DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR.versusDYNEMECH SYSTEMS PVT. LTD.

                         [2017) 7 S.C.R. 587


                  DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR.                             A
                                  v.
                DYNEMECH SYSTEMS PVT. LTD.
                   (Civil Appeal No.10265 of2017)
                                                                       B
                         AUGUST 09, 2017
· [R.K. AGRAWAL AND MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.I

         Employee's Compensation Act, 192 3 (Earlier known as
  Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923) - ss.3(1), 4(l)(a) -Accident c
  'arising out of' and 'in the course of employment' - Two persons
  employed with respondent-company as engineer/sales executive were
  deputed to test a filter installed in a factory, for which both of them
  went from Delhi to Haryana - While returning from Haryana, both
  employees met with an accident, consequent to which one employee
  died and the other sustained injuries - Application for compensation D
 filed by appellant (father of deceased employee) before the
  Commissioner - Application was dismissed on the ground that the
  accident cannot be said to have arisen out of and in course of
  employment - High Court confirmed the award passed by the
  Commissioner - On appeal, held: There is no material on record to E
  show that the deceased employee had exposed himself to added
  peril by his own imprudent act - When an employment begins and
· when it ceases, depends upon the facts of each case - There is a
  notional extension at both entry and exit by time and space - Jn the
  instant case, the accident arose out of and in cqurse of employment
  inasmuch as the very nature of the employment of the deceased F
  made it necessary for him to be on the road in question.
       Disposing of the appeal, the Court

        HELD: 1. The words 'arising out of' u/s. 3(1) of the
 Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 (Earlier known as G
 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923) and 'in the course of
 employment' u/s. 4(1)(a) of the Act are in fac"t two different phrases
 and have been understood as such. If the accident had occurred
 on account of a risk which is an incident of employment, the claim
 shall succeed unless, of course, the workman had exposed himself H
                                  587
588           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2017] 7 S.C.R.


A     to an added peril by his own imprudent act. The phrase 'in the
      course of employment' suggests that the injury must be caused
      during the currency of employment, whereas the expression 'out
      of employment' conveys the idea that there must be a causal
      connection between the employment and the injury caused to
      the workman as a result of the accident. Prima facie, while
 B
      deciding the issue on hand, there is no material on record to
      show that the deceased workman had exposed himself to added
      peril by his own imprudent act. [Para 6) [592-F-H; 593-A)
         2.1 When a workman is on the public road or public place
   or on public transport he is there as any other member of the
 c public and is not there in the course of his employment unless
   the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to
   be there. In other words, there must be a causal relationship
   between the accident and the employment. The expression 'out
   of employment' is not confined to the mere nature of the
 D employment: the expression applies to employment as such, to
   its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. The
   words "arising out of employment" are understood to mean that
   during the course of employment, the injury has resulted from
   some risk incidental to the duties. Unless engaged in the duty
 E owed to the employer, it is reasonable to believe that the workman
   would not otherwise have suffered. [Para 7) [593-B-C)
            2.2 There cannot be any dispute that the question as to
      when an employment begins and when it ceases, depends upon
      the facts of each case. There is a notional extension at both
 F    entry and exit by time and space. There may be some reasonable
      extension in both time and space and a workman may be regarded
      as in the course of his employment even though he has not
      reached or has left employer's premises. [Para 7] [593-D-E]
         3. In the case on hand, the deceased was employed as an
 G engineer, assigned the duty of promoting the sales and installation
   of the products of the respondent company. It is not in dispute
   that a product was installed on the day prior to the accident at the
   Factory situated at Dharu Heda in the State of Haryana which is
   about 70 kms .from Delhi ~tate. It is also not in dispute that the
   deceased on the instruction and direction of the respondent, left
 H
           DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH                       589
                   SYSTEMS PVT. LTD.

for the field work assigned to him. After completing the necessary · A
work assigned to him and his co-worker, both of them were
returning to Delhi and at that time they met with the unfortunate
accident. Thus, under the facts and circumstances, it is to be
held that the deceased had to go to Dharu Heda, Haryana from
Delhi for the purposes of carrying out the work entrusted to him B
and after completing his work he was returning to Delhi. The
very nature of his employment made it necessary for him to be
there. In view of the same, it needs to be held that the accident
had taken place in the course of the employment. [Para 91 [596-
E-H; 597-A]                                .
      4., It is clear that the presence of the deceased on the road   C
in question was incidental to his employment as a sales engineer.
As he had to go to the Hero Honda Factory to conduct a filter
test, he was merely doing what was required of him as an
employee. Thus, his accidental death on the way back after
completing his work falls squarely within Section 3(1) of the Act.    D
In the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, it needs to be
concluded that the accident arose out of employment inasmuch
as the very nature of the employment of the deceased made it
necessary for him to be there. [Paras 20, 211 [600-H; 601-A-BI
      Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja              E
      AIR 1958 SC 881 - distinguished.
      Pierce v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd. (1911)
      1 KB 997; John Stewart and Son Ltd v. Longhurst
      (1917) AC 249; Andrew v. Failsworth Industrial Society
      (1904) 2.K. B. 32; Lawrence v. George Matthews Ltd.             F
      (1929) 1 KB 1; Mackinnon Machenzie & Co. (P) Ltd.
      v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Jssak (1969) 2 SCC 607 : [19701
      1 SCR 869; Regional Director Employees' State
      Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa (1996) 6
      SCC 1 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 797; Manju Sarkar v.
      Mabish Miah (2014) 14 SCC 21 : [20141 6 SCR 126 -               G
      referred to.
      B.E.S.T. Undertaking v. Agnes AIR 1964 SC 193: [19641
      SCR 930; Union of India v. Surendra Pandey (2015)
      13 sec 625 - relied on.
                                                                      H
590             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 7 S.C.R.


A                             Case Law Reference

      AIR 1958 SC 881                    distinguished            Paras

      (1911) 1 KB 997                    referred to              Para 11

      (1917) AC 249                      referred to              Para 12
 B
      (1904) 2 K. B. 32                  referred to              Para 13

      (1929) 1 KB 1                      referred to              Para 14

       [1964) SCR 930                    relied on                 Para 15
 c     [1970] 1 SCR 869                  referred to               Paral6

       [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 797           referred to               Para 17
       (2015) 13 sec 625                 relied on                 Para 18

 D     [2014] 6 SCR 126                  referred to               Para 19

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.10265
       of2017.

             From the Judgment and Order dated 23.04.2014 of the High Court
 E     of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No.349 of2011.

              R. K. Nain, Ms. Pratima N. Chauhan, Jitendra Jain, Advs. for
      . the Appellants.

              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 F
              MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

              2. The judgment dated 23n1April2014 passed in FAO No. 349 of
       2011 by the High Court of Delhi is called in question in this appeal by the
 G     unsuccessful claimants. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has
       confirmed the award passed by the Commissioner under the Employees'
       Compensation Act, 1923 (Known earlier as the Workmen's
       Compensation Act, 1923 until 2009) (for brevity "the Act") dismissing
       the claimants' petition on the ground that the accident cannot be Said to
       have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
 H
     DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                               591
       PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

          3. Records reveal that the deceased workman Shri Ravi Shekhar         A
  Joshi, son of the appellant, was employed with respondent (Dynemech
  Systems Pvt. Ltd.) as an engineer. He was entrusted with the duty to
  be in the field for promoting the sales/installation of the products of the
  respondent. On the unfortunate day of the accident, i.e., 08.09.2007,
  the deceased and his co-worker Shri Vikas (who was also employed as           B
  an engineer/sales executive) were deputed to test a filter which was
  installed on 07.09.2007 at Hero Honda Factory, Dharu Heda, Haryana.
  Accordingly, both of them went from Delhi and checked the filter installed
  at Hero Honda Factory, Dharu Heda, Haryana in the afternoon and
  thereafter started the return journey to Delhi at 4:30 PM. Both the
  workers including the deceased met with road accident while they were         C
  little away from Hero Honda Factory and sustained injuries. Both were
  taken to the hospital wherein the deceased was declared "brought dead"
· while his co-worker was discharged after being given first-aid.

        The app~llants filed an application for compensation under Section
 22 of the Act befon: the Learned Commissioner. Based on the pleadings,         D
 the Learned Commissioner framed the following issues.

        1. Whether the accident of the deceased occurred during the
           course of and out of employment?
                                                                                E
        2. Whether the deceased falls under the definition of workman
           under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?

        3. If so, whether the claimant is entitled for compensation as per
           claim application?
                                                                                F
        4. Relief, if any?

        After the full-fledged trial, written arguments were submitted on
 301h January, 2010. The Commissioner, after a wait of about 14 months
 dismissed the claim application of the appellants by deciding issue no. 1
 only, on the ground that the accident cannot be said to have arisen out of     G
 and in the course of employment. The said award of dismissal of the
 claim petition was confirmed by the High Court as mentfuned supra.

        4. The only question to be decided by this Court in this appeal is
 as to whether the Learned Commissioner, as well as the High Court is
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592             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 7 S.C.R.



A     justified in deciding that the accident in question cannot be said to have
      arisen out of and in the course of employment.

              5. Undisputedly the employer's liability for compensation to the
      employee arises only if the employee has suffered in the accident which
      arose out of and in the course of employment. Section 3( I) of the Act
B     deals with the employer's liability for compensation to the employee in
      case ofaccident arising out of and in the course of employment. Section
      3( 1) reads thus:
             "If personal injury is caused to [an employee] by accident arising
             out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be
 c           liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of
             this chapter:''.

             The amount_of,compensation where the death resulted from the
      injury shall be quantified in accordance with Section 4 of the the Act.
      Section 4(l)(a) reads thus:
 D
             "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensa-
             tion shall be as follows, namely:-

             (a) where death results from the injury: An amount equal to fifty
             per cent. of the monthly wages of the deceased *[employee]
 E           multiplied by the relevant factor;

                                           or

             an amount of* [one lakh and twenty thousand rupees], whichever
             is more;"
 F
             6. The words 'arising out of' and 'in the course of employment'
      are in fact two different phrases and have been understood as such. If
      the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of
      employment, the claim shall succeed unless, of course, the workman
      had exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act. The
 G    phrase 'in the course of employment' suggests that the injury must be
      caused during the currency of employment, whereas the expression 'out
      of employment' conveys the idea that there must be a causal connection
      between the employment and the injury caused to _the workman as a
      result of the accident.
.H
     DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                                 593
       PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

        Prima facie, while deciding the issue on hand, therejs no material        A
. on record to show that the deceased workman had exposed himself to
  added peril by his own imprudent act.

        7. When a workman is on the public road or public place or on
 public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not
 there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his              B
 employment makes it necessary for him to be there. In other words,
 there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the
 employment. The expression 'out of employment' is not confined to the
 mere nature of the employment: the expression applies to employment
 as such, to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. The   C
 words "arising out of employment" are understood to mean that during
 the course of employment, the injury has resulted from some ri~k incidental
 to the duties. Unless engaged in the duty owed to the employer, it is
 reasonable to believe that the workman would not otherwise have suffered.

         There cannot be any dispute that the question as to when an D
  employment begins and when it ceases, depends upon the facts of each
· case. There is a notional extension at both entry and exit by time and
  space. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and space
  and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment
  even though he has not reached or has left employer's premises. In
  India, the courts have recognized the principle of notional extension of · E
  time and space for over 60-70 years while determining whether the
  injury has been caused out of or in the course of the employment of the
  workman. The Courts have held consistently that the employment does
  not necessarily end, when the tool down signal is given and when -the
  workman actually leaves his place of work.                                 p

         8. The High Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in the
  case of Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja (AIR
  1958 SC 881) to conclude that when an employee is commuting to and
  from the place of work and there is an accident, such an accident cannot
  be said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. This G
  Court has rendered judgment based on the facts and,circumstances of
· that case. The facts in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing's case (supra)
  are different from the facts of this case. While deciding Saurashtra
  Salt Manufacturing's case (supra), this Court has clearly observed
  that the facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined
                                  '                                               H
594            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 7 S.C.R.



A     carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of or in
      the course of the employment of the workman, keeping in view at all
      times this notional extension. It is also observed that accident cannot be
      said to have occurred during the course of employment unless the very
      nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. The
      relevant portions of the judgment in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing's
 B
      case (supra) read thus:
                  "As a rule. the employment of a workman does not com-
            mence until he has reached the place of employment and does
            not continue when he has left the place of employment, the jour-
            ney to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is
 c          now well-settled, however. that this is a subject to the theory of
            notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an
            area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in
            leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable
            extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded
 D          as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached
            or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances
            of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to
            determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of
            the emplovment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this
            theory of notional extension.
 E
                   It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to refer to
             the various decisions in England and in India explaining the afore-
             said theory because even if on such a basis a workman may be
             regarded as being in the course of his employment at point B
 F           either while on his way to the salt works or returning from it, the
             question for our decision is whether he was still in the course of
             his employment when he was on his journey between points A
             and B of the map., Ext- 35. While the case was in the High Court
             attention of the learned judges was drawn to the failure of the
             Commissioner for Workmeq's Compensation to examine witnesses
 G           to prove an alleged arrangement between the appellant and the
             Kharvas (ferry-walas) for the carrying of the workmen of the
             appellant by boat across the creek to enable them to be ferried to
             and from the salt works. The learned Judges of the High Court at
             first were inclined to order a remand for the recording of this
 H           evidence, but, having regard to the view which they took of the
DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                         595
  PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

 recent decisions of the House of Lords in England, they thought it A
 unnecessary to have such evidence recorded. In their opinion, on
 the material as already on the record, it must be held that the
 accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the
 deceased workmen. In this Court, as already stated, we
 considered it necessary to have evidence taken in this connection B
 and findings recorded thereon. The findings, on the evidence so
 recorded, is quite clear that there was no arrangement between
 the appellant and the Kharvas to ferry to and from the salt works,
 across the creek, any workman of the appellant. According to
 the evidence, workmen of the salt works are charged by the
 Kharvas when they cross the creek in their boats. The only C
 concession made by them on their own account is not to make
 such a charge in the case of any person who is a Kharva - a
 fellow caste man. It is also clear from the evidence on the record,
 both before and after remand, that the boatsferried across the
 creek are used by the public, every one of whom has to pay the D
 charge for being ferried across the creek with the exception of a
 person of the Kharva caste. To reach point A on the map a
 workman has to proceed in the town of Porbander via a public
 road. A workman then uses at point A a boat, which is also used
 by the public, for which he has to pay the boatman's dues, to go to
 point B. From point B to the salt works there is an open sandy E
 area 450 to 500 feet long and 200 to 250 feet wide. This sandy
 area is also open to the public. From this sandy area there is a
 footpath going to the salt jetty, point C and a foot-track going to
 the salt works, point D. There is no question that the foot-track
 going to the salt works is a public way. The footpath from the
                                                                       F
 sandy area to the salt jetty, point C, may or may not be used by
 the public. For the purpose of this case it may be assumed that a
 workman must necessarily use that footpath if he has to go to the
 salt jetty and from there to the various salt pans and salt reser-
 voirs within the area of the salt works. It is well settled that when
 a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public G
 transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not
 there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of
 this employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A
 workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment
 he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is
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596            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017) 7 S.C.R.



A           in the course of his employment ifhe reaches the place of work
            or a point or an area which comes within the theory' of notional
            extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay
            compensation for any accident happening to him. In the present
            case, even if it be assumed that the theory of notional extension
            extends upto point D, the theory cannot be extended beyond it.
 B
            The moment a workman left point B in a boat or left point A but
            had not yet reached point B, he could not be said to be in the
            course of his employment and any accident happening to him on
            the journey between these two points could not be ~aid to have
            arisen out of and in the course of his employment. Both the
 c          Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and the High Court
            were in the error in supposing that the deceased workmen in this
             case were still in the course of their employment when they were
             crossing the creek between points A and B. The accident which
             took place when the boat was almost at point A resulting in the
             death of so many workmen was unfortunate, but for that accident
 D
             the appellant cannot be made liable."
                                                         (emphasis supplied)
            It was not the case in Sauraslttra Salt Manufacturing's case
      (supra), that the employees travelled by creek because their employment
 E    necessitated it.

              9. In the case on hand, the deceased was employed as an engineer,
      assigned the duty of promoting the sales and installation of the products
      of the respondent company. It is not in dispute that a product was installed
      on the dai prior to the accident at the Hero Honda Factory situated at
 F    Dharu Heda in the State ofHaryana which is about 70 kms from Delhi
      State. It is also not in dispute that the deceased on the instruction and
      direction of the respondent, left for the field work assigned to him on
      08.09.2007. After completing the necessary work assigned to him and
      his co-worker, both of them were returning to Delhi and at that time they
      met with the unfortunate accident. Thus, under the facts and
 G    circumstances, it is to be held that the deceased had to go to Hero Honda
      Factory, Dharu Heda, Haryana from Delhi for the purposes of carrying
      out the work entrusted to him and after completing his work he was
      returning to Delhi. The very nature of his employment made it necessary
      for him to be there. In view of the same, in our considered opinion, it
 H
    DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                              597
      PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

needs to be held that the accident had taken place in the course of the       A
employment.

       10. English Courts have elaborated in great detail on the subject
of'arising out ofe)llployment' while considering the matters arising out
ofThe English Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.
                                                                              B
      11. Buckley, LJ., in Pierce v. Provident Clothing and Supply
Co. Ltd. [(1911) 1 KB 997/, made the following observations: ·
      "The words 'out of' necessarily involve the idea that the accident
      arises out 'of a risk incidental to the employment. An accident
      arises out of the employment where it results from a risk incidental    C
      to the employment, as distinguished from a risk common to all
      mankind, although the risk incidental to the employment ·may
      include a risk common to all mankind."

       12. Lord Buckmaster, in the case of John Stewart and Son Ltd.
v. Longhurst ((1917) AC 249/, observed that whether a situation arises        D
'out of or in the course of employment' can only be determined on a
case-to-case basis:

      "Some of the reported cases, which have been fully referred to
      by the Lord. Chancellor, appear to me to have made the same
      mistake and to have attempted to define a fixed boundary dividing · E
      the cases that are within the statute from those that are without.
      This it is almost impossible to achieve. No authority can with
      certainty do more than decide whether a particular case upon
      particular facts is or is not within the meaning of the phrase."

       The facts of each case must be examined separately. One case           F
cannot be relied upon to conclusively decide the outcome of the other.
Hence, the facts of this case must be examined in light of the context
that they are situated in.

      13. The case ofAn4rew v. Failsworth Industrial Society ((1904)          G
2 K. B. 32/, lays down that the accident need not be connected to the
work, as long as the employee was in a position that arose out of the
employment. Collins, M. R. observed as follows:

      "Though [the accident] may not be connected with, or have any
      relation to, the work the man was doing, yet, if in point of fact the   H
598            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017) 7 S.C.R.


A           position in which the man was doing the work, and the place he
            must necessarily occupy whilst doing the work are a position and
            a place of danger which caused the accident, it may fairly be said
            that it arose out of the employment, not because of the work, but
            because of the position"

 B           14. English courts have also held that injuries to employees on
      their way back home fall within those 'arising out of employment.' In
      Lawrence v. George Matthews Ltd. {(1929) 1 KB lj, the deceased
      was employed as a commercial traveller by coal merchants, who paid
      him a commission for all orders obtained for them. While on his way
 C    home on his motorcycle after completing a trip, he was struck fatally by
      a falling tree which was blown down by a gale. In proceedings for
      compensation, the Court of Appeal held by a majority that the accident
      arose out of the employment of the deceased on the ground that the
      deceased's employment brought him to a spot which, owing to the
      existence of the tree, had a quality that resulted in danger. The fact that
 D    the tree fell due to forces of nature was immaterial, as the immediate
      cause of the accident was the falling of the tree.

             15. Indian Courts have also expounded upon the phrase 'arising
      out of and in the course of employment' in great detail.

 E            In the case of B.E.S.T. Undertaking vs Agnes(AIR 1964 SC
      193), this Court laid down as under:
               "Under Section 3( I) of the Act the injury must be caused to the
             workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his
             employment. The question, when does an employment begin and
 F           when does it cease, depends upon the facts of each case. But the
             Courts have agreed that the employment does not necessarily
             end when the "down tool" signal is given or when the workman
             leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There is a
             notional extension as both the entry and exit by time and space.
             The scope of such extension "must necessarily depend on the
 G
             circumstances of a given case. An employment may end or may
             begin not only when the employee begins to work or leaves this
             tools but also when he used the means of access and egress to
             and from the place of employment. A contractual duty or
             obligation on the part of an employer to use only a particular means
 H
   DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                          599
     PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

     of transport extends the area, of the field of employment to the A
     course of the said transport. Though at the beginning the word
     "dutv" has been strictly construed. the later decisions have
     liberalized this concept. A theoretical option to take an alternative
     route may not detract from such a duty ifthe accepted one is of
     proved necessity or of practical compulsion. But none of the de- B
     cisions cited at the Bar deals with a transport service operating
     over a large area like Bombay. They are, therefore, of little assis-
     tance, except insofar as they laid down the principles of general
     application. Indeed, some of the law Lords expressly excluded
     from the scope of their discussion cases where the exigencies of
     work.compel an employee to traverse public streets and other C
     public places. The problem that now arises before us is a novel
     one and is not covered by authority."
       16. The case of J.fackinnon Machenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v.
Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak {(1969)2 SCC 607] is also relevant to
understand the meaning of 'arising out of employment'. Justice           D
Ramaswami, delivering the judgment for a three Judge Bench of this
Court, held:
      " ...The words 'arising out of employment' are understood to mean
      that 'during the course of the employment, injury has resulted
      from some risk incidental to the duties ofthe service, which, unless E
      engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe
      the workman would not otherwise have suffered'. In other words,
      there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the
      employment. The expression 'arising out of employment' is again
      not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression F
      applies to employment as such to its nature, its conditions, its
      obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors
      the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the
       injury would be one which arises 'out of employment'. To put it
       differently if the accident had occurred on account ofa risk which
       is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation, G
       must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself
       to an added peril by his own imprudent act ... "

      17. This Court in Regional Director Employees' State I11sura11ce
 Corporation v. Francis De Costa [(1996) 6 SCC 1/, laid down three
                                                                          H
600            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 7 S.C.R.


A     principles for the claimants to prove before they can claim compensation
      under S. 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948:
            "(1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal
            connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have
            been suffered in course of employment."
B
             As Section 2(8) of that Act is inpari materia with Section 3(1)
      of the the Act, these principles are relevant for cases under the latter.
            18. Again, in the case of Union of India v. Surendra Pandey
      [(2015) 13 SCC 625) this Court has explained the principle of notional
 c    extension of employment giving examples as under:
            "It was also pointed out by Lord Denning in the aforesaid case of
            R. v. National Insurance Commr., exp Michael that the extension
            of the meaning of the phrase "in the course of his employment"
            has taken place in some cases but in all those cases, the workman
 D          was at the premises where he or she worked and was injured
            while on a visit to the canteen or some other place for a break.
            The test of what was "reasonably incidental" to employment, may
            be extended even to cases while an employee is sent on an errand
            by the employer outside the factory premises. But in such cases,
            it must be shown that he was doing something incidental to his
 E
            employment. There may also be cases where an employee has to
            go out of his work place in the usual course of his employment.
            Latham, C.J. in South Maitland Railways Pty. Ltd. v. James
            observed that when the workmen on a hot day in course of their
            employment had to go for short time to get some cool water to
 F           drink so as to enable them to continue to work without which they
             could not have otherwise continued, they were in such cases doing
             something in the course of their employment when they went out
             for water." (emphasis supplied)
             19. The aforementioned observations are reiterated by this Court
 G    in a number of subsequent judgments, including in the case of Manju
      Sarkar v. Mabish Miah [(2014) 14 SCC 21)).

              20. From the aforementioned, it is clear that the presence of the
       deceased on the road in question was incidental to his employment as a
       sales engineer. As he had to go to the Hero Honda Factory to conduct a
 H
    DAYA KISHAN JOSHI & ANR. v. DYNEMECH SYSTEMS                               601
      PVT. LTD. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

filter test, he was merely doing what was required of him as an employee.      A
Thus, his accidental death on the way back after completing his work
falls squarely within Section 3( 1) of the Act.
       21. Having regard to the. facts and circumstances of the case on
hand, it needs to ]je concluded that the accident arose out of employment
inasmuch as the very nature of the employment of the deceased made it          B
necessary for him to be there.
      By recording the aforementioned finding on the first issue, the
matter is returned to the Commissioner under the Act for deciding the
remaining issues framed by him.
                                                                               c
      22. The appeal is disposed of. No costs.

Ankit Gyan                                               Appeal disposed of.