COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTUREversusTHE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS.

                        [2022] 16 S.C.R. 349                              349


                 COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE                                  A
                                  v.
 THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 1320 of 2022)
                        FEBRUARY 14, 2022                                 B
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
        Architects Act, 1972: ss.21, 45; Council of Architecture
(Minimum Standards of Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020
– Writ petition filed by first respondent, a society registered under
                                                                          C
the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 having professional
architects as its members and seeking quashing of the Regulations,
2020 circulated by Communication dated 31.10.2018 and
03.12.2018 on the ground that these regulations required prior
approval of the central government u/s.45(1) of the Act and no
such approval was obtained – Appellant before the High Court also         D
questioned the locus standi of first Respondent – High Court allowed
the writ petition and quashed the impugned communication – Hence,
the present appeal – Held: The Council of Architecture may prescribe
minimum standards of architectural education – It is only in cases
where the Council choose to prescribe standards in the form of
                                                                          E
regulations that the requirement of approval of the Central
Government under s.45(1) would become necessary – On the
question of locus standi, first respondent society due to the nature of
its membership, could not have been aggrieved – The first respondent
could not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are
not in any way concerned – High Court erred in not addressing             F
itself to these important issues – Impugned order set aside.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD : 1.1 Both the communications dated 31.10.2018
and 03.12.2018, impugned before the High Court, were not part
of any Regulations framed by the appellant in exercise of the             G
power conferred by Section 45(1) of the Act. The requirements
of prior approval and the notification in the official gazette in terms
of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of Regulations and not
in respect of communications such as the ones impugned in the
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                                 349
350            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     writ petition. This is why an argument is advanced on the inter-
      play between Sections 21 and 45 of the Act. [Para 9][352-B-C]
            1.2 The Council of Architecture may prescribe minimum
      standards of architectural education, either by way of regulations
      issued under Section 45(2) or even otherwise. It is only in cases
B     where the Council chooses to prescribe standards in the form of
      regulations that the requirement of approval of the Central
      Government under Section 45(1) would become necessary [Para
      15][355-C]
            1.3 The 1st respondent society (writ petitioner), due to the
C     nature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by the
      prescriptions affecting the teaching faculty. The 1 st respondent
      could not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are
      not in any way concerned. [Para 19][356-G]
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1320
D     of 2022.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 04.06.2019 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition No. 34676 of 2018.
            Naveen R. Nath, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Ms. Lalit Mohini
      Bhat, Rahul Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.
E
            Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, K. M. Vignesh Ram, Rajeev Kumar
      Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, Ashiwan Mishra, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave,
      Ms. Preeti Rani, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Moh. Akhil, G. S. Makker, Advs. for
      the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
            V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
            Leave granted.
              2. The 1st respondent herein which is a society registered under
      the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and which has as its
G     members, professional architects who claim to be teaching faculty in
      institutions imparting education in Architecture, filed a writ petition on
      the file of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, praying for quashing
      the “Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulations, 2017”
      circulated by the appellant herein vide communications dated 31.10.2018
H     and 03.12.2018. The main and perhaps the only ground of challenge to
  COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF                          351
   ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

the Regulations was that the Regulations required the prior approval of       A
the Central Government under Section 45 of The Architects Act, 1972,
(in short referred to as ‘the Act’) before they are implemented and that
no such prior approval was obtained before issuing the impugned
communications.
       3. The appellant herein took umbrage under Section 21 of the           B
Act. The appellant also questioned the locus standi of the 1st respondent
to challenge the impugned communications, since the communications
were addressed to institutions teaching Architecture, none of which had
come forward to challenge the same.
       4. Taking a view that Section 21 cannot be read in isolation and       C
that the provisions of Section 45 are mandatory, the High Court allowed
the writ petition and quashed the impugned communications. Hence, the
appellant is before us.
       5. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties.                                                                      D
       6. Before we consider the issue that arises for consideration, we
must take note of one important subsequent development. After this
Court ordered notice in the Special Leave Petition, a Notification bearing
F.No.CA/193/2020/MSAER dated 11.08.2020 was published in the
Government Gazette, notifying the “Council of Architecture (Minimum           E
Standards of Architectural Education) Regulations, 2020”. These
Regulations were directed to come into force with effect from the 1st
day of November, 2020. These Regulations have been issued, as seen
from the Notification, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses
(e), (g), (h) and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21
of the Act. They have been issued in supersession of the 1983                 F
Regulations.
        7. Due to the above subsequent development, the question relating
to the inter-play between Section 21 and Section 45 of the Act has become
one of mere academic importance. However, Mr. Naveen R. Nath,
learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that the question of       G
law is of importance and advanced arguments.
       8. Admittedly, the communication dated 31.10.2018 issued by the
appellant herein drew the attention of the educational institutions to the
revised eligibility criteria for admission to 5 year B.Arch. degree course
and also to the Minimum Standards for Architectural Education prescribed      H
352            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     by the Council to be followed for the academic session 2019-20. The
      second impugned communication was dated 03.12.2018 which was the
      “Approval Process” for 2019-20.
             9. Both the communications dated 31.10.2018 and 03.12.2018,
      impugned before the High Court, were not part of any Regulations framed
B     by the appellant in exercise of the power conferred by Section 45(1) of
      the Act. The requirements of prior approval and the notification in the
      official gazette in terms of Section 45(1) of the Act, are in respect of
      Regulations and not in respect of communications such as the ones
      impugned in the writ petition. This is why an argument is advanced on
      the inter-play between Sections 21 and 45 of the Act. Section 21 reads
C     as follows:-
            “21. Minimum standard of architectural education.- The
            Council may prescribe the minimum standards of architectural
            education required for granting recognised qualifications by
            colleges or institutions in India.”
D
            Section 45 reads as follows:-
            “45. Power of Council to make regulations.- (1) The Council
            may, with the approval of the Central Government, [by notification
            in the Official Gazette], make regulations not inconsistent with
E           the provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder, to carry
            out the purposes of this Act.
            (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generalityof the
            foregoing power, such regulations may provide for—
               (a) the management of the property of the Council;
F
               (b) the powers and duties of the President and the Vice-
               President of the Council;
               (c) the summoning and holding of meetings of the Council and
               the Executive Committee or any other committee constituted
               under section 10, the times and places at which such meetings
G              shall be held, the conduct of business there at and the number
               of persons necessary to constitute a quorum;
               (d) the functions of the Executive Committee or of any other
               committee constituted under section 10;

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  COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF                            353
   ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

          (e) the courses and periods of study and of practical training, if    A
          any, to be undertaken, the subjects of examinations and
          standards of proficiency therein to be obtained in any college
          or institution for grant of recognised qualifications;
          (f) the appointment, powers and duties of inspector;
          (g) the standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training        B
          and other facilities for architectural education;
          (h) the conduct of professional examinations, qualifications of
          examiners and the conditions of admission to such examinations;
          (i) the standards of professional conduct and etiquette and code      C
          of ethics to be observed by architects;
          (j) any other matter which is to be or may be provided by
          regulations under this Act and in respect of which no rules
          have been made.
      (3) Every regulation made under this section shall be laid, as soon       D
      as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament,
      while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be
      comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions,
      and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the
      session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree
                                                                                E
      in making any modification in the regulation or both Houses agree
      that the regulation should not be made, the regulation shall thereafter
      have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the
      case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment
      shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously
      done under that regulation.                                               F
        10. It may be seen from sub-section (2) of Section 45 that it gives
a list of matters for which provision may be made in the Regulations, in
clauses (a) to (j). Clause (a) to (d) concern the management and
administration of the Council of Architecture and its property. It is only
clauses (e), (g) and (h) of sub-section(2) of Section 45 which have a           G
bearing on the Minimum Standards of Education. Clause (f) relates to
appointment of Inspectors and clause (i) relates to standards of
professional conduct and etiquette. Clause (j) is a residuary clause.
     11. Interestingly, the 1983 Regulations as well as the 2020
Regulations (now issued after the judgment of the Madras High Court),           H
354             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     are issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (e), (g), (h)
      and (j) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 read with Section 21. If the
      stipulation contained in Section 21 is subsumed in one of the clauses of
      Section 45(2), there was no necessity for invoking the power under
      Section 45(2) read with Section 21 while issuing the Regulations. In
      other words, if the minimum standards of architectural education are
B
      covered by clauses (e), (g) and (h), or at least by the residuary clause (j)
      of sub-section (2) of Section 45, it would have been enough for the
      appellant to issue the regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by
      Section 45(2) alone without invoking Section 21 along with it. The reason
      why Section 21 is also invoked along with Section 45(2) is not far to
C     seek.
             12. Clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 45 relates to standards
      of professional conduct and code of ethics to be observed by architects.
      The substantive power to prescribe the code of professional conduct for
      architects, flows out of Section 22. It reads as follows:-
D           “22. Professional conduct.-(1) The Council may by regulations
            prescribe standards of professional conduct and etiquette and a
            code of ethics for architects.
            (2) Regulations made by the Council under sub-section (1) may
            specify which violations thereof shall constitute infamous conduct
E           in any professional respect, that is to say, professional misconduct,
            and such provision shall have effect notwithstanding anything
            contained in any law for the time being in force.”
             13. Apparently, Section 22 confers substantive power upon the
      Council to prescribe standards of professional conduct and Section 45(2)(i)
F     deals with the procedural power. But Section 22 itself makes it clear
      that the prescription of standards of professional conduct and code of
      ethics for architects could be done only by way of regulations. This is in
      contrast to Section 21.
             14. To put it differently, Section 22(1) confers power upon the
G     Council of Architecture to prescribe standards of professional conduct
      and a code of ethics, only by way of regulations, though Section 45(2)(i)
      takes care of the procedural requirement. But Section 21 which confers
      substantive power upon the Council to prescribe minimum standards of
      architectural education, is not couched in the same language as Section
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  COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF                           355
   ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

22(1). In other words, Section 21 does not contain a stipulation that, “the    A
Council may by regulation prescribe minimum standards of architectural
education”. The words “may by regulation”, found in Section 22, are
conspicuous by their absence in Section 21. This is a clear indication of
the fact, (i) that the Council is empowered to prescribe minimum standards
of architectural education, not necessarily by taking recourse to Section
                                                                               B
45(2); and (ii) that if at all, such minimum standards are issued otherwise
than through Regulations, they should not be in conflict with those found
in the Regulations.
      15. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act that the Council of
Architecture may prescribe minimum standards of architectural
education, either by way of regulations issued under Section 45(2) or          C
even otherwise. It is only in cases where the Council chooses to prescribe
standards in the form of regulations that the requirement of approval of
the Central Government under Section 45(1) would become necessary.
       16. It is interesting to see that the communications dated 31.10.2018
and 03.12.2018 issued by the appellant which were put to challenge             D
before the High Court, were primarily aimed at streamlining the institutions
imparting architectural education. The 1st respondent herein who
challenged the communications, was admittedly a society, which has as
its members, the teaching faculty. This can be seen from paragraph 2 of
the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent herein before the High Court,    E
the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-
      “The members of the Society are professionalArchitects who have
      engaged themselves as teaching faculty and the society recognises
      four kinds of members, namely (1) Life Member – Professor
      registered with COA and being heads of institutions with Ten years       F
      of teaching experience, (2) Associate /Affiliate Member–Teachers
      registered with COA having less than Ten years of teaching
      experience, (3) Patron/Donor Member – Accomplished
      Academicians and Renowned Teachers registered with COA
      involved in Architectural Education with Twenty years of
      experience and (4) Institutional Member –representing a college          G
      or school or institute of Architecture”.
       17. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant before the High
Court, a specific objection was taken to the maintainability of the writ
petition on the ground that the communications impugned in the writ
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356             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 16 S.C.R.


A     petition were addressed to the institutions imparting architectural education
      and that individuals who claim to be teaching faculty cannot challenge
      the same. It was also contended in the counter affidavit that the 1st
      respondent (writ petitioner) was attempting to espouse the cause of some
      defaulting educational institutions which did not meet the minimum
      standards. Another important issue raised in the counter affidavit filed
B
      by the appellant herein before the High Court was that one of the members
      of the 1st respondent Society was a member of the appellant Council
      which approved the 2015 norms and that some of the members of the 1 st
      respondent Society even acted as Inspectors and inspected the
      educational institutions to find out whether minimum standards are put in
C     place.
             18. But the above objections were not even considered by the
      High Court. The High Court addressed itself merely to the question of
      the requirement of approval of the Central Government under Section
      45(1) and did not go into the question of locus standi of the 1st respondent.
D     The High Court even overlooked the fact that none of the educational
      institutions imparting architectural education ever chose to challenge the
      communications impugned before the High Court. In fact, the appellant
      has furnished a chart extracting the provisions of the 1983 Regulations
      in Column No.1, the 2017 Prescriptions in Column No.2, and the area of
      difference between the two, in Column No.3. It is seen from the said
E     chart that many of the changes brought forthwith in 2018 were in relation
      to, (i) duration of the architecture programme; (ii) admission to
      architecture course; (iii) intake and migration; (iv) courses and periods
      of study; (v) professional examination, standards of proficiency and
      conditions of admissions and qualifications of examiners; and (vi)
F     standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities.
             19. If at all, the 1st respondent-society (writ petitioner), due to the
      nature of its membership, could have been aggrieved only by the
      prescriptions affecting the teaching faculty. The 1st respondent could
      not have challenged the prescriptions with which they are not in any
G     way concerned. Unfortunately, the High Court did not address itself to
      these important issues.
             20. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be allowed and the impugned
      order is bound to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the
      impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed
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  COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE v. THE ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF                      357
   ARCHITECTS (TASA) & ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

by the 1st respondent before the High Court shall stand dismissed. No     A
costs.

Devika Gujral and Amarendra Kumar                       Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Priyanshu Agarwal, LCRA)

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