DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD.versusEMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPN.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 742
- Decided
- 28 October 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
The kitchen and catering activities of Delhi Gymkhana Club qualify as a "factory" under Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, making the club liable to contributions under the Act.
Summary
The Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd., a members' club with a kitchen and catering division employing more than twenty workers, was held by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation to be covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and was ordered to pay contributions for the period 1980-1985. The club challenged the order, arguing that its kitchen was not a "factory" and that food preparation did not constitute a "manufacturing process", and that, as a non‑profit organization with its own welfare schemes, it should be exempt under Section 1(4) of the Act. The Supreme Court examined the statutory definitions of "factory" and "manufacturing process" (as defined in the Factories Act, 1948) and noted that the club employed over twenty persons, used power in its kitchen, and that cooking alters and prepares food, fitting the definition of manufacturing. Relying on a series of precedents that treated hotel and club kitchens as factories, the Court adopted a liberal interpretation of the beneficial social legislation, rejecting the narrow view advanced by the club. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissed the appeal, and confirmed that the club is liable to pay the ESI contributions. The judgment emphasizes that the purpose of the ESI Act is to provide social security and should not be defeated by technicalities.
Issues considered
- Whether the kitchen and catering operations of Delhi Gymkhana Club constitute a "factory" under Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
- Whether the preparation of food in the club's kitchen amounts to a "manufacturing process" within the meaning of the Act.
- Whether the club is exempt from the Act under Section 1(4) on the ground that it is a non‑profit organization with its own welfare schemes.
Legislation cited
- Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948s. 1(4), s. 1(5), s. 2(12), s. 2(14AA), s. 45-A
- Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1989
- Factories Act, 1948s. 2(k)
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 14 S.C.R. 1082
A DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD.
v.
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPN.
(Civil Appeal No. 2415 of 2003)
B OCTOBER 28, 2014
[T. S. THAKUR AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
· Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948: s.2(12) as stood
prior to Amendment Act 2911989- Expressions 'factory' and
C 'manufacturing process' - Explained - Extending of
· provisions of the Act to persons working in kitchen-catering
division of Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd.- ES/ Act is a
beneficial piece of social welfare legislation aimed at
securing the well-being of employees and court will not adopt
D a narrow interpretation which will have the effect of defeating
the objects of the Act - Kitchen is an integral part of the
club which caters to the needs of its members and their
guests, on payment of money thereby making the appellant-
club fall within the definition of 'factory' u/s 2(12) of ES/ Act. -
E Order of ES/ Corporation u/s 45-A of ES/ Act, holding that
appellant club is covered under provisions of ES! Act,
upheld- Factories Act, 1948- s.2(k)(I).
The instant appeal arose out of the order. dated
4.8.1986 passed by ESI Corporation holding the
F appellant-club as covered under the Employees' State .
Insurance Act, 1948 and directing it to pay the required
contribution in respect of its employees for the period
1.2.1980 to 31.8.1985.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G HELD: 1.1 Even though the terms "kitchen" and
"catering" of a club may not be called a factory in
common parlance, having regard to the definition of
"manufacturing process" and that ESI Act is a beneficial
legislation, a liberal interpretation has to be adopted.
·H
1082
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1083
INSURANCE CORPN.
Therefore, so long as manufacturing process is carried A
on with or without the aid of power by employing more
than twenty persons for wages, it would come within the
meaning of "factory" as defined u/s 2(12) of the ESI Act.
[Para 20][1093-F-H]
The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, B
Employees State Insurance Corporation (2014)
Vol. 9 Scale 177; Employees State Insurance
Corporation v. Hyderabad Race Club, (2004) LLR
769 (SC)= (2004) 6 SCC 191- relied on.
Cricket Club of India, Bombayv. Employees' State
c
Insurance Corporation (1998) LLR 729 (Bombay
HC), Employee~' State Insurance Corporation v.
Jalandhar Gymkhana Club, (1992) LLR 733
(P & H HC) - approved.
D
1.2 Admittedly more than 20 persons are employed
in preparation of foodstuffs and ·serving in the kitch~n
catering division of the appellant club and those
. employees are paid salary, wages, gratuity etc.
Admittedly, the club maintains a kitchen, refrigerator, E
geyser and other equipments are used in making
and preparation of foodstuffs wherein power is used.
[Para 12][1090-B-C]
1.3 The appellant-club is catering to the elite people
of Delhi. Appellant-club provides various services to its F
members and organizes several sports activities. Wide
range of activities of the club are associated With the
large number of staff. Kitchen is an integral part of the
club which caters to the needs of its members and their
guests, on payment of money either in cash or by card, G
where the food items are put for sale, thereby making
the appellant-club fall within the definition of 'factory'
u/s 2(12) of the ESI Act. There is no reason to keep the
employees of the appellant-club out of the welfare
H
1084 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 14 S.C.R.
A coverage of the beneficial legislation like ESI Act.
[Para 13 and 17][1090-F-G; 1092-D-E]
G L. Hotels Limited and Ors. v. TC. Sarin and Anr.
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 808: (1993) 4 sec 363;
Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy
B Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation
And Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 61 ; Transport Corporation
of India v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation
&Anr. 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 393: (2000) 1 sec
332 and Cochin Shipping Co. v. ES/ Corporation
c 1992 (3) SCR 909: (1992) 4 SCC 245 - relied
on.
CASE LAW REFERENCE
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 808 . relied on para 14
D. (2009) 9 sec 61 relied on para 15
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 393 relied on para 19
1992 (3) SCR 909 relied on para 19
(2014) Vol.9 Scale 177 relied on para 21
E (2004) LLR 769 (SC) =(2004)
6 sec 191 relied on para 22
(1998) LLR 729 (Bo!llbay HC) approved para 22
(1992) LLR 733 (P & H HC). approved para 22
F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2415 of 2003.
From the judgment and order dated 15.07.2002 in FAQ
No. 30 of 1987 of the High Court of Delhi at N. Delhi.
Rakesh K. Sharma, Sanjay Kunur, R.N. Keshwani and
G S.N. Bhat,Advs. for the Appellant.
Mahesh Srivastava, Vaibhav M. Srivastava, P.N. Puri,
Murari Kumar, YakeshAnand, Vijay Pratap Singh a·nd Sanjeev
Anand, Ad vs. for the Respondent.
H
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1085
INSURANCE CORPN.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·A
R. BANUMATHI, J.
1. Short point falling for consideration in this appeal is
whether kitchen of the appellant-club and catering section
thereon come within the meaning of "factory" and B
"manufacturing process" as defined in Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948 (for short 'ESI Act').
2. The appellant-Delhi Gymkhana Club is a member club,
duly registered under the Companies Act. Appellant-club has
a kitchen to cook food items to provide food and refreshment c
to its members. On 20.03.1975, a notification was issued by
the Delhi Administration, in exercise of the powers conferred
under Section 1(5) of the ESI Act, stating that the provisions
contemplated under the Act .shall be extended to the
establishments specified in the Schedule thereon. In D
furtherance of the said notification, the respondent-ES!
Corporation sought to apply the provisions of the Act on the
appellant-club, on the ground thatthe preparation of food items
amounts to "manufacturing process" and that the appellant-
club is a factory/establishment covered under the provisions E
of the ESI Act. After issuing the show cause notice, ESI
Corporation passed the order on 4.8.1986 under Section 45-
Aof the ES I Act, holding that M/s. Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited
is covered under the provisions of Employees State Insurance
Act, directing the appellant to pay Rs.6,82,655.40 as a F
contribution of insurance in respect of employees for the period
from 1.02.1980 to 31.08.1985, along with interest@6% per
annum.
3.Aggrieved, the appellant filed-a petition in the ESI Court
which, by a judgment dated 25.11.1986, while allowing the G
petition of the appellant-club, held that preparation of eatables
does not fall under "manufacturing process" and hence, ESI
Act is not applicable to the appellant-club and the appellant
was not liable to pay contribution. Aggrieved by the same,
respondent-corporation preferred appeal before the High H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
A Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and held that the
kitchen is an integral part of the club and that cooking of
foodstuffs amounts to 'manufacturing process' falling within the
meaning of sub-section ( 14AA) of Section 2 of tlie ESI Act,
thereby falling within the meaning of 'factory' as defined under
B Section 2(12) of ESIAct. Being aggrieved, the appellant-club
is in appeal before us.
·1
4. Contention of the appellant is that the Club is a non-
profit organization, exclusively rendering facilities. to its
(Tlembers and that the ESI Act is not applicable to them. It is
C contended that social security perks, better than the ones
contemplated under the ESI Act, are already put in place for
the benefit of employees. Contending that preparation of food
iterns does not amount to"manufacturing process' and that
provisions of ESI Act are not applicable to the club, the
D appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in· Indian
Hotels Co. Ltd. Vs. I. T.O. (2000) 7 SCC 39, wherein it was
held that preparation of foodstuffs in hotel kitchen is merely
processing of food to make it .edible and that there is no
manufacturing process.
E 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the purpose is to extend the benefit of the
scheme to the employees working in the appellant-club and
while doing so, the object of welfare legislations, like the ESI
Act, ought to be kept in mind. Refuting the appellant's contention
F that preparation of foodstuffs in the kitchen does not amount
to 'manufacturing process', the respondent placed reliance on
the decision of this Court in GL. Hotels vs. T.C. Sarin (1993)
4 sec 363, wherein it was held that cooking forms part of
manufacturing process, as it alters and treats or otherwise
G adapts an article of food or substance with a view to its use,
sale, delivery or disposal in the club. It was submitted that the
High Court rightly held that the kitchen of the appellant falls
. within the meaning of'factory' as defined under Section 2(12)
of the ESIAct.
H
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1087
INSURANCE CORPN. [R. BANUMATHI, J.)
6. We have carefully considered the submissions and A
perused the materials on record.
7. ESI Act is made applicable under Section 1(4) to all
factories including factories belonging to the Government, other
than seasonal factori~s. Proviso appended to Section 1(4) of
the ESI Act carves out an exception. Sub-section (4) of Section B
1 of the ESI Act shall not apply to a factory or establishment·
belonging to or under the control of the Government whose
employees are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially
similar or superior to the benefits provided under this Act.
8. The provisions of Section 1(5) of the ESIAct enable C
the appropriate government to issue notification in respect of
any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial,
commercial, agricultural or otherwise. In exercise of its powers
under Section 1(5) of the Act, the Delhi Administration issued
the notification dated 20.03.1975 extending the provisions of D
the Act to certain establishments. -
Relevant portion of the said notification reads as under:
"1. Any premises including the precincts In the
thereof whereon ten or more persons Union E
but in any case less than twenty persons, Territory
are employed or were employed for of Delhi.
wages on any day of the preceding
twelve months and in any part of which
a manufacturing process is being F
carried on with the aid of power or is
ordinarily so carried on; but excluding a
mine subject to the operation of the
Mines Act 1952 (35of1952) or railway
running shed or an establishment which G
is exclusively engaged in any of the
manufacturing process specified in
clause (12) of Section 2 of the.
Employees State Insurance Act, 1948
(34of1948). H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S.C.R.
I
A 2. Any premises including the precincts In the
thereof whereon twenty or more Union
persons are employed or were Territory
employed for wages on any day of the of Delhi.
preceding twelve months, and in any
B part of which a manufacturing process
is being carried on without the aid of
power, or is ordinarily so carried on; but
excluding a mine subject to the
operation of the Mine Act, 1952 (35 of
c . 1952) to a railway running shed or an
establishment which is exclusively
engaged in any of the manufacturing
process specified in clause (12) of
Section 2 of the Employees' State
D Insurance Act, 1948 · (34 of
1948).3."." '.-. " ... "
In furtherance of the above notification, the ESI
Corporation sought to apply the provisions of the Act to the
appellant-club.
E 9. The word "factOry" has been defined in Section 2(12)
of ESI Act as under:-
"2(12) "factory" mea.ns any premises including the
precincts thereof whereon twenty or more persons are
employed or were employed for wages on any day of
F
the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a
manufacturing process if being carried on with the aid
of power or is ordinarily so carried on but does not
include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines
Act, 1952 (35of1952), or a railway running shed."
G
The above definition is prior to the amendment Act 29/
1989. In this appeal, we are concerned with the definition of
"factory" as it ex~sted prior to October 20, 1989.
10. Prior to Act 29/1989, in Section 2(12) of the ESIAct,
H the expressions "manufacturing process", "power" shall have
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1089
INSURANCE CORPN. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
the meaning respectively assigned to them in the Factories A
Act, 1948. After Act 29 of 1989, a separate definition for
"manufacturing process" has been incorporated in sub-section ·
(14AA) of Section 2 which practically has the same effect. It is
seen from the definition of "factory" that the following conditions
are to be satisfied in order to make any premises including B
the precincts thereof a factory:
(1) in the premises including the precincts thereof
twenty or more persons are employed or were
employed for wages on any day of the preceding
twelve months; C
(2) in any part of these premises or precincts, a
manufacturing process is being carried on, and
(3) such manufacturing process must be carried on
with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on. D
11. "Manufacturing process" has been defined in Section
2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 as under:-
"2. (l<) 'manufacturing process' means process for -
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, E
packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up,
demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting
any article or substance wlth a view to its use,
sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or
(ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; F
or
(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power;
or
(iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter
press, lithography, photogravure or other similar G
process or book binding; or
(v) constructing, reconstructing, repairir)g, refitting,
finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or
(vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage." H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 14 S.C.R.
A For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only
with Section 2(k) (i) of the FactoriesAct.
12. We need not go into the details of the number of
employees working in the kitchen of the appellant-club, as
admittedly more than 20 persons are employed in preparation
B of foodstuffs and serving in the kitchen-catering division and
those employees are paid salary, wages, gratuity etc.
Admittedly, the club maintains a kitchen, refrigerator, geyser
and other equipments are used in making and preparation of
foodstuffs wherein power is used. That food items are being
C prepared in the kitchen and being served in the kitchen of the
appellant-club to appellant-club's members and their guests
for payment is not disputed.
13. The object of the appellant-club is to promote polo,
hunting, racing, tennis and other games, athletic sports and
0 recreations amongst its members. Huge contribution is
collected for becoming members of the club and only the
privileged can become the members of the appe!fant-club.
There are wide range of sports activities, recreations and big
budget is involved. The kitchen of the club has a direct
E connection with the activities carried on in the rest of the club
precincts. The members and the guests of the members share
the services of the kitchen. The ESI Act is enacted to provide
certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity
in case offemale employees, employment injury and to make
F provision in certain other matters in relation thereto. We find
no reason as to why the employees of the appellant-club should
be kept out of the welfare coverage of the beneficial legislation
like ESIAct.
14. Let us now examine whether preparation of food
G items in the kitchen of the appellant-club amounts to
"manufacturing process" bringing the club within the purview
of the definition of 'factory'. it has been consistently held by
this Court that preparation of foodstuffs in hotels and
H restaurants amounts to manufacturing process, thereby
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1091
INSURANCE CORPN. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
invoking the applicability of the provisions of the ESI Act. This A
Court in G.L. Hotels Limited and Ors. vs. T. C. Sarin and Anr.,
(1993) 4 SCC 363 has affirmed the views of the High Court
that "since the manufacturing process in the form of cooking
and preparing food is carried on in the kitchen and the kitchen
is a part of the hotel or a part of the precinct of the hotel, the B
entire hotel falls within the purview of the definition of "Factory"."
15. In Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant vs. Deputy
Director, Employees· State Insurance Corporation And Anr.,
(2009) 9 sec 61, the question for consideration was whether
the appellant-restaurant, which was using LPG gas for C
preparation of coffee, tea and other beverages, is covered
under the ESIAct. Observing that it is a settled position of law
that cooking, preparing of food items qualifies as
manufacturing process and that the use of LPG satisfies the
definition of power, this Court in paragraphs (27) and (39) D
held as under:-
27. Both the appellants prepare sweets, savouries and
other beverages in their establishments. It is a settled
position of law that cooking and preparing food items
qualifies as manufacturing process. In ES/ v. Spencer & E ·
Co. Ltd. (1978 Lab IC 1759 Mad) the Madras High Court
held, while dealing with the case of a hotel run by Spencer
and Co., that preparation of coffee, peeling of potatoes,
making bread toast, etc. in a hotel, involve "manufacturing
process". Similarly, the Bombay High Court in Poona F
Industrial Hotel Ltd. v. /. C. Sarin (1980 Lab IC 100 Born),
held that the kitchen attached to Hotel Blue Diamond run
by the petitioners therein, should be considered as a
"factory" forthe purpose of the ES I Act. Hence, it is beyond
. doubt that there is manufacturing process involved in the G
establishment of the appellants.
39. In our view, the use of LPG satisfies the definition of
power as it is mechanically transmitted and is not H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 14 S;C.R.
· A something generated by human or animal agency. Since
the esta_blishments of the appellants involve a
manufacturing process with the aid of LPG, which can
now be termed as power, the establishments of tlie
appellants can be termed as factories, and therefore,
B the ESI Act will apply to these establishments."
16. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the
above decisions are in respect of hotels and the appellant is
only a club which has been running a kitchen and catering
division only for the benefit of its members and the same is
C · not for the purpose of making any profit and it should be held
that the appellant-club does not fall within the definition of
"factory" under Section 2(12) of the ESIAct. We find no merit
·in the above submission.
17. The appellant-club is catering to the elite people of
D Delhi. Appellant-club provides various services to its members
and organizes several sports activities. Wide range of activities
of the club are associated with the large number of staff.
Kitchen is an integral part of the club which caters to the
needs of its members and their guests, on payment of money
E either in cash or by card, where the food items are put for
sale, thereby making the appellant-club fall within the definition
of 'factory' under Section 2(12) of the ESI Act. All the persons
employed for the purpose of supply and distribution of food·
prepared in the kitchen and for doing other incidental duties in
F connection with the kitchen and catering are to be regarded
as employees of the factory. It hardly matters for the employee
whether the appellant's kitchen is run with any profit making
motive or not.
G 18. The object of ESI Act is to provide certain benefits
to the employees in case of sickness, maternity and
employment injury and also to make provision for certain other
matters in relation thereto. ES I Act is a beneficial piece of social
welfare legislation aimed at securing the well-being of the
H employees and the court will not adopt a narrow interpretation
which will have the effect of defeating the objects of the Act.
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1093
INSURANCE CORPN. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
19. In the case of Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant A
vs. Dy. Director ES/ Corporation &Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 61 in
paragraph 20 it has been held as under:-
"20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial
legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the
Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to B
employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity
and employment injury and to make provision for certain
other matters in relation thereto. The Employees' State
Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the ..
canons of interpreting a social legislation are different C
from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The
courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would
defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts
must even, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in
order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had D
in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act,
therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to
promote its objects."
The same principle was reiterated in Transport
Corporation of India vs. Employees' State Insurance E
Corporation &Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 332 and Cochin Shipping
Co. vs. ES/ Corporation (1992) 4 SCC 245.
20. Even though the term "kitchen", "catering" of a club
may not be called a factory in common parlance, having regard F
to the definition of "manufacturing process" and that ESI Act is·
a beneficial legislation, a liberal interpretation has to be
adopted. Therefore, so long as manufacturing process is
carried on with or without the aid of power by employing more
than twenty persons for wages, it would come within the G
meaning of"factory" as defined under Section 2(12) of the ESI
Act. The contention that the appellant-club is a non-profit
making organization would not take away the same from the
purview of the Act.
H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 14 S.C.R.
A 21. In The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. vs. Regional Director;
E;mployees State Insurance Corporation reported in (2014)
Vol.9 Scale 177, the question which was referred to a larger
Bench was "whether the Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. being
engaged in organizing sports activities which involves
B providing of service to the members of the Club and outsiders
can be construed as a "shop" for the purpose of extending
the benefits under the ESIAct." Referring to Cochin Shipping
Co. vs. ES! Corporation (supra) and Bombay Anand Bhavan
Restaurant vs. Deputy Director ES/ Corporation & Anr.
c,. (supra), in paragraphs (71) and (72), it was held as under:
"71. It has consistently been the stand of the Appellants-
herein that the term 'shop' must be understood in its
'tradit:onal sense'. However, as has been observed by
this Court. in the case of Bombay Anand Bhavan
D Restaurant(supra), the language of the ESIAct may also
be strained by this Court, if necessary. The scheme
and context of the ESI Act must be given due
.consideration by this Court. A narrow meaning should
not be attached to the words used in the ESI Act. This
E Court should bear in mind that the ESIAct seeks to insure
the employees of covered establishments against various
risks to their life, health and well-being a'ld places the
said charge upon the empioyer.
72. We find that the term 'shop' as urged to be understood
F and interpreted in its. traditional sensewould not serve
the purpose of the. ESI Act. Fur~her in light of the
judgments discussed above and in particular the Cochin
Shipping Case (supra)' and the Bombay Anand Bhavan
Case (supra), this Court is of the opinion that an
G expansive meaning may be assigned to the word 'shop'
forthe purposes of the ESIAct. As has been found above,
the activities of the Appellant-Turf Clubs is in the nature
of organized and systematic transactions, and further that
the said Turf Clubs provide services to members as well
H as public in lieu of consideration. Therefore, the
DELHI GYMKHANA CLUB LTD. v. EMPLOYEES STATE 1095
INSURANCE CORPN. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
Appellant-Turf Clubs are a 'shop' for the purpose of A
extending the benefits under the ESI Act."
22. In Employees State Insurance Corporation vs.
Hyderabad Race Club, (2004) LLR 769 (SC)=(2004) 6 SCC
191, this Court has clarified that a club will be coverable under
the ESIAct. B
23. In Cricket Club of India, Bombay vs. Employees'
State Insurance Corporption (1998) LLR 729 (Bombay HG),
the Bombay High Court has held that ESI Act will apply to a
club since there was no distinction between a hotel and a club.
In Erryployees' State Insurance Corporation vs. Jalandhar C
Gymkhana Club, (1992) LLR 733 (P & H HG), the Punjab
and Haryana High Court considered the question whether
manufacturing process is being carried on in the kitchen of
the club, rendering catering services to its members. It was
held that a perusal of sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of Section 2(k) of D
the Factories Act would make it clear that preparation of the
items which are prepared in the kitchen and the preservation
and storing of any articles in the cold storage would amount to
a manufacturing process.
E
24. The counsel for the appellant claimed exemption
under Section 1(4) of the ESIAct, contending that the club is
already providing medical facilities and that they have staff
welfare fund out of which employees are paid in cases· of death,
funeral expenses and in case of illness and hence ESI Act is F
not applicable to them. The provisions of ESI Act must be
construed along the lines of the objects of the Act so that the
benefits of welfare legislation are not curtailed. ESI Act
provides a kind of social security and employees are one of
the most vulnerable ar.d deprived section of the society, who G
are in the constant need of protection, security and assistance.
The social security system needs to be effective and
ccnstructive and should have more coverage areas.
Government has the obligation to protect working class from
uncertain contingencies so that they can happily contribute H
towards social security schemes. ESI Act and all the provisions
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 14 S.C.R.
A of the Act are significant and are meant to realize state's
obligation in safeguarding the rights provided under Part IV of
the Constitution. The appellant's contention regarding
adequate social security benefits being already in place is not
tenable.
B 25. In the light of the various decisions and the view taken
by this Court in GL. Hotels case, the High Court has rightly
held that the preparation of food items in the kitchen of the
appellant-club amounts to "manufacturing process" and that
the employees are covered under the purview of the ESI Act.
C Considering the activities of the appellant-club and that the
kitchen catering forms an integral part of the appellarit-club,
the High Court rightly held that the appellant-club falls within
the purview of the ESI Act and we do not find any infirmity in
the order passed by the High Court.
D 26. Learned counsel for the appellant-club then submitted
that the order under Section 45-A was passed in 1986 and by
this time the contribution amount payable would have
accumulated and, therefore submitted that in case ifthe Court
holds that the employees of the appellant-club are covered
E under the ESI Act, the contribution should be made prospective
from the date of the order passed by this Court. The Act being
a beneficial legislation, the above contention cannot be
countenanced. ESI contribution ought to have been paid when
the demand was made in 1986. It is very unfortunate that the
F appellant-club has not paid the ESI contribution of its
employees for more than three decades and is not justified in
seeking for prospective operation of the order.
27. The impugned order of the High Court does not suffer
G from any infirmity warranting interference. We find no merit in
the appeal and the same is dismissed.
Rajendra Prasad Appeal dismissed.
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