DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYversusHELLO HOME EDUCATION SOCIETY
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 33
- Decided
- 11 January 2024
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
Mere notings and in‑principle approvals do not confer a vested right, and a subsequent policy requiring land allocation by auction applies to pending cases, rendering the Society's claim untenable.
Summary
The Hello Home Education Society sought to establish a junior high school in Vasant Kunj and obtained an essentiality certificate and sponsorship letter only for Jasola. Despite an in‑principle approval by the Lieutenant Governor in 2003, the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) changed its policy in December 2003 to allocate educational land only through public auction, a policy later reinforced by the 2006 amendment to the 1981 Rules. The Society filed a writ petition in 2014 demanding the issuance of an allotment letter, but the High Court granted relief, which the DDA appealed. The Supreme Court held that mere notings and in‑principle approvals do not create vested rights, that the policy change applied to pending cases, and that the Society’s 11‑year delay barred equitable relief. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court orders and dismissed the writ petition, allowing the DDA's appeal.
Issues considered
- The effect of an in‑principle approval and internal notings on the creation of vested rights.
- Whether a change in policy and amendment of the 1981 Rules applying to pending cases defeats the Society's claim.
- The impact of the Society's inordinate delay on its entitlement to relief under Article 226.
- The applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of policy change.
- The relevance of area‑specific essentiality certificates and sponsorship letters to land allotment.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 454 : 2024 INSC 33
Delhi Development Authority
v.
Hello Home Education Society
(Civil Appeal Nos. 3659-3660 of 2023)
11 January 2024
[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Mere notings and in-principle approvals, if confers a vested
right; in view of the change in policy decision and the amended
1981 Rules that the allotment of land would be made through
auction and also included those cases where allotment was
yet to be made, if the High Court was justified in granting
relief to the respondent society; and that the litigant who is
not diligent, if could invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of
the High Court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
Headnotes
Administrative law – Policy decision – Change in policy –
Mere notings and in-principle approvals, reliance upon to
claim any right – Matter pertaining to allotment of land to
respondent-Educational Society to establish School in Jasola
area, wherein the Society secured an Essentiality Certificate
and Sponsorship Letter for that area – Complaint by a resident
of Vasant Kunj alleging that the Society was trying to get an
illegal allotment of land in Vasant Kunj – In-principle approval
of the Lieutenant Governor for Vasant Kunj – Thereafter,
Institutional Allotment Committee made recommendation
for allotment of land to the Society in Vasant Kunj, but no
allotment letter issued – Meanwhile change in policy by the
Development Authority that allotment of land to Educational
Institutions to be made through auction and any further
allotment would be covered by the policy decision – Writ
petition by the Society seeking direction to the department
to implement the decision already taken for allotment of plot
to the Society for establishment of school in Vasant Kunj, at
par with the other Education Society – Direction by the Single
Judge to issue allotment letter – Division Bench upheld the
order – Correctness:
* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 455
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
Held: In-principle approval by the Lieutenant Governor for allotment
of land in Vasant Kunj having been granted in 2003, there was no
justification for the Society to file a writ petition in the year 2014
on the basis thereof – Essentiality Certificate and Sponsorship
Letter were with respect to setting up an educational institution in
Jasola Area – Said certificates and the requirements were area
specific – Appellant could not be compelled to make an allotment
where the essential and mandatory conditions were not fulfilled
– Policy decision of 2003 and the 1981 Rules amended in 2006
clearly mentioned that allotment of land would be made through
auction and also included those cases where allotment was yet
to be made – Before the date of change in policy, there was no
allotment of land in favour of the respondent – There was no
challenge either to the policy decision or to the 1981 Rules – Merely
seeking a Writ on the strength of the in-principle approval given
by the Lieutenant Governor would not be maintainable in view of
the change situation arisen much earlier to the filing of the writ
petition – Furthermore, mere notings and in-principle approvals
do not confer a vested right – Also, any allotment made contrary
to the existing policy and rules, would not form basis of benefit
being extended to another society as under law negative parity is
not recognised or approved – Single Judge and Division Bench
of the High Court erred while granting relief to the Society, thus,
the impugned orders set aside – Delhi Development Authority
(Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981. [Paras 18.1-
18.4, 18.7, 18.9, 18.10, 19]
Delay/Laches – Inordinate delay in approaching the Court –
Effect:
Held: Litigant who is not diligent cannot invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court u/Art. 226 – On facts, in-principle
approval having been granted on 24.03.2003, there was no
justification for the Society to wait for 11 years to file a writ petition
in the year 2014 on the basis of the said in-principle approval of
the Lieutenant Governor – Society ought to have exercised due
diligence and should have claimed its rights within a reasonable
time from the date of said in- principle approval if the same was
not being implemented and the allotment letter was not being
issued – There is no justifiable or satisfactory explanation for the
said period of inordinate delay of 11 years – Constitution of India
– Art. 226. [Para 18.1]
Administrative Law – Policy decisions – Internal notings, if
would confer any right or not:
456 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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Held: Until and unless the decision taken on file is converted into a
final order to be communicated and duly served on the concerned
party, no right accrues to the said party – Mere notings and in-
principle approvals do not confer a vested right. [Para 18.7]
Case Law Cited
Bachhittar Singh vs State of Punjab [1962] Suppl. SCR
713 : AIR 1963 SC 395; Sethi Auto Service Station vs
DDA [2008] 14 SCR 598 : (2009) 1 SCC 180; Mahadeo
vs Sovan Devi Civil Appeal No. 5876 of 2022 (decided
on 30.08.2022); Howrah Municipal Corporation & Ors.
Vs. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2003] 6 Suppl.
SCR 1212 : (2004) 1 SCC 663; State of Orissa & Anr.
vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) thr. LRs & Ors. 2023
INSC 619 paras 23-34; Municipal Committee, Barwala,
District Hisar, Haryana through its Secretary/President
v. Jai Narayan and Company and Another (2022) SCC
Online SC 376 – referred to.
List of Acts
Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land)
Rules, 1981; Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed
Nazul Land) Amendment Rules, 2006.
List of Keywords
Essentiality Certificate; Sponsorship Letter; Land Allotment
Committee; Mis-conception; In-principle approval; Allotment of
public land; Educational sites; Tender; Public Auction; Writ of
Mandamus; Natural principle of justice; Change in policy; Doctrine
of legitimate expectation; Retrospective effect; Vested right;
Internal notings; Change in law; Policy decision; Negative parity;
Public interest; Transparency; Inordinate delay; Ministerial act;
Extraordinary jurisdiction; Article 226; Due diligence.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.3659-3660 of
2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2021 in LPA No.224 of
2019 and dated 22.02.2022 in RP No.15 of 2022 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 457
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Madhavi Divan, ASG, Nitin Mishra, Shreeyash U Lalit, Ms. Mitali
Gupta, Ms. Anandrita, Ms. Akshita Goyal, Aditya Goyal, Ms. Apurva
Gaur, Shubham Saigal, Advs. for the Appellant.
Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Dilip Singh,
Ms. Raj Lakshmiverma, Pramod Tiwari, Vivek Tiwari, Ms. Priyanka
Dubey, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1. These appeals by the Delhi Development Authority assail the
correctness of the judgment and order dated 12.11.2021 passed by
the High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No.224 of 2019, whereby the appeal
filed by the appellant was dismissed and the judgment of the learned
Single Judge dated 15.11.2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.4459 of
2014 allowing the writ petition was confirmed. Further challenge is
to an order dated 22.02.2022 passed in Review Petition No. 15 of
2022, by which the review petition was effectively dismissed except
for a clarification that in the main judgement, in place of ‘Jasola’ with
respect to the resolution of Institutional Allotment Committee1 and
the approval of Lieutenant Governor, the word ‘Vasant Kunj’ be read.
