COMMUNIDADE OF TIVIM, TIVIM, BARDEZ GOAversusSTATE OF GOA & ORS.

                  [2025] 7 S.C.R. 497 : 2025 INSC 835

             Communidade of Tivim, Tivim, Bardez Goa
                               v.
                      State of Goa & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 9470 of 2025)
                                  14 July 2025
           [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the Administrative Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant
       the appellant, permission to compromise proceedings with the private
       respondents in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code of Comunidades.

                                   Headnotes†
       Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 – Code
       of Comunidades – Art.154(3) – Goa Land Use (Regulation)
       Act, 1991 – By the order dated 13.04.2023, the Administrative
       Tribunal, Goa refused to grant permission to the appellant to
       compromise proceedings instituted by the private respondents
       herein (respondent nos. 3 to 11) – Writ Petition filed by the
       appellant, stood dismissed by the High Court vide order dated
       06.08.2024 – Whether interference is required with the order
       dated 06.08.2024 passed by the High Court:
       Held: There is no reason to interfere with the order dated 06.08.2024
       passed by the High Court – This Court is in complete agreement
       with the Administrative Tribunal, Goa which has refused to accord its
       permission to the filing of the consent terms – What weighed in with
       the Tribunal is the fact that these terms effectively wipe out tenancy
       rights of the private respondents which was declared by the Trial Court
       vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and by the proposed compromise,
       the parties have agreed that in lieu of the 60:40 bifurcation of land
       between them, the judgment dated 01.09.2017 stands set aside –
       This prompted the Tribunal to observe that instead of testing the
       correctness of judgment dated 01.09.2017 on merits before the
       appellate court, the parties intend to set aside the judgment by way
       of compromise – The proposed consent terms or the compromise
       sought to be entered by the appellant with the private respondents
       falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the Tenancy Act and the Land Use
       Act, insofar as it creates freehold ownership rights over tenanted land,
* Author
498                                                        [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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       without resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of
       such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that these terms
       effectively allow the appellant, as well as the private respondents,
       to use an agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes – The
       compromise sought by the parties is nothing but an abuse of the
       process of law – The so called compromise or agreement is a ploy to
       defeat the provisions of law and therefore it has been rightly denied
       the legal sanctity which was sought. [Paras 14, 19]

                                List of Acts
       Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964; Code of
       Comunidades; Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991.

                             List of Keywords
       Compromise proceedings; Tenancy rights; Consent terms;
       Bifurcation of land; Freehold ownership; Land use; Agricultural
       land; Non-agricultural; Abuse of the process of law.

                            Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9470 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2024 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in WP No. 194 of 2024

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Ninad Laud, Deepak Gaonkar, Rohan
       Sharma, Guruprasad Naik, Dcosta Ivo Manuel Simon.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Abhay Anil Anturkar, Dhruv Tank, Aniruddha Awalgaonkar, Sarthak
       Mehrotra, Ms. Surbhi Kapoor, Bhagwant Deshpande, Ms. Subhi
       Pastor.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1.     Delay of 146 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is condoned.
       Leave granted.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                              499

                   Communidade of Tivim, Tivim, Bardez Goa v.
                            State of Goa & Ors.

2.    The appellant before this court is a ‘Communidade’1 or an agricultural
      association of villagers that has properties in common and the income
      derived from these properties accrues in favour of its members. The
      system is peculiar to Goa and is based on the concept of collective
      village ownership, which was originally called as the ‘Gaunkari
      System’ and the village communities owning the land collectively
      were known as ‘gaunkaria’ which ultimately came to be termed as
      ‘communidades’ during the Portuguese colonisation of Goa.
3.    Under challenge before us in this Appeal is the judgment dated
      06.08.2024 by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant, stood
      dismissed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.
4.    The High Court while doing so has upheld the order dated 13.04.2023
      by which the Administrative Tribunal, Goa has refused to grant
      permission to the Appellant to compromise proceedings instituted
      by the private respondents herein (respondent Nos. 3 to 11) under
      the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter
      ‘Tenancy Act, 1964’).
5.    At the outset, it is necessary to mention here at this stage that
      the administration of Comunidades is governed by the Code of
      Comunidades (hereinafter ‘the Code’). Article 154 (3) of the Code
      empowers the Administrative Tribunal to grant permission to the
      Communidade to compromise terms in any suit to which the
      Communidade is a party.
6.    The facts which have led to filing of the Writ Petition before the High
      Court can be summarised as under:
      a)      Two properties (hereinafter ‘Suit Properties’) belonging to the
              appellant, known as “Oiteil-De-Madel” bearing Survey No. 448/0
              & “Levelechy Aradi” bearing Survey No. 440/0 are situated in
              the village of Tivim in the taluka of Bardez in Goa and were
              leased to the predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents
              by the appellant, in July, 1978.
      b)      A civil suit was filed by the predecessor of the private respondents
              praying that his name be entered in the Tenants column in
              the Survey numbers which correspond to the two properties
              mentioned above. This suit was decreed on 08.01.1986 &


