Supreme Court of India
DAXABENversusTHE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 771
- Decided
- 29 July 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- INDIRA BANERJEE
Holding
An FIR under Section 306 IPC cannot be quashed on the ground of a settlement; the High Court’s order quashing the FIR is set aside.
Summary
The widow of Shaileshkumar Patel challenged the quashing of FIR No. I‑11209016200112, filed under Section 306 IPC for alleged abetment of his suicide, on the ground that the complainant and accused had reached a monetary settlement. The Gujarat High Court, invoking its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, set aside the FIR, holding that the settlement rendered further proceedings futile. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 306 IPC is a grave, non‑compoundable offence constituting a crime against society, and the State, not the informant, has the exclusive right to prosecute such offences. Consequently, a settlement cannot justify quashing the FIR, and the High Court’s order was set aside. The Court emphasized that the inherent power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly and only where the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or does not disclose an offence.
Issues considered
- Whether an FIR under Section 306 IPC, a non‑compoundable offence, can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Section 306 IPCAbetment of suicideNon‑compoundable offenceSection 482 CrPCQuashing FIRSettlementInherent powers of High CourtCrime against society
Judgment
[2022] 13 S.C.R. 295 295
DAXABEN A
v.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022)
JULY 29, 2022 B
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Quashing of FIR
– FIR u/s.306 for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment
of imprisonment of ten years – Quashed by the High Court on the
C
basis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused named
in the FIR – On appeal, held: Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint
is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a
matter between the State and the accused – State has a duty to ensure
that law and order is maintained in society and the offender is
prosecuted – An informant has no right in law to withdraw the D
complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/
or heinous nature, which impacts society – Offence u/s. 306 of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence
– s.307 falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and
are to be treated as crime against society and not against the
E
individual alone – On a parity of reasoning, offence u/s. 306 would
fall in the same category – An FIR u/s. 306 cannot even be quashed
on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving
spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else –
Thus, the impugned orders of the High Court set aside – Penal
Code, 1860 – s. 306. F
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The issue whether the criminal miscellaneous
applications filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could
have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetment
to commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten G
years, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement
between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR, is
answered in negative. [Para 25][308-C-D]
H
295
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A 1.2 Even though, the inherent power of the High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings
is wide, such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in
exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C is not
to be exercised for the asking. In exceptional cases, to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court might in
B
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 quash criminal
proceedings. However, interference would only be justified when
the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patently
frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Paras 27, 29][308-F; 309-A-
B]
C 1.3 Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to
commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course,
the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure
D the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court.
Where the victim and offender have compromised disputes
essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can
exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal
proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal
complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be
E exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case. However, before exercising its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court has to be circumspect and have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or
F serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim.
Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment
to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such
crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can
G prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is
serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against
society. [Paras 37, 38][313-D-G]
1.4 Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to
grave and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 297
the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, where A
complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to
extract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially strong
offenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and serious
offences such as murder, rape, bride-burning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with them. This would
B
render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-B
etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social
purpose. [Para 39][314-A-B]
1.5 In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainant
is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal
complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it C
becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The State
has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society.
It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and
serious non- compoundable offences which impact society, the
informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the D
extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and
punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law to
withdraw the complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave,
serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society. [Para
40][314-C-D]
E
1.6 In exercise of power under Section 482, the Court does
not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint
except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that
the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. [Para
49][322-A]
F
1.7 The criminal proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud
by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. only because
there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between
the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased.
Section 307 IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious G
offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not
against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence
under section 306 IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR
under Section 306 IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of
any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is
clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine the
question whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence under
Section 306 IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its power
under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole
ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant
B
had been compromised. The impugned orders of the High Court
are set aside. [Paras 50, 51][322-B-E]
M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its Inspector of
Police (2019) 3 SCC 315; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of
Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301 : [2019] 9 SCR 703;
C Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh (2001) 9 SCC
618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247; S.S. Chheena v. Vijay
Kumar Mahajan and Another (2010) 12 SCC 190 :
[2010] 9 SCR 1111; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey (2019) SCC Online 1786; State
D of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.