Brief facts:
2. Hello Home Educational Society 2 desired to establish a new
Junior High School (Class I to Class VIII) in Jasola area, New
Delhi. For the said purpose, the Society was required to obtain an
Essentiality Certificate, Sponsorship Letter and also the necessary
recommendation from the appropriate authority. On 27.12.2000,
an Essentiality Certificate was issued by the Deputy Director of
Education. Thereafter, on 08.01.2002, Sponsorship Letter was issued
by the Estate Branch, Lucknow Road, Delhi for setting up the Middle
School in Jasola, District South Zone. It is after the fulfilment of these
two conditions that the Land Allotment Committee recommends for
allotment of the land.
1 IAC
2 The Society
458 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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3. According to paragraph 4 of the Sponsorship Letter, the same
was valid for five years and the allotment of land would be made
subject to Essentiality Certificate being valid and only for the area
recommended. It further provided that in case land is not available in
that area, the Society could approach the Land Allotment Committee
for fresh sponsorship in areas where the land is available.
4. Having obtained necessary permissions, the Society applied on
09.09.2002 vide Form No.3124 for allotment of one acre of land in the
following three areas namely: Jasola, Sarita Vihar and Vasant Kunj.
5. The IAC made recommendation for allotment of land to the Society
in Vasant Kunj vide letter dated 23.01.2004. It appears that this
letter recommending allotment of land in Vasant Kunj was issued
under some mis-conception. The Sponsorship Letter and Essentiality
Certificate had been issued for Jasola area only and there was no
Essentiality Certificate or Sponsorship Letter for Vasant Kunj area.
Vasant Kunj area was in Zone 20, whereas Jasola in Zone 25 at
the relevant time and now it is in Zone 29.
6. A complaint was made by one Mr. Sukhbir Singh, who was a resident
of Vasant Kunj on 21.02.2003, stating that the Society was trying
to illegally get an allotment in Vasant Kunj area for establishing a
school whereas the sponsorship letter was issued by the Directorate
of Education for Jasola area. Despite the said objection, being on
record and also the fact that the Society was not entitled to any
allotment in any area other than for which the Essentiality Certificate
and Sponsorship Letter had been issued, the file for allotment of
land measuring 0.54 hectares in Pocket 6 & 7, Sector-B, Vasant
Kunj was prepared and submitted for approval. The said file was
also placed before the Lieutenant Governor who had in turn granted
the in-principle approval for the same on 24.03.2003.
7. Despite the in-principle approval of the Lieutenant Governor, no
allotment letter was issued to the Society. A note was made on the
same day for verification of the complaint before proceeding any
further. The Director of Education was required to give a clarification
as to how the land was recommended for allotment in Vasant Kunj
area, in place of Jasola. These communications are dated 31.03.2003
and 03.04.2003. The note regarding verification of the complaint was
made on the same file in which in-principle approval was granted
by the Lieutenant Governor and it was recorded that only after
verification, the matter was to be proceeded further.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 459
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
8. In the meantime, a resolution was passed on 15.12.2003 by the
competent body of the appellant that allotment of land to Educational
Institutions running on commercial lines should be made through
auction including the cases where the allotment was yet to be made.
As no allotment had been made in favour of the Society, any further
allotment would be covered by the policy decision dated 15.12.2003.
A second complaint dated 19.01.2004 was made by one Mr. A.B.
Gour on similar lines as the complaint dated 21.02.2003. Several
other complaints were received with respect to allotment of public
land for educational sites to establish institutions on commercial
basis. Considering the seriousness of complaints, a CBI enquiry
was directed to be conducted.
9. In the meantime, the Society applied for Essentiality Certificate for
establishing Junior High School (Class I to Class VIII) for Vasant Kunj
area. The Competent Authority i.e. the Deputy Director of Education,
vide letter dated 29.01.2004, issued the Essentiality Certificate for
Vasant Kunj area. Once again it was limited for a period of five years
subject to obtaining all other necessary permissions and fulfilment
of all conditions. The Central Government, in consultation with the
appellant amended the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal
of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 19813 vide Delhi Development
Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Amendment Rules,
2006, dated 19.04.2006 making it mandatory that allotment of land
could be made either through Auction or by Tender.
10. The appellant, vide communication dated 19.06.2008, rejected the
request for allotment in view of the changed policy and required
the Society to participate in public auction of school sites, if it was
so interested. The appellant again, vide letter dated 18.05.2012 in
response to request letter of the Society dated 30.01.2011, informed
that the request for allotment letter had been examined and duly
rejected by the competent authority.
11. The Society, in the meantime, approached the High Court of Delhi
by way of W.P.(Civil) No.4459 of 2014 on 19.07.2014 praying for
a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent therein to implement
the decision already taken for allotment of institutional plot to the
3 For short, “1981 Rules”
460 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
appellant in view of the approval granted for Vasant Kunj area. Parity
was also claimed with one Jyotika Education Society decided by the
Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No.1670-71 of 2006. Relief claimed in the
writ petition is reproduced hereunder:
i) To issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate
order or direction directing the respondents to implement the
decision already taken for allotment of an institutional plot to
the petitioner for establishment of a middle school in Vasant
Kunj pocket 6&7 Sector B and at par with Jyotika Education
society and other matter decided by the Hon’ble Court decided
in LPA No. 1670-71/2006.
ii) Quash the impugned letter dated 19/06/2003 and 18/05/2012
as the allotment to establish the middle school was approved
by the Hon’ble on 24/03/2003 much prior to the notification of
change in policy i.e. 19/04/2006 hence both the impugned letter
against the natural principle of justice.
iii) Restore the letter of sponsorship issued by the Directorate of
Education in 2003.
iv) Any other relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper
in the facts and circumstances of the case may, also be granted.
12. The appellant filed its counter affidavit and additional affidavit. After
exchange of pleadings, the learned Single Judge, vide judgment
dated 15.11.2018, quashed the communications dated 19.06.2008
and 18.05.2012 and further directed the appellant to issue allotment
letter forthwith. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition
on the following findings:
i) The complaint made was with respect to the allotment in Jasola
and not Vasant Kunj;
ii) Vasant Kunj and Jasola fall in the same zone;
iii) Change in policy cannot be made retrospectively;
iv) Doctrine of legitimate expectation should have been invoked
in favour of the Society;
v) The right to allotment had accrued to the Society in March,
2003 and the same could not be nullified.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 461
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
13. The appellant was aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single
Judge as, according to it, the judgment was both factually and legally
incorrect and as such unsustainable. It preferred an intra-Court appeal
before the Division Bench which was registered as L.P.A. No.224 of
2019. The Division Bench, by the impugned order dated 12.11.2021,
dismissed the appeal on the reasoning that change of policy from
allotment to auction could not have any retrospective effect, and
therefore, the rejection of allotment was illegal. The appellant filed a
Review Petition before the Division Bench registered as R.P.No.15 of
2022, which was disposed of, vide order dated 22.02.2022 without
interfering with the main order, except for a clarification. It is against
these two orders that the present appeals have been filed.
14. This Court, while issuing notice on 13.07.2022, passed an interim
order staying the operation and effect of the impugned orders. The
fact thus remains that till date no allotment has been made in favour
of the respondent Society.
15. We have heard Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor
General for the appellant and Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned
senior counsel for the respondent.
ARGUMENTS BY APPELLANT
16. The arguments advanced by Ms. Divan may be briefly summarised
as under:
i) The respondent had no vested right conferred upon them as
no allotment had taken place in their favour at any time. It
was merely a noting in the office file and in-principle approval
of the Lieutenant Governor. However, with a rider that the
complaint already made by Mr. Sukhbir Singh on 21.02.2003
was to be verified and thereafter further process was to take
place. Subsequently, the Society had been duly communicated
that the request for allotment had been rejected which was
communicated twice; firstly, on 19.06.2008 and later on
18.05.2012.
ii) The internal notings are not decisions and do not confer any
right, till such time, the decision taken on file is translated into
allotment order and duly communicated to the allottee. Mere
internal notings and approval cannot form a basis for claiming
a right. Reliance was placed upon the following judgments:
462 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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a. Bachhittar Singh vs State of Punjab4
b. Sethi Auto Service Station vs DDA5
c. Mahadeo vs Sovan Devi6.
iii) Once there is a change in law, a policy decision taken by the
competent authority, where allotment was replaced by ‘public
auction’ or ‘tender’ and such policy decision also providing that
this change would apply to even pending cases, no claim could
be set up by the Society contrary to the said change in policy.
The Society was duly communicated that as and when auction
for educational sites is held, it was at liberty to participate in
the same. Reliance was placed upon the following judgement
for this preposition:
a. Howrah Municipal Corporation & Ors. Vs. Ganges
Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors.7.
iv) It was mandatory to possess an Essentiality Certificate and the
Sponsorship Letter from the competent authority for specific
zones where the institution was to be set up or established.
In the present case, initially the Society had the Essentiality
Certificate and the Sponsorship Letter for Jasola area. Later
on it only had obtained an Essentiality Certificate for Vasant
Kunj area. It admittedly till date has no Sponsorship Letter for
Vasant Kunj area. As such also the Society was not eligible
for any allotment of educational site or for that matter even
eligible for applying for setting up an educational institution in
Vasant Kunj area.
v) The claim of the Society that allotments had been made in favour
of the Vikram Shilla Education Society, High Brow Education
Society and M/s Jyotika Education Welfare Society would not be
of any help for two reasons. Firstly, all these Societies possessed
the Essentiality Certificate and the Sponsorship Letters for the
specific areas where allotment was sought. Secondly, if any
wrong had been committed in allotting educational sites to these
three Societies, no negative parity could be claimed on its basis.
4 AIR 1963 SC 395
5 (2009) 1 SCC 180
6 Civil Appeal No. 5876 of 2022 (decided on 30.08.2022)
7 (2004) 1 SCC 663
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 463
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
vi) The plea of a legitimate expectation raised by the Society on
the basis of the in-principle approval of the Lieutenant Governor
also was unfounded in law. The said doctrine of legitimate
expectation would not be affected in the present case, for the
reason that once a policy decision had been taken in larger
public interest and also to maintain transparency in dealing with
land belonging to the State, to be settled by way of auction or
tender, the liberty was also given to the Society to apply and
participate.
vii) The request for allotment was made as far back as March,
2003. The policy had changed on 15.12.2003, the 1981 Rules
had also been amended later on in April 2006, the rejection
for allotment was made in 2008 and 2012, the Society for the
first time challenged the rejection only in July 2014. It never
challenged the change in the policy decision nor the amendment
to the 1981 Rules. As such there was an inordinate delay of
10 years on the part of the Society in filing the writ petition.
Today after 20 years, there can be no justification for making
any such allotment.
viii) Learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench committed
factual and legal error in allowing the writ petition and dismissing
the appeal of the appellant respectively. It was thus prayed that
the appeal be allowed and the impugned order be set aside
and the writ petition filed by the Society be dismissed.
ARGUMENTS BY RESPONDENT
17. On the other hand, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior
counsel, defended the impugned orders while making the following
submissions:
i) The appellant had been continuously changing its stand in the
pleadings filed before the High Court and before this Court. Most
of the arguments advanced before this Court were not pleaded
or raised before the High Court. This Court may, therefore, not
consider such pleadings, documents and arguments which are
not available before the High Court.
ii) In particular, it was pointed out that the fact regarding the CBI
enquiry was never raised before and was being raised for the
first time before this Court. The fact that there was no need for
464 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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a school in Vasant Kunj area is also being raised for the first
time before this Court. The fact that Vasant Kunj and Jasola
fall in different Zones has also been raised for the first time
before this Court.
iii) The Lieutenant Governor being the highest executive authority
and having approved in-principle allotment in favour of the
Society in Vasant Kunj area on 24.03.2003, nothing further was
required to be deliberated upon and it was just a ministerial
act of issuing the allotment letter pursuant to the said approval
which was required. The appellant for reasons best known to
it delayed the issue of allotment letter and over a period of
time have been raising all kinds of frivolous pleas to deprive
the Society from the allotment and establishing an educational
institution in Vasant Kunj area.
iv) The change in policy could not be given retrospective effect.
The in-principle approval was granted on 24.03.2003, whereas
the change in policy came in December, 2003. The 1981 Rules
were much later amended in April 2006. The Society would be
entitled to be dealt with the practice and procedure existing at
the time when the request was made and in-principle approval
was granted by the Lieutenant Governor.
v) Lastly it was submitted that in similar facts and circumstances,
the appellant had allotted land to different Societies even after
the change of policy and the amendment in the 1981 Rules
without holding public auction or by tender process.
ANALYSIS
18. Having considered the submissions advanced, our analysis on the
various issues is as under:
18.1 Taking up the last point first as raised by the appellant that
there was inordinate delay in approaching the Court, we find
much substance in the same. It is well settled that the litigant
who is not diligent cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The in-principle approval having been granted on 24.03.2003,
there was no justification for the Society to wait for 11 years
to file a writ petition in the year 2014 on the basis of the said
in-principle approval of the Lieutenant Governor. The Society
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 465
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
ought to have exercised due diligence and should have claimed
its rights within a reasonable time from the date of said in-
principle approval if the same was not being implemented and
the allotment letter was not being issued. There is no justifiable
or satisfactory explanation for the said period of inordinate delay
of 11 years. The writ petition ought to have been dismissed on
this ground alone. Reference can be made to a recent judgment
of this Court in State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Laxmi Narayan
Das (Dead) thr. LRs & Ors.8 Paragraphs 25, 30, 32, 33 and
34 are extracted hereunder:
“25. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others,
(2007) 9 SCC 278, this Court has opined that though there
is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet ordinarily
a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. In
the said case the respondents had filed the writ petition after
seventeen years and the court, as stated earlier, took note
of the delay and laches as relevant factors and set aside
the order passed by the High Court which had exercised
the discretionary jurisdiction.
xxx xxx
30. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation
of India Ltd. and others v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4
SCC 479, considering the principle of delay and laches,
opined as under:- “36. We may also find that the appellant
remained silent for years together and that this Court,
taking a particular view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar
Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12
SCC 197 would not entitle stale claims to be raised on
this behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant
slept over the matter for almost a little over two years even
after the pronouncement of the judgment. 37. Thus, the
endeavour of the appellant, to approach this Court seeking
the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a misadventure, which
is liable to be rejected, and the appeal is dismissed.” 31.
8 2023 INSC 619 paras 23-34
466 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and others v. Shyam Kishore
Singh - (2020) 3 SCC 411, the issue regarding the delay
and laches was Civil Appeal No.8072 of 2010 Page 27 of
51 considered by this Court while dismissing the petition
filed belatedly, seeking change in the date of birth in the
service record.
xxx xxx
32. The issue of delay and laches was considered by
this Court in Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan
and others, (2022) 2 SCC 25. Therein it was observed
that a neglect on the part of a party to do an act which
law requires must stand in his way for getting the
relief or remedy. The Court laid down two essential
factors i.e. first, the length of the delay and second,
the developments during the intervening period. Delay
in availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such
right. Relevant paras 20 to 22 of the above mentioned
case are extracted below: “20. The principles governing
delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However, they
have their distinct characters and distinct elements.
One can say that delay is the genus to which laches
and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might
be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence.
However, there may be a case where acquiescence is
involved, but not laches. These principles are common
law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these
principles find place in various statutes which restrict
the period of limitation and create non-consideration of
condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to
be applied by Civil Appeal No.8072 of 2010 Page 28 of
51 way of practice requiring prudence of the court than
of a strict application of law. The underlying principle
governing these concepts would be one of estoppel.
