Holding

The bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply where a subsequent event creates a new cause of action, so the second suit is not barred.

Summary

The plaintiff, Chemplast, entered into an agreement to sell a parcel of land to the appellant, Cuddalore Powergen, but registration of the sale deed was blocked by a Government Order (GO) that reserved the land for a power project. The plaintiff filed a first suit seeking a permanent injunction against the appellant and the seller to protect possession. After the High Court quashed the GO, the plaintiff filed a second suit for specific performance, cancellation of the deed in favor of the appellant, and an injunction. The appellant contended that Order II Rule 2 of the CPC barred the second suit, leading the trial court to reject the plaint, a decision later reversed by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the bar applies when a subsequent event creates a new cause of action and held that the relief sought in the second suit was not available at the time of the first suit due to the GO, thus a new cause of action arose. Consequently, the bar under Order II Rule 2 does not apply, and the second suit may proceed. The Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s restoration of the second suit.

Issues considered

Whether the principles of Order II Rule 2 CPC bar the institution of the second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint filed by the plaintiff.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order II Rule 2, s. Order VII Rule 11
Registration Act

Subjects

Institution of second suitRejection of plaintSuit to include the whole claimRelief of permanent injunctionSuit for specific performanceAgreement to sellGovernment Order banning registration of sale deedsCause of actionSubsequent suitSubsequent eventNew cause of actionSame cause of actionCancellation of sale deedExtraneous mattersGeneral principles underlying Ord. II r. 2Multiplicity of suitsStatus/Stage of first suitRejection of plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d) CPCPrevent multiplicity of suitsPlaints read as wholeSecond suit not maintainableEntitlement of reliefAvailability of relief

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 123 : 2025 INSC 73

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd
v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 372-373 of 2025)
15 January 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the principles enumerated u/Ord. II r. 2 CPC would bar
the institution of a second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint
filed by the respondent no. 1-buyer.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. II r.2 – Suit to include
the whole claim – Relief of permanent injunction sought
in a previous suit, thereafter, institution of suit for specific
performance – Applicability of Ord. II r.2 – On facts, agreement
to sell certain property between respondent no. 1-buyer
and respondent no. 2-seller – Multiple failed attempts by
the respondent no. 1 to get the sale deed registered – Also
respondent no. 1 came to know about the Government Order
banning registration of sale deeds in the said village other
than the appellant – Appellant along with respondent no. 2
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the suit property of the respondent no. 1 – Suit for permanent
injunction by the respondent no. 1 – Meanwhile the GO quashed
by the High Court – Respondent no. 1’s case that during the
first suit only he came to know about the execution of the
registered sale deed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant in respect of the said property – Respondent no. 1
then filed the second suit, the suit for specific performance
of the agreement for sale, cancellation of the sale deed and
permanent injunction – Application by the appellant that the
second suit hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 – Application allowed and
plaint rejected in the second suit – First Appeal thereagainst
dismissed – However, the High Court allowed the second

* Author
124 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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appeal and restored the plaint in the second suit, holding that
the second suit not hit by the bar u/Ord. II r.2 – Correctness:
Held: Bar under the provisions of Ord II r.2 would not stand in
the way of the institution of the second suit by the respondent
no. 1 – True import of the bar u/Ord. II r.2 must be that it
operates to preclude a plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on
the same cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim,
or reliefs, which the plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of
filing of the first suit – Ord. II r.2 do not operate as a bar when
the subsequent suit is based on a cause of action different
from that on which the first suit was based and that the identity
of the causes of action in both the suits must be the material
consideration before the court which decide the applicability
of this provision to a second suit filed by the plaintiff – There
may arise a situation where the plaintiff may be entitled to a
relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in
time – Such relief becomes available to him on the happening
of a subsequent event, post the institution of the first suit, then
the bar u/Ord. II r.2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff
who has instituted a subsequent suit for claiming those reliefs –
Occurrence of that subsequent event gives rise to a fresh cause
of action to the concerned plaintiff for claiming certain reliefs
which he was otherwise prevented from claiming – On facts,
mandatory bar was created by a G.O. issued by the State
Government which disabled the respondent no. 1 from seeking
the remedy which he was otherwise entitled to – When the order
quashing the G.O. was passed, the rights of the respondent
no.1 crystallized and a relief which was impossible to obtain
earlier due to the existence of a State Government imposed ban
was now made available to the respondent no.1 – Thus, a new
cause of action for obtaining the relief of specific performance
directing the respondent no. 2 to execute the sale deed in
favour of the respondent no. 1 and for seeking the cancellation
of the sale deed entered into between the respondent no. 2
and the appellant had arisen – In the interests of justice, the
decisions of the High Court relating to the GO must be held
to have given rise to a new cause of action to the respondent
no. 1 for the agitating the reliefs in the second suit – It cannot
be accepted that the respondent no. 1 was fully aware of the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 125

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

circumstances relating to the ban at the time of entering into
the agreement to sell – It is only when the respondent no. 1
approached the revenue authorities on multiple occasions for the
execution of the sale deed that the reluctance of the registrar
was noticed and writ petition was filed challenging the actions
of the registrar, thus, no reason to doubt the bona fides of the
respondent no. 1 – It cannot be said that such extraneous
matters not set forth in the plaint – Respondent no. 1 indicated
in the first plaint that a writ petition instituted by them before the
High Court challenging the actions of the registrar is pending
and in the second plaint, they averred that the High Court had
quashed the G.O. in a public interest litigation and had disposed
of their writ petition – Rejecting the plaint in the second suit
would result in depriving the respondent no. 1 from claiming
the relief of specific performance of the agreement for sale and
the cancellation of the sale deed – Reliefs in the subsequent
suit founded on a cause of action distinct from that which is the
foundation of the former suit – Facts necessary to be proved
and the evidence to support the claims in the second suit also
different from that of the first suit – Thus, the respondent no. 1
could not have prayed for the reliefs claimed in the subsequent
suit at an earlier stage – High Court rightly held that the bar
u/Ord II r.2 not applicable and the respondent no. 1 would not
be prevented from instituting the second suit, and the plaint in
the second suit was restored – Trial court to decide both the
suits together on their own merits and in accordance with law,
within the stipulated period. [Paras 73, 74, 77-90]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. II r.2 – Suit to include
the whole claim – General Principles underlying Ord. II r.2:
Held: Object of Ord II r.2 is to prevent the multiplicity of suits –
Provision is founded on the principle that a person shall not be
vexed twice for one and the same cause – Mandate of Ord. II r. 2
is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the
same cause of action, in one suit – Phrase “cause of action” mean
that “every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
Court” – While it is acknowledged that the applicability of Ord II r.2
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
126 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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a correct and reliable test is to determine whether the claim in the
new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from
that which was the foundation of the former suit – Defendant who
takes shelter under the bar imposed by Ord. II r.2(3) must establish
that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action
as that on which the previous suit was based; in respect of that
cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief;
and being thus entitled to more than one relief, the plaintiff, without
any leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for
which the second suit had been filed – Defendant must also have
produced the earlier plaint in evidence in order to establish that
there is an identity in the causes of action between both the suits
and that there was a deliberate relinquishment of a larger relief on
the part of the plaintiff – Since the plea is a technical bar, it has
to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely
on the basis of inferential reasoning. [Para 47].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. II r.2 – Suit to include
the whole claim – Applicability of Ord. II r.2 – Status/Stage
of the first suit:
Held: Ord. II r.2 does not impose any restriction on the applicability
of the principles therein based on the stage or status of the first
suit – No clear requirement that the first suit either be pending or
disposed of in order to make a plea of bar u/Ord. II r.2 as regards
the second or subsequent suit – Laudable object behind this
provision is to prevent the multiplicity of suits and the splitting of
claims – Stage at which the first suit is, would not be a material
consideration in deciding the applicability of the bar u/Ord. II r.2 – It
needs to be looked into, whether the cause of action in both suits
is one and the same in substance, and whether the plaintiff is
agitating the second suit for claiming a relief which was very well
available to him at the time of filing the first suit – Thus, the fact
that the first suit is still pending before the concerned court would
have no material impact in deciding whether the subsequent suit
filed is barred by the principles u/Ord. II r.2. [Paras 48, 49, 51]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. II r.2 – Suit to include
the whole claim – Rejection of plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d) –
Determination of the applicability of the bar u/Ord II r.2 –
Approach to be adopted by the court:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 127

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

Held: Before rejecting the plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d), the Courts must
ensure that the plaint is read as a whole and its entire averments
are looked into – Few lines or passages must not be read in
isolation – It is imperative that the pleadings are read as a whole
for ascertaining the true import of the averments therein – It must
be deduced whether the causes of action in both the suits are
identical in substance in order to sustain a successful plea u/
Ord II r.2 – It would be a reductive approach to only cull out the
cause of action paragraphs from the respective plaints and decide
that they disclose the same cause of action on mere comparative
overview. [Para 56]

Words and phrases – ‘Cause of action’ – Meaning of – Phrase
‘Cause of action for the purpose of Ord II r.2’ – Elucidated.
[Paras 37, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47]

Case Law Cited
Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, AIR 1964 Raj 114;
National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v. S.N. Jaggi,
AIR 1971 All 421 – approved.
Thiyagavalli Panchayathai Serntha Nochikkadu Grama Vivasayigal
Pdthukappu Mattrum Makkal Pothunala Sangam, represented by
its Secretary, Nochikkadu v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board (2008) SCC OnLine Mad 188; Vurimi Pullarao v. Vemari
Venkata Radharani [2019] 18 SCR 1125 : (2020) 14 SCC 110;
Rathnavati v. Kavita Ganashamdas [2014] 13 SCR 120 : (2015)
5 SCC 223; Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan [2014] 10 SCR 1202 :
(2015) 11 SCC 12; Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal [1964] 7 SCR 831 :
AIR 1964 SC 1810; Sucha Singh Sodhi (Dead) through Legal
Representatives v. Baldev Raj Walia and Anr. [2018] 3 SCR 324 :
(2018) 6 SCC 733; Mohammad Khalil Khan and Others v. Mahbub
Ali Mian and Others, AIR 1949 PC 78; S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State
Bank of Mysore and Others [2007] 1 SCR 843 : (2007) 11 SCC
75; Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private Limited v. Venturetech Solutions
Private Limited [2012] 7 SCR 933 : (2013) 1 SCC 625; Saleem
Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others [2002] Suppl.
5 SCR 491 : (2003) 1 SCC 557; Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv
Kumar Gupta and Others [2007] 10 SCR 520 : (2007) 10 SCC 59;
128 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports Private Limited [2014] 7 SCR
461 : (2014) 6 SCC 424; Chhotanben and Another v. Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar and Others [2018] 3 SCR 422 : (2018) 6
SCC 422 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Words and Phrases (4th Edn.); Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary; Black’s
Law Dictionary; Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Registration Act.

List of Keywords
Institution of second suit; Rejection of plaint; Suit to include the
whole claim; Relief of permanent injunction; Suit for specific
performance; Agreement to sell; Government Order banning
registration of sale deeds; Cause of action; Subsequent suit;
Subsequent event; New cause of action; Same cause of action;
Cancellation of sale deed; Extraneous matters; General principles
underlying Ord. II r. 2 CPC; Multiplicity of suits; Status/Stage of first
suit; Rejection of plaint u/Ord VII r.11(d) CPC; Prevent multiplicity
of suits; Plaints read as whole; Second suit not maintainable;
Entitlement of relief; Availability of relief.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 372-373 of
2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2016 and 30.06.2016 of
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CMP No. 12498 of 2016
and SA No. 858 of 2014 respectively

Appearances for Parties
V. Prabhakar, Sr. Adv., D. Ravichander, Sivagnanam K, Nanchil J
Deekshith, Sahil Bhalaik, Tushar Giri, Siddharth Anil Khanna, Ritik
Arora, Shivam Mishra, Gulshan Jahan, Advs. for the Appellant.
V. Chitambaresh, Sr. Adv., K. V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan,
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 129

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the
following parts:-

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ............................................................... 3
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
(ORIGINAL DEFENDANT NO. 2) ....................................... 14
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
(ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF) ..................................................... 20
D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION ........................................ 26
E. ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 26
I. General Principles underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC ...... 27
II. Status/Stage of the first suit is immaterial for the
applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC ............................... 41
III. The plaints have to be read as a whole to determine the
applicability of the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC for the
purpose of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)
CPC ................................................................................ 44
IV. Application of the principles in Order II Rule 2 CPC to
the institution of a suit for specific performance when the
relief of permanent injunction was sought in a previous
suit .................................................................................. 47
V. The “entitlement to” along with the “availability of” the
relief as a requisite in determining the applicability of
Order II Rule 2 .................................................................. 63
F. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 78

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
130 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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1. Delay condoned in filing SLPs.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals arise out of the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court of Madras dated 01.09.2016 in CMP No. 12498 of 2016
in S.A. No. 858 of 2014 and the order dated 30.06.2016 in S.A.
No. 858 of 2014 respectively filed by the respondent no. 1 herein
(original plaintiff) whereby the High Court allowed the second appeal
and restored the plaint in O.S. No. 122 of 2008.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
4. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited (hereinafter, the
“respondent no.1/original plaintiff”) is said to have entered into
an agreement for sale with Mrs. Senthamizh Selvi (hereinafter,
the “respondent no.2/original defendant no. 1”) on 24.01.2007
whereby the respondent no. 2 agreed to sell the suit property
admeasuring 1 acre situated in village Thiyagavalli, Cuddalore
to the respondent no. 1 for a total consideration of Rs. 1,50,000.
Pursuant to the agreement for sale and after receiving the entire
sale consideration, it is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they
were also put in possession of the suit property. In furtherance
of the same, the respondent no. 2 is also said to have executed
an irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 26.03.2007 to enable the
respondent no. 1 to complete the formalities as regards the execution
and registration of the sale deed pertaining to the suit property.
The Power of Attorney was registered with the Office of the Sub
Registrar, Joint I, Chennai Central, on the same day. Consequently,
on 07.09.2007, the respondent no. 1 got the agreement for sale in
respect of the suit property registered with the Joint Sub Registrar
II, Cuddalore.
5. However, on 02.11.2007, the respondent no. 2 issued a letter inter
alia revoking the Power of Attorney issued in favour of the respondent
no. 1 to which the respondent no. 1 issued a reply on 05.11.2007.
After couple of months i.e., on 06.02.2008, the respondent no.2
again issued a letter to the respondent no. 1 in which she enclosed a
demand draft of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000. According to the respondent
no. 1, the letter inter alia mentioned that the demand draft was being
enclosed in connection with the repayment of money borrowed from
the respondent no. 1 for the purchase of a vehicle and there was
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 131

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

no indication that the amount sought to be returned was towards
the sale consideration which was received by the respondent no. 2
pursuant to the agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007. It is the case
of the respondent no. 1 that, on 08.02.2008, they had returned
the demand draft and issued a reply to the aforementioned letter.
Additionally, it is also stated that on 09.02.2008, the respondent no. 1
furnished a notice to the respondent no. 2 asking her to perform
her part of the agreement for sale by executing the sale deed and
further not to alienate the property in favour of any other person. It
appears that the respondent no. 2 has not furnished any reply to
the said notice till date.
6. It is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they had visited the
office of the sub-registrar on multiple occasions for the purpose
of registering the sale deed. However, the same was refused. On
14.12.2007, one more attempt was made by the respondent no. 1
to get the sale deed registered, however, the documents were not
accepted by the revenue authorities. Aggrieved by such refusal,
on 21.01.2008, the respondent no. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 1783 of
2008 before the Madras High Court. During the pendency of these
writ proceedings, it was found out that the revenue authorities
had declined to register the sale deed due to the existence of a
Government Order (hereinafter, the “GO”) dated 08.08.1986 issued
by the Government of Tamil Nadu by which certain parcels of land
situated at Thiyagavalli (where the suit property is located) and
Kudikkadu villages were reserved exclusively for the purpose of
a thermal power station to be set up by the Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board (hereinafter, the “TNEB”). Furthermore, vide letter dated
23.10.2006, the TNEB had authorized the Cuddalore Powergen
Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter, the “appellant/original defendant
no.2”) to develop a power station and for that purpose an extent
of 350 hectares of land is said to have been earmarked. As a
consequence, the general ban against registering the suit property
did not operate against the appellant herein. It is pertinent to mention
that a petition in public interest being Writ Petition No. 11453 of
2007 was filed by an organization representing the agriculturists
namely the Thiyagavalli Panchayathai Serntha Nochikkadu Grama
Vivasayigal Pdthukappu Mattrum Makkal Pothunala Sangam, on
20.03.2007, before the Madras High Court challenging the decision
of the revenue authorities not to register the sale deeds.
132 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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7. On and from the 2nd week of February 2008, as alleged, the appellant
along with the respondent no. 2 started to interfere with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit property of the respondent no. 1.
8. Since the threat of dispossession was imminent and in order to
prevent further attempts of trespassing into the suit property, on
16.02.2008, the respondent no. 1 filed original suit O.S. No. 28 of
2008 (hereinafter, the “first suit”) before the Principal District Judge,
Cuddalore for permanent injunction to restrain the appellant and the
respondent no.2 from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent no. 1. The same
is still pending before the concerned court.
9. However, the appellant in its written statement put forward altogether
a different case in the aforementioned first suit. It is the case of the
appellant that it had entered into a bona fide agreement for sale dated
20.02.2007 with the respondent no. 2 in order to purchase the suit
property and a sale deed in that regard was registered on 24.01.2008.
It is their case that, at the time of both the sale agreement and the
sale deed, it was the respondent no.2 alone who was in possession of
the suit property and consequently, the possession was transferred to
the appellant on 24.01.2008. Therefore, the appellant contended that
the respondent no. 1 cannot seek an injunction against the appellant
who was the actual owner in possession of the suit property as on
the date of institution of the first suit.
10. Subsequently, on 05.03.2008, a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court heard the public interest litigation in Thiyagavalli Panchayathai
Serntha Nochikkadu Grama Vivasayigal Pdthukappu Mattrum
Makkal Pothunala Sangam, represented by its Secretary,
Nochikkadu v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board
reported in (2008) SCC OnLine Mad 188 (Writ Petition No. 11453 of
2007) and quashed the G.O. dated 08.08.1986 along with the letter
dated 23.10.2006 by which lands including the suit property were
reserved exclusively for the appellant. In the same breath, the High
Court also directed the revenue authorities to receive and register all
the documents pertaining to the Thiyagavalli and Kudikkadu villages
presented to them, if such documents fulfilled all the stipulations
contained in the Registration Act or any other enactment governing
such registration. The relevant excerpts of this judgement are as
follows:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 133

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

“11. Taking note of the categorical stand of the third
respondent in the impugned proceedings, we are at a loss
to understand as to how and under what provision of law
such a prohibition came to be imposed by the respondents
restraining any individual land owners in the above two
villages from transferring their lands either by way of sale
or by any other mode to any third party other than “M/s.
Cuddalore Power Company Limited” and refuse to register
such documents.
12. Under Article 300-A of the Constitution, a right of a
citizen to own a property and retain the same has been
well protected and such right cannot be deprived of except
by authority of law.
xxx xxx xxx
15. In this context, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1982) 1 SCC
39 (Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and others), wherein, paragraphs 27
and 41 are relevant for our present purpose which read
as under:
“27. The quintessence of our Constitution is the rule of
law. The State or its executive officers cannot interfere
with the rights of others unless they can point to some
specific rule of law which authorizes their acts. In State
of M.P. v. Thakur Bharat Singh, the Court repelled the
contention that by virtue of Article 162, the State or its
officers may, in the exercise of executive authority, without
any legislation in support thereof, infringe the rights of
citizens merely because the legislature of the State has
power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the
executive order is issued. It was observed:
Every act done by the Government or by its officers
must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be
supported by some legislative authority.
The same principle was reiterated by the Court in Satwant
Singh Sawhney v. Dr. Ramarathnam, Assistant Passport
134 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Officer Government of India, New Delhi and Smt. Indira
Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain.
41. There still remains the question whether the seizure
of wheat amounts to deprivation of property without the
authority of law. Article 300-A provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The
State Government cannot while taking recourse to the
executive power of the State under Article 162, deprive a
person of his property. Such power can be exercised only
by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order.
Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject
to other provisions of the Constitution. It is, therefore,
necessarily subject to Article 300-A. The word “law” in the
context of Article 300-A must mean an Act of Parliament or
of a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having
the force of law, that is positive or State-made law. The
decisions in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. and Bishan
Das v. State of Punjab are an authority for the proposition
that an illegal seizure amounts to deprivation of property
without the authority of law.”
16. The above proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was subsequently followed in the reported
decisions in 2003 (1) SCC 591 (Hindustan Times and
others v. State of U.P. and another) and (2006) 2 SCC
545 (State of Bihar and others v. Project Uchcha Vidya,
Sikshak Sangh and others).
17. Applying the above said principle to the fact of this
case, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned
proceedings of the respondents are liable to be set
aside as non-est in law. Accordingly, setting aside the
proceedings, the prayer of the petitioner stands allowed
and the respondents are directed to receive and register all
the documents present by them for registration pertaining
to the villages namely, Thiyagavalli and Kudikkadu, if
such documents satisfy the stipulations contained in the
Registration Act or any other enactment governing such
registration.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 135

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

11. Immediately thereafter, the respondent no. 1 contended that they
had addressed a letter dated 06.03.2008 to the Tahsildar, Cuddalore,
calling upon the authorities not to alter the revenue records in respect
of the suit property in anybody’s name. As a consequence of the
decision rendered in the public interest litigation, vide order dated
25.03.2008, the Writ Petition No. 1783 of 2008 which was filed by
the respondent no. 1 was also disposed of by a learned Single Judge
of the Madras High Court on similar terms.
12. It is the case of the respondent no. 1 that they acquired knowledge
of the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 pertaining to the suit property
executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant, only
after the institution of the first suit. Therefore, the respondent no. 1
filed another Original Suit being O.S. No. 122 of 2008 (hereinafter,
the “second suit”) in the Court of the First Additional Subordinate
Judge, Cuddalore inter alia praying that (a) the respondent no. 2
be directed to specifically perform the terms and conditions of the
agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007 which was registered on
07.09.2007 by executing and registering the sale deed in favour of
the respondent no. 1; (b) the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 executed
by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant be declared as null
and void; and (c) permanent injunction restraining the respondent no.
2 and the appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent no. 1 be granted.
13. Contending that the second suit is hit by the bar under Order II Rule
2 CPC, the appellant moved an I.A. No. 17 of 2009 in the second
suit under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC, for the
rejection of plaint. On 30.04.2009, the Court of the First Additional
Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, allowed the I.A and consequentially,
passed a decree rejecting the plaint in the second suit i.e., O.S. No
122 of 2008. The relevant observation is as follows:
“… in the instant case on our hand we have elaborately
discussed the entire plaint in both the suits with regard
to the subject matter of the cause of actions and we
have also recorded the reasons that the causes of action
for the present suit were very well available during the
filing of the earlier suit and moreover these aspects are
actually admitted by the respondent that the respondent
had knowledge about the impugned sale deed even in the
136 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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2nd week of February 2008; Thus, in the light of the above
discussion the point is answered that the suit is clear bar
as it required under order 2 rule 2 r/w order VII rule 11(d)
C.P.C. and in result this petition is allowed with cost.”
(emphasis supplied)

14. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the respondent no. 1 filed Appeal
Suit No. 10 of 2009 in the Court of the Principal District Judge,
Cuddalore against the order passed in I.A. No. 17 of 2009 in the
second suit. However, on 05.10.2009, the same was dismissed as
not pressed since the respondent no. 1 conceded to the objection
that a regular appeal against an order passed in an I.A. was not
maintainable and the proper course of action to challenge an order
in allowing an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC would
be to file a regular first appeal against the decree which is passed
in the original suit. The Court, therefore, observed as thus:
“This appeal coming on the day for final hearing before me
in the presence of Thiru P.I.X. Vedamnayagam, Advocate
for the appellant and Thiru. M. Balathandayutham Advocate
for the respondent, the appellant’s counsel made an
endorsement appeal may be dismissed as not pressed,
in view of filing of fresh appeal on the same judgment
and decree, this court doth order and decree as follows:
1. that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed
as not pressed.
2. that there be no order as in costs.”
(emphasis supplied)

15. Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 filed a fresh Appeal Suit No. 1 of
2010 in the Court of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against
the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2009 by which the plaint in
the second suit was rejected and prayed that the same be set aside.
The First Appellate Court found no reason to interfere with the order
of the Trial Court. Therefore, the First Appeal was dismissed and
the Trial Court’s order was confirmed.
16. As against the concurrent findings of both the Courts, the respondent
no. 1 filed a Second Appeal in S.A No. 858 of 2014 under Section
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 137

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

100 CPC before the High Court. On 30.06.2016, the High Court
allowed the second appeal ex-parte and restored the plaint in the
second suit. The High Court was of the view that the second suit
was not hit by the bar under Order II Rule 2 and that the plaint could
not have been rejected. The relevant observations made by the High
Court are as follows:
“19. In this case, I do not find any deliberate omission on
the part of the plaintiff to make a claim in the earlier suit.
Further, in a case of this nature wherein the possession of
the suit property is said to have been handed over to the
agreement holder, it is not an unusual situation of sudden
interference by the land owner warranting the agreement
holder to file a suit for bare injunction. Therefore, if any
such situation arises, the agreement holder cannot be
precluded from claiming or seeking an immediate and
emergent relief first in order to prevent further damage
or abuse. Therefore, filing of such suit for bare injunction
also by reserving the right to file a comprehensive suit
later cannot be construed or considered as the one arising
out of same cause of action in order to bring it under the
hammer of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.
20. Considering the above stated facts and circumstances
and considering the case laws discussed as above, I am
of the firm view that the rejection of the plaint by the trial
Court which was confirmed by the appellate Court is totally
erroneous and against law.
21. Accordingly, the substantial question of law raised
in the appeal is answered in favour of the appellant. It
is made clear that this Court is not expressing any view
on the merits as claimed by the appellant as it is for the
appellant to establish the same before the trial Court in
both the suits.
22. Consequently, the Second Appeal is allowed and the
plaint in O.S.No.122 of 2008 is restored. The trial Court
is directed to take up the suit in O.S.No.122 of 2008 and
try along with O.S.No.90 of 2010 and decide the matter
on merits and in accordance with law within a period of
138 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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six months. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
No costs.”
(emphasis supplied)

17. The appellant thereafter preferred a Civil Misc. Petition in CMP No.
12498 of 2016 before the High Court against the ex-parte judgement
and order dated 30.06.2016. It is the case of the appellant that the
vakalat nama of their counsel was duly filed with the registry of the High
Court on 02.09.2015, however, the same was returned on 07.09.2015
since the vakalat nama did not contain the enrolment number of the
counsel in compliance with the new procedure implemented by the
registry. It was contended that the counsel of the appellant never
knew about the return of the vakalat nama and that his actions were
neither willful nor wanton but a bona fide mistake. Furthermore, when
the matter was listed for hearing, the name of the counsel with the
endorsement “Vakalat returned” was also not mentioned in the cause
list as per usual practice. It was submitted that this was the sole
reason why the matter was taken up for hearing in the absence of
the counsel for the appellant. Therefore, the appellant prayed that
the second appeal be re-heard as otherwise they would be subject
to serious prejudice. After hearing the counsel for the appellant,
the High Court rejected the miscellaneous petition on 01.09.2016
observing that the objections raised by the counsel for the appellant
had no merit. Hence, the High Court concluded that setting aside
the earlier judgment and order dated 30.06.2016 and reopening the
matter would not serve any useful purpose.
18. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant has filed the
present appeals before this Court.