1    Portugese translation of the English word ‘Community’.
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            consequently, the name of the predecessor of the private
            respondents was entered as tenant of the two properties. Since
            no appeal was preferred against the decree passed by the Trial
            Court, the same attained finality. Thereafter, predecessor of
            the private respondents herein passed away on 01.02.2015.
       c)   On 08.12.2016, the private respondents herein filed Tenancy
            Application No. 71/2016 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division
            (B-Court), Bicholim (hereinafter ‘Trial Court’) for declaration
            of Tenancy under Section 7 of the Tenancy Act, 1964. Despite
            service of notice to the appellant by the Trial Court, no
            appearance was entered on its behalf, which led to the case
            being proceeded ex-parte against the appellant.
       d)   Vide Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2017, Trial Court allowed
            the Tenancy Application, consequently declaring the private
            respondents as agricultural tenants of the Suit Properties.
            Aggrieved by the declaration of tenancy, the appellant preferred
            Tenancy Appeal before the Ad-hoc District Judge-I at Mapusa,
            Goa (hereinafter ‘Appellate Court’).
       e)   The above-mentioned appeal remains pending before the
            Appellate Court till date. All the same, during pendency of
            the Tenancy Appeal, an Extraordinary General Body Meeting
            of the appellant was held on 14.03.2021, in which members
            of the appellant deliberated upon the Tenancy Appeal and
            also considered the fact that if the appeal fails, they stand
            to lose a major chunk of land held by the Communidade. It
            is at this meeting that the Communidade resolved that as a
            compromise, the land in dispute could be bifurcated into a
            60:40 sharing ratio, with 60% of the land being allotted to
            the private respondents and 40% of the land to be retained
            by the communidade.
       f)   Pursuant to the above, Managing Committee of the Communidade
            had further deliberations and finally, a General Body Meeting
            was convened on 31.10.2021 wherein consent terms were
            finalised and agreed upon. All the same, before filing these
            consent terms before the Appellate Court, permission was
            needed from the Administrative Tribunal in terms of Article
            154 (3) of the Code. Accordingly, on 22.02.2023, respondent
            No. 2 herein i.e., Administrator of Communidades forwarded
            the consent terms to the Administrative Tribunal for approval.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                        501

              Communidade of Tivim, Tivim, Bardez Goa v.
                       State of Goa & Ors.

     g)    As stated earlier, by an Order dated 13.04.2023, such permission
           was denied by the Administrative Tribunal and this Order of
           the Administrative Tribunal was assailed by the Communidade
           before the High Court by way of a Writ Petition.
7.   The short question that arose for consideration before the High Court,
     which will also be before this Court is whether the Administrative
     Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant the appellant, permission
     to compromise proceedings with the private respondents in terms of
     Article 154 (3) of the Code? The High Court as we know has already
     held that this permission could not have been granted under law.
8.   We have heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned counsel for the appellant
     who submits that the Administrative Tribunal has erred in refusing to
     grant permission to the Communidade, and as such, the High Court
     ought not to have upheld the Administrative Tribunal’s decision. He
     contends that the best interests of the appellant and its members
     have to be considered and both the High Court as well as the
     Administrative Tribunal have failed to take into consideration the fact
     that the appellant had finalised consent terms, keeping in mind its
     best interest and in the absence of such terms, the suit properties
     would have to be regarded as ‘tenanted land’ which is allotted to
     the private respondents herein, which would in turn be contrary to
     the appellant’s best interests.
9.   It is Mr. Ahmadi’s second argument that the Code itself by virtue of
     Article 30 (4) (g) empowers the Communidade to deliberate upon,
     the withdrawal and compromise of civil suits and this aspect of the
     matter was completely ignored by the High Court.
10. For the respondent no. 1-State of Goa and respondent no. 2, we
    have heard learned counsel Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, who supports
    the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and submits that the same
    warranted no interference by the High Court and hence, there is no
    infirmity with the order impugned. Learned counsel would argue that
    the consent terms sought to be entered into between the appellant
    and the private respondents is nothing but an attempt to bypass and
    negate the provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as well as the
    Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 (hereinafter ‘Land Use Act’).
11. In this regard, the learned Counsel has referred to Clauses i), iii),
    v), x) and xi) of the consent terms, which essentially confer to the
    private respondents ‘all rights and interests, which rights shall be
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       akin to full ownership rights’ over 60% of the land and reciprocally,
       the appellant is to have ‘exclusive rights free from any tenancy claim’
       over 40% of land. Additionally, these clauses also stipulate that the
       private respondents can use and utilise 60% of the land ‘for any
       purpose whatsoever’ in lieu of which the appellant is also entitled to
       use its share of 40% of land ‘in the manner deemed fit and proper.’
12. It is therefore the respondent-State’s contention that the proposed
    consent terms effectively accord freehold ownership rights over the
    land in question to both the parties and also allows them to use
    the land for non-agricultural purposes, which is in blatant violation
    of statutory provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as well as the
    Land Use Act.
13. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and having perused
    the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the
    Administrative Tribunal has rightly refused to grant permission to
    the consent terms finalised by the appellant. A bare perusal of the
    same indicates that it is nothing but an attempt to circumvent the
    statutory framework laid down in Tenancy Act and also violates the
    Land Use Act.
14. We are in complete agreement with the Administrative Tribunal, Goa
    which has refused to accord its permission to the filing of the consent
    terms. What weighed in with the Tribunal is the fact that these terms
    effectively wipe out tenancy rights of the private respondents which
    was declared by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and
    by the proposed compromise, the parties have agreed that in lieu
    of the 60:40 bifurcation of land between them, the judgment dated
    01.09.2017 stands set aside. This prompted the Tribunal to observe
    that instead of testing the correctness of judgment dated 01.09.2017
    on merits before the appellate court, the parties intend to set aside
    the judgment by way of compromise.
15. Moreover, the Tribunal also expressed its dismay at the fact that these
    consent terms have the effect of bypassing the Tenancy Act, since
    it confers full ownership rights to the private respondents who have
    been declared as tenants and any compromise which is contrary to
    a statute cannot be entered into by the appellant.
16. Section 9 of the Tenancy Act lists down the modes of termination
    of tenancy and specifies that tenancy can only be terminated via
    three modes. The first is when the tenant himself surrenders his
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                            503

              Communidade of Tivim, Tivim, Bardez Goa v.
                       State of Goa & Ors.

     right of tenancy to the landlord in the manner contained in Section
     10. Similarly, in the second situation, the landlord may terminate the
     tenancy, but only on the basis of the specific grounds contained in
     Section 11. Lastly, Section 9 (c) provides for termination under any
     other specific provision of the Tenancy Act. It is abundantly clear that
     by means of the proposed compromise, the parties have essentially
     terminated the tenancy, without recourse to any of the modes referred
     to in Section 9 of the Act.
17. We shall now refer to Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act which is titled
    “Special rights and privileges of tenants.” Section 18A in this chapter
    provides that every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from
    his landlord, the land held by him as a tenant on the tillers’ day,
    subject to other provisions of the Act. This chapter then lays out the
    procedure to be followed. Section 18C provides for the Mamlatdar
    to first issue public notice to the tenants who are deemed to have
    purchased the lands as well as the landlords of such lands and
    other interested persons. The purchase price payable by a tenant
    to the landlord is then indicated in the Table contained in Section
    18D. We must also take note of the fact that Section 18K of the
    Tenancy Act prohibits a tenant who has purchased the land from
    transferring the land without the Mamlatdar’s prior permission. If
    the proposed consent terms are to be allowed, not only would the
    tenant be conferred full ownership rights, in complete disregard of
    the procedure for purchase mentioned above, but it would also mean
    that the tenant would be conferred a right to alienate land, without
    seeking permission of any statutory authority.
18. It is also important to take note of the fact that even after a tenant has
    purchased the land in question after complying with the procedure
    contemplated under Chapter IIA, he is barred from using the land
    for any purpose other than agriculture, as per Section 2 of the Land
    Use Act, which reads as under:
           “2. Regulation of use of land.— Notwithstanding anything
           contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country
           Planning Act, 1974 (Act 21 of 1975), or in any plan or scheme
           made thereunder, or in the Goa Land Revenue Code, 1968
           (Act 9 of 1969), no land which is vested in a tenant under the
           provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy
           Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) shall be used or allowed to be
           used for any purpose other than agriculture.”
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19. A bare reading of the aforementioned provisions is enough to come
    to the conclusion that the proposed consent terms or the compromise
    sought to be entered by the appellant with the private respondents
    falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the Tenancy Act and the Land Use
    Act, insofar as it creates freehold ownership rights over tenanted land,
    without resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of
    such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that these terms
    effectively allow the appellant, as well as the private respondents, to
    use an agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. In other words,
    the compromise not only circumvents procedural aspects contained
    in Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act but also allows the parties to use
    the suit properties for a purpose which is expressly barred by the
    Land Use Act. The compromise sought by the parties is nothing
    but an abuse of the process of law. The so called compromise or
    agreement is a ploy to defeat the provisions of law and therefore it
    has been rightly denied the legal sanctity which was sought.
20. As regards the submission of the learned counsel relating to Art. 30
    (4) (g) of the Code, it is to be noted that the said provision merely
    empowers a Communidade to deliberate upon terms of compromise,
    which upon finalisation, has to be forwarded to the Administrative
    Tribunal. By no stretch of imagination can this provision be construed
    to mean that it confers an unfettered power on the Communidade to
    enter into a compromise, without the Tribunal’s sanction.
21. Hence, we see absolutely no reason to interfere with the order dated
    06.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.
22. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed. Pending application(s),
    if any, shall stand disposed of.
23. All the same, we deem it necessary to clarify that we have expressed
    no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the dispute between the
    appellant and private respondents as regard the claim of Tenancy.
    The Tenancy Appeal filed by the appellant before the Appellate Court
    shall be decided on its own merits, in accordance with law.

       Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan