Supreme Court of India
CHETANversusTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 793
- Decided
- 30 May 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
The conviction under IPC s.302, IPC s.404 (for the gold chain), and Arms Act s.3 and s.5 is upheld, while the conviction under IPC s.404 for the mobile phone is set aside.
Summary
The appellant was convicted of murder (IPC s.302), misappropriation of property (IPC s.404), and unlawful possession and use of a firearm (Arms Act s.3, s.5) based largely on circumstantial evidence, including the last‑seen theory, forensic ballistics, and his subsequent abscondence. The Supreme Court examined whether the chain of circumstantial evidence satisfied the legal requirements for conviction and whether the time gap between the last sighting and the discovery of the body undermined the prosecution case. It held that the forensic evidence linking the recovered double‑barrel gun to the fatal injuries, the corroborated witness testimonies, the appellant’s concealment and misleading conduct, and the recovery of the victim’s gold chain collectively established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also considered the appellant’s failure to explain the recovery of the weapon and ammunition as an adverse inference. While upholding the murder conviction and the Arms Act convictions, the Court set aside the conviction for misappropriation of the mobile phone, giving the appellant the benefit of doubt on that specific charge. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to surrender to serve the remaining sentence.
Issues considered
- The adequacy of circumstantial evidence, including the last‑seen theory, to sustain convictions under IPC s.302, s.404 and Arms Act s.3, s.5.
- Whether the time gap between the appellant and the deceased being last seen together and the discovery of the body defeats the last‑seen theory.
- The relevance of the appellant’s abscondence and misleading statements as evidence of guilt.
- The requirement for the accused to explain the recovery of the weapon and ammunition under Evidence Act s.106.
- The propriety of setting aside the conviction under IPC s.404 for the alleged recovery of the mobile phone.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27, s. 3, s. 5
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304, s. 404
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the courts below convicting and sentencing the appellant u/ss.302, 304 IPC, and u/ss.3, 5 of the Arms Act, 1959. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 304, 404 – Murder – Conviction on basis and recovery of articles – Prosecution case that homicidal death of the victim due to gunshot injury by the appellant – Appellant had a grudge against the victim because of certain monetary dispute – After committing the offence, the appellant misappropriated the mobile phone
Subjects
MurderCarrying and using gun without valid licenseUnlawful possession of gunCircumstantial evidenceD.B.B.L. gunWeapon of crimeRecovery of articlesForensic evidenceAct of abscondenceGunshot injuryMotiveLast‑seen theoryBeyond reasonable doubtNo direct evidenceBallistic injuries to vital organsBallistic testNot ordinary weapon of crimeSpecial knowledgeMisleading family of deceasedElement of grudgeHuman experiences and human behaviorNo element of surmise and conjectureUnnatural deathHomicideBullet injuryRecovery of gun and its dischargeRecovery of spent cartridge
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 906 : 2025 INSC 793
Chetan
v.
The State of Karnataka
(Criminal Appeal No. 1568 of 2013)
30 May 2025
[Surya Kant and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the courts
below convicting and sentencing the appellant u/ss.302, 304 IPC,
and u/ss.3, 5 of the Arms Act, 1959.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 304, 404 – Murder – Conviction on
basis of circumstantial evidence, last seen theory, and recovery
of articles – Prosecution case that homicidal death of the victim
due to gunshot injury by the appellant – Appellant had a grudge
against the victim because of certain monetary dispute –
After committing the offence, the appellant misappropriated
the mobile phone and gold chain belonging to the victim –
Appellant used gun belonging to his grandfather without a
valid license – Courts below convicted and sentenced the
appellant u/ss.302, 304 and ss.3, 5 of the Arms Act, on basis
of the circumstantial evidence, last seen theory, recovery of
articles, forensic evidence and the act of abscondence by the
appellant – Interference with:
Held: It was unnatural death due to gunshot injury, thus, case of
homicide – Evidence of witnesses supports the last seen theory
and strengthens