CICILY KALLARACKALversusVEHICLE FACTORY

                     [2012] 8 S.C.R. 95


                   CICILY KALLARACKAL                                A
                            vs.
                    VEHICLE FACTORY
           (S.L.P (C) Nos. 24228-24229 of 2012)

                      AUGUST 6, 2012
                                                                     B
 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

      Limitation - Special Leave Petition (SLP) - Delay in
filing - Condonation of the delay - Held: On facts there was
inordinate unexplained delay in filing the SLP - Condonation C
of such delay would amount to substituting the period of
limitation prescribed by the legislature for filing SLP - Petition
dismissed on the ground of delay - Constitution of India,
 1950 - Article 136.
                                                                     D
     Anshula/ Aggarwal v. NO/DA (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) -
relied on.

     Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Writ jurisdiction
- Challenge to the order of National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission - Maintainability of - Held: Orders             E
of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under
the writ jurisdiction of High Court, because a statutory appeal
in terms of s. 27A(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act lies
to Supreme Court - Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - s. 27A
(1)(c).                                                              F
     Mohammad Swalleh and Ors. v. /I/rd All. District Judge,
Meerutand Anr. AIR 1988 SC 94: 1988 (1) SCR 840 -
referred to.

                       Case Law Reference:                           G

     1988 (1) SCR 840           Referred to            Para 2

     (2011) CPJ 63 (SC)         Relied on              Para 4
                                95                                   H
     96         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012) 8 S.C.R.


 A         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave
     Petition (C) No. 24228-24229 of 2012.
         From the Judgment & Order dated 16.09.2008 and
     17.12.2009 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in W.A.
     No. 2518 of 2007 and RP No. 380 of 2009.
 B
           Tulika Prakash, M. Khairati, K. Rajeev for the Appellant.
           The following Order of the Court was delivered
                                ORDER
C      1. These special leave petitions have been filed against
  the impugned judgments and orders dated 16.9.2008 in Writ
  Appeal No. 2518 of 2007 and 17.12.2009 in Review Petition
  No. 380 of 2009. In order to decide the controversy it is not
  necessary to make the reference to the factual controversy
D involved herein.
        The basic issue has been raised in the petitions that the
  Kerala High Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ
  petition against the judgment and order passed by the National
  Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter called
E 'the Commission'). The said order could be challenged only
  before this Court in view of the provisions of National Consumer
  Protection Act, 1986, thus, the order passed by the High Court
  impugned herein is a nullity for want of jurisdiction.
F      2. So far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, the
  learned counsel for the petitioner is right that the High Court
  had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter against the order of
  the Commission. However, while dealing with a similar issue
  this Court in Mohammad Swalleh & Ors. v. II/rd All. District
G Judge, Meerut & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 94, observed:

          '7. It was contended before the High Court that no appeal
          lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the
          District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention.
          (sic no appeal lay) ... On that ground the High Court
H         declined to interfere with the order of the learned District
  CICILY KALLARACKAL v. VEHICLE FACTORY                      97


   Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach A
   because if there is no appeal maintainable before the
   learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned
   District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the
   High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226
   of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the B
   conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was
   invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set
    it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the
    case justice has been done though, as mentioned
    hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that c
    the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper.
     If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting
    aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of
     the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution then no
     exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore,
                                                                  0
     justice has been done and as the improper order of the
     Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can
     be taken." (Emphasis added)

     ln~iew of the above, it is not always necessary to set aside
an order if found to have been passed by an authority/court         E
having no jurisdiction.

      Despite this, we cannot help but to state in absolute terms
that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ
petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against    F
the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal
is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has
provided for a statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be
proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass     G
the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions
in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not
 exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is
 one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of    H
     98        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012) 8 S.C.R.


 A us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are
   dismissing this petition on other grounds.

        3. So far as these petitions are concerned, there is an
  inordinate unexplained delay of 1314 days in filing the petition
8 against the order dated 16.9.2008 and of 851 days against the
  order dated 17.12.2009. Cause shown for not approaching this
  Court within limitation is stated that petitioner was not physically
  fit and for some days remained in hospital. The cause shown
  is not sufficient as it was not necessary for the petitioner to
C come here personally.

       4. This Court in Anshu/a/ Agga!Wal v. NO/DA, (2011) CPJ
  63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a
  matter where the special courts/tribunals have been constituted
  in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person
D aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them.
  Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application
  for condonation of delay in such cases the court must keep in
  mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute
    (s).
E
       5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay
  without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the
  period of limitation by this Court in place of the period
  prescribed by the legislature for filing the special leave petition.
  Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the
F delay.

          6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as
    explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these
    petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay.
G
        7. While declining to interfere in the present Special Leave
  Petition preferred against the order passed by the High Court
  in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
  the Constitution of India, we hereby make it clear that the order
H of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under
    CICILY KALLARACKAL v. VEHICLE FACTORY                     99


the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in   A
terms of Section 27 A(1 )(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we
have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will
not be proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to
entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission.
                                                                    B
     A copy of this order may be sent to the Registrar General
of all the High Courts, for bringing the same to the notice of
Hon'ble the Chief Justices and Hon'ble Judges of the
respective High Courts.

K.K.T.                                        SLPs dismissed.       C