Supreme Court of India
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABADversusM/S URMIN PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 951
- Decided
- 20 October 2023
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- S RAVINDRA BHAT
Holding
The Revenue was justified in invoking Section 11A where the assessee deliberately mis‑classified the product, the burden of proof for re‑classification lies on the Revenue, specific tariff entries prevail over general ones, and the authority under Rule 6 can determine classification and issue notices under Section 11A.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a series of appeals concerning the classification of tobacco products as either ‘chewing tobacco’ (CET SH 2403 9910) or ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ (CET SH 2403 9930) and the consequent duty liability under the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Revenue argued that the assessee deliberately re‑classified its product to obtain a lower MRP‑based duty by invoking the proviso to Section 11A, while the assessee contended that there was no wilful misstatement and that the burden of proof lay on the Revenue. The Court held that a specific tariff entry prevails over a general one, the burden of proof for re‑classification rests on the Revenue, and the authority under Rule 6 of the CTPM Rules may determine the correct classification and issue notices under Section 11A when wilful suppression is proved. Accordingly, the Court allowed the Revenue’s appeals in several groups, set aside the tribunal’s findings, and dismissed the remaining appeals, also remitting one matter for fresh adjudication.
Issues considered
- The product should be classified under CET SH 2403 9910 or CET SH 2403 9930?
- Whether the Revenue was justified in invoking the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act?
- Who bears the burden of proof for a change in classification of the product?
- Whether a declaration under Rule 6 of the CTPM Rules precludes the Revenue from issuing a notice under Section 11A or 11AC?
- Whether the specific tariff entry overrides a general entry in classification?
Legislation cited
Subjects
classificationcentral exciseSection 11Achewing tobaccozarda scented tobaccomisclassificationburden of prooftax evasionCTPM RulesMRP based assessment
Judgment
[2023] 13 S.C.R. 573 : 2023 INSC 951
CASE DETAILS
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD
v.
M/S URMIN PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 10159-10161 of 2010)
OCTOBER 20, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issues for consideration:
The primary dispute in the present seven groups of appeals revolved
around classification of the product in question keeping in view two
competing Central Excise Tariff Sub-Headings / entries i.e. under CET SH
2403 9910 as ‘chewing tobacco’ or under CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’. Ancillary issues related to invoking of the proviso
to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and declaration made r.6 of
the ‘Chewing Tobacco’ and Unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machines
(Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010 (CTPM
Rules).
Central Excise Tax, 1944 – s.11A, proviso – Invoking extended
period of limitation – Deliberate intention to avoid payment of duty by
the assessee by misclassification and willful misstatement of its product
– Adjudicating Authority therefore justified in invoking the extended
period as provided in the proviso to s.11A(1).
Held: Notification No.2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 was issued in
supersession of Notification No.13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 specifying
thereunder the goods covered under Section 4A of Act 1944 for MRP-
based assessment. The notification did not specify the goods falling under
CET SH 2403 9930 (‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’) but covered the goods
falling under CET SH 2403 9910 (‘chewing tobacco’). Since the ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ was not specified under MRP-based assessment
under Section 4A of CE Act, the goods had to be assessed under Section 4
of the CE Act. The abatement provided to the goods classified under CET
573
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
SH 2403 9910 was 50 percent. Hence, if the goods are cleared as ‘chewing
tobacco’ the duty has to be paid on lower value resulting in payment of a
35 lesser amount of duty, as the value determined under Section 4A after 50
percent abatement was much lesser compared to transactional value under
Section 4 of CE Act. It is for this precise reason the assessee changed the
classification from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to ‘chewing tobacco’.
‘Zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was brought into the ambit of Section 4A of
the CE Act (MRP-based assessment), by virtue of amendment to Notification
No.2 of 2006 vide Notification No.16 of 2006 dated 11.07.2006. In other
words, ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was not specified for assessment under
Section 4A of CE Act for the period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006. In the light
of the same, the Revenue was correct and justified in issuing the show cause
notice. Though one of the contentions raised by the assessee was that they
had filed a letter on 30.03.2006 to the Department clearly showing the change
in the classification by the assessee, however, the letter dated 30.03.2006
had been cleverly drafted and it does not mention in detail the product which
they were manufacturing at that material time namely ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’. It is this hiding of the fact and not specifying the details in their
letter that led to the issuance of the show cause notice and invocation of
Section 11A and Section 11 AC of the CE Act, by the Department. It cannot
be ignored that till filing of the letter dated 30.03.2006, the assessee itself was
classifying the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ falling under CET
SH 2403 9930 and being a large-scale manufacturer and paying large sums
of amount as duty, to contend that it was unaware of the difference between
these two products, or to contend that it had classified the product as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ by ignorance, is not a plausible justification on part of
the assessee. However, on the issuance of Notification No.2 of 2006 dated
01.03.2006 under which ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was excluded or in
other words not included in the said notification, the assessee changed the
description of its product from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to ‘chewing
tobacco’. The date of communication of the letter dated 30.03.2006 by the
assessee also acquires significance in as much as the Notification No.2 of
2006 dated 01.03.2006 were to take effect from 01.04.2006, just two days
later. The intention was to evade payment of duty payable under Section 4
of CE Act; despite knowing the fact that its product was not covered under
relevant notification which provides for valuation under Section 4A, yet
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. 575
M/S URMIN PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS
the assessee did so, only to pay duty on lower value as per Section 4A of
CE Act, by claiming the product manufactured by it as ‘chewing tobacco’
rather than ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to avail benefit of MRP-based
assessment which was lower than the value as prescribed under Section 4
of the CE Act. The Adjudicating Authority was of the clear view that there
has been a deliberate intention to avoid payment of duty by the assessee
by misclassification and willful misstatement of its product and hence it
was justified in invoking the extended period as provided in the proviso to
Section 11A(1) of CE Act, 1944. [Paras 40, 41, 42 and 43]
Central Excise Tax, 1944 – ss. 4 and 4A - Classification – Two
competing entries – ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’- Product manufactured and cleared by the assessee for the
period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006 to be classified under the Central Excise
Tariff Sub-Heading( CET SH) 2403 9910 as ‘chewing tobacco’ or under
CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco.
Held: The principle of admission is the best proof that can be applied
to conclude that the assessee itself had classified the product as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ based on the declaration in ER-I returns for April
2006 and onwards – The assessee itself right from the beginning has been
consistently declaring the product manufactured by it as ‘chewing tobacco’
till the 8-digit regime in 2005 (w.e.f. 24.02.2005) sub-classified the entries
as ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ – In the ER-I returns
filed from March 2005 till April 2006 i.e., after the sub-classification, the
assessee mentioned the description of the product as ‘zarda scented tobacco’
and from April 2006 reclassified it as ‘chewing tobacco’ –Notification No.
2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 was issued in supersession of Notification 13
of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 specifying the goods covered under Section
4A of the CE Act, for MRP based assessment – The said notification did
not specify the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9930, i.e., ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’, but it covers the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9910
i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’ – Thus ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ not having been
specified under MRPbased assessment u/s. 4A of the CE Act, the goods had
to be necessarily assessed u/s. 4 of the CE Act – The assessee being aware
that there being no change in the nature of the products, its ingredients and
also the manufacturing process had changed and misclassified the product
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
as ‘chewing tobacco’ from ‘zarda/jarda scented’ tobacco – Had the assessee
continued its classification as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’, the duty payable
as per transaction value u/s. 4 of the CE Act would have been much more
than the determination u/s. 4A of CE Act after 50 % abatement – It is for
this precise reason for avoiding and evading payment of the higher duty, the
classification was deliberately changed from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
to ‘chewing tobacco’. [Paras 44, 46 and 47]
Interpretation of Statutes – Entry in Fiscal Statute – Specific entry
vis-a-vis General entry:
Held: It is trite law that when specific entry is found in a fiscal statute,
the same would prevail over any general entry – If there are two or more sub-
headings, the heading which provides the most specific description will have
to be preferred to a heading providing a more general description. [Para 49]
Tax/ Taxation – Central Excise – Chargeability – Classification
- Burden/Onus of Proof- For change in classification of the product –
Lies on whom:
Held: It is settled law that the onus/burden of proof for change in
classification of the product lies on the Department, particularly when
it wishes to challenge a long-accepted classification – Classification is a
question relating to “chargeability” –Insofar as chargeability is concerned,
the burden of proof lies on the Revenue and not on the assessee. [Paras 68
and 70]
Central Excise – ‘Chewing Tobacco’ and Unmanufactured Tobacco
Packing Machines (Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty)
Rules, 2010 (CTPM Rules) – r.6 – Purpose of declaration filed under
Rule 6 of CTPM Rules – Parameters to be examined, determined, and
adjudicated under Rule 6 – Such declaration, if having any nexus to
classification of the product – Whether on account of classification by
such declaration, would preclude the Department from issuing a Notice
under Section 11A or 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1944.
Held: (1) What is the purpose of the declaration filed under Rule 6
of CTPM Rules? ANSWER: To ascertain the details of the product to be
manufactured and the nature of the product for purposes of fixing the packing
capacity of the machine and determine the duty. (2) What are the parameters
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. 577
M/S URMIN PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS
which are required to be examined, determined, and adjudicated under Rule
6 by the Prescribed Authority? ANSWER: To inquire and determine the
correctness of the details furnished under the declaration, namely, Form
No.1. (3) Whether the Competent Authority have the power and jurisdiction
to determine the classification or specific entry within which the declared
product is to be classified? OR Whether the issue of classification of a
product can be the subject matter of adjudication/decision under Rule 6(2)
of CTPM Rules? ANSWER: Yes. (4) Whether a declaration made under
Rule 6 has any nexus to the classification of the product? ANSWER: Yes,
for the purpose of determining the packing capacity and corresponding
duty. (5) Whether on account of classification by such declaration, would
preclude the Department from issuing a Notice under Section 11A or 11AC
of CE Act, 1944? ANSWER: No, if there is improper or misdeclaration or
improper declaration. [Para 109]
Central Excise – Classification – Common parlance test continues
to be one of the determinative tests for the classification of a product.
[Para 120]
Words and Phrases – ‘suppression’- Meaning of – Discussed .
[Para 42]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
CCE v. Cotspun (1999) 7 SCC 633 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 184;
Continental Foundation Jt. Venture v. Commissioner of Central Excise
(2007) 10 SCC 337 : [2007] 9 SCR 554; Westinghouse Saxby Farmer Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta, (2021) 5 SCC 586 : [2021]
3 SCR 622; A. Nagaraju Bros. v. State of A.P., (1994) 3 Supp SCC 122:
[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 784; HPL Chemicals Limited v. CCE, Chandigarh:
(2006) 5 SCC 208 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 125; CCE v. Damnet Chemicals
Private Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 490 : [2007] 9 SCR 813; CCE v. Srivallabh Glass
Works Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 341; Commissioner of Central Excise v. Shri
Baidyanath Ayurved chewing tobacco (2009) 12 SCC 419 : [2009] 5 SCR
879; W.P.I.L. v. CCE Meerut 2005 (181) ELT 359; HPL Chemicals Limited
v. CCE Chandigarh. 2006 (197) ELT 324 (SC); Mauri Yeast India Private
Limited v. State of UP. 2008 (225) ELT 321 (SC); CCE, Nagpur v. Shree
Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ayurved chewing tobacco. 2009 (237) ELT
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
225 (SC); ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner (2019) 17 SCC 46; HPL Chemicals Ltd.
v. CCE, Chandigarh 2006 (197) ELT 324 [SC]; Mauri Yeast India Pvt. Ltd.
v. State of U.P. 2008 (225) ELT 321 [SC]; Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union
of India (2023) 3 SCC 1; Hindustan Poles Corpn. v. CCE (2006) 4 SCC
85 : [2006] 3 SCR 461; Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019)
4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; CCE Nagpur v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved
Bhawan 2009 (237) ELT 225 [SC]; Mathuram v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC
667 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 195; CC v. Dilip Kumar and Company (2018) 9
SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 1191; Indo International Industries v. CGST (1981)
2 SCC 528 : [1981] 3 SCR 294; Damodar J. Malpani v. CCE (2004) 12
SCC 70; Yogesh Associates v. CCE, Surat-II (2005)(188) ELT 251 (SC);
Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, New Delhi 2005 (188) ELT 251; Dharam Pal
Satyapal v. CCE New Delhi [2005] (183) ELT 241 (SC); Union of India
vs. Delhi Cloth and General Mills [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 586; Collector of
Central Excise, Kanpur vs. Krishna Carbon Paper Co. (1989) 1 SCC 150:
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 12; Coastal Paper Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central
Excise, Vishakhapatnam (2015) 10 SCC 664 : [2015] 8 SCR 486 and Parle
Agro Pvt. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Trivandrum (2017) 7
SCC 540 : [2017] 5 SCR 30 - referred to.
Prabhat Zarda Factory v. Commr. Of Central Excise [2004 (163) ELT
485 (Tri-Delhi) – referred to.
Mishra Zarda Traders v. State of Orissa 1987 SCC Online 363-
referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10159-
10161 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.03.2010 of the Customs Excise
& Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench, Ahmedabad in Appeal
No. E/426, 427 and 428 of 2008.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6519 of 2023, 2469 of 2020, 6521, 6522, 6523-24
of 2023, 959 of 2019, 6538-42, 6531-37, 6525, 6526, 6527, 6528, 6529,
6530 of 2023, 5146 of 2015 and 3596 of 2023.
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 579
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS
Appearances:
S K Bagaria, Vivek Kohli, Sr. Advs., B. Krishna Prasad,
Ms. Sheena Taqui, Ms. Akansha Saini, Ajit K Sinha, Shiv Vinayak Gupta,
Mrs. Bina Gupta, Mrs. Nisha Bagchi, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Shetty
Uday Kumar Sagar, Ms. Aakansha Kaul, S.K. Singhania, H.R. Rao, Ajay
Choudhary, Kavin Gulati, Aditya Bhattacharya, Bhanu Gupta, Kishan Datta,
A.R. Madhav Rao, A. Mukunda Rao, Siddhant Buxy, M.P. Vinod, Sunil
Tyagi, Ashwani Sharma, Nalin Talwar, Sandeep Buraria, Archit Upadhayay,
Ms. Bhavya Bhatia, Kumar Ajit Singh, Rupesh Kumar, Aditya Kumar, Ms.
Pankhuri Shrivastava, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Aryaman Sharma, Dr. Seema
Jain, Vimlesh Kumar, A.K. Jain, Advs. for the appearing parties.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. Delay condoned on 23.08.2023.
2. These appeals are divided into seven (7) groups for convenience, and
facts of each group are enumerated under the respective groups whereunder
questions or points for determination have been formulated and analysed
thereunder. For the purpose of convenience, the details of the judgment
with reference to each group and details thereof are enumerated hereinbelow
in the following table no. 1:
TABLE 1
GROUP CONTENT – DETAILS PAGE NUMBER
NUMBER.
FROM TO
1. Commissioner Of Central Excise Ahmedabad v. M/S
Urmin Products and Ors. [ C. A. No. 10159 – 10161 of
2010]
i. Brief Facts 17 20
ii. Submissions of Parties 20 29
iii. Discussion and Finding 29 49
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
2. Commissioner Of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. M/S.
Flakes-N-Flavourz [ C. A. 5146 of 2015]
i. Brief Facts 50 51
ii. Submissions of Parties 51 55
iii. Discussion and Findings 56 72
3. Commissioner Of Central Goods and Service Tax Excise
and Customs Bhopal v. Kaipan Masala Pvt. Ltd. [ Diary
No. 44912 of 2019; Diary No. 6888 of 2020]
i. Brief Facts 73 78
ii. Submissions of Parties 78 81
iii. Discussion and Findings 81 86
4. M/S Dharampal Premchand Ltd. V. Commissioner of
Central Excise [ C.A. No. 2469 of 2020 along with Diary
No. (s) 3492, 3487, 2810, 3484, 3513, 3536, 3544, 3545,
3547 of 2020.]
i. Brief Facts 86 90
ii. Submissions of Parties 90 94
iii. Discussion and Findings 95 116
5. Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax v. M/S
Tej Ram Dharam Paul [C.A. No. 3596 of 2023]
i. Brief Facts 116 119
ii. Submissions of Parties 119 121
iii. Discussion and Findings 121 125
6. Commissioner Of Central Excise and Service Tax Meerut
V. M/S Som Pan Products Pvt. Ltd. [D.No.14581 of 2019]
i. Brief Facts 126 127
ii. Submissions of Parties 127 129
iii. Discussion and Findings 129 130
7. Commissioner of Central Excise & ST Alwar v. Tara
Chand Naresh Chand [C.A. No.959 of 2019]
i. Brief Facts 131 133
ii. Submissions of Parties 133 137
iii. Discuss and Findings 137 142
ORDER Page 143-144
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 581
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
3. On behalf of the Revenue in the various groups of matters before
this Court, we have heard: - (1) Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned Additional
Solicitor General of India, (2) Ms. Nisha Bagchi, learned standing counsel.
4. On behalf of the assessee, we have heard: - (1) Mr. S.K. Bagaria
and Mr. Vivek Kohli, learned Senior Counsel, (2) Mr. A.R. Madhav Rao,
Mr. Rupesh Kumar and Ms. Seema Jain, learned counsel.
5. The Appellants in Group No. (s) 1,2,3,5,6 and 7, and the Respondents
in Group No.4, namely the ‘Commissioner of Central Excise’ are hereinafter
referred to as “Revenue”. The Appellants in Group No.4 and the respective
respondents in Group No. (s) 1,2,3,5,6 and 7, are hereinafter referred to as
“Assessee” for the sake of convenience and brevity.
6. For ease of reference, the following table no. 2 of nomenclatures/
abbreviations is made available below.
TABLE 2
Sr. No. Nomenclature/ Particulars / Meaning
Abbreviation
1. “BIS” Bureau of Indian Standards
2. “CBIC” Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs
3. “CETA” Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985
4. “CE ACT’ Central Excise Act, 1944
5. “CET SH” Central Excise Tariff Sub-Heading
6. “CESTAT” Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate
Tribunal
7. “CTPM” Chewing Tobacco and Unmanufactured
Tobacco Packing Machines (Capacity
Determination and Collection of Duty)
Rules, 2010
8. “CRCL” Central Revenue Control Laboratory
9. “OIA” Order-In-Appeal
10. “OIO” Order-In-Original
11. “CT” Chewing Tobacco
12. “ZST” Zarda/Jarda Scented Tobacco
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
7. The learned advocates appearing for the parties have placed reliance
and referred to various statutory provisions, relevant chapters of CE Act,
CETA, CE Rules, CTPM Rules, and various relevant notifications/circulars
issued from time to time by the respective departments/ministry. For clarity
and ease of reference we have catalogued the same herein in table no.3
below:
TABLE 3
I. TARIFF AND NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO THE PERIOD
2005-2006 ISSUED UNDER CE ACT
1. Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tariff in 2004-05 (6 Digit Code).
2. Notification No. 13/2002 – CE (NT) dated 01.03.2002 under Section
4A prescribing abatement from MRP for arriving at assessable value.
3. Notification 10/2003 – CE (NT) dated 01.03.2003 under Section 4A
prescribing abatement of 50% for all goods under 2404.41.
4. Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tariff in 2005-06 (8 Digit Code)
5. Circular 808/05/2005- CX dated 25.02.2005 in regard to introduction
of 8-digit tariff from 6-digit tariff in vogue earlier.
6. Notification 2/2006 – CE (NT) dated 01.03.2006 under Section 4A.
7. Notification 16/2006 – CE (NT) dated 11.07.2006 under Section 4A.
II. TARIFF AND NOTIFICATIONS BETWEEN THE YEARS
2010-2015 ISSUED UNDER THE CE ACT
1. Notification: 10/2010- C.E. (N.T.) dated 27-Feb-2010 notifying
Unmanufactured Tobacco and Chewing Tobacco under Section 3A.
2. Chewing Tobacco and Unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machines
(Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010
Notification: 11/2010-C.E. (N.T.) dated 27-Feb-2010
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 583
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
3. Notification: 16/2010 – CE. Dated 27.02.2010 prescribing rate for
branded unmanufactured tobacco and chewing tobacco.
4. Notification: 16/2010 – CE. Dated 27.02.2010 prescribing rate for
branded unmanufactured tobacco and chewing tobacco.
5. Notification: 17/2010 – CE (NT) dated 13.04.2010- Notifies Jarda
scented tobacco under Section 3A.
6. Notification 18/2010 – CE (NT) dated 13.04.2010 – Prescribing
the capacity deemed to have been produced for chewing tobacco
(including Filter Khaini), Unmanufactured Tobacco and Jarda Scented
Tobacco.
7. Notification: 19/2010- C.E. dated 13.04.2010 – prescribing the rate
for Chewing Tobacco, Unmanufactured Tobacco and Filter Khaini.
8. Notification: 14/2012 – CE Dated 14.03.2012 prescribing the new rate
for Chewing Tobacco, Unmanufactured Tobacco and Filter Khaini.
9. Notification: 2/2014 – C.E. dated 24.01.2014 – prescribing the new
rate for Chewing Tobacco, Unmanufactured Tobacco and Filter
Khaini.
10. Notification: 17/2014 – C.E. dated 11.07.2014 – Prescribing the new
rate for chewing tobacco, unmanufactured tobacco and filter khaini.
8. It would be apt and appropriate to extract Section 11A as it stood in
1980, and as it stood after the amendment brought in 2000 and by Act 10
of 2000 (w.e.f. 17.11.1980) and subsequent substitution by Act 8 of 2011,
as it would have a direct bearing on the various batch of appeals before us.
They read as under:
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
1980 2000 2011
Section 11A. Section 11A. 2
Section ' 11.
&erroneously
refunded, whether or for any
not such non-levy or reason, other than
non-payment, short- the reason of fraud
levy or short payment or collusion or any
! or erroneous refund, wilful misstatement or
as the case may be, suppression of facts or
was on the basis of any contravention of any
approval, acceptance of the provisions of
or assessment relating this Act or of the rules
to the rate of duty made thereunder
on or valuation of with intent to evade
" ! excisable goods under payment of duty,-
any other provisions (a) the Central Excise
of this Act or the rules Officer shall, within
# $ made thereunder], a [two years] from the
% Central Excise Officer relevant date, serve
may, within one year notice on the person
from the relevant date, chargeable with the
serve notice on the duty which has not been
person chargeable with so levied or paid
the
1 Substituted by Act 10 of 2000, sec. 97(a), for “erroneously refunded” (w.e.f.
17.11.1980)
2 Subs. By Act 8 of 2011
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 585
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
duty which has not been
levied or paid or which
has been short- lev- " !
ied or short- paid or to
whom the refund has
erroneously been made, #
requiring him to show ,
cause why he should
' not pay the amount
specified in the notice:
Provided that where
any duty of exercise
! has not been levied
or paid or has been
( ) )** short-levied or short-
+ paid or erroneously
+ + # refunded by reason of
+ fraud, collusion or any
wilful misstatement or
suppression of facts, or
contravention of any of
the provisions of this
Act or of the rules made
thereunder with intent
to evade payment of
duty, by such person or
his agent, the provisions
of this sub-section shall
have effect, as if for the
words [one year], the
words “five years” were
substituted.
Explanation. - Where
the service of the notice
is stayed by an order of
a Court, the period of
such stay
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
shall be excluded in
computing the aforesaid
period of [one year] or
five years, as the case
may be.
[(1A) When any duty
of excise has not
been levied or paid
or has been short-
levied or short paid or
erroneously refunded,
by reason of fraud,
collusion or any
wilful misstatement or
suppression of facts, or
contravention of any of
the provisions of this
Act or the rules made
thereunder with intent
to evade payment of
duty, by such person
or his agent, to whom
a notice is served
under the proviso to
sub-section (1) by the
Central Excise Officer,
may pay duty in full
or in part as may be
accepted by him, and
the interest payable
thereon under section
11AB and penalty equal
to twenty-five per cent
of the duty specified in
the notice or the duty so
accepted by such person
within thirty days of the
receipt of the notice.]
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 587
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
9. The detailed discussion of the relevant provisions, rules, notifications,
and circulars and its applicability or otherwise, have been deliberated upon
while analysing the facts under each of the group.
A PRELUDE TO THE LIS
10. We deem it necessary to briefly state the history of classification of
these two competing entries which have been the pivotal issue in all these
groups of appeals before this Court, i.e., CET SH 2403 9910 (‘chewing
tobacco’) and CET SH 2403 9930 (‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’)
11. At the outset, it may be noticed that the expressions ‘chewing
tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ are nowhere defined under the
CE ACT or CETA. CETA initially covered ‘tobacco’ in item No.9 to the
schedule. Entry 9(II) was country tobacco and sub-clause (2) thereof read
“if intended for sale as chewing tobacco, whether manufactured or merely
cured.” In 1983, ‘tobacco’ was covered under Item 4 of the Schedule of
the CE Act. The relevant entry being Entry 4 II (5) which covered ‘chewing
tobacco’. In 1985, the CETA was enacted and ‘Chewing tobacco’ was shown
under Entry 4 II (4). The Finance Act,1987, inserted “CET SH 2404.39”
with effect from 01.03.1987. The heading included the following:
“Chewing tobacco including preparations commonly known as Khara
Masala, Kiwam, Dokta, Zarda, Sukha and Surti”.
Thus, for the first time ‘Zarda’ was recognized separately as
preparation.
12. In 1996-97, CET SH 2404.40 was reformulated to read “chewing
tobacco and preparations containing chewing tobacco”.
13. In 2002, under Section 4A of the CE Act, Notification No. 13/2002 –
CE (NT) dated 01.03.2002 was issued prescribing abatement as percentage of
retail sale price. However, it is to be noticed that Notification No.13/2002 had
not covered ‘Chewing Tobacco’ reflecting under the relevant Entry 2404.21,
within its ambit of ‘notified goods’ for the purposes of availing benefits under
Section 4A. However, subsequently by Notification No.10/2003 – CE (NT)
dated 01.03.2003 was issued introducing Entry 24A in Notification 13/2002
dated 1.03.2002, thereby covering all goods under entry 2404.41 within
the ambit of ‘notified goods’ for the purposes of Section 4A of the CE Act.
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
14. Prior to the introduction of the 8-digit tariff classification, ‘chewing
tobacco’ was reflected under Chapter 24, under specific entry ‘2404.41’ of
the six-digit Central Excise Tariff classification. Subsequently the new 8-digit
Central Excise Tariff classification was introduced vide Circular 808/05/2005
-CX dated 25.02.2005, Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tarriff came to be
amended and heading ‘2403’ was introduced which reads:
“2403 – Other manufactured tobacco and manufactured tobacco
substitutes; ‘Homogenised’ or ‘Reconstituted’ tobacco; Tobacco
extracts and essences”.
The Central Excise Tariff Heading ‘2403’ included the following
sub-headings:
“2403 9910 chewing tobacco
2403 9920 preparations containing chewing tobacco.
2403 9930 zarda/jarda scented tobacco.”
15. On 01.03.2006, Notification No.2/2006 was issued, vide which
Notification No.13/2002 dated 01.03.2002 was superseded. Thus, the list of
products, with their respective chapter headings/sub-headings, which were
to be covered under the assessment in terms of Section 4A of the CE Act,
were notified in terms of the eight-digit tariff classification. However, it is
pertinent to note that said Notification No.2/2006 did not include ‘Jarda/
Zarda scented tobacco – CET SH 2403 9930’ within the scope of ‘notified
goods’ under Section 4A of the CE Act, for availing the benefits of abatement
as percentage of retail sale price.
16. Subsequently, Notification No.16 of 2006 dated 11.07.2006 was
issued, wherein CET SH 2403 9930 came to be included within Notification
No.2/2006 dated 01.03.2006, thereby including ‘jarda/ zarda scented
tobacco’ within the scope of ‘notified goods’ under Section 4A of CE Act.
17. It is relevant to note at this juncture, the period between 1.03.2006
and 11.07.2006, during which the benefits of MRP-based assessment
was not available to goods classified under CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘jarda/
zarda scented tobacco’ is the very same period of dispute which has to
be adjudicated in the appeals in Group I (Urmin Products) and Group II
(Flakes-n-flavourz).
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 589
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
18. In light of the evolution of classification of ‘chewing tobacco’
and ‘jarda/zarda scented tobacco’ having been discussed hereinabove,
we proceed to address the issues/questions formulated within the various
appeals before us. At the outset, it must be mentioned that the findings and
conclusions arrived at will pertain to the issues formulated and adjudicated
in light of the facts relevant to those groups, and hence, the findings are
mutually exclusive to the facts of each group.
I. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AHMEDABAD
V. M/S URMIN PRODUCTS AND ORS. [ C. A. NO. 10159 –
10161 OF 2010]
BRIEF FACTS
19. In these appeals, the Revenue has challenged the order dated
25.03.2010 passed by the jurisdictional CESTAT whereunder the
classification given by the assessee was accepted as “flavoured chewing
tobacco” falling under CET SH 2403 9910 and not as ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ falling under CET SH 2403 9930 of CETA.
20. The assessee came to be visited with a show cause notice dated
09.07.2007 stating thereunder that the assessee had been manufacturing
and clearing the product manufactured by it as ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ under the guise of ‘chewing tobacco.’ During the visit to the
assessee’s factory by the Department’s officers, they noticed the process
of manufacturing ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco.’ The statement of the
production manager and also the statement of the factory in charge came
to be recorded, based on which the Department concluded that there was a
deliberate intention to evade payment of duty by misclassification and wilful
misstatement of their product to enable them to pay lesser duty. Accordingly,
by invoking the extended period of limitation as provided under proviso to
Section 11A(1) CE Act, the Department called upon the assessee to show
cause as to why the product which had been classified as ‘chewing tobacco’
should not be classified as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and why the said
product should not be accordingly assessed to duty as per Section 4 of the
CE Act, for the period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006. Further, the assessee was
required to show cause as to why the penalty as a consequence of wilful
misclassification should not be recovered. The said show cause notice came
to be adjudicated and the show cause notice including the demand made
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
thereunder, was upheld in OIO dated 28.01.2008. This OIO was challenged
and an appeal came to be filed before the CESTAT which came to be allowed
and the stand taken by the assessee was upheld by opining as under:
“21. On the other hand, the department has not produced any evidence
to show that the product is Tobacco Scented with Zarda. In fact, the
learned SDR relied upon the process of manufacture in adjudication
order. However, the process of manufacture given in the adjudication
order in Para 2 is the manufacturing process as noticed by the officers
when they visited the factory premises. This is a flowchart prepared
by the officers after their visit. However, when we have a look at the
statement of the Production Manager Shri Ramesh Narsinghbhai
Patel in the flow chart, the Zarda Scented Tobacco in the process
of manufacture is missing. Zarda Scented Tobacco figures in the
manufacturing flow chart given by Shri Dipak Suryakant Shah only.
Further, it was also brought to our notice that during the period
from 19.01.05 to 20.08.05, the appellants had described the product
in the classification list as Chewing Tobacco and from 1.3.05, to
31.3.06, it was classified as Zarda Scented Tobacco and from 1.4.06
onwards, the classification description was Chewing Tobacco which
continues till today. In the invoice/bills prepared by the appellant,
the item was described as Zafrani Zarda and from 1.4.06, it is being
called as Baghban Flavoured Chewing Tobacco. It is not the case
of the department or the party that there was change in the label or
manufacturing process. From the description in the label, it is quite
clear that the product is called Flavoured Chewing Tobacco. No
expert opinion or information from the trade have been obtained
and it is only the statement of factory manager that the product is
usually eaten with Pan, Betel nut or Pan Masala etc. Department has
come to the conclusion that the product is not Chewing Tobacco.
Further, as submitted by the appellant, nowhere in the statement of
the employees, it has been stated that Zarda Scent was added. Under
these circumstances, in view of the above discussion, neither side has
been able to show whether the product is Chewing Tobacco or Zarda
Scented Tobacco clearly. Both sides have some points in their favour
and some against them. Under these circumstances, in view of the
fact that the label calls the product as Flavoured Chewing Tobacco,
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 591
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
no Zarda Scent has been used and the product has not been sold as
Zarda Scented Tobacco by the appellant, we consider that the claim
of the appellant that the product is Flavoured Chewing Tobacco has
to be accepted. Thus, on merit, the appellants succeed. Therefore, the
demand for differential duty fails and naturally the penalties imposed
under Section 11AC of Central Excise Act or rules of Central Excise
Rules, 2002 also have to be set aside.”
21. The issue of limitation was also held in favour of the assessee by
opining as under:
“22. In any case, we consider that the limitation would apply in this
case and show cause notice should not have been issued beyond one
year in view of the fact that the appellant intimated their intention to
change. Further, the appellant had also intimated that the proposed
change was not in line with industrial factory. Therefore, extended
period also could not have been applied in this case.”
22. Hence these appeals.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
23. We have heard Shri N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the Revenue, and Ms. Nisha Bagchi, appearing for
the Revenue.
24. It is the contention of the Revenue that Notification No.2 of 2006
dated 01.03.2006 was issued in supersession of Notification No.13 of 2002
dated 01.03.2002 specifying thereunder that the goods covered under Section
4A of CE Act 1944 was for MRP-based assessment and it did not specify
the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9930 that is ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’, but it covers the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9910 that is
‘chewing tobacco’. It was contended that as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
was not specified under MRP-based assessment under Section 4A, the goods
have to be assessed under Section 4 of the CE Act. Shri Venkataraman,
Learned Additional Solicitor General and Shrimati Nisha Bagchi have
contended that the assessee changed and misclassified the product from
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ i.e., CET SH 2403 9930 to ‘chewing tobacco’
i.e., CET SH 2403 9910 with an intention to evade payment of duty under
Section 4 of the CE Act, 1944 despite there being no change in the nature
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
of the products. It is contended that the assessee despite being aware of the
fact that their product was not covered under relevant notification which
provides for valuation under Section 4A of CE Act, had continued to avail
the benefit of Section 4A of CE Act till 11.07.2006. It is contended by the
Revenue, that abatement provided to the goods classifiable under CET SH
2403 9910 i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’ was 50 percent, therefore if the goods
are cleared as ‘chewing tobacco’ the duty has to be paid on lower value,
resulting in payment of such amount of duty as the value determined under
Section 4A of CE Act, after 50 percent abatement, which was much less
as compared to transaction value under Section 4 of CE Act. It is further
contended by the Revenue that ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was brought
into the ambit of Section 4A of CE Act, by amendment to Notification
No.16 dated 11.07.2006 and thus the product ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
was not specified for assessment under Section 4A of the CE Act, for the
period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006. Hence, the Revenue sought to justify the
demand of duty short paid by the assessee by invoking the proviso under
Section 11A (1), along with interest, at the appropriate rate under Section
11AB of the Act 1944.
25. The learned Senior counsel for the Revenue would further elaborate
his submissions by contending that the assessee has not shown any proof of
record for concluding that ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ is also ‘chewing
tobacco’. By contending that this tariff classification was in force during the
period of the board’s letter dated 23.06.1987, notice dated 15.07.1987, and
the notification dated 16.03.1995 and as such they would not come to the
rescue of the assessee. It is also urged that the tariff has been aligned to 8
digits and more specifically calculation has been provided where ‘chewing
tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ have been separately classified
and as such the contention of the assessee has no legs to stand.
26. The Revenue would further contend that the assessee is selling its
product as “zafrani zarda” and as such it cannot claim ‘zarda/jarda’ used
in the tariff heading is different from ‘zarda/jarda’ used by assessee and
further, the assessee has not been able to demonstrate how its product is
different from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ mentioned in the tariff. The
Revenue would also contend that once the product is sold as ‘zarda/jarda’,
which is specifically covered under CET SH 2403 9930, it cannot claim that
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 593
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
the said product would fall CET SH 2403 9910 as ‘chewing tobacco’. The
Revenue has drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that assessee earlier
classified the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’, and there being no
change in classification of the product, to pay duty at lesser value would
be without any justification. They would also contend that the tribunal has
committed a serious error in ignoring the statement of the persons who were
in charge of the factory and the statement of the factory manager which was
relied upon by the department to substantiate as to how the assessee had
been manufacturing the product, and the process, and there being no change
in the manufacturing process, or any new plant and machinery having been
installed in their unit. The standing counsel for the Revenue, would also
contend that during 2005-06 the assessee themselves described the product
as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and suddenly from April 06, 2006, started
describing their product as ‘chewing tobacco’ classifiable under CET SH
2403 9910 to avail the benefit of Notification No.2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006.
It was also contended that when two or more headings are available, the
product should be classified under the more specific heading according to
the description of the product and in the instant group it would fall under
CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’.
27. The Revenue also contended that tribunal in paragraph 21 of the
impugned order having held that “both sides have some points in their
favour and some against them” failed to elaborate or assign the reasons for
extending the benefit of Section 4A to assessee and on this ground alone the
impugned order is liable to be set aside.
28. The Revenue would also contend that tribunal committed a
serious error in concluding that show cause notice should have been issued
within one year period as the assessee intimated their intention to change
the classification and contended that the assessee has not mentioned any
details of the products which they were manufacturing at that material
time but had only forwarded a cryptic communication, lacking details and
bereft of material particulars, namely the intention of changing the heading
and classification of the product which was being manufactured by them
and no evidence for reasons of change was forthcoming from the said
communication, and as such the assessee cannot take umbrage under the said
communication to stave-off its liability or, to contend that extended period
of limitation cannot be applied as the department knew about such change.
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
29. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent – asseessee
by supporting impugned order passed by the tribunal would contend that
intention of the Revenue/Government was to levy duty on the product
manufactured by the appellant-assessee under Section 4A of CE Act only. He
would submit that the product manufactured by the assessee was classified
under CET SH No.2404.41 as ‘chewing tobacco’ and duty was assessed
under Section 4A of CE Act on MRP basis and accordingly duty was paid.
He would contend that with introduction of the 8 (eight) digit tariff era,
assessee classified its product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ under CET
SH 2403 9930 for the period 01.03.2005 to 28.02.2006. At this juncture,
he would hasten to add that in accordance with the policy on taxation on
‘tobacco production’, the duty assessment regime remained constant i.e.,
under Section 4A of CE Act on MRP basis only. He would contend that
Notification No.2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 which was issued superseding
Notification No.13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 under the list of notified goods
with the respective Chapter heading/sub-heading, would cover assessment
in terms of Section 4A of the CE Act. Though notified, by oversight ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ under CET SH was omitted, he would contend that
taxation of ‘tobacco products’ remains constant i.e., under Section 4A of
CE Act on MRP basis. In this background he would contend that throughout
the respondent-assessee has classified its product as ‘chewing tobacco’ with
the knowledge and acceptance of the Department.
30. He would also contend that the extended period of limitation could
not have been invoked in the background of assessee having intimated the
Department about the change in classification in advance and there was no
suppression of fact or mis-declaration.
31. He would also contend that assessment under Section 4 of the CE
Act in terms of the transaction value of the product, the price charged and
recovered by the assessee would necessarily have to be treated as cum-
duty-price and assessment ought to be done and when such an exercise is
undertaken the differential duty would be insignificant.
32. He would contend that the product manufactured by the assessee
is only ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’, which
expressions are not defined under the Act and no explanation is provided on
what products could possibly have been covered under the heading ‘zarda/
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 595
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
jarda scented tobacco’, or what is the scope of that heading. In that view of
the matter, he would contend that the ‘Common Trade Parlance Test’ as has
been enunciated by this Court will have to be applied and tested. He would
also further contend that classification is a question relating to chargeability
and, therefore, the burden of proof lies on the Department, for which no
evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the Department to justify the
change. It is his submission that any change in the classification has to be
based on something more than just change in tariff entry. Even otherwise,
if classification is possible under two entries, the one more beneficial to the
assessee would be adopted. Hence, relying upon the following judgments
he prays for dismissal of the appeal filed by the Revenue:
1. HPL Chemical Ltd. v. CCE 2006 197 ELT Chandigarh 324 (SC)
2. Mauri Yeast India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2008) 5 SCC 680
3.C.G. & S.T. CCE and ST Rohtak v. Som Flavours Masala Pvt. Ltd.
- Civil Appeal No.1251 of 2023 disposed of on 17.02.2023.
4. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Shree Baidyanath
Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 419.
ISSUES/QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
33. Questions that arise for our consideration in this group are
as under:
Q.1 Whether the authorities below were correct and justified in
invoking the proviso to Section 11A of the CE Act?
Q.2 Whether the product manufactured and cleared by the assessee
for the period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006 was required to be classified
under the CET SH 2403 9910 as ‘chewing tobacco’ or to be classified
under CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’?
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
BACKGROUND
34. The assessee herein was availing the benefit of the Notification
No. 13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002, issued in exercise of the power under
Section 4A of CE Act, whereunder the goods/products were chargeable
to a duty of excise with reference to value, notwithstanding anything
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
contained in Section 4 of CE Act, to be deemed to be the retail sale
price declared on such goods, else such amount of abatement, if any,
from such retail sale price by classifying the product manufactured as
‘chewing tobacco’.
35. Undisputedly, the assessee was availing the benefit of
Notification No.13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 and adopting MRP-based
assessment. Even after the introduction of 8-digit tariff classification
(w.e.f. 28.02.2005), the assessee was availing the same benefit. However,
in the teeth of two classifications made under Notification dated
24.02.2005, re-organizing the CET SH 2403 9910 as ‘chewing tobacco’
and CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’, which attracted
duty of 34% on both the products at the time, the assessee classified
or re-classified the product manufactured and hitherto declared as
‘chewing tobacco’ to ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. Notification No.2
of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 issued in supersession of Notification No.13
of 2002 excluded ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and did not specify
CET SH 2403 9930 for MRP-based assessment, or in other words did
not include or did not specify ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ for MRP-
based assessment. Hence, the assessee started classifying the product
manufactured as ‘chewing tobacco’ though he had declared earlier as
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. Thus, by virtue of such deletion/omission
in light of Notification No.13 of 2002, the assessment was required to
be made under Section 4 which provides for the valuation of excisable
goods for purposes of charging of duty of excise. In other words, the
benefits that were flowing from the operation of Section 4A having
been excluded by virtue of the Notification dated 01.03.2006, the
assessee reverted to ‘chewing tobacco’ to avail the benefit of Section 4A.
In the light of the analysis of these notifications vis-à-vis the statutory
provisions of the levy of duty or chargeability, it would not detain us
for long to answer the questions formulated hereinabove.
RE: Q. No. 1 Issue of Limitation/ Section 11A of the CE Act:
36. In the instant case i.e., Civil Appeal Nos.10159-10161 of 2010
-CCE Ahmedabad vs. M/s Urmin Products Pvt. Ltd. the show cause
notice came to be issued on 09.07.2007 and the OIO came to be passed
on 28.01.2008 which resulted in the impugned order dated 25.03.2010.
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 597
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
37. The tribunal by the impugned order has held to the following effect:
“22. In any case, we consider that the limitation would apply in this case
and show cause notice should not have been issued beyond one year in
view of the fact that the appellant intimated their intention to change.
Further, the appellant had also intimated that the proposed change was
not in line with the industrial factory. Therefore, the extended period
also could not have been applied in this case.”
38. It would be apt to note at this juncture itself that the judgment of
this Court in CCE Vs. Cotspun (1999) 7 SCC 633, whereunder, it came
to be held that levy of excise duty based on an approved classification list
is not a short levy and differential duty cannot be recovered on the ground
that it is a short levy. It was further held that levy of excise duty based on an
approved classification list is the correct levy, at least until the correctness
of the approval is questioned by the issuance of a show cause notice to the
assessee. It is only when the correctness of the approval is challenged that
an approved classification list ceases to be such.
It was further held:
“14. The levy of excise duty on the basis of an approved classification
list is the correct levy, at least until such time as to the correctness of the
approval is questioned by the issuance to the assessee of a show-cause
notice. It is only when the correctness of the approval is challenged
that an approved classification list ceases to be such.
15. The levy of excise duty on the basis of an approved classification
list is not a short levy. Differential duty cannot be recovered on the
ground that it is a short levy. Rule 10 has then no application.
16. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment in Ballarpur
Industries which did not advert to Rule 173-B, does not lay down the
law correctly and it is overruled. The decision in Rainbow Industries,
on the other hand, correctly lays down the law. It was delivered in
the context of Rule 173-C dealing with approved price lists and the
provisions of Rules 173-C and 173-B are analogous.”
39. However, the said finding in Cotspun’s case would not merit
acceptance for the simple reason that the amendment to Section 11A of
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
CE Act, brought by Act 10 of 2000, would clearly take within its sweep,
that even if there is non-levy or non-payment, short levy or short payment,
or erroneous refund, as the case may be, on the basis of any approval,
acceptance or assessment relating to the rate of duty or on valuation of
excisable goods under any other provisions of the CE Act or the rules made
thereunder, the Central Excise Officer can, within one year from the relevant
date, serve a notice on the person chargeable with duty which has not been
levied or unpaid or which has been short levied or short paid or to whom
the refund has been erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause
why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice.
40. Notification No.2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 was issued in
supersession of Notification No.13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 specifying
thereunder the goods covered under Section 4A of Act 1944 for MRP-
based assessment. It was noticed that the notification did not specify the
goods falling under CET SH 2403 9930 (‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’) but
covered the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9910 (‘chewing tobacco’).
Since the ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was not specified under MRP-based
assessment under Section 4A of CE Act, the goods had to be assessed under
Section 4 of the CE Act. The abatement provided to the goods classified
under CET SH 2403 9910 was 50 percent. Hence, if the goods are cleared
as ‘chewing tobacco’ the duty has to be paid on lower value resulting
in payment of a lesser amount of duty, as the value determined under
Section 4A after 50 percent abatement was much lesser compared
to transactional value under Section 4 of CE Act. It is for this precise
reason the assessee changed the classification from ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ to ‘chewing tobacco’. ‘Zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was brought
into the ambit of Section 4A of the CE Act (MRP-based assessment), by
virtue of amendment to Notification No.2 of 2006 vide Notification No.16
of 2006 dated 11.07.2006. In other words, ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
was not specified for assessment under Section 4A of CE Act for the period
01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are
of the considered view the contention of the assessee cannot be accepted
and the Revenue was correct and justified in issuing the show cause notice.
41. One of the contentions raised by the assessee throughout has been
that they had filed a letter on 30.03.2006 clearly showing the change in the
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 599
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
classification by the assessee and the reasons for the change were shown
in the statement as well as their letter dated 25.06.2007 and there was no
suppression. In fact, the adjudicating authority has extracted the contents of
the letter dated 30.03.2006 in paragraph 13.1 of the OIO dated 28.01.2008.
However, for immediate reference and at the cost of repetition it is extracted
herein below:
“This is to inform you that as per the practice followed by our industry,
we classified our product; chewing tobacco into CETSH 2403 9910.”
42. It is an admitted fact that till the filing of this letter, the assessee
continued to classify the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ falling
under CET SH 2403 9930. It is for this precise reason, that the adjudicating
authority has observed, and rightly so that the letter dated 30.03.2006 had
been cleverly drafted and it does not mention in detail the product which
they were manufacturing at that material time namely ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’. Though the classification in the letter shows entry CET SH 2403
9910 (‘chewing tobacco’), it would depict a picture as though it is a new
product. A plain reading of the letter would not indicate that the author of
the said letter intended to reveal any details about the product that is being
manufactured. However, the assessee cannot feign ignorance as to the
necessity of furnishing such relevant details necessary for determination of
payment of duty. The assessee having been in this industry for a long period
was well aware of this statutory requirement. Upon a deeper examination
of the said letter, the suppression becomes more apparent, namely the non-
mentioning of change of the name and classification of the goods which
they were currently manufacturing and which they ought to have disclosed.
It would be apposite to note the judgment of this court in Continental
Foundation Jt. Venture v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2007) 10 SCC
337 that suppression means failure to disclose full information with intent
to evade payment of duty. It has been further held:
“12. The expression “suppression” has been used in the proviso to
Section 11A of the Act accompanied by very strong words as ‘fraud’ or
“collusion” and, therefore, has to be construed strictly. Mere omission
to give correct information is not suppression of facts unless it was
deliberate to stop the payment of duty. Suppression means failure to
disclose full information with the intent to evade payment of duty.
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
When the facts are known to both the parties, omission by one party
to do what he might have done would not render it suppression. When
the revenue invokes the extended period of limitation under Section
11A the burden is cast upon it to prove suppression of fact. An incorrect
statement cannot be equated with a wilful misstatement. The latter
implies making of an incorrect statement with the knowledge that the
statement was not correct.
14. As far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that
the intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as
misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly
qualified by the word ‘wilful’, preceding the words “ misstatement or
suppression of facts” which means with intent to evade duty. The next
set of words ‘contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or Rules’
are again qualified by the immediately following words ‘with intent
to evade payment of duty.’ Therefore, there cannot be suppression
or misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet constitute a
permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11A.
Misstatement of fact must be wilful.”
It is this hiding of the fact and not specifying the details in their letter
that led to the issuance of the show cause notice and invocation of Section
11A and Section 11 AC of the CE Act, by the Department. It cannot be
ignored that till filing of the letter dated 30.03.2006, the assessee itself was
classifying the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ falling under CET
SH 2403 9930 and being a large-scale manufacturer and paying large sums
of amount as duty, to contend that it was unaware of the difference between
these two products, or to contend that it had classified the product as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ by ignorance, is not a plausible justification on part
of the assessee. However, on the issuance of Notification No.2 of 2006 dated
01.03.2006 under which ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was excluded or in
other words not included in the said notification, the assessee changed the
description of its product from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to ‘chewing
tobacco’. The date of communication of the letter dated 30.03.2006 by the
assessee also acquires significance in as much as the Notification No.2 of
2006 dated 01.03.2006 were to take effect from 01.04.2006 and just two days
before the date of the said Notification No.2 of 2006 coming into effect, this
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 601
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
communication dated 30.03.2006 has been forwarded to the Department by
the assessee. The intention of springing up such a letter is evident from the
fact that intention was to evade payment of duty payable under Section 4
of CE Act; despite knowing the fact that its product was not covered under
relevant notification which provides for valuation under Section 4A, yet
the assessee did so, only to pay duty on lower value as per Section 4A of
CE Act, by claiming the product manufactured by it as ‘chewing tobacco’
rather than ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to avail benefit of MRP-based
assessment which was lower than the value as prescribed under Section 4
of the CE Act.
43. Yet another factor which cannot go unnoticed is the statement of the
production manager and factory in-charge and manager recorded at the time
of the inspection of the units/factory of the assessee, whereunder they have
clearly admitted in their statement dated 21.06.2007 recorded under Section
14 of the CE Act, wherein they confirmed that in the E.R. 1 returns filed for
the month of April 2006 onwards, they have revised the classification of their
final product from CET SH 2403 9930 to CET SH 2403 9910 and started
describing their product as ‘chewing tobacco’ instead of ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ and by virtue of such declaration they continued to pay duty as per
MRP-based assessment under the relevant Notification No.2 of 2006 dated
01.03.2006 though ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was not covered under
MRP-based assessment during the period 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006 till the
tariff entry i.e., CET SH 2403 9930 being brought within the ambit of Section
4A of CE Act by issuance of Notification 16 of 2006 dated 11.07.2006. It is
for this precise reason that the act of the assessee was held to be a deliberate
and accordingly wilful misstatement was alleged on part of the assessee,
with an intention to evade duty payable under Section 4 of the CE Act,
which would attract the extended period of limitation, namely proviso to
Section 11A (1) being invoked. The adjudicating authority has examined
the issue of invoking an extended period of limitation, in the background
of the communication dated 30.03.2006 which has been very heavily relied
upon by the assessee to stave off the allegation of misrepresentation or
wilful misstatement of facts and the adjudicating authority opined as under:
“It can be seen that the assessee had very cleverly drafted the letter
and did not mention any details of the product which they were
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
manufacturing at that material time i.e.,’Jarda scented tobacco’. On
reading this letter, any person could conclude that they have started
a new product ‘Chewing tobacco’ which they have classified in
2403 9910 as it is the, correct subheading of Chewing tobacco. On a
plain reading of the letter, at the first instance, no one will be able to
understand the real motive. The assessee did not mention in the letter
that they are changing the name and classification of the goods which
are currently being manufactured by them which they were supposed
to do. Had they mentioned this fact at that time, the issue would not
have arisen at all. Intentionally, they have hidden the facts and did
not elaborate in the letter. The assessee, on the contrary preferred to
show the reasons in the statement recorded under Section 4 on 26-6-
2006 when the department caught him for evading the duty. Further,
the assessee has mentioned that as per the practice followed by their
industry, they classify their product Chewing tobacco into 2403 9910.
The classification of the goods manufactured by an assessee is based on
many factors including the raw material used, manufacturing process
and the end use. If any of the deciding factors is changed then the
classification may change and therefore the industry cannot decide the
classification in such type of goods. The assessee intentionally hid the
fact that they have changed the classification of their product viz. ‘Jarda
scented tobacco’. It is an establish fact that when there is no dispute
on classification and the assessee suddenly submits a very carefully
drafted letter of such type, a general inference will be drawn that a
new product has been introduced in place of earlier one. The assessee,
with intent to evade the Central Excise duty, deliberately resorted to
mis-statement and willfully suppressed the vital facts. The assessee had
changed and misclassified the product from ‘Jarda scented tobacco’ to
‘Chewing tobacco’ with an intention to evade payment of duty payable
under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, despite knowing the
fact that their product was not covered under the relevant Notification
which provides for valuation under Section 4A. The assessee did so to
enable them to pay duty on lower value [as the value as per Section 4A
of Central Excise Act, 1944 (MRP based assessment) was lower than
the value as per Section 4 of Central Excise Act, 1944. Thus, there
was a deliberate intention to evade payment of duty by the assessee,
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 603
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
by misclassification and willful mis-statement of their product and due
to this act, the department is entitled to invoke the extended period as
provided in the proviso to Section 11A (1) of the Central Excise Act,
1944 to recover the differential duty along with interest under section 11
AB for the larger period upto 5 years and has also rendered themselves
liable to penalty under section 11 AC of the Central Excise Act 1944.
I, accordingly hold that the assessee is liable to penalty under Section
11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944.”
However, the tribunal has proceeded to hold that limitation would
apply and show cause notice should not have been issued beyond one year
in view of the fact that the assessee intimated their intention to change – vide
Paragraph 22 of the impugned order, without addressing the aforesaid issues
which has been dealt in detail hereinabove. In other words, the tribunal by
cryptic order has negatived the contentions of the Revenue and held that
the invocation of the extended period of limitation was not warranted. This
finding, not being in consonance with the facts obtained on the hand, we are
unable to subscribe our views to the judgment of the tribunal. In that view
of the matter, we are of the considered view that Question No.1 is to be
answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue and affirm the
finding of the adjudicating authority and reverse and/or set aside the finding
recorded by the tribunal which has been observed at the initial stage herein
given that it is not only contrary to the facts but also contrary to law as noticed
hereinabove. It is for these precise reasons the Adjudicating Authority was
of the clear view that there has been a deliberate intention to avoid payment
of duty by the assessee by misclassification and willful misstatement of
its product and hence it was justified in invoking the extended period as
provided in the proviso to Section 11A(1) of CE Act, 1944.
RE: Q.2 – WHETHER ASSESSEE’S CLASSIFICATION FOR
THE PERIOD IN DISPUTE IS TO BE ACCEPTED?
44. In the instant case the principle of admission is the best proof
that can be applied to conclude that the assessee itself had classified the
product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ based on the declaration in ER-I
returns for April 2006 and onwards. On advent of 8-digit era under the
CETA, ‘chewing tobacco’ was classified under CET SH 2403 9910, and
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ came to be separately classified under CET
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
SH 2403 9930 from 01.03.2005 despite such classification, the notification
issued in respect of goods to be assessed on the basis on MRP continued
to show the tariff heading and the goods covered under ‘chewing tobacco’
head as 2404.41. When Notification No.2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 came to
be issued and it reflected under Serial No.28 that all goods classified under
entry SH 2403 9910 to 2403 9920 were covered for MRP assessment and
the product ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was not included under said entry,
it necessarily meant that ‘zarda scented tobacco’ could not be determined
under MRP assessment scheme.
45. The signatory to the ER – 1 returns filed by the assessee for the
relevant period was Smt. Sheetal K Majithia, Director – Finance and she was
the one who took the decision to change the classification of the product.
Hence, she was issued with the summons for appearing and explaining the
same. However, she chose to ignore the summons and has not appeared before
the adjudicating authority. Whereas, the factory in-charge and manager, Shri
Dipak S Shah, has appeared and has furnished the statement, whereunder
he admits that he reports to Smt. Sheetal K Majithia, Director – Finance.
He further admits in his statement dated 26.06.2007 and 09.07.2007, that
their/assessee’s product is classifiable as ‘jarda/zarda scented tobacco,’ they
still continued to pay duty as per MRP-based assessment prescribed under
Section 4A of the CE Act. He further admits at the material time 2005-06,
the product manufactured by them was described as ‘jarda/zarda scented
tobacco’ and was known and sold in the market as ‘jarda/zarda scented
tobacco’, which was also described in their invoices accordingly. He has
categorically admitted in his statement that from April 2006 onwards the
assessee started describing their product as ‘chewing tobacco’ for availing
the benefit of Notification of 2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006, which undisputedly
did not continue to reflect ‘jarda/zarda scented tobacco’. In this background,
when the communication dated 30.03.2006 to the Department intimating
the change of classification is perused, it would indicate the details of
the products which was being manufactured was not specified in the said
communication at all. In that view of the matter, the communication relied
upon by the assessee would pale into insignificance. `
46. The label of the product manufactured by the appellant is “Baghban
Zafrani Zarda” and below the label it is indicated as “flavoured chewing
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 605
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
tobacco.” It has been the consistent stand of the assessee that the expression
“zarda/jarda” in the tariff entry is different from the term “zarda/jarda”
used by the appellant. It is nobody’s case that there was a change in the
label or manufacturing process from the six (6) digit era to the eight (8)
digit tariff era. The tribunal itself seems to have been in dilemma and has
been swayed by the fact that no expert opinion had been obtained by the
Department for classification. This situation would not arise at all for reasons
more than one, firstly, the assessee itself right from the beginning has been
consistently declaring the product manufactured by it as ‘chewing tobacco’
till the 8-digit regime in 2005 (w.e.f. 24.02.2005) sub-classified the entries
as ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. In the ER-I returns
filed from March 2005 till April 2006 i.e., after the sub-classification, the
assessee mentioned the description of the product as ‘zarda scented tobacco’
and from April 2006 reclassified it as ‘chewing tobacco’.
47. At the cost of repetition it requires to be noticed that the Notification
No. 2 of 2006 dated 01.03.2006 was issued in supersession of Notification
13 of 2002 dated 01.03.2002 specifying the goods covered under Section
4A of the CE Act, for MRP based assessment. The said notification did
not specify the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9930, i.e., ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’, but it covers the goods falling under CET SH 2403 9910
i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’. Thus zarda/jarda scented tobacco not having been
specified under MRP-based assessment under Section 4A of the CE Act,
the goods had to be necessarily assessed under Section 4 of the CE Act.
The assessee being aware that there being no change in the nature of the
products, its ingredients and also the manufacturing process had changed and
misclassified the product as ‘chewing tobacco’ from ‘zarda/jarda scented’
tobacco. Had the assessee continued its classification as ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’, the duty payable as per transaction value under Section 4 of the
CE Act would have been much more than the determination under Section
4A of CE Act after 50 % abatement. It is for this precise reason for avoiding
and evading payment of the higher duty, the classification was deliberately
changed from ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ to ‘chewing tobacco’.
48.The reliance placed by the assessee on Board’s letter dated
23.06.1987, trade notice dated 15.07.1997 and Notification dated 16.03.1995,
would have no impact or bearing on the facts of the present case/group, since
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
they were issued during the era of 6-digit tariff classification being imposed.
As noticed by us above, the tariff entry having been realigned to 8 digits
and there being a specific sub-heading being provided and two competing
products namely – ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
having been separately classified, the aforesaid circular/notifications relied
upon by the assessee would not come to rescue of the assessee.
49. It is trite law that when specific entry is found in a fiscal statute,
the same would prevail over any general entry. If there are two or more
sub-headings, the heading which provides the most specific description
will have to be preferred to a heading providing a more general description.
In the light of the aforestated discussion we are of the considered
view that classification of the product as adjudicated by the authority
deserves to be accepted and finding recorded by the tribunal deserves
to be set aside and consequently allow these appeals. Thus, both the
points formulated hereinabove in this group is answered in favour of
the Revenue and against the asessee.
II. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHANDIGARH
V. M/S. FLAKES-N-FLAVOURZ [ C. A. 5146/2015]
50. In the instant group, the Revenue is in appeal assailing the
order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal
(CESTAT), New Delhi dated 20.02.2014 by the jurisdictional tribunal.
BRIEF FACTS
51. The respondent-assessee is the manufacturer of zarda, pan chatni
and scented supari falling under the category of excisable goods under the
CETA, and was clearing its product ‘Gopal Zarda’ under CET SH 2403 9910
as ‘chewing tobacco’ and paid excise duty based on retail sale price under
section 4A of the CE Act, (hereinafter to referred as “CE Act”). During the
audit, it was found that the assessee’s product merits classification under
CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘Zarda/Jarda scented Tobacco’. On redetermination of
value under section 4 of the CE Act it was found that the assessee has short-
paid excise duty by Rs. 4,28,65,508/- and accordingly, a show cause notice
came to be issued under section 11A of the CE Act. The Commissioner of
Central Excise, in his OIO dated 02.04.2008 confirmed the demand of duty,
interest, penalty and held that the product manufactured by the respondent-
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 607
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
assessee falls under CET SH 2403 9930 as ‘Zarda/Jarda scented tobacco’
by concluding that assessment has to be made under section 4 of the CE Act.
An appeal was preferred against the said order before the CESTAT which
came to be allowed and the OIO dated 02.04.2008 was set aside.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
52. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties.
53. Ms. Nisha Bagchi learned counsel appearing for the Department
has supported the OIO dated 02.04.2008 while contending that the tribunal
committed an error in setting aside the said findings and in holding that the
product in question was classifiable as ‘chewing tobacco’ under CET SH
2403 9910 and rejecting the stand of the department that same should be
classified as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ under CET SH 2403 9930. She
would contend that the tribunal erred in relying upon its findings recorded in
M/s Urmin Products Private Limited which undisputedly is under challenge
before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 10159-161 of 2010 (Group I) and as such
it ought not to have relied upon the said judgment. She would also contend
that the tribunal erred in not considering the fact on 15.02.2007 Shri Manoj
Gupta, partner of the appellant, he has admitted that perfumery compounds
are added to the raw tobacco and as such product is to be classified under CET
SH 2403 9930 as ‘Zarda/Jarda scented tobacco’ and not ‘chewing tobacco’.
54. She would contend that prior to CETA (Amendment), 2004 came
into force on 28.02.2005, ‘chewing tobacco’ and its preparations were covered
under chapter 2404.41 and after the amendment the said chapter heading
was classified into three separate tariff items within the chapter heading
2404 namely, ‘chewing tobacco’, preparations containing ‘chewing tobacco’
and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and would contend all these three items
were earlier classified collectively under chapter heading 2404.41 and the
classification as it exists today clearly suggests that ‘chewing tobacco’ is not
scented/flavoured/perfumed tobacco and both the disputed items fall under
different and distinct classes of products. She would also submit that the
assessee themselves admit that their product is ‘zarda/jarda’ and even the
packed pouches bear printed description of their contents as ‘Gopal Zarda’.
Reiterating the contentions raised, grounds urged and pleas put forward Civil
Appeal No. 10159-161 of 2010 (M/s Urmin Products Private Limited), she
prays for allowing this appeal.
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
55. Per contra, Mr. Vivek Kohli, learned senior counsel, appearing
for the respondent has reiterated the contentions raised and grounds urged
before the tribunal. He would contend that throughout the period before
dispute, during the disputed period and even after the disputed period, the
product manufactured by the assessee was classified as ‘chewing tobacco/
flavoured chewing tobacco’. Even the ER-1 returns and weekly online
returns filed by the assessee classifying the product as ‘chewing tobacco’
were accepted by the Revenue without any objection. He would contend that
even after introduction of 8-digit tariff for full one year i.e., from 1.03.2005
to 28.02.2006, the assessee classified its product under tariff entry number
2403 9910 and discharged its tax liability under Section 4A of CE Act, which
was accepted with full knowledge by the Revenue and raising objection
during audit of the unit for the period 1.03.2006 to 11.07.2006 is possibility
of higher Revenue during this period is due to (a) technical oversight by the
Revenue itself which was later corrected and, (b) the alternate assessment on
transaction value rather than MRP based assessment. He would contend that
when classification of the product is accepted earlier and for the subsequent
period, same cannot be classified differently. There being no definition of
the competing products, the application of the common parlance test is to
be adopted and when so adopted the only conclusion that has to be drawn is
that product is to be construed as ‘chewing tobacco’, as declared in invoices
and understood by distribution chain of dealers, stockists, retailers and
consumers. He would submit that burden of proof lies on the Revenue as
classification is a question relating to chargeability and the same having not
been discharged by adducing any evidence whatsoever the classification as
done by the adjudicating authority has been right set-aside by the tribunal.
56. He would submit that the Revenue is seeking to impose
classification wherein the word ‘perfumery’ to impart flavour to ‘chewing
tobacco’ has the basis and the fact remains the very same process is adopted
since decades. Based on uncorroborated statement the classification cannot
be done. To conclude he would contend that as opined that this court in
W.P.I.L. v. CCE Meerut – 2005 (181) ELT 359 has opined that during
transition phases inadvertent mistakes have to be interpreted/ understood
in the light of or in the context of policy prevailing in respect of the product
and the policy then existing was to tax tobacco products under Section 4 A
of the CE Act – MRP based assessment, it is only logical that classification
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 609
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
declared by the assessee and declared by the department prevail. Hence, he
prays for dismissal of the appeal by relying upon the following judgments.
i. HPL Chemicals Limited v. CCE Chandigarh. 2006 (197) ELT 324
(SC)
ii. Mauri Yeast India Private Limited v. State of UP. 2008 (225) ELT
321 (SC)
iii. C.G. and S.T. CCE and S.T., Rohtak v. Som Flavour Masala Private
Limited
iv. CCE, Nagpur v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan. 2009 (237)
ELT 225 (SC)
v. W.P.I.L. Limited v. CCE, Meerut. 2005 (181) ELT 359 SC.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
57. The period involved in the present appeal pertains to 01.03.2006
to 10.07.2006. During the audit of the accounts of the assessee, the
department noticed that the assessee was manufacturing ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’ and was claiming it as ‘chewing tobacco’. The stand of
the assessee has been that they were manufacturing varieties of flavoured
‘chewing tobacco’. Hence, the statement of the partner of the assessee came
to be recorded on 15.02.2007, which has been noticed in paragraph 3 of
show cause notice dated 30.03.2007. Hence, we do not propose to extract
the same. A perusal of the said statement would indicate the manner in
which the product has been manufactured. It is admitted in the statement
given by the partner of the assessee, that raw tobacco is mixed with an
additive mixture which is manufactured by mixing perfumery compounds
received from the noticee’s Delhi Unit itself. He also admits that to this
perfumery mixture, further compounds are added for making various types
of tobacco to be manufactured. Based on this statement and precisely for
the reason that the product manufactured by the assessee seems to not be
‘chewing tobacco’, aforesaid show cause notice dated 30.03.2007 came
to be issued by calling upon the assessee to show cause as to why the
short-paid duty amounting to Rs.4,28,65,508/- should not be recovered.
The said show cause notice came to be adjudicated and the Commissioner
confirmed the said demand.
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
58. Being aggrieved by the order dated 02.04.2008 passed by the
Commissioner, appeal before the tribunal was filed and as already noticed
hereinabove, there were divergent views of the Member (Judicial) and
Member (Technical). The judicial member at paragraph 16 of the order
held that the appellant (assessee) had properly classified it as ‘chewing
tobacco’ under CET SH 2403 9910 and applying the principles laid in
M/s Urmin Products Private Limited (which is the subject matter of Civil
Appeal No. 10159-161 of 2010) allowed the appeal whereas the technical
member disagreed with the said view and held that the product manufactured
by the appellant-assessee is to be classified as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
under CET SH 2403 9930 and should be assessed under the provision of
Section 4 of CE Act, for the relevant period and with effect from 11.07.2006
under Section 4A when specific Notification No.16/2006 dated 11.07.2006
came into force.
59. In the light of the difference of opinion the matter came to be
referred to the opinion of a third member who concurred with the view
expressed by the judicial member and held that the product manufactured by
the petitioner was ‘chewing tobacco’ and not ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
as claimed by the Revenue.
60. It is pertinent to mention that the issue concerning classification
has been discussed by us herein above in the matter of Commissioner of
Central Excise, Ahmedabad Vs. M/s Urmin Products Private Limited and
Others and findings recorded by us in paragraph no.(s) 46,47,48 and 49
supra would be squarely applicable to the facts on hand.
61. Undisputedly, the tribunal as noticed herein above has relied upon
the view expressed in M/s Urmin Products Private Limited by it to arrive
at a conclusion that the product is to be classified as ‘chewing tobacco’.
62. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, the assessee duly has been
declaring the product manufactured by it as ‘chewing tobacco’. However,
the fact remains that there was no issue till the Six-digit tariff era which
was revoked with the introduction of the Eight-digit tariff head. Pursuant
to the same the entry was reorganized and reclassified as ‘chewing tobacco’
(2403 9910), a preparation containing the ‘chewing tobacco’ (2403 9920)
and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ (2403 9930). Circular No. 808/5/2005-
CX dated 25.02.2005 came to be issued whereunder classification was
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 611
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
given that the subsisting notification having a six-digit enumeration should
be read in terms of the eight-digit of the new Central Excise Tariff. On
01.03.2006, Notification No. 02/2006 came to be issued by virtue of which
a Notification No. 13/2002 dated 01.03.2002 was superseded. Thus, the
list of products with their respective chapter headings/sub-headings, which
were to be covered under the MRP-based assessment in terms of Section
4A of the CE Act, was notified in terms of an Eight-digit tariff. In the said
notification ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was left out or was not included
for MRP-based assessment. Subsequently, by clarificatory Notification No.
16/2006 dated 11.07.2006, the product ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was
brought back within the MRP-based assessment benefit. Thus, the burning
issue would be between the period 01.03.2006 to 11.07.2006 which in the
instant case relates to 01.03.2006 to 10.07.2006.
63. In the instant case, the facts do not disclose there being a change
in the declaration of the product manufactured by the present respondent
herein, as was in the case with M/s Urmin Products Private Limited. Even
otherwise by virtue of the change from Six-digit tariff to Eight-digit tariff
era and during the period 01.03.2006 to 11.07.2006. Though the generic
word ‘chewing tobacco’ including preparation commonly known as “khara
masala, quiwam, dhokta, zarda, sukha, surti” or “chewing tobacco and
preparation containing chewing tobacco” got bifurcated or took its new birth
by virtue of which the said entry was re-organised and classified under three
headings namely ‘chewing tobacco’ (2403 9910), ‘preparations containing
chewing tobacco’ (2403 9920) and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ (2403
9930), the heading ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ did not find a place in
the corresponding Notification No. 02/2006 dated 01.03.2006 and thereby
the ‘zarda/jarda’ scented tobacco got excluded from the preview of the
Notification No. 02/2006 and the benefit of the assessment in terms of Section
4A was no more available for the product ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ or
in other words the manufacturers of ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ were
required to be assessed under Section 4 of CE Act. On account of this
there was a huge gap in the central excise duty leviable under Section 4
of the CE Act, which would obviously be the heartburn for the taxpayers
which resulted in the above-noticed tug of war between the Revenue and
the assessee, wherein the assessee contended the products manufactured
by it though scented or flavoured still continued to be ‘chewing tobacco’
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
and it did not partake the character of the ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’.
For finding an answer to this question, apart from the finding recorded in
M/s Urmin Products Private Limited’s case, we deem it appropriate to note
that the general rules for the interpretation of the goods are traceable to
provisions of the CETA under the chapter heading “general rules for the
interpretation this schedule”. Presuming for a moment that where goods
are prima facie classifiable under two or more headings (by accepting the
proposition of the assessee) it raises a serious doubt with regard to the
classification of the product. In such circumstances, section 2 of the CETA,
1985 provides that the rates at which duties of excise shall be leviable under
the CE Act, are specified in the first and second schedules. The first schedule
contains a set of rules known as “general rules for the interpretation of
this schedule”. These rules begin with a mandate that the classification of
goods in this schedule shall be governed by the following principles laid
thereunder. This rule had received interpretation of this Court in the matter
of Westinghouse Saxby Farmer Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Calcutta, (2021) 5 SCC 586 whereunder it came to be held as follows:
“26. Rule 1 of these Rules makes it clear that “the titles of Sections,
Chapters and Sub-Chapters are provided for ease of reference only and
that for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to
the terms of the headings and any relative Section or Chapter Notes and
provided such headings or Notes do not otherwise require, according
to the provisions of the rules that follow”.
27. Rule 2 deals with (i) incomplete or unfinished articles; and (ii)
mixtures or combinations of material or substance. While Rule 2(a)
deals with incomplete or unfinished Articles, Rule 2(b) deals with
mixtures or combinations of a material or substance.
28. Rule 3 deals with cases where goods are classifiable under two or
more sub-headings. But Rule 3 begins with a reference to Rule 2(b).
Therefore, it is necessary to extract Rule 2(b) and Rule 3 together.
They read as follows:
“2. (a)***
(b) Any reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be taken
to include a reference to mixtures or combinations of that material or
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 613
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
substance with other materials or substances. Any reference to goods
of a given material or substance shall be taken to include a reference
to goods consisting wholly or partly of such material or substance.
The classification of goods consisting of more than one material or
substance shall be according to the principles of Rule 3.
3. When by application of Rule 2(b) or for any other reason, goods
are, prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings, classification
shall be effected as follows:
(a) the heading which provides the most specific description shall be
preferred to headings providing a more general description. However,
when two or more headings each refer to part only of the materials or
substances contained in mixed or composite goods or to part only of the
items in a set put up for retail sale, those headings are to be regarded
as equally specific in relation to those goods, even if one of them gives
a more complete or precise description of the goods.
(b) mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or
made up of different components, and goods put up in sets for retail
sale, which cannot be classified by reference to clause (a), shall be
classified as if they consisted of the material or component which gives
them their essential character, insofar as this criterion is applicable.
(c) when goods cannot be classified by reference to clause (a) or
clause (b), they shall be classified under the heading which occurs last
in numerical order among those which equally merit consideration.”
64. On the strength of the inputs used in the manufacture of the
disputed product and the end product which is sought to be classified as
‘chewing tobacco’ by the assessee and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ by
the Revenue, results in the moot question, as to what test is to be adopted
namely, whether sole or principal usage test is to be applied? This Court
in Westinghouse Saxby Farmer Ltd.’s case (supra) had an occasion to deal
with similar issues and took note of the earlier dicta of this Court rendered
in A. Nagaraju Bros. v. State of A.P., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 122 and held
there is no ‘one’ single universal test in this matter.
65. Keeping these aspects in mind when the facts on hand are perused
it would disclose the product manufactured by the assessee-respondent is
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
sold as ‘Gopal zarda’ and both the members of the tribunal namely, technical
members and judicial members are ad idem on the issue of the manufacturing
process of the goods and the product in question namely, they all agree that
tobacco flavouring substance is added and the judicial member has clearly
held that the product is marketed as “flavoured chewing tobacco”. This
addition of scent or flavour in the ‘chewing tobacco’ was contended to be
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ by the Revenue, whereas the assessee has
taken a stand that by addition of the scent or flavour, it would not partake the
character of the ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ but continues to be ‘chewing
tobacco’. In this background, the difference between ‘chewing tobacco’
and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ if attempted to be ascertained from the
definition found in the glossary of Bureau of Indian Standards, particularly
in terms of definition and preparation, it is classified as under:
“2.27 ‘Chewing Tobacco¬’- Chewing tobacco, as its name suggests
is a tobacco preparation for chewing purpose, also taken with paan
(betel leaf). Gutka, surti, zarda, quiwam and dokta are some of the
different types of chewing tobacco preparations.
2.184 ‘Zarda’- A chewing tobacco product made of highly scented
and flavoured tobacco flakes. Chewed along with betel nut and paan
(betel leaf).”
66. A careful perusal of the meaning allocated to the concerned
products, ‘Chewing Tobacco’ and ‘Zarda’ leads to formulation of the
following distinction based on the different parameters as under:
“Preparation and Form
Chewing Tobacco: Chewing tobacco typically comes in loose leaf or
twist form. It consists of cured and fermented tobacco leaves. Chewing
tobacco is usually taken by placing a portion of it between the cheek
and gum, where it releases nicotine over time as it’s slowly chewed.
Zarda Tobacco: Zarda, on the other hand, is a specific type of chewing
tobacco that is finely chopped or shredded and highly scented and
flavoured. It is often sweetened and can be brightly coloured. Zarda
is known for its strong and distinct aroma and flavour. It is often
consumed by placing it in the mouth, similar to other chewing tobacco
products, and is sometimes chewed along with betel nut and paan.
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 615
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
Flavour and Aroma
Chewing Tobacco: Chewing tobacco can come in various flavours,
but it may not always be as strongly scented or flavoured as Zarda.
The flavours can range from natural tobacco flavours to menthol,
wintergreen, or other fruit and spice flavours.
Zarda Tobacco: Zarda is specifically known for its highly scented and
flavoured nature. It is often infused with strong spices and sweeteners,
giving it a distinct and potent aroma and taste. The flavours in Zarda
are often more pronounced and intense compared to regular chewing
tobacco.
Use with Betel Nut and Paan
Chewing Tobacco: While chewing tobacco can be used alongside betel
nut and paan, it is not exclusive to this combination. Chewing tobacco
can be used independently as well.
Zarda Tobacco: Zarda is more commonly associated with being used
in combination with betel nut and paan. This combination is often
considered a traditional practice in some South Asian cultures.”
67. At this juncture, it may be relevant to draw a distinction between the
facts of the instant case and the facts in the case of Urmin supra. In the present
factual scenario, there has been a consistent and clear classification provided
by the assessee, which was accepted by the Revenue, prior to the dispute
arising from the audit objection raised by the concerned assessing officer.
68. Unlike the facts as narrated above in Group I, i.e., Urmin, whereunder
the assessee therein had sought to change the classification of the goods
manufactured by them, particularly when there was a difference in the duty,
and a much higher duty was required to be paid by the assessee. Whereas
in the instant case on hand, there has been no change in classification of the
product which was sought by the assessee. It is settled law that the onus/burden
of proof for change in classification of the product lies on the Department,
particularly when it wishes to challenge a long-accepted classification. This
court in the case of HPL Chemicals Limited Vs. CCE, Chandigarh: 2006 5
SCC 208 while discussing the onus/burden of proof in matters of chargeability
held as follows:
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
“28. This apart, classification of goods is a matter relating to
chargeability and the burden of proof is squarely upon the Revenue.
If the Department intends to classify the goods under a particular
heading or sub-heading different from that claimed by the assessee, the
Department has to adduce proper evidence and discharge the burden
of proof. In the present case the said burden has not been discharged
at all by the Revenue. On the one hand, from the trade and market
enquiries made by the Department, from the report of the Chemical
Examiner, CRCL and from HSN, it is quite clear that the goods are
classifiable as “denatured salt” falling under Chapter Heading 25.01.
The Department has not shown that the subject product is not bought
or sold or is not known or is dealt with in the market as denatured
salt. The Department’s own Chemical Examiner after examining the
chemical composition has not said that it is not denatured salt. On the
other hand, after examining the chemical composition has opined that
the subject-matter is to be treated as sodium chloride.”
29. It has been held by this Court in a number of judgments that the
burden of proof is on the Revenue in the matter of classification. In
Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. [(1996) 10 SCC 413] in para
15 this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 419-20)
“15. In our view, the conclusion reached by the High Court is fully
in accord with the decisions of this Court and the same is justified in
law. The burden of proof is on the taxing authorities to show that the
particular case or item in question is taxable in the manner claimed
by them. Mere assertion in that regard is of no avail. It has been held
by this Court that there should be material to enter appropriate finding
in that regard and the material may be either oral or documentary. It
is for the taxing authority to lay evidence in that behalf even before
the first adjudicating authority. Especially in a case as this, where the
claim of the assessee is borne out by the trade enquiries received by
them and also the affidavits filed by persons dealing with the subject-
matter, a heavy burden lay upon the Revenue to disprove the said
materials by adducing proper evidence. Unfortunately, no such attempt
was made. As stated, the evidence led in this case conclusively goes to
show that nylon twine manufactured by the assessee has been treated
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 617
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
as a kind of nylon yarn by the people conversant with the trade. It is
commonly considered as nylon yarn. Hence, it is to be classified under
Item 18 of the Act. The Revenue has failed to establish the contrary.
We would do well to remember the guidelines laid down by this Court
in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 241 : AIR 1977
SC 597] in such a situation, wherein it was stated: (SCC p. 254, AIR
p. 607, para 35)
‘When an article has, by all standards, a reasonable claim to be
classified under an enumerated item in the Tariff Schedule, it will be
against the very principle of classification to deny it the parentage and
consign it to an orphanage of the residuary clause.’ ”
69. Given the circumstances in the present case, the Department
has not provided any sufficient evidence before this Court determine the
nature, characteristics, contents, and composition of the product in order to
adjudicate the present dispute purely on the issue of classification and hence
no attempt can be made to determine the appropriate entry of classification
for the product manufactured by the assessee at the relevant period of time
of the dispute. The Revenue has also not raised any specific grounds in
relation to any wilful misstatement with an intention to evade duty on part
of the assessee, as opposed to the case of Urmin wherein one of the main
grounds urged was the intention to avoid payment of duty. It is pertinent to
mention that there is a specific observation made by the Commissioner in
his OIO dated 30.03.2007 that no wilful suppression is attributable to the
assessee, and placing reliance on this very observation, the tribunal had
also set-aside the penalty imposed upon the assesssee. It may be noted that
this court in the case of CCE vs. Damnet Chemicals Private Ltd. (2007) 7
SCC 490 had held:
“26. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to hold that there has been
conscious or deliberate withholding of information by the assessee.
There has been no wilful misstatement much less any deliberate and
wilful suppression of facts. It is settled law that in order to invoke the
proviso to Section 11-A(1) a mere misstatement could not be enough.
The requirement in law is that such misstatement or suppression of
facts must be wilful. We do not propose to burden this judgment with
various authoritative pronouncements except to refer the judgment of
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
this Court in Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. v. CCE [(2005) 7 SCC 749 :
(2005) 188 ELT 149] wherein this Court held : (SCC p. 759, para 27)
“27. … we find that ‘suppression of facts’ can have only one meaning
that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to evade
payment of duty. When facts were known to both the parties, the
omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must
have done, would not render it suppression. It is settled law that
mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression. There
must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to find wilful
suppression.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. It is clear from the material available on record that the Excise
Authorities had inspected the manufacture process, collected the
necessary information and details from the respondent assessee
and even collected the samples and sent for chemical analysis. The
authorities were aware of the tests and analysis reports of the products
manufactured by the respondent assessee. The relevant facts were
very much within the knowledge of the Department authorities. The
Department did not make any attempt to lead any evidence that there
was any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to
evade payment of duty.”
70. Classification is a question relating to “chargeability”. It is well
settled law that insofar as chargeability is concerned, the burden of proof lies
on the Revenue and not on the assessee. In the facts obtained in the present
case, no evidence of whatsoever nature has been placed by the Revenue
to raise any presumption. In fact, the entire proceedings are based upon
“audit objection” and the Revenue attempts to rely upon the additives to the
‘chewing tobacco’ as the basis for arriving at a conclusion, that assessee had
cleared the ‘jarda/zarda scented tobacco’ which is not even supported by the
samples drawn or inquiry made from the traders or consumers or stockist,
suppliers and buyers. In the absence of iota of material, the finding of the
tribunal cannot be displaced. It would be of benefit to extract the finding
recorded by the third member of the tribunal, who upheld the finding of the
judicial member and it reads:
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 619
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
“9 In the tariff the expression xxxx practice. In the present case, as the
product is flavour chewing tobacco and it is bought and sold in the
market as chewing tobacco. Further the appellant from the beginning
classifying the same as chewing tobacco and after the period in dispute
also classified the same as chewing tobacco. Hence I find merit in the
contention of the appellant that the product in question is chewing
tobacco and classifiable under Heading 24039910 of the Tariff.”
71. Upon anxious consideration of the aforestated facts, coupled with
lack of cogent evidence for the purpose of determination of the classification
entry with respect to the product manufactured by the assessee, we deem
it necessary to not interfere with the findings of the tribunal in light of
the settled judicial findings of this Court which directly have a bearing
on the facts of the present case.
72. At the cost of repetition, we would further like to reiterate that
the observations and findings recorded in this group are exclusive to the
peculiar facts of this case only.
III. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GOODS AND SERVICE TAX
EXCISE AND CUSTOMS BHOPAL V. KAIPAN MASALA PVT.
LTD. DIARY NO. 44912/2019 AND 6888/2020
73. Two Appeals i.e., Diary No. 44912 of 2019 and Diary No. 6888
of 2020 are the subject matter of this group whereunder the Revenue is in
appeal challenging the order of the jurisdictional CESTAT dated 14.11.2018
passed in Excise Appeal Nos. 50468, 50469, 50470, 50471, 57472, 51319
and 51978 of 2018.
BRIEF FACTS
74. Before adverting to the facts of the present group it may be noticed
that with effect from 01.03.2015, the capacity of production per packing
machine per month and rate of duty for ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘Zarda/
jarda Scented Tobacco’ was amended vide Notification No. 4/2015 and
Notification No. 5/2015-C.E. (N.T.), respectively and the duty for ‘chewing
tobacco’ was prescribed differently as compared to ‘Zarda/Jarda scented
tobacco’ as already noticed herein above. The respondent-assessee vide
their communication letter dated 18.03.2015 intimated to the jurisdictional
competent authority that the product manufactured by them is only ‘scented
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
zarda/jarda tobacco’ which is different from ‘chewing tobacco.’ They also
informed that the nomenclature of ‘chewing tobacco’ is being used as there
was no difference in the capacity of production as well as the rate of duty
before the budget of 2015-16. In response to the said letter of the assessee, the
Range Superintendent vide his letter dated 19.03.2015 requested the assessee
to submit the manufacturing process of their product. Hence, the assessee
vide its communication dated 24.03.2015 informed that ‘chewing tobacco’
and ‘scented zarda/jarda tobacco’, both contain the same ingredients.
75. A Notification No. 25/2015-CE dated 30.04.2015 was brought
with effect from 01.05.2015 whereby the rate of Central Excise Duty of
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ came to be amended again but there was no
change in the rate of duty on ‘Chewing Tobacco’ as compared to ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’.
76. The assesee vide communication dated 28.05.2015 intimated to the
department that with effect from 01.06.2015, they would be manufacturing
‘chewing tobacco’ falling under CET SH 2403 9910 instead of ‘scented
zarda/jarda tobacco’ falling under CET SH 2403 9930 and accordingly
submitted a revised form to the competent officer. In the background of
frequent changes made in the classification by the assessee and in order to
ascertain the proper classification of goods, the officers of the department
drew the samples of the products under panchnama dated 01.06.2015 and
forwarded the same to the chemical examiner, CRCL, New Delhi and
received the test report on 03.06.2015. It was found that the ‘chewing
tobacco’ contains identical ingredients that are contained in ‘scented
zarda/jarda tobacco.’ It was also noticed by the department that assessee
through communication and declaration form filed prior to 28.05.2015 had
mentioned their product as Pan masala and “scented zarda/jarda tobacco”.
Thus, having found that the product manufactured by the assessee namely,
contains the same ingredients as ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘scented zarda/
jarda tobacco’ and involves the same manufacturing process which was
confirmed by the CRCL Report vide dated 03.06.2015 and the assessee had
attempted to change their stand by filing convenient declarations, the claim
of the assessee was not accepted. It appeared that the assessee deliberately
and intentionally mis-declared and misclassified their products with an
intention to evade central excise duty. Hence an order dated 28.08.2015
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 621
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
came to be passed which covered the period of June 2015 to August 2015.
In continuation of the same, four more orders for the period November
2015; December 2015; January 2016, and February 2016 came to be passed
vide order dated 30.10.2015; 27.11.2015; 31.12.2015, and 29.01.2016
respectively demanding the amounts indicated therein. Being aggrieved
by the said orders, the assessee preferred appeal Nos. 338 of 2015, 53 of
2016, 52 of 2016, 209 of 2016 and 210 of 2016 before the Commissioner
(Appeals), which came to be disposed of by order dated 23.10.2017 on the
ground that a notice under Section 11A of the CE Act, has already been
issued for determination and confirmation of the duty payable, the assessee
has liberty to raise all grounds before the authority adjudicating in the
proceedings initiated vide the show cause notice issued on 02.02.2016 and
accordingly, the appeals came to be disposed of vide order dated 23.10.2017.
77. The show cause notice dated 02.02.2016 came to be adjudicated
vide order dated 16.07.2018 whereunder demand of duty amount of
Rs.7,47,66,000/- along with interest and penalty came to be passed.
Being aggrieved by the said order, the assessee has filed an Appeal No.
E/53421/2018-EX(DB) before CESTAT, New Delhi which is pending;
however, the assessee has simultaneously proceeded to challenge the order
dated 23.10.2017 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) before the tribunal
in Appeal No. E/50468, 50469, 50470, 50471, and 50472 of 2018 which
came to be allowed vide order 14.11.2018. Hence, the Revenue is in appeal
in Civil Appeal Diary No. 6888 of 2020 against the said order the order
dated 14.11.2018 passed by the CESTAT.
78. Similarly, the Revenue has also come in appeal in Civil Appeal
Diary No. 44912 of 2019 against the order dated 14.11.2018 passed in
Excise Appeal 51978 of 2018 and Excise Appeal No. 51319 of 2018 against
the respondent-assessee wherein the Show Cause Notice dated 01.03.2017
was issued for the payment of differential duty of Rs. 16,95,33,000 by the
Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence Bhopal for the period
of June 2015 to February 2016 which culminated in order-in-original dated
20.12.2017. The said order held that the assessee has misclassified the
product as ‘chewing tobacco’ instead of ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and
the differential duty claimed in Show Cause Notice was affirmed. The said
order became the subject of appeal No.51978 of 2018 and No.51319 of
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
2018 before the CESTAT which vide the common order dated 14.11.2018
set aside the OIO.
SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES
79. Ms. Nisha Bagchi learned counsel appearing for Revenue, would
contend, that tribunal committed a serious error in holding the product in
question as ‘chewing tobacco’ though it was to be classified as ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’. She would contend that tribunal failed to appreciate the
test report dated 4.11.2015, suggested that the product did not contain added
lime and yet on the ground test reports not having been drawn a finding has
been recorded by the tribunal to the effect that adjudicating authority was
not in a position to correlate the test report in the absence of test memo.
She would also contend that tribunal failed to notice that assessee itself had
requested for retest of the sample on the ground that the test report is not very
specific and the various parameters on which it was opined that the sample
contained the characteristics of ZST have been clearly spelt out and that the
retest has been allowed by the adjudicating authority is factually not correct.
The prayer for retest not being in consonance with CBEC’s manual.
Hence, she would contend that tribunal ought to have remanded the matter.
She would further contend that the tribunal ignored the statement dated
27.10.2015 of Shri Ram Gopal Agnihotri, Director of assessee company
whereunder the distinction between CT and ZST has been admitted as also
the ingredients of the product manufactured by the assessee was set out. She
would submit that the finding of CRCL on the test reports has been ignored
by the tribunal, which clearly disclosed the final product manufactured by
the assessee was ZST. Hence, she prays for the appeal to be allowed.
80. Whereas the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would
contend that the order passed by the Tribunal does not suffer from any
infirmity and it is contended that assessee, admittedly, had followed the due
procedure in law by following the statutory declarations under the CTPM
Rules, declaring that they intend to operate different number of machines
in each of the months under dispute. It is contended that had there been any
malafide intentions to wrongly claim the benefit reduced rate of duty on
CT, the assess would have either increased its production by increasing the
number of operating machines or at least would have maintained the very
same number of operating machines. However, every month the assessee
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 623
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
was consistently reducing the operating machines as per the demand of its
product in the market. The decision to manufacture ZST prior to the period of
dispute, and to manufacture CT during the period of dispute as well as using
different number of packing machines every month was purely a commercial
decision taken by the assessee based on several factors. By supporting the
order of the tribunal, it is contended that CT and ZST are different product
and known as such in the market and as such there cannot be a flip flop
by selling same product in two different names. It is also canvassed that
no enquiry was conducted by the department to ascertain the classification
of the product namely no market enquiry was conducted to ascertain the
common parlance understanding of the product. The product sold by the
assessee had been described on the package as ‘chewing tobacco premium’
and as per the Legal metrology (packaged commodities) rules 2011, the
labelling/description contained on the packaging is determinative of the
goods contained in the package, until proved to the contrary. Hence, the
assessee has prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
DISCUSSION & FINDINGS
81. It is pertinent to note at the outset that show cause notice dated
02.02.2016 for the classification of the product is the subject matter of the
appeal before the CESTAT in Appeal No. E/53421 of 2018 where under
the order dated 16.07.2018 is impugned before it. The said order dated
16.07.2018 has been passed by the Commissioner pertains to the period of
June 2015 to August 2015 where the Commissioner has adjudicated and
passed an order regarding mis-classification.
82. The orders dated 30.10.2015, 27.11.2015, 31.12.2015 and
29.01.2016 which were impugned before the Commissioner (Appeals)
were disposed of on 23.10.2017 in the background of the show cause notice
dated 02.02.2016.
83. The assessee who has two units namely, at Bhopal and Bilaspur
by communication dated 18.03.2015 intimated the Jurisdictional Divisional
officer that the product manufactured by them is ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ which is entirely different from ‘chewing tobacco’. It was also
intimated that the nomenclature ‘chewing tobacco’ is being used as there
was no difference in capacity of production as well as rate of duty before
budget 2015-16, since the government fixed different rates of duty for these
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
products, they shall be discharging central excise duty as per the Notification
No. 05/2015 dated 01.03.2015. However, the assessee vide its letter dated
08.06.2015 addressed to the jurisdictional Range officer informed that
the manufacturing process of ‘chewing tobacco’ and the ingredients used
for manufacturing are same for both the products. It is also admitted by
the assessee that ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ would contain additional
ingredients of gulab jal, glycerine and perfume and as such panchnama dated
01.06.2015 was drawn. The report chemical examiner disclosed that the
samples obtained from the factory of the assessee where the assessee claimed
to manufacture only ‘chewing tobacco’ also contained the same ingredients
that are used in the manufacturing of ‘scented zarda/jarda tobacco’. It is for
this precise reason, the proceedings for misdeclaration and misclassification
came to be initiated and OIO dated 28.08.2015 came to be passed which was
affirmed in appeal on 23.10.2017. The adjudicating officer after having taken
note of the chemical examiner’s report dated 03.08.2015, whereunder it was
found that the ‘chewing tobacco’ manufactured by the assessee contains
identical ingredients that are contained in ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ had
arrived at a conclusion that the assessee has mis declared and misclassified
its goods as ‘chewing tobacco’ instead of ‘scented zarda/jarda tobacco’.
84. When the assessee itself vide a letter dated 18.03.2015 (refer to
in para 6.4 at page 95 of order in original dated 16.07.2018) has intimated
that the product manufactured by it was ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. The
stand or change of the nomenclature by the assessee contending that it is
only ‘chewing tobacco’ is completely misplaced for three reasons namely:
(1) there was no change in the manufacturing process of both the items
and the product was claimed to be ‘chewing tobacco’ containing the same
ingredients as that of ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’; (2) The declaration was
filed by assessee as ‘scented zarda/jarda tobacco’ up till 27.04.2015; (3)
The duty payable had been determined on the basis of the deemed capacity
of production under Rule 6(2) of the CTPM Rules.
85. On omission of Compounded Levy Scheme vide Act No. 14 of
2001 Section 3A of the CE Act, was again inserted by Act 18 of 2008,
hence ‘chewing tobacco’ was notified under Section 3A by Notification
No. 10 of 2010 dated 27.02.2010. From time to time, several Notifications
were issued increasing rate of duty for ‘chewing tobacco’, unmanufactured
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 625
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
tobacco. Notification No. 4 of 2015 dated 01.03.2015 was issued notifying
the deemed capacity of production per packing machine per month, on the
same day on which Notification No. 5/2015 was issued. Subsequently, by
Notification No. 25/2015 dated 30.04.2015 came to be issued under which
the rate of duty per packing machine per month was notified which was
based on packing speed. The differential duty between ‘chewing tobacco’
and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was not only vast but also huge. The
following table is the mirror to this fact:
Period ‘Chewing ‘Zarda/ Relevant
Tobacco’ Jarda Scented Notification
Tobacco’
P r i o r t o Same Same
01.03.2015
w.e.f. 01.03.2015 38.64 lakhs per 27.05 lakhs per N o t i f i c a t i o n
packing machine packing machine N o . 0 4 / 2 0 1 5 -
per month per month C E (N . T. ) d t .
01.03.2015
w.e.f. 30.04.2015 38.64 lakhs per 82.11 lakhs per Notification No.
packing machine packing machine 25/2015 CE dated
per month per month 30.04.2015
86. Hence, the assessee who had taken a stand by its communication
dated 18.03.2015 was manufacturing ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
changed its version and started contending the product manufactured by
it is ‘chewing tobacco’. The assessee was changing the classification of
its product, as the central excise duty on ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
and ‘chewing tobacco’ was changing. The view taken by adjudicating
authority is based on factual evaluation which derives its support from
the CRCL Report which confirmed that the samples drawn has the same
ingredients as that of ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and thereby rightly
confirmed the duty demanded under the Show Cause Notice. The findings
recorded by us in Group No. 1 in matter of M/s Urmin Products with
regard to classification would squarely be applicable to the facts on hand
and as such both these appeals deserved to be allowed by setting aside
the impugned order of the tribunal.
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
IV. M/S DHARAMPAL PREMCHAND LTD. V. COMMISSIONER
OF CENTRAL EXCISE - CA NO.2469 OF 2020, DIARY NO.3492,
3487, 2810, 3484, 3513, 3536, 3544, 3545 AND 3547 OF 2020
BRIEF FACTS
87. The assessee is in appeal before this Court assailing the common
impugned Final Order dated 06.01.2019 passed by CESTAT, Allahabad. At
the outset, we would like to state that the findings recorded and observations
made under the present group of appeals are confined to this group only.
The period of dispute involved in these appeals relates to May 2015 to
January 2016.
88. The declarations filed by the assessee classifying their product
as ‘Chewing Tobacco’ were approved by orders passed by the Deputy
Commissioner upto 23.09.2015 though a higher rate had been prescribed
for ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ vide Notification No.25/2015 dated
30.04.2015. The Deputy Commissioner thereafter vide Order dated
13.01.2016 amended assessee’s declaration dated 08.01.2016, wherein
assessee classified the product as CET SH 24039910 i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’,
and Deputy Commissioner reclassified it to CET SH 2403 9930 i.e., ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’, w.e.f. 16.01.2016. The Deputy Commissioner
in his Order dated 13.01.2016 justified the reclassification on account of
discovery of the fact that similar manufacturer i.e, M/s Dharampal Satyapal
was manufacturing the same product with identical manufacturing process
and classifying the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. Subsequent
order came to be passed on 17.02.2016 correcting the next declaration dated
11.02.2016 w.e.f. 18.02.2016, after affording a personal hearing.
89. The Revenue had also issued two show cause notices pertaining
to the goods manufactured at two different factories of the assessee. Show
cause dated 04.05.2016 was issued for the factory located at 1D, A-34/35,
Sector 60, NOIDA (hereinafter referred to as “1D factory”) and show cause
notice of same date was also issued for the factory located at 6A, A-34/35,
Sector 60, NOIDA (hereinafter referred to as “6A factory”). An Addendum
dated 09.02.2016 was made to the show cause notices wherein reliance
on CRCL reports were placed regarding the characteristics of the product.
Under both the show cause notices, differential duty for the period May
2015 to January 2016 which was short paid on the ground of misdeclaration
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 627
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
was demanded along with interest, and penalty. The reclassification and
the demand proposed in the Notices were confirmed by the Commissioner
by OIO on 28.11.2017 and 29.11.2017 respectively. These orders were
challenged before the High Court of Allahabad in Writ Tax No. 232/2018
and Writ Tax No. 234/2018, which came to be dismissed on the ground that
the petitioner has alternate remedy. The SLP No. 7369/2018 challenging
the order dated 26.02.2018 passed in Writ Tax No. 232/2018 also came to
be dismissed. Hence the assessee preferred Appeal No. 70437/2018 and
70438/2018 before CESTAT, which came to be rejected by Final Order No.
A/71893-94/2019-EX (DB) dated 06.11.2019.
90. Hence, the present appeals came to be filed by assessee before the
Tribunal in respect of:
a. The adjudication orders in the show cause notices dated 04.05.2016.
b. The appellate orders confirming the amendments made to the
declarations on and after 08.01.2016 from ‘chewing tobacco’ to ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’.
c. A refund claim made in respect of duty paid in February 2016 under
protest after the declaration was modified.
d. Abatement/ refund granted but appropriated towards payment of
duty.
91. The dispute in all these appeals revolved around the classification
of the impugned product. The tribunal by common order dated 06.11.2019
dismissed the appeals and upheld the orders impugned before it.
92. Being aggrieved by the order of the tribunal dated 06.11.2019
these appeals have been filed.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
93. The thrust of the arguments canvassed by Mr. S.K Bagaria, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/assessee is: the original authority
had acted beyond the jurisdiction and travelled beyond the powers vested
under Rule 6 of the CTPM Rules, 2010. He would also contend that the issue
of classification of a product cannot be the subject matter of adjudication
in an order passed under Rule 6(2) of CTPM Rules. He would contend that
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
when the issue of classification of a product arises, the initial burden is on the
Department/Revenue, and it can be contested by the assessee and thereafter
the dispute is to be adjudicated by following the principles of natural justice.
He has submitted that these aspects though urged before the tribunal, had
been completely ignored and as such impugned orders are required to be
set aside by this Court.
94. He would elaborate his submissions by contending that the issue
of classification is an independent issue in itself and no decision on the
classification can be taken in a matter concerning the approval of declaration
under Rule 6 of the CTPM Rules. He would also contend that the description
of a product as declared under the declaration filed under Rule 6 cannot
be changed by the Revenue when the product has been sold and marketed
under a particular heading. He would contend that under the CETA, there is
no definition of ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ and
therefore the test lies in the market understanding of the product and the
same would prevail. He would further contend that under Rule 6 of CTPM
Rules, the authority would only consider the number of machines installed
in the factory and production capacity of the same and it was not open to
him to examine the correct classification of the product. In support of his
submissions, he has relied upon the following judgments:
(i) ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner (2019) 17 SCC 46.
(ii) HPL Chemicals Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh 2006 (197) ELT 324 [SC]
(iii) Mauri Yeast India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. 2008 (225) ELT 321
[SC]
(iv) CCE Nagpur v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan 2009 (237)
ELT 225 [SC]
(v) W.P.I.L. Ltd. v. CCE 2005 (181) ELT 359 [SC]
(vi) Mathuram v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 667
(vii) CC v. Dilip Kumar and Company (2018) 9 SCC 1
(viii) Indo International Industries v. CGST (1981) 2 SCC
(ix) UOI v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. 1963 Supply (1)
SCR 586
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 629
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
95. M/s. Nisha Bagchi, learned counsel for the Revenue would contend
that the declaration filed by the assessee classifying their product as 2403
9910 was approved and orders were passed by the Deputy Commissioner
upto 23.09.2015 though a higher rate had been prescribed for ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ by Notification No.25 of 2015 dated 30.04.2015
which product was manufactured by the assessee. She would contend that
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was notified under Section 3A of CE Act,
vide Notification No.17 of 2010 dated 13.04.2010 and by Notification
No.18 of 2010 dated 13.04.2010, the CTPM Rules were amended to cover
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. She would contend that the declarations
filed by the assessee were determined and/ or adjudicated after affording a
personal hearing and by relying upon the admission/statement made by the
General Manager of the assessee during the personal hearing, the Deputy
Commissioner has modified all subsequent declarations which came to be
confirmed by the appellate authority. She would also place reliance upon
the CRCL report to contend that the samples drawn from one of the units
had a pleasant odour/fragrance. She would draw the attention of the Court
to the findings recorded by the tribunal which is to the effect that the use
of saffron and scented flavour in the manufacture of the product had been
admitted by the General Manager; and, one unit of the same group was
manufacturing an identical product which was being classified as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ and both these products had the same brand name
and was entering the market as the same product. She would also contend
that the appellant had not contested that manufacturing process which was
identical and both products were marketed under the same brand name. She
would also submit that the classification of the product ought to have been
under CET SH 2403 9930 and there cannot be estoppel in taxation matters
for rectifying the past erroneous classification/ declaration which was
approved pursuant to intentional misdeclaration and wilful suppression. To
conclude her arguments, she would submit that the adjudicating authority
and the tribunal have considered the factual matrix and arrived at a well-
reasoned conclusion based on the characteristics of the product, the test
reports applying the commercial parlance, admission of the assessee, and
the definitions found in IS glossary and existing precedents. Hence, by
relying upon the following Judgments she has sought for dismissal of the
appeals:
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
(i) CCE v. Cotspun (1999) 7 SCC 633 (Para 14, 15)
(ii) Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India 2023 (3) SCC1
(iii) Hindustan Poles Corpn. v. CCE (2006) 4 SCC 85
(iv) Mishra Zarda Traders v. State of Orissa 1987 SCC Online 363
(v) Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC17
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
96. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and
after bestowing our anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at
the bar the following points/questions would arise for our consideration:
(1) What is the purpose of the declaration filed under Rule 6 of CTPM
Rules?
(2) What are the parameters which are required to be examined,
determined, and adjudicated under Rule 6 by the Prescribed Authority?
(3) Whether the Prescribed Authority have the power and jurisdiction to
determine the classification or specific entry within which the declared
product is to be classified?
OR
Whether the issue of classification of a product can be the subject matter
of adjudication/decision under Rule 6(2) of CTPM Rules?
(4) Whether a declaration made under Rule 6 has any nexus to the
classification of the product and on account of the classification of
such declaration, would preclude the Department from issuing a Notice
under Section 11A or 11AC of CE Act, 1944?
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
97. While adjudicating the above questions/points, the answer to one is
likely to overlap with the other and as such we propose to adjudicate these
questions together and we propose to answer them accordingly and record
conclusion question or point-wise.
98. For undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be necessary
to examine the applicable rules in question i.e., ‘Chewing Tobacco’ and
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 631
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
Unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machines (Capacity Determination and
Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010. The aforesaid rules came to be notified by
Notification No.11 of 2010 dated 27.02.2010 which came into force from
08.03.2010. The aforesaid rules were made applicable to the goods specified
and notified as per Section 3A. ‘Chewing tobacco’ was notified under Section
3A by Notification No.10 of 2010 dated 27.02.2010 and ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ was specified as notified goods under Section 3A of CE Act, 1944 by
Notification No.17 of 2010 dated 13.04.2010 on the same day i.e. 13.04.2010
Notification No.18 of 2010 came to be issued amending the CTPM Rules,
2010 to cover zarda/jarda scented tobacco.
99. The aforesaid rules to the extent it require adjudication of the
points/questions formulated hereinabove would necessarily be required to be
extracted and Rule 6 which would have direct bearing on the points formulated
hereinabove is extracted herein below for immediate reference and it reads:
“Rule 6. Declaration to be filed by the manufacturer. - (1) A
manufacturer of notified goods shall, immediately on coming into force
of these rules, and not later than 8th March, 2010, declare in Form 1
annexed to these rules,
(i) the number of single-track packing machines available in his factory;
(ii) the number of packing machines out of (i), which are installed in
his factory;
(iii) the number of packing machines out of (i), which he intends to
operate in his factory for production of pouches of notified goods with
lime tube and without lime tube, respectively, with effect from the 8th
day of March, 2010;
(iv) the number of multiple track or multiple line packing machine
available in his factory;
(v) the number of multiple track or multiple line packing machines out
of (iv), which are installed in his factory;
(vi) the number of multiple track or multiple line packing machines out of
(iv), which he intends to operate in his factory for production of pouches
of notified goods without lime tube and with lime tube, respectively,
with effect from the 8th day of March, 2010;
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
(vii) the name of the manufacturer of each of the packing machine, its
identification number, date of its purchase and the maximum packing
speed at which they can be operated for packing of pouches of notified
goods, with lime tube and without lime tube, of various retail sale prices;
(viii) description of goods to be manufactured including whether
unmanufactured tobacco or chewing tobacco or both, their brand names,
whether pouches shall contain lime tube or not;
(ix) denomination of retail sale prices of the pouches to be manufactured
during the financial year;
(x) the plan and details of the part or section of the factory premises
intended to be used by him for the manufacture of notified goods
of different denomination of retail sale prices and the number of
machines intended to be used by him in each such part or section, to the
jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise or the Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, with a copy to
the jurisdictional Superintendent of Central Excise : Provided that a
new manufacturer shall file such declaration at least seven days prior
to the commencement of commercial production of notified goods in
his factory.
(2) On receipt of the declaration referred to in sub-rule (1), the Deputy
Commissioner of Central Excise or the Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise, as the case may be, shall, after making such inquiry
as may be necessary including physical verification, approve the
declaration and determine and pass order concerning the annual capacity
of production of the factory within three working days in accordance
with the provisions of these rules.
Provided that the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise or the
Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, may
direct for modifications in the plan or details of the part or section
of the factory premises intended to be used by the manufacturer for
manufacture of notified goods of different retail sale prices, as he thinks
proper, for effective segregation of the parts or sections of the premises
and the machines to be used in such parts or sections before granting
the approval :
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 633
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
Provided further that if the manufacturer does not receive the approval
in respect of his declaration within the said period of three working
days, the approval shall be deemed to have been granted subject to
the modifications, if any, which the Deputy Commissioner of Central
Excise or the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case
may be, may communicate later on but not later than thirty days of
filing of the declaration.”
100. A perusal of the above rule would indicate that the manufacturer
of notified goods should immediately on coming into force of the Rules
(08.03.2010) file a declaration in Form No.1 declaring the details of notified
goods as prescribed or specified under sub-rule (i) to (x) and on receipt of
such declaration the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise, namely, the Competent Authority, would
approve the declaration and determine and pass orders concerning the annual
capacity within three working days after making such inquiry as may be
necessary including physical verification. The first proviso to Rule 6 of
CTPM mandates that the authorised officer may direct modifications of the
details as prescribed thereunder. The perusal of the second proviso would
indicate that if the manufacturer does not receive the approval in respect of
his declaration within the said period of 3 working days, the approval shall
be deemed to have been granted subject to the modifications, if any, which
the authorised officer as the case may communicate not later than 30 days
of the filing of such declaration.
101. Learned counsel appearing for the assessee has raised a contention
that since the classification of the product being disputed by the Revenue,
the burden lies upon the Department and it is beyond the scope of Rule 6(2)
and suggested change of classification whilst adjudicating a declaration
made under Rule 6 can only be by the issuance of a Notice or otherwise, it
would be foul of natural justice. The said argument howsoever attractive
cannot be accepted for the simple reason that sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 would
clearly indicate that on receipt of a declaration referred to in sub-rule (1),
the Competent Authority would be required to make such inquiry as may be
necessary including physical verification by determining the correctness or
otherwise of such declaration concerning the annual capacity of production
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
of the factory. The nomenclature of the Rule would itself indicate that the said
Rule is called as “Chewing Tobacco and Unmanufactured Tobacco Packing
Machines (Capacity, determination and collection of duty) Rules, 2010”. A
combined reading of clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 would indicate
during the inquiry contemplated under sub-rule (2), the adjudicating authority
would be determining the annual capacity production of the factory and the
Competent Authority would be required to take into consideration the details
of the track packing machines installed in the factory, the number of packing
machines which are available and the assessee intending to operate in his factory,
number of multiple tracks or multiple line packing machines available and to be
used or operated with and without lime tube. The maximum packing speed of
such machines, various retail sale prices, description of goods to be manufactured
including whether ‘unmanufactured tobacco’ or ‘chewing tobacco’ or both,
and whether pouches contain lime tube or not, details of said products, are to
be determined. In the process of undertaking such an exercise, the Competent
Authority would be required to necessarily examine as to whether the product
in question would fall within the classification of notified goods, inasmuch as
the product has to necessarily fall within the notified goods as notified under
sub-section (1) of Section 3A and for the relevant period.
102. The Form of declaration that has been prescribed under Rule 6 is Form
No. 1 and such declaration ought to contain the details specified thereunder. For
the purposes of clarity and brevity we deem it appropriate to extract the Form
No.1 as prescribed under Rule 6 herein below:
“FORM - 1
[See rule 6]
(1) Name of the manufacturer :
(2) Address of the manufacturing premise :
(3) ECC No:
(4) Address of other premises manufacturing the same products :
(5) Number of single track packing machines available in the factory :
(6) Number of packing machines out of (5), which are installed in the
factory :
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 635
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
(7) Number of packing machines out of (5), which the manufacturer
intends to operate in his factory for production of pouches of notified
goods with lime tube and without lime tube, respectively :
(8) Number of multiple track or multiple line packing machine
available in the factory :
(9) Number of multiple track or multiple line packing machines out
of (8), which are installed in the factory :
(10) Number of multiple track or multiple line packing machines out
of (8), which the manufacturer intends to operate in his factory for
production of pouches of notified goods with lime tube and without
lime tube, respectively :
(11) Name of the manufacturer of each of the packing machine, its
identification number, date of its purchase and the maximum packing
speed at which the machines can be operated for packing of notified
goods, with lime tube and without lime tube, of various retail sale
prices :
(12) Description of goods to be manufactured including whether
unmanufactured tobacco or chewing tobacco or both, their brand
names, whether pouches shall contain lime tube or not, and other
concerned details :
(13) Denomination of retail sale prices of the pouches to be
manufactured during the financial year :
(14) The ground plan and details of the part or section of the factory
premises intended to be used by him for manufacture of notified
goods of different denomination of retail sale prices and the number of
machines intended to be used by him in each of such part or section :
(15) Declaration
(a) I/We further declare that the particulars furnished above are true and
correct in all respects. In case any particulars are found to be untrue/
incorrect, I/We undertake to pay any additional amount of excise duty
on notified goods manufactured by me/us as per provisions of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or the rules made or notifications
issued thereunder.
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
(b) I/We further undertake that any addition or removal of the
packing machine would be done under the physical supervision of the
Central Excise Officer as per the procedure provided in the Chewing
Tobacco and unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machines (Capacity
Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010.
(c) I/We hereby agree to abide by the provisions and conditions of the
Chewing Tobacco and unmanufactured Tobacco Packing Machines
(Capacity Determination and Collection of Duty) Rules, 2010.
Place:
Date: Name, residential address and signature of
manufacturer/authorised agent”
103. ‘Chewing tobacco’ and preparations containing ‘chewing tobacco’
was found in Entry CETH 2404.41 by virtue of Notification No.13 of 2006
dated 01.03.2002 and it was covered under MRP-based assessment under
Section 4A of CE Act. On the advent of 8 (eight) digit tariff regime ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ was introduced under a separate head under ‘CET
SH 2403 9930’ and ‘chewing tobacco’ under the head ‘CET SH 2403 9910’
with effect from 28.02.2005. However, Notification No.2 of 2006 which was
issued in supersession of Notification No.13 of 2002 ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobacco’ was deleted or, in other words, such Entry was omitted.
104. In the light of the two products having been notified under Section
3A as ‘notified goods’ which is contemplated under Rule 2(c), it cannot be
gainsaid by the assessee that while adjudicating the declaration filed, the
issue of classification would not fall within the domain of the adjudicating
authority under Rule 6(2). In the event, that there has been improper
classification of the notified goods the adjudicating authority would be
empowered to rectify the misclassification, all the more, in a situation where
it has been misclassified with an intention to evade a higher rate of duty.
It is in the teeth of the same, that the expression “inquire, determine and
pass order” will acquire great significance under Rule 2(c). The declaration
which is required to be filed under Rule 6(1) by a manufacturer is of “notified
goods”. The said notified goods means as defined under Rule 2(c) which
reads as under:
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 637
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
“(c) “notified goods” means unmanufactured tobacco, bearing a brand
name, and chewing tobacco notified under sub-section (1) of section
3A of the Act by the notification of the Government of India in the
Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), No. 10/2010-Central
Excise (N.T.), dated the 27th February, 2010;”
105. From time to time, the notified goods came to be included or
excluded, which power vested with the rule-making authority and there
cannot be any quarrel on this proposition. The product zarda/jarda scented
tobacco, as noticed herein (supra) came to be notified under Section 3A (1)
of CE Act, 1994, with effect from 13.04.2010 and correspondingly the CTPM
Rules also came to be amended to cover zarda/jarda scented tobacco. As
such the assessee contended that the adjudicating authority would not be
within his powers to determine the classification.
106. A holistic reading of Rule 6 would indicate that the details
prescribed thereunder alone would be the subject matter of determination
concerning the annual capacity of production of the factory. The second
proviso to Rule 6 would clearly indicate that the Prescribed Authority
is empowered to modify the declaration on the facts obtained from such
declaration. While undertaking such exercise of determination and passing
orders concerning the annual capacity of production of the factory as
contemplated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 6, the Prescribed Authority would
have to take into consideration the issue relating to the classification of the
product. We say so for reasons more than one, firstly, the details required
to be furnished as prescribed under clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (1) of Rule
6 would indicate that apart from details mentioned therein, the declarant
will have to specify the description of goods to be manufactured without
specifying the classification entry to the Central Excise Tarif Act. On the
basis of such declaration filed by the assessee, the duty for a particular
month has to be calculated by application of the appropriate rate of duty
specified in the notification as indicated under Rule 7. Necessarily to
ascertain the duty payable, the issue of classification will have to be gone
into in an inquiry held under sub-rule (2) of Rule 6, as otherwise the
inquiry contemplated would become redundant or meaningless. Secondly,
to calculate the duty of the product, the condition precedent is the capacity
of the production. Thus, it becomes important to ascertain the capacity of
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
production first, which can only be done when the concerned authority is
acquainted with the product as described which would ultimately assist the
Competent Authority to classify the product under the appropriate tariff
head as provided under CETA. Thirdly, the rationale behind Rule 6(2)
is that, unless there is proper classification of the product, the Competent
Authority would not be in a position to ascertain the correct classification
under the tariff head and consequently would not be able to determine the
annual capacity of the production of the notified goods, which may lead
to improper calculation. This is more so, for every notified product may
not possess similar ingredients as that of the other product. It is trite law
that changes in the ingredient of a product can bring about change in the
production capacity, namely, affect the manufacturing process. Thus, in the
event of mis-description, wrong description or erroneous description or
intentional improper classification of the product manufactured would not
tie the hands of the Competent Authority from piercing the corporate veil to
ascertain the true nature of the product and reclassify the same, necessarily
after affording an opportunity of hearing which would be in compliance of
the doctrine of natural justice. The object sought to be achieved by this Rule
is to empower the Department to determine the annual capacity based on
the declaration of the assessee and such declaration would not be required
to be accepted in the event of there being an improper description of the
goods or product in the declaration so filed. In fact, declaration Form No.1
itself would indicate that in column No.15A, the declarant has agreed to
bind itself to pay any additional amount of excise duty on notified goods
manufactured by it by such declaration, if found to be untrue or incorrect.
This undertaking would reinforce the fact that even in case of acceptance
of such declaration by the Competent Authority, it does not preclude them
thereafter to demand the differential duty on account of short demand to
recover such duty, and necessarily complying with the principles of natural
justice.
107. As noticed hereinabove both the parties have relied upon the
judgment of this Court in CCE V. Cotspun (supra) whereunder this Court
has held that once there is the levy of excise duty on the basis of an approved
classification list, until the correctness of the approval of the question by
issuance of a show cause notice to the assessee, same cannot be disturbed.
It has been further held that levy of excise duty on the basis of an approved
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 639
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
notification is not a short levy. It was also held that differential duty cannot
be recovered on the basis that it is a short levy and revised assessment could
be made effective prospectively from the date of the show cause notice and
not with reference to earlier removals made under an approved classification
list. In this background, it came to be held that as long as classification
list subsists, the differential duty cannot be claimed on the same product.
108. It has to be noticed that in Cotspun (supra) the assessee was
manufacturing NES Yarn and the classification list was filed by the
manufacturer as required under Rule 173-B of the Central Excise Rules,
1944 and same had been approved by the Competent Authority and it was
accordingly classified under old Tariff Item No.19-I(2)(a) and (2)(e). Notice
to reopen the assessment for the period February 1977 to May 1977 was
issued on the ground that the NES Yarn ought to have been classified under
old Tariff Item No.19-I(2)(f) and the differential duty was demanded. This
was followed by a second show cause notice and subsequently amended
by corrigendum. The adjudicating authority upheld the contention of the
assessee by arriving at a conclusion that duty liability had been ascertained
based on an approved classification list, and the question of short levy did
not arise. However, the appellate authority allowed the appeal and confirmed
the demand. On appeal, the tribunal held the revised assessment could be
made effective only prospectively, namely, from the date of show cause
notice, not earlier. This Court took note of the fact that the assessee was
required to file before the appropriate Excise Officer, for approval, a list of
the goods that he proposes to clear and the said list indicated that details to
be found in such approval list filed before the Appropriate Authority which
not only include the description of the goods produced or manufactured by
the declarant but also provided the tariff entry under which the goods that
the declarant intends to remove would fall and the rate of duty leviable
thereon, apart from other particulars, as prescribed under sub-rule (2) of
Rule 173-B. It is these details which had been furnished by the assessee in
Cotspun’s case (supra) which had been accepted and while justifying its
demand of reclassification, would operate retrospectively by relying upon
Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rule, 1944, which is similar to the contention
raised in the present case. However, this contention did not find favour by
this Court on the ground that Rule 173-B dealt with the classification list and
Proper Officer ought to have made inquiry and approve the list with such
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
modifications as was considered necessary, after such inquiry, as he deems fit,
unless otherwise directed by the Proper Officer, determine the duty payable
on the goods intended to be removed in accordance with such list vide sub-
rule (2) of Rule 173-B. Whereas the corresponding Rule 6 in the instant
case does not indicate or remotely suggest declaration of such classification
is required to be made. However, Rule 6(2) only prescribes the description
of the goods to be specified by the declarant in his declaration. Hence, this
would result in casting additional onerous responsibility on the Competent
Authority to undertake the exercise of ascertaining as to the nature of
the goods and its classification under CETA for proper determination of
production capacity of the machine. It would also be apposite to note the
judgment of this Court in CCE v. Srivallabh Glass Works Ltd. (2003) 11
SCC 341 whereunder the Cotspun’s case (supra) was distinguished on
facts and held that Cotspun’s case (supra) only lays down that so far as
classification list subsists, the differential duty cannot be claimed on the
same product mentioned in the classification list, however, if the product
being cleared is different from the one mentioned in the classification list,
the principles enunciated in Cotspun’s case (supra) would not be applicable.
In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the Revenue
has the power and jurisdiction to determine the classification for specific
Entry within which the product is to be declared or classified and the issue
of classification can be the subject matter of adjudication/ decision under
sub-rule (2). A declaration made under Rule 6 resulting in the determination
and passing of the order under sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 would not preclude the
Department or Revenue from issuing notice under Section 11A or Section
11AC of CE Act where there is wilful misstatement or suppression of fact
leading to what levy or non-levy of the duty.
109. In the instant case, the declaration confined to ‘chewing tobacco’
falling under CET SH 2403 9910. However, during the course of such
inquiry, the Competent Authority would be competent to examine as to
whether the product would fall within the notified goods. In the instant case,
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ was specified as notified goods under Section
3A by Notification No.17 of 2010 dated 13.04.2010 and the CTPM Rules
also correspondingly had been amended on the same day i.e., 13.04.2010
by Notification No.18 of 2010. Thus, taking into within its sweep the said
‘notified goods’ as defined under Rule 2(c) of CTPM Rules for the purposes
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 641
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
of classification and this exercise undertaken by the Competent Authority
cannot be found fault with. Hence, we record our finding on the questions
formulated hereinabove as under:
(1) What is the purpose of the declaration filed under Rule 6 of CTPM
Rules?
ANSWER: To ascertain the details of the product to be manufactured
and the nature of the product for purposes of fixing the packing capacity
of the machine and determine the duty.
(2) What are the parameters which are required to be examined,
determined, and adjudicated under Rule 6 by the Prescribed Authority?
ANSWER: To inquire and determine the correctness of the details
furnished under the declaration, namely, Form No.1.
(3) Whether the Competent Authority have the power and jurisdiction
to determine the classification or specific entry within which the
declared product is to be classified?
OR
Whether the issue of classification of a product can be the subject matter
of adjudication/decision under Rule 6(2) of CTPM Rules?
ANSWER: Yes.
(4) Whether a declaration made under Rule 6 has any nexus to the
classification of the product?
ANSWER: Yes, for the purpose of determining the packing capacity
and corresponding duty.
(5) Whether on account of classification by such declaration, would
preclude the Department from issuing a Notice under Section 11A or
11AC of CE Act, 1944?
ANSWER: No, if there is improper or misdeclaration or improper
declaration.
110. In the light of the findings recorded herein above, we are of the
considered view that the impugned orders of the tribunal would not be
sustainable and the order of the adjudicating authority deserves to be
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
upheld, consequently these appeals deserves to be allowed, except Civil
Appeal arising out of Diary No. 3487 of 2020 which is directed against the
order dated 06.11.2019 passed by the CESTAT in Excise Appeal No. 70242
of 2018., which stand on a different footing and hence the said appeal is
taken up for consideration and disposed of by the following order.
111. The appellant-assessee filed an abatement claim amounting to Rs.
1,99,41,935/- before the Deputy/Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise,
Division-II, Noida under Rule 10 of CTPM Rules. The said claim was
adjudicated and by order dated 30.3.2016 was allowed. However, under
the very same order the said amount which was allowed to be distributed to
the assessee by cash was ordered to be appropriated under Rule 9 of CTPM
Rules read with Section 11 of CE Act.
112. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, an appeal came to be
filed before the Commissioner who by order dated 31.08.2017 upheld the
order-in-original dated 30.03.2016 to the extent of appropriation of central
excise duty of Rs.1,82,56,000/- and set aside to the extent of interest of
Rs.18,59,042/ levied.
113. Being aggrieved by the same, appeal was filed before the CESTAT
in Excise Appeal No.70242 of 2018 contending before the tribunal that
the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30.03.2016 is in violation of
natural justice, namely, in the grounds of appeal before this Court it has been
urged the impugned order passed by the tribunal it had failed to address the
issue of abatement of Rs. 1,96,67,556/-. On perusal of the case papers and
after hearing the learned advocates appearing for the parties, we notice that
the tribunal has failed to examine this issue. Hence, on the short ground
of tribunal having not examined this issue, the appeal deserves to be
allowed. Accordingly, Civil Appeal arising out of Diary No. 3487 of 2020
is allowed and the matter is remitted to the tribunal for adjudication
de novo on merits. We have not expressed any opinion on merits, and
contentions of both the parties on the issue of abatement is kept open.
V. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GOODS AND SERVICE TAX
V. M/S TEJ RAM DHARAM PAUL - CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3596
OF 2023
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 643
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
BRIEF FACTS
114. The period of dispute in this group is May 2015 to December
2015. The assessee claims the product to be classified under CET SH 2403
9910 i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’, whereas the Revenue contends that the product
ought to have been classified under CET SH 2403 9930 i.e., ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’. Coming to the facts of this appeal, the assessee submitted
Form No.1 before the jurisdictional Central Excise Division declaring that
they would manufacture ‘Mahapasand Zarda/Jarda Scented Tobacco’
and paid duty accordingly for the period from 10.03.2015 to 31.03.2015.
Thereafter, Form No.2 was submitted by the assessee, and duty was paid on
‘Zarda/Jarda Scented Tobacco’. The Revenue drew samples of the product
on 13.03.2015 and forwarded the same to the CRCL who by its report dated
23.03.2015 classified the product as ‘chewing tobacco’. Accordingly, the
assessee was informed on 27.04.2015 that the product is to be classified as
‘chewing tobacco’.
115. Accordingly, the appellant-assessee submitted revised Form No.1
on 23.05.2015 and informed that they would manufacture ‘chewing tobacco’.
Notification No.25 of 2015 which came into effect from 30.04.2015 under
which the rate of duty for packing machine per month was notified on
1.03.2015. Hence, the Department drew fresh samples under Panchnama
dated 29.05.2015 and forwarded the same to CRCL for obtaining the report.
The CRCL forwarded the report on 20.07.2015 without classifying the
product. On being asked to classify the tariff entry by the Revenue, the
Chemical Examiner vide communication dated 27.07.2015 refused to do
so stating “assessing officers at various levels should not ask the Deputy
Chief Chemist/Chemical Examiner to give the tariff classification”, citing
para 70 (B) and (C) of manual of the Revenue Laboratories. Thereafter,
on 04.12.2015 Revenue visited the premises of the assessee again and took
samples which came to be recorded in Panchnama and forwarded the same to
CRCL for fresh reports. In the meanwhile, the Competent Authority passed
the capacity determination order on 18.12.2015 under Rule 6(2) of CTPM
Rules holding that the product manufactured by the appellant-assessee for the
period from May 2015 to December 2015 is ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’.
On 21.12.2015 assessee was called upon to deposit differential duty along
with interest and same was deposited under protest.
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
116. On 01.07.2016 a show cause notice was issued demanding
duty, interest, and penalty under Section 11A, 11AA, and 11AC read with
relevant Rules which came to be adjudicated by OIO dated 18.03.2021
whereunder the demand made under the show cause notice was affirmed.
In the interregnum, the assessee challenged the capacity determination
order No.24 of 2015 dated 18.12.2015 before the Commissioner (Appeal-I)
who dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was premature as the issue
relating to the classification was pending since the show cause notice dated
01.07.2016 had already been issued and it was yet to be decided vide order
dated 06.12.2016. Aggrieved by the same an appeal was filed before the
tribunal and tribunal held that issue of classification was open and it was
to be decided by the adjudicating authority. Subsequently, OIO came to be
passed on 18.03.2021, confirming the duty demand and further ordered for
appropriation of the amount specified thereunder, apart from imposing of
penalty. Being aggrieved by the same, appeal was filed before the tribunal
which came to be allowed and the order dated 18.03.2021 was set aside.
Hence, this appeal by the Revenue.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
117. Ms. Nisha Bagchi, the learned counsel for the Revenue, criticized
the tribunal’s decision, arguing that it did not examine the definitions in the
IS glossary and ignored the CRCL report dated 14.12.2015. She argued
that adding scent to Zarda would change the product’s character to ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’. Ms. Bagchi also cited the assessee’s representative’s
statements and the fact that the product was previously classified as
‘Mahapasand zarda/jarda scented tobaccot’ for March and April 2015 but
was later changed to ‘Mahapasand chewing tobacco (without lime tube)’
for May 2015 to December 2015. Ms. Bagchi argued that the assessee’s
dual stand at different times depending on the rate of duty the product
attracted was evident in Notification No.25 of 2015, which fixed the duty
per packing machine/per month. In reply, Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellant-assessee has not only relied upon
the communication dated 27.04.2015 (Annexure A-7) but also the CRCL
Report dated 23.03.2015 which would indicate that the consistent stand of
the Department itself was that the product manufactured by the assessee is
‘chewing tobacco’ and as such the impugned order of the tribunal would
not warrant interference.
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 645
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
118. The assessee argued that the Revenue’s assumption that adding
certain flavours to ‘zarda scented tobacco’ is incorrect, as these additives
only enhance the taste and assessment of the product as a ‘chewing tobacco’,
and do not change the basic characteristics. It was also contended that
‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ having not been
defined under the statute, the principles of trade parlance must be resorted
to, which is its popular meaning and understanding by those people using
the product and not scientific and technical. The assessee also harped upon
the contention that the last report dated 14.12.2015 of the CRCL is an
‘induced opinion’. It was further contended that the Revenue had failed to
establish or demonstrate that the product is not ‘chewing tobacco’ and the
cross-examination of the Chemical Examiner reflected that she had failed to
substantiate her report as to the basis on which she opined that the product is
‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. Hence, relying upon the following judgments
the assessee has sought for the appeal to be dismissed:
‘1. Prabhat Zarda Factory v. Commr. Of Central Excise [2004 (163)
ELT 485 (Tri-Delhi)
2. Suresh Enterprises v. Commr. Of Central Excise, decided on
06.07.2006.
3. Yogesh Associates v. CCE, Surat-II (2005(188) ELT 251 (SC).
4. Gopal Zarda Udyog v. CCE, New Delhi 2005 (188) ELT 251
5. Dharam Pal Satyapal v. CCE New Delhi [2005 (183) ELT 241
(SC).’
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
119. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and on
perusal of the record it would emerge therefrom that the Form No.1 dated
05.03.2015 submitted by the assessee before the jurisdictional Central
Excises Division, Kundli, it had declared that they were manufacturing
‘Mahapasand zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. On 17.03.2015, Form No.2
was submitted by the assessee for the period 10.03.2015 to 31.03.2015,
and duty was paid for the said period as per declaration in Form No.1. On
13.05.2015 the Department by Panchnama on the same date, drew samples of
the product of the assessee’s product i.e., ‘Mahapasand zarda/jarda scented’
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
manufactured and forwarded the same to CRCL who by the opinion dated
23.05.2015 opined as under:
“TEST REPORT:
“The sample is in form of brown coloured dried pieces of vegetable
matter. It is a preparation containing tobacco, lime and flavouring
agents. It is other than Jarda Scented Tobacco. It has the characteristic
of Khaini”.
120. Based on the said report the Department by communication dated
27.04.2015 informed the assessee, the product being manufactured by the
assessee is classifiable under Chapter sub-heading 2403 9910 as ‘chewing
tobacco (other than filter Khaini)’ and as such called upon the assessee-
respondent to show cause as to why the Form No.1 dated 05.03.2015 should
not be rejected as the product manufactured by the respondent-assessee fell
in the category of ‘chewing tobacco (other than filter Khaini)’ and not under
sub-heading 2403 9930 – ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. Accordingly, the
assessee started submitting Form No.1 declaring the product manufactured
by it as ‘chewing tobacco’. This Court has consistently held the common
parlance test continues to be one of the determinative tests for the
classification of a product. In Commissioner of Central Excise v. Shri
Baidyanath Ayurved chewing tobacco (2009) 12 SCC 419, this Court has
held as under:
“49. The primary object of the Excise Act is to raise revenue for
which various products are differently classified in the new Tariff Act.
Resort should, in the circumstances, be had to popular meaning and
understanding attached to such products by those using the product
and not to be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms
and expressions used. The approach of the consumer or user towards
the product, thus, assumes significance. What is important to be seen
is how the consumer looks at a product and what is his perception in
respect of such product. The user’s understanding is a strong factor
in determination of classification of the products.
61. In the matters of classification of goods, the principles that have
been followed by the courts—which we endorse—are that there may
not be justification for changing the classification without a change
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 647
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
in the nature or a change in the use of the product; something
more is required for changing the classification especially when
the product remains the same. Earlier decision on an issue inter
partes is a cogent factor in the determination of the same issue.
The applicability of maxim res judicata pro veritate accipitur in the
matters of classification of goods has to be seen in that perspective.”
121. Even the report of the Chemical Examiner clearly reflects that
it is ‘chewing tobacco’. In fact, it is the Revenue that has been taking
consistently inconsistent stand. In the first instance when Form No.1 was
filed by the assessee declaring the product ‘Mahapasand zarda scented
tobacco’, the Department drew samples from the factory premises,
obtained the CRCL Report, and called upon the assessee to reclassify its
product as ‘chewing tobacco’ under CET SH 2403 9910 and accordingly
the Form No.1 was filed by the assessee and duty paid in tune with the
declaration filed. It is only after Notification No.25 of 2015 came to be
issued revising the duty payable on ‘zarda scented tobacco’ that fresh
samples were drawn, and the Revenue started singing a new tune, and
thus called upon the assessee to declare the product manufactured by it as
‘zarda scented tobacco’. In the light of communication dated 27.04.2015
by the Revenue addressed to the assessee and calling upon the assessee
to classify its product as ‘chewing tobacco’ and the same having been
complied by the assessee it is too late in the day for the Department to
take a contrary stand.
122. The order of the tribunal has taken into account the aforestated
aspects to arrive at a conclusion that the declaration filed by the assessee
is just and proper, which does not suffer from any infirmity either on facts
or on law calling for our interference. Hence, the appeal filed by the
Department deserves to be rejected.
VI. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX
MEERUT II V. M/S SOM PAN PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. [DIARY
NO. 14581/19]
123. In the present group, the Revenue is in appeal challenging the
correctness and legality of order dated 25.09.2018 passed by CESTAT,
Allahabad, whereby the order passed by the authorities below treating the
product manufactured by the respondent as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
falling under CET SH 2403 9930 and allowing the appeal as a consequence
of the demands raised has been set aside.
BRIEF FACTS
124. The assessee after obtaining the registration under the CE Act
declared the product manufactured by them as ‘Jarda’ falling under CET
SH 2403 9930 and it was assessed to duty as ‘Jarda scented tobacco’. On
30.04.2015, the assessee filed a declaration effective from 01.05.2015,
declaring the product as Jarda, and on the same day separate rates for
‘Jarda scented tobacco’ and ‘chewing tobacco’ were notified having a
vast difference with respect to the duty leviable on ‘chewing tobacco’.
The Assistant Commissioner confirmed the duty on ‘Jarda/Zarda scented
tobacco’ and thereafter the assessee vide communication dated 12.05.2015
sought to correct its declaration and intended to shift the product to tariff
heading CET SH 2403 9910 (chewing tobacco) instead of CET SH 2403
9930 i.e., ‘jarda/zarda scented tobacco’. The Assistant Commissioner by
communication dated 18.05.2015 rejected the request and by communication
dated 20.05.2015 called upon the assessee to furnish a complete list of all
ingredients used for the manufacturing of the product with write-up and
flow chart duly certified. The assessee paid the duty under protest for the
month of May 2015 though he has filed a revised declaration. The Assistant
Commissioner vide order dated 02.06.2015 rejected the proposed change
in classification and raised the demand for the months of June 2015 to
September 2015 and this order was confirmed by the appellate authority
on 12.01.2016. A separate show cause notice dated 04.05.2016 was issued
claiming differential duty on May 2015 which was confirmed vide order
dated 16.03.2017 and the appellate tribunal set aside both the orders, namely,
dated 12.01.2016 and 16.03.2017. The assessee’s attempt to contend that
what was manufactured by it was ‘chewing tobacco’ by relying upon the
sale invoices before the tribunal was successful and it was held that the
product manufactured by the petitioner was ‘chewing tobacco’. Hence, the
Revenue is in appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES
125. Ms. Nisha Bagchi, learned standing counsel for the Revenue,
would contend that post facto declaration by the assessee would not be valid
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 649
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
in view of Rule 6,7,9 of CTPM Rules. She would contend that the assessee
in its declaration had clearly declared the product in manufactured by it
as, zarda scented tobacco, based on which the duty would be payable. The
tribunal committed an error in proceeding on the basis that it is the case of
the Revenue that assessee had manufactured Zarda by showing the same as
CT though the assessee itself had declared manufacturing of zarda product.
She would submit that the statutory provisions do not provide any definition
of the two competing terms and the goods would be classified as per general
commercial parlance. She would further contend that the assessee had failed
to demonstrate cogent evidence, that it manufactured chewing tobacco
during the relevant period. Hence, she prays for the appeal being allowed.
126. The learning counsel appearing for the assessee would rely upon
the registration form submitted to the department whereunder the list of
ingredients used in the manufacture of the product had been specified and
nowhere it is stated that scent was being used for the product and as such
the department ought to have rebutted the ingredients furnished by the
assessee. It is submitted that the assessee never declared the manufacture of
ZST and even otherwise no testing of the product is carried out despite the
request made by the assessee. It is submitted that the particulars furnished
by the assessee classifying the product as ‘zarda’ under CET SH 2403 9930
would by itself not make the product as such and as has been contended
by the revenue, it would be the product which was manufactured by the
assessee which would matter for determination of duty. Hence, the assessee
has prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
127. We have heard Smt. Nisha Bagchi, appearing for the appellant-
Revenue, and Ms. Seema Jain appearing for the respondent-assessee.
128. A valiant attempt was made by Ms. Nisha Bagchi to contend that
the tribunal erred in appreciating the fact that the onus of establishing the
change in classification was on the assessee and it ought not to have looked
into the IS glossary to arrive at a conclusion that the product manufactured
by the respondent-assessee was ‘chewing tobacco’. Hence, she has prayed
for setting aside the order of the tribunal. Per contra, learned counsel for
the assessee has supported the order of the tribunal.
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
129. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties we
notice that the tribunal has assigned the following reason for accepting the
plea of the assessee: -
“Admittedly in the present case the appellants have marketed their
product as chewing tobacco and not as Jarda scented tobacco. Revenue
has neither disputed the manufacturing process undertaken by the
appellant which shows non-use of any scent or perfume in the product
nor have made any enquiries from the dealers, shopkeepers or the
ultimate consumers of the product. No evidence of procurement of
Perfume or Scent as raw material and then use in the product stands
produced by the. Revenue. No employee of the assessee was examined
so as to establish that perfume being used for manufacture of their final
product. As such the said factor of marketing of the goods as chewing
tobacco leads us to inevitable conclusion apart from other reasons as
discussed above, that the product in question is admittedly chewing
tobacco and not Jarda scented tobacco.”
130. The aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the tribunal is just and
proper based on appreciation of factual matrix which would not call for
interference. Hence the appeal is dismissed.
VII. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & ST ALWAR V.
TARA CHAND NARESH CHAND [C.A NO.959 OF 2019]
BRIEF FACTS
131. In the last group, in this batch of appeals before this Court,
the Revenue is calling in question the order dated 28.03.2018 passed by
CESTAT in Excise Appeal No.51953 of 2017 whereunder the order dated
27.09.2017 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise classifying the
product manufactured by the respondent-assessee as ‘chewing tobacco’
falling under CET SH 2403 9910, as against the claim of the Revenue of
the said product falling under CET SH 2403 9930.
132. The respondent assessee had filed Form 1 declaring the product
manufactured by it as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ which came to be
adjudicated and accordingly an order came to be passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, whereunder the product of the assessee was classified by
him as ‘chewing tobacco’. The assessee filled another form on 28.04.2015
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 651
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
describing the product as “Jayanti zarda/jarda scented” classifying the
product under CET SH 2403 9910, culminating in another determination
order dated 05.05.2015, wherein the Deputy Commissioner classified the
product as ‘chewing tobacco’ under CET SH 2403 9910.
133. A search was conducted by the Director General of Central Excise
in the factory of the petitioner after drawing the panchnama and recording
the statement of Shri. Tara Chand Jain, partner of the assessee-firm. The
samples were forwarded for chemical examination. The chemical examiner
opined that the samples had a characteristic odour of odoriferous substances
vide report dated 07.03.2016. Hence, a show cause notice dated 24.02.2017
came to be issued alleging that during the period March 2015 to February
2016, the assessee manufactured the product using the process in which
tobacco was ground and mixed with lime, menthol, synthetic flavouring
perfumes, compound, etc. and was labelled as “Jayanti Brand Zarda”.
Hence, alleging central excise duty amounting to Rs.4.81 crores was short
paid and the demand came to be raised. The said show cause notice came
to be adjudicated and the demand was confirmed. However, no penalty
was imposed. The tribunal by the impugned order has allowed the appeal
on the ground that the department itself had declared the classification as
‘chewing tobacco’ though the assessee had declared the same as ‘jarda/
zarda scented tobacco’ and as such by relying upon its order rendered in
Urmin products private Ltd allowed the appeal. Hence, the Revenue has
filed the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
134. We have heard the arguments of Nisha Bagchi, learned standing
counsel appearing for the Revenue appellant and Mr. A.R. Madhav Rao,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent assessee. It is the contention of
the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue that the tribunal committed
an error in arriving at a conclusion that the classification of the product
is ‘chewing tobacco’ and not ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. She would
contend that the Commissioner had examined the process of manufacture
and taken into consideration the test reports of CRCL in the light of tariff
heading and the trade opinion, including the statement of two customers
to conclude that the product is ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’. She would
submit that the tribunal erroneously applied the principles laid down in
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
Urmin products and Flakes N Flavours without applying its mind to the
present case. She would contend that the tribunal has merely relied upon the
communication of the superintendent of excise whereunder the assesses’s
prayer to classify the product as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ had been
rejected and classified the same as ‘chewing tobacco’ to set aside the order
in original which classified the product manufactured by the assessee as
‘chewing tobacco’.
135. She would submit that there can be no dispute to the proposition
that there cannot be estoppel in taxation proceedings and Section 11A of
the CE Act, which permits demand within a normal period of limitation.
Hence, she seeks for the appeal to be allowed.
136. Per contra, Shri A.R. Madhav Rao, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-assessee would contend that there can be no short levy for the
past period, particularly in the present case, since the declaration filed by the
assessee was approved. He would further contend that no appeals had been
filed against the approval of the classification and said orders had become
final. He would also add that ISI’s specification and glossary are applicable
to determine the classification in the absence of any definition of ‘chewing
tobacco’ preparations for ‘chewing tobacco’ and ‘zarda/jarda scented
tobaccot’ or any test prescribed by the CBIC. He would contend that the
burden of classification or change of classification of a product is always on
Revenue and the same has not been discharged. He would contend that there
ought to be uniformity in classification. By relying upon the judgment of this
Court in Damodar J. Malpani Vs. CCE reported in (2004) 12 SCC 70 in a
case relating to ‘chewing tobacco’ itself, it was held that where the process
adopted has been scrutinized and the Revenue in the case of one assessee
has classified the product as ‘unmanufactured tobacco’ falling under heading
24.01 as it stood then, another assessee following the same process cannot
be discriminated and there should be uniformity in classification. He would
contend that verification contemplated under Rule 6(2) of CTPM rules 2010
is not confined to a verification of only the number of machines installed in
the applicant’s premises and the description of the product and classification
of the same is also verified and this is evident from the fact wherein physical
verification of the respondent’s product apart from the verification of the
machines had been done when it attempted to change the classification of
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 653
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
the product from ‘chewing tobacco’ to ‘zarda/jarda scented tobaccot’ and
same was turned down. He would submit that notification under Section 3A
for the period in question (i.e., March 2015 to February 2016) covered four
different products each having a different deemed capacity of production
and rate, which was a function of the speed of packing for some products.
Therefore, the department would necessarily have to classify the appropriate
tariff entry in order to pass orders determining the monthly deemed capacity
and duty to be paid by the applicant. He would submit that even the monthly
returns depict the product of the respondent-assessee as ‘chewing tobacco’
has been scrutinized and assessed to be correct for the relevant period. By
referring to Rule 12 of Central Excise Rules 2002, he would contend that
filing of the returns would be applicable to notified goods under Section 3A
and said returns are required to be scrutinized and assessed by which process
there would be verification of the product manufactured by the assessee and
classification of the same. Hence, by relying upon the following judgments
he prays for the dismissal of the appeal.
a) Collector of Central Excise, Baroda vs. Cotspun Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC
633
b) Union of India vs. Delhi Cloth and General Mills 1963 Supp. 1
SCR 586.
c) Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs. Krishna Carbon Paper Co.
(1989) 1 SCC 150
d) Coastal Paper Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Vishakhapatnam (2015) 10 SCC 664
e) Parle Agro Pvt. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Commercial Tax,
Trivandrum (2017) 7 SCC 540
f) Damodar J. Malpani and anr v. Collector of Central Excise (2004)
12 SCC 70
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
137. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties
and perused the records. At the outset, we would like to make it explicitly
clear that the tribunal though has relied upon the judgment of Urmin and
Flakes-n-flavourz, apart from assigning other reasons, in the facts and
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
circumstances obtained in the present case, we have proceeded to examine
the rival contentions, notwithstanding the findings recorded by the tribunal
in Urmin Products and Flakes-n-flavourz which are the subject matter of
Civil Appeal No.10159-161 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No.5146 of 2015,
which has been adjudicated by us under this common order itself by
assigning separate and independent reasons and the facts of the said case are
distinguished from the facts of the present case. This view also gets fortified
by the very fact that in the instant case, an inquiry was conducted in respect
of assessee’s product and the superintendent in-charge of the respondent’s
factory furnished the reports to the Deputy Commissioner on 04.03.2015
after visiting the factory of the assessee, inspected the machines and the
product manufactured, since the assessee had declared in Form 1 to the
effect that the product manufactured by it is ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’.
In the said report the superintendent has opined as under:
“As regards the assessee’s letter dated 02.03.2015 regarding amendment
in their Registration by changing the CETSH of their final product form
24039910 (Chewing Tobacco) to 24039930 (Jarda Scented Tobacco),
it is submitted that looking to the production process/ingredients the
product is already correctly classified under CETSH 24039910 and
does not merit classification under the CETSH 24039930, as claimed
by the assessee.”
138. Thus, it is clear that the stand of the assessee has been consistent
to the effect that product manufactured by it is to be classified as ‘zarda/
jarda scented tobacco’ and at the insistence of the jurisdictional Deputy
Commissioner the assessee was classifying the goods under CET SH
2403 9910 i.e., ‘chewing tobacco’, for which there was also an order
of determination passed under Rule 6(2) of CTPM rules. Whereas in
the other matters, namely Urmin and Flakes-n-Flavourz, the facts were
entirely different. In Urmin Products the assessee had declared the product
as ‘chewing tobacco’ and then changed the classification to ‘zarda/jarda
scented tobacco’ and again came back to the original position of declaring
it or classifying it as ‘chewing tobacco’. These classifications in Urmin
Products were at the behest of the assessee himself. In Flakes-n-Flavourz,
the assessee was alleged to be manufacturing ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’
and clearing it as ‘chewing tobacco’, and on facts it was found that there
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 655
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
were additives added to the tobacco. In the said case this Court on facts
held that there was no wilful suppression attributable to the assesssee and
the Revenue had failed to establish the product as ‘zarda scented tobaccot’.
139. In the instant case the assessee had clearly declared his product
as ‘zarda/jarda scented tobacco’ falling under sub-heading 2403 9930 in
Form 1 filed and based on the said declaration, capacity determination order
dated 04.03.2015 under rule 6(2) had been passed re-classifying the product
as ‘chewing tobacco’. Accordingly, for the period April 2015 in Form-1
the assessee had described the product as ‘Jayanti Zarda Scented- 2403
9910’. However, in the capacity determination order dated 05.05.2015, the
Deputy Commissioner classified the goods as ‘chewing tobacco’. As such,
there was no misstatement or suppression of facts, collusion, or fraud in
the instant case and hence on facts, the principles enunciated in Urmin’s
case is distinguishable. It may be noted that this court in the case of CCE
vs. Damnet Chemicals Private Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 490 had held:
“26. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to hold that there has been
conscious or deliberate withholding of information by the assessee.
There has been no wilful misstatement much less any deliberate and
wilful suppression of facts. It is settled law that in order to invoke the
proviso to Section 11-A(1) a mere misstatement could not be enough.
The requirement in law is that such misstatement or suppression of
facts must be wilful. We do not propose to burden this judgment with
various authoritative pronouncements except to refer the judgment of
this Court in Anand Nishikawa Co. Ltd. v. CCE [(2005) 7 SCC 749 :
(2005) 188 ELT 149] wherein this Court held : (SCC p. 759, para 27)
“27. … we find that ‘suppression of facts’ can have only one meaning
that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to evade
payment of duty. When facts were known to both the parties, the
omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must
have done, would not render it suppression. It is settled law that
mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression. There
must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to find wilful
suppression.”
(emphasis supplied)
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R.
27. It is clear from the material available on record that the Excise
Authorities had inspected the manufacture process, collected the
necessary information and details from the respondent assessee and even
collected the samples and sent for chemical analysis. The authorities were
aware of the tests and analysis reports of the products manufactured by
the respondent assessee. The relevant facts were very much within the
knowledge of the Department authorities. The Department did not make
any attempt to lead any evidence that there was any wilful misstatement
or suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty.”
140. In the facts of the present case, there has been no penalty levied
under Rule 26 on the ground that there has been no intent to evade duty. In
fact, the commissioner in his order dated 27.09.2017 concludes at para 48.2
to the following effect:
“..in view of the above there is no fraud or collusion or any wilful
misstatement or separation of facts with intent to evade payment of
duty to invoke the provisions of Section 11A (4) of Central Excise Act,
1944 in the present case.”
141. It is also pertinent to note that on 04.03.2015 the respondent-assessee
sought to make a change in the registration certificate and claimed that the
product manufactured by it was zarda/jarda. However, the appellant-Revenue
called upon the respondent to withdraw the application for registration as
‘zarda’ and to show it only as ‘chewing tobacco’ and thereafter application
showing the product as ‘chewing tobacco’ came to be filed on 06.07.2015,
and accordingly said application was allowed on 23.07.2015 vide annexure
A-45 (volume II of the counter affidavit). Thus, the registration certificate
itself reflects the product as ‘chewing tobacco’. This court in the case of CCE
vs. Tata Tech Ltd (2008) 11 STR 449 (SC) has held;
“there cannot be a demand against the classification under which the
product is registered without undoing the classification of the product
in the registration certificate”.
142. For the reasons aforestated we are of the considered view that
the findings of the tribunal warrant no interference by this Court and
the appeal has to fail.
COMMR. OF CEN. EXC. AHMEDABAD v. M/S URMIN 657
PRODUCTS P. LTD. AND OTHERS [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]
143. We place on record our deep appreciation for the able assistance
rendered by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, in not only
making available compilation of statutory provisions, notifications, and
circulars prevalent at the relevant time, but also their erudite elucidation of
arguments which are noted hereinabove, which enabled this Court to arrive
at the conclusions recorded hereinabove.
Resultantly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
(a) Civil Appeal Nos.10159-10161 of 2010, Civil Appeal No.…….. of
2023 arising out of Diary No.44912 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No…….
of 2023 arising out of Dairy NO.6888 of 2020 are hereby allowed.
(b) Civil Appeal No. 5146 of 2015, Civil Appeal No. 2469 of 2020
along with Civil Appeals arising out of Diary No.(s) 3492, 2810, 3484,
3513, 3536, 3544, 3545 and 3547 of 2020, Civil Appeal No. 3596 of
2023, Civil Appeal No. arising out of Diary No. 14581 of 2019 and
Civil Appeal No. 959 of 2019 are hereby dismissed.
(c) Civil Appeal No. ______ of 2023 arising out of Diary No. 3487 of
2020 stands remitted to the Tribunal for adjudication afresh in light of
observations made in paragraph no. 110 and 113 of group number – 4
appeals (i.e., Dharampal Premchand group)
(d) Costs made easy.
Headnotes prepared by: Appeals disposed of.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
Assisted by: Shubhanshu Das, LCRA
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