Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s rejection of the Order VII Rule 11 application and articulated a two‑pronged test to distinguish artistic works from designs for the purposes of sections 15(2) of the Copyright Act and 2(d) of the Designs Act.

Summary

The dispute arose when Inox India Ltd filed a trademark suit alleging that Cryogas Equipment Pvt Ltd and LNG Express infringed its proprietary engineering drawings and related literary works used in cryogenic semi‑trailers. LNG Express moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, arguing that the drawings were ‘designs’ under the Designs Act and therefore not protectable under the Copyright Act because of section 15(2). The Commercial Court initially dismissed the suit, but the High Court set aside that order, holding that a detailed inquiry into whether the drawings are artistic works or designs is required and that the plaint discloses a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view, clarifying a two‑pronged test – first to determine if the work is an artistic work or a design, and second, if not an artistic work, to apply the functional‑utility test to decide design protection. It held that the Commercial Court cannot dismiss the suit at the preliminary stage and directed a full trial to resolve the IP issues. The appeals were dismissed, and the Commercial Court was ordered to proceed with the interim injunction application and trial within specified time‑frames.

Issues considered

What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ under section 2(d) of the Designs Act?
Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC?

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11, s. Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
Copyright Act, 1957s. 14(c), s. 15(1), s. 15(2)
Designs Act, 2000s. 2(d)
Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958

Headnote

Issue for Consideration i) What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in s.15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act; ii) Whether the High Court erred in setting the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC. Headnotes† Copyright Act, 1957 – s.15(2) – Designs Act, 2000 – s.2(d) – What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an article falls within the limitation set out in

Subjects

Section 15(2) of Copyright ActSection 2(d) of Designs ActDesignArtistic workFunctional utilityOrder VII Rule 11Civil Procedure CodeIndustrial designIntellectual propertyProprietary Engineering DrawingsTrialPrima facie inquiryMixed question of law and fact

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 765 : 2025 INSC 483

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited
v.
Inox India Limited and Others
(Civil Appeal No. 5174 of 2025)
15 April 2025
[Surya Kant* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
i) What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an
article falls within the limitation set out in s.15(2) of the Copyright
Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of the Designs
Act; ii) Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of
the Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application u/Or.VII,
R.11 of the CPC.

Headnotes†
Copyright Act, 1957 – s.15(2) – Designs Act, 2000 – s.2(d) –
What are the parameters for determining whether a work or
an article falls within the limitation set out in s.15(2) of the
Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ u/s.2(d) of
the Designs Act:
Held: The original artistic work, which initially enjoys copyright
protection, does not lose the same merely because a ‘design’
derived from it has been industrially applied to create a product –
While the expression ‘artistic work’ has a broad spectrum, ‘design’ is
restricted to specific features such as shape, configuration, pattern,
ornamentation, or composition of lines or colours, applied to an
article through an industrial process, resulting in a finished product
that appeals to the eye – These visually appealing features, when
applied industrially, define a ‘design’ under the Designs Act – The
inquiry cannot be concluded merely by assuming that what does
not qualify as an ‘artistic work’, within the meaning of the Copyright
Act, would automatically receive protection under the Designs
Act – While protection under the Designs Act is not as enduring
as that under the Copyright Act, it is not granted by default and
requires specific criteria to be met – In this regard, courts in India
and globally consistently apply the test of ‘functional utility’ to

* Author
766 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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determine whether a work qualifies for protection under the Designs
Act – This Court has formulated a two-pronged approach in order
to crack open the conundrum caused by s.15(2) of the Copyright
Act so as to ascertain whether a work is qualified to be protected
by the Designs Act – This test shall consider: (i) whether the work
in question is purely an ‘artistic work’ entitled to protection under the
Copyright Act or whether it is a ‘design’ derived from such original
artistic work and subjected to an industrial process based upon
the language in s.15(2) of the Copyright Act; (ii) if such a work
does not qualify for copyright protection, then the test of ‘functional
utility’ will have to be applied so as to determine its dominant
purpose, and then ascertain whether it would qualify for design
protection under the Design Act – The courts, while applying this
test, ought to undertake a case specific inquiry guided by statutory
provisions, judicial precedents, and comparative jurisprudence.
[Paras 58, 59, 60, 61]

Copyright Act, 1957 – Designs Act, 2000 – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – Respondent no.1 filed a trademark suit
before the Commercial Court against the appellants – Appellant
moved its application u/Or. VII, R.11 of CPC, seeking rejection
of the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable u/s.15(2)
of the Copyright Act – It was contended that the Proprietary
Engineering Drawings, for which respondent no.1 claimed
copyright protection, fell within the definition of ‘design’
u/s.2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000 – Commercial Court allowed
the said application and rejected respondent no.1’s plaint –
High Court remanded the matter to Commercial Court for
fresh consideration – The Commercial Court reconsidered the
application and allowed the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC
and rejected the plaint – Respondent no.1 again approached
the High Court challenging the order of the Commercial
Court – The High Court by the impugned judgment set aside
the Commercial Court’s orders – Whether the High Court erred
in setting aside the order of the Commercial Court and thus
rejecting the application u/Or.VII, R.11 of the CPC:
Held: The core dispute revolves around whether the ‘Proprietary
Engineering Drawings’ qualify as drawings u/s.2(c) of the Copyright
Act or whether they fall within the definition of a ‘design’ u/s.2(d)
of the Designs Act, necessitating a detailed examination – This
Court is in complete agreement with the reasoning of the High
Court that the question as to whether the original artistic work
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 767

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

would fall within the meaning of ‘design’ under the Designs Act
cannot be answered while deciding an application u/Or.VII, R.11
of the CPC – This stage would involve only a prima facie inquiry
as to the disclosure of cause of action in the plaint – The question
pertaining to ascertaining the true nature of the ‘Proprietary
Engineering Drawings’ involves a mixed question of law and fact
and could not have been decided by the Commercial Court at a
preliminary stage based upon such a casual appraisal of the plaint
averments – This Court, therefore concur with the High Court that
this case warrants a trial given the triable issues involved – The
plaintiff before the Commercial Court, i.e., respondent no.1, was
erroneously non-suited due to incorrect assumptions made by
the Commercial Court which misread the plaint, misapplied legal
principles and overlooked the distinction between ‘artistic work’
and ‘design’ – In light of the discussion on relevant precedents
and legal positions, and the clear test outlined, the Commercial
Court is directed to consider the issue afresh and conduct trial by
adopting an Occam’s Razor approach to ascertain the true nature
of the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’. [Paras 66(b), 67, 68, 69]

Case Law Cited
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati
Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844;
Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd. [2008] 7 SCR
397 : (2008) 10 SCC 657 – referred to.
Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 60; Dart
Industries Inc. and Another v. Techno Plast and Others, 2007
SCC OnLine Del 892; Mattel, Inc. v. Jayant Agarwalla, 2008 SCC
Online Del 1059; Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar and Co., 2009 SCC
OnLine Del 1647; Pranda Jewelry Pvt. Ltd. v. Aarya 24 KT, 2015
SCC OnLine Bom 958; Fun World and Resorts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Nimil KK, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 219; Smithkline Beecham Plc. v.
Hindustan Lever Ltd., 1999 SCC OnLine Del 965; Tractors and
Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Standard Combines Pvt. Ltd, 2012 SCC
OnLine Mad 5470; Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint and Hardwares,
2013 SCC OnLine Del 1980; Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. Videocon
Industries Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 565; Standard Corporation
India Ltd. v. Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine
Mad 850; Photoquip India Ltd. v. Delhi Photo Store, 2014 SCC
OnLine Bom 1088; TTK Prestige Ltd. v. KCM Appliances Pvt.
Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2129 – referred to.
768 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Amp v. Utilux [1972] RPC 103; Interlego A.G v. Tyco Industries
Inc and Others [1988] UKPC 3; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74
S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954); Esquire Inc v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,
Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1985); Brandir International,
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir.1987);
Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th
Cir. 2004); Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419
(5th Cir. 2005); Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1002, 197 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2017) – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883
(Paris Convention); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, 1886 (Berne Convention); Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (TRIPS).

List of Acts
Copyright Act, 1957; Designs Act, 2000; Trade and Merchandise
Marks Act, 1958; English Registered Designs Act, 1949; Penal
Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Section 15(2) of Copyright Act, 1957; Section 2(d) of Design
Act, 2000; Design; Rejection of plaint; Order VII, Rule 11;
Copyright protection; Artistic work; Shape; Configuration; Pattern;
Ornamentation; Composition of lines or colours; Test of ‘functional
utility’; Industrial process; Case specific inquiry guided by statutory
provisions, judicial precedents, and comparative jurisprudence;
Proprietary Engineering Drawings; Detailed examination; Mixed
question of law and fact; Triable issues.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5174 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.2024 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in AFO No. 119 of 2024
With
Civil Appeal No. 5175 of 2025
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 769

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Rahul Chitnis, Sudipto Sircar, Hersh Desai,
Ms. Shwetal Shepal, Aditya Khanna, Samrat Mehta, Chander
Shekhar Ashri.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Chander M Lall, J Sai Deepak, Sr. Advs., Smriti Yadav, Nirupam
Lodha, Dhiren Karania, Kshitij Parashar, Gautam Wadhwa,
Ms. Annanya Mehan, R Abhishek, For M/S. Khaitan & Co..

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Surya Kant, J.

Leave granted.
2. The captioned appeals arise from a common judgement dated
22.10.2024 delivered by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
(High Court) in a dispute between the parties primarily concerning
an alleged copyright infringement, whereby the 4th Additional District
Judge at Vadodara’s (Commercial Court) order dated 03.05.2024
allowing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) was set aside, and the Suit filed by
Respondent No. 2 was restored to its original number (Impugned
Judgement).
3. The parties to the appeal are, inter alia embroiled in a dispute
concerning the purported infringement of intellectual property
(IP) rights in relation to the designing and manufacturing of the
internal parts of Cryogenic Storage Tanks and Distribution Systems
which are mounted on Trailers and Semi-Trailers, to effectively
transport industrial gases, liquified natural gas (LNG) and such
like substances.

A. Facts
4. That being so, given the shared sequence of events underlying these
two appeals, this presents an appropriate juncture for a detailed
examination of the factual matrix.
770 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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4.1. The dispute between the parties arose when Respondent No.
1 in these appeals, Inox India Limited (Inox), filed Trademark
Suit No. 3/2019 (Suit) before the Commercial Court against the
Appellants, i.e. Cryogas Equipment Private Limited (Cryogas)
and LNG Express India Private Limited (LNG Express), on
24.09.2018. Inox primarily alleged that Cryogas, LNG Express,
and others had infringed two distinct types of copyright: (i) the
drawings of LNG Semi-trailers developed by Inox (Proprietary
Engineering Drawings); and (ii) the details, processes,
descriptions and narrations written by Inox employees in creating
the Proprietary Engineering Drawings (Literary Works). These
IPs were supposedly developed by Inox to meet the specific
requirements for storing and transporting sophisticated LNG
Semi-trailers suitable for Indian roads.
4.2. In this Suit, Inox sought relief in terms of: (i) a declaration
that Cryogas, LNG Express and others have infringed Inox’s
Proprietary Engineering Drawings, IP and Literary Works; (ii)
a permanent injunction restraining Cryogas, LNG Express
and the other associated parties from using or reproducing
any drawings or works similar to that of Inox’s Proprietary
Engineering Drawings or Literary Works; (iii) a permanent
injunction against the use of any IP or know-how associated with
manufacturing the impugned products; (iv) an order directing
Cryogas, LNG Express and others to surrender all infringing
materials for destruction, including drawings, trailers, labels
and other items using the Proprietary Engineering Drawings;
and (v) an award of damages amounting to Rs. 2 Crores for
copyright infringement.
4.3. In addition, Inox filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking an ad interim injunction to restrain
Cryogas, LNG Express, and others from infringing its IP rights
and confidential information during the pendency of the Suit.
4.4. In response thereto, LNG Express moved its application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection of the Suit on
the ground that it was not maintainable under Section 15(2) of
the Copyright Act, 1957 (Copyright Act). It primarily contended
that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, for which Inox
claimed copyright protection, fell within the definition of a ‘design’
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 771

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000 (Designs Act). It
argued that Inox had lost copyrights for the said drawings by
failing to register them under the Designs Act. Furthermore,
LNG Express asserted that copyright does not subsist in any
design that is registered or capable of being registered under
the Designs Act once it has been reproduced more than fifty
times by an industrial process, either by the copyright owner or
any authorised licensee. Specifically, it contested Inox’s claim of
generating revenue amounting to Rupees 122 crores, arguing
that such proceeds could only have been realised through the
sale of Cryogenic Semi-trailers manufactured by an industrial
process and using the Proprietary Engineering Drawings in
excess of the stipulated threshold of fifty reproductions. In this
context, LNG Express assailed that protection could not be
sought under the Copyright Act by virtue of Section 15(2), and
the Suit thus falls at the threshold.
4.5. The Commercial Court, on 01.04.2022, allowed the application
filed by LNG Express under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC,
consequently rejecting Inox’s plaint and its application for
interim injunction. Inox filed two appeals before the High
Court challenging the orders of the Commercial Court. On
13.03.2024, the High Court, through a common order set aside
the Commercial Court’s order, holding that it erred in allowing
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, which
had led to the rejection of both the plaint and the prayer for
interim injunction. The High Court remanded the matter to the
Commercial Court for fresh consideration, restoring the Suit to
its original number and directing it to adjudicate the pending
applications concurrently while issuing separate orders for each.
4.6. Subsequently, on 03.05.2024, in compliance with the High
Court’s directions, the Commercial Court reconsidered the
aforementioned applications. By way of separate orders, it
allowed LNG Express’ application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC, resulting in the rejection of the plaint, and consequently
dismissed Inox’s application for ad interim injunction.
4.7. Inox once again approached the High Court, challenging the
Commercial Court’s orders dated 03.05.2024 through separate
appeals. The High Court, in turn, vide the Impugned Judgment,
772 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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set aside the Commercial Court’s orders based on the following
rationale and has issued: (i) The Commercial Court erred in
law by presuming that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings
qualified as a ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act
and stood utilised to manufacture a product more than fifty
times through an industrial process, thereby excluding it from
protection under the Copyright Act; (ii) LNG Express’ application
under Order VII, Rule 11 of the CPC was rejected, and the
Suit was restored to its original number; (iii) Inox’s interim
injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the
CPC was reinstated; and (iv) The restored interim injunction
application was directed to be decided by the Commercial Court
on its merits independently and as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within eight weeks.
4.8. Hence, the instant appeals. We may clarify at this stage that
after reserving our judgment on 29.01.2025 and pending the
present proceedings, the Commercial Court was permitted
to proceed with hearing the parties on the interim application
in accordance with the High Court’s directions. However, the
passing of the final order was directed to remain in abeyance.

B. Contentions on behalf of the Appellants
5. Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Cryogas
and LNG Express, vehemently argued that the High Court erred
in setting aside the Commercial Court’s order dated 03.05.2024,
which had allowed their application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC. In support of his contentions, he advanced the following
submissions:
(a) Inox filed the Suit seeking protection of the Proprietary
Engineering Drawings under the Copyright Act, alleging that
Cryogas and LNG Express had infringed its IP rights in both the
artistic elements of the drawings and the literary components
detailing the processes and descriptions therein. Inox further
sought to restrain Cryogas and LNG Express from converting
the two-dimensional industrial drawings of cryogenic Semi-
trailers into three-dimensional representations. However, these
pleas ought to be outrightly rejected as they have been raised
as an afterthought to circumvent the applicability of Section
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 773

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

15(2) of the Copyright Act. Admittedly, Semi-trailers can only
be manufactured through an industrial and mechanical process.
(b) LNG and Cryogenic Semi-trailers worldwide are designed in
accordance with international standard-setting bodies such as
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the
Pressure Equipment Directive (PED). Given that these trailers
are used for transporting cryogenic liquids, their design must
comply with country-specific regulations, while international
standards prescribe detailed guidelines on design parameters,
material selection, and internal components. Accordingly, all
relevant stakeholders, including the parties herein, adhere to
PED stipulations and the guidelines issued by the Ministry of
Road Transport and Highways of India.
(c) The Suit is barred under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act,
as the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, for which Inox claims
copyright infringement, are capable of being registered under
the Designs Act. The copyright protection for such drawings
would cease to subsist in view of Section 15(2) of the Copyright
Act once Semi-trailers are reproduced or manufactured more
than fifty times through an industrial process.
(d) The right to protect IP in terms of the Proprietary Engineering
Drawings would, however, be available to Inox under the
Designs Act, provided the said drawings were registered
under it. Furthermore, ‘Semi-trailers’ or ‘Road Vehicle Trailers’
manufactured by Inox fall within the classification under Schedule
III of the Designs Act, specifically Class 12-10. Consequently,
to claim an IP infringement, Inox should have registered the
Proprietary Engineering Drawings under the Designs Act.
(e) The objective of the Copyright Act is to protect artistic works
such as paintings, sculptures, and other forms of creative
expression for extended periods. In contrast, the Designs Act
is intended to safeguard industrial designs for a limited duration
to facilitate commercial exploitation. The Legislature’s intent
was thus to provide protection for industrial designs, such as
the Proprietary Engineering Drawings, under the Designs Act
rather than the Copyright Act, so as to ensure that such works
are regulated within the appropriate legal framework.
774 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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(f) Inox has failed to disclose in its plaint before the Commercial
Court the number of Semi-trailers it has produced through an
industrial process. Instead, it has engaged in strategic drafting
by selectively revealing that it has generated revenue of Rupees
122 crores, seemingly to circumvent the legal effect of Section
15(2) of the Copyright Act. However, such revenue can be
reasonably inferred to result from the production of more than
fifty Semi-trailers, thereby triggering the bar under Section 15(2)
of the Copyright Act. Inox cannot rely on evasive drafting to
create a misleading impression of a valid cause of action. These
contentions were buttressed by relying on the ratio laid down in
decisions such as Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and others v.
Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle.1
(g) Inox has erroneously asserted that the Proprietary Engineering
Drawings are not capable of registration as ‘designs’ under
Section 2(d) of the Designs Act on the ground that the products
manufactured using these drawings lack visual appeal, as they
pertain to the inner vessel of the Semi-trailer, which remains
concealed. This claim ought to be rejected, as the drawings fall
within the category of designs capable of registration under the
Designs Act but have not been registered. Moreover, it is incorrect
to suggest that the Semi-trailers lack visual appeal, given that the
drawings also encompass the external shape and components
of a Semi-trailer. In any case, the question of visual appeal is
inherently subjective and cannot be a determinative factor for
considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
(h) The scope of inquiry before the Commercial Court in the Suit
is limited to determining whether the Proprietary Engineering
Drawings are capable of registration under the Designs Act
and, if they have not been so registered, whether they lose
the protection of the Copyright Act once applied to articles
through an industrial process. The question of such drawings
being subject to the limitations imposed by Section 15(2) of
the Copyright Act is a pure question of law, which should be
decided based on a prima facie appraisal of the averments in
the plaint, without the necessity of adducing further evidence.

1 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3844.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 775

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

(i) Lastly, Inox’s assertion that the plaint also pertains to the
alleged theft of confidential information and trade secrets by
Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, ought to be rejected at the threshold.
The plaint contains no specific prayers regarding such claims,
and any alleged breach of this nature arising from a common
law right would be actionable before a civil court rather than a
Commercial Court, which inter alia may only adjudicate matters
related to IP rights. Moreover, a perusal of the plaint reveals that
the Suit has been filed for copyright infringement under Section
62(2) of the Copyright Act, which falls within the jurisdiction of
the Commercial Court.

C. Contentions on behalf of Respondent No. 1
6. Mr. Chander M. Lall and Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Learned Senior Counsels
representing Inox, refuted the claims put forth by Cryogas and LNG
Express and instead adduced the following submissions:
(a) The Suit pertains to two distinct categories of copyright: the
Proprietary Engineering Drawings and the Literary Work.
Consequently, the reliefs sought in the Suit are also distinct
in nature. As a result, each IP claim should be assessed
independently, with due consideration given to its unique
characteristics and legal implications.
(b) Industrial drawings, such as the Proprietary Engineering
Drawings, fall within the definition of ‘artistic works’ under Section
2(c) of the Copyright Act. An artistic work can be denied copyright
protection by invoking Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act only
if such work is either registered or capable of being registered
under the Designs Act. Moreover, the Proprietary Engineering
Drawings pertain to the internal components of a cryogenic
container and are excluded by the exception under Section
2 of the Designs Act, which states that a registrable design
‘does not include any mode or principle of construction or
anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device’.
Furthermore, these drawings lack visual appeal, a necessary
criterion for a ‘design’ under the Designs Act. Accordingly,
Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act is inapplicable, and the
Proprietary Engineering Drawings cannot be deemed capable
of registration under the Designs Act.
776 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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(c) The Literary Work in question is not subject to the bar under
Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. The Commercial Court erred
in concluding that the Literary Work, including details, processes,
and descriptions, is merely a reference to the Proprietary
Engineering Drawings and the information contained therein.
Such an interpretation incorrectly assumes that all the rights
asserted in the plaint are intrinsically linked to the Proprietary
Engineering Drawings. This approach is inconsistent with
fundamental principles of copyright law, which recognise that
each category of copyright protection is distinct and must be
assessed independently.
(d) The infringement arising from the theft of confidential information
constitutes a distinct legal issue and is not subject to the
limitations imposed by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act.
Courts have consistently recognised that confidential information
is a separate legal concept possessing independent value,
warranting protection under common law principles. Accordingly,
the misappropriation of confidential information should be
assessed on its own merits.
(e) The issues concerning the three IPs in question are distinct and
separate, a fact that the Commercial Court failed to appreciate
while allowing LNG Express’ application under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC. The Commercial Court proceeded under the
erroneous assumption that an ‘original artistic work’ automatically
loses protection under the Copyright Act once it is applied to
an article through an industrial process. The Commercial Court
further failed to consider the true meaning and scope of ‘design’
under the Designs Act. That apart, the claims concerning the
infringement of the Literary Work and the theft of confidential
information fall outside the purview of Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC and could not have been summarily rejected.
(f) The determination of whether the original artistic work qualifies
as a ‘design capable of being registered’ under the Designs Act
cannot be made while deciding an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC. At this stage, the jurisdiction of the court is
limited to conducting a prima facie inquiry to ascertain whether
or not the plaint discloses a cause of action. The issue at hand
involves a mixed question of law and fact and thus requires
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 777

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

a full trial wherein both parties can present evidence before a
conclusive finding can be drawn.
(g) Inox, in its Suit, has also sought an injunction restraining Cryogas,
LNG Express, and others from converting the two-dimensional
Proprietary Engineering Drawings into three-dimensional objects.
The Local Commissioner’s Report dated 26.09.2018 provides
substantive evidence in this regard, revealing that several files
containing Inox’s proprietary materials—including inspection
reports, general test plans, shop weld plans, quality control
programs, and drawing design calculations—were found at the
premises of LNG Express and Cryogas. These documents pertain
to the quality control processes of Inox’s proprietary materials and
products, further substantiating the claim of unauthorised use.

D. Issues
7. Having perused the factual matrix and on consideration of the
rival contentions advanced by the parties, it is patently clear that
the singular issue which invites our analysis, revolves around
the maintainability of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC. However, given the abstruse nature of the underlying
dispute, stemming from a fundamental dissonance in the parties’
interpretations of the applicability of the Designs Act, we deem it
appropriate to adjudicate and analyse the following issues:
i. What are the parameters for determining whether a work or an
article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the
Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a ‘design’ under Section
2(d) of the Designs Act?
ii. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the order of the
Commercial Court and thus rejecting the application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC?

E. Analysis

E.1 Issue No. 1: The parameters for determining whether a work
or an article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2)
of the Copyright Act
8. We may clarify at the very outset that the discussion herein would
be limited to determining the distinction between a ‘design’ under
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the Designs Act and an ‘artistic work’ that might warrant copyright
protection. To be precise, we are not, either expressly or implicitly,
addressing the merits of the case. This examination has been
prompted by the intrinsic disagreement posited by the parties in
terms of the applicability of the Designs Act. Such a divergence in
interpretation brings to light an interesting juxtaposition and perhaps
a grey area which has not been seemingly addressed by this Court in
the past. In this context, we find it appropriate to bridge this gap by
conducting a conclusive analysis through a two-pronged approach:
(i) examining the current IP statutory framework in India; and (ii)
evaluating the criteria considered and tests adopted across various
jurisdictions. Finally, based on these two aspects, we seek to set out
(iii) the definitive factors to be considered to ascertain whether an
article ought to be conferred protection under the Copyright Act or the
Designs Act within the confines of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act.

E.1.1. The current IP statutory framework
9. IP rights are fundamentally aimed at excluding or preventing others
from possessing, using, or alienating the protected IP, thereby
enabling the owner to benefit from the product of their intellect.
In India, IP rights encompass a broad spectrum of intangible
properties, including Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Designs, and
Geographical Indications, each governed and protected by distinct
Statutes. These legislations enable creators or inventors to earn
recognition and receive financial benefits from their innovations in a
manner which balances them with public interest. However, for the
purposes of the present analysis, our examination will be confined
to the intersection between the Copyright Act and the Designs Act.
10. In India, copyright is governed by the Copyright Act, 1957, which was
enacted to safeguard the rights of copyright owners, including for
commercial exploitation and to encourage the creation of innovative
works. Copyright is a statutory and negative right, preventing
unauthorised copying of copyrighted material. Under Section 14 of
the Act, copyright owners are granted a bundle of exclusive rights,
including the right to reproduce, issue copies, perform in public, and
create translations and adaptations.
11. The term ‘copyright’ has been defined under Section 14 of the
Copyright Act to mean “the exclusive right subject to the provisions
of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts
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in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof, namely…”
It espouses the protection of works in terms of: (i) literary, dramatic
or musical work, not being a computer programme; (ii) a computer
programme; (iii) an artistic work; (iv) a cinematograph film; and
(v) a sound recording. To put it in more clear terms, the language
employed in the provision reads as follows:
“14. Meaning of Copyright—For the purposes of this
Act, “copyright” means the exclusive right subject to the
provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any
of the following acts in respect of a work or any substantial
part thereof, namely:—
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not
being a computer programme,—
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including the
storing of it in any medium by electronic means;
(ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being
copies already in circulation;
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to
the public;
(iv) to make any cinematograph film or sound recording
in respect of the work;
(v) to make any translation of the work;
(vi) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vii) to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of
the work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work
in sub-clauses (i) to (vi);
(b) in the case of a computer programme,—
(i) to do any of the acts specified in Clause (a);
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or
for commercial rental any copy of the computer programme:
Provided that such commercial rental does not apply in
respect of computer programmes where the programme
itself is not the essential object of the rental.
(c) in the case of an artistic work,—
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including—
(A) the storing of it in any medium by electronic or other
means; or
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(B) depiction in three-dimensions of a two-dimensional
work; or
(C) depiction in two-dimensions of a three-dimensional work;
(ii) to communicate the work to the public;
(iii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being
copies already in circulation;
(iv) to include the work in any cinematograph film;
(v) to make any adaptation of the work;
(vi) to do in relation to adaptation of the work any of the acts
specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);
(d) in the case of a cinematograph film,—
(i) to make a copy of the film, including— (A) a photograph
of any image forming part thereof; or (B) storing of it in
any medium by electronic or other means;
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or
for such rental, any copy of the film;
(iii) to communicate the film to the public;
(e) in the case of a sound recording,—
(i) to make any other sound recording embodying it
including storing of it in any medium by electronic or other
means;
(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or
for such rental, any copy of the sound recording;
(iii) to communicate the sound recording to the public.”
12. The enactment of the Designs Act in 2000, established a distinct
protection regime for designs in India. The Designs Act seeks to
minimise overlap with the Copyright Act by defining the term ‘design’
under Section 2(d) as “only the features of shape, configuration,
pattern, ornament or composition of lines or colours applied
to any article whether in two dimensional or three dimensional
or in both forms, by any industrial process or means, whether
manual, mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, which
in the finished article appeal to and are judged solely by the
eye but does not include any mode or principle of construction
or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device,
and does not include any trade mark as defined in clause (v) of
sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or property mark as defined in section
479 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any artistic work
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as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957
(14 of 1957).” This aspect of IP thus focuses on the utility of work,
as well as its visual appeal and aesthetic, making it an important
factor in determining consumer preference or commercial viability.
13. It must be borne in mind that Section 2(d) of the Design Act,
reproduced above, expressly bars the inclusion of ‘artistic works’
encapsulated under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act. To further
illuminate, the expression ‘artistic work’ has been defined in the
Copyright Act which reads as follows:
“2. Interpretation.— In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires—
….
(c) “artistic work” means,—
(i) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram,
map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether
or not any such work possesses artistic quality;
(ii) a work of architecture; and
(iii) any other work of artistic craftsmanship;”
14. Despite the clear language employed in these provisions, a small
vantage point of intersection exists wherein a ‘design’ shares
commonalities with ‘artistic works’ such as paintings or drawings, that
may be accorded copyright protection. This similitude is aptly illustrated
in the Venn Diagram below. We may, however, hasten to caveat that
this is only an illustrative image and is not exhaustive in nature.
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15. This penumbra seems to have been synopsized and, to some extent,
amplified in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. We say so, for the
reason that the provision itself enumerates that “copyright in any
design, which is capable of being registered under the Designs
Act, 2000 but which has not been so registered, shall cease as
soon as any article to which the design has been applied has been
reproduced more than fifty times by an industrial process by the
owner of the copyright or, with his licence, by any other person.”
16. We must also bear in mind that Section 15(1) of the Copyright
Act explicitly states that a ‘copyright’ shall not subsist in a ‘design’
protected under the Designs Act. This provision thus establishes
that once a ‘design’ is registered, any copyright protection ceases
to exist. Whereas, as already recapitulated, Section 15(2) of the
Copyright Act clarifies that any design which is capable of being
registered under the Designs Act, if not registered, then the copyright
protection in such design would terminate once that design is applied
to any article and reproduced in excess of 50 times by an industrial
process, either by the owner or a licensee.
17. The lines perhaps seem blurred owing to the inherent overlap between
copyrightable artistic works and designs. To put it more simply, there
may be some designs that could be entitled to copyright protection,
and conversely, there can be certain artistic works which lose their
copyright protection when industrially applied. This perplexity is
further augmented on account of there being an express interdiction
on designs from seeking any long-term copyright protection.

E.1.2. Parameters adopted across various jurisdictions
18. To resolve this legal conundrum, it is essential to establish clear
parameters distinguishing works eligible for protection under the
Designs Act versus the Copyright Act. In this vein, we turn to
established jurisprudence and comparative legal frameworks, and
have thus examined: (i) the approach adopted by Courts in India;
(ii) the factors employed by courts in the United States of America
(US); and (iii) broader international principles that provide guidance
on the interplay between copyright and design protection.
19. By synthesising these perspectives, we aim to formulate a definitive
test that will provide clarity on the scope of protection afforded under
the respective Statutes.
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E.1.2.1 Approach adopted by Courts in India
20. The test applied by various High Courts in India to resolve the
intersection between the Copyright Act and the Designs Act can be
categorised into two distinct approaches:
i. Interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act: This involves
pulling back the curtains on the overlaps or intersections
between the two Statutes and ascertaining whether an article
would qualify protection under the Copyright Act for being an
‘original artistic work’ or whether it would earn protection under
the Designs Act.
ii. Examination of the ‘Functional Utility’ of the Article: This
requires an assessment as to whether the article serves a
functional purpose beyond mere artistic expression. If the
primary characteristic of the work is its functional utility rather
than aesthetic appeal, it would not qualify to seek protection
under the Designs Act.

E.1.2.1.1 Interpreting Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act
21. It has already been explained in paragraphs 16 and 17 of this
judgement, that a ‘design’ defined under Section 2(d) of the Designs
Act cannot be afforded protection by the Copyright Act under the guise
of it being an ‘artistic work’. While there obviously seems to be a narrow
intersection between ‘artistic works’ and ‘designs’, particularly in the
case of paintings, sculptures or drawings, Section 15(2) attempts to
obfuscate these overlaps and create a marked distinction so as to
prevent any unintended disconcertment. The crux of the issue thus
lies in correctly classifying an article as either a ‘design’ under the
Designs Act or an ‘artistic work’ under the Copyright Act.
22. This interface between the two legislations was addressed extensively
by the Delhi High Court in Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar,2 where the
dispute concerned the copyright infringement in the manufacture and
sale of certain patterns of upholstery fabric by the defendant therein.
The plaintiff, an American company, claimed exclusive rights to the
drawings applied on the fabric, stating that they had sought copyright
registration for the same and sought damages from the defendant.

2 2006 SCC OnLine Del 60.
784 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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23. The Delhi High Court denied the plaintiff any protection under the
Copyright Act. It based its decision on the following definitive factors:
(i) the plaintiff’s work is not a piece of art in itself in the form of a
painting, despite there being labour and innovativeness applied to
put a particular ‘configuration’ in place. This configuration comprises
of motifs and designs, which by themselves are not original; (ii) The
object of such an arrangement was to put them to industrial use and
does not have any utility or independent existence of itself; (iii) Fabric
designs on textile goods have been classified as proper subject matter
of design protection by inclusion under Class 5 of the Design Rules,
2001; (iv) Legislative intent is also to be kept in mind, which is to
protect the creator of the work for a certain period for commercial
exploitation. Protection under the Copyright Act is for the lifetime of
the author and an additional period of sixty years, which is not so
in the case of the Designs Act, where the period is much lesser; (v)
‘Artistic work’ defined under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act has
been excluded from the definition of ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of
the Designs Act to exclude for instance, works such as the painting
of M.F. Hussain; (vi) It is apparent that it is the Designs Act which
would give protection to the plaintiff in this case and not the Copyright
Act, as the work in question cannot be labelled as an ‘artistic work’.
24. The Delhi High Court followed and affirmed the ratio in Microfibres
I (supra) in subsequent judgements, such as in Dart Industries Inc
and another v. Techno Plast and others,3 where the controversy
concerned the plaintiffs, who were manufactures of ‘Tupperware’
products, alleging that the defendants had infringed their copyright
and design rights by producing strikingly similar products. The High
Court held that no copyright protection would subsist once a design
had been registered under the Design Act. That was a case concerning
product drawings meant to create the ultimate product design, for
which the copyright claim in the said drawings was rejected.
25. The High Court in this context further enunciated as follows:
“44. No doubt, the plaintiff has tried to argue that for
creating the same designs, the defendant would have
applied the technique of ‘reverse engineering’ inasmuch
as striking resemblance to the Tupperware Products could

3 2007 SCC OnLine Del 892.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 785

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have been achieved by the defendants by circumventing
the tedious and lengthy process used for manufacture of
the Tupperware Products by using computer techniques
possibly by 2D or 3D scanning. This is a matter which
would require evidence. May be on the basis of evidence
led ultimately plaintiff is successful in showing that there
is a copyright in the product drawings and the defendants
have copied the said drawings thereby violating the
copyright rights in creating their own products striking
similar to the Tupperware Products. However, prima
facie, it seems that once the drawings are made for
creating the ultimate product design, the copyright
in the said drawings cannot be claimed under the
Copyright Act. May be this is the reason that Section
15 of the Copyright Act provides that once a design
is registered under the Designs Act, copyright therein
shall not subsist. Such a copyright in any design
ceases even when any article to which the design
has been applied has been reproduced more than 50
times by an industrial process by the owner of the
copyright. The underlying message is that copyright
in an industrial design is governed by the Designs Act,
2000. If a design is registered under that Act it is not
legible for protection under the Copyright Act. In such
cases after the design is registered under the Designs Act,
the protection given is not copyright protection but a true
monopoly based on statute inasmuch as such designs were
never protected by the common law. Exception may be in
those cases where copyright had come into existence
in respect of artistic drawings and subsequently
those drawings were used as models or patterns to
be multiplied by any industrial process. There, if the
drawings became capable of registration as a design it
would not result in copyright being fortified [See Warner
Brothers v. Roadrunner, 1988 FSR 292]. However, if the
intended industrial use of the work was contemporaneous
with its coming into existence, Section 15 of the Copyright
Act would apply. I may hasten to clarify that it is not
suggested that if any design is registered, copyright under
no circumstance exist in the drawings. Section 15 lays
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down that on registration of a design under the Designs
Act, the copyright shall not subsist in that design and not
in the drawings. Therefore, it is possible that when the
moulded plastic article of novel shape is made from a
working drawing, as in the instant case, the drawing may
qualify as an original work entitled to copyright protection
and, at the same time, a registered design for the shape
of the article would be protected under the Designs Act.
If an unauthorised copy is made of the article, it may
constitute an indirect copy of the drawing and therefore
may infringe the copyright.”
[Emphasis supplied]

26. Similarly, in Mattel, Inc v. Jayant Agarwalla,4 the plaintiff Mattel
alleged that the defendant had infringed their copyright by copying
the design of their board game and creating an electronic game
called ‘Scrabulous’. Mattel further argued that all versions of their
game, since 1932, qualified as ‘artistic works’ under Section 2(c) of
the Copyright Act and were protected in India under the International
Copyright Order, 1991. On the contrary, the defendant contended
that Mattel’s game board, being a three-dimensional article, could
not be protected under the Copyright Act and ought to have been
registered as a design under the Designs Act. A Learned Single Judge
of the High Court, having duly considered the competing claims and
relying on Microfibres I (supra), declined ad interim injunction to
the plaintiff on the basis that its board game had been reproduced
more than fifty times, along with its alphabetical tile pieces, without
any registration having taken place under the Designs Act.
27. Meanwhile, Microfibres I (supra), which was being relied on in
several such decisions, was appealed before a Division Bench of
the Delhi High Court vide Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar and Co,5
contending that the subject works qualified as original ‘artistic
works’ within Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act and that no artificial
distinction between works which are pure artistic works and those
which are not could be drawn. In particular, the appellant questioned

4 2008 SCC Online Del 1059.
5 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1647.
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the finding of the Single Judge that the artistic work in question did
not have the ability to stand by itself as a piece of art and had no
independent existence.
28. The Division Bench of the High Court, having considered these
contentions, dismissed the appeal and summarised its conclusions
as follows:
“46. We thus summarise our findings as follows:—
a. The definition of ‘artistic work’ has a very wide
connotation as it is not circumscribed by any limitation of
the work possessing any artistic quality. Even an abstract
work, such as a few lines or curves arbitrarily drawn would
qualify as an artistic work. It may be two-dimensional or
three-dimensional. The artistic work may or may not have
visual appeal.
b. The rights to which a holder of an original artistic
work is entitled are enumerated in Section 14(c) of the
Copyright Act.
c. It is the exclusive right of the holder of a Copyright
in an original artistic work to reproduce the work in any
material form. For example, a drawing of an imaginary
futuristic automobile, which is an original artistic work,
may be reproduced in three-dimensional material form
using an element, such as a metal sheet.
d. The design protection in case of registered works
under the Designs Act cannot be extended to include
the copyright protection to the works which were
industrially produced.
e. A perusal of the Copyright Act and the Designs Act
and indeed the Preamble and the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Designs Act makes it clear that the
legislative intent was to grant a higher protection to pure
original artistic works such as paintings, sculptures
etc and lesser protection to design activity which is
commercial in nature. The legislative intent is, thus,
clear that the protection accorded to a work which
is commercial in nature is lesser than and not to be
equated with the protection granted to a work of pure art.
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f. The original paintings/artistic works which may be
used to industrially produce the designed article would
continue to fall within the meaning of the artistic work
defined under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957
and would be entitled to the full period of copyright
protection as evident from the definition of the design
under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act. However, the
intention of producing the artistic work is not relevant.
g. This is precisely why the Legislature not only limited
the protection by mandating that the copyright shall cease
under the Copyright Act in a registered design but in
addition, also deprived copyright protection to designs
capable of being registered under the Designs Act, but
not so registered, as soon as the concerned design
had been applied more than 50 times by industrial
process by the owner of the copyright or his licensee.
h. In the original work of art, copyright would exist and the
author/holder would continue enjoying the longer protection
granted under the Copyright Act in respect of the original
artistic work per se.
i. If the design is registered under the Designs Act,
the Design would lose its copyright protection under
the Copyright Act. If it is a design registrable under
the Designs Act but has not so been registered, the
Design would continue to enjoy copyright protection
under the Act so long as the threshold limit of its
application on an article by an industrial process for
more than 50 times is reached. But once that limit is
crossed, it would lose its copyright protection under the
Copyright Act. This interpretation would harmonise the
Copyright and the Designs Act in accordance with the
legislative intent.
47. Thus, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is
dismissed but with no order as to costs.”
[Emphasis supplied]

29. The Delhi High Court’s view in Microfibres II (supra) has found
favour with other High Courts, also, such as the Bombay High Court
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in Pranda Jewelry Pvt. Ltd. v. Aarya 24 KT,6 and the Kerala High
Court in Fun World and Resorts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Nimil KK.7

E.1.2.1.2 The aspect of Functional Utility
30. In order to fully appreciate the scope of ‘functional utility’, it is
imperative first to have a complete grasp on the objects and purpose
of the Designs Act. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a decision
of this Court in Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd.,
which laid down as follows:8
“26. In fact, the sole purpose of this Act is protection
of the intellectual property right of the original design
for a period of ten years or whatever further period
extendable. The object behind this enactment is to
benefit the person for his research and labour put in
by him to evolve the new and original design. This is
the sole aim of enacting this Act. It has also laid down
that if design is not new or original or published previously
then such design should not be registered. It further lays
down that if it has been disclosed to the public anywhere
in India or in any other country by publication in tangible
form or by use or in any other way prior to the filing date,
or where applicable, the priority date of the application for
registration then such design will not be registered or if
it is found that it is not significantly distinguishable from
known designs or combination of known designs, then
such designs shall not be registered. It also provides that
registration can be cancelled under Section 19 of the Act
if proper application is filed before the competent authority
i.e. the Controller that the design has been previously
registered in India or published in India or in any other
country prior to the date of registration, or that the design
is not a new or original design or that the design is not
registerable under this Act or that it is not a design as
defined in Clause (d) of Section 2. The Controller after

6 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 958.
7 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 219.
8 (2008) 10 SCC 657.
790 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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hearing both the parties if satisfied that the design is not
new or original or that it has already been registered
or if it is not registerable, cancel such registration and
aggrieved against that order, appeal shall lie to the High
Court. These prohibitions have been engrafted so as
to protect the original person who has designed a new
one by virtue of his own efforts by researching for a long
time. The new and original design when registered
is for a period of ten years. Such original design
which is new and which has not been available in the
country or has not been previously registered or has
not been published in India or in any other country
prior to the date of registration shall be protected
for a period of ten years. therefore, it is in the nature
of protection of the intellectual property right. This
was the purpose as is evident from the statement of
objects and reasons and from various provisions of
the Act. In this background, we have to examine whether
the design which was registered on the application filed
by the respondent herein can be cancelled or not on the
basis of the application filed by the appellant…”
[Emphasis supplied]

31. This Court further acknowledged that the term ‘design’ had been
extensively interpreted by English Courts, considering that the
expression was pari materia with the definition consecrated in the
Indian context. This alignment is particularly relevant as English
jurisprudence has long employed the ‘functional utility’ test to ascertain
whether a work would be entitled to protection under English law,
especially under the English Registered Designs Act, 1949—a test
subsequently adopted by some of the High Courts in India.
32. The question of ‘functional utility’ in the context of design was first
addressed by the House of Lords in Amp v. Utilux, wherein the
dispute between the parties involved the infringement of designs
relating to a single electrical terminal and to a number of terminals
joined together in line.9 The controversy therein pertained to whether

9 [1972] RPC 103.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 791

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others

the features or the shape of the terminals were solely dictated by
function or if they appealed to the eye. Lord Reid (for himself and
Lord Donovan) opined that:
“There must be a blend of industrial efficiency with
visual appeal. If the shape is not there to appeal to
the eye but solely to make the article work then this
provision excludes it from the statutory protection.
I would add to avoid misunderstanding that no doubt in
the great majority of cases which the Act will protect the
designer had visual appeal in mind when composing his
design. But it could well be that a designer who only
thought of practical efficiency in fact has produced
a design which does appeal to the eye. He would not
be denied protection because that was not his object
when he composed the design.”
[Emphasis supplied]

33. This decision was the first to draw a distinction in designs between
‘features’ and ‘shapes’ that were construed to be ‘aesthetically
appealing’ to the eye of the consumer, in comparison to features
that existed merely for ‘purely functional purposes’. This demarcation
based upon functional utility was further relied upon by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council while interpreting the English
Registered Designs Act, 1949, in Interlego A.G v. Tyco Industries
Inc and others.10 This line of distinction on the basis of features
being eye-appealing or merely due to functional utility, as developed
by English courts, has been subsequently employed by some of the
High courts in India.
34. The Delhi High Court first addressed the issue of functional utility in
Smithkline Beecham Plc. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd,11 where the plaintiff
sought a declaration of ownership over toothbrush designs to prevent
the defendants from infringing upon them. The Single Judge examined
whether the ‘S’-shaped design of the toothbrush was primarily functional
or aesthetic. Applying the functional utility test, the court determined

10 [1988] UKPC 3.
11 1999 SCC OnLine Del 965.
792 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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that while the design offered some aesthetic appeal to consumers, its
primary purpose was functional. As a result, the High Court ruled in
favour of the defendant and denied design protection to the plaintiff.
35. The Madras High Court thereafter applied the functional utility test
in Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. v. Standard Combines
Pvt. Ltd.,12 following the precedent set in Smithkline (supra). The
case involved allegations of infringement and passing off relating to
certain tractor models, parts, and fittings. In reviewing whether the
Trial Court was correct in rejecting the plaint, the High Court held
that serious questions remained regarding whether the specific parts
or shapes were functional or aesthetic. Additionally, it needed to be
determined whether the original drawings warranted protection under
the Designs Act or the Copyright Act. Consequently, the Madras High
Court ruled that the plaint could not be rejected at the threshold.
This decision by the Single Judge thereafter came to be reaffirmed
by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in 2014.13
36. The Smithkline (supra) decision itself was reaffirmed by a Full Bench
of the Delhi High Court in Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint and Hardwares.14
This case involved a dispute over the infringement of novel and
distinguishable mirror frames and addressed the broader legal question
of whether a passing off action could be combined with a claim under
the Designs Act, although not relevant to the present discussion.
37. The Bombay High Court also commented on the standard of the
functional utility test in Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. Videocon Industries
Ltd.,15 wherein it has put forth that the ‘conundrum of functionality
may be resolved by taking note of the fact that it would make no
impact on the article’s functionality, if the function could be performed
by the use of another shape as well’.
38. Interestingly, the Bombay High Court, in Photoquip India Ltd. v.
Delhi Photo Store,16 appears to have adopted a conjunctive approach
by interpreting Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act alongside the test
of functional utility. While adjudicating the plaintiff’s claim for an

12 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 5470.
13 Standard Corporation India Ltd. v. Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 850.
14 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1980.
15 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 565.
16 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1088.
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injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing its copyright in
artistic works, a Learned Single Judge succinctly held that:
“29. What is that to which Section 15(2) refers? It speaks
only of a ‘design’, and not an ‘artistic work’. It has no
application to the latter, but only to the former. Section
2(d) of the Designs Act makes this plain, for it excludes
from the definition of design all ‘artistic works’.
Therefore, the Defendants’ argument must necessarily be
that the Plaintiff’s drawings are not artistic works at all, but
are designs. Following the Interlego decision, Mrs. Justice
Dalvi held in Indiana Gratings that to be registrable under
the Designs Act (even if not actually registered), the shape
or configuration of the whole article is to be considered, for
it is this of which a commercial monopoly is sought. The
design and the article must, of necessity, be taken as
a whole. If there is a part of it that is functional, that
stands excluded from the definition of a design. The
exclusionary intent extends only to that which has
no appeal but describes or portrays purely functional
features. If it does, it is not a ‘design’. It may then enjoy
copyright as an ‘artistic work’. This inclusion under the
Copyright Act is not to be confused, as regrettably Mr.
Grover does, with the question of ‘visual appeal’ for the
purposes of the Designs Act. As in Indiana Gratings, the
present Plaintiff’s drawings are skilled diagrams that do not
reflect any finished products, let alone a finished product of
any ‘visual’ or aesthetic appeal. They only serve a functional
purpose. They are not, therefore, designs.”
[Emphasis supplied]

39. No decision of any other High Court or this Court expressing a
discordant view has been cited before us. We thus safely proceed on
the premise that the test of functional utility is integral to determining
whether an article or work qualifies for protection under the Designs
Act and its continued relevance, as recently held by the Delhi High
Court in TTK Prestige Ltd. v. KCM Appliances Pvt. Ltd.17

17 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2129.
794 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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E.1.2.2 Factors employed by courts in the US
40. The analysis of ‘functional utility’ for determining eligibility for design
protection closely parallels the ‘conceptual separability’ standard
established by American Courts. Under this standard, courts assess
whether the artistic aspect of an article can be distinguished from
its utilitarian or functional component. This approach aligns with
the tests applied by Indian High Courts, which exclude functional
or utilitarian subject matter from protection under the Designs Act.
41. While American jurisprudence does not treat the distinction between
artistic works and designs in the same manner as Indian law, there
are notable similarities in the parameters used to separate the
functional aspects of a work from its artistic or aesthetic features
and thus conclusively determine whether a work is entitled statutory
protection. One of the first such cases employing an approach of
separating artistic expression from a utilitarian article was Mazer v.
Stein.18 The US Supreme Court in that dispute examined the validity
of copyrights granted to the respondents for statuettes of male and
female dancing figures made of semivitreous china. The Court ruled
that while the copyright owners could not prevent others from using
statuettes of human figures in table lamps, they could prohibit direct
copying of their specific copyrighted statuettes.
42. Though the court in Mazer (supra) did not explicitly use the term
‘conceptual separability’, but that was seemingly the foundation
to bifurcate an artistic expression from a utilitarian article. In fact,
the position of law developed in Mazer (supra) was subsequently
incorporated by the US Congress in the Copyright Act, 1976, which
postulated that:
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic,
and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical
drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined

18 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954).
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in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.”
“A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is
considered a “useful article”.”
[Emphasis supplied]

43. With the insertion of the notion of ‘conceptual separability’ into the
statutory framework, a phase of continuous evolution was undergone
to define the scope and extent of this concept. For instance, in Esquire
Inc v. Ringer,19 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit assessed the House Report of the 1976 Act and enumerated
that ‘the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian object, even
if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional considerations,
is not eligible for copyright’.
44. Thereafter, while adjudicating Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Peral Inc,20 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit qualified that
the test of ‘conceptual separability’ is not a brightline rule but involves
a degree of subjectivity. It introduced a primary-subsidiary approach,
surmising that the test of ‘conceptual separability’ would be satisfied if
the artistic features of a design are ‘primary’ to its subsidiary utilitarian
function. However, in Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp,
the Second Circuit further held that ‘conceptual separability’ would
be met if the artistic features of the design were not essential to the
article’s utilitarian function.21
45. During this time, Circuit Courts relied on the works of scholars and
academicians to conclusively put forth that considering the dominant
characteristic of industrial design is the non-aesthetic and utilitarian

19 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
20 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
21 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1985).
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concerns, copyrightability ultimately should depend on the extent to
which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional
considerations.22 It was also laid down that a direct assessment
needs to be conducted in this regard to exclude the general realm of
industrial design while preserving the exclusive rights in ‘applied art’.
46. Having said that, the Fifth Circuit sought to adopt a unique
approach and followed the ‘Likelihood of Marketability Approach’
wherein conceptual separability would exist if there is a substantial
likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian use, it would still
be marketable to some significant segment of the community merely
owing to its aesthetic qualities.23 It thus seems that there was a time
when multiple tests were applied by American Courts to determine
the copyrightability of useful articles.
47. The US Supreme Court, resolved these inconsistencies finally in 2017,
vide Star Athletica LLC v. Varsity Brands Inc,24 by establishing
a clear test for the protection of features incorporated into the
design of a useful article. It held that to be eligible for copyright
protection, the feature would have to: (i) be perceived as a two or
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article; and
(ii) it would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work, either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium or
expression, if it were imagined separately from the useful article
into which it is incorporated. In laying down these parameters, Star
Athletica (supra) also abandoned the distinction created between
‘physical’ and ‘conceptual separability’, which had been adopted by
some courts based on the copyright framework’s legislative history.
The US Supreme Court thus axiomatically reconciled the various
inconsistencies in interpretation and established a uniform standard
for analysing ‘conceptual separability’.

E.1.2.3 Broader International Principles
48. In our effort to definitively address the overlap between ‘design’ and
‘artistic works’, we have already explored their treatment by the courts

22 Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir.1987); Pivot Point Int’l,
Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004).
23 Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005).
24 Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 197 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2017).
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in India, as well as in the US. As an apotheosis to this sojourn, we
also deem it essential to explore broader international principles and
frameworks that regulate these aspects.
49. Public international law has played a crucial role in setting and
enforcing minimum standards for IP rights among States. The earliest
multilateral agreement in this regard was the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 (Paris Convention).25
However, while Article 5quinquies of the Paris Convention requires
Members to establish a standard of protection for industrial designs,
it does not explicitly provide any guidance in terms of harmonizing
design protection with the copyright regime.
50. Subsequently, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, 1886 (Berne Convention), was established to
set legal principles for the protection of ‘literary and artistic works’;
across multiple jurisdictions.26 While industrial designs are mentioned
within this broad classification, the Berne Convention primarily allows
States to develop sui generis protection for such designs through
their domestic laws. Notably, it does not elaborate on the overlap
between design protection and copyright, leaving the matter largely
to municipal legislation.
51. The most major development in the realm of multilateral treaties
on IP rights, however, came with the adoption of the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (TRIPS).27
In comparison to the Paris Convention or the Berne Convention,
TRIPS discusses ‘industrial designs’ in a far more comprehensive
manner. Articles 25 and 26 of the TRIPS recognise that Members
may employ the test of ‘functional utility’ to exclude designs that
are built on technical or fundamental consideration and require a
minimum protection duration of 10 years, a provision which is also
reflected in the Designs Act in India.

25 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on
December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on
June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14 1967.
26 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at
Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914,
revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, and revised at Stockholm on
July 14, 1967 (with Protocol regarding developing countries).
27 TRIPS, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 33 I.L.M. 1197.
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52. The relevant provisions of TRIPS have been highlighted as follows:
“Article 25 – Requirements for Protection:
1. Members shall provide for the protection of
independently created industrial designs that are new
or original. Members may provide that designs are not
new or original if they do not significantly differ from
known designs or combinations of known design features.
Members may provide that such protection shall not
extend to designs dictated essentially by technical
or functional considerations.
2. Each Member shall ensure that requirements for securing
protection for textile designs, in particular in regard to any
cost, examination or publication, do not unreasonably
impair the opportunity to seek and obtain such protection.
Members shall be free to meet this obligation through
industrial design law or through copyright law.
Article 26 – Protection:
1. The owner of a protected industrial design shall have
the right to prevent third parties not having the owner’s
consent from making, selling or importing articles bearing
or embodying a design which is a copy, or substantially
a copy, of the protected design, when such acts are
undertaken for commercial purposes.
2. Members may provide limited exceptions to the
protection of industrial designs, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the
normal exploitation of protected industrial designs and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the owner of the protected design, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties.
3. The duration of protection available shall amount
to at least 10 years.”
[Emphasis supplied]

53. In summation, while international treaties such as the Paris
Convention, the Berne Convention, and TRIPS have played a pivotal
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role in shaping IP protections, they do not pointedly address a unified
framework for resolving the overlap between ‘design’ and ‘copyright’
protection. Instead, they allow individual jurisdictions to formulate
their own approaches. TRIPS, in particular, acknowledges the role
of ‘functional utility’ in distinguishing protectable designs, thereby
reinforcing the necessity of a nuanced approach at the domestic level.
Consequently, the harmonisation of design and copyright protection
remains largely a matter of national legislative policy.

E.1.3. The final piece of the puzzle – the approach to be adopted
54. Having traversed the stratagem adopted across various jurisdictions
and the key considerations that influence them, we see light at the
end of the tunnel and deem it pertinent to outline our own definitive
parameters that align with our existing IP right framework.
55. The expression ‘artistic work’ under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act
has a very wide connotation and may also include abstract work(s)
comprising a few lines or curves arbitrarily drawn, which could be
either two or three-dimensional. It may be clarified that such a work
may or may not have any visual appeal. Further, the holder of such
an artistic work is entitled to draw protection under Section 14(c) of
the Copyright Act, including the exclusive right to reproduce such work
in any material form. Such a reproduction may also involve depicting
a three-dimension work of a two-dimensional work or vice versa.
56. However, if such reproduction is done by employing an industrial
process, which may be manual, mechanical or chemical, and which
results in a finished article that may appeal to the eye, then ‘the
features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament or composition of
lines or colours applied to the article by such an industrial process’,
constitutes ‘design’ within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Designs
Act.
57. It thus seems that the intent of producing an original artistic work is
not determinative of its protection under the Copyright or Designs
Regime. Rather, the legislative intent is to harmonise the two Statutes
so that while an ‘artistic work’ qualifies for copyright protection, its
commercial or industrial application—i.e., the ‘design’ derived from
the original work for industrial production—is subject to the limitations
set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. Such a design gets
protected only if it is registered under the Designs Act.
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58. To further simplify, the original artistic work, which initially enjoys
copyright protection, does not lose the same merely because a
‘design’ derived from it has been industrially applied to create a
product. While the expression ‘artistic work’ has a broad spectrum,
‘design’ is restricted to specific features such as shape, configuration,
pattern, ornamentation, or composition of lines or colours, applied
to an article through an industrial process, resulting in a finished
product that appeals to the eye. These visually appealing features,
when applied industrially, define a ‘design’ under the Designs Act.
59. Our analysis further reveals that the inquiry cannot be concluded
merely by assuming that what does not qualify as an ‘artistic work’,
within the meaning of the Copyright Act, would automatically receive
protection under the Designs Act. While protection under the Designs
Act is not as enduring as that under the Copyright Act, it is not
granted by default and requires specific criteria to be met. In this
regard, courts in India and globally consistently apply the test of
‘functional utility’ to determine whether a work qualifies for protection
under the Designs Act.
60. It would therefore be appropriate to espouse the approach already
undertaken by the courts in India, as it not only emulates the best
practices employed by US courts and the principles enshrined in
International Conventions but it also gives due consideration to
contemporaneous laws and legislations. We have thus formulated
a two-pronged approach in order to crack open the conundrum
caused by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act so as to ascertain
whether a work is qualified to be protected by the Designs Act.
This test shall consider: (i) whether the work in question is purely
an ‘artistic work’ entitled to protection under the Copyright Act or
whether it is a ‘design’ derived from such original artistic work
and subjected to an industrial process based upon the language
in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act; (ii) if such a work does not
qualify for copyright protection, then the test of ‘functional utility’
will have to be applied so as to determine its dominant purpose,
and then ascertain whether it would qualify for design protection
under the Design Act.
61. The courts, while applying this test, ought to undertake a case-
specific inquiry guided by statutory provisions, judicial precedents,
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and comparative jurisprudence. It must be kept in mind that the
overarching objective is to ensure that rights granted under either
regime serve their intended purpose without unduly encroaching upon
the domain of the other. With this approach, we have attempted to
clarify the treatment of works at the intersection of ‘copyright’ and
‘design’ law(s), thereby ensuring coherence and consistency in the
application of IP rights in India.
62. We hasten to add that this Court has undertaken the task of clarifying
the perceived complexities arising from Section 15(2) of the Copyright
Act. In this context, we appreciate the efforts of High Courts across
the country in adopting best practices that align with our socio-legal
framework. Our analysis and examination have hopefully resolved
this legal issue to prevent any further ambiguity in the future.

E.2 Issue No. 2: The High Court’s rejection of the application
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
63. Adverting to the case at hand, the primary contention between the
parties lies in whether or not the High Court erred in setting aside
the Commercial Court’s order, whereby it allowed the application
preferred by LNG Express under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
64. The Commercial Court allowed LNG Express’s application on the
ground that the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’ qualified as a
‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, and therefore, no
suit for copyright infringement could be maintained in favour of Inox.
65. However, the High Court, having disagreed with the finding of the
Commercial Court, initially remanded the matter for reconsideration.
When the Commercial Court reiterated its earlier conclusion, the
High Court again intervened and rejected LNG Express’s application,
with a direction to the Commercial Court to consider Inox’s plea for
an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC.
66. This prolonged oscillation between the High Court and the Commercial
Court has brought the parties before us. On a deeper analysis of the
Impugned Judgement, we find that the High Court has substantiated
its conclusions with the following broad reasons:
(a) Section 15(1) of the Copyright Act applies when a design is
registered under the Designs Act, thereby implicitly barring
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any claim for copyright protection. However, Section 15(2) of
the Copyright Act requires an inquiry to determine whether the
drawing in question falls within the scope of the Designs Act.
This necessary inquiry implies that a suit cannot be dismissed
outrightly under Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
solely based on a reading of the averments in the plaint.
(b) The core dispute revolves around whether the ‘Proprietary
Engineering Drawings’ qualify as drawings under Section 2(c)
of the Copyright Act or whether they fall within the definition of
a ‘design’ under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, necessitating
a detailed examination.
(c) The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Microfibres II
(supra), has laid down that the term ‘artistic work’ has a broad
scope and may exist independently or as a precursor to a design.
Additionally, a design derived from an artistic work may enjoy
copyright protection, which ceases once it is industrially applied
beyond the threshold set in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act.
Given these intricate distinctions, a more detailed analysis is
warranted, and such determinations cannot be made at the
very threshold.
(d) Even if the drawing in question is not classified as an original
artistic work, it does not automatically qualify for protection under
the Designs Act. In such cases, it must be assessed whether
the dominant aspect of the design is functional or whether
the design is registrable under the Designs Act, meaning that
when applied to an article through an industrial process, the
finished product must possess aesthetic appeal rather than
being purely functional.
(e) Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act serves as a limitation on
the protection granted to artistic works under the Act. Allowing
Inox’s claim may result in a cascading effect, potentially allowing
every tracing or drawing to receive copyright protection while
simultaneously being industrially or commercially exploited
through its application to an article. Such an outcome would
likely contravene the intent of the Legislature.
(f) Ultimately, the determination of whether the ‘Proprietary
Engineering Drawings’ of the inner vessel, which is admittedly
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an ‘original artistic work’ under Section 2(c) of the Copyright
Act, continues to enjoy copyright protection or whether such
protection is curtailed by Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act due
to their industrial application, is a significant mixed question of
law and fact.
(g) Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC empowers a court to reject
a plaint if the plaintiff fails to disclose a cause of action. In
determining this, the court is not required to delve into complex
legal questions but must simply assess whether the allegations,
if taken as true, establish a cause of action without evaluating
the likelihood of success. Since the plaintiff explicitly sought
copyright protection over the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’;
the literary work associated with the internal parts of Cryogenic
trailers; and the know-how for their manufacture or assembly,
the rejection of the plaint was unwarranted.
(h) When determining whether a plaint discloses a cause of action,
the court is not required to conduct an elaborate inquiry into
complex legal or factual issues. The court’s role is limited to
assessing whether any of the allegations indicate a cause of
action. As long as the claim presents some cause of action or
raises questions appropriate for judicial determination, the fact
that the case may be weak or unlikely to succeed is not a valid
reason for striking it out. For rejecting a plaint, it is unnecessary
to evaluate whether the averments substantiate the ownership
claim made by the defendant. Likewise, if the defendant raises
a legal issue in the written statement, it cannot be adjudicated
through an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, as
doing so would amount to pre-judging the matter.
(i) In any event, the Suit encompasses additional claims relating
to ‘literary work,’ confidential information, and know-how, which
cannot be rejected in part. Even if the claim for copyright
infringement is deemed untenable, the Suit would still be
maintainable with respect to the other rights asserted. As a
result, the entire Suit must proceed to trial, since a plaint cannot
be partially rejected.
67. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning of the High Court
that the question as to whether the original artistic work would fall
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within the meaning of ‘design’ under the Designs Act cannot be
answered while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC. This stage would involve only a prima facie inquiry as to the
disclosure of cause of action in the plaint. The question pertaining to
ascertaining the true nature of the ‘Proprietary Engineering Drawings’
involves a mixed question of law and fact and could not have been
decided by the Commercial Court at a preliminary stage based upon
such a casual appraisal of the plaint averments.
68. We therefore concur with the High Court that this case warrants
a trial given the triable issues involved. The plaintiff before the
Commercial Court, i.e., Inox, was erroneously non-suited due to
incorrect assumptions made by the Commercial Court which misread
the plaint, misapplied legal principles and overlooked the distinction
between ‘artistic work’ and ‘design.’
69. In light of our discussion on relevant precedents and legal positions,
and the clear test we have outlined, we direct the Commercial Court
to consider the issue afresh and conduct trial by adopting an Occam’s
Razor approach to ascertain the true nature of the ‘Proprietary
Engineering Drawings’. Additionally, the Commercial Court would
also need to independently assess the claims related to infringement
of the Literary Works, confidential information, know-how etc. so as
to resolve the matter comprehensively.

F. Conclusion and directions
70. Having thus examined the vagaries of IP law and the intrinsic synergy
that exists between two independent legislations, namely the Designs
Act and the Copyright Act, we dismiss the instant appeals with the
following conclusions and directions:
i. The decision of the High Court rejecting the application under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is upheld;
ii. The Commercial Court is directed to deliver its decision on the
pending application seeking interim injunction preferred by Inox,
within a period of two months;
iii. The Commercial Court is further directed to conduct trial and
discern the true nature of the Proprietary Engineering Drawings
based upon the test laid down in paragraph 60 of this judgement,
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as also the other related IP right infringements claimed by Inox,
within a period of one year, given that it has already wasted
significant judicial time on this issue.
71. Ordered accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed
of in the above terms.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan