Holding

Sections 9‑A, 10, 11‑A, 12 and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are applicable to minority‑run educational institutions and do not violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

Summary

The Christian Medical College Vellore Association, a minority‑run educational institution, challenged two references made by the Tamil Nadu Government to the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arguing that sections 9‑A, 10, 11‑A, 12 and 33 of the Act could not apply to a minority institution protected by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. The High Court had held that the Act was inapplicable and quashed the references. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Act’s provisions infringed the minority’s right to administer the college and hospital and whether the High Court erred in its decision. Relying on the purpose of the Act as a social‑security measure and on earlier judgments that regulatory statutes affecting all workers do not abridge Art. 30(1) unless they impose a special burden, the Court held that the Act applies equally to minority institutions and does not violate the constitutional right. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the references to the Labour Court were allowed to proceed.

Issues considered

The applicability of sections 9‑A, 10, 11‑A, 12 and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to educational institutions established and administered by minorities under Art. 30(1).
Whether the operation of those provisions amounts to an infringement or abridgment of the minority’s constitutional right to administer its institution.
Whether the High Court was correct in quashing the references to the Labour Court under the Act.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institution Control Act, 1975s. 3(3)(a), s. 3(3)(b)
Constitution of Indias. Art.30(1), s. Art.41, s. Art.42, s. Art.43
Delhi School Education Act, 1973s. 8(4)
Gujarat University Act, 1949s. 51-A, s. 52-A
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10, s. 11-A, s. 12, s. 33, s. 9-A

Subjects

Article 30minority educational institutionIndustrial Disputes Actlabour lawright to administerconstitutional lawemployment disputesocial security legislationtrade unionindustrial dispute

Judgment

CHRISTIAN MEDlCAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL
A EMPLOYEES' UNION & ANR.
v.
CHRISTIAN MEDICAL COLLEGE VELLORE
ASSOCIATION & ORS.

B. OCTOBER 20, 1987

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ] i
Constitution of India-Art. 30(1) read with Arts. 41, 42, & 43-
Right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice
conferred on religious and linguistic minorities-The right has to be
c exercised subject to the general laws enacted by the State to give protec-
tion to the recognised rights of workers.
~
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-ss. 9A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33-In
their application to educational institutions established and adminis-
D tered by religious and linguistic minorities, the provisions do not
abridge the right conferred on them by Art. 30( 1) of the Constitution.

Sometime during the period 1975-78, the first respondent-Asso-
ciation managing the affairs of the Christian Medical College and
Hospital at Vellore dismissed three of its employees from service and
E terminated the services of another employee who was on probation. ~
When industrial disputes were raised in this behalf, the State Govern-
ment made two separate references to the Labour Court for adjudica-
tion: one in respect of the three employees who had been dismissed and
the other in respect of the employee whose services had been termi-
nated. Questioning the validity of the reference the first respondent
F filed two Writ Petitions for quashing them and a third Writ Petition
praying for a declaration that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes '
Act, 1947 were unconstitutional and ultra vires and were inapplicable in f-·
entirety to the minority educational institutions protected by Art. 30(1)
of the Constitution. The first Respondent pleaded that the hospital
attached to the Christian Medical College formed an integral part of the
G college which was an educational institution established and adminis-
tered by a minority and thus was also entitled to the protection of Art.
30(1); that the college and the hospital being minority institutions en-
titled to the protection of Art. 30(1), any industrial dispute arising ~
between the management and employees of the college and the hospital
could not be adjudicated upon under the provisions of the Act as such
H adjudication amounted to interference with the right of the minority to
546
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE 547

)-- administer the college and the hospital; and that the Act was not appli-
A
cable to educational institutions generally irrespective of their being
minority institutions or not.

The High Court held that the Christian Medical CoJlege Hospital
which was attached to the Christian Medical College was an educational
institution; that even so, it was an industry within the meaning of the B
,.l expression 'industry' given in the Act, and that even though the College
and the hospital constituted an industry, they together constituting an
educational institution established and administered by a minority,
ss. 9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the Act would not be applicable to them
by virtue of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, and, accordingly, quashed
the reference made under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act to the Labour Court.
' c
~· It was argued on behalf of the first respondent that the application
of the provisions of the Act would result in the abridgment of the right
of the management of minority educational institutions guaranteed
under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution to administer such institutions
inasmuch as the Labour Court or Tribunal might set aside an order of D
dismissal or removal of a workman passed by the manageme'lt aud
reinstate him in service or make an order altering his conditions of
service contrary to the agreement entered into with him and the mino-
rity educational institution would be exposed to constant and endless
... litigation. Reliance was placed in support of the above propositions on
the decision of this Court'in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society & E
Anr. e!c. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173 wherein this
Court held that certain provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949
were violative of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.

Allowing the appeal,
F
--\ HELD: The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been conceived and
enacted with the object of bringing into existence a machinery for
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes between employers
and workmen in accordance with the principles accepted hy the Inter-
national Labour Organisation and the United Nations Economic, Social
and Cultural Organisation. The Act is meant to be a counter-vailing G
force to counteract the inequalities of bargaining power which is in-
herent in the employment relationship. The International Covenant on
~ Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 which is a basic document
d.eclaring certain specific human rights in addition to proclaiming the
right to work as a human right treats equitable conditions of work
prohibition of forced labour, provision for adequate remuneration, th; H
548 SUPREME COUR1 REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A right to a limitation of work hours, to rest and leisure, the right to form ~
and join trade unions of ones' choice, the right to strike etc. also as
human rights. The Preamble of our Constitution says that our country
is a socialist republic. Articles 41 and 42 provide that the State shall
make effective provision for securing right to work, just and humane
conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 43 states that the
B State shall endeavour to secure by suitable legislation or economic
organisation or in any other way to all workers agricultural, industrial
or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural
opportunities. These rights which are enforced through the several
pieces of labour legislation in India have got to be applied to every
workman irrespective of the character of the management. Even the
c management of a minority educational institution has got to respect
these rights and implement them. Due obedience to these laws would
assist in the smooth working of the educational institutiops and would
facilitate their proper administration. If such laws are made inappli-
cable to minority educational institutions, there is every likelihood of
D such institutions being subjected to maladministration. Merely because
an impartial tribunal is entrusted with the duty of resolving disputes
relating to employment, unemployment, security of work and other con-
ditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right guaranteed under
Art. 30(1) of the Constitution is violated. If a dispute Is raised by an
employee against the management of a minority educational institution _.,_
E such dispute will have necessarily to be resolved by providing appro-
priate machinery for tltat purpose. Laws are now passed by all the
civilised countries providing for such a machinery. The Act with which
we are concerned in this case is an Act which has been brought into .
force for resolving such industrial disputes. Sections 9A, 10, ll·A, 12
and 33 of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as htterfering with the right
F guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. [S70D-H; 571A·C, E-Fl

2. The Act is a social security measure intended to ensure welfare
of labour and it falls within one or the other of the following entries in
List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: Entry 22-Trade
Unions, htdustrial and labour disputes; Entry 23-Social security and
G social insurance, employment and unemployment; and Entry 24-
Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, emp-
loyer's liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pen- ~
sions and maternity benefits. T,he Act generally applies to all industries ·
irrespective of the religion or caste to which the parties belong. It ap-
plies to industries owned by the Central and the State Governments too.
H Any decision given by the Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court under
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE 549

the Act is subject to judicial review by the ffigh Court under Art. 226
and an appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The A
Labour Court, the Industrial Tribunal, the High Court and this Court
while dealing with matters arising out of the Act have to deal with them
objectively. The smooth running of an educational institution depends
upon the employment of workmen who are not subjected to victimisa-
tion or any other kind of maltreatment. The conditions of service of ' B
workmen in all institutions including minority educational Institutions
have to be protected in the interest of the entire society and any unfair
labour practice, such as 'hiring and firing', termination or retrench-
ment of the service of a workmen on irrational grounds wlll have to be
checked. The Act makes provisions in respect of these matters. The Act .
being a general law for prevention and settlement of industrial disputes

~·
,
cannot be construed as a law which directly interferes with the right of C
adminisiration of a minority educational institution guaranteed under
Art. 30(1) of the Constitution; The law is not enacted with the object of
interfering with any such right. It clearly falls within the observation of
Mathew,J. in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society & Anr. v. State
of Gujarat & Anr. that "regular tax measures, economic regulations, D
social welfare legislation, wage and hour legislation and similar
measures may, of course have some effect upon the right under
Art. 30(1). But where the burden is the same as that borne by others
engaged in different forms of activity, the similar impact on the right
seems clearly insufficient to constitute an abridgement". [S82A-G I
E
Observations of Mathew, J. in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College
Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1975] 1S.C.R.173, relied
• on.

3. The decision in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society &
Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. is distinguishable from the present one. F ·
Clause (b) of the two sub-sections of s. Sl·A qf .the Gujarat University
Act, 1949 conferred a blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor or other
officer authorised by him to approve or not any recomlllendation made
by the management regarding the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank
or termination of service of a workman. The said Act did not furnish
any guidelines regarding the exercise of that power which was In the G
nature of a 'veto' power. Secondly, s. 52-A of the said Act which re·
quired the disputes between the governing body and any member of the
teaching staff, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated
college or recognized or approved institution connected with the condi·
tions of service of such member to be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitra-
tion, consisting of one nominated by the governing body of the college H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A
or, as the case may be, of the recognised or approved institution, one
member· nominated by the member of the staff involved in the dispute
~
and an Umpire approved by the Vice-Chancellor was held to he an
unconstitutional interference with the right guaranteed under
Art. 30(1) of the Constitntion as it was likely to involve the minority
educational institutions in a series of arbitration proceedings and the
B power vested in the Vice-Chancellor to nominate an Umpire to decide
all disputes between the governing body and the members of the staff ...:l
connected with the letter's conditions of service would make virtnally
the Vice-Chancellor the person who would have the nltimate voice in
the decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration. There was also no check on
the question whether the dispute was one which deserved to be coll-
sidered by the Tribnnal of Arbitration. In the instant case there is no
c room for such contingency to arise. A reference nnder the Act has to be
made by the Government either when both parties request the Govern- -~
ment to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication or only when it is
satisfied that there exists an industrial dispute. When an industrial
dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer should first
D consider whether it can be settled after hearing both the parties and it is
only when his efforts to bring about a settlement fail and he makes a
report accordingly to the appropriate Government, the Government is
called upon to take a decision on the question whether the case is a fit
one for reference to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. It is
only when a reference is made by the Government the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court gets jurisdiction to decide a case. It
,.
E
cannot, therefore, be said that each and every dispute raised by a
workman wonld automatically end up in a reference to the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court. Secondly, the circumstances in which .
the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court may set aside the decision
arrived at by the management in the course of a domestic enquiry held
F by the management into an act of misconduct of a workman are evolved
by a series of judicial decisions. The powers of an industrial tribunal to
interfere in cases of dismissal of a workman by the management are not '
/,...
unlimited and the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere
(a) where there is want of good faith; (b) when there is victimisation or
G unfair labour practice: (cl when the management has been guilty of the
basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice; and (d) when
on the materials before the Court the finding is completely baseless or
perverse. It cannot, therefore, he said that the Industrial Tribunal or '.>-.
the Labour Court will function arbitrarily and interfere with every
decision of the management as regards dismissal or discharge of a
H workman arrived at in a disciplinary enquiry. The power exercisable by
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE 551

the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot, therefore, be A
equated with the power of 'veto' conferred on the Vice-Chancellor
under cl.(b) of either of the two sub-sections of s. 51-A of the Gujarat
University Act, 1949. As already stated the decision of the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court is open to judicial review by the High
Court and by this Court on appeal. Section 11-A which confers the
power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a B
lesser punishment in lieu of the order of discharge or dismissal passed
by the 1118nagement cannot be considered as conferring an arbitrary
power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court .. The power
under s. 11·A has to be exercised judicially and the Industrial Tribunal
or the Labour Court is expected to interfere with the decision of a
management under s. UA only when it is satisfied that the punishment
imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of C
guilt of the workman concerned. The Industrial Tribunal or the Labour
Court has to give reasons for its decision which again, would be subject to
judicial review by the High Court and this Court. l565C-H; 566A-H; 567Al

Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society & Anr. v. State of D
Gujarat & Anr., 11975} l S.C.R. 173, distinguished.

Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. Their Workmen, 11958}
S.C.R. 667; Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina & Ors., 11979] 1 S.C.R. 820;
Mrs. Y. Thedamma v. Union of India & Ors., 119871 2 S.C.C. 516;
Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India E
& Ors., 11986] 4 S.C.C. 707 and All Saints High School, Hyderabad,
etc. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. etc., 11980} 2 S.C.R.
924; referred lo.

4. In this context it is interesting to note that the right to enter
into a contract flowing from the right to liberty guaranteed by the F
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
America which was considered to be an absolute right at one stage is no
longer construed as a bar on the legislature making a law imposing
restrictions on the managements in order to advance the welfare of the
labour. It is now settled in the United States of America that neither the
'contract' clause not the 'due process' clause had the effect of overrid- G
ing the power of the state lo establish all regulations that are reasonably
necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general
welfare of the community and that this power can neither be abdicated
nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant; and that
all contract and property or other vested rights are held subject to Its
fair exercise. In view of the change in the attitude of the Court laws H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.

regulating hours of labour, labour in mines, employment of children in "'
A hazardous occupation, payment of wages, minimum wages laws, work-
men's compensation laws and collective bargaining have been upheld in
recent years. Similarly, the right to religious freedom and the right to
free speech guaranteed hy the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America, though they appear to he absolute have
B been construed to be subject to regulation by the State in exercise of its
legitimate police powers. [S72C; 573C-E; 577Cl ~

Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578; Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S.1; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45; Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161; Lincoln Federal Labour Union v. North Western Inn & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145; and Whitney
c v. California, 274 U.S. 357; referred to. ~

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8818
of 1983.

D From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.1982 of the Madras
High Court in W.P. No. 220, 221and 222 of 1980.

C.S. Vaidyanathan, M.N. Krishnamani, Parbir Chowdhary,
S.R. Bhat and K.V. Mohan for the Appellants.

E F.S. Nariman, Harbans Lal, Shanti Bhushan, Harish N. Salve,
H.K. Puri, S. Ramasubramaniam, Rajen Mahapatra, Miss Mridula
Ray, Mrs. Kitty Kumarmangalam, C.V. Subba Rao, R. Mohan, and
A. V. Rangam for the Respondents. ..
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
VENKATARAMIAH, J. The important question which arises
for determination in this appeal by special leave is whether sections
9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (herein-
after referred to as 'the Act') are applicable to educational institutions
established and administered by minorities which are protected by
G clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India.

The first respondent-Christian Medical College Vellore Associ-
ation, Vellore, is an association registered under the Societies Regis-
tration Act, 1860. The object of the association is "the establishment,
maintenance and development of Christian Medical Colleges and
H Hospitals in India where women and men shall receive an education of
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 553

the highest grade in the art and science of Medicine and Nursing or in A
one or other of the related professions to equip them, in the spirit of
Christ, for service in the relief of suffering and the promotion of
health." Dr. Ida Scudder, a daughter of an American Medical missio-
nary in India, realising the need for more women doctors in India to
give relief of the suffering women, in particular, started a one-bed
clinic in 1900 at Vellore in the State of Tamil Nadu. Within two years B
she set up a 40-bed hospital with the assistance of a group of medical
women. Since her main desire was to train women as nurses and

- doctors who should go out to serve suffering women and children she
started the training courses for nurses in 1906 and a medical school for
women in 1918. The hospital and the medical school grew in their
stature in course of time. The medical school was converted into a
medical college with degree courses in 1942. In the year 1947 even men C
were admitted to the medical college as students. The hospital has
since become an important medical institution in South India. The
hospital is being used for training the students of the medical college
by providing clinical facilities. The medical college and the college of
nursing in Vellore are affiliated to the University of Madras and they D
both go by the name, the Christian Medical College. In the medical
college the post-graduate degree courses have also been started. In
addition thereto post-graduate diploma courses in different specialities
have also been started. In the year 1982, when the common judgment
of the High Court of Madras in the three writ petitions, out of which
this appeal arises, was delivered, there were about 500 students includ- E
ing post-graduate students in the medical college, 400 in college of
nursing and about 164 in para medical courses. The medical college
also conducts research into the fundamental causes of diseases, their
prevention and treatment. It is also claimed that the medical college is
a pioneer in the development of higher specialities like Cardiology,
Neuro Surgery, Psychiatry, Thoracic Surgery, Urology, Gastro- F
Enterology etc. The hospital in which the clinical facilities are pro-
vided to the students of the medical college is also a very big hospital
which attracts large number of patients, many of whom are treated as
in-patients. The college and the hospital are now being managed by
respondent No. 1 Association. In view of the heavy responsibilities
undertaken by the college and the hospital it has become necessary to G
employ a large number of persons as teachers, doctors, nurses and
other staff for running the college and the hospital, and also adminis-
A' trative staff for the purpose of managing their affairs. The employees
of the college and the hospital are paid salaries and allowances and are
entitled to the usual conditions of service as are applicable to such
employees in other medical colleges and hospitals in India. It is natural H
-
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A that in a big establishment like the one under consideration between ~
the management and its employees there would be disputes with re-
gard to the security of employment and other conditions of service.

Sometime during tqe period 1975-1978, three employees,
namely, Mr. Gilbert Samuel, a clerk in the Microbiology Department
B of the Christian Medical College and Hospital, Mr. M. Devadoss, a
packer in the Central Sterile Supply Department of the Hospital and ~
Mrs. Yesudial, a cook in the Staff & Student Nurses' Hostel of the
Rural Health Centre attached to the hospital, were dismissed from
service by the management. On an industrial dispute being raised by -
the Christian Medical College Hospital Employee's Union in respect
C of the dismissal of the above three persons, the Government of Madras
by its order dated 19.2.1979 referred the following question to the
Labour Court for adjudication:-
J \

"Whether the non-employment of Thiruvalargal Gilbert
Samuel, M. Devadoss and Tmt. Yesudial is justified, and if
D not, to what relief each of them would be entitled; to com-
pute the relief, if any awarded, it terms of money, if it
could be so computed."

This reference was numbered as I.D. No. 52 of 1979 on the file of the
Labour Court.
E
One R. Subramaniam, a probationer Stenographer of the above
institutions, whose services had been terminated in 1975 at the end of
the probationary period also raised an industrial dispute in 1978 and
that case was also referred to the Labour Court by the State Govern-
.
ment on 11.4.1979. The question referred to the Labour Court read as
F follows:-

"Whether the non-employment of Thim R. Subramaniam
is justified, if not to what relief he is entitled; to compute
the relief, if any awarded, in terms of money, if it could be
so computed."
G
This reference was numbered as I.D. No. 84 of 1979 on the file of the
Labour Court.

Questioning the validity of the above two references the first
respondent-Association filed Writ Petition Nos. 221 and 222 of 1980
H on the file of the High Court of Madras for quashing the said refe-
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 555

rences. The first respondent-Association also filed Writ Petition A
No. 220 of 1980 on the file of the High Court of Madras praying for a
declaration that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional and
ultra vires and were inapplicable in entirety to the minority educational
institutions protected by Article 30( 1) of the Constitution of India, like
the Christian Medical College and the hospital attached thereto at
Vellore. B

The first respondent-Association pleaded that the hospital
attached to the Christian Medical College formed an integral part of
the college which was an educational institution established and
administered by a minority and thus was also entitled to the protection
of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Secondly, it was urged C
that the college and the hospital being minority institutions entitled to
the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India any indus-
trial dispute arising between the management and employees of the
college and the hospital could not be adjudicated upon under the
provisions of the Act as such adjudication amounted to interference
with the right of the minority to administer the college and the hospital D
which together constituted an educational institution. It was also con-
tended that the Act was not applicable to educational institutions gen-
erally irrespective of their being minority institutions or not. The peti-
tions were contested by the Union of India, the State of Tamil Nadu,
the Christian Medical College and Hospital Employees' Union and the
workmen concerned. The High Court after hearing the parties recor- E
ded the following findings:-

1. The Christian Medical College Hospital which. was attached
to the Christian Medical College was an educational institution;

2. The Christian Medical College Hospital even though it was an F
educational institution was an industry within the meaning of the ex-
pression 'industry' given in the Act; and

3. Even though the Christian Medical College and the hospital
attached thereto constituted an industry, they together constituting an
educational institution established and administered by a minority, G
sections 9-A, 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 of the Act would not be applicable to
them by virtue of Article 30( 1) of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the High Court quashed the references made under
section lO(l)(c) of the Act to the Labour Court. Aggrieved by the
judgment of the High Court the Christian Medical College Hospital H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A Employees' Union and one of its workman have filed this appeal by ~
special leave.

The principal question which arises for determination in this case
is whether the Act which is passed with the twin object of preventing
B industrial disputes and the settlement of such disputes between emp-
loyers and employees is applicable to educational institutions which 1
are protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Article ,...__
30(1) of the Constitution oflndia provides as follows:-

"All minorities, whether based on religion or language,
shall have the right to establish and administer educational
C institutions of their choice." \
·-1 \
In Re. The Kera/a Educational Bill, 1957, [ 1959] S.C.R. 995. this
Court construed Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India and held
thus:-
D
"The first point to note is that the Article gives certain
rights not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic
minorities. In the next place, the right conferred on such
minorities is to establish educational institutions of their
choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion
E should establish educational institutions for teaching reli-
gion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right
to establish educational institutions for teaching their
language only. What the Article says and means is that the .
religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right
to establish educational institutions of their choice. (Pages
F 1052-1053) ......... The next thing to note is that the
Article, in terms, gives all minorities, whether based on
religion or language, two rights, namely, the right to estab-
lish and the right to administer educational institutions of
their choice. (Page 1053) . . . . . . . . . . . . The right to
administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-
administer. (Page 1062) ...... "

The meaning of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India was ~
again considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the
Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society & Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat
& Anr., [1975) 1 S.C.R. 173. Ray, C.J. observed in the above decision
H thus:-
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 557

"The minority institutions have the right to adminis- A
ter institutions. This right implies the obligation and duty
of the minority institutions to render the very best to the
students. In the right of administration, checks and
balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required
to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their
conditions of service. The right to administer is to be tern- B
pered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth
administration. The best administration will reveal no trace
or colour of minority. A minority institution should shine
: in exemplary eclectism in the administration of the institu-
tion. The best compliment that can be paid to a minority
institution is that it does not rest on or proclaim its minority C
character.

Regulations which will serve the interest of the stu-
dents, regulations which will serve the interest of the
teachers are of paramount importance in good administra-
tion. Regulations in the interest of efficiency of teachers, D
discipline and fairness in administration are necessary for
preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. (Pages
196-197)

E
In the field of administration it is not reasonable to
claim that minority institutions will have complete auto-
,. nomy. Checks on the administration may be necessary in
order to ensure that the administration is efficient and
sound and will serve the academic needs of the institution.
The right of a minority to administer its educational institu- F
tion involves, as part of it, a correlative duty of good
administration. (Page 200)"

Mathew, J. discussing what type of action by the State would
amount to the abridgement of the right guaranteed under Article 30( 1)
of the Constitution of India observed at page 265-266 thus:- G

"The application of the term 'abridge' may not be
difficult in many cases but the problem arises acutely in
certain types of situations. The important ones are where a
law is not a direct restriction of the right but is designed to
accomplish another objective and the impact upon the right H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A
is secondary or indirect. Measures which are directed at
other forms of activities but which have a secondary or
~
direct or incidental effect upon the right do not generally
abridge a right unless the content of the right is regulated.
As we have already said, such measures would include vari-
ous types of taxes, economic regulations, laws regulating
B the wages, measures to promote health and to preserve
hygiene and other laws of general application. By hpothe- .-k
sis, the law, taken by itself, is a legitimate one, aimed
directly at the control of some other activity. The question
is about its secondary impact upon the admitted area of ~

administration of educational institutions. This is especially
a problem of determining when the regulation in issue has
c an effect which constitutes an abridgement of the constitu-
tional right within the meaning of Article 13(2). In other _-{
\
words, in every case, the court must undertake to define
and give content to the word 'abridge' in Article 13(2)(1).
The question to be asked and answered is whether the
D particular measure is regulatory or whether it crosses the
zone of permissible regulation and enters the forbidden
territory of restrictions or abridgement. So, even if an edu-
cational institution established by a religious or linguistic
minority does not seek recognition, affiliation or aid, its
activity can be regulated in various ways provided the regu- ~
E lations do not take away or abridge the guaranteed right.
Regular tax measures, economic regulations, social welfare
legislation, wage and hour legislation and similar measures
may, of course have some effect upon the right under Article
30( 1). But where the burden is the same as that borne by
others engaged in different forms of activity, the similar
-
F impact on the right seems clearly insufficient to constitute an '
abridgement. If an educational institution established by a
religious minority seeks no recognition, affiliation or aid, / ~--
the state may have no right to prescribe the curriculum,
sllabi or the qualification of the teacters."

(Underlining by us)
G

The question now is whether the Act, if it is made applicable to
minority institutions protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of
India, would in any way abridge the right of the minority concerned to
establish or administer an educational institution. The Act came to be
".
H passed in the year 1947 with the object of bringing into existence a
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 559

~. machinery for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes be-
tween employers and workmen in accordance with the decisions of the
A
International Labour Organisation. The Act provides for a machinery
for collective bargaining. The object of industrial adjudication has,
therefore, been to be a countervailing force to counteract the
inequalities of bargaining power which is inherent in the employment
relationship. In one of the commentaries Ol! the Act the need for and B
,-l.. the character of industrial adjudication is described as follows:

"The law governing industrial relations is one of the
: vitally important branches of the law-the legal system on
which depends the social and economic security of a very
large majority. "The parties to the industrial disputes pre-
sent an infinite permutations of attitudes" on, economics, c
politics and human relations. General consensus on the
methods of resolving them is beyond reach. The core of
modem industrial law, therefore, consists of the problems
dealing with the conflict arising between the industrial em-
ployers and their employees relating to employment and D
social security. The study of industrial law, therefore,
necessarily concerns itself with the struggle of industrial
workmen for security. It is the security of job, the mini-
mum standard of living, of his future and that of his
--.I-. children and conversely the fear of insecurity which bedevil
the worker. In other words, security is the keystone in E
dealing with the industrial relations between the industrial
employers and their workers. The industrial worker, there-
fore, is the 'focal point' of any legal enquiry in the indus-
trial relations. In the words of Prof. Forkosch, "the
sociologist may see the worker as a human being caught in
congeries of frustrations, complexes and urges-a mind F
J-\ that cannot cope with the baffling contradictions of the
modem society". "There is", therefore, as Prof. Otto
Kahn-Freund points out "everywhere a constant need for
finding a judicium finium regundorum between collective
bargaining and legislation of all kinds as instruments for the
regulation of conditions of employment-wages and hours, G
holidays and pensions, health, safety and welfare, and
even, increasingly, social security." (See O.P. Malhotra:
The Law of Indush:ial Disputes, Fourth Edn., Vol. I,
( 1985)-Introduction-page XX)

Section 2(k) of the Act defines an 'industrial dispute' as any H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.

A
dispute or difference between employers and employers or between ~·
employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is
connected with the employment or non-employment on the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. The Act
provides for the constitution of works committees in industrial estab-
lishments employing 100 workmen or more and they are charged with
B the duty of removing causes of friction between the employer and
workmen in the day-to-day working of the establishment and prornot- -1.
ing measures for securing amity and good relations between them.
Industrial peace is most enduring where it is founded on voluntary
settlement, and the works committees are entrusted with the duty of :
providing a machinery for the settlement of disputes. Section 12 of the
Act provides for the appointment of Conciliation Officers in order to
c negotiate between the managements and their workmen and to bring
about settlement if possible. If the conciliation proceedings fail, the
Conciliation Officer has to make a report to the appropriate Govern-
ment accordingly. A reference to an Industrial Tribunal of a dispute
1
under section 10 of the Act is made where both parties to an industrial
D dispute apply for such reference or where the appropriate Government
considers it expedient so to do. An award of a Tribunal may be in
operation for a period of one year subject to the provisions of section
19 of the Act. The power to refer disputes to Industrial Tribunals and
enforce their awards is an essential corollary to the obligation that lies
on the Government to secure conclusive determination of the disputes ~
E with a view to redressing the legitimate grievances of. the parties
thereto, such obligation arising from the imposition of restraints on the
rights of strike and lock-out, which must remain inviolate, except
where considerations of public interest override such rights. The
Industrial Tribunals or Labour Courts constituted under the Act are
presided over by persons having judicial experience such as a person
F who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or who has been for a 1,

period not less than three years a District Judge or an Additional l-.
District Judge or a person who has not less than five years' service as
presiding officer of a Labour Court constituted under any law for the
time being in force or who holds a degree in law of a University
established·by law in any part of India and is holding or has held an
G office not lower in rank than that of Assistant Commissioner of Labour
under the State Goverment for not less than ten years. The Presiding
Officer of a Labour Court should also possess substantially the same
qualifications and they are set out in section 7 of the Act. Section 9-A ~-"
of the Act, which is one of the sections the applicability of which to a '~
minority educational institution is questioned, provides that no emp-
H loyer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE (VENKATARAMIAH, J.) 561

applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the A
Fourth Schedule to the Act shall effect such change without giving to
the workmen likely to be affected by such change a notice in the
prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be
effected; or within twenty-one days of giving such notice, except in
certain cases which are mentioned in the proviso thereto. This section
was introduced since there was a persistent demand that notice should B
be given whenever it was proposed to make any change in the condi-
tions of service of the workmen. Section 11-A of the Act confers
powers on the Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to
give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen. It
provides that where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or
dismissal of a workmen has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudi- C
cational proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or
dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of
discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on
such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other D
relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in
lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may
require. On the basis of the materials on record, the Tribunal is em-
powered to pass an appropriate order under section 11-A of the Act.
Section 33 of the Act provides that the conditions of service etc. of the
employees should remain unchanged under certain circumstances dur- E
ing pendency of proceedings before an arbitrator or a conciliation
officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or
Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute. It
further provides that no employer shall in regard to any matter con-
nected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen con-
cerned in such di~pute, the conditions of service applicable to them F
i~mediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or for any
misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether
by disn;iissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute,
sav_e with the exp~ess permission in writing of the authority before
which the proceedmgs is pending. If the conditions of service relate to
any matter not connected with the dispute or if the misconduct of the
G
workman is not connected with the dispute the management should
seek the approval of the authority concerned and comply with the
othe.r conditions mentioned in the proviso to section 33(2) of the Act.
Section 33(3) of the Act provides that in the case of protected work-
m~n the express permission of the authority concerned should be ob-
tamed before any such action is taken. Section 33-A of the Act pro- H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

A vi des for the making of an application before a conciliation officer,
Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal
for appropriate relief if section 33 of the Act is contravened. Thus it is
seen that the Act is one which is enacted as a social security measure in
order to ensure welfare of labour and it falls within one or the other of
entry 22-Trade Unions; industrial and labour disputes, entry
B 23-social security and social insurance; employment and unemploy-
ment and entry 24-welfare of labour including conditions of work,
provident funds, employer's liability, workmen's compensation,
invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits in the List III of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Act generally
applies to all industries irrespective of the religion or caste to which the
parties belong. It applies to industries owned by the Central and the
c State Governments too. Any decision given by the Industrial Tribunal
or a Labour Court under the Act is subject to judicial review by the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and an
appeal to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
The Labour Court, the Industrial Tribunal, the High Court and this
D Court while dealing with matters arising out of the Act have to deal
with them objectively. The smooth running of an educational institu-
tion depends upon the employment of workmen who are not subjected
to victimisation or any other kind of maltreatment. The conditions of
service of workmen in all institutions including minority educational
institutions have to be protected in the interest of the entire society
E and any unfair labour practice, such as 'hiring and firing', termination
or retrenchment of the service of a workman on irrational grounds will
have to be checked. The Act makes provisions in respect of these
matters. The Act being a general law for prevention and settlement of
industrial disputes cannot be construed as a law which directly
interfers with the right of administration of a minority educational
F institution guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.
The law is not enacted with the object of interfering with any such
right. It clearly falls within the observation of Mathew, J. in St.
Xavier's College, case (supra) that "regular tax measures, economic
regulations, social welfare legislation, wage and hour legislation and
similar measures may, of course have some effect upon the right under
G Article 30(1). But where the burden is the same as that borne by others
engaged in different forms of activity, the similar impact on the right
seems clearly insufficient to constitute an abridgement."

It is, however, argued on behalf of the first respondent-
Association that the application of the provisions of the Act will result
H in the abridgment of the right of the management of minority educa-
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.) 563

A tional institutions to administer such institutions since there is always a
chance in th(: course of an industrial ad Judi cation that the Tribunal or
A
the Labour Court as the case may be may pass an order setting aside an
order of dismissal or removal of a workman passed by the management
and reinstating him in service or making an order altering the condi-
tions of service of workmen contrary to the agreement entered into
with them. It is urged that such adjudication results in the attenuation B
,.l_ of the power of the management to dismiss or remove a workman as
and when it likes. It is also stated that the minority educational institu-
tion is likely to be exposed to constant and endless litigation which
... would again adversely affect the right of the minority to establish and
administer an educational institution guaranteed under Article 30(1)
of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed in support of the above
c
~.
propositions on the decision of this Court in the St. Xavier's College
case (supra). In that case the Court held that clause (b) of sub-section
'
(1) and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 51-A of the Gujarat
University Act, 1949 were violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution
of India so far as the minority educational institutions were concerned.
The Court also held that section 52-A of that Act was also violative of D
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The contentions of the
parties urged in that case and the conclusion reached by the Court are
briefly stated in the judgment of Khanna, J. at pages 243-244 which
read thus:
~
"Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section SIA E
of the impugned Act which make provision for giving a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against a penalty
to be proposed on a member of the staff of an educational
institution would consequently be held to be valid. Clause
(b) of those sub-sections which gives a power to the Vice-
Chancellor and officer of the University authorised by him F
J{ to veto the action of the managing body of an educational
institution in awarding punishment to a member of· the
staff, in my opinion, interferes with the disciplinary control
of the managing body over its teachers. It is significant that
the power of approval conferred by clause (h) in each of the
two sub-sections of section 5 lA on the Vice Chancellor or G
other officer authorised by him is a blanket power. No
guidelines are laid down for the exercise of that power and
~'\ it is not provided that the approval is to be withheld only in
case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or terrnina-
tion of service is ma/a fide or by way of victimisation or
other similar cause. The conferment of such blanket power H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 1 S.C.R.

on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him
A for vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of
an educational institution makes a serious inroad on the
right of the managing body to administer an educational
institution. Clause (b) of each of the two sub-sections of
section 51A should, therefore, be held to be violative of
B article 30(1) so far as minority educational institutions are
concerned.

Section 52A of the Act relates to the reference· of
disputes between a governing body 'iind any member of the
teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an
affiliated college or recognized or approved institution con-
c nected with the conditions of service of such member to a \
Tribunal of Arbitration, consisting of one nominated by
the governing body of the college or, as the case may be, of
-1\
the recognised or approved institution, one member
nominated by the member of the staff involved in the dis-
D pute and an Umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor.
Section 52A is widely worded and as it stands it would
cover within its ambit every dispute connected with the
conditions of service of a member of the staff of an educa-
tional institution, however, trivial or insignificant it may
be, which may arise between the governing body of a col-
E lege and a member of the staff. The effect of this section
would be that the managing committee of an educational
institution would be embroiled by its employees in a series
of arbitration proceedings. The provisions of section 52A
would thus act as a spoke in the wheel of effective administ-
ration of an educational institution. It may also be stated
F that there is nothing objectionable to selecting the method of
arbitration for settling major disputes connected with condi-
tions of service of staff of educational institutions. It may
indeed be a desideratum. What is objectionable, apart from
what has been mentioned above, is the giving of the power to
the Vice-Chancellor to nominate the Umpire. Normally in
G such disputes there would be hardly any agreement bet-
ween the arbitrator nominated by the governing body of
the institution and the one nominated by the concerned
member of the staff. The result would be that the power
would vest for all intents and purposes in the nominee of
the Vice-Chancellor to decide all disputes between the
H governing body and the member of the staff connected with
EMPLOYEES UNION v. ·c.M. COLLEGE [VEN&ATARAMIAH, J.] 565

the latter's conditions of service. The governing body
A
would thus be hardly in. a position to take any effective
disciplinary action against a member of the staff. This must
cause an inroad in the right of the governing body to
administer the institution. Section 52A should, therefore,
be held to be violative of article. 30(1) so far as minority
educational institutions are concerned." B
--i.. (emphasis added).

We are of the view that the decision in the St. Xavier's College
= case (supra) is distinguishable from the present one. Clause (b) of the
two sub-sections of section 51-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949
conferred a blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer
.c
~ authorised by him to approve or not any recommendation made by tke
management regarding the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or
tetlll.inatiotl of service of a workman. The said Act did not furnish any
guidelines regarding the exercise of that power which was in the nature
of a 'veto' power. Secondly, section 52-A of the Gujarat University
Act, 1949 which required the disputes between the governing body and D
any member of the teaching staff, other academic and non-teaching
staff of an affiliated college or recognised or approved institution con-
nected with the conditions of service of such member to be referred to
a Tribunal of Arbitration, consisting of one nominated by the govern-
~ ing body of the college or, as the case may be, of the recognised or
approved institution, one member nominated by the member of the E
staff involved in the dispute and an Umpire approved by the Vice-
Chancellor was held to be an unconstitutional interference with a right
guaranteed under Article '30(1).of the Constitution of India as it was
likely to involve the minority educational institutions in a series of
arbitration proceedings and that the power vested in the Vice-
Chancellor to nominate an Umpire to decide all disputes between the F
J---\ governing body and the members of the staff connected with the
latter's conditions of service would make virtually the Vice-Chancellor
the person who would have the ultimate voice in the decision of the
Tribunal of Arbitration. There was also no check on the question
whether the dispute was one which deserved to be considered by the
Tribunal of Arbitration. In the instant case there is no room for such G
contingency to arise. A reference under the Act has to be made by the
Government either when both parties requested the Government to
.i( refer an industrial dispute for adjudication or only when it is satisfied
that there exists an industrial dispute. When an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer should first consider
whether it can be settled after hearing both the parties and it is only H
,

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A
when his efforts to bring about a settlement fail and he makes a report Jt,
accordingly to the appropriate Government, the Government is called
upon to take a decision on the question whether the case is a fit one for
reference to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. It is only
when a reference is made by the Government the Industrial Tribunal
vi the Labour Court gets jurisdiction to decide a case. It cannot,
B therefore, be said that each and every dispute ratsed by a workman
would automatically end up in a reference to the Industrial Tribunal or _L
the labour Court. Secondly, the circumstances in which the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court may set aside the decision arrived at by
the management in the course of a domestic enqui\y held by the :
management into an act of misconduct of a workman are evolved by a
series of judicial decisions. In Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. and
c Another v. Their workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 667 this Court has observed \
that the powers of an industrial tribunal to interfere in cases of dismis- -1
sal of a workman by the management are not unlimited and the Tri-
bunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment
for that of the management. It will interfere (a) where there is want of
D good faith; (b) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice; (c)
when the management has been guilty of the basic error or violation of
the principles of natural justice; and (d) when on the materials before
the Court the finding is completely baseless or perverse. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court will
function arbitrarily and interfere with every decision of the manage-
E men! as regards dismissal or discharge of a workman arrived at in a
>-
disciplinary enquiry. The power exercisable by the Industrial Tribunal
or the Labour Court cannot, therefore, be equated with the power of
'veto' conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under clause (b) of either of
the two sub-sections of section 51-A of the Gujarat University Act,
1949. As we have already said earlier the decision of the Industrial
-
F Tribunal or the Labour Court is open to judicial review by the High
Court and by this Court on appeal. Section 11-A which has been ~
introduced since then into the Act which confers the power on the
Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a lesser punish-
ment in lieu of the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the man-
agement again cannot be considered as conferring ,an arbitrary power
G on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. The power under
section 11-A of the Act has to be exercised judicially and the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court is expected to interfere with the decision )_\
of a management under section 11-A of the Act only when it is
satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly
disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. The
H Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court has to give reasons for its
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 567

decision. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal or of the Labour
A Court is again, as already said, subject to judicial review by the High
A
Court and this Court.

In Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors., [1979) 1 S.C.R. 820 this
Court was required to consider a provision which was more or less
similar to the provisions in St. Xavier's College, case (supra}. The B
Court held that the conferment of a right of appeal to an outside
--l.
authority like the Vice-Chancellor which took away the disciplinary
power of a minority educational institution was violative of Article
30( 1) of the Constitution of India since the said power was uncanalised
and unguided in the sense that no restriction had been placed on the
exercise of the power.
c
~ Explaining his own decision in Lilly Kurian's case (supra) A.P.
Sen, J. has observed recently in Mrs. Y. Theclamma v. Union of India
and Ors., [1987) 2 S.C.C. 516 that while the right of the minorities,
religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institu-
lions of their choice could not be interfered with, restrictions by way of D
regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and
maintaining excellence t!tereof can validitly be prescribed. He further
held that regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of
service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the
matter of disciplinary action and that the endeavour of the court in all
~
the cases had been to strike a balance between the constitutional obli- E
gation to protect what was secured to the minorities under Article
30( 1) of the Constitution of India and the social necessity to protect
... the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation .
Accordingly, A.P. Sen, J. held that section 8(4) of the Delhi School
Education Act, 1973 was designed to afford some measure of protec-
tion to teachers of minority institutions without interfering with the F
J--\management's right to take disciplinary action. According to the
learned Judge section 8(4) which provided that where a management
committee of a recognised school intended to suspend any of its emp-
loyees such intention should be communicated to the Director and no
such suspension should be made except with the prior permission of
the Director was not invalid. The learned Judge emphasised his earlier G
view expressed in Lilly Kurian's case (supra) that the right guaranteed
under Article 30( 1) of the Constitution of India was subject to the
>( regulatory power of the State and that Article 30(1) of the Constitu-
tion of India was not a charter for maladministration. In doing so the
learned Judge followed the observation made by Chinnappa Reddy, J.
in Frank Anthony Public School Employees' Association v. Union of H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

India and Others, [ 1986] 4 S.C.C. 707 which read as follows:-
A ~
"Section 8(4) would be inapplicable to minority
institutions if it had conferred blanket power on the
Director to grant or withhold prior approval in every case
where a management proposed to suspend an employee
B but we see that it is not so. The management has the right
to order immediate suspension of an employee in case of _t_
gross misconduct but in order to prevent an abuse of power
by the management a safeguard is provided to the emp-
Joyee that approval should be obtained within 15 days. The :
Director is also bound to accord his approval if there are
adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension. The
c provision appears to be eminently reasonable and sound (
and the answer to the question in regard to this provision is ~
directly covered by the decision in All Saints High School,
'\
where Chandrachud, C.J. and Kailasam, J. upheld section
3(3)(a) of the Act impugned therein."
D
In All Saints High School, Hyderabad etc. etc. v. Government of
Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 224 etc. a provision impos-
ing certain restrictions on the power of suspension of a teacher by a
minority educational institution which was contained in clauses (a) and
(b) of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised
E Private Educational Institution Control Act, 1975 was upheld by +
Chandrachud, C.J. at pages 937-939 thus: ,
"Section 3(3)(a) provides that no teacher employed ...
in any private educational institution shall be placed under
suspension except when an inquiry into the gross miscon-
F duct of such teacher is contemplated. Section 3(3)(b) pro-
vides that no such suspension shall remain in force for more l..~
than a period of two months and if the inquiry is not comp-
leted within that period the teacher shall, without prejudice,
to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as a
teacher. The proviso to the sub-section confers upon the
G competent authority the power, for reasons to be recorded
in writing to extend the period of two months for a further
period not exceeding two months if, in its opinion, the ~

inquiry could not be completed within the initial period of ~<
two months for reasons directly attributable to the teacher.

H With respect, I find it difficult to agree with Brother
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.J 569

+.. Fazal Ali that these provisions are violative of article 30(1).
A
The question which one has to ask oneself is whether in the
normal course of affairs, these provisions are likely to in-
terfere with the freedom of minorities to administer and
manage educational institutions of their choice. It is un-
doubtely true that no educational institution can function
efficiently and effectively unless the teachers observe at B
least the commonly accepted norms of good behaviour.
Indisciplined teachers can hardly be expected to impress
upon the students the value of discipline, which is a sine
: qua non of educational excellence. They can cause incalcul-
able harm not only to the cause of education but to the
society at large by generating a wrong sense of values in the
minds of young and impressfonable students. But discipline c
j
l is not to be equated with dictatorial methods in the treat-
ment of teachers. The institutional code of discipline must
therefore conform to acceptable norms of fairness and can-
not be arbitrary or fanciful. I do not think that in the name
of discipline and in the purported exercise of the funda- D
mental right of administration and management, any edu-
cational institution can be given the right to 'hire and fire'
its teachers. After all, though the management may be left
free to evolve administrative policies of an institution, edu-
cational instruction has to be imparted through the instru-
mentality of the teachers; and unless, they have a constant E
assurance of justice, security and fair play it will be impos-
sible for them to give of their best which alone can enable
the institution to attain the ideal of educational excellence.
Section 3(3)(a) contains but an elementary guarantee of
freedom from arbitrariness to the teachers. The provision
is regulatory in character since it neither denies to the F
~-\ management the right to proceed against an erring teacher
nor indeed does it place an unreasonable restraint on its
power to do so. It assumes the right of the management to
suspend a teacher but regulates that right by directing that
a teacher shall not be suspended unless an inquiry into his
conduct is contemplated and unless the inquiry is in respect G
of a charge of gross misconduct. Fortunately, suspension of
teachers is not the order of the day, for which reason I do
~ not think that these restraints which bear a reasonable
nexus with the attainment of educational excellence can be
considered to be violative of the right given by Art. 30(1).
The limitation of the period of suspension initially to two H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] I S.C.R.

months, which ~an in appropriate cases be extended by
A
another two months, partakes of the same character as the
provision contained in section 3(3)(a). In the generality of
cases, a domestic inquiry against a teacher ought to be
completed within a period of two months or say, within
another two months. A provision founded so patently on
B plain reason is difficult to construe as an invasion of the
right to administer an institution, unless that right carried
with it the right to maladminister. I therefore agree with
Brother Kailasam that sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the
Act do not offend against the provisions of Art. 30(1) and
are valid."

c In view of the observations of this Court in All Saints High
School's case (supra), Frank Anthony Public School's case (supra) and
Y. Theclamm's case (supra) it has to be held that the provisions of the
Act which provide for the reference of an industrial dispute to an
Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court for a decision in accordance
o with judicial principles have to be declared as not being violative of
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. It has to be borne in mind
that these provisions have been conceived and enacted in accord3nce
with the principles accepted by the International Labour Organisation
and the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation.
The International Convenent on Economic, Social and Cultural
E Rights, 1966 which is a basic document declaring certain specific
human rights in addition to proclaiming the right to work as a human
right treats equitable conditions of work, prohibition of forced labour,
provision for adequate remuneration, the right to a limitation of work
hours, to rest and leisure, the right to form and join trade unions of
ones' choice, the right to strike etc. also as human rights. The Pream-
F ble of our Constitution says that our country is a socialist republic.
Article 41 of the Constitution provides that the State shall make effec-
tive provision for securing right to work. Article 42 of the Constitution
provides that the State shall make provision for securing just and
humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 43 of the
Constitution states that the State shall endeavour to secure by suitable
G legislation or economic organisation or in any other way to all workers
agricultural, industrial or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of
work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure
and social and cultural opportunities. These rights which are enforced
through the several pieces of labour legislation in India have got to be
applied to every workman irrespective of the character of the manage-
H men!. Even the management of a minority educational institution has
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 571

~ got to respect these rights' and implement them. Implementation of
these rights involves the obedience to several labour laws including the
A
Act which is under consideration in this case which are brought into
force in the country. Due obedience to those laws would assist in the
smooth working of the educational institutions and would facilitate
proper administration of such educational institutions. If such laws are
made inapplicable to minority educational institutions, there is every B
,..l likelihood of such institutions being subjected to maladministration.
Merely because an impartial tribunal is entrusted with the duty of
resolving disputes relating to employment, unemployment, security of
~ work and other conditions of workmen it cannot be said that the right
guaranteed under Article 30( 1) of the Constitution of India is violated.
If a creditor of a minority educational institution or a contractor who
c
.~
h~ built the building of such institution is permitted to file a suit for
recovery of the money or damages as the case may be due to him
against such institution and to bring the properties of such institution
to sale to realise the decretal amount due under the decree passed in
such suit is Article 30(1) violated? Certainly not. Similarly the right
guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is not violated, if a D
minority school is ordered to be closed when an epidemic breaks out in
the neighbourhood, if a minority school building is ordered to be
pulled down when it is constructed contrary to town planning law or if
a decree for possession is passed in favour of the true owner of the land
...;... when a school is built on a Ian-:! which is not owned by the management
of a minority school. In the same way if a di3pute is raised by an E
employee against the management of a minority educational institu-

- lion such dispute will have necessarily to be resolved by providing
appropriate machinery for that purpose. Laws are how passed by all
the civilised countries providing for such a machinery. The Act with
which we are concerned in this case is an Act which has been brought
into force for resolving such industrial disputes. Sections 10, 11-A, 12 F
~ and 33 of the Act cannot, therefore, be construed as interfering with
the right guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.
Similarly, section 9-A of the Act, which requires the management to
issue a notice in accordance with the said provision in order to make
changes in the conditions of service which may include changes in the
hours of work, leave rules, introduction of new rules of discipline etc., G
cannot be considered as violative of the right guaranteed under Article
I
>{ 30( 1) of the Constitution of India. The High Court was in error in
thinking that the power of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court
under the Act was uncanalised, unguided and unlimited and in think-
ing that .the said power was equivalent to the power of the Vice-
Chancellor or any other officer nominated by him functioning under H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A the Gujarat University Act, 1949 which was the subject matter of j;
decision in the St. Xavier's College case (supra). Accordingly we are of
the view that the provisions of sections 9A, 10, 11A, 12 and 33 of the
Act are applicable to the minority educational institutions like the
Christian Medical College and hospital at Vellore also.

B Before concluding we feel that it is appropriate to refer to some
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in '~
which it has construed some of the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States of America which appear to confer absolute rights.
It is interesting to note that the right to enter into a contract which was '
considered to be an absolute right at one stage is no longer construed
as a bar on the legislature making a law imposing restrictions on the
c
~
managements in order to advance the welfare of the labour. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
America provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; 11or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or pro-
D perty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". The 'liberty' guaranteed
by this clause was variously defined by the Supreme Court of America
as will be seen hereinafter. In the early years it meant almost exclu-
sively 'liberty of contract'. The concept of 'liberty of contract' was
elevated to the status of an accepted doctrine in Allgeyer v. ~
E Louisiana., 165 U.S. 578. Applied repeatedly in subsequent cases as a
restraint on state power, freedom of contract was also alluded to as a
property right, as is evident in the language of the Court in Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 which said that "included in the right of personal
liberty and the right of private property-partaking of the nature of
each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property.
Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which
labour and other services are exchanged for money or other forms of ~
F

property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with,
there is substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established con-
stitutional sense." (emphasis added). In Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) a law restricting employment in bakeries to ten hours
G per day and 60 hours per week was held to be an unconstitutional
interference with the right of adult labourers to contract with respect
to their means of livelihood. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 ~}-t
( 1908) a statute attempting to outlaw 'yellow dog' contracts whereby,
as a condition of obtaining employment, a worker had to agree not to
join or to remain a member of a union, were voided on ground~ of
H unconstitutional impairment of freedom of contract, or more partlcu-
EMPLOYl'iES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 573

larly, of the unrestricted right of the employer to hire and fire. In this
i case the Supreme Court of the United States of America went to the A
extent of holding that it was a part of every man's civil rights that he
shoold be left at liberty to refuse business relations with any person
whomsover whether the refusal rested upon reason, or was the result
of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice and with his reasons neither the
public nor third person had any legal concern. This was done during B
the first decade of this century. But during 1930s 'liberty' in the sense
~- of freedom of contract, judicially translated into what Justice Black
has labelled the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional
doctrine, lost its potency as an obstalce to the enforcement of legisla-
J lion calculated to enhance the bargaining capacity of workers as
against that already possessed by th~ir employers (Vide Lincoln
c
~
Federal Labour Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949). It is now settled in the United States of America that neither
the 'contract' clause nor the 'due process' clause had the effect of
overriding the power of the state to establish all regulations that are
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, com-
fort, or general welfare of the community and that this power can D
neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by
express grant; and that all contract and property or other vested rights
are held subject to its fair exercise. In view of the change in the
attitude of the Court laws regulating hours of labour, labour in mines,
-fl..' employment-of children in hazardous occupations, payment of wages,
minimum wages laws, workmen's compensation laws and collective E
bargaining have been upheld in recent years even though the right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been once construed
as an absolute right not alienable by any consideration of public weal.

Two other provisions of the Constitution of the United States of
America which appear to confer absolute rights have also been construed F
-~ as rights which may be regulated by the statute in the public interest in
exercise of its police powers and they are the religious freedom and the
freedom of expression. The relevant part of the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States of America reads that "the Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibi-
ting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or G
of the press." In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) the
question for consideration was whether the conviction of a member of
~ the Mormons faith under a law prohibiting polygamy despite the fact
that an accepted doctrine of his church which then imposed on its male
members the duty to practice polygamy was valid or not. The Supreme
Court of the United States of America rejecting the contention of the H

'
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A accused based on the right which guaranteed the free exercise of reli- ~
gion observed thus: /,

" ...... There never has been a time in any State of
the Union when polygamy has not been an offense against
society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with
B more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is
impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of
religion freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in
respect' to this more important feature of social life.
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, .,.
l
nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and
usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be
c built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social
obligations and duties, with which government is neces-
sarily required to deal ........... An exceptional colony
of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may some-
times exist for a time without appearing to disturb the
D social condition of the people who surround it; but there
cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of
constitution, it is without the legitimate scope of the power
of every civil government to determine whether polygamy
or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its
dominion.
E
In our opinion the statute immediately under consi-
deration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is
constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for .,.
all those residing in the territories, and in places over which
the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the
F only question which remains is, whether those who make '>
polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the ,...,._
operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not
make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found
guilty and punished, while those who do must be acquitted
and go free. This would be introducing a new element into
G criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one be- ·!--<,

lieved that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religi-
ous worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not inlerfere to
H prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was
EMPLOYEES UNION v. C.M. COLLEGE [VENKATARAMIAH, J.) 575

her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead A
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil govern-
ment to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

So here, as a law of the organization of society under
the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided
that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man B
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances.''
c
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court of America on the
above question show that the said Court has always balanced the in-
terest asserted by the Government against the claim of religious liberty
accepted by the person affected and if the governmental interest is
compelling and if no alternative forms of regulation would subserve D
that interest the claimant of the right is required to yield. Thus it is
seen that the religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment is
not absolute although the Court has tried to protect substantially the
exercise of religious freedom by the citizens of the United States of
America.
E
Similarly as regards the right of free speech and expression the

- Supreme Court of the United States of America has observed in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) thus:-

"But although the rights of free speech and assembly
are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. F
Their expercise is subject to restriction, if the particular
restriction proposed is required in order to protect the
State from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic or moral."

It may be noted that the Constitution of the United States of G
America does not contain any clauses corresponding to Article 25(1)
of the Constitution of India which guarantees freedom of conscience
and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, "subject to
public order, morality and health and to the other provision of" of Part
III of the Constitution of India and Article 25(2) of the Constitution
which provides that "nothing in this article shall affect the operation of H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] l S.C.R.

A any existing law or prevent the State from making any law (a) regulat-
ing or restricting any economic, financial, political dr other secular
activity which may be associated with religious practice .......... "
The Constitution of the United States of America also does not con-
tain a provision corresponding to clause (2) of Article 19 of the
Constitution of India which provides that "nothing in sub-clause (a) of
B
clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the
State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said-clause in
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of
the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency
or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or inci-
C tement to an offence." Yet, the right to liberty, the right to religious
freedom and the right of free speech though they appear to be asbo-
lute, have been construed to be subject to regulation by the State in
exercise of its legitimate police powers. We have set out in some detail
these aspects of the constitutional law of the United States of America
D in order to facilitate tl)e construction of and the meaning to be given to
our own constitution, though we need not be guided always by what
the Supreme Court of the United States of America says about its own
constitution.

Having given our very anxious consideration to the right of the
minorities guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India
E and the necessity for having a general law which regulates the re111tion-
ship between employers and workmen and after balancing the two
interests we have come to the conclusion that the decision of the High
Court is liable to be set aside and the three writ petitions filed before
the High Court should be dismissed. We, accordingly, allow this ap-
peal, set aside the common judgment of the High Court in Writ Peti-
F tion Nos. 220 to 222 of 1980 on the file of the High Court and dismiss
the said writ petitions. The Labour Court to which the references have
been made by the Government of Tamil Nadu shall now proceed to
dispose of the said references in accordance with law. There shall be
no order as to costs.

G H.L.C. Appeal allowed.