Holding

A purposive construction of Rule 43(1) shows that a female government servant is not disqualified from maternity leave for her own biological child merely because she has two surviving stepchildren for whom she has already taken child care leave.

Summary

Deepika Singh, a nursing officer at PGIMER, married a man who had two children from a previous marriage. She applied for maternity leave for her first biological child under Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, but the authorities denied it, arguing that she already had two surviving children for whom she had previously availed child care leave under Rule 43-C, making her ineligible. The Central Administrative Tribunal and the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the denial. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that maternity leave and child care leave are distinct statutory benefits and that a purposive construction of Rule 43, consistent with Articles 15(3), 21, 42 of the Constitution and international conventions, does not disqualify a woman from maternity leave merely because she has stepchildren. The Court emphasized the legislative intent to facilitate women’s continued employment and rejected the literal reading that would defeat the purpose of maternity protection. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' decisions and directing that the appellant be granted maternity leave.

Issues considered

The interpretation of Rule 43(1) of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, regarding eligibility for maternity leave when a female servant has two surviving children, including stepchildren.
Whether availing child care leave under Rule 43-C for stepchildren bars entitlement to maternity leave under Rule 43.
The need for a purposive construction of Rule 43 in light of constitutional provisions and international obligations on gender equality.
Whether denial of maternity leave violates Articles 15(3), 21, 42 of the Constitution and CEDAW/UDHR commitments.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972s. Rule 43, s. Rule 43-C
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961s. Section 3(c), s. Section 5

Subjects

Maternity leaveChild care leaveCentral Civil Services (Leave) RulesPurposive interpretationGender equalityConstitutional lawInternational conventionsEmployment lawStepchildrenBeneficial legislation

Judgment

[2022] 7 S.C.R. 557 557

DEEPIKA SINGH A
v.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 5308 of 2022)
AUGUST 16, 2022 B
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
A S BOPANNA, JJ.]
Service Law: Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972: r. 43
– Maternity leave – Entitlement to – Female government servant-
C
nursing officer applied for maternity leave on the birth of her first
biological child when she had already taken the benefit of child
care leave in respect of the two children born to her spouse from his
first marriage – Rejected by the tribunal as also the High Court –
On appeal, held: Independent of the grant of maternity leave, a
woman is also entitled to the grant of child care leave for taking D
care of her two eldest surviving children whether for rearing or for
looking after any of their needs, such as education, sickness and
the like – Both maternity leave and child care leave constitute distinct
entitlements – The fact that the nursing officer’s spouse had two
biological children from his first marriage would not impinge upon
E
her entitlement to avail maternity leave for her sole biological child
– Grant of child care leave to her cannot be used to disentitle her to
maternity leave u/r. 43 – Unless a purposive interpretation were to
be adopted, the object and intent of the grant of maternity leave
would simply be defeated – Grant of maternity leave under the Rules
of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of women in the F
workplace – Child birth has to be construed in the context of
employment as a natural incident of life and hence, the provisions
for maternity leave must be construed in that perspective –
Furthermore, the guardians and caretakers-mother and father, of
children may change with remarriage, adoption, or fostering – Such
G
atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally deserving not
only of protection under law but also of the benefits available under
social welfare legislation – On facts, the structure of the employee’s
family changed when she took on a parental role with respect to
her spouse’s biological children from his previous marriage – When
courts are confronted with such situations, they would do well to H
557
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in question rather
than to prevent its application – Thus, the nursing officer was entitled
to the grant of maternity leave – Judgment of the High Court and
the tribunal is set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
B HELD: 1.1 Under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, the State
is empowered to enact beneficial provisions for advancing the
interests of women. The right to reproduction and child rearing
has been recognized as an important facet of a person's right to
privacy, dignity and bodily integrity under Article 21. Article 42
C enjoins the State to make provisions for securing just and humane
conditions of work and for maternity relief. [Para 21][572-B-C]
1.2 India has ratified to several international conventions
of the United Nations. Article 25(2) of the UDHR provides that
motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
D assistance. Article 11(2)(b) of CEDAW requires states “to
introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social benefits.”
In alignment with the Constitution as well as the treaties
mentioned, Rule 43(1) of the Rules of 1972 contemplates the
grant of maternity leave for a period of 180 days. Independent of
the grant of maternity leave, a woman is also entitled to the grant
E of child care leave for taking care of her two eldest surviving
children whether for rearing or for looking after any of their needs,
such as education, sickness and the like. Child care leave under
Rule 43-C can be availed of not only at the point when the child is
born but at any subsequent period as is evident from the
F illustrative causes which are adverted to in the provisions. Both
constitute distinct entitlements. [Paras 22, 23][572-D; 573-G-H;
574-A-B]
1.3 The facts of the present case indicate that the spouse
of the appellant had a prior marriage which had ended as a result
G of the death of his wife after which the appellant married him.
The fact that the appellants spouse had two biological children
from his first marriage would not impinge upon the entitlement
of the appellant to avail maternity leave for her sole biological
child. The fact that she was granted child care leave in respect of
the two biological children born to her spouse from an earlier
H
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 559
AND OTHERS

marriage may be a matter on which a compassionate view was A
taken by the authorities at the relevant time. Gendered roles
assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women
are always pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of
childcare work. According to a “time-use survey conducted by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
B
(OECD), women in India currently spend upto 352 minutes per
day on unpaid work, 577% more than the time spent by men.12
Time spent in unpaid work includes childcare. In this context,
the support of care work through benefits such as maternity leave,
paternity leave, or child care leave (availed by both parents) by
the state and other employers is essential. Although certain C
provisions of the Rules of 1972 have enabled women to enter
the paid workforce, women continue to bear the primary
responsibility for childcare. The grant of child care leave to the
appellant cannot be used to disentitle her to maternity leave under
Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972. [Para 24][574-C-F]
D
1.4 Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted
in the present case, the object and intent of the grant of maternity
leave would simply be defeated. The grant of maternity leave
under Rules of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of
women in the workplace. It is a harsh reality that but for such
provisions, many women would be compelled by social E
circumstances to give up work on the birth of a child, if they are
not granted leave and other facilitative measures. No employer
can perceive child birth as detracting from the purpose of
employment. Child birth has to be construed in the context of
employment as a natural incident of life and hence, the provisions F
for maternity leave must be construed in that perspective. [Para
25][574-G; 575-A]
1.5 The predominant understanding of the concept of a
“family” both in the law and in society is that it consists of a
single, unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain G
constant over time) and their children. This assumption ignores
both, the many circumstances which may lead to a change in one
s familial structure, and the fact that many families do not conform
to this expectation to begin with. Familial relationships may take

H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer
relationships. A household may be a single parent household for
any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse,
separation, or divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers
(who traditionally occupy the roles of the “mother” and the
“father”) of children may change with remarriage, adoption, or
B
fostering. These manifestations of love and of families may not
be typical but they are as real as their traditional counterparts.
Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally
deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits
available under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the
C law must not be relied upon to disadvantage families which are
different from traditional ones. The same holds true for women
who take on the role of motherhood in ways that may not find a
place in the popular imagination. [Para 26][575-B-E]
1.6 The structure of the appellants family changed when
D she took on a parental role with respect to her spouse s biological
children from his previous marriage. When the appellant applied
to PGIMER for maternity leave, PGIMER was faced with facts
that the law may not have envisaged or adequately accounted for.
When courts are confronted with such situations, they would do
well to attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in question
E rather than to prevent its application. [Para 27][575-F]
1.7 The appellant was entitled to the grant of maternity
leave. The communication of the third respondent denying her
the entitlement was contrary to the provisions of Rule 43. The
impugned judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the
F CAT is set aside. The appellant shall be granted maternity leave
under Rule 43. [Para 28][575-G-H; 576-A]
KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob (2020) 14 SCC 126 :
[2019] 14 SCR 928; Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse
(2014) 1 SCC 188 : [2013] 10 SCR 259; Municipal
G Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll)
(2000) 3 SCC 224 : [2000] 2 SCR 171; Justice K.S.
Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
: [2017] 10 SCR 569; Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh

H
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 561
AND OTHERS

Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1 : [2009] 13 SCR 989 – A
referred to.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, ‘Time-Use’ (OECD Stat) <https://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? datasetcode = TIME_
USE#> accessed 22 August 2022 – referred to. B
Case Law Reference
[2019] 14 SCR 928 referred to Para 15
[2013] 10 SCR 259 referred to Para 16
[2000] 2 SCR 171 referred to Para 20 C
[2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 21
[2009] 13 SCR 989 referred to Para 21
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5308
of 2022. D
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.03.2021 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 3460 of 2021.
Akshay Verma, Ms. Sushma Verma, Ms. Savita Dhanda, Advs.
for the Appellant.
E
Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Alka
Agarwal, Anmol Chandan, Anukalp Jain, Amit Sharma, Anirudh Sharma,
Sudarshan Rajan, Mahesh Kumar, Ramesh Rawat, Hitain Bajaj, Rohit
Bhardwaj, Ashutosh Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from a judgment dated 16 March 2021 of a
Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
G
3. The appellant was, at the material time, working on the post of
Nursing Officer in the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education
and Research1 at Chandigarh since her appointment on 25 November
2005. On 18 February 2014, the appellant married Amir Singh. The spouse
1
“PGIMER” H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A of the appellant was married before his marriage to the appellant, but his
former wife passed away on 16 February 2013. From his first marriage,
he has two children, a male child born on 1 February 2001 and a female
child born on 3 March 2005. The appellant filed an application on 4 May
2015, requesting the authorities at PGIMER to enter the names of the
two children born from the first marriage of her spouse in the official
B
service record.
4. The appellant had her first biological child on 4 June 2019 from
her marriage. On 6 June 2019, she applied for maternity leave for the
period from 27 June 2019 to 23 December 2019 in terms of Rule 43 of
the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972.2 The authorities at
C PGIMER sought a clarification on 3 July 2019 regarding the fact that
the spouse of the appellant had two surviving children from his first
marriage. The appellant submitted a detailed reply on 24 July 2019.
The request of the appellant for the grant of maternity leave was rejected
on 3 September 2019 on the ground that she had two surviving children
D and had availed of child care leave earlier for the two children born from
the first marriage of her spouse. Consequently, maternity leave for the
child borne by her, considered as her third child, was found to be
inadmissible in terms of the Rules of 1972. By an office order dated 21
January 2020, her leave for the period from 30 May 2019 to 3 June 2019;
4 June 2019 to 27 October 2019; 27 October 2019 to 6 November 2019;
E and 7 November 2019 to 31 November 2019 was treated as earned
leave, medical leave, half pay leave, and extraordinary leave respectively.
The period of extraordinary leave was not counted towards increments
in the scale of Rs. 9300-34800 under FR-26(ii) of the Fundamental Rules,
Volume-I.
F 5. Aggrieved by the decisions dated 3 September 2019 and 21
January 2020 of the administrative authorities at PGIMER, the appellant
moved the Central Administrative Tribunal3 at its Chandigarh Bench in
OA No 155 of 2020. By a judgment dated 29 January 2021, the Central
Administrative Tribunal dismissed the OA, holding:
G “10. [ ] It is, thus, clear that the maternity leave can be granted to
a female government servant only if she has less than two surviving
children. As per her own request, the applicant has already shown
her two children from the first marriage of her husband as her
2
“Rules of 1972”
3
H “CAT”
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 563
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

children and she has been availing benefit in their respect on A
many occasions earlier and subsequent to her marriage. Therefore,
for all practical purposes and as far as respondent department is
concerned, she has already two surviving children and she is taking
benefit for them from the respondent department by way of Child
Care Leave and other benefits.
B
11. In view of the above, any child born to her now will be considered
only as a third child and cannot be taken as the first child. It may
be true that Viren Partap Singh is first child born to her after her
first pregnancy with her husband. But, of her own choice, the
applicant has already got the names of other two children from
her husband’s first marriage entered in the record of the office C
as her children and is availing benefits on their behalf including
Child Care Leave. The Rule position is clear and for all practical
purposes, the applicant has two surviving children. As such, any
child born to her now can only be considered as third child.
12. In view of the above, the decision of the respondents to reject D
her maternity leave is correct even though it may be first maternity
for the applicant herself”
6. The appellant moved the High Court in a writ petition 4 under
Article 226 of the Constitution, calling into question the judgment of the
Tribunal, resulting in the impugned judgment. By the impugned judgment E
and order dated 16 March 2021, the High Court dismissed the petition
on the ground that there is no perversity or illegality in the judgment of
the CAT. The High Court held:
“12. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rule would reveal that
maternity leave can be granted to a female Government servant F
only if she has less than two surviving children. Though, the petitioner
is not the biological mother of the two children born from the first
wedlock of her husband, she cannot deny the fact that now she is
the mother of them also after having married to Amar Singh. In
this way, the petitioner has already two surviving children. Not G
only this, she has also availed CCL for them from the respondent
Department. In this view of the matter, any child born to her is to
be considered as a third child. We are of the considered view that
the CAT has rightly observed in the impugned order that “....for
4
CWP No 3460 of 2021 H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A all practical purposes, the applicant has two surviving children.
As such, any child born to her now can only be considered as a
third child.”
7. Child care leave is provided under Rule 43-C. Rule 43-C is
extracted below:
B “43-(C). Child Care Leave
(1) A woman Government servant having minor children below
the age of eighteen years and who has no earned leave at her
credit, may be granted child care leave by an authority competent
to grant leave, for a maximum period of two years, i.e., 730 days
C during the entire service for taking care of upto two children
whether for rearing or to look after any of their needs like
examination, sickness, etc.
(2) During the period of child care leave, she shall be paid leave
salary equal to the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on
D leave.
(3) Child care leave may be combined with Leave of any other
kind.
(4) Notwithstanding the requirement of production of medical
certificate contained in sub-rule (1) of rule 30 or sub-rule (1) of
E
rule 31, leave of the kind due and admissible (including commuted
leave not exceeding 60 days and leave not due) upto a maximum
of one year, if applied for, be granted in continuation with child
care leave granted under sub-rule (1).
(5) Child care leave may be availed of in more than one spell.
F
(6) Child care leave shall not be debited against the leave account.”
8. The High Court opined that since the appellant had availed of
child care leave in respect of the biological children of her spouse born
from his first marriage, she would be disentitled to the grant of maternity
G leave. After her marriage to Amar Singh, she was considered to have
two surviving children. The High Court found that she therefore did not
meet the requirement of sub-rule (1) of Rule 43 of having less than two
surviving children for the purpose of being granted maternity leave.
9. Notice was issued in these proceedings on 1 July 2021. In
H pursuance of the order issuing notice, the respondents have entered
appearance and have filed a counter affidavit.
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 565
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

10. We have heard Mr Akshay Verma, learned counsel appearing A
on behalf of the appellant and Mr Sudarshan Rajan, learned counsel
appearing for the second, third and fourth respondents.
11. The case of the appellant is that the maternity leave was sought
by her on the birth of her first biological child and the fact that there are
two children of her spouse born from an earlier marriage would not B
disentitle her under Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972. Counsel for the appellant
submitted that though the appellant had availed of child care leave in
respect of her step children, this leave is distinct from maternity leave.
12. The contention of the respondents is that having taken the
benefit of child care leave in respect of the two children born to the C
spouse of the appellant from his first marriage, the appellant was not
entitled to maternity leave in respect of the birth of her own biological
child. The appellant was, in the submission of the respondents, disentitled
to maternity leave on the ground that she had two surviving children, in
terms of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972.
D
13. The significant issue which falls for determination in the appeal
turns on the interpretation of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972. The Central
Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972 have been framed under the proviso
to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 43 is extracted below:
“43. Maternity Leave E
(1) A female Government servant (including an apprentice) with
less than two surviving children may be granted maternity leave
by an authority competent to grant leave for a period of (180 days)
from the date of its commencement.
(2) During such period, she shall be paid leave salary equal to the F
pay drawn immediately before proceeding on leave.
NOTE:- In the case of a person to whom Employees State
Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), applies, the amount of leave
salary payable under this rule shall be reduced by the amount of
benefit payable under the said Act for the corresponding period. G
(3) Maternity leave not exceeding 45 days may also be granted to
a female Government servant (irrespective of the number of
surviving children) during the entire service of that female
Government servant in case of miscarriage including abortion on
production of medical certificate as laid down in Rule 19: H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Provided that the maternity leave granted and availed of before
the commencement of the CCS (Leave) Amendment Rules, 1995,
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of this sub- rule.
(4)(a) Maternity leave may be combined with leave of any other
kind.
B (b) Notwithstanding the requirement of production of medical
certificate contained in sub-rule (1) of Rule 30 or sub-rule (1) of
Rule 31, leave of the kind due and admissible (including commuted
leave for a period not exceeding 60 days and leave not due) up to
a maximum of two years may, if applied for, be granted in
C continuation of maternity leave granted under sub-rule (1).
(5) Maternity leave shall not be debited against the leave account.”
14. The marginal note to Rule 43 is titled „maternity leave. Sub-
rule (1) stipulates that a female government servant with less than two
surviving children would be granted maternity leave for a period of 180
D days from the date of its commencement. Sub-rule (2) stipulates that
during the period of maternity leave, the employee is entitled to leave
salary equal to the pay drawn immediately before proceeding on leave.
Sub- rule (3) stipulates that maternity leave not exceeding 45 days may
also be granted to a female government servant, irrespective of the
E number of surviving children, during the entire service in case of a
miscarriage including an abortion on production of a medical certificate.
Sub-rule (4) stipulates that maternity leave is capable of being combined
with leave of any other kind.
15. The provisions of Rule 43(1) must be imbued with a purposive
F construction. In KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob,5 this Court noted that
beneficial legislation must be given a liberal approach:
“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed
with a purpose-oriented approach. The Act should receive a liberal
construction to promote its objects. Also, literal construction of
the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the
G
court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the
law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should
receive a purposeful or functional interpretation

5
H (2020) 14 SCC 126
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 567
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

12. In the words of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., the principles of A
statutory construction of beneficial legislation are as follows:
(Workmen case, SCC p. 76, para 4)
“4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled.
Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as ‘social
welfare legislation and human rights’ legislation are not to be B
put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In
construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction
must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must
be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned
with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such
statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce’s C
opinion
in Prenn v. Simmonds [Prenn v. Simmonds, (1971) 1 WLR
1381 : (1971) 3 All ER 237 (HL)] ).
In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is
not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but D
is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix
of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted
purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases
cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central
Govt. Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court , we had E
occasion to say : (Surendra Kumar Verma case, SCC p. 447,
para 6)
‘6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of
“bread and butter” statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity,
receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to
F
give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to
make inroads by making etymological excursions.’’’
13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the
statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then
a construction that suppresses the problem and advances the
remedy should be adopted.” G
16. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse,6 a two-judge Bench
of this Court comprising AK Sikri and Ranjana Desai, JJ. ruled that

6
(2014) 1 SCC 188 H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A courts must bridge the gap between law and society through the use of
purposive interpretation, where applicable:
“13.3. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs to
be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing
with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents
B under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised
sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice”
which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the
Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India
clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the
rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice,
C liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving
their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty
of the courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While
giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is
supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.
D 14. Of late, in this very direction, it is emphasised that the courts
have to adopt different approaches in “social justice adjudication”,
which is also known as “social context adjudication” as mere
“adversarial approach” may not be very appropriate. There are
number of social justice legislations giving special protection and
E benefits to vulnerable groups in the society. Prof. Madhava Menon
describes it eloquently:
“It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that ‘social context
judging’ is essentially the application of equality
jurisprudence as evolved by Parliament and the Supreme
F Court in myriad situations presented before courts where
unequal parties are pitted in adversarial proceedings and
where courts are called upon to dispense equal justice. Apart
from the social-economic inequalities accentuating the disabilities
of the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself
operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a
G situation, the Judge has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities
of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party
if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. This
result is achieved by what we call social context judging or social
justice adjudication.” [Keynote address on “Legal Education in
H Social Context” delivered at National Law University, Jodhpur
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 569
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

on October 12, 2005, available on http://web.archive.org/web/ A
20061210031743/http:/www.nlujodhp ur.ac.in/ceireports.htm [last
visited on 25-12-2013]]
…
16. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes
patterns of behaviour. It reflects the values of society. The role B
of the court is to understand the purpose of law in society
and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a
society is a living organism. It is based on a given factual
and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes
change in law precedes societal change and is even intended C
to stimulate it. In most cases, however, a change in law is
the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social
reality changes, the law must change too. Just as change in
social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to change in social
reality is the life of the law. It can be said that the history of law
is the history of adapting the law to society’s changing needs. In D
both constitutional and statutory interpretation, the court
is supposed to exercise discretion in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective and objective
purposes of the law.”
(emphasis supplied) E

