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Supreme Court of India

"COMMON CAUSE", A REGISTERED SOCIETY THROUGH ITS DIRECTORversusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Citation
1996 INSC 1402
Decided
28 November 1996
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

The earlier directions for discharge or acquittal do not apply where trial pendency is caused by the accused’s own actions, and the specified categories of offences are excluded from such relief, with courts mandated to restore proceedings against discharged/acquitted persons for those offences.

Summary

The Supreme Court issued a clarificatory order modifying its earlier judgment (1 May 1996) in Writ Petition (C) No. 1128 of 1986, which had provided for discharge or acquittal of accused whose criminal trials were pending for a prescribed period. The Court held that the relief does not apply where the pendency is caused wholly or partly by the accused’s own dilatory tactics or actions that prolong the trial. It defined ‘commencement of trial’ for sessions courts (charges framed under CrPC s.228), warrant cases by magistrates (charges framed under s.240 or s.246), and summons cases (questioning under s.251). The order added several categories of offences—matrimonial offences (IPC s.498‑A), offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act (s.138), criminal misappropriation and breach of trust, IPC s.304‑A, and offences affecting public health, safety, and morals—to the list excluded from the earlier relief. Courts were directed to restore cases against discharged or acquitted accused for these added offences within three months, while confirming that cases already closed for other offences would not be reopened. The petition was disposed of.

Issues considered

  • The scope of the Supreme Court's earlier directions on discharge/acquittal of accused in pending criminal cases.
  • Whether pendency attributable to the accused's own dilatory tactics bars the application of those directions.
  • The proper interpretation of ‘pendency of trial’ and ‘non‑commencement of trial’ under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • The inclusion of specific offences (e.g., matrimonial offences, Section 138 NI Act, Section 304A IPC) within the exclusion from the earlier relief.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Article 21right to speedy trialdischarge and acquittalpendency of criminal casesdilatory tacticsCode of Criminal ProcedureIndian Penal CodeNegotiable Instruments Actmatrimonial offencescriminal breach of trustSection 304Apublic health offencesSupreme Court clarificatory order

Judgment

A               "COMMON CAUSE", A REGISTERED SOCIETY
                       THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR
                                            v.
                           UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                                NOVEMBER 28, 1996
B
               [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

            Constitution of India, 1950: Article 21

C         Right to lif,,_Speedy llial-Earlier judgment* of Supreme Cowt regard-
  ing discharge or acquittal of undemial prisoners-Modification and clarifica-
  tion of earlier judgment-Held, accused concemed are not entitled to eam
  any discharge or acquittal as per paragraphs 2(a) to 2(f) of earlier judgment
  if it is demonstrated that the accused concemed seek to take advantage of
  their wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction of trials
D against them-Phrase "pending of tlials" as employed in paragraphs from 1(a)
  to 1(c) and the phrase 'non-commencement of trial' as employed in para-
  graphs from 2(b) to 2(f) explained-Additions made in the list of offences to
  which directions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of earlier judgment shall
  not apply.
E
            *Common Cause, A registered Society v. Union of India, [1996] 4 SCC
    33, referred to.

            CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 1128 of
    1986.
F
            (Under Article 32 of the. Constitution of India.)

            H.D. Shourie, Petitioner-in-Person.

            Guntur Prabhakar, R.B. Misra, B.B. Singh, (J.R. Das for Sinha &
G Das, Anip Sachthey, ·A.s. Bhasme, S.K. Agnihotri, Pravir Choudhary, R.
  Sasiprabhu, P.R .. Seetharaman, M. Veerappa, Raj Kumar Mehta, G.K.
  Bansal, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Ashok Mathur, S.K. Nandy, Ms. Indu Mal-
  hotra, Naresh K. Sharma, Krishnamurthi Swami, P.K. Manohar, Ms.
  Kamini Jaiswal, Kailash Vasdev, Ms. S. Janani, Gopal Singh, Ms. H. Wahi,
  D.N. Mukherjee, Shreepal Singh, D.M. Nargolkar and D.N. Mukherjee for
H the Respondents.
                                    296
               COMMON CAUSE A REGD. SOCY. v. U.0.1.                    297

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :                        A
      We have heard learned counsel appearing for the concerned parties
in the present proceedings. Having given our anxious consideration to their
contentions, we deem it fit to clarify/modify our judgment dated 1st May
1996 in Writ Petition (C) No. 1128 of 1986 as under :
                                                                              B
     I.   The time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal
          cases in patagraphs from 2( a) to 2(!) of our judgment shall not
          apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceed-
          ings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted
          by the concerned accused or on account of any other action of C
          the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words
          it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained
          pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid
          clauses of paragraph 2 despite full cooperation by the concerned
          accused to get these proceedings disposed of the delay in the
          disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the concerned D
          accused, nor such delay is caused on account of such accused
          getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher courts. Accused
          concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as
          per paragraphs 2(a) to 2(!) of our judgment if it is demonstrated
          that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own E
          wrong or any other action of their own resulting in protraction
          of trials against them.

      II. The phrase 'pendency of trials' as employed in paragraphs from
          l(a) to l(c) and the phrase 'non-commencement of trial' as
          employed in paragraphs from 2(b) to 2(!) shall be construed as      F
          under:

          (i) In cases df trials before Sessions Court the trial shall be
          treated to have commenced when charges are framed under
          Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the          G
          concerned cases.

          (ii) In cases of trials of warrant cases by magistrates if the cases
          are instituted upon police reports the trials shall be treated to
          have commended when charges are framed under Section 240 of
          the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 while in trials of warrant H
    298                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19%] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A             cases by magistrates when cases are instituted otherwise than on
              police report such trials shall be treated to have commended
              when charges are framed against the concerned accused under
              Section 246 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

              (iii) In cases of trials of summons cases by magistrates the trials
B             would be considered to have commended when the accused who
              appear or are brought before the magistrate are asked under
              Section 251 whether they plead guilty or have any defence to
              make.
          ID. In paragraph 4 of our judgment in the list of offences to which
c             directions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply, the
              following additions shall be made :

                (n) matrimonial offences under Indian Penal Code including
            Section 498-A or under any other law for the time being in force;
            (o) offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act including of-
            fences under Section 138 thereof; (p) offences relating to criminal
            misappropriation of property of the complainant as well as offen-
            ces relating to criminal breach of trust under India Penal Code or
            under any other law for the time being in force; (q) offences under
            Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Cnde or any offence pertaining
E           to rash and negligent acts which are made punishable under any
            other law for the time being in forw; (r) c:>ffences affecting the
            public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals as listed in
            Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code or such offences under any
            other law for the time being in force.
F
               It is further directed that in criminal cases pertaining to offen-
            ces mentioned under the above additional categories (n) to (r)
            wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to
            our judgment dated 1st May 1996 and they are liable to be
            proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order
G           and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted as aforesaid,
            the concerned criminal court shall suo motu or on application by
            the concerned aggrieved parties shall issue within three months of
            the receipt of this clarificatory order at their end, summons or
            warrants, as the case may be, to such discharged or acquitted
H           accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them for being
                    COMMON CAUSEAREGD.SOCY. v. U.O.l.                       299

             proceeded further in accordance with law.                             A
                It is however made clear that in trials regarding other offences
             which are covered by the time limit specified in our eerlier order
             dated 1st May 1996 wherein the concerned accused are already
             acquitted or discharged pursuant to the said order, such acquitted
             or discharged accused shall not be liable to be recalled for facing   B
             such trials pursuan.t to the present clarificatory order which qua
             such offences will be treated to be purely prospective "imd no such
             cases which are already closed shall be reopened pursuant to the
             present order.

          IV. Copies of this clarificatory order shall be communicated by the
                                                                                   c
              Office of this Court to all the High Courts, Chief Secretaries of
              all the States and the concerned administrative Heads of all the
              Union Territories. Registrars of the High Courts shall be re-
              quested by the Office to communicate copies of this clarificatory
              order to all the criminal courts under the control and superin-      D
              tendence of the respective High Courts with direction to send
              Compliance Reports to the High Courts concerned within three
              months from the date of receipt of communication of the
              clarificatory order at their end.

    IA. Nos. 3-6 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in the light of this clarificatory E
    order.


-   T.N.A.                                                 Petition disposed of.


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