D. STEPHEN JOSEPHversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

A                              D. STEPHEN JOSEPH
                                          v.
                            UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                                   APRIL 25, 1997

B                    [G.N. RAY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)

            Service Law :

            Promotio1i---To the post of Assistant Engineer-50% quota reserved for
C persons possessing degree in Electrical Engineering with three years regular
  service in the grade of Junior Engineers-Three years to be counted from date
  of acquiring the degree in Electrical Engineerin15Tribunal holding that reck-
  oning of three years from date of acquisition of degree in Electrical Engineer-
  ing invalitl--On appeal held, any past practice dehors the Rule cannot be
  taken into consideration as practice consistently followed for long by inter-
D preting the Rule-Hence no interference called for.
            M.B. Joshi and Ors. v. Salish Kumar Pandey and Ors., [1993) Suppl.
    2 SCC 419, Relied on.

            N. Suresh Nathan and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1992) Suppl. 1
E sec 484, distinguished.
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3118 of
    1997.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 4.6.93 of the Central Ad-
F   ministrative Tribunal, Madras in O.A. No. 577 of 1993.

            R. Venkataramani and S.M. Garg for the Appellant.

          K.N. Shukla, Avatar Singh Rawat, D.S. Mehra, Chandan Ramamur-
    thi and V.G. Pragasam for the Respondents.
G
            The following Order of the Court was delivered :

            Leave granted.

            Heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question that arises
H for decision in this case is whether for promotion to the post of Assistant
                                          1040
                          D.S. JOSEPH v. U.0.l.                         1041

Engineer in the 50% promotion quota reserved for the person possessing          A
degree in Electrical Engineering from a recognised University or an
equivalent with three years' regular service in the grade of Junior Engineers
in the electricity department. Government of Pondicherry, three years'
experience as Junior Engineer in the grade is to be counted from the date
of acquisition of the degree in Electrical Engineering or the length of         B
service in the grade of Junior Engineers is to be reckoned if the incumbent
at the time of promotion to the 50% quota also possesses degree in
Electrical Engineering.

      The Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench by the im-
pugned order has held that the respondents who are holding the post of          C
Junior Engineers and have three years' regular service in that grade and
also possess degree in Electrical Engineering will be entitled to get such
promotion to 50% reserved quota and their experience of three years is
not to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the degree in Electrical
Engineering. Such decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal is being      D
impugned in this case.

      Mr. Venkataramani, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
contended that the plain language of the Rule need not be followed in all
cases and in applying the rule for promotion to 50% quota from amongst
Junior Engineers with degree in Electrical Engineering, past practice is        E
required to be considered as held by this Court in N. Suresh Nathan a11d
Anr. v. Union of India &: Ors., (1992] Suppt 1 SCC page 484. If the past
practice is taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the said
Rule, it will be quite evident that experience of three years had always
been reckoned from the date of the acquisition of the degree in Electrical      F
Engineering. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained
and the promotion of private respondents in the 50% quota earmarked for
the persons holding degree in Electrical Engineering could not have given
to the said Private respondents.

      It appears to us that the State Government is labouring under a           G
wrong impression as to the applicability of the past practice as indicated
in Suresh Nathan's case. This Court in the said decision, has only indicated
that past practice should not be upset provided such practice conforms to
the rule for promotion and consistently for some time past the rule has
made applicable in a particular manner. In our view, the decision in            H
    1042                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1997] 3 S.C.R.

A Nathan's case only indicates that past practice must be referable to the
  applicability of the Rule by interpreting it in a particular manner consis-
  tently for some time. Any past practice dehors the rule cannot be taken
  into consideration as past practice consistently followed for long by in-
  terpreting the Rule. It may be indicated here that a similar question also
B came up for consideration before this Court in M.B. Joshi and Ors. v. Satish
  Kumar Pandey and Ors., [1993] Suppl. 2 SCC 419. The decision in Suresh
  Natha11 's case distinguished in the facts of that case and it was indicated
  that when the language of the Rule is quite specific that if a particular
  length of service in the feeder post together with educational qualification
  enable a candidate to be considered for promotion, it will not be proper
C to count the experience only from the date of acquisition of superior
  educational qualification because such interpretation will violate the very
  propose to give incentive to the employee to acquire higher education.

        In the instant case, there is no dispute that the rule for promotion to
  50% quota came into effect in 1982 and in 1987 and thereafter only some
D ad hoc promotions were given. Therefore, there is no occasion to proceed
  on the footing that the Rule for promotion since effective from 1982 has
  been followed differently by giving an interpretation of the Rule as was
  noted in the decision in Suresh Nathan's case. Therefore, in our view, the
  decision in Suresh Nathan's case, which is an exception to the accepted
E principle of interpretation of the Rule on the plain language, only under
  special circumstances, has no manner of application in the facts of the case.
  We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the ultimate decision of the
  Tribunal. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order
  as to costs.

F    G.N.                                                   Appeal. dismissed.