17. For the purpose of adopting an approach which furthers
legislative policy, it would be appropriate to derive some guidance from
the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act 19617 though, it must be
stated at the outset that the Act per se has no application to the PGIMER
as an establishment. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Act of 1961 are F
indicative of the object and intent of Parliament in enacting a cognate
legislation on the subject.
18. Section 3(c) of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 defines the
expression „delivery to mean the birth of a child. Section 5 provides for
the right to payment of maternity benefit. Section 5 is extracted in its G
entirety below:
“5. Right to payment of maternity benefit.– (1) Subject to the
provisions of this Act, every woman shall be entitled to, and her
7
‘‘Act of 1961’’ H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A employer shall be liable for, the payment of maternity benefit at
the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual
absence, that is to say, the period immediately preceding the day
of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period
immediately following that day.
B Explanation.– For the purpose of this sub-section, the average
daily wage means the average of the woman s wages payable to
her for the days on which she has worked during the period of
three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which
she absents herself on account of maternity, the minimum rate of
wage fixed or revised under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11
C of 1948), or ten rupees, whichever is the highest.
(2) No woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has
actually worked in an establishment of the employer from whom
she claims maternity benefit, for a period of not less than eighty
days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her
D expected delivery:
Provided that the qualifying period of eighty days aforesaid shall
not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam
and was pregnant at the time of the immigration.

E Explanation.– For the purpose of calculating under the sub- section
the days on which a woman has actually worked in the
establishment, the days for which she has been laid-off or was
on holidays declared under any law for the time being in force to
be holidays with wages, during the period of twelve months
immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be
F taken into account.
(3) The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled
to maternity benefit shall be twenty-six weeks of which not more
than eight weeks shall precede the date of her expected delivery:
Provided that the maximum period entitled to maternity benefit by
G
a woman having two or more than two surviving children shall be
twelve weeks of which not more than six weeks shall precede
the date of her expected delivery:
Provided further that where a woman dies during this period, the
maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and
H including the day of her death:
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 571
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Provided also that where a woman, having been delivered of a A
child, dies during her delivery or during the period immediately
following the date of her delivery for which she is entitled for the
maternity benefit, leaving behind in either case the child, the
employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for that entire
period but if the child also dies during the said period, then, for
B
the days up to and including the date of the death of the child.
(4) A woman who legally adopts a child below the age of three
months or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity
benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is
handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother,
as the case may be. C

(5) In case where the nature of work assigned to a woman is of
such nature that she may work from home, the employer may
allow her to do so after availing of the maternity benefit for such
period and on such conditions as the employer and the woman
may mutually agree.” D

19. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 confers an entitlement on a woman
to the payment of maternity benefits at a stipulated rate for the period of
her actual absence beginning from the period immediately preceding the
day of her delivery, the actual day of her delivery and any period
immediately following that day. Sub-section (3) specifies the maximum E
period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit. These
provisions have been made by Parliament to ensure that the absence of
a woman away from the place of work occasioned by the delivery of a
child does not hinder her entitlement to receive wages for that period or
for that matter for the period during which she should be granted leave in F
order to look after her child after the birth takes place.
20. The Act of 1961 was enacted to secure women s right to
pregnancy and maternity leave and to afford women with as much
flexibility as possible to live an autonomous life, both as a mother and as
a worker, if they so desire. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. G
Female Workers (Muster Roll),8 a two-judge Bench of this Court
placed reliance on the obligations under Articles 14, 15, 39, 42 and 43 of
the Constitution, and India s international obligations under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 19489 and Article 11 of the Convention on
8
2000 (3) SCC 224
9
“UDHR” H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women10 to extend
benefits under the Act of 1961 to workers engaged on a casual basis or
on muster roll on daily wages by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
The Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972, it is well to bear in mind,
are also formulated to entrench and enhance the objects of Article 15 of
the Constitution and other relevant constitutional rights and protections.
B
21. Under Article 15(3) of the Constitution, the State is empowered
to enact beneficial provisions for advancing the interests of women.
The right to reproduction and child rearing has been recognized as an
important facet of a person s right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity
under Article 21.11 Article 42 enjoins the State to make provisions for
C securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.
22. In this context, regard may also be had to several international
conventions of the United Nations that India has ratified. Article 25(2)
of the UDHR provides that motherhood and childhood are entitled to
special care and assistance. Article 11(2)(b) of CEDAW requires states
D “to introduce maternity leave with pay or comparable social benefits.”
The relevant provision of Article 11 of CEDAW states that:
“Article 11:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
E discrimination against women in the field of employment in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same
rights, in particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the
F application of the same criteria for selection in matters of
employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the
right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of
service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining,
G including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and
recurrent training;

10
“CEDAW”
11
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Suchita Srivastava
H v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 573
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal A
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of
treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement,
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity
to work, as well as the right to paid leave; B
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of
reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the
grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their C
effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate
measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on
the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination
in dismissals on the basis of marital status; D
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable
social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority
or social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social
E
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through
promoting the establishment and development of a network of
child-care facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in
F
types of work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article
shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and
technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended
as necessary.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
23. In alignment with the Constitution as well as the treaties
mentioned above, Rule 43(1) of the Rules of 1972 contemplates the
grant of maternity leave for a period of 180 days. Independent of the
grant of maternity leave, a woman is also entitled to the grant of child H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A care leave for taking care of her two eldest surviving children whether
for rearing or for looking after any of their needs, such as education,
sickness and the like. Child care leave under Rule 43-C can be availed
of not only at the point when the child is born but at any subsequent
period as is evident from the illustrative causes which are adverted to in
the provisions, which have been extracted in the earlier part of the
B
judgment. Both constitute distinct entitlements.
24. The facts of the present case indicate that the spouse of the
appellant had a prior marriage which had ended as a result of the death
of his wife after which the appellant married him. The fact that the
appellant s spouse had two biological children from his first marriage
C would not impinge upon the entitlement of the appellant to avail maternity
leave for her sole biological child. The fact that she was granted child
care leave in respect of the two biological children born to her spouse
from an earlier marriage may be a matter on which a compassionate
view was taken by the authorities at the relevant time. Gendered roles
D assigned to women and societal expectations mean that women are always
pressed upon to take a disproportionate burden of childcare work.
According to a ‘time-use’ survey conducted by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), women in India
currently spend upto 352 minutes per day on unpaid work, 577% more
than the time spent by men.12 Time spent in unpaid work includes
E childcare. In this context, the support of care work through benefits
such as maternity leave, paternity leave, or child care leave (availed by
both parents) by the state and other employers is essential. Although
certain provisions of the Rules of 1972 have enabled women to enter the
paid workforce, women continue to bear the primary responsibility for
F childcare. The grant of child care leave to the appellant cannot be used
to disentitle her to maternity leave under Rule 43 of the Rules of 1972.
25. Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted in the
present case, the object and intent of the grant of maternity leave would
simply be defeated. The grant of maternity leave under Rules of 1972 is
G intended to facilitate the continuance of women in the workplace. It is a
harsh reality that but for such provisions, many women would be
compelled by social circumstances to give up work on the birth of a
12
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Time-Use’ (OECD
Stat) <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TIME_USE#> accessed 22 August
H 2022
DEEPIKA SINGH v. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 575
AND OTHERS [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

child, if they are not granted leave and other facilitative measures. No A
employer can perceive child birth as detracting from the purpose of
employment. Child birth has to be construed in the context of employment
as a natural incident of life and hence, the provisions for maternity leave
must be construed in that perspective.
26. The predominant understanding of the concept of a “family” B
both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single, unchanging
unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant over time) and
their children. This assumption ignores both, the many circumstances
which may lead to a change in one s familial structure, and the fact that
many families do not conform to this expectation to begin with. Familial
relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or C
queer relationships. A household may be a single parent household for
any number of reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or
divorce. Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy
the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change with
remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of love and of D
families may not be typical but they are as real as their traditional
counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the family unit are equally
deserving not only of protection under law but also of the benefits available
under social welfare legislation. The black letter of the law must not be
relied upon to disadvantage families which are different from traditional
ones. The same undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role E
of motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular imagination.
27. The facts of the present case, too, indicate that the structure
of the appellant’s family changed when she took on a parental role with
respect to her spouses biological children from his previous marriage.
When the appellant applied to PGIMER for maternity leave, PGIMER F
was faced with facts that the law may not have envisaged or adequately
accounted for. When courts are confronted with such situations, they
would do well to attempt to give effect to the purpose of the law in
question rather than to prevent its application.
28. For the above reasons, we hold that the appellant was entitled G
to the grant of maternity leave. The communication of the third
respondent denying her the entitlement was contrary to the provisions of
Rule 43. We accordingly set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court dated 16 March 2021 and the judgment of the CAT dated
29 January 2021. The OA filed by the appellant shall in consequence H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A stand allowed and the appellant shall be granted maternity leave under
Rule 43 in terms of the present judgment. The benefits which are
admissible to the appellant shall be released to her within a period of two
months from the date of this order.
29. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
B 30. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.

C

D

E

F

G

H