalf of the respondent, urged
this court not to intervene, and submitted that admissions have almost
concluded. He points out that earlier too, the UT had insisted upon the
relevant criterion of 75% minimum cut-off in the qualifying examination and
points to a note submitted to the High Court, justifying the 75% minimum
criterion for the sports quota. It was argued that whilst for 2017-18, the
minimum qualifying marks required for sports category candidates was 60%,
         DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                         237
               AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

it was increased for the years 2018-19 and 2019- 20 to 75%. Learned counsel,
therefore, urged that there is nothing inherently arbitrary or discriminatory
in the insistence of such criterion. He reiterated that in the present case too,
out of the 34 applications received, 28 fulfilled the 75% threshold and all
but one (out of 17) seats had been filled by them.
       10. Learned counsel further stated that evolving a minimum threshold
educational qualification for the purposes of allocation in the sports quota
was essentially a policy matter which the UT exercised legitimately in the
present case. He submitted that this Court’s intervention would result in
large scale disruption of the allocations made till date and that it would
be futile to intervene since several other candidates who might not have
applied and who might be better off than the appellant would be kept out
of consideration.
       Analysis & Conclusions
       11. Besides the brochure the relevant extracts of which were set
out before discussing the relevant submissions, it is necessary to briefly
describe the relevantprovisions of the prevailing sports quota (embodied in
a Policy2). Para 2 of the policy stated that the benefit of this sports category
would be available to those who “pass their qualifying examination from
schools/colleges recognised by the Chandigarh administration and those
who studied in Chandigarh schools or colleges for at least two years
before applying for graduation certificates”. The policy further stipulated
that merit of the certificates, i.e. sports certificates would be graded
appropriately as A, B, C and D, and in descending order. Grade A contains
sports persons of international standing, -who represented the country or
who donned the India colour in Olympic Games, World Cups, tournaments
and championships organised by international federations at the highest
levels, and Commonwealth Games. Grade B comprised of sports persons,
who participated in World University/international tournaments and games
other than those in Grade A in which at least 10 teams participated, including
Asian Federation Cup; Schools Games or obtained first three positions in
recognised National Championships, International championships, State
Federations, All India Combined Universities team etc. Grade C listed
participation in senior nationals/inter-University tournaments/federation

2   Dated 05.05.2003 issued by the UT Chandigarh.
238           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 11 S.C.R.


cup; Junior National Federation i.e. National School Games, KVS teams
participating in the national school games; first three positions in recognised
Chandigarh schools game (provided at least 7 teams participated) and several
such other sports competitions and events. Grade D listed participation in
senior national championship/national games participation in recognised
junior championship; participation in national school games etc.
      12. The Policy further provided that the state rankings would be
considered by the concerned institution and listed the criteria in the following
order: record holders in any event; winners; runners-up; third position
holders; number of times participated; number of disciplines participated).
Other criteria too were spelt out.
        According to the policy, sports gradation excluded those participating
in the sub- junior ranking tournaments and, that events the positions achieved
would be only if they were achieved with seven or more participants in
State/Senior/Junior/inter- college competition or international tournaments
etc or in at least ten state universities in national, i.e. senior, junior and all
university competitions. Besides this, the policy stipulated that the applicants
would be interviewed and also would be given field tests in the discipline
concerned, “to assess the genuineness of the testimonials/certificates which
they produce in support of their claims”.
       13. It would be also necessary to reproduce the note which was placed
before the High Court approved by the Chandigarh administration, while
justifying the 75% minimum qualifying criterion in the present case. Dealing
with the respondent’s admission policy based upon the UT Chandigarh’s
stipulations, the note inter alia stated as follows:
             “ PEC had been participating in, Joint Admission Committee
             (JAC) Chandigarh till year 2017. Eligibility criteria of JAC
             2017 for general and sports category was same i.e., class 12th
             at least 60% marks. Copy attached for ready reference.
             The eligibility criteria followed by PEC for Kashmiri Migrants
             and Kashmiri Pandits/ Kashmiri Hindu Families (Non-
             Migrants) living in Kashmir Valley, Sportspersons, Sons/
             Daughters/ Spouses of Military/ Paramilitary personnel,
             Children/ Grandchildren of Freedom Fighters is as follows: -
           DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                             239
                 AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

 Year     of   Admission      Relevant       Relevant        Remarks
 Admission     through        Criteria of    Criteria of
                              10+2 setup     10+2 followed
                              by Admission   by PEC
                              Agency
 2017-18       JAC            > 60%          > 60%           Same as Admission
               Chandigarh                                    Agency

 2018-19       JoSAA/CSAB     > 75%          > 75%           Same as Admission
                                                             Agency
 2019-20       JoSAA/CSAB     > 75%          > 75%           Same as Admission
                                                             Agency
 2020-21       JoSAA/CSAB     10+2 Pass      10+2 Pass       Same as Admission
                                                             Agency
 2021-22       JoSAA/CSAB     10+2 Pass      10+2 Pass       Same as Admission
                                                             Agency
 2022-23       JoSAA/CSAB     10+2 Pass      10+2 Pass       Same as Admission
                                                             Agency
 2023-24       JoSAA/CSAB     > 75%          >75%            Same as Admission
                                                             Agency

               The admission process has started and the last date to apply
               for counselling of Kashmiri Migrants and Kashmiri Pandits/
               Kashmiri Hindu Families (Non- Migrants) living in Kashmiri
               Valley, Sports persons, Sons/ Daughters/ Spouses of Military/
               Paramilitary personnel Children/Grandchildren of Freedom
               Fighters was 10.07.2023 and the further process is in progress.
               That the instant writ petition is coming up for preliminary
               hearing only on 13.07.2023, when the admission process is
               already underway and thus, the petition in barred by latches.
               That the prospectus is sacrosanct and at this stage, in case,
               the criteria is changed, the entire admission process shall get
               delayed and derailed.
               The academic session is scheduled to start from 31.07.2023
               and the candidates have to attend minimum 75% of lectures
               to become eligible for appearing in examination.”
      14. It is now entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence, that the
doctrine of equality has varied- and layered dimensions, one of which is
240           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 11 S.C.R.


that under Article 14, “Equals must be treated equally. Unequals must
not be treated equally. What constitutes reasonable classification must
depend upon the facts of each case, the context provided by the statute,
the existence of intelligible differentia which has led to the grouping of
the persons or things as a class and the leaving out of those who do not
share the intelligible differentia. No doubt it must bear rational nexus
to the objects sought to be achieved.” (Ref Manish Kumar v Union of
India (UOI) & Ors3).
     15. This court, in Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan4 explained
how the reasonable classifi cation is to be applied:
      “6. The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of
      absolute equality amongst all, which may be a physical impossibility.
      All that Article 14 guarantees is the similarity of treatment and not
      identical treatment. The protection of equal laws does not mean that
      all laws must be uniform. Equality before the law means that among
      equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered
      and that the likes should be treated alike. Equality before the law
      does not mean that things which are different shall be treated as
      though they were the same. It is true that Article 14 enjoins that
      the people similarly situated should be treated similarly but what
      amount of dissimilarity would make the people disentitled to be
      treated equally, is rather a vexed question. A legislature, which
      has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an infinite variety
      of human relations must of necessity, have the power of making
      special laws, to attain particular objects; and for that purpose it
      must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and
      things upon which such laws are to operate. Mere differentiation or
      inequality of treatment does not “per se” amount to discrimination
      within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. The State has
      always the power to make classification on a basis of rational
      distinctions relevant to the particular subject to be dealt with. In
      order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions
      must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classifi cation must be founded
      on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
3   2021 (14) SCR 895
4   2002 (2) SCR 649
         DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                      241
               AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

      that are grouped together from others who are left out of the
      group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation
      to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. What is necessary
      is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification
      and the object of the Act. When a law is challenged as violative of
      Article 14, it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy
      underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by
      it. Having ascertained the policy and the object of the Act, the
      court has to apply a dual test in examining the validity, the test
      being, whether the classification is rational and based upon an
      intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that
      are grouped together from others that are left out of the group,
      and whether the basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or
      relation with its avowed policy and objects. In order that a law
      may be struck down under this article, the inequality must arise
      under the same piece of legislation or under the same set of laws
      which have to be treated together as one enactment. Inequality
      resulting from two different enactments made by two different
      authorities in relation to the same subject will not be liable to
      attack under Article 14"
      It has also been held, in State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa 5
that “the object to be achieved” should not be “a mere pretence for
an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification”
should not be “characterized as arbitrary or absurd”. The judgment
in Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of A.P. 6 , is a decision where this
court pointed out, to how discrimination arises, if persons who are
un- equals are treated as equals, thus:
      “Just as a difference in the treatment of persons similarly situate
      leads to discrimination, so also discrimination can arise if persons
      who are unequals, i.e., differently placed, are treated similarly.
      … A law providing for equal treatment of unequal objects,
      transactions or persons would be condemned as discriminatory
      if there is absence of rational relation to the object intended to
      be achieved by the law.”
5   5 1974 (1) SCR 771
6   1993 (3) SCR 616
242           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


        16. The observations in Roop Chand Adlakha v Delhi Development
Authority7 are very perceptive, and relevant in the present context; the court
had said that the “process of classification is in itself productive of inequality
and in that sense antithetical of equality. The process would be constitutionally
valid if it recognises a pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration
of the effects of such pre-existent inequality. But the process cannot in itself
generate or aggravate the inequality” and warned that overemphasis on the
doctrine of classification “or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover
some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the
article of its precious content and end in replacing doctrine of equality by
the doctrine of classification” thus pushing classification rendering “the
precious guarantee of equality “a mere rope of sand”.” The application of
the reasonable classification test, in Deepak Sibal v Punjab University8, led to
invalidation of a rule which disqualified and rendered ineligible employees of
private establishments, and confining admission of candidates to government
departments and institutions, in evening law college. Condemning the
classification, this court said that the university had “deviated from the
objective for the starting of evening classes. The objective was to accommodate
in the evening classes employees in general including private employees
who were unable to attend morning classes because of their employment.”
The justification given by the university, that government employees held
permanent jobs or position was held to be irrelevant for the object of opening
the evening law course.
       17. In Subramanian Swamy v Central Bureau of Investigation9 this court
frowned upon, and declared void, a classification based on status in public
employment, characterizing that it defeats the purpose of the underlying law,
i.e combating corruption:
      “59. It seems to us that classification which is made in Section 6-A on the
      basis of status in government service is not permissible under Article 14
      as it defeats the purpose of finding prima facie truth into the allegations
      of graft, which amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there
      be sound differentiation between corrupt public servants based on their
      status? Surely not, because irrespective of their status or position,
7   1988 Supp (3) SCR 353
8   1989 (1) SCR 689
9   2014 (9) SCR 283
        DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                         243
              AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

     corrupt public servants are corrupters of public power. The corrupt
     public servants, whether high or low, are birds of the same feather and
     must be confronted with the process of investigation and inquiry equally.
     Based on the position or status in service, no distinction can be made
     between public servants against whom there are allegations amounting
     to an offence under the PC Act, 1988.”
       On an objective application of the principles outlined above, this
court is of the considered opinion that the objective of introducing the sports
quota i.e. 2% of intake, was to promote and encourage those who excelled
and gained a certain degree of prescribed proficiency and achievement in
defined competitive sports. The introduction of this quota was to promote
sports, and sportsmanship in educational institutions. No doubt, the state
acts within its rights to prescribe a certain minimum eligibility standard or
set of criteria as the threshold requirement for admission to any particular
course, given its peculiar requirements. The Punjab and Haryana High Court,
thus, upheld the prescription of a cut off eligibility standard of securing
minimum 15% in the qualifying examination, in Jagatpreet Kaur And Ors.
vs Punjab University10:
     “The petitioner has himself stated that the prospectus for Punjab
     Engineering College had specifically provided that there would a
     minimum cut- off aggregate of 15 marks. The respondents-University
     have only introduced the criteria which ensures the bare minimum
     of academic excellence which would be required of a student who is
     ultimately to become an Engineer. In Amardeep Singh Sahota ‘s case
     (supra) the Full Bench has categorically held that these are students
     who will ultimately serve humanity. Excellence in Sports may be a
     relevant consideration, but a certain minimum academic standard is
     required to be maintained.”
      The objective of introducing sports quota, however, is not to
accommodate academic merit, but something altogether different:
promotion of sports in the institution, the university, and ultimately, in the
country. Among others, universities are the nurseries or the catchment for
sportspersons, who can represent in state, national, international level and
Olympic sports. At the same time, the state or educational institution can

10 (2004) 138 PLR 896
244            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 11 S.C.R.


insist upon a minimum eligibility condition. That is not to say that such
condition would necessarily and mandatorily have to be what is applicable
to general (or open category) candidates. The latter kind of criteria would
tend to exclude meritorious sportspersons, and place the less (academically)
meritorious sportspersons, at a disadvantageous position, because they
satisfy the open category candidates’ criterion of higher academic merit.
For instance, it is quite possible that a sportsperson, who has and continues
to represent the country in international Olympic sports, and gained such
excellence as to have bagged a medal or two, in say, wrestling, would be
altogether excluded in the eventuality of a wrestler, of the same category
(but who has never reached the national level) securing 80% marks in the
qualifying examination. It exactly this consequence which this court had
warned would be the “unequal application” of a uniform criteria, a wooden
equality without regard to the inherent differences, which Article 14 frowns
upon, and forbids.
        18. The conclusion drawn by the court is also supported by the fact that
the sports policy of 2023 governing admissions, was evolved with a careful
eye to detail, to ensure that performance in sport, rather than academic merit,
was the chosen criterion to be applied for filling the 2% sports quota. Another
reason which leads this court to conclude that discrimination has resulted, is
because in respect of sports too, the state has lowered the criterion for those
enjoying vertical classification, under Article 15 (4). In such event, it was open
to the state to lower the eligibility criterion, for sports quota, to other candidates
too; the dissimilarity in treatment is therefore, egregious. Moreover, the record
indicates that except for the academic years 2018-19, 2019-20 and 2023-24,
for all the previous years, the eligibility prescribed was lower; indeed, for
2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23, the criterion was “10+2 Pass”. Lastly, the
sports policy, itself underlines that the quota would be available to students
who “pass their qualifying examination from schools/colleges recognised
by the Chandigarh administration” or had studied in Chandigarh for two
preceding years. Requiring all candidates to possess a fulfil a certain eligibility
standard- such as the one, prescribed in the sports policy, of 2023 (alluded
to) or the qualifying marks prescribed by the concerned Board, or university,
to pass in the concerned subjects is entirely different from the prescription
of a uniform standard, far higher than the such a minimum threshold. The
imposition of the minimum 75% eligibility condition, therefore, does not
         DEV GUPTA v. PEC UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY                            245
               AND ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

subserve the object of introducing the sports quota, but is, rather destructive
of it; the criterion, in that sense subverted the object and is discriminatory; it
therefore, falls afoul of the equality clause, in Article 14 of the Constitution.
       19. For the above reasons, it is held that exclusion of the petitioner
and other like candidates, on the ground of their securing less than 75%
in the qualifying examination, was unwarranted and discriminatory. The
reference to, and incorporation of clauses giving effect to such criterion is
held unenforceable and void. This court is alive to the fact that allocation
for admission to all but one seat has been completed. By this court’s interim
order, dated 08.08.2023, the respondent was restrained from filling the left-
over seat(s) which had to be filled after the last round (of admission process)
scheduled on 10.08.2023. In view of the findings, it is hereby directed that
the remaining seat or seats shall be filled by application of the standards
spelt out in the sports policy of the UT of Chandigarh, as applied by the
respondent university to determine inter se sports merit of the candidates
who had applied, but whose candidature was rejected on the ground of
ineligibility due to their securing less than 75% marks in the qualifying
examination. These candidates however should have qualified in terms of the
immediately preceding academic year’s criterion, applicable for the balance
sports quota seat(s). At the same time, candidates who have been selected
and given admission are concerned, shall not be disturbed. The process of
filling the remaining vacant seat(s)- in the sports quota shall be completed
within two weeks. Nothing said in this judgment shall result in invalidation
of admission of candidates in other (non-sports) categories.
       20. The impugned order is, resultantly, set aside. The appeal is allowed
in the above terms. In the circumstances, there shall be no order on costs.

Headnotes prepared by:                                              Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan