COLLECTOR SINGHversusL.M.L. LTD., KANPUR

                      [2014] 13 S.C.R. 735


                      COLLECTOR SINGH                                 A
                                 v.
                     L.M.L. LTD., KANPUR
                (Civil Appeal No. 10125 of 2014)
                                                                      B
                     NOVEMBER 11, 2014
          [T. S. THAKUR AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.)
        Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s.11A - Dismissal
  of appellant, a semi-skilled workman in respondent-                 C
  company- If disproportionate to the act of misconduct proved
  against the appellant - Allegation that appellant threw jute/
  cotton waste balls hitting the face of his superior officer and
  a/so abused him in filthy language - Appellant submitted
  apology letter- Labour Court, however, held that termination
  of appellant was justified - High Court upheld the award
                                                                      0
  passed by Labour Court- Held: Labour Court and the High
  Court did not properly a{:lPreciate tenor of the apology
  Jetter- From the apology letter, it is discernible that appellant
  made admission only with respect to throwing of the jute!
  cotton waste balls by mistake - The letter nowhere stated           E
  that appellant was involved in the incident of hurling abuses
  and using filthy language against his superior officer- Mere
  Act of throwing jute/cotton waste balls weighing 5 to 10 gms
  may not by itself lead to imposing punishment of dismissal
. from service - Considering the totality of the circumstances,       F
  the punishment of dismissal from service was harsh and
  disproportionate -But, nearly two decades have passed since
  termination appellant and over these years the appellant
  must have been gainfully employed elsewhere - Further,
  appellant has almost reached the age of superannuation -            G
  In such circumstances, there cannot be any order of
  reinstatement and award of /umpsum compensation of
  Rs.5 Lakhs would meet the ends ofjustice.

                                                                      H
                                735
736        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A        Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 - Jurisdiction
  under- Scope-Held: Jurisdiction u/Art. 136 is extraordinary
  and interference with concurrent findings of fact recorded by
  the courts below is permissible only in exceptional cases and
  not as a matter of course - Where appreciation of evidence
B is found to be wholly unsatisfactory or the conclusion drawn
  from the same is perverse in nature, in exercise of the
  jurisdiction under Art. 136, the Supreme Court may interfere
   with the concurrent findings for doing complete justice in the
   case.
c         Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N. B. Narawade
          (2005) 3 sec 134 - held inapplicable.
          Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development
          Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 9; Om
          Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386
 D
          : 2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693; Union of India v. G.
          Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 763: 1997 (3) Suppl.
          SCR 549; Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India
          and Ors. (1991) 3 sec 213: 1991 (2) SCR 676;
          Jain Bhagwan v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
 E
          (2013) 11 SCC 187; Ram Kish an v. Union of India
          & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 157 : 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR
          251; Rama Kant Misra v. State of Uttar Pradesh
          & Ors. (1982) 3 SCC 346: 1983 (1) SCR 648 and
          Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd..
 F
          (1984) 2 SCC 569: 1984 (3) SCR 169 - relied
          on.
          Davalsab Husainsab Mui/a v. North West
          Karnataka Road Transport Corporation (2013) 10
 G        SCC 185 : 2013 (9) SCR 826 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference:
      2013 (9) SCR 826'           referred to             Para 6
      c2003) 8 sec 9              relied on              Para 11
 H
       COLLECTOR SINGH v. L.M.L. LTD., KANPUR                        737


2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693         relied on               Para 11      A
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 549         relied on               Para 11
1191 (2) SCR 676                relied on               Para 11
(2013) 11sec187                 relied on               Para 12
                                                                     B
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 251         relied on               Para 13
1983 (1) SCR 648                relied on               Para 13
1984 (3) SCR 169                relied on               Para 13
(2005) 3 sec 134                held inapplicable       Para 14      c
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
10125 of 2014.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2012 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ
                                                                     D
Petition No. 12157of1997.
     Ms. Daggar Malhotra, Bharat Sangal, Advs. for the
Appellant.
      R. Santhanam,A. P. Sinha, Ms.Abha R. Sharma,Advs.
for the Respondent.                                                  E
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. Whether the punishment of dismissal from service of
the appellant is disproportionate to the act of misconduct           F
proved against the appellant and whether the concurrent
findings of the Courts below need to be interfered with are the
points falling for consideration in this appeal.
      3. Brief facts which led to the filing of this appeal are as   G
follows:- The appellant was working as a semi-skilled workman
since 15.8.1986 in the. respondent-company, namely, M/s.
L.M.L. Limited (Scooter Unit), Kanpur. The appellant was
served with a charge-sheet on 18.4.1992 stating that on that
date, he threw jute/cotton waste balls hitting the face of Laxman    H
738         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A Sharma, Foreman in the said company and on objecting to
   the same, the appellant is alleged to have further abused him
   with filthy language and also threatened him with dire
   consequences outside the premises of their factory. On
   25.4.1992, the appellant submitted an apology letter stating
 B that hi~ had thrown piece of jute which fell on Foreman Laxman
   Sharma by mistake and seeking pardon for the same. A
   departmental inquiry was conducted on 25.5.1992 and the
   appellant was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine
   the witnesses as well as for putting forth his defence. The
.C Enquiry Officer submitted his report finding that the appellant
   was guilty of misconduct and on the basis of the enquiry report,
   the appellant was dismissed from the services of the company
   by an order dated 24.6.1992.
      . 4. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the appellant
D raised an industrial dispute which was registered as
  Adjudication No.178/1994 before the Labour Court, Kanpur.
  The Labour Court relied upon the letter of apology dated
  25.4.1992 and by its award dated 17 .9.1996, held that the
  termination of services of the appellant was-justified. Aggrieved
E by the said order, appellant filed a writ petition before the High
  Court and vide its order dated 24.9.2012, High Court
  dismissed the writ petition upholding the award passed by the
  Labour Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has
  filed this appeal by way of special leave. This Court has issued
F notice limited to the question of quantum of punishment.
       5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
  charges against the appellant are minor charges of alleged
  throwing of jute/cotton waste balls and even assuming that the
G charges had been proved, dismissal from service for such a
  minor act of misdemeanor is harsh and disproportionate and
  prayed for reinstatement with consequential benefits.
           6. The first limb of contention advanced at the hands of
      the learned counsel for the respondent was that the
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       COLLECTOR SINGH v. L.M.L. LTD., KANPUR                       739
                [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

discretionary power exercised by the Labour Court under             A
Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to set aside the
punishment of discharge or dismissal has to be exercised
judiciously with care and caution and before exercising the
said discretion, the finding that order of discharge or dismissal
was not justified is necessary. In support of his contention,       B
learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in Dava/sab Husainsab Mui/a vs. North West Karnataka
Road Transport Corporation, (2013) 10 SCC 185. Learned
counsel for the respondent then contended that the appellant
is a habitual offender and on a previous occasion, on 18.7.1988     C
the appellant had misbehaved with a co-worker whereby a
warning notice had been issued to the appellant and the
appellant assured never to repeat such an act. It was submitted
that inspite of such warning the appellant was again defiant
and having regard to the gravity of charges, the Management         D
imposed punishment of dismissal from service and Labour
Court rightly held that such punishment was justified.
       7. Yet another argument advanced on behalf of the
respondent was that use of abusive language against the
 Foreman is a serious misconduct and punishment of dismissal E
from service cannot be said to be harsh or disproportionate.
 It was submitted that any leniency towards such misconduct
would have serious impact on the discipline amongst the
workmen in the factory and keeping in view the gravity of the
charges proved, the courts below have rightly declined to F
interfere with the quantum of punishment. To substantiate his
contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon a number of
judgments.
      8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
·contentions of both parties and perused the impugne·d order G
 and the materials on record.
      9. Insofar as the first limb of contention as to the
satisfaction of Labour Court in interfering with the discretion
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740       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2014] 13 S.C.R.


A of the authority, considering the findings of the courts below in
   our considered view, the Labour Court and the High Court did
   not properly appreciate tenor of the apology letter. Courts
   below appear to have proceeded on the premise that in his
   apology letter, the appellant has admitted the said incident on
B 18.4.1992. Courts below held that the charges proved against
   the workman are not only throwing jute/cotton waste balls on
   his superior officer/the Foreman, but for alleged misbehaviour
   using filthy language and in such circumstance, punishment of
   dismissal imposed by the Management is justified. By perusal
C of the contents of the said apology letter, it is discerned that
   the appellant has made admission only with respect to throwing
   of the jute/cotton waste balls by mistake and further stating
   that such a mistake would not be repeated in future and that
   he be pardoned for the same. The letter nowhere states that
o the appellant was involved in the incident of hurling abuses
   and using filthy language against his superior officer. In
    essence, even the incident of throwing of jute/cotton waste balls
    at the Foreman has been stated as a mistake. As we have
    already observed use of abusive language is not established
E by the apology letter. Therefore, mere act of throwing of jute/
    cotton waste balls weighing 5 to 10 gms may not by itself lead
    to imposing punishment of dismissal from service. In such a
    situation, we find it difficult to fathom a reason for placing such
    excessive reliance on the apology letter by the enquiry officer
 F appointed for the departmental enquiry as well as the courts
    below for justifying the punishment of dismissal from service.
         10. Jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is
   extraordinary and interference with the concurrent findings of
   fact recorded by the courts below is permissible only in
 G exceptional cases and not as a matter of course. Where the
   appreciation of evidence is found to be wholly unsatisfactory
   or the conclusion drawn from the same is perverse in nature,
   in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
   Constitution, this Court may interfere with the concurrent findings    f-
 H for doing complete justice in the case. In the facts and

                                                                          -
       COLLECTOR SINGH v. L.M.L. LTD., KANPUR                          741
                [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

circumstances of the case, in our view, it is a fit case to exercise   A
the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere
with the conclusion of the Labour Court upholding the
punishment of dismissal as affirmed by the High Court.
          11. Insofar as the next limb of contention at the hands of
 the learned counsel for the respondent as to the quantum of 8
  punishment, it is not necessary for us to refer to the plethora of
 judgments relied upon by the respondent. In those decisions,
  the termination of services was held to be justified on the basis
  of abusive and filthy language in the light of the facts and
  circumstances of those cases. It is well settled that the court C
  or the tribunal will not normally interfere with the discretion of
  the disciplinary authority in imposing of penalty and substitute
  its own conclusion or penalty. But the punishment should be
  commensurate with the proved misconduct. However, if the
  penalty imposed is disproportionate with the misconduct D
  committed and proved, then the Court would appropriately
   mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate
· authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the
   litigation, it may in exceptional cases even impose appropriate
   punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. This E
   principle was reiterated in various decisions of this Court in
   Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation.
   Ltd. &Anr., (2003) 8 SCC 9, Om Kumar& Ors. vs. Union of
   India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, Union of India & Anr. vs. G.
   Ganayutham, ( 1997) 7 SCC 463 and Ex-Naik Sardar Singh F
   vs. Union of India and Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 213.
       12. Considering the scope of judicial review on the
 quantum of punishment and referring to various cases in Jai
 Bhagwan vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (2013) 11 SCC G
 187, in which one of us (Justice T.S. Thakur) was a member,
 this Court held as under:-
       "What is the appropriate quantum of punishment to be
       awarded to a delinquent is a matter that primarily rests
       in the discretion of the disciplinary authority. An authority    H
742        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


 A        sitting in appeal over any such order of punishment is by
          all means entitled to examine the issue regarding the
          quantum of punishment as much as it is entitled to
          examine whether the charges have .been satisfactorily
          proved. But when any such order is challenged before a
· B       Service Tribunal or the High Court the exercise of
          discretion by the competent authority in determining and
          awarding punishment is generally respected except
          where the same is found to be so outrageously
          disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct that the
 c        Court considers it be arbitrary in that it is wholly
          unreasonable. The superior courts and the Tribunal
          invoke the doctrine of proportionality which has been
          gradually accepted as one of the facets of judicial review.
          A punishment that is so excessive or disproportionate to
 D        the offence as to shock the conscience of the Court is
          seen as unacceptable even when courts are slow and
          generally reluctant to interfere with the quantum of
          punishment. The law on the subject is well settled by a
          series of decisions rendered by this Court ..... "
 E         13. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view that
   the punishment of dismissal from service for the misconduct
   proved against the appellant is disproportionate to the charges.
   In Ram Kish an vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in ( 1995) 6
   sec 157, the delinquent employee was dismissed from
 F service for using abusive language against superior officer.
   On the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court held
   that the punishment was harsh and disproportionate to the
   gravity of the charge imputed to the delinquent and modified
   the penalty to stoppage of two increments with cumulative
 G ~3ffect. The Court held as under:-
            "It is next to be seen whether imposition of the
          punishment of dismissal from service is proportionate ·
          to the gravity of the imputation. When abusive language
          is used by anybody against a superior, it must be
 H
      COLLECTOR SINGH v. L.M.L. LTD., KANPUR                  743
               [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

     understood in the environment in which that person is A
     situated and the circumstances surrounding the event
     that led to the use of abusive language. No strait-jacket
     formula could be evolved in adjudging whether the
     abusive language in the given circumstances would
     warrant dismissal from service. Each case has to be B
     considered on its own facts. What was the nature of the
     abusive language used by the appellant was not stated.
     On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
     the considered view that the imposition of punishment of
     dismissal from service is harsh and disproportionate to C
     the gravity of charge imputed to the delinquent constable.
     Accordingly, we set aside the dismissal order. ...... "
     Reference may also be made to the decisions of this
Court in Rama Kant Misra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & 0
Ors., (1982) 3 SCC 346 and Ved Prakash Gupta vs. Delton
Cable lndia(P) Ltd.; (1984) 2 SCC 569:
       14. The High Court has relied on the judgment in
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. N.B.Narawade, (2005) 3
SCC 134, wherein it was held that the penalty of dismissal on E
the alleged use of filthy language is not disproportionate to the
charge as it disturbs the discipline in the factory. We are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the above decision may not be applicable. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, in our view, the punishment of F
dismissal from service is harsh and disproportionate and the
same has to be set aside.
      15. Having said that the punishment of dismissal from
service is harsh and disproportionate, this Court in ordinary
course would either order reinstatement modifying the G
punishment or remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority
for passing fresh order of punishment. But we are deliberately
avoiding the ordinary course. We are doing so because nearly
two decades have passed since his termination and over these
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744         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 13 S.C.R.


A years the appellant must have been gainfully employed
  elsewhere. Further, the appellant was born in the year 1955
  and has almost reached the age of superannuation. In such
  circumstances, there cannot be any order of reinstatement and
  award of lump sum compensation would meet the ends of
B justice. Considering the length of service of the appellant in
  the establishment and his deprivation of the job over the years
  and his gainful employment over the years elsewhere, in our
  view, lump sum amount of compensation of Rs.5,00,000/-
  would meet the ends of justice in lieu of reinstatement, back
c wages, gratuity and in full quit of any other amount payable to
  the appellant.
         16. In the result, the impugned Order of the High Court
  dated 24.9.2012 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
  No.1215711997 confirming the award of the Labour Court is
D set aside and the appeal is allowed. The
  respondent-management is directed to pay the amount of
  compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the appellant within a period
  of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order failing
  which, the said amount is payable with interest at the rate of
E 9% per annum thereon.


      Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                             Appeal allowed.