(2011) 14 SCC 770 : [2011] 15 SCR 540; Monica
Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P. (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]
9 SCR 943; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar
AIR 1990 SC 494 : (1990) Supp SCC 686 : [1989]
Suppl. SCR 165; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
E Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others (1983) 1 SCC 1 :
[1983] 1 SCR 884; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Gourieshetty Mahesh (2010) 11 SCC 226 : [2010]
8 SCR 423; Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand
(2013) 11 SCC 673; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
F Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 :
[1988] 2 SCR 930; Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 : [2007] 10 SCR 847;
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 :
[1980] 1 SCR 1071; Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay
Sharma & Others (2021) 5 SCC 524; Gian Singh v.
G State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012]
8 SCR 753; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014)
9 SCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; State of Maharashtra
v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SC 29 : [2013]
12 SCR 563; CBI v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 299
: [2015] 10 SCR 277; State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi A
Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376 : [2015] 9 SCR 772;
Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another
(2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019) 5 SCC 688 :
B
[2019] 2 SCR 864; Arun Singh and Others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary and Another (2020)
3 SCC 736 : [2020] 3 SCR 707 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2019) 3 SCC 315 referred to Para 10 C
[2019] 9 SCR 703 referred to Para 11
[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247 referred to Para 12
[2010] 9 SCR 1111 referred to Para 13
[2011] 15 SCR 540 referred to Para 21 D
[2008] 9 SCR 943 referred to Para 28
[1989] Suppl. SCR 165 referred to Para 29
[1983] 1 SCR 884 referred to Para 31
[2010] 8 SCR 423 referred to Para 31 E
(2013) 11 SCC 673 referred to Para 32
[1988] 2 SCR 930 referred to Para 33
[2007] 10 SCR 847 referred to Para 34
F
[1980] 1 SCR 1071 referred to Para 35
(2021) 5 SCC 524 referred to Para 36
[2012] 8 SCR 753 referred to Para 41
[2014] 4 SCR 1012 referred to Para 42
G
[2013] 12 SCR 563 referred to Para 43
[2015] 10 SCR 277 referred to Para 44
[2015] 9 SCR 772 referred to Para 45
[2017] 10 SCR 12 referred to Para 46
H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A [2019] 2 SCR 864 referred to Para 47
[2020] 3 SCR 707 referred to Para 48
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1061-1084 of 2022.
B From the Judgment and Order dated 20.10.2020 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.5600, 5107,
5004, 5108, 5165, 5159, 5161, 5524, 5166, 5162 and 5739 of 2020 and
Order dated 29.07.2021 in R/Criminal Misc Application Nos.10845, 10846,
10847, 10848, 10849, 10850, 10851, 10852, 10853, 10855, 10856 and
10858 of 2021.
C
Priank Adhyaru, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the
Appellant.
Anitha Shenoy, Maninder Singh, Sr. Advs., Ms. Deepanwita
Priyanka, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Vivek Mathur, Ms. Aarti Krupa
D Kumar, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Vaibhav Joshi, Ankur Mathur, Ivan,
Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Prabhas Bajaj, Pranav
Saigal, Ajay Sabarwal, Manvendra Singh, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati,
Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
Leave granted.
2. These Appeals are against the impugned final judgment and
order dated 20th October 2020 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad allowing the Criminal Revisional Applications under Section
F 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Cr.P.C), being R/Criminal
Misc. Application Nos. 5026 of 2020, 5600 of 2020, 5107 of 2020, 5004
of 2020, 5108 of 2020, 5165 of 2020, 5159 of 2020, 5161 of 2020, 5524 of
2020, 5166 of 2020, 5162 of 2020, 5739 of 2020 and quashing the FIR
being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1 st March 2020 registered with
G Himmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, District Sabarkantha, and also
the order dated 29th July 2021 passed by the High Court dismissing the
Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by the Appellant, registered
as R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 10845 of 2021, 10846 of 2021,
10847 of 2021, 10848 of 2021, 10849 of 2021, 10850 of 2021, 10851 of
2021, 10852 of 2021, 10853 of 2021, 10855 of 2021, 10856 of 2021,
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 301
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
10858 of 2021 for recalling the said common final order dated 20th October A
2020.
3. The Appellant is the wife of late Shaileshkumar Chimanbhai
Patel, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, who is stated to have
committed suicide on 1st March 2020 by consuming poison in his office.
4. One Pinakin Kantibhai Patel, claiming to be a cousin of the B
deceased, as also an Accountant working for the deceased, lodged an
FIR being C.R. No. I-11209016200112 dated 1st March 2020 with
Himmatnagar Police Station, District Sabarkantha, naming 12 accused
persons, being the applicants in the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications
in the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, referred to above, C
alleging that they had committed offence under Section 306 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) of abetting the commission of suicide by the
deceased.
5. As per the FIR, the deceased left a hand-written note, the
contents whereof are as hereunder:- D
“With due respect, I am to state that I, Shaileshkumar
Chimanlal Patel, Proprietor of Jigar Transport, state that I
have been cheated. The names and statement are as under
1. As per the instructions of Anil Mathur, I have paid amounts
as under: Anil Mathur, RTO, Jodhpur, Service Ratanpur RTO E
Check Post, Anil Mathur, Rs.600000/-, Pramod Dadhichi
Rs.10,00,000/-, Sunil Mathur, Rs.300000/-, Niharika Mathur
Rs.800000/-, Malvika Mathur Rs.300000/-, Niru Mathur
Rs.700000/-, Dolly Mathur Rs.300000/-. The accounts of
above amounts are not cleared and they have not returned F
the amounts.
2. Karni Bhavarsha serving in RTO, Mandar Border, and
Rajkuar G. serving in RTO had launched company and amount
is given in their RP Powertech company and total amount
comes to Rs.3723200/-.
G
3. Vijaysinh Bhati who has committed most cheating and fraud
with me. I am in credit of Rs.14700000 (Rupees one crore
forty seven lakhs only). From this person. I am also in credit
of Rs.1,50,000/- from Chandravirsinh Bhati and in credit of
Rs.10,00,000 from Padam Bhati. They have taken my CRETA
H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A car bearing RT No.6797 and they are not giving my car back.
It is requested to do needful.”
6. The FIR records :-
“There is signature in English. The name Patel Shaileshkumar
Chimanlal is written in gujarati under the signature. The
B names of Padam Bhati, Chandravirsinh Bhati, Dolly Mathur,
Niru Mathur, Malvika Mathur, Niharika Mathur, Sunil Mathur,
Pramod Dadhichi, Anil Mathur, PK Powertech, Kamalpal
Mineral Pvt. Ltd., Leena Computerized Ledger Statements are
affixed with staple pin. These words are written in the
C handwriting of Shaileshkumar. I know the handwriting. I had
given this chit to Apurvabhai in the office. He had read over
the said chit. He told me that this is suicide note of
Shaileshkumar.
The name Pramod Dhidhasi is written in the suicide note but
D the real name is Pramod Dadhichi. That money was given to
all persons through Bank except Vijaysinh. Kamalpal Minerals
Pvt. Limited of Vijaysinh was given Rs.18,52,000/.”
7. In the FIR, it was alleged that the deceased had been making
phone calls to the accused persons calling upon them to return his money,
E but they did not do so. The accused had cheated the deceased of
Rs.2,35,73,200/-. The deceased was in acute financial crunch and,
therefore, constrained to take his own life.
8. Section 306 of the IPC reads:
“306. Abetment of suicide. -If any person commits suicide,
F whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.”
9. As argued by Ms. Shenoy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
G on behalf of the Respondents, what is required to constitute alleged
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the IPC is that there must be
an allegation of either direct or indirect act of incitement to the commission
of the offence of suicide.
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 303
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
10. Ms. Shenoy cited M. Arjunan v. State, Represented by its A
Inspector of Police1, where this Court held:-
“7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section
306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused
to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.
The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by B
using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the
abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of
suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate
the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of
instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied the
accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC.” C
11. Ms. Shenoy also cited Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana2,
where this Court held:
16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a
proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission D
of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of
cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence
of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving
multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and
responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment
of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and E
convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission
of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment
of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless
there be such action on the part of the accused which compels
the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action F
ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a
person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another
or not, could only be gathered from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted G
commission of suicide by another, the consideration would
be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act
of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the
decisions above-referred, instigation means to goad, urge
1
(2019) 3 SCC 315
2
(2019) 17 SCC 301 H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the
persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and
the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to
induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it
may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of
suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and
B
by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which
leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit
suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section
306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the
self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually
C draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held
guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the
part of the accused in such cases would be examined with
reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if
the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused
intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger,
D
a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of
suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying
the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or
was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of
suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human
E behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own
facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having
bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the
deceased.”
12. Ms. Shenoy referred to Ramesh Kumar v. State of
F Chhatisgarh3, where this Court defined ‘instigate’ as under:-
“Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do an act.”
13. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another.4,
cited on behalf of the Respondent, this Court observed:-
G
“25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person
or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive
act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing
3
(2001) 9 SCC 618
4
H (2010) 12 SCC 190
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 305
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the A
legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear
that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has
to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an
active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide
seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the
B
deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.”
14. The proposition of law enunciated and/or re-enunciated in the
judgments cited above are well settled. Whether the acts alleged would
constitute an offence, would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the case. Each case has to be judged on its own merits.
C
15. In this case, however, it appears that the High Court did not
even address to itself, the question of whether the allegations in the FIR
constituted an offence under Section 306 IPC or not. The FIR was
quashed in view of a settlement between the accused named in the FIR
and the complainant.
D
16. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question of
whether there was any direct or indirect act of incitement to the offence
of abetment of suicide, since the High Court has not gone into that
question. Suffice it to mention that even an indirect act of incitement to
the commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment of
suicide under Section 306 of the IPC. E
17. In Court, it was submitted that the parties had amicably resolved
their disputes. In support of such submission, affidavits of Settlement of
Disputes, signed by the complainant and other family members of the
deceased were placed on record.
F
18. The High Court held:
“9. Since now, the dispute with reference to the impugned
FIR is settled and resolved by and between parties which is
confirmed by the original complainant through their learned
advocate, the trial would be futile and any further continuation
G
of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.
Therefore, the impugned FIR is required to be quashed and
set aside.
10. Resultantly, the applications are allowed. The impugned
FIR being No. C.R.No. I-11209016200112 of 2020 registered
H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A with Himmatnagar ‘A’ Division Police Station, District
Sabarkantha and all other consequential proceedings arising
out of said FIR are hereby quashed and set aside qua the
applicants.”
19. By the common order dated 29th July 2021, also impugned in
B these appeals, the prayer of the Appellant for recalling the order dated
20th October 2020 was declined. The High Court held:-
“22. …However, as discussed herein above, this Court has
passed an order dated 20.10.2020 after considering the
settlement arrived at between the original first informant, who
C is cousin brother of the deceased and was working as an
Accountant of the firm of the deceased. Further, investigating
agency has verified about the genuineness of the settlement
arrived at between the parties. It is not in dispute that the
present applicant is a third party – as stated in Paragraph
No.1 of the application and, hence, so far as the FIR in
D question is concerned, she is merely a witness in the FIR.
Therefore, when this Court has passed an order after giving
an opportunity of hearing, the original first informant –
cousin brother of the deceased, the order dated 20.10.2020
passed by this Court is not required to be recalled while
E exercising power under Section 482 of the Code.
23. At this stage, it is once again required to be noted that the
applicant has stated in the memo of application at Page No.9
that the respondent No.3 – original first informant has
pocketed hefty amount from an individual original accused
F and is totally out of picture post allowing of the quashing
petition and is not in contact with the present applicant. Thus,
it appears that after settling the dispute by the respondent
No.3 – original first informant with the original accused, he
has not given/paid the said amount to the applicant, however,
for the reasons, it is always open for the applicant to file
G appropriate proceeding against the respondent No.3 –
original first informant. Therefore, the present application,
which is filed for recalling the order, is not maintainable, and
in the facts of the present case, this Court is not inclined to
exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code for
H recalling of the order dated 20.10.2020.
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 307
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, all these applications A
are dismissed.”
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court referred to an order
dated 6th December 2019 passed by a three Judge Bench of this Court
in Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krishna Kumar Pandey5) where this Court held that in a revision arising B
out of conviction, the High Court could not have sealed the right of the
employer to take disciplinary action against the accused for misconduct
in accordance with the Service Rules.
21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this Court referred with
approval, to the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder C
Pal Singh Bhullar and Ors.6 where this Court held that the High Court
was not denuded of inherent power to recall a judgment and/or order
which was without jurisdiction, or in violation of principles of natural
justice, or passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to a party
affected by the order or where an order was obtained by abusing the
process of Court which would really amount to its being without D
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can be exercised to recall such orders.
22. The High Court rightly found, in effect, that it had the inherent
power to recall a judgment and/or order which was without jurisdiction
or a judgment and/or order passed without hearing a person prejudicially
affected by the judgment and/or order. The High Court, however, fell in E
error in not recalling the order dated 20th October 2020. The High Court
did not address to itself, the question of whether it had jurisdiction to
quash a criminal complaint under Section 306 of the IPC, which is a
grave non-compoundable offence, entailing imprisonment of ten years,
on the basis of a settlement between the parties. F
23. The High Court erred in declining the prayer of the Appellant
for recalling its order dated 20th October 2020, passed without hearing
the wife of the deceased only because the original informant/complainant,
a cousin brother and an employee of the deceased had been heard.
Hearing a cousin-cum-employee of the deceased cannot and does not G
dispense with the requirement to give the wife of the deceased a hearing.
The wife of the deceased would have greater interest than cousins and
5
2019 SCC Online 1786
6
(2011) 14 SCC 770 H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A employees in prosecuting accused persons charged with the offence of
abetting the suicide of her husband.
24. Be that as it may, since the initial order dated 20th October
2020 is also under challenge in these appeals, it is really not necessary
for this Court to delve deeper into the question of whether a final order
B passed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quashing an FIR could have, at
all, been recalled by the High Court, in the absence of any specific
provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall and/or review of such order. The High
Court has, in effect, held that in exceptional circumstances, such orders
can be recalled, in exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, to
prevent injustice.
C
25. The only question in this appeal is whether the Criminal
Miscellaneous Applications filed by the accused under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of
the IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment of
imprisonment of ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of a
D settlement between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR.
The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.
26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides :—
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in
E this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.”
F 27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,
such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.
Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for
the asking.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P.7, this Court held that
G
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
7
H (2008) 8 SCC 781
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 309
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of the A
Court, the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under
Section 482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would
only be justified when the complaint did not disclose any offence, or was
patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.
Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar8.
B
30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi
and Others.9, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is
the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This
provision confers a separate and independent power on the C
High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases
where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where
the process of the court has been seriously abused. It is not
merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the
orders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section
that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash the D
proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against
witnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the
scope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section
482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present
Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in E
some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would
be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the present Code can be
exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant
and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute.
Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be F
exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,
there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and
397(2) of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearly
defined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC G
43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed as
follows : [SCC para 10, p. 47 : SCC (Cri) p. 76]
8
AIR 1990 SC 494 : 1990 Supp SCC 686
9
(1983) 1 SCC 1 H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A “Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law
when a specific provision is made : easy resort to inherent
power is not right except under compelling circumstances.
Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent
power should not invade areas set apart for specific power
under the same Code.”
B
8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in
mind is as to when the High Court acting under the provisions
of Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as
quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter
was gone into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
C Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where the
scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was
considered and while laying down the guidelines and the
grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Court
D observed as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp.
511-12]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an
order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused
can be quashed or set aside:
E (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the
essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against
F the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently
absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent
person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused;
G (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been
based either on no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 311
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal A
defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a
complaint by legally competent authority and the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and
provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies
where the High Court can quash proceedings.” B
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Court
in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC
505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ
1146] where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed
as follows : [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133] C
“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in
the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any
offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the D
Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against
an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the
face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,
no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking E
the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding
or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the
High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. F
Gourieshetty Mahesh10, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there is
reasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.
32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand11, this Court
G
held:—
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to
10
(2010) 11 SCC 226
11
(2013) 11 SCC 673 H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence
or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present
or not has to be judged by the High Court. …”
B
33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre12, a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarized
the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:—
C “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution
at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied
by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations
as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the
court to take into consideration any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient
D and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to
continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be
utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing
E a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking
into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the
proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal13, this
Court observed:—
F “46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not
used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private
vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused.
On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion
that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
G inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the
12
(1988) 1 SCC 692
H 13
(2007) 12 SCC 1
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 313
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the A
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position,
the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.”
35. It is a well settled proposition of law that criminal prosecution,
if otherwise justified, is not vitiated on account of malafides or vendetta.
As said by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh14 “if the B
use of the power for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation
or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others15,
this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve
the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to C
degenerate into weapons of harassment.
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commit
suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and
can even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non- D
compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse
of the process of Court. Where the victim and offender have
compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the High
Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash
the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a
criminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be E
exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal
proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be circumspect
and have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous F
or serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise
between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes
like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide
are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society. G
In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when
the offence is serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime
against society.
14
(1980) 2 SCC 471
15
(2021) 5 SCC 524 H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A 39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave and
serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant,
would set a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodged
for oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot free, even in
cases of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride- burning,
B
etc. by buying off informants/complainants and settling with them. This
would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498-A, 304-B etc.
incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant is
only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is
C lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matter
between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that
law and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute
offenders. In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offences
which impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has the
D right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction
and punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law to
withdraw the complaint of a non-compoundable offence of a grave,
serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society.
41. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab16, this Court discussed the
E circumstances in which the High Court quashes criminal proceedings in
case of a non-compoundable offence, when there is a settlement between
the parties and enunciated the following principles:-
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender
F and the victim has been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of
criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice
in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is
put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of
justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes
G are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist
in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-
being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer
only because he and the victim have settled the dispute
amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet
H 16
(2012) 10 SCC 303
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 315
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or A
without the permission of the court. In respect of serious
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of
mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working
B
in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain
offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil
flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. C
or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court
may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the
D
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is
satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly
any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not
quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty
and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its E
own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed”.
42. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab17, this Court held that
in case of heinous and serious offences, which are generally to be treated
as crime against society, it is the duty of the State to punish the offender.
Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and F
victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender
should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime.
43. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi 18, this
Court held:-
“26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the G
manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits
fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus
operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in
17
(2014) 9 SCC 466
18
(2014) 15 SC 29 H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a
social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an
accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there
is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail
of these kinds of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case
having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character.
B
The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the
financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence
creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. ...”
44. In CBI v. Maninder Singh19, this Court held:-
C “17. … In economic offences the Court must not only keep in
view that money has been paid to the bank which has been
defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of
simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence
with which we are concerned was well planned and was
committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal
D profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To
quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused
has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced
sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders
are not allowed to continue, the entire community is
E aggrieved.”
45. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi Stanley20, this Court
held:-
“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to
be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The
F submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us
unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence
and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True
it is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that
G altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing
a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery
of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the
ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor
19
(2016) 1 SCC 389
H 20
(2016) 1 SCC 376
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 317
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in A
this case. We say no more on this score.
15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence
or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create
a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be
quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the B
principle that when the matter has been settled it should be
quashed to avoid the load on the system. …”
46. In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and Others v. State of Gujrat and Another21, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court quoted Narinder Singh (supra), Vikram Anantrai C
Doshi (supra), CBI v. Maninder Singh (supra), R. Vasanthi Stanley
(supra) and held:-
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarised in the following
propositions: D
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or
to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer
new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court. E
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court
to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding
on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between
the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation
of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. F
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
G
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding
or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must
21
(2017) 9 SCC 641 H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure
the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process
B of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that
the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
C no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
D involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the
victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute.
Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the
E overriding element of public interest in punishing persons
for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing
F insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
G appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 319
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause A
oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic well-being of the State
have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere B
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would
be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud
or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained
of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.” C
47. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors.22, a
three-Judge Bench discussed the earlier judgments of this Court and
laid down the following principles:-
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions D
of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is
observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised E
having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
F
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involved heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact
on society;
G
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the
offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
22
(2019) 5 SCC 688 H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc.
would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences
and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society
B and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the
criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC
and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the
society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section
482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved
their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High
C Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed
under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is
there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
D sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing
the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would
be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such
an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after
E the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-
sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6
and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh
F [(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-
G compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there
is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender,
the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the
accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how
H
DAXABEN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. 321
[INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
he had managed with the complainant to enter into a A
compromise, etc.”
48. In Arun Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh Through
its Secretary and Another23, this Court held:-
“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] it has B
been observed that in respect of offence against the society it
is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is
a settlement between the offender and victim the same shall
not prevail since it is in interests of the society that offender
should be punished which acts as deterrent for others from C
committing similar crime. On the other hand, there may be
offences falling in the category where the correctional
objective of criminal law would have to be given more
weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such
cases, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between
the parties would lead to better relations between them and D
would resolve a festering private dispute and thus may exercise
power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings
or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.
15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been
laid down, we are of the view that offences for which the E
appellants have been charged are in fact offences against
society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious
impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is
founded on the overriding effect of public interests in
punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an F
offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or such similar transactions or has any element
of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such
cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant
and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground
to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet. G
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in
refusing to quash the charge-sheet on the ground of
compromise between the parties.”
23
(2020) 3 SCC 736 H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 13 S.C.R.
A 49. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the
Court does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint
except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the
allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.
50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding cannot be
B nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.
P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement,
between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the
deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased. As
held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan & Ors.
(supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of heinous and
C serious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not
against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence under
section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of any
financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,
D guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is clarified that it was not
necessary for this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in this
case discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the High
Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the
proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused
and the informant had been compromised.
E
51. The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders of the High
Court are set aside. The observations made in this judgment are not to
be construed as any observation on the merits of the contentions of the
respective parties.
F
Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.
G
H
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