DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusSANDEEP KAUSHIK AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 789
- Decided
- 3 August 2022
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- M R SHAH
Holding
The Supreme Court modified the High Court order, directing DTC to pay Rs 7.5 lakhs with interest to the respondent in lieu of appointment, as actual appointment is not possible.
Summary
The Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) appealed a Delhi High Court order that directed it to appoint Sandeep Kaushik as a driver with seniority, after the High Court had held the original recruitment process defective because appointments were based solely on viva marks. DTC argued that 14 years had elapsed, the recruitment landscape had changed, no driver posts existed, and the appellant could not reinstate Kaushik. The Supreme Court agreed that while the High Court was correct in finding the recruitment process flawed, the circumstances now made actual appointment impossible. Consequently, the Court modified the order, directing DTC to pay Kaushik a lump‑sum compensation of Rs 7.5 lakhs with 6% interest from September 2013, allowing DTC to recover the amount from respondent No.2. The appeals were partly allowed and no costs were awarded.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court order directing appointment of the respondent as driver can be enforced after a lapse of 14 years and changed recruitment circumstances.
- Whether a lump‑sum compensation in lieu of actual appointment is an appropriate remedy.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's finding that the recruitment process was bad.
Subjects
Judgment
848 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 848 [2022] 6 S.C.R.
A DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION
v.
SANDEEP KAUSHIK AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 4920-4921 of 2022)
B AUGUST 03, 2022
[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]
Service Law – Appointment / Recruitment – Of Drivers in
appellant-transport Corporation – High Court while holding the
entire recruitment process to be bad as the appointments were made
C
solely on the basis of marks allotted in the viva test, directed the
appellant-transport corporation to appoint respondent no.1 as
Driver with seniority as per his merit position without any back
wages – Plea of appellant–transport corporation before Supreme
Court that 14 years have passed from the date of the recruitment
D and there are changed circumstances due to which it is not possible
now to actually reinstate/appoint respondent no.1 on the post of
driver – Held: On facts, as on today, no post of driver is available
– All the subsequent appointments are now being made on
contractual basis and through contractors – As on today, the age
of respondent No.1 would be approximately 49 years while the
E
retirement age of a driver is reported to be 55 years – If respondent
No.1 is to be appointed now as driver, he will have to clear the
driving test to drive the bus on the road – Considering the overall
facts and circumstances, at this stage, actual appointment of
respondent No.1 is not possible – However, with a view to do
F substantial justice, respondent No.1 awarded lumpsum compensation
of Rs.7.5 lakhs in lieu of actual appointment with 6% interest from
September, 2013 onwards till the actual payment is made to
respondent no.1.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
G HELD:1.1. Considering the fact that the appointments were
made solely on the basis of the marks allotted in the viva test,
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court,
insofar as holding the entire recruitment process bad, does not
call for any interference. [Para 5][851-D]
H
848
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. SANDEEP KAUSHIK 849
AND ORS.
1.2. It is however pointed out that as on today, no post of A
driver is available. All the subsequent appointments are now being
made on contractual basis and through contractors. As on today,
the age of the respondent No.1 would be approximately 49 years.
The retirement age of the driver is reported to be 55 years. If
respondent No.1 is to be appointed now as driver, he will have to
B
clear the driving test to drive the bus on the road. Considering
the overall facts and circumstances of the case, at this stage, the
actual appointment of respondent No.1 is not possible. Therefore,
if respondent No.1 is awarded a lumpsum compensation in lieu of
actual appointment as a driver with reasonable interest, the same
can be said to be in larger interest and can be said to be doing C
substantial justice. [Para 5][851-E-H]
2. The appellant-transport corporation shall pay a sum of
Rs.7.5 lakhs to respondent No.1 as compensation with 6 per cent
interest from September, 2013 onwards till the actual payment is
made. It will be open for the appellant to recover the same from D
respondent No.2. However, the initial liability to pay the aforesaid
amount would be on the appellant. [Para 6][852-C-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4920-
4921 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2013 of the High Court E
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No.3510 of 2012 and Order dated
05.09.2014 in Review Petition No.195 of 2014 in W.P. (C) No.3510 of
2012.
Dr. Monika Gusain, Adv. for the Appellant.
F
Manish Bhardwaj, Piyush Sharma, Nachiketa Joshi, Shiv Mangal
Sharma, Om Prakash Shukla, Amit Sharma, G. S. Makker, Advs. for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J. G
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 13.09.2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi in Writ Petition No. 3510 of 2012 and the order dated 05.09.2014
H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.
A passed in Review Petition No. 195 of 2014 in Writ Petition No. 3510 of
2012, the Delhi Transport Corporation has preferred the present appeals.
1.1 By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
allowed the writ petition and directed the appellant to appoint the private
respondent herein – original writ petitioner in the writ petition namely,
B Sandeep Kaushik as Driver with seniority as per his merit position without
any back wages.
2. Dr. Monika Gusain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant – Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) has vehemently submitted
that in the present case, the appellant sent a requisition to the respondent
C No. 2 for recruitment of drivers as far as back in the year 2007. It is
submitted that the advertisement was issued to fill up the post of drivers
in the month of January, 2008 and thereafter 14 years have passed and
there are changed circumstances due to which now it is not possible to
reinstate/appoint the private respondent herein – original writ petitioner
on the post of driver.
D
2.1 It is vehemently submitted that as on today there is no post of
driver available on which the private respondent herein – original writ
petitioner can be accommodated and/or reinstated. It is pointed out that
now, all the appointments on the post of drivers are being made
contractually. It is also submitted that the retirement age of the drivers is
E 55 years and the original writ petitioner, at present, would be
approximately of 49 years of age and even if he is to be reinstated/
appointed on the post in question – driver, he has to clear the driving test.
It is pointed out that therefore, at this stage, no actual appointment can
possibly be made.
F 2.2 It is also vehemently submitted by Dr. Monika Gusain, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that in fact there was no
fault and/or illegality on the part of the appellant – DTC. It is submitted
that the entire process of recruitment was handed over to respondent
No.2, who conducted the examination and the entire recruitment process
G and the appellant – DTC was to make the appointment as per the
recommendations made by respondent No.2.
3. Shri Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.2 is not in a position to support their action making the
appointments only on the basis of the marks allotted in the viva test and
without there being any guidelines to bifurcate the marks on different
H
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. SANDEEP KAUSHIK 851
AND ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]
aspects. However, he has submitted that subsequently now the entire A
system has been changed.
4. Mr. Manish Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.1 - original writ petitioner has vehemently submitted that
as such the original writ petitioner has succeeded before the High Court
and the Hon’ble High Court has specifically observed and held that the B
entire recruitment process was bad as the appointments were made
solely on the basis of the marks allotted in the viva test. It is submitted
that the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner is fighting since the
year 2008/2009 and even the Hon’ble High Court has directed to appoint
the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner without back wages.
Therefore, it is prayed not to interfere with the same. C
5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective parties and the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court and considering the fact that the appointments were made
solely on the basis of the marks allotted in the viva test, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court, insofar as holding the D
entire recruitment process bad, does not call for any interference by this
Court.
However, at the same time, the question, which is required to be
considered is whether the respondent No.1 is to be appointed now after
a period of 14 years from the date of initial recruitment and when there E
are changed circumstances due to which it is now not possible to actually
appoint the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner. It is pointed out
that as on today, no post of driver is available. All the subsequent
appointments are now being made on contractual basis and through
contractors. As on today, the age of the respondent No.1 would be F
approximately 49 years. The retirement age of the driver is reported to
be 55 years. If the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner is to be
appointed now as driver, he will have to clear the driving test to drive the
bus on the road. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the opinion that at this stage, the actual appointment of
respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner is not possible. Therefore, we G
are of the opinion that if the respondent No.1 – original writ petitioner is
awarded a lumpsum compensation in lieu of actual appointment as a
driver with reasonable interest, the same can be said to be in larger
interest and can be said to be doing substantial justice. We are of the
opinion that if in lieu of actual appointment, the respondent No. 1 – H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 6 S.C.R.
A original writ petitioner is awarded a sum of Rs. 7.5 lakhs as compensation
with 6 per cent interest from September, 2013 onwards till the actual
payment is made, the same will meet the ends of justice. To the aforesaid
extent, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is to
be modified.
B 6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeals succeed in part. The impugned judgment and order passed
by the High Court is hereby modified and it is directed that the appellant
shall pay a sum of Rs.7.5 lakhs with 6 per cent interest from September,
2013 till the actual payment is made to the respondent No.1 – original
writ petitioner by way of compensation in lieu of actual appointment, to
C be paid within a period of eight weeks from today. It will be open for the
appellant to recover the same from respondent No.2. However, the initial
liability to pay the aforesaid amount would be on the appellant – DTC.
The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is modified
to the aforesaid extent.
D Present appeals are accordingly partly allowed to the aforesaid
extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
be no order as to costs.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals partly allowed.
E
F
G
H
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