The question of prejudice is also an important issue to
be taken note of by the court. 21. The word “laches” is
derived from the French language meaning “remissness
and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or
negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 467
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is
neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law
requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must
stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22.
Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the
delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As
stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of
the party approaching the court apart from the change
in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy
on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would
indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has
put the other party in a particular position, and therefore,
it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before
the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on
equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”
Civil Appeal No.8072 of 2010 Page 29 of 51
33. Finally, in paras 37 and 38, it was observed as under
: “37. We have already dealt with the principles of law
that may have a bearing on this case. … there was an
unexplained and studied reluctance to raise the issue ....
38. ….Hence, on the principle governing delay, laches …
Respondent No. 1 ought not to have been granted any
relief by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
34. If the aforesaid principles of law are applied in the
facts of the case in hand from the table of list of dates as
available in para no. 12, it is evident that there is huge
delay on the part of the respondents to avail of their
appropriate remedy.”
18.2 It may also be noticed that the original Essentiality Certificate
and Sponsorship Letter were with respect to setting up an
educational institution in Jasola Area. The said certificates
and the requirements were area specific. On the basis of
an Essentiality Certificate and Sponsorship Letter for Jasola
Area, no allotment could have been proposed for Vasant
Kunj area. Complaint had already been made prior to the
in-principle approval and had substance. Apparently for the
same reason, the note was made below the in-principle
468 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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approval that further process to take place after verification
of the complaint. It may be noted here that the Essentiality
Certificate, the Sponsorship Letter and the allotment letter
are to be carried out by three different authorities. The last
of the three stages i.e. allotment was to be carried out by
appellant. However, only upon fulfilment of the conditions
as provided under the relevant rules and the policy. The
appellant could not be compelled to make an allotment where
the essential and mandatory conditions were not fulfilled,
as in the case at hand. The High Court fell in error in not
correctly appreciating this aspect of the matter.
18.3 The fact that Jasola and Vasant Kunj fall in different areas
or zones is admitted by the Society in as much as it had
separately applied for Essentiality Certificate for Vasant
Kunj, which was also granted in 2004. The appellant has
specifically stated that Jasola area was in Zone 25 (now
Zone 29) whereas Vasant Kunj area was in Zone 20. The
High Court thus committed an error in treating them to be in
the same Zone without any basis.
18.4 The policy decision taken on 15.12.2003 clearly mentioned
that allotment of land would be made through auction and
also included those cases where allotment was yet to be
made. Subsequently the 1981 Rules were amended in April
2006, whereby also the provision for allotment was replaced
by auction or by tender. There was no challenge either to the
policy decision of December, 2003 or to the amendment of
2006 to the 1981 Rules. Merely seeking a Writ of Mandamus
on the strength of the in-principle approval given by the
Lieutenant Governor would not be maintainable in view of
the change situation which had arisen much earlier to the
filing of the writ petition.
18.5 The arguments advanced by Dr. Singhvi that the appellant
had been changing its stand continuously is no help as the
facts of the case which are on record and which are not
disputed, need to be accepted, even if they are raised at a
later stage. The respondents have not been able to establish
or even prima facie establish that the facts as narrated by the
appellant and as recorded above were incorrect.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 469
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
18.6 The issue relating to the CBI enquiry being raised before this
Court as also the other facts like Vasant Kunj area did not
require a school, or that Vasant Kunj and Jasola fall in different
zones being raised for the first time before this Court also do
not have any bearing on the merits of the matter in view of
the conduct of the respondent Society which approached the
Court after 11 years.
18.7 The issue relating to internal notings as to whether it would
confer any right or not has been adequately dealt with and
settled by series of judgements of this Court. It is well settled
that until and unless the decision taken on file is converted
into a final order to be communicated and duly served on
the concerned party, no right accrues to the said party. Mere
notings and in-principle approvals do not confer a vested right.
Relevant extracts from judgments of this Court in this regard
are being reproduced hereunder:
a) Bhachhittar Singh (supra):
“9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make
such an order. Merely writing something on the file does
not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an
order of the State Government two things are necessary.
The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor
as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to
be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order
modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was
ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State
Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound
by what was stated in the file…..
[Emphasis supplied]
10. ……Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
communicated to the person who would be affected by
that order before the State and that person can be bound
by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the
person affected by it, it would be open to the Council
of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again
and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be
regarded as anything more than provisional in character.”
[Emphasis supplied]
470 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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b) Sethi Auto Service Station (supra)
“14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file
do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order.
A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on
the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for
internal use and consideration of the other officials of the
department and for the benefit of the final decision-making
authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not
meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate
into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties,
only when it reaches the final decision-making authority
in the department, gets his approval and the final order
is communicated to the person concerned.”
[Emphasis supplied]
“22. From the afore-extracted notings of the Commissioner
and the order of the Vice Chairman, it is manifest that
although there were several notings which recommended
consideration of the appellants’ case for relocation but
finally no official communication was addressed to or
received by the appellants accepting their claim. After the
recommendation of the Technical Committee, the entire
matter was kept pending; in the meanwhile, a new policy
was formulated and the matter was considered afresh
later in the year 2004, when the proposal was rejected by
the Vice Chairman, the final decision making authority in
the hierarchy. It is, thus, plain that though the proposals
had the recommendations of State Level Co-ordinator
(oil industry) and the Technical Committee but these
did not ultimately fructify into an order or decision of the
DDA, conferring any legal rights upon the appellants. Mere
favourable recommendations at some level of the decision
making process, in our view, are of no consequence and
shall not bind the DDA. We are, therefore, in complete
agreement with the High Court that the notings in the file
did not confer any right upon the appellants, as long as
they remained as such. We do not find any infirmity in
the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and
affirmed by the Division Bench, warranting interference.”
[Emphasis supplied]
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 471
Delhi Development Authority v. Hello Home Education Society
c) Mahadeo (supra),
“14. It is well settled that inter-departmental communications
are in the process of consideration for appropriate decision
and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right.
This Court examined the said question in a judgment
reported as 3Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan3 . Reliance
was placed on Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab4 to hold
that merely writing something on the file does not amount
to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the
State Government, two things are necessary. First, the
order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor
as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and second, it
has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal
order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary
was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State
Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound
by what was stated in the file.
[Emphasis supplied]
18.8 Reference can also be made to another judgment of this Court
in Municipal Committee, Barwala, District Hisar, Haryana
trough its Secretary/President v. Jai Narayan and Company
and Another9, wherein this Court took a similar view.
18.9 Whether the change in policy was retrospective or not is not an
issue here. The change in policy decision taken on 15.12.2003
clearly mentions that even pending allotment matters were to
be dealt with according to said change i.e. of holding auctions.
This decision of change in policy brought about on 15.12.2003
was never challenged as is apparent from the relief claimed
in the petition. Therefore, the settled procedure to be followed
on or after 15.12.2003 was only to provide land by way of
auction of educational sites and not by way of any allotment.
Before that date there was no allotment of land in favour of
the respondent. Even otherwise it is the settled position of law
that whenever the State intends to transfer any land resort
should be by public auction or inviting tenders.
9 (2022) SCC Online SC 376
472 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
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18.10 Another argument raised by Dr. Singhvi regarding allotment
having been made in favour of other Societies is also of
no help. In the present case, the Society did not have the
necessary Sponsorship Letter for establishing the school in
Vasant Kunj area, and therefore, it was not even eligible to
apply for procuring a site in Vasant Kunj area under the original
rules. Further it is well settled that if any allotment had been
made contrary to the existing policy and rules, the same would
not form a basis of benefit being extended to another society
as under law negative parity is not recognised or approved
rather it is disapproved.
19. For the reasons recorded above, we are convinced that the only
outcome of the writ petition was dismissal. The Single Judge and
Division Bench fell in serious error while granting relief to the
respondent Society. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, the
impugned orders passed by the Division Bench and Single Judge
are set aside. The writ petition is dismissed.
20. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
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