Holding

The Industrial Tribunal erred; under Section 33(2)(b) it must only determine if a prima facie case exists using the pre‑ponderance of probability standard, and need not examine passengers, so approval of the dismissal should be granted.

Summary

A bus driven by the respondent crashed, killing seven passengers. The employer dismissed the driver after a domestic enquiry and sought approval of the dismissal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Tribunal refused approval, holding that the enquiry was flawed because the passengers were not examined, allegedly violating natural justice. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s order. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) is limited to determining whether a prima facie case exists, that the appropriate standard of proof is pre‑ponderance of probability, and that the principle of res ipsa loquitur applies, making it unnecessary to examine the passengers. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in law, and the Supreme Court set aside its order and directed that approval of the dismissal be granted.

Issues considered

The scope of the Industrial Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act – whether it may re‑appreciate evidence or only assess a prima facie case.
Whether the failure to examine bus passengers vitiates a domestic enquiry under the principles of natural justice.
The standard of proof applicable to a domestic enquiry – pre‑ponderance of probability versus proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a domestic enquiry concerning a bus accident.
Whether the Tribunal took an irrelevant fact into account in rejecting approval of the dismissal.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10, s. 33(2)(b)

Subjects

Industrial Disputes ActSection 33(2)(b)Domestic enquiryNatural justiceStandard of proofRes ipsa loquiturPrima facie caseDismissalLabour lawTribunal jurisdiction

Judgment

CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. A
v.
G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM

DECEMBER 17, 2004
B
[N. SANTOSH HEGDE AND S.B. SINHA, JJ.]

Labour laws :

Industrial Disputes Act, J947-Sections 33(2)(b) and JO-Grant of
approval of dismissal order-Jurisdiction of Industrial tribunal-Scope of- C
Held : Jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited and cannot be equated with
section JO-Tribunal has to see whether prima facie case against delinquem
employee is made out on the evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry-
On facts, refusal of approval of dismissal order of driver by tribunal on
the ground of non-examination ofpassengers when evidence adduced during D
domestic enquiry showing negligence of driver-Single Judge and Division
Bench of High Court upheld the order-On appeal held : Courts below
failed to pose unto themselves correct questions-Tribunal did not apply
the principle of res ipsa loquitur and took into consideration an irrelevant
fact that the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to pe
examined-It also failed to apply standard of proof- 'preponderance of E
probability' in relation to domestic enquiry-Hence, order of tribunal set
aside and tribunal directed to grant approval to the dismissal ordet-
Constitution of India, J950-Article 136.

Maxims : F
Res ipsa loquitur-Principle of-Discussed.

A bus met with an accident resulting in death of seven passengers.
Branch Manager of the appellant-Roadways Company conducted 'on
the spot inquiry and submitted a report to the effect that the respondent- G
driver of the bus drove the bus in a rash and negligent manner. There-
after·, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent
and charges were framed. Inquiry Officer found the respondent guilty
of misconduct and the Disciplinary Authority dismissed him from serv-
ices. Appellant filed an application under section 33(2)(b) of the Indus- H
1123
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A trial Disputes Act, 1947 for grant of approval of the dismissal order.
Presiding Officer rejected the grant of approval on the ground of failure \
to observe principles of natural justice by not examining the passengers.
Appellant filed writ petition challenging the order. Single Judge and
also the Division Bench of High Court dismissed the same. Hence the
B present appeal.

Appellant-Roadways Company contended that the evidence clearly
shows that the bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner
resulting in the death of seven passengers; that in the enquiry of this
nature it was not necessary to examine the passengers of the bus; and
C that the appellant not only afforded an opportunity to the respondent
to cross-examine the witnesses examined on their behalf but also gave
opportunity ·to examine defence witnesses, as such the principles of
natural justice were followed.

D Respondent-driver contended that in the domestic enquiry the
alleged misconduct of the respondent cannot be said to have been proved
inasmuch as no finding has been recorded as regards the culpability of
,I
the respondent vis-a-vis commission of the said misconduct; and that
only because an accident had taken place, the same by itself in absence
of strict proof thereof cannot be a ground to infer that misconduct on
E the part of the respondent stood proved.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under
F Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes At, 1947 is a limited one. The
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) cannot be
equated with that of Section 10 of the Act. While exercising jurisdiction
under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required
to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the
validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delin-
G quent, keeping in view the fact that if the permission or approval is
granted, the discharge or dismissal order passed against the delinquent
employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding
before the Tribunal in terms of the 1947 Act. [1131-D-E; 1133-F-G)

H Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Bane1jee, AIR (1958) SC 79, referred to.
CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM 1125
.r
1.2. The principle of Evidence Act has no application to a domestic A
enquiry. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the prin-
ciple of natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic
enquiry but the said principle cannot be stretched too far nor can be
applied in a vacuum. It is further trite that the standard of proof
required in a domestic enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal trial is absolutely B
different Whereas in the former, 'preponderance of probability' would
suffice; in the latter, 'proof beyond all reasonable doubt' is imperative.
[1132-F-1133-E; 1134-D]

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Edu-
cation _v. K.S. Gandhi and Others, [1991] 2 SCC 716, referred to. C
1.3. A quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct
question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question
posed leads to a wrong answer. Errors of fact can also be a subject-
matter of judicial review. [1140-B)
D
E v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004) Vol. 2
Weekly Law Report 1351, referred to.

Judicial Review, 'Appeal and Factual Error' by Paul P. Craig Q.C.
2004 Public Law 788, referred to.
E
2.1. In the instant case, admittedly an enquiry has been held wherein
the parties examined their witnesses. Respondent was represented and
assisted by three observers. Branch Manager submitted his report to the
effect that the driver of the bus drove the bus in a rash and negligent
manner and proved the same before the Inquiry Officer. The nature of F
impact clearly demonstrates that the vehicle was being driven rashly or
negligently. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value of
the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the bus deserved
serious consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. [1131-D-E; 1134-E-F)

2.2. The enquiry officer has categorically rejected the defence of G
the respondent that the bus was being driven at a slow speed. The
principle of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case. Once the
said. doctrine is found to be applicable the burden of proof would shift
on the respondent to prove that the vehicle was not being driven by him
rashly or negligently. The Industrial Tribunal did not apply the principle H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
"1 .
A of Res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and
took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane for determining
the issue, namely, the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required
to be examined. In a case involving accident it is not essential to examine
the passengers of the bus. Furthermore, the Industrial Tribunal further
B failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic
enquiry, which is "preponderance ofprobability" and applied the standard
of proof required for a criminal trial. Therefore, the Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal as also the Single Judge and the Division Bench of
the High Court misdirected themselves in law insofar as they failed to
pose unto themselves correct questions. Thus, a case for judicial review
C was clearly made out. Order of High Court is set aside and the Industrial
Tribunal is directed to grant approval to th~ dismissal order against the
respondent. [1128-G-H; 1140-C-D; 1140-A]

Mis. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors.,
D [1971] 2 SCC 617 and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Negarkar v. Union of India and
Ors., [1999] 7 SCC 409, distinguished. '

Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Ors. v. Mis. Ranjit Ginning and
Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR (1977) SC 1735; (Smt.) Sar/a Dixit and Another
v. Balwant Yadav and Others, [1996] 3 SCC 179; Divisional Controller
E KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, (2004) SCALE 308; Thakur Singh v.
State of Punjab, [2003] 9 SCC 208 and State of Haryana and Others v.
Rattan Singh, (1977] 2 SCC 491, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3392 of
F 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.6.2001 of the Madras High
Court in W.A. No. 46 of 1993.

K. Ramanurthy, A. Krishnamoorthy and Sriram J. Thalapathy for the
G Appeallant.

J. Buther, R.S. Chauhan, Ms. Geeta Kalra and Ambhoj Kumar Sinha
for the Respondent.

H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A around 3.00 p.m. near Poondi dashed against a tamarind tree which
was at the edge of the road and thereby caused a very big accident.

2. While you w,ere on duty as aforesaid, even though it was a
I
straight road and was visible to a distance of about 300 ft. In respect
of the buses which come from the opposite direction, you have been
B
very negligent and in a careless and irresponsible manner move the
bus very fast and dashed the front left side of the bus against the
branch of the tamarind tree which was cut and found at the left side
of the road and after that turned the bus towards the right side and
thereby caused heavy damage to the bus. On account of your
c aforesaid act the entire left side of the bus dashed against the
tamarind tree branch which resulted in the passengers at the left
side of the bus to sustain grievous injuries and that seven passen-
gers died in the aforesaid accident and about I 0 passengers sus-
tained grievous injuries and that you were responsible for the same.
D
3. Further, you were responsible for the Joss of accessories of the
bus to the tune of Rs.30,000 and also you were responsible for the
loss of revenue for the Corporation.

4. Further, you were responsible for tarnishing the fair name of the
E Corporation amongst general public."

In the domestic inquiry that followed the said charge-sheet, two wit-
nesses were examined on behalf of the Appellant.

F The Inquiry Officer upon consideration of the materials brought on
records by the parties therein found the Respondent guilty of misconduct
in relation to the charges framed against him. The Inquiry Officer rejected
the contention of the Respondent herein that the bus was being driven at
a slow speed and the accident took place to save a boy who suddenly crossed
the road holding:
G
"Thus it has been proved beyond doubt by the evidence adduced
by the management's side that the delinquent was careless, negli-
gent and rash in driving the bus at the time -of the occurrence
resulting in this accident and he is responsible, for this accident and
H consequences thereof and the defence evidence by way of two
CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM [SI1'<1IA, J.] 1129

statements adduced by the delinquent in proof of his defence cannot A'
be given any credit or credence for reasons already expatiated. The
delinquent has not alleged any brake failure in his earlier statement
in Ex.P-9 or in his written explanation to charge memo, in which
he has stated that he effectively used brake and halted the bus after
impact." B
The Respondent was, thereafter, dismissed from the services by the
Disciplinary Authority.

As an industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal the
Appellant herein filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial C
Disputes Act for grant of approval of the said order of dismissal. The learned
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal by an order dated 29.4.88 despite
holding that 'the scope of adjudication in a proceeding under Section
33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is limited and while granting approval
it does not sit as a court of appeal re-appreciating the evidence for itself but D
has to examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the evidence adduced
in the domestic enquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case had been
made out on the charges leveled or if the findings are perverse', carne to
the following findings:

"In the instant case, the domestic enquiry conducted cannot be E
considered as fair and proper and is vitiated on account o~ the
failure of the Enquiry officer to observe the principles of natural
justice by not examining the passengers who had given the state-
ments."
F
On such finding the approval sought for by the Appellant herein was 1

rejected. A writ petition was filed by the Appellant questioning the correct-
ness or otherwise of the said order dated 1.12.1992 before the High Court.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court upheld the said order. A writ
appeal No. 46/1993 filed by the Appellant against the order passed b)! the
learned Single Judge was dismissed opining: G

"Though the learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana & Another v.
Rattan Singh reported in AIR (1977) SC 1512, we hold that the said
pronouncement of the Apex Court will not have any application to H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the present case as it was a converse case where the finding are
based upon some evidence, namely, eye witness, and therefore, in
that context, the Supreme Court held that non-examination of the
passenger will not vitiate the enquiry. The said pronouncement will
not have any application to the facts of the present case and it is
clearly distinguishable."
B
Mr. K. Ramamurthy, learned senior counsel on behalf of the Appellant
would contend that the learned Tribunal and consequently the learned
Judges of the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned
judgments insofar as they failed to take into consideration that in an enquiry
C of this nature it was not necessary to examine the passengers of the bus. The
learned counsel urged that the admitted photographs of the bus in question
after it met with an aforementioned accident clearly demonstrate that the
same was being driven in a rash and negligent manner as a result of which
7 passengers died and some others suffered serious injuries. It was submitted
D that the Appellant had not only afforded an opportunity to the Respondent
to cross examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the Appellant but also
was given the opportunity to examine his defence witnesses and in that view
of the matter the principles of natural justice must be held to have fully been
complied with. In support of the said contention, learned counsel has strongly
relied on a decision of this Court in Divisional Controller KSRTC (NWKRTC)
E v. A.TMane, (2004) 8 SCALE 308.

Mr. J. Buther, learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent, on the
other hand, would submit that in the domestic enquiry the alleged miscon-
duct of the Respondent cannot be said to have been proved inasmuch as no
p finding has been recorded as regards the culpability of the Respondent vis-
a-vis commission of the said misconduct. It was further contended that only
because an accident had taken place, the same by itself in absence of the
strict proof thereof and having regard to the fact that the Respondent had
been acquitted in the criminal trial, cannot be held to be a ground to infer
that the misconduct on the part of the Respondent stood proved. The learned
G counsel in support of his argument has placed reliance upon a decision of
this Court in Mis Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and
Others, [1971] 2 SCC 617 and Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of
India & Others, [1999] 7 SCC 409

H Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:
CH OLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. TIURUGNANASAMBANDAM [SINHA, J.] 113 l

''l2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an A
industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the stand-
ing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or,
where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the
terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and
the workman
B
(a) ***
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge
or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman.
c
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed,
unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application
has been made by the employer to the authority before which the
proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the
employer." D
It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a limited
one. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b)
cannot be equated with that of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
In this case admittedly an enquiry has been held wherein the parties exam- <- E
ined their witnesses. The Respondent was represented and assisted by three
observers. Shri M. Venkatatesan was the Branch Manager, CRC Tanjore
Town Branch, who had submitted his report and proved the same before the
Inquiry Officer. He furnished a detailed account of the position of the bus
vis-a-vis the other bus after the collision took place. He found that there was p
no brake tyre mark of the bus on the road. All the two seaters seats on the
entire left side of the bus were found totally damaged. The left side roof
arch angle of the bus was found totally out. Not only 4 persons were found
to be dead at the spot, the driver and conductor of the bus and l 0 other
passengers were also sustained injuries in this accident. Out of the said 10
passengers, 3 subsequently died in the hospital owing to the injuries sus- G
tained by them. He further found that on the left side of the road in the
earthen margin, there was a tamarind tree's protruding branch and which
was found to have been already cut and the bottom stump of the b~anch was
found protruding to a length of 3 inches. The bus was found to have been
brought to a halt only at a distance of 81 ft. from the place of impact against H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the tree. He further noticed that even after the impact of the bus against the
tree, the delinquent is said to have swerved the bus further to the right side
from left side without applying brake and reducing speed and later only be
brought the bus to a halt at some distance as a result of which the entire
side roof angle of the bus got cut.

B The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, as noticed
hereinbefore, opined that the passengers of the bus should have been ex-
amined. It does not appear from the order dated 29.4.88 passed by the
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal that the Respondent herein made any
prayer for cross examining the passengers who travelled in the ill-fated bus
C and who were examined by the said Shri M. Venkatesan. It is evident from
the order of the learned Tribunal that only in the show-cause filed by the
Respondent in response to the second show-cause notice, such a contention
was raised. The learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal in his im-
pugned judgement further failed to take into consideration that even if the
D statements of the said passengers are ignored, the misconduct allegedly
committed by the Respondent would stand proved on the basis of the
evidence adduced by Shri M. Venkatesan together with the circumstantial
evidences brought on records. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
although referred to the sketch drawn by PW-I on the site (Ex.P-2) and 4
photographs (Ex.P-8) but ignored the same observing that unless witnesses
E were examined in support of the two exhibits, it is not possible to draw any
inference therefrom. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine
the materials on records independently but referred to the findings of the
Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge to the effect that from
their judgments it was apparent that the driver had not been driving the bus
F rashly and negligently.

It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principle of Evidence
Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.

In Maharastra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Edu-
G cation v. K.S. Gandhi and Others, [1991] 2 sec 716, it was held:

"It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and
the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmen-
tal proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities r .- -
to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent
H
CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM [SINHA, J.] 1133

and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conform- A
ity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and
relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud,
conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be
available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof.
In our considered view inference from the evidence and circum- B
stances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or specu-
lation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt c:rcumstances
to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to
form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct
or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the
facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective
c
facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact
which it is sought to establish ........ The standard of proof is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt but the preponderance ofprobl:\bili-
ties tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more prob-
able. Standard of proof, however, cannot be put in a strait-ja,cket D
formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof.
The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances
in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases
and domestic enquires."
E
There cannot, however, be any doubt whatsoever that the principl,e of
natural justice are required to be complied with in a domestic enquiry. It
is, however, well-known that the said principle cannot be stretched too far
nor can be applied in a vacuum.

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for F
grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Bfirn
Ltd. v R.N. Banerjee, AIR (1958) SC 79. While exercising jurisdiction under
Section 33(2(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see a~ to
whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the validity or
otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent; keeping in G
view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of
discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent em-
ployee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding before
:;; -, the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes
Act. In Martin Burn 's case (supra) this court stated: H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A "A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a
case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is
led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether
a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration
is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the
B conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclu-
sion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the
Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a
different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own
judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider
whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the
c record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. v The Workers of the
Company, (1952] Lab. AC 490 (F)."

It is further trite that the standard of proof required in a domestic
enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal trial is absolutely different. Whereas in the
D former 'preponderance of probability' would suffice; in the latter, 'proof
beyond all reasonable doubt' is imperative.

The tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of
the Industrial Disputes Act was required to bear in mind the aforementioned
E legal principles. Furthermore, in a case of this nature the probative value
of the evidence showing the extensive damages caused to the entire left side
of the bus; the fact that the bus first hit the branches of a tamarind tree and
then stopped at a distance of 81 ft therefrom even after colliding with
another bus coming from the front deserved serious consideration at the
hands of the tribunal. The nature of impact clearly demonstrates that the
F vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.

Res ipsa loquitur is a well-known principle which is applicable in the
instant case. Once the said doctrine is found to be applicable the burden of
proof would shift on the delinquent. As noticed hereinabove, the enquiry
G officer has categorically rejected the defence of the Respondent that the bus
was being driven at a slow speed.

In Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others v. Mis. Ranjit Ginning
& Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Another, AIR ( 1977) SC 1735 this Court
H observed:
CHO LAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM [SINHA, J.] 1135

"6.The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence A
but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff
as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely
within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff
can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to estab-
lish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought B
to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The
general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident
"speaks for itself' or tells its own story. There ~re cases in which
the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff
to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the
defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other c
cause than his own negligence .... "

The said principle was applied in Sar/a Dixit (Smt.) and Another v.
Ba/want Yadav and Others, [1996) 3 SCC 179.
D·
In A.T Mane (supra), this Bench observed:

"6 ... Learned counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in support
of this contention of his in the case of Karnataka State Road
Transport Corpn. v. B.S. Hullikatti, [2001) 2 SCC 574. That was
also a case where a conductor concerned had committed similar E
misconduct 36 times prior to the time he wa.s found guilty and
bearing that fact in mind this Court held thus:-

"Be that as it may, the principle of res ipsa loquitur, namely, the
facts speak for themselves, is clearly applicable in the instant case.
F
Charging 50 paise per ticket more from as many as 35 passengers
could only be to get financial benefit, by the Conductor. This act
was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent
was not fit to be retained as a Conductor because such action or
inaction of his is bound to result in financial loss to the appellant
--I. corporation." G

7. On the above basis, the Court came to the conclusion that the
order of dismissal should have been set aside. In our opinion, the
facts of the above case and the law laid down therein applies to the
facts of the present case also."
H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, [2003] 9 SCC 208, this Court
observed:

"4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle
at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over
a bridge and then it fell into canal. In such a situation the doctrine
B
of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and the burden shifts on to the
man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the
accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part.
He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to
causes other than negligence on his part."
c
The burden of proof was, therefore, on the Respondent to
prove that the vehicle was not being driven by him rashly or
negligently.

D Furthermore, in a case involving accident it is not essential to examine
the passengers of the bus. In State of Haryana & Others v Rattan Singh,
[1977] 2 SCC 491 this Court observed:

"5. Reliance was placed, as earlier stated, on the non-compliance
with the departmental instruction that statement of passengers should
E be recorded by inspectors. These are instructions of prudence, not
rules that bind or vitiate in the violation. In this case, the Inspector
tried to get the statements but the passengers declined, the psychol-
ogy of the latter in such circumstances being understandable, al-
though may not be approved. We cannot hold that merely because
F statements of passengers were not recorded the order that followed
was invalid. Likewise, the re-evaluation of the evidence on the
strength of co-conductor's testimony is a matter not for the court
but for the administrative tribunal. In conclusion, we do not think
the courts below were right in overturning the finding of the do-
mestic tribunal."
G
Yet again, this Court in A. T Mane (supra) referring to the decision of
this court in Rattan Singh (supra) held:
r- ~
"6 .. .ln such circumstances, it was not necessary or possible for the
appellant-corporation to have examined the passengers to establish
H
CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. nnRUGNANASAMBANDAM [SINHA, J.] 1137

the guilt of the respondent. He also submitted that the finding of A
the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge that the punishment
is disproportionate to the misconduct is wholly misconceived."

In Mis Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.(supra) this Court was seized
with a different question namely the employer's liability to pay the bonus B
to the workmen which had a direct relation with the profit earned by the
company for the year 1960-61. In support of financial condition of the
management which had a direct nexus with the employer's capacity to pay
bonus and in that situation it was held that mere production of a balance-
sheet by the management would not serve the purpose as the entries con-
tained therein, if called in question, must be proved. The tribunal in that case c
came to the conclusion that management had failed to prove the original cost
of the machines, plant and machinery, its age, the probable requirements for
replacement, the multiplier and the divisor. In those circumstances the claim
was held to have been properly disallowed by the Tribunal holding:
D
"14 ....... No doubt the procedure prescribed in the Evidence Act by
first requiring his chief-examination and then to allow the delin-
quent to exercise his right to cross-examine him was not followed,
but that the Enquiry Officer, took upon himself to cross-examine
the witnesses from the very start. It was contended that this method
would violate the well recognized rules of procedure. In these E
circumstances it was observed at page 264:

"Now it is no doubt true that the evidence of the Respondent
and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the
Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries F
conducted by Tribunal even though they may be judicial in
character. The law requires that such Tribunals should ob-
serve rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and
if they do so their decision is not liable to be impeached on
the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance
with that which obtains in a Court of law." G

But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply
that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what
it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a
contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are com- H'
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
-1,

A petent to speak about them and are subjected to cross-examination
by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a
document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that
naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents
and are the statements contained therein true. When the appellant
B produced the balance-sheet and profit and loss account of the
company, it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of
it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged
the Appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the
books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or
other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant
c to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect
thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who
challenges this far.t. This is both in accord with principles ofnatural
justice as also according to the procedure under Order XIX, Civil
Procedure Code and the Evidence Act both of which incorporate
D these general principles. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence
Act are not strictly applicable except in so far as Section 11 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 and the rules prescribed therein permit
it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not
evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing
its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in
E existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either
by affidavit or by witnesses who have executed them, if they are
alive and can be produced. Again if a party wants an inspection,
it is incumbent on the Tribunal to give inspection in so far as that
is relevant to the enquiry. The applicability of these principles are
F well recognized and admit of no doubt."

The said decision, for the reasons stated hereinabove, cannot have any
application to the fact of the present case.

The learned Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon a
G decision of this Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar (supra). In that case,
this court was concerned with the charge of misconduct against the appellant
therein concerning an allegation that he favoured M/s Hari Vishnu Pakaging
Ltd. Nagpur (assessee) by not imposing penalty on it under Rule 173-Q of
the Central Excise Rules, 1944 when he had passed an order-in-Original No.
H 20of1995 dated 2.3.1995 holding that the assesee had clandestinely manufac-
CHOLAN ROADWAYS LTD. v. G. THIRUGNANASAMBANDAM [SINHA, J.] 1139
. ·~
tt1red and cleared the excisable goods willfully and evaded the excise duty A
and had ordered confiscation of the goods. The misconduct was said to h'ave
been committed by the appellant while exercising his judicial function.
Having regard to the factual matrix obtaining therein, this court observed:

"3 7. Penalty to be imposed has to be commensurate with the gravity
of the offence and the extent of the evasion. In the present case,
B
penalty could have been justified. The appellant was, however,~ of
the view that imposition of penalty was not mandatory. He could
have formed such a view ...... "

It was further observed: c
"41. When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits. ijut
it cannot be said that by not levying the penalty the officer has
favoured the assessee or shown undue favour to him. There has, to
be some basis for the disciplinary authority to reach such a con-
clusion even prima facie. The record in the present case does qot D
show if the disciplinary authority had any information within its
possession from where it could form an opinion that the appelhj.nt
showed "favour" to the assessee by not imposing the penalty. He·
may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction. But that wrong qm
be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initi-
E
ating disciplinary proceedings against an officer while he is actii;ig
as a quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a
quasi-judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervisi9n
in appeal.

42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot F
take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspici~n
~.
has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis
for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent
officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in
the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order
in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against
I
G
the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar ca~e
the appellant invariably imposed penalty."

In the aforementioned factual matrix of the case it was held that every
error of law would not constitute a charge of misconduct. H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
-< '
A This decision also has no application to the facts of the present case.
In the instant case the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal as also the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court misdirected
themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves correct
questions. It is now well-settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose
B unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A
wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, further more,
the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent
insofar as it did not apply the principle of Res ipsa loquitur which was
relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consid-
eration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrel-
C evant fact not garmane for determining the issue, namely, the passengers
of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tri-
bunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a
domestic enquiry, which is "preponderance of probability" and applied the
standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review
D was, thus, clearly made out.

Errors of fa:::t can also be a subject-matter of judicial review. (See E.
v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004) Vol.2 Weekly Law
Report page 1351 ). Reference in this connection may also be made to an
interesting article by Paul P. Craig Q.C. titled 'Judicial Review, Appeal and
E Factual Error' published in 2004 Public Law Page 788.

The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained and, thus, must
be set aside.

p Ordinarily, we would have remitted the matter back to Industrial
Tribunal for its consideration afresh but as the matter is pending for a long
time and as we are satisfied having regard to the materials placed before us
that the Industrial Tribunal should have granted approval of the order of
punishment passed by the Appellant herein against the Respondents, we
direct accordingly. The Respondents may, however, take recourse to such
G remedy as is available to in law for questioning the said order of dismissal.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be
sustained which are set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

H N.J. Appeal allowed.