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT (ORIGINAL
DEFENDANT NO. 2)
19. Mr. V. Prabhakar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that in order to test whether the second suit
would be hit by Order II Rule 2, the averments of the plaint in the first
suit would have to be taken note of with a view to ascertain whether
the respondent no. 1 had any cause of action for seeking the relief
claimed in the second suit, while filing the first suit itself. The counsel
highlighted the following averments made by the respondent no. 1
in the plaint of the first suit:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 139

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

“6. Quite unfortunately, the First Defendant for reasons
best known to her, issued a letter on 2nd November 2007
(received by the Plaintiff on 5th November 2007) inter alia
revoking the Power of Attorney issued in favour of the
Plaintiff…
7. While these are the circumstances, the Defendant with
an ulterior design and ill motive issued a letter to the
Plaintiff on 06.02.2008 setting forth frivolous and vexatious
contentions enclosing a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- by way of
demand draft. A copy of the said letter along with a copy
of the demand draft is submitted herewith as document
No. 6…”
According to the learned counsel, these aforesaid averments as
regards the revocation of the Power of Attorney and the alleged
return of the entire sale consideration clearly and explicitly indicate
the refusal on the part of the respondent no. 2 to have the sale deed
executed and registered in favour of the respondent no. 1. Despite
being conscious of the explicit refusal of the respondent no. 2 to
perform the contract, the respondent no. 1 had chosen to sue only
for permanent injunction in the first suit without seeking the relief
of specific performance. This omission amounts to a deliberate
relinquishment and therefore, attracts Order II Rule 2(2) CPC.
20. The counsel also drew the Court’s attention to the averments made
as regards the cause of action in the plaint of the second suit:-
“The cause of the action for the suit arose on and from
24th Jan 2008 (sic – 2007) when the first defendant
entered into the Agreement for sale with the plaintiff on
25th March, 2007 when the first defendant executed the
irrevocable power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff and
when the payments were made under the Agreement for
sale. On 7th September, 2007 when the agreement for
sale was registered, on 24th January 2008 when the sale
deed was executed by the first defendant in favour of the
second defendant, on and from the 2nd week of the Feb,
2008 when the plaintiff came to know of the impugned
sale deeds, on and from 24th Jan, 2008 when the first
defendant registered the sale deed in respect of the suit
property in favour of the second defendant which amounts
140 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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to deemed refusal on her part to perform her part of
the Agreement for sale and on all dates when the first
defendant has failed to perform her part of the contract
and at Thyagavalli village, Cuddalore District within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable court.”
(emphasis supplied)

The counsel submitted that the above referred paragraph would
indicate that the respondent no. 1 had a cause of action to seek
the relief of specific performance in the first suit in view of specific
knowledge of the execution of sale deed in favour of the appellant.
21. Furthermore, it was submitted that Order II Rule 2(3) permits the
institution of a second suit in respect of a relief which had been
omitted to be sought only if the leave of the court is obtained therefor.
Although the respondent no. 1 averred that “The Plaintiff reserved
its right to file a separate suit for specific performance against the
Defendant” in the plaint of the first suit, yet admittedly no such leave
was granted by the Court before which the first suit was instituted.
22. As regards the relief for declaration that the sale deed dated
24.01.2008 executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant is null and void, which was sought for in the second suit,
the counsel submitted that the respondent no. 1 was already aware
of the factum of sale and this was sufficiently indicated in the plaint
of the first suit through the following averment:
“9. The 2nd Defendant claims to have purchased the
property from the first defendant while the first defendant
has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property …”
According to the counsel, the aforesaid averment contained in the
first suit has been clarified by the respondent no. 1 in the second
suit as follows:
“VIII. During the second week of Feb 2008, the second
Defendant attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit property and they
demanded possession of the suit property with the help
of anti-social elements with a copy of the sale deed
said to have been executed by the First Defendant
in its favour. Thus, the Plaintiff came to know about the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 141

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

alleged sale of the suit property by the First Defendant to
the Second Defendant…”
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the aforesaid, the counsel submitted that even while filing
the first suit on 16.02.2008, the respondent no. 1 was aware that the
appellant had purchased the suit property from the respondent no.
2 on 24.01.2008. Therefore, the relief seeking a declaration that the
sale deed dated 24.01.2008 was null and void was also available
on the date when the first suit had been filed and an omission to
avail this relief would also attract the provisions of Order II Rule 2.
23. It was submitted that the factum of the respondent no. 1 having
knowledge of the sale made by the respondent no. 2 in favour of
the appellant even before the filing of the first suit stands fortified by
the fact that the appellant had been impleaded in the first suit as the
second defendant. Otherwise, in the normal course, the respondent
no. 1 would have filed the suit for permanent injunction only against
the respondent no. 2 praying that she be restrained along with her
men, agents and persons claiming through/under her from interfering
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
24. The counsel then submitted that extraneous matters cannot be
projected as giving a cause for the second suit, unless such
extraneous matters have been set forth in the agreement to sell
itself so as to postpone the cause for filing a suit for specific
performance. The respondent no. 1 had entered into an agreement
with the respondent no. 2 on 24.01.2007 being fully aware of the
facts that were prevalent on the said date and therefore, cannot
plead extraneous matters for the purpose of saving the second
suit. Furthermore, the cause of action paragraph in the second suit
has not referred to any extraneous cause for instituting the suit for
specific performance.
25. To fortify his submissions, the counsel contended that the facts of
the present case are pari materia to those in Vurimi Pullarao v.
Vemari Venkata Radharani reported in (2020) 14 SCC 110 wherein
this Court had held that the second suit for specific performance
was barred under Order II Rule 2. It was also submitted that the
decisions in Rathnavati v. Kavita Ganashamdas reported in
(2015) 5 SCC 223 and Inbasagaran v. S. Natarajan reported in
142 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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(2015) 11 SCC 12 which were relied upon by the High Court in the
impugned judgment are clearly distinguishable on facts.
26. Finally, as regards the judgment and order dated 01.09.2016 made
by the High Court in C.M.P. No. 12498 of 2016 in S.A. No. 858 of
2014, the counsel submitted that the appellant had preferred the
aforesaid miscellaneous petition before the High Court since the
second appeal had been decided without hearing the counsel for
the appellant and this ought not to have been done. However, the
High Court had rejected the prayer made by the appellant.
27. In light of all the aforesaid, the counsel prayed that both the impugned
orders of the High Court dated 30.06.2016 and 01.09.2016 be set
aside, the plaint in the second suit i.e., O.S. No. 122 of 2008 be
rejected and the orders of the Trial Court along with that of the First
Appellate Court be restored.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
(ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF)
28. On the other hand, Mr. V. Chitambaresh, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent no. 1 submitted that the cause of
action as pleaded in both the suits are totally different and that
the reliefs claimed in the second suit could not have been claimed
in the first suit. It was submitted that the respondent no. 1 had
to seek immediate protection against the threat of dispossession
and therefore, it had instituted the first suit praying for injunction
against the respondent no. 2 and the appellant. The provisions of
Order II Rule 2 are based on the principle that no person should
be vexed twice for the same cause of action. The rule provides
that every suit shall include the whole of the claim and the reliefs
which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of
action. If the plaintiff fails to do so, they will not be entitled to sue
for the portion of the claim or the relief so omitted subsequently.
However, if there are different causes of action arising even out of
the same transaction, the plaintiff cannot be expected to pray for
all the reliefs in a single suit.
29. The counsel set out in brief, the causes of action, dates and events
contained in the plaint of the first suit (O.S. No. 28 of 2008) wherein
a prayer for the grant of permanent injunction was made as follows:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 143

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

“The cause of action for the suit arose on 24th January
2007 when the plaintiff entered into an agreement for sale
at Cuddalore, on 26th March when the defendant executed
an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff,
on 7th September, 2007 when the sale agreement was
registered, on and from the second week of February 2008
when the defendants have been attempting to interfere
with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the suit property and on all dates when the threat of
dispossession continues and at Cuddalore within the
jurisdiction of this Court.”
All the relevant dates and events set out in the first suit are:
• 24.01.2007: An agreement to sell was executed in favour of the
respondent no. 1 by the vendor and the delivery of possession
of the property was granted to the respondent no. 1 after receipt
of the entire sale consideration.
• 26.03.2007: Registration of the irrevocable Power of Attorney
by the vendor in favour of the respondent no.1 for the purpose
of completion of all formalities as regards the execution and
registration of the sale deed.
• 07.09.2007: Registration of the agreement for sale made by
the vendor in favour of the respondent no. 1.
• 02.11.2007: Letter issued by the vendor revoking the Power of
Attorney made in favour of the respondent no. 1.
• 05.11.2007: Receipt of the aforesaid letter and reply by the
respondent no. 1 that the Power of Attorney could not be revoked.
• January 2008: Refusal by the Registrar to register the sale
deed in favour of the respondent no. 1 on several occasions
as a consequence of which a writ petition was filed before the
Madras High Court.
• 06.02.2008: Another letter issued by the vendor by which a
Demand Draft of Rs. 1,50,000 was sent to the respondent no. 1.
• 08.02.2008: Receipt of the aforesaid letter and reply by the
respondent no. 1 to the vendor along with the return of the
Demand Draft.
144 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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• 09.02.2008: Letter issued by the respondent no. 1 to the vendor
stating that the property not be alienated in favour of any other
person.
The counsel argued that the dates as set out hereinabove clearly
indicate that despite all the actions taken by the respondent no. 1
for the execution of the sale deed in its favour, there was a threat
of dispossession and that the respondent no. 1 was constrained
to approach the Court urgently in order to protect its possession.
Furthermore, from the aforementioned dates and events, it was
not possible to make a prayer for specific performance in the first
suit. It was submitted that the respondent no. 1 was not aware of
the execution of the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 in favour of the
appellant and it was also not the case of the appellants that they had
informed the respondent no. 1 of the execution of a sale deed in their
favour. Therefore, the submissions on behalf of the appellant that
the respondent no. 1 was aware of the sale deed dated 24.01.2008
during the institution of the first suit is completely unsustainable and
liable to be rejected. Additionally, the respondent no. 1 had also
reserved its right to sue for specific performance at a later stage and
the same cannot be read against the respondent no. 1.
30. The counsel set out in brief, the causes of action, dates and events
contained in the plaint of the second suit (O.S. No. 122 of 2008)
wherein a prayer for specific performance of the agreement to sell
dated 24.01.2007, declaration of sale deed dated 24.01.2008 as null
and void, and the grant of permanent injunction was made, as follows:
“XXII. The cause of action for the suit arose on and from
24th January, 2007 when the first defendant entered into
the agreement for sale with the plaintiff, on 26th March
2007 when the first defendant executed the irrevocable
power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff and when the
payments were made under the agreement for sale.
On 7th September, 2007 when the agreement for sale
was registered, on 24th January, 2008 when the sale
deed was executed by the first defendant in favour
of the second defendant, on and from the 2nd week
of February, 2008 when the plaintiff came to know of
the impugned sale deeds, on and from 24th Jan 2008
when the first defendant registered the sale deed in
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 145

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

respect of the suit property in favour of the second
defendant which amounts to deemed refusal on her
part to perform her part of the Agreement for sale
and on all dates when the first defendant has failed
to perform her part of the contract and at Thyagavalli
Village, Cuddalore District within the jurisdiction of
this Court.”
(emphasis supplied)

All the relevant dates and events set out in the second suit are:
• Various dates and on 14.12.2007: The Registrar had refused
registration of the sale deed in favour of the respondent no.1.
• 21.01.2008: Respondent no. 1 filed a Writ Petition No. 1783 of
2008 before the Madras High Court challenging the actions of
the Registrar. It came to the knowledge of the respondent no. 1
that the refusal on part of the Registrar was due to a G.O. dated
08.08.1986 issued by the State Government and a notification
dated 23.10.2006 issued by the TNEB which reserved the lands
including the suit property for a thermal station.
• 05.03.2008: The High Court rendered its judgment in the
public interest litigation filed in Writ Petition No. 11453 of 2007
whereby the G.O. of 1986 and the notification of the TNEB
dated 23.10.2006 were quashed.
• 06.03.2008: Respondent no. 1 sent a letter to the Tahsildar to
not effect any changes to the revenue records.
In light of the aforesaid, the counsel submitted that on a mere reading
it is evident that the causes of action are different and the reliefs
claimed in the second suit could not have been prayed for earlier. It
was pointed out that in addition to the dates and events mentioned
in the first suit, the respondent no. 1 has brought forth a crucial fact
in the second suit, i.e., that the High Court had rendered a decision
in the public interest litigation which was filed against the refusal of
the Registrar to register the sale deed.
31. It was submitted that the appellant who was the original defendant no.
2 did not make out or establish the principles which were laid down
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal
reported in AIR 1964 SC 1810. The principles are as follows:
146 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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i. That the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action
as on which the previous suit was based;
ii. That in respect of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled
to more than one relief;
iii. That being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff,
without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the
relief for which the second suit had been filed.
Furthermore, the counsel also placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in Rathnavathi (supra), Inbasagaran (supra) and Sucha
Singh Sodhi (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Baldev
Raj Walia and Anr. reported in (2018) 6 SCC 733 in order to fortify
his submissions as regards the non-applicability of Order II Rule 2
in the present facts and circumstances.
32. It was submitted that the respondent no. 1 is the original purchaser
& is in possession of the suit property. As per the appellant’s
own submission, the agreement to sell in his favour was dated
20.02.2007 and this was admittedly executed after the agreement to
sell dated 24.01.2007 in favour of the respondent no. 1. Therefore,
the appellant cannot be said to be a bona fide purchaser of the
suit property.
33. The counsel, in the last, submitted that the respondent no. 1 would
be left with no remedy in the event the plaint in the second suit
is rejected. The High Court in its impugned judgment has rightly
acknowledged that the orders of the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court were erroneous and against the law. Even though it was an
ex-parte judgment in the first instance, the High Court had heard
the appellant subsequently and affirmed its judgment. Therefore, the
counsel prayed that the present petition be dismissed and that the
order of the High Court may not be interfered with.

D. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
34. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is as follows: -
I. Whether in the facts & circumstances of the present case, the
principles enumerated under Order II Rule 2 CPC would bar the
institution of a second suit and warrant rejection of the plaint
filed by the respondent no. 1 herein in O.S. No. 122 of 2008?
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 147

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

E. ANALYSIS
35. Order II Rule 2 CPC reads as under:
“2. Suit to include the whole claim. —
(1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which
the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of
action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim
in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.—Where a plaintiff
omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes,
any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in
respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.—A person
entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same
cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but
if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for
all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief
so omitted.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this rule an obligation
and a collateral security for its performance and successive
claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed
respectively to constitute but one cause of action.”
(emphasis supplied)

I. General Principles underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC
36. The object of both the Rules 1 and 2 of Order II is to prevent the
multiplicity of suits. Order II Rule 2 is founded on the principle that
a person should not be vexed twice for one and the same cause.
It is a rule which is directed against two evils i.e., the splitting up
of claims and the splitting up of remedies. What Order II Rule 2
requires is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one
and the same cause of action, in one suit. However, this must not
be misunderstood to mean that every suit shall include every claim
or every cause of action which the plaintiff may have against the
defendant. Therefore, where the causes of action are different in the
two suits, Order II Rule 2 would have no application.
148 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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37. On a more careful perusal of the provision, it can be seen that Order II
Rule 2(1) reads as - “every suit shall include the whole of the claim
which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action”,
whereas the words used in Order II Rule 2(3) are “the same cause
of action”. Despite being so, the words “the cause of action” used
in Order II Rule 2(1) must be read to mean “the particular cause
of action”. Only on such a reading one can arrive at the inference
that where there are different causes of action, Order II Rule 2 will
not apply; and where the causes of action are the same, the bar
imposed by Order II Rule 2 may apply.
38. Order II Rule 2(1) requires every suit to include the whole of the claim
to which the plaintiff is entitled to in respect of a particular cause of
action. However, the plaintiff has an option to relinquish any part of
his claim for the purpose of bringing the suit within the jurisdiction
of any court. Order II Rule 2(2) contemplates a situation where a
plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of the
claim which he is entitled to make. If the plaintiff so acts, then he shall
not, afterwards, sue for the part or portion of the claim that has been
omitted or relinquished. It must be noticed that Order II Rule 2(2)
does not contemplate the omission or relinquishment of any portion
of the plaintiff’s claim with the leave of the court so as to entitle him
to come back later to seek what has been omitted or relinquished.
Such leave of the court is contemplated by Order II Rule 2(3) in
situations where a plaintiff being entitled to more than one relief on
a particular cause of action, omits to sue for all such reliefs. In such
a situation, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a subsequent suit
to claim the relief(s) earlier omitted except in a situation where leave
of the court had been obtained. It is, therefore, clear from a conjoint
reading of the provisions of Order II Rules 2(2) and (3) CPC that the
aforesaid two sub-rules of Order II Rule 2 contemplate two different
situations, namely, where a plaintiff omits or relinquishes a part of a
claim which he is entitled to make and, secondly, where the plaintiff
omits or relinquishes one out of the several reliefs that he could have
claimed in the suit. It is only in the latter situation where the plaintiff
can file a subsequent suit seeking the relief omitted in the earlier suit,
provided that at the time of omission to claim the particular relief, he
had obtained the leave of the court in the first suit.
39. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the
phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance was stated
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 149

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

to be the existence of those facts which give a party the right to
judicial interference on his behalf. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary,
a cause of action is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives
rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which,
if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain a judgment.
Black’s Law Dictionary states that cause of action is generally
understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party
to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative
facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation
that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another
person. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) defined cause of
action as follows:
“‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply
a factual situation the existence of which entitles one
person to obtain from the court a remedy against another
person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to
include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle
the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant
would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also
been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the
defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint,
or the subject-matter of grievance founding the action, not
merely the technical cause of action.”
40. The phrase “cause of action” has not been legislatively defined in any
enactment. However, the meaning of the expression has been the
subject of judicial consideration in various decisions. In Mohammad
Khalil Khan and Others v. Mahbub Ali Mian and Others reported
in AIR 1949 PC 78, the Privy Council agreed that “cause of action”
means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary
to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.
Furthermore, it was stated that the cause of action has no relation
whatsoever to the defence that may be set up by the defendant,
nor does it depend upon the character of the relief which is prayed
for by the plaintiff but refers to the media upon which the plaintiff
asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. The relevant
observations are as follows:
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“The phrase “cause of action” has not been defined in
any enactment, but the meaning of it has been judicially
considered in various decisions. In Read v. Brown [22
Q.B.D. 128.], Lord Esher, M.R., accepted the definition
given in Cook v. Gill [(1873) 8 C.P. 107.] that it means
“every fact which it would be necessary for the Plaintiff
to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the
judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece
of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but
every fact which is necessary to be proved.” Fry, L.J.,
agreed and said, “Everything which, if not proved, gives
the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be
part of the cause of action.” Lopes, L.J., said, “I agree with
the definition given by the Master of Rolls of a cause of
action, and that it includes every fact which it would be
necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable a Plaintiff
to maintain his action.” This decision has been followed in
India. The term has been considered also by the Board.
In Mussammat Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [(1888) L.R.
15 I.A. 156.], Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the
Board observed as follows:
“Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to
the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor
does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed
for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set out
in the plaint as the cause of action, or in other words, to
the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive
at a conclusion in his favour.”
(emphasis supplied)

41. The Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan (supra) also discussed
the principles governing the applicability of Order II Rule 2 CPC and
the several “tests” therefor in detail. On a thorough examination of
the reasoning given in several decisions, it was opined that: -
a. The correct test is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact
founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was
the foundation of the former suit;
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 151

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

b. Where the question is whether the cause of action in two suits
is the same or not, one of the tests that is applied is whether
the same evidence would support the claims in both suits. If
the evidence required to support the claims is different, then
the causes of action are also different;
c. The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to
be the same if they are identical in substance and not merely
technically identical. Therefore, the application of the rule
depends, not upon any technical consideration of the identity
of the forms of action, but rather upon a matter of substance.
42. The Court in Mohammad Khalil Khan (supra) acknowledged that
what would constitute the cause of action in a suit must always
depend on the particular facts of each case and the true difficulty
in each instance arises only upon the application of this rule. The
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“As pointed out in Moonshee Bazloor Ruheem v.
Shumsoonnissa Begum (11 M.I.A. 551 at p. 605) “The
correct test in all cases of this kind is, whether the claim
in the new suit is, in fact, founded on a cause of action
distinct from that which was the foundation of the former
suit. . . .” The object of the rule is clearly to avoid splitting
up of claims and to prevent multiplicity of suits.
xxx xxx xxx
What would constitute the cause of action in a suit must
always depend on the particular facts of the case. It was
laid down in Brunsden v. Humphrey (14 Q.B.D. 141)that
where the question is whether the cause of action in two
suits is the same or not, one of the tests that is applied is
whether the same evidence would support the claims in
both suits; if the evidence required to support the claims
is different, then the causes of action are also different.
This appears to be clear from the judgments of both Brett
M.R. and Bowen L.J. Brett M.R. observed as follows:
“……Different tests have been applied for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the judgment recovered in one
action is a bar to subsequent action. I do not decide
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this case on the ground of any test which may be
considered applicable to it; but I may mention one of
them; it is whether the same sort of evidence would
prove the plaintiff’s case in the two actions. Apply
that test to the present case…”
Bowen, L.J., quoted the following words of De Grey, L.J.
in Kitchen v. Campbell [(1771) 2 W. B1. 827.] :
“……The principal consideration……is whether it be
precisely the same cause of action in both, appearing
by proper averments in a plea, or by proper facts
stated in a special verdict, or a special case. And
one great criterion of this identity is that the same
evidence will maintain both actions. …..”
And applying the test mentioned above the learned L. JJ.,
came to the conclusion in the case before the court that the
causes of action as to damage done to the plaintiff’s cab,
and to the injury occasioned to the plaintiff’s person were
distinct; in other words, the cause of action on which the
first suit was founded was distinct from the cause of action
in the second suit which was founded on different facts.
It is important to note that in the course of his judgment
Bowen L.J. also pointed out that in considering whether
the causes of action in the two suits are the same, it
would be enough if the causes of action in the two suits
are in substance proved to be identical. After stating that
it is a well settled rule of law that damages resulting from
one and the same cause of action must be assessed and
recovered once for all, the learned Lord Justice observed
as follows:
“The difficulty in each instance arises upon the
application of this rule, how far is the cause which is
being litigated afresh the same cause in substance
with that which has been the subject of the previous
suit.” (14 Q.B.D. 141, 147)
At the end of the paragraph occurs the following observation:
“It is evident therefore that the application of the
rule depends, not upon any technical consideration
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 153

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

of the identity of forms of action, but upon matter of
substance.”
Further on, the learned Lord Justice observed,
“….the point I now have to determine, whether the
cause of action arising from damage to the plaintiff’s
cab is in substance identical with that which accrues in
consequence of the damage caused to his person…”
These observations show that in considering whether
the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same or
not as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test to
be applied is, are the causes of action in the two suits in
substance—not technically—identical? Applying this test
the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the causes
of action in the two suits in Brunsden v. Humphrey[(14
Q.B.D. 141). were distinct.
Observations to the same effect appear in certain decisions
of this Board. In Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund [12
Beng. [(1873) 12 Beng L.R. 304, 315], their Lordships
stated as follows:—
“Their Lordships are of opinion that the term “cause
of action” is to be construed with reference rather to
the substance than to the form of action. …”
In Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranne [ (1875)
LR 2.I.A. 283, 285.], Sir Montague Smith in delivering the
judgment of the Board observed:—
“… their Lordships are of opinion that the expression
“cause of action” cannot be taken in its literal and
most restricted sense. But however that may be…”
The decision in the Rajah of Pittapur v. Sri Rajah Venkata
Mahipati Surya [(1885) L.R. 12.I.A. 116] does not advance
the case of the appellants. In that case the plaintiff sued
to recover immovable property in consequence of having
been improperly turned out of possession and afterwards
sued to recover from the same defendant movable property
in consequence of its wrongful detention. Their title to the
said estate as well as to the half share of the personality
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now sued for was under a will of one Bharayamma. On
the facts, their Lordships held that the causes of action
in the two suits were distinct. They held that:
“The claim in respect of the personality was not a
claim arising out of the cause of action which existed
in consequence of the defendants having improperly
turned the plaintiffs out of possession of Viravaram
[Zemindari property]. It was a distinct cause of action
altogether, and did not arise at all out of the other.”.
Referring to the above case. Lord Buckmaster stated
the true principle concisely as follows in Muhammad
Hafiz v. Muhammad Zakariya [(1921) L.R. 49.I.A. 9, 15]:
“. . . . the cause of action is the cause of action
which gives occasion for and forms the foundation
of the suit, and if that cause enables a man to ask
for larger and wider relief than that to which he limits
his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the
balance by independent proceedings.”
In similar language what was decided in Brunsden v.
Humphrey (14 Q.B.D. 141) may be stated as follows,
namely, that the cause of action which gave occasion for
and formed the foundation for the first suit in that case was
different from the cause of action which gave occasion for
and formed the foundation for the second suit.”
(emphasis supplied)

43. A summary of the principles laid down in Mohammad Khalil Khan
(supra) are as under:
“The principles laid down in the cases thus far discussed
may be thus summarised:—
(1) The correct test in cases falling under Or.2, r.2, is
“whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, founded
upon a cause of action distinct from that which was
the foundation for the former suit.” [Moonshee Buzloor
Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum [11 M.I.A. 551, 605.] ].
(2) The cause of action means every fact which will be
necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 155

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

to support his right to the judgment. [Read v. Brown (22
Q.B.D., 128, 131)].
(3) If the evidence to support the two claims is
different, then the causes of action are also different.
[Brunsden v. Humphrey [14 Q.B.D. 141].
(4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered
to be the same if in substance they are identical.
[Brunsden v. Humphrey [14 Q.B.D. 141 ].
(5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the
defence that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it
depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the
Plaintiff. It refers “to the media upon which the Plaintiff asks
the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. [Muss.
Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [54 L.R. 15 I.A. 156, 157]. This
observation was made by Lord Watson in a case under s.
43 of the Act of 1882 (corresponding to Or.2, r.2), where
plaintiff made various claims in the same suit.”
(emphasis supplied)

44. Therefore, the phrase “cause of action” for the purposes of Order II
Rule 2 would mean the cause of action which gives an occasion for
and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause enables a person
to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his
claim, he cannot be permitted to recover the balance reliefs through
independent proceedings afterwards, especially when the leave of
the court has not been obtained.
45. A Constitutional Bench of this Court in Gurbux Singh (supra)
emphasized that the plaint in the former suit would have to be
produced in order to sustain a plea of applicability of Order II Rule
2 in the subsequent suit. While stating so, the Court observed that
the “cause of action” would be the facts which the plaintiff had then
alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed. The Court
also laid down that the defendant who seeks to take recourse to a
successful plea under Order II Rule 2(3) must make out the following:
(a) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action
as that on which the previous suit was based; (b) that in respect
of that cause of action, the plaintiff was entitled to more than one
relief; and (c) that being thus entitled to more than one relief, the
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plaintiff, without any leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue
for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. The Court
had observed as under:
“6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3)
of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant
who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second
suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on
which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of
that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than
one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one
relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court
omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had
been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the
defendant would have to establish primarily and to start
with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous
suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause
of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on
which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be
no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief
which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to
a particular cause of action but this might, by no means,
be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has
to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed
merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason
that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2
of the Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the
defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit
and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause
of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the
pleadings in CS 28 of 1950 were not filed by the appellant
in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea under
Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned
trial Judge, however, without these pleadings being on
the record inferred what the cause of action should have
been from the reference to the previous suit contained in
the plaint as a matter of deduction. At the stage of the
appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in
the appellant’s case and pointed out, in our opinion, rightly
that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 157

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

record, a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil
Procedure Code was not maintainable.”
(emphasis supplied)

Therefore, there must exist an identity between the cause of action
which forms the basis of the former and the subsequent suit. Since
the plea taken under Order II Rule 2 is a technical one, it has to be
established satisfactorily and it cannot be presumed merely on the
basis of inferential reasoning.
46. In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore and Others reported
in (2007) 11 SCC 75, this Court categorically held that if the defendant
wishes to show that the causes of action were identical in both suits,
it is necessary for him to have marked the earlier plaint in evidence
and then make out that there was a relinquishment of a relief by
the plaintiff, without the leave of the Court. It was also stated that
Order II Rule 2 is directed towards securing an exhaustion of the
relief in respect of a cause of action and not to the inclusion in one
and the same action of different causes of action, even though they
may arise from the same transaction. In other words, a number of
causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not
the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in
one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall
include the “whole of the claim” arising out of “one and the same
cause of action”.
47. On a conspectus of the aforesaid discussion, what follows is that:
i. The object of Order II Rule 2 is to prevent the multiplicity of
suits and the provision is founded on the principle that a person
shall not be vexed twice for one and the same cause.
ii. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole
claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action,
in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the
different causes of action arising from the same transaction
must be included in a single suit.
iii. Several definitions have been given to the phrase “cause of
action” and it can safely be said to mean – “every fact which
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in
order to support his right to the judgment of the Court”. Such
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a cause of action has no relation whatsoever to the defence
that may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon
the character of the relief which is prayed for by the plaintiff
but refers to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court
to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.
iv. Similarly, several tests have been laid out to determine the
applicability of Order II Rule 2 to a suit. While it is acknowledged
that the same heavily depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, it can be said that a correct and
reliable test is to determine whether the claim in the new suit is
in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which
was the foundation of the former suit. Additionally, if the evidence
required to support the claims is different, then the causes of
action can also be considered to be different. Furthermore, it is
necessary for the causes of action in the two suits to be identical
in substance and not merely technically identical.
v. The defendant who takes shelter under the bar imposed by
Order II Rule 2(3) must establish that (a) the second suit was
in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the
previous suit was based; (b) in respect of that cause of action,
the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; and (c) being
thus entitled to more than one relief, the plaintiff, without any
leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for
which the second suit had been filed.
vi. The defendant must also have produced the earlier plaint in
evidence in order to establish that there is an identity in the
causes of action between both the suits and that there was a
deliberate relinquishment of a larger relief on the part of the
plaintiff.
vii. Since the plea is a technical bar, it has to be established
satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of
inferential reasoning.

II. Status/Stage of the first suit is immaterial for the applicability
of Order II Rule 2 CPC
48. A careful perusal of Order II Rule 2 would indicate that it does not
impose any restriction on the applicability of the principles therein
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 159

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

based on the stage or status of the first suit. In other words, there is
no clear requirement that the first suit either be pending or disposed
of in order to make a plea of bar under Order II Rule 2 as regards
the second or subsequent suit. It is conspicuous by the absence
of such a stipulation that the law makers thought fit that the bar
under this provision would apply if there is an identity in the causes
of action of both suits and irrespective of whether the first suit is
disposed or not.
49. Furthermore, the laudable object behind this provision is to prevent
the multiplicity of suits and the splitting of claims. If it is held that
it is a necessary condition for the first suit to be disposed of, for a
plea under Order II Rule 2 to be maintainable, parties would still be
able to file multiple suits with the excuse that the first suit is pending.
Declaring so would not serve to further the object of Order II Rule 2
in any manner whatsoever. On the contrary, this would run counter
to the objective behind the enactment of the provision and only
serve to continuously vex the defendants. Therefore, reading such
a qualification into the rule which is clearly absent in the letter of the
provision would be unjustified.
50. That the disposal of the first suit is not a requirement under Order II
Rule 2 was clarified by this Court in Virgo Industries (Eng.) Private
Limited v. Venturetech Solutions Private Limited reported in (2013)
1 SCC 625. Herein, the Court held that the principles under Order II
Rule 2 would have an application even when the subsequent suit is
filed during the pendency of the first suit. A plea under this provision
would be available irrespective of the stage at which the prior suit
is at. The relevant observation is as follows:
“17. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had
considered, and very rightly, to be bound to follow an earlier
Division Bench order in R. Vimalchand v. Ramalingam
[(2002) 3 MLJ 177] holding that the provisions of Order 2
Rule 2 CPC would be applicable only when the first suit
is disposed of. As in the present case the second set of
suits were filed during the pendency of the earlier suits,
it was held, on the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the
Division Bench of the High Court, that the provisions of
Order 2 Rule 2(3) will not be attracted. Judicial discipline
required the learned Single Judge of the High Court to
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come to the aforesaid conclusion. However, we are unable
to agree with the same in view of the object behind the
enactment of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as
already discussed by us, namely, that Order 2 Rule 2 CPC
seeks to avoid multiplicity of litigations on the same cause
of action. If that is the true object of the law, on which we
do not entertain any doubt, the same would not stand
fully subserved by holding that the provisions of Order
2 Rule 2 CPC will apply only if the first suit is disposed
of and not in a situation where the second suit has been
filed during the pendency of the first suit. Rather, Order
2 Rule 2 CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations.
Though direct judicial pronouncements on the issue are
somewhat scarce, we find that a similar view had been
taken in a decision of the High Court at Allahabad in Murti
v. Bhola Ram [ILR (1894) 16 All 165] and by the Bombay
High Court in Krishnaji Ramchandra v. Raghunath Shankar
[AIR 1954 Bom 125].”
(emphasis supplied)

51. In light of the aforementioned, it is re-affirmed that the stage at which
the first suit is, would not be a material consideration in deciding
the applicability of the bar under Order II Rule 2. What needs to be
looked into is whether the cause of action in both suits is one and
the same in substance, and whether the plaintiff is agitating the
second suit for claiming a relief which was very well available to him
at the time of filing the first suit. Therefore, the fact that the first suit
i.e., O.S. No. 28 of 2008 is still pending before the concerned court
would have no material impact in deciding whether the subsequent
suit filed as O.S. No. 122 of 2008 is barred by the principles under
Order II Rule 2.

III. The plaints have to be read as a whole to determine the
applicability of the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC for the
purpose of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC
52. In Saleem Bhai and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others
reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557, the Court was faced with the issue
whether the filing of a written statement by the contesting defendant
was necessary in order to decide an application for rejection of plaint
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 161

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

made under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d). It was held that, for this
purpose, the relevant facts which need to be looked into are the
averments in the plaint and it is those averments which are germane.
The relevant observations are as under:
“9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that
the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding
an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint.
The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the
plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any
time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of
deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11
of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane;
the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement
would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a
direction to file the written statement without deciding the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be
procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction
by the trial court. The order, therefore, suffers from non-
exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the court as well
as procedural irregularity. The High Court, however, did
not advert to these aspects.”
(emphasis supplied)

53. In yet another decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv
Kumar Gupta and Others reported in (2007) 10 SCC 59, this Court
discussed the approach that Courts must adopt while considering
whether the plaint is to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d). It
was stated that the proper approach would be to verify the entire
averments in the plaint. A few lines or a passage must not be read
in isolation and the pleadings have to be read as a whole in order
to ascertain its true import. The relevant observations are thus:
“21. As observed earlier, before passing an order in an
application filed for rejection of the plaint under Order
7 Rule 11(d), it is but proper to verify the entire plaint
averments. The abovementioned materials clearly show
that the decree passed in Suit No. 183 of 1974 came to
the knowledge of the plaintiff in the year 1986, when Suit
No. 424 of 1989 titled Assema Architect v. Ram Prakash
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was filed in which a copy of the earlier decree was placed
on record and thereafter he took steps at the earliest
and filed the suit for declaration and in the alternative for
possession. It is not in dispute that as per Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, a suit ought to have been filed within
a period of three years from the date of the knowledge.
The knowledge mentioned in the plaint cannot be termed
as inadequate and incomplete as observed by the High
Court. While deciding the application under Order 7 Rule
11, few lines or passage should not be read in isolation
and the pleadings have to be read as a whole to ascertain
its true import. We are of the view that both the trial court
as well as the High Court failed to advert to the relevant
averments as stated in the plaint.”
(emphasis supplied)

54. The decision of this Court in Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports
Private Limited reported in (2014) 6 SCC 424 held that in order to
determine whether a suit is barred by Order II Rule 2, the Courts
must examine the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaints
filed in the relevant suits. However, considering the technicality of the
plea under this provision, both the plaints must be read as a whole
to identify the cause of action which is necessary for the plaintiff
to prove, if traversed. The relevant observations are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“12. The courts in order to determine whether a suit is
barred by Order 2 Rule 2 must examine the cause of action
pleaded by the plaintiff in his plaints filed in the relevant
suits (see S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore
[(2007) 11 SCC 75]). Considering the technicality of the
plea of Order 2 Rule 2, both the plaints must be read as
a whole to identify the cause of action, which is necessary
to establish a claim or necessary for the plaintiff to prove if
traversed. Therefore, after identifying the cause of action
if it is found that the cause of action pleaded in both the
suits is identical and the relief claimed in the subsequent
suit could have been pleaded in the earlier suit, then the
subsequent suit is barred by Order 2 Rule 2.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 163

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

55. In Chhotanben and Another v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar
and Others reported in (2018) 6 SCC 422, this Court was of the
opinion that for the purpose of rejecting the plaint under Order VII
Rule 11(d) CPC, the averments made in the plaint must be looked
into and the plaint is required to be read as a whole. It was added
that the defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by
them in their written statement or any application filed by them cannot
be the bases to decide the application under Order VII Rule 11(d).
It is only the averments in the plaint that are germane. The relevant
observations are as thus:
“15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in
the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint
is required to be read as a whole. The defence available
to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written
statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the
basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d).
Only the averments in the plaint are germane...”
(emphasis supplied)

56. Order VII Rule 11(d) reads as – “where the suit appears from the
statement in the plaint to be barred by any law”. In light of the aforesaid,
it follows that before rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d),
the Courts must ensure that the plaint is read as a whole and its
entire averments are looked into. A few lines or passages must not
be read in isolation and it is imperative that the pleadings are read
as a whole for ascertaining the true import of the averments therein.
In performing such a holistic reading, it must be deduced whether
the causes of action in both the suits are identical in substance in
order to sustain a successful plea under Order II Rule 2. It would be
a reductive approach to only cull out the cause of action paragraphs
from the respective plaints and decide that they disclose the same
cause of action on mere comparative overview.

IV. Application of the principles in Order II Rule 2 CPC to the
institution of a suit for specific performance when the relief
of permanent injunction was sought in a previous suit.
57. In Virgo Industries (supra), initially two suits had been filed by
the plaintiff-respondent for permanent injunction in order to restrain
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the defendant-appellant from alienating and encumbering the suit
properties on which there were agreements to sell made in favour of
the plaintiff-respondent. Subsequently, the plaintiff-respondent filed
two more suits seeking the relief of specific performance of the said
agreements. It was held that the bar under Order II Rule 2 would
apply to the subsequent set of suits filed for specific performance
since the plaintiff itself had claimed in the averments of the first set of
plaints that the defendant had no intention to honour the agreement
to sell. Therefore, the foundation for the relief of permanent injunction
in the initial set of suits had furnished a complete cause of action
to also sue for the relief of specific performance. It was opined that
since the said relief was omitted and no leave in this regard was
obtained or granted by the Court, the second set of suits were not
maintainable. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“13. A reading of the plaints filed in CSs Nos. 831 and
833 of 2005 show clear averments to the effect that after
execution of the agreements of sale dated 27-7-2005
the plaintiff received a letter dated 1-8-2005 from the
defendant conveying the information that the Central
Excise Department was contemplating issuance of a notice
restraining alienation of the property. The advance amounts
paid by the plaintiff to the defendant by cheques were
also returned. According to the plaintiff it was surprised
by the aforesaid stand of the defendant who had earlier
represented that it had clear and marketable title to
the property. In Para 5 of the plaint, it is stated that the
encumbrance certificate dated 22-8-2005 made available
to the plaintiff did not inspire confidence of the plaintiff
as the same contained an entry dated 1-10-2004. The
plaintiff, therefore, seriously doubted the claim made by
the defendant regarding the proceedings initiated by the
Central Excise Department. In the aforesaid paragraph of
the plaint it was averred by the plaintiff that the defendant
is “finding an excuse to cancel the sale agreement and sell
the property to some other third party”. In the aforesaid
paragraph of the plaint, it was further stated that “in this
background, the plaintiff submits that the defendant is
attempting to frustrate the agreement entered into between
the parties”.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 165

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

14. The averments made by the plaintiff in CSs Nos. 831
and 833 of 2005, particularly the pleadings extracted
above, leave no room for doubt that on the dates when
CSs Nos. 831 and 833 of 2005 were instituted, namely,
28-8-2005 and 9-9-2005, the plaintiff itself had claimed
that facts and events have occurred which entitled it to
contend that the defendant had no intention to honour the
agreements dated 27-7-2005. In the aforesaid situation
it was open for the plaintiff to incorporate the relief of
specific performance along with the relief of permanent
injunction that formed the subject-matter of the above two
suits. The foundation for the relief of permanent injunction
claimed in the two suits furnished a complete cause of
action to the plaintiff in CSs Nos. 831 and 833 to also sue
for the relief of specific performance. Yet, the said relief
was omitted and no leave in this regard was obtained or
granted by the Court.”
(emphasis supplied)

58. Thus, what is discernible from the above is that in Virgo Industries
(supra), after the execution of the agreement to sale, the defendant
had issued a letter which conveyed that the Central Excise Department
was contemplating issuing a notice restraining alienation of the
suit property on account of a pending revenue demand. Under this
pretext, the advance amount paid by the plaintiff was returned by
the defendant. These were all circumstances that were referred to in
the plaint of the first suit itself. Moreover, the plaintiff also made an
averment in the plaint of the first suit that the defendant is “finding an
excuse to cancel the sale agreement and sell the property to some
third party” and also that “the defendant is attempting to frustrate
the agreement entered into between the parties”. Therefore, this
Court had held that there is no doubt regarding the fact that the
plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s intention to not honour the
agreement which they had entered into and that it was open for the
plaintiff to avail the relief of specific performance along with the relief
of permanent injunction.
59. This Court in Inbasagaran (supra) was also faced with a similar
issue wherein it had to decide the applicability of Order II Rule 2 to
the subsequent suit for specific performance. However, the decision
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herein deals with a slightly different factual situation. The respondent
was allotted the suit property as a house site by the Housing Board
through a lease-cum-sale agreement, however, on a condition that
a sale deed would be executed in favour of the respondent only
when he constructs a building in the suit property. In the meantime,
the respondent had entered into an agreement for sale with the
appellant and obtained a part of the sale consideration as well. It was
agreed that the appellant shall prepare a plan for construction of the
building in the suit property, the respondent would get it approved
and thereafter, the appellant would undertake the construction at
his own cost. The appellant took possession of the suit property
and completed the construction. Thereafter, the Housing Board on
18.02.1985 had executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent.
The appellant alleged that the respondent attempted to forcefully
take possession of the building constructed on the suit property and
was therefore, constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction on
11.09.1985. In response to this, the respondent also filed a similar
suit for permanent injunction to restrain the appellant from interfering
with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It was in this
suit for injunction that the respondent disclosed to the appellant that
the execution of the sale deed in his favour by the Housing Board
was complete. After the said factum of transfer was brought to the
notice of the appellant, he had sent a legal notice to the respondent
and on 25.04.1986, he filed another suit for specific performance of
the agreement to sell. In short, since the plaintiff-appellant only came
to know of the sale deed executed by the Housing Board in favour
of the respondent after the institution of the first suit, the cause of
action was held to be different and distinct in both the suits. There
relevant observations are as under:
“18. In the subsequent suit filed by the plaintiff being OS
No. 252 of 1986, a decree for specific performance of
the agreement was claimed on the ground inter alia that
the defendant in the earlier suit took a defence that the
sale agreement was allegedly given up or dropped by the
plaintiff. The cause of action, as pleaded by the plaintiff in
the subsequent suit, arose when the respondent-defendant
disclosed the transfer made by the Housing Board in his
favour and finally when the defendant was exhibiting an
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 167

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

intention of not performing his part of the sale agreement
and in reply to the lawyer’s notice the defendant made a
false allegation and denied to execute the sale deed as
per the agreement.
19. A perusal of the pleadings in the two suits and the
cause of action mentioned therein would show that the
cause of action and reliefs sought for are quite distinct
and are not same.
xxx xxx xxx
27. Besides the above, on reading of the plaint of the suit
for injunction filed by the plaintiff, there is nothing to show
that the plaintiff intentionally relinquished any portion of his
claim for the reason that the suit was for only injunction
because of the threat from the side of the defendant to
dispossess him from the suit property. It was only after the
defendant in his suit for injunction disclosed the transfer of
the suit property by the Housing Board to the defendant
and thereafter denial by the defendant in response to the
legal notice by the plaintiff, the cause of action arose for
filing the suit for specific performance.”
(emphasis supplied)

60. In Inbasagaran (supra), the Court was of the view that the decision
adopted in Virgo Industries (supra) cannot be applied since in
Inbasagaran (supra) the suit for injunction was filed due to the threat
given by the respondent to dispossess him from the suit property
and there was no allegation made in the first suit that the respondent
was threatening to alienate or transfer the property to a third party
in order to frustrate the agreement.
61. Similarly, in Rathnavathi (supra), the Court refused to accept the
submission that the second suit for specific performance was barred
by the principles underlying Order II Rule 2. Here, an agreement
for sale was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant no. 2
for the sale of the suit house and part payment was also made by
the plaintiff. Later, on 07.01.2000, the plaintiff had filed the first suit
against the defendants for seeking permanent injunction restraining
the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession over
the suit house since the defendant no. 1 who is a total stranger to
168 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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the suit house, along with defendant no. 2 who was the vendor, had
visited the suit house on 02.01.2000 and threatened to dispossess
the plaintiff from the suit property. In the written statement of this
first suit, it was disclosed to the plaintiff that the defendant no. 2 had
sold the house to defendant no. 1 on 09.02.1998. Subsequently, a
legal notice dated 06.03.2000 was served upon the defendant no. 2
and the plaintiff had filed a second suit seeking the relief of specific
performance. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought to add a prayer for the
cancellation of the sale deed alleged to have been executed by the
defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant no. 1 in the second suit by
way of an amendment and the same was allowed. It was under such
circumstances that this Court had held that the rigours of Order II
Rule 2 were not attracted and observed as thus:
“22. Coming first to the legal question as to whether bar
contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is attracted so as to non-
suit the plaintiff from filing the suit for specific performance
of the agreement, in our considered opinion, the bar is
not attracted.
xxx xxx xxx
25. In the instant case when we apply the aforementioned
principle, we find that the bar contained in Order 2 Rule
2 CPC is not attracted because of the distinction in the
cause of action for filing the two suits:
25.1. So far as the suit for permanent injunction is
concerned, it was based on a threat given to the plaintiff
by the defendants to dispossess her from the suit house on
2-1-2000 and 9-1-2000. This would be clear from reading
Para 17 of the plaint. So far as the cause of action to file
suit for specific performance of the agreement is concerned,
the same was based on non-performance of agreement
dated 15-2-1989 by Defendant 2 in the plaintiff’s favour
despite giving legal notice dated 6-3-2000 to Defendant
2 to perform her part.
25.2. In our considered opinion, both the suits were,
therefore, founded on different causes of action and hence
could be filed simultaneously…
xxx xxx xxx
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 169

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

28. We cannot accept the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants when she contended that since
both the suits were based on identical pleadings and when
cause of action to sue for relief of specific performance
of agreement was available to the plaintiff prior to filing
of the first suit, the second suit was hit by bar contained
in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC.
29. The submission has a fallacy for two basic reasons.
Firstly, as held above, cause of action in two suits being
different, a suit for specific performance could not have
been instituted on the basis of cause of action of the first
suit. Secondly, merely because pleadings of both suits
were similar to some extent did not give any right to the
defendants to raise the plea of bar contained in Order 2
Rule 2 CPC. It is the cause of action which is material to
determine the applicability of bar under Order 2 Rule 2
CPC and not merely the pleadings. For these reasons,
it was not necessary for the plaintiff to obtain any leave
from the court as provided in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC for
filing the second suit.
30. Since the plea of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, if upheld,
results in depriving the plaintiff to file the second suit, it
is necessary for the court to carefully examine the entire
factual matrix of both the suits, the cause of action on
which the suits are founded, the reliefs claimed in both the
suits and lastly, the legal provisions applicable for grant
of reliefs in both the suits.”
(emphasis supplied)
62. The Court in Rathnavathi (supra) had added that the defendants
would not be justified in raising a plea of bar under Order II Rule 2
merely on account of the pleadings of both the suits being similar to
some extent. It is the identity of the cause of action which must be
a material consideration for the Courts and not the pleadings alone.
Additionally, since a successful plea under this provision would result
in depriving the plaintiff of his right to file the second suit, Courts
must be careful and should examine the entire factual matrix of both
the suits, the causes of action on which they are founded, the reliefs
which are claimed in both suits and the legal provisions applicable
for the grant of reliefs.
170 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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63. In Vurimi Pullarao (supra), it was observed by this Court that the
plaint of the first suit filed for injunction contained a recital of the
agreement to sell; the price fixed for the bargain between the parties;
the payment of earnest money; the handing over of possession;
the demand for performance and the failure of the defendant to
perform the contract. It was held that the cause of action for the suit
for specific performance had arisen when the plaintiff had notice of
denial by the defendant to perform the contract. This notice of denial
was much prior to the date of institution of the first suit. Therefore,
the plaintiff was entitled to sue for specific performance but however,
omitted to sue for such relief in the initial suit. There was also a
complete identity of the causes of action between the two suits.
Hence, this Court had arrived at the conclusion that in the absence
of any leave obtained from the court for having omitted the claim
for the relief of specific performance, the second suit would be hit
by the provisions of Order II Rule 2(3). The relevant observations
are reproduced hereinbelow:
“20. In the present case, the earlier suit for injunction was
instituted on 30-10-1996. Para 2 of the plaint in the suit
for injunction contained a recital of the agreement to sell
dated 26-10-1995; the price fixed for the bargain between
the parties; the payment of earnest money; the handing
over of possession; the demand for performance and the
failure of the defendant to perform the contract. Indeed,
the plaintiff also asserted that she was going to institute
a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated
26-10-1995. Under the agreement dated 26-10-1995, time
for completion of the sale was reserved until 25-10-1996.
Notice of performance was issued on 11-10-1996 to which
the defendant had replied on 13-10-1996. The cause of
action for the suit for specific performance had arisen when
the plaintiff had notice of the denial by the defendant to
perform the contract. On 30-10-1996 when the suit for
injunction was instituted, the plaintiff was entitled to sue
for specific performance. There was a complete identity
of the cause of action between the earlier suit (of which
para 2 of the plaint has been reproduced in the earlier
part of the judgment) and the cause of action for the
subsequent suit. Yet, as the record indicates, the plaintiff
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 171

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

omitted to sue for specific performance. This is a relief for
which the plaintiff was entitled to sue when the earlier suit
for injunction was instituted. Having omitted the claim for
relief without the leave of the Court, the bar under Order
2 Rule 2(3) would stand attracted.”
(emphasis supplied)

64. On a detailed examination of the aforementioned decisions, it can
be seen that the variance in opinion that can observed as regards
the applicability of the bar contained in Order II Rule 2 is due to a
pertinent factual distinction i.e., the date when the refusal to perform
the agreement for sale on part of the defendant was brought to the
notice of the plaintiff. While in Virgo Industries (supra) and Vurimi
Pullarao (supra) the plaintiffs had notice of the defendant’s refusal
to perform even prior to the institution of the first suit for injunction,
in Inbasagaran (supra) and Rathnavathi (supra), such a knowledge
of the fact that the defendants had no intention to perform the
agreement for sale was acquired after the first suit was instituted
and through the defence which was put forth by the defendants to
the first suit. This was precisely why the plea of bar under Order II
Rule 2 was said to apply to the facts in Virgo Industries (supra)
and Vurimi Pullarao (supra) and to be inapplicable to the facts in
Inbasagaran (supra) and Rathnavathi (supra).
65. If the factual scenario of the present case is superimposed to those
in the decisions as aforesaid, it can be seen that the respondent
no. 1 (plaintiff) had filed a suit for permanent injunction against both
the respondent no. 2 and the appellant in order to restrain them from
interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit
property by the respondent no. 1. In the plaint of the first suit for
injunction, the respondent no. 1 averred as follows:
“6. Quite unfortunately, the First Defendant for reasons
best known to her, issued a letter on 2nd November 2007
(received by the Plaintiff on 5th November 2007) inter alia
revoking the Power of Attorney issued in favour of the
Plaintiff…
7. While these are the circumstances, the Defendant with
an ulterior design and ill motive issued a letter to the
Plaintiff on 06.02.2008 setting forth frivolous and vexatious
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contentions enclosing a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- by way of
demand draft. A copy of the said letter along with a copy
of the demand draft is submitted herewith as document
No. 6…
8. … The plaintiff also issued a notice through its counsel
on 09.02.08 calling upon her not to sell the suit property
to any person…”
(emphasis supplied)

66. The revocation of the Power of Attorney which was issued in favour
of the respondent no. 1 for the performance of all formalities in
connection with the registration and execution of the sale deed on
02.11.2007, combined with the return of the entire sale consideration
which was given by the respondent no. 1 on 06.02.2008 under
alleged false pretexts, also combined with the lack of response to
the letter dated 09.02.2008, was sufficient for the respondent no. 1,
as a reasonable individual, to infer that the respondent no. 2 did not
intend to perform her part of the agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007
and execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1.
67. Furthermore, in the plaint of the first suit, the respondent no. 1 alluded
to the fact that it was aware of the purchase of the suit property by
the appellant and stated thus:
“9. The 2nd defendant claims to have purchased the
property from the first defendant while the first defendant
has no right, title or interest in respect of the suit property
after having received the entire sale consideration. The
second defendant cannot claim any right through the first
defendant in respect of the suit property.
10. As already stated, the first defendant has no right title
or interest in respect of the suit property after receiving the
entire sale consideration from the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s
possession is protected statutorily u/s Section 53 A of the
Transfer of property Act. The second defendant cannot
claim itself to be a bona fide purchaser as much as it is
fully aware of the subsisting sale agreement which took
place between the plaintiff and the first defendant.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 173

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

68. Adding to the above, in the plaint of the second suit, the respondent
no. 1 additionally made an averment that when the respondent no. 2
and appellant i.e., the original defendants, demanded possession
of the suit property during the second week of February 2008, they
furnished a copy of the sale deed which was said to have been
executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant. This
no doubt refers to the sale deed dated 24.01.2008. Thereafter,
the respondent no. 1 proceeds to agree that the act on part of the
respondent no. 2 in revoking the Power of Attorney and also executing
a sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of the appellant
would by themselves sufficiently prove that the respondent no. 2
had refused to perform her part of the contract. Admittedly, both the
events pre-existed the date of institution of the first suit. The specific
averments are as follows:
“VIII. During the second week of Feb 2008, the second
Defendant attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit property and they
demanded possession of the suit property with the help of
anti-social elements with a copy of the sale deed said to
have been executed by the First Defendant in its favour.
Thus, the Plaintiff came to know about the alleged sale
of the suit property by the First Defendant to the Second
Defendant…”
IX. The facts set out above would reveal that while the
plaintiff has performed his part of the contract, the first
defendant has failed to perform her part of the contract.
The act on the part of the first defendant in revoking the
power of Attorney and executing a sale deed in respect
of the suit property in favour of the second defendant
itself would prove that the first defendant has refused to
perform her part of the contract.

xxx xxx xxx
XVI. While the circumstances are such, the first defendant
with an ulterior design and ill motive, issued a letter
on 5th February 2008, forwarding a Demand Draft for
Rs. 1,50,000/- inter alia mentioning that she is enclosing
the said draft in connection with the repayment for the
purchase of vehicle. A cursory perusal of the letter would
174 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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reveal the reveal the motive behind issuing such a letter
and the said letter has been issued with ulterior design and
motive and the statement made in the letter is a blatant lie.
While on 24th Jan, 2007, the first defendant has entered
into an Agreement for Sale, executed the irrevocable power
of Attorney and received the entire sale consideration, it
is not understood as to what warranted the return of the
demand draft. Evidently, this demand draft has been sent
after executing the impugned sale deed illegally in favour
of the second defendant…”
(emphasis supplied)
69. The averments as regards the cause of action in the plaint of the
second suit also indicate the fact that the respondent no. 1 was
aware of the alleged sale deed dated 24.01.2008 entered into
between the respondent no. 2 and the appellant during the second
week of February 2008 and that this amounted to a deemed refusal
on part of the respondent no.2 to perform the agreement for sale.
It reads as thus:
“The cause of the action for the suit arose on and from
24th Jan 2008 (sic – 2007) when the first defendant
entered into the Agreement for sale with the plaintiff on
25th March, 2007 when the first defendant executed the
irrevocable power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff and
when the payments were made under the Agreement
for sale. On 7th September, 2007 when the agreement
for sale was registered, on 24th January 2008 when the
sale deed was executed by the first defendant in favour
of the second defendant, on and from the 2nd week of
the Feb, 2008 when the plaintiff came to know of the
impugned sale deeds, on and from 24th Jan, 2008 when
the first defendant registered the sale deed in respect of
the suit property in favour of the second defendant which
amounts to deemed refusal on her part to perform her part
of the Agreement for sale and on all dates when the first
defendant has failed to perform her part of the contract
and at Thyagavalli village, Cuddalore District within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable court.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 175

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

70. A conjoint reading of the aforementioned averments made by the
respondent no.1 as the plaintiff in the plaints of both the suits would
indicate that the refusal by the respondent no. 2 to perform the
agreement for sale was brought to the knowledge of the respondent
no. 1 much prior to the filing of the first suit. In other words, the notice
of the refusal to perform on part of the respondent no. 2 preceded
the filing of the first suit. Therefore, to this extent, the factual scenario
would be akin to those in Virgo Industries (supra) and Vurimi
Pullarao (supra). This might be why the Trial Court in its judgment
and decree dated 30.04.2009 passed in I.A. No. 17 of 2009 and O.S.
No. 122 of 2008 (second suit) had arrived at the conclusion that the
second suit must be subjected to the bar imposed under Order II
Rule 2. In other words, that when the respondent no. 1 could have
prayed for a larger relief in their first suit, their omission to do so
must preclude them for agitating the same subsequently.
71. However, in our opinion, the Trial Court had unfortunately failed to
address a key aspect – whether more than one relief in respect of
the cause of action which formed the foundation of the institution
of the first suit was “available” to the respondent no. 1? In other
words, whether the relief of specific performance and the relief to
pray for the cancellation of the sale deed dated 24.02.2008 executed
in favour of the appellant were “available” to the respondent no. 1
at the time of filing the first suit in view of the ban imposed on the
registration of sale deeds at the Thyagavalli village by the G.O.
dated 08.08.1986 issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu and the
notification dated 23.10.2006 issued by the TNEB which exclusively
allowed the appellant to register the sale deeds at the Thyagavalli
village where the suit property is situate.

V. The “entitlement to” along with the “availability of” the
relief as a requisite in determining the applicability of
Order II Rule 2.
72. The Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan (supra) elaborated
on the true import of Order II Rule 2 as follows:
“Shortly stated O. 2. R. 2, C.P.C., enacts that if a Plaintiff
fails to sue for the whole of the claim which he is entitled
to make in respect of a cause of action in the first suit,
then he is precluded from suing in a second suit in respect
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of the portion so omitted. To apply the rule to the facts of
the case their Lordships will have to consider what was
the cause of action in Suit No. 8, on which the Plaintiffs
founded their claims, and whether they included all the
claims which they were entitled to make in respect of
that cause of action in that suit. For, if they failed to
include all the claims, then by force of O. 2, R. 2, they are
precluded from including the claim omitted in the present
Suit No. 2.”
(emphasis supplied)

73. Order II Rule 2(1) reads that – “every suit shall include the whole
of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the
cause of action…”. Similarly, Order II Rule 2(3) reads that – “A person
entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of
action may sue for all or any of such reliefs…”. It is necessary that
the same intention also be read into Order II Rule 2(2) which reads
that – “where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally
relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in
respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished”. The phrase “any
portion of his claim” must essentially be understood to mean any
portion of his claim which he is entitled to make for the simple reason
that there cannot be a deliberate or intentional relinquishment of any
portion of a claim, if the plaintiff was not entitled to it. Therefore, the
true import of the bar under Order II Rule 2 must be that it operates
to preclude a plaintiff from instituting a second suit, on the same
cause of action, for a claim, any portion of a claim, or reliefs, which
the plaintiff was entitled to avail at the time of filing of the first suit.
74. There may arise a situation where the plaintiff may be entitled to a
relief but such a relief was not available at a certain point in time.
In other words, that obtaining such a relief was impossible due to
the circumstances which existed during the institution of the first
suit. It is our opinion that, in such scenarios, Courts must give such
an interpretation to the principles under Order II Rule 2 that is not
bogged down by mere technicalities.
75. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Rajasthan High
Court in Ramjilal v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan reported in
AIR 1964 Raj 114 wherein the High Court had opined that Order II
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 177

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

Rule 2 does not require that a person must seek all the remedies
to which he may be entitled to even though it would be impossible
for him to obtain the remedy from the opposite party. Herein, it was
not possible for the plaintiff to obtain the relief of possession from
the respondent no. 2 in his initial suit since the respondent no. 2
himself was put in actual possession of the property much after the
institution of the first suit. In such circumstances, it could not be said
that the plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any portion of his claim
or that he omitted to ask for a relief which he could otherwise obtain.
The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. Now, in the present case, when the petitioner filed the
first suit on 14th August, 1946, his claim was only for a
declaration to the effect that the adoption of respondent
No. 2 by Pusharam was invalid in law and for the relief
that the adoption-deed should be cancelled. According to
the admission of respondent No. 2 himself he was not in
possession of the property in respect of which the second
suit was filed on 1st July, 1954. It cannot therefore, be
said that the plaintiff had intentionally relinquished any
portion of his claim or that he omitted to ask for a relief
which he could get from respondent No. 2. Even if he had
sued for possession against respondent No. 2, he could
not obtain a decree for possession against a person who
was admittedly not in occupation of the same. It would,
therefore, have been futile on the part of the petitioner to
sue for possession against respondent No. 2 at that time.
O. 2, R. 2 C.P.C. does not require that a person must seek
all the remedies to which he may be entitled even though
it be impossible for him to obtain them from the opposite
party. It is true that respondent No. 2 had obtained a decree
for possession against the landlords on 18th February,
1946, i.e., about six months prior to the institution of the
petitioner’s suit, but the petitioner was not a party to that
suit. It had nowhere been mentioned in the judgment of the
learned Members of the Board of Revenue if the petitioner
was even aware of the decree which respondent No. 2
had obtained against the landlords Moreover, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument that the said decree
was in the knowledge of the petitioner, then too, he could
178 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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not sue for possession, because respondent No. 2 was
not put in actual possession of the property in execution
of the decree. It was about three years after, i.e., on 11th
March, 1949 that respondent No. 2 got possession of the
property. In our opinion, the learned Members committed an
error, which is patent on the face of the record, in holding
that the petitioner ought to have sued for possession at the
time when he filed the first suit on 14th August, 1946….

xxx xxx xxx
15. We think it unnecessary to burden the judgment by
referring to other authorities. In our opinion, the learned
Members of the Board of Revenue have committed an
error, which is apparent on the face of the record i.e.
from the very perusal of their judgment, in dismissing
the suit filed by the petitioner on the grounds that it was
barred by O. 2, R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They
have also failed to exercise their jurisdiction by giving an
incorrect interpretation to O. 2, R. 2 and not deciding the
suit on merits.”
(emphasis supplied)

76. We are also in agreement with the position taken by the Allahabad
High Court in National Security Assurance Company Ltd. v.
S.N. Jaggi reported in AIR 1971 All 421 in so far as it held that
a subsequent suit in respect of a claim which was barred at the
time of the earlier suit but revived later on by an enactment would
not be hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2. Here, the appellant
insurance company had insured the goods of the respondent in his
shop and his home respectively. During the disturbances and rioting
which took place on 07.09.1947 and 08.09.1947, the respondent’s
goods, both at his home and shop, were looted. While the applicant
had raised a claim for the goods looted at his home, he did not
raise any claim for the insured goods at his shop since he had no
knowledge of it. However, when the factum of looting at his shop
came to his knowledge, he intimated the insurer but the insurer
took the defence that intimation of the loss was not made within 15
days of the occurrence of the looting as per the insurance policy.
Under these circumstances, the respondent instituted a suit against
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 179

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

the insurer for recovery of the amount which was to be paid on
account of the loss of goods at his house only and the same ended
in a compromise decree where the respondent accepted a sum of
Rs. 5500. On 09.12.1951, the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment)
Act, 1951 was applied to Uttar Pradesh, where the respondent was
now residing. In such circumstances, the appellant then made a claim
for recovery of the amount due from the insurer for the loss of goods
at his shop on account of him being a displaced person and also a
debt being due to him. The High Court opined that the Act enacted
special provisions which revived the claim of the respondent and
that it can be said that a fresh right was conferred on the applicant
by the Act to recover the amount due from the appellant-insurer for
the loss of the goods kept in the shop. Therefore, there would be
no question of applicability of Order II Rule 2 in order to bar the
respondent’s claim. The relevant observations are as thus:
“20. There now remains to consider the argument whether
the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 were attracted and
otherwise the applicant was not entitled to claim the
amount he having accepted Rs. 5,500/- in full payment
of the claim under the insurance policy.
21. ... As the law stood in 1948 the applicant under the
terms of the policy was not entitled to recover the loss
incurred by him for the destruction of goods of the shop or
looting thereof as he had not been able to intimate of the
loss to the company within fifteen days of the occurrence.
Since the applicant had been able to intimate the loss of
the insured goods kept in the house within fifteen days
of the occurrence, he filed a suit No. 650 of 1948 in the
Civil Court at Delhi for recovery of Rs. 8,000/- from the
company which represented the risk which the company
covered for the loss of the goods in the house. That being
the position no question of the application of provisions of
Order 2, Rule 2 will arise as in that suit which was instituted
by the applicant in 1948 he could not, in law, claim a relief
for the loss of the goods kept in the shop as under the
terms of the insurance policy he could not recover the
amount representing risk covered by the company for
those goods. I think the Tribunal was right in holding that
in the suit filed by the applicant in the Civil Court at Delhi
180 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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the applicant could not have obtained any relief in respect
of loss of the goods kept in his shop. The compromise in
the said suit, to my mind, would remain confined to the
claim in regard to the loss of the goods kept in the house
of applicant and when the applicant who was the plaintiff in
the suit accepted the sum of Rs. 5,500/- in full settlement
of the claim under the policy it would only mean that he
accepted that smaller sum as against Rs. 8,000/-, a sum
claimed in full satisfaction of the claim under the policy
relating to the loss of the goods kept in the house and not
to the loss of the goods kept in the shop as they were not
the subject-matter of the suit at all. I do not agree with
the learned counsel for the appellant that the applicant is
estopped now to raise any claim and re-agitate the matter
as he would be deemed to have given up the claim in
regard to the loss of the goods kept in the shop. I do not
see how the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P. Code, or
the principles of estoppel bar the applicant from recovering
the money due under the insurance policy for the loss of
the goods kept in the shop. In fact the company in 1948
told the applicant that he was not entitled to recover any
thing in regard to the loss of the goods in the shop as the
claim had not been made within the time as agreed under
the policy, then to say now that the applicant could have
claimed that sum will be allowing the company to blow
hot and cold at the same time.
22. ... The Act enacted special provisions which revived
the claim of the applicant and it can be said that a fresh
right was conferred on the applicant by the Act to recover
the amount due on the policy for the loss of the goods
kept in the shop and in that view of the matter also no
question of applicability or Order 2, Rule 2, C.P. Code or
any principles of estoppel, can bar the applicant’s claim.”
(emphasis supplied)

77. These decisions of the Rajasthan and Allahabad High Courts
respectively, have rightly taken the view that when it is not possible
for the plaintiff to obtain a particular relief in the first instance but such
relief becomes available to him on the happening of a subsequent
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 181

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

event, post the institution of the first suit, then the bar under Order II
Rule 2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff who has instituted
a subsequent suit for claiming those reliefs. It can be said that the
occurrence of that subsequent event gives rise to a fresh cause of
action to the concerned plaintiff for claiming certain reliefs which he
was otherwise prevented from claiming.
78. In Virgo Industries (supra), this Court had held that just because
the relief for specific performance was premature on the dates on
which the first set of suits were instituted, it would not mean that it
could not be prayed for in the first suit, especially when the defendant
made his intentions clear through his overt acts. This view was taken
in a different factual context. In the said case, the plaintiff claimed
that the suit for specific performance was premature on the date of
filing of the first set of suits since the time for execution of the sale
documents in terms of the agreement to sell had not elapsed. It is in
this background that the Court had taken the view that a suit claiming
a relief to which the plaintiff may become entitled to at a subsequent
point in time, though may be termed as premature, yet, cannot be
dismissed to be presented on a future date. However, such a view
cannot be adopted in the facts of the present case since it is not
the premature nature of the claim but the impossibility of it which
prevented the respondent no. 1 from availing certain remedies. A
mandatory bar was created by a G.O. issued by the State Government
which disabled the respondent no. 1 from seeking the remedy which
he was otherwise entitled to.
79. The G.O. Ms. No. 1986 dated 08.08.1986 issued by the Government
of Tamil Nadu read with the notification dated 23.10.2006 issued by the
TNEB imposed an absolute prohibition which restrained any individual
land owner in the two villages of Thiyagavalli and Kudikkadu from
transferring their lands either by way of sale or by any other mode to
any third party other than to “M/s. Cuddalore Power Company Limited”
who is the appellant herein. On the strength of this G.O., the revenue
authorities refused to register the sale deeds pertaining to several
extents of land, belonging to several individuals. Only sale deeds
executed in favour of the appellant herein was being registered by
the authorities. The Madras High Court while delivering its decision
dated 05.03.2008 in the public interest litigation remarked that they
were at a loss to understand as to how and under what provision
of law such a prohibition could have been imposed and stated that
182 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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any such ban would directly infringe the constitutional right of any
land owner to his right to property.
80. During the institution of the first suit for permanent injunction by
the respondent no.1 on 16.02.2008, the proceedings in the public
interest litigation which challenged the G.O. dated 08.08.1986 was
still pending before the High Court and the respondent no. 1 himself
had also filed a separate writ petition challenging the actions of the
registrar. Until the High Court quashed the G.O. dated 08.08.1986
vide order dated 05.03.2008 passed in the public interest litigation,
the respondent no. 1 could not have registered a sale deed in his
favour or sought for the relief of specific performance. It must be
highlighted that the factual situation herein is slightly different from one
where there is a statutory requirement under any law which mandates
that a permission/sanction from certain competent authorities must
be obtained before registering a sale deed. In such a situation, the
court would be empowered to grant a conditional decree of specific
performance subject to such permission/sanction being obtained by
the appropriate party and a suit for specific performance would be
maintainable. However, in the present peculiar facts, there was an
absolute ban and not a conditional restriction to execute the sale
deeds. Therefore, a suit for specific performance could not have
been instituted by the respondent no.1 since it would have been
nothing but a futile attempt.
81. It is worthy to be noted that the respondent no. 1 had approached
the revenue authorities multiple times for registering a sale deed in its
favour but was faced with a denial from the authorities on every one
of these attempts. As a natural next course of action, the respondent
no. 1 filed their own writ petition dated 21.01.2008 challenging such
a refusal. When the order dated 05.03.2008 quashing the G.O.
dated 08.08.1986 was passed, the rights of the respondent no.1 had
been crystallized and a relief which was impossible to obtain earlier
due to the existence of a State Government imposed ban was now
made available to the respondent no.1. It was on the basis of the
decision dated 05.03.2008 that the writ petition which was filed by
the respondent no. 1 was disposed of by a single judge of the High
Court on 25.03.2008. Therefore, a new cause of action for obtaining
the relief of specific performance directing the respondent no. 2 to
execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 1 and for
seeking the cancellation of the sale deed dated 24.01.2008 entered
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 183

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

into between the respondent no. 2 and the appellant had arisen on
05.03.2008 and on 25.03.2008 respectively.
82. The counsel for the appellant argued that extraneous matters cannot
be projected as giving a cause for the second suit, unless such
extraneous matters had been set forth in the agreement to sell itself
so as to postpone the cause for filing a suit for specific performance.
It was alleged that the respondent no. 1 entered into an agreement to
sell on 24.01.2007 being fully aware of the facts that were prevalent
on the said date and therefore, cannot plead extraneous matters for
the purpose of saving the second suit. Furthermore, it was their case
that these extraneous matters were neither set forth in the cause
of action paragraph provided in the second plaint nor were they
argued before the High Court in the proceedings which resulted in
the impugned judgment.
83. We are unable to agree with these contentions raised by the counsel
for the appellant. First, it would be unfair to the respondent no. 1 to
hold that the decisions of the Madras High Court dated 05.03.2008
and 25.03.2008 respectively relating to the G.O. would not be of
any benefit whatsoever to their cause just because the existence
of such a ban was not mentioned in the agreement to sell which
was entered into with the respondent no. 2. It is clear that the ban
prevented the respondent no. 1 from obtaining a title to the property
which he otherwise could have obtained if not for the existence of
such peculiar circumstances. Furthermore, averments relating to
these decisions of the Madras High Court were mentioned in the
second plaint. Therefore, in the interests of justice, the decisions
dated 05.03.2008 and 25.03.2008 must be held to have given rise
to a new cause of action to the respondent no. 1 for the agitating
the reliefs in the second suit.
84. Secondly, it cannot be accepted that the respondent no. 1 was
fully aware of the circumstances relating to the ban at the time of
entering into the agreement to sell and would therefore, be precluded
from relying on the decision lifting the ban to postpone his cause of
action. Such a fact cannot be inferred from the plaints which have
been placed before us. On the other hand, from the averments of
the plaint, it can be seen that the agreement to sell was registered
by the respondent no. 1 with the Joint Sub-Registrar, Cuddalore
on 07.09.2007 without any hassle. Even at this stage, the revenue
184 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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authorities had not brought it to the knowledge of the respondent
no. 1 that the agreement to sell could not be registered in his favour
due to the operation of the ban. It is only when the respondent no. 1
approached the revenue authorities on multiple occasions for the
execution of the sale deed that the reluctance of the registrar was
noticed and a writ petition had been immediately filed challenging
the actions of the registrar. Therefore, we see no reason to doubt
the bona fides of the respondent no. 1.
85. Thirdly, it cannot be said that such extraneous matters are not set
forth in the plaint. On the contrary, on a holistic reading of the both
the plaints, it can be seen that the respondent no. 1 indicated in
the first plaint that a writ petition instituted by them before the High
Court challenging the actions of the registrar is pending and in the
second plaint, they had averred that the High Court had quashed
the G.O. dated 08.08.1986 in a public interest litigation and had also
disposed of their writ petition. It is, however, true that the specific
pleadings as regards the cause of action does not contain the date
on which the High Court had decided the public interest litigation i.e.,
05.03.2008 or the date on which the writ petition of the respondent
no. 1 was disposed of i.e., 25.03.2008. However, it is difficult for us
to subscribe to such a technical view that since these dates do not
figure in the paragraph relating to the cause of action in the second
plaint as giving rise to a new cause of action to the respondent
no.1, the same would not save the second suit. As indicated by us
in our forgoing discussion, the plaint should be read as a whole and
certain specific paragraphs or lines should not be isolated to arrive
at a restricted view. As far as the contention that these arguments
were not raised before the High Court goes, a bare perusal of the
Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal filed by the respondent no. 1
would indicate that the grounds relating to the ban imposed by the
G.O. dated 08.08.1986 and the subsequent decision of the High Court
in the public interest litigation as also in the writ petition filed by the
respondent no. 1 were agitated during the second appeal as well.
86. It is established law that the principles governing the applicability of
the provisions of Order II Rule 2 do not operate as a bar when the
subsequent suit is based on a cause of action different from that on
which the first suit was based and that the identity of the causes of
action in both the suits must be the material consideration before the
court which decide the applicability of this provision to a second suit
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 185

Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd v.
M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited and Anr.

filed by the plaintiff. It would be incorrect for us to hold that merely
because the pleadings in the plaint filed in O.S. No. 28 of 2008 and
the plaint filed in O.S. No. 122 of 2008 are similar to some extent,
the causes of action are also identical. Rejecting the plaint in the
second suit i.e., O.S. No. 122 of 2008 would result in depriving the
respondent no. 1 from claiming the relief of specific performance of
the agreement for sale dated 24.01.2007 and the cancellation of the
sale deed dated 24.01.2008. In this regard, we have examined the
entire factual matrix along with the causes of action on which both the
suits were founded, through a holistic reading of the plaints placed
before us. In our opinion, the reliefs in the subsequent suit are in
fact founded on a cause of action which is distinct from that which
is the foundation of the former suit. The facts which are necessary
to be proved and the evidence to support the claims in the second
suit are also different from that of the first suit. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the respondent no. 1 could have prayed for the reliefs
claimed in the subsequent suit at an earlier stage.
87. The High Court could be said to have fallen in error in failing to
notice that the crucial fact which acted as a linchpin in saving the
second suit was its own decisions dated 05.03.2008 and 25.03.2008
respectively which set aside the ban imposed by the G.O. dated
08.08.1986 and directed the registrar to register the sale deeds
pertaining to the suit property. However, for altogether different
reasons than what has been elaborated by us, the High Court held
that the bar under Order II Rule 2 was not applicable and that the
respondent no. 1 would not be prevented from instituting the second
suit. As a consequence, the plaint in the second suit i.e., O.S. No.
122 of 2008 was restored. The Trial Court was accordingly directed to
decide both the suits together on their own merits and in accordance
with law, within a period of six months. We do not wish to disturb
the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the High Court.
88. The questions relating to whether such an agreement for sale dated
24.01.2007 could have been entered into by the respondent no.1 in
ignorance of the subsistence of the ban which was imposed by the
G.O. dated 08.08.1986 to begin with and whether the appellant entering
into a subsequent sale deed dated 24.01.2008 during the existence
of the aforementioned agreement to sell was a bona fide purchaser
of the suit property, along with all other pertinent questions, are all
issues which will have to be determined by the Trial Court on merits.
186 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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89. In so far as the appeal preferred against the decision of the High
Court dated 01.09.2016 in C.M.P. No. 12498 of 2016 in S.A. No.
858 of 2014 is concerned, we find no reason to make separate
observations since after a detailed examination of the two plaints,
we have also arrived at the conclusion that the bar under Order II
Rule 2 would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

F. CONCLUSION
90. In view of the aforesaid, it is held that the bar under the provisions
of Order II Rule 2 CPC would not stand in the way of the institution
of the second suit by the respondent no. 1 (original plaintiff).
91. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any views on the
merits of the matter.
92. In view of the above, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.
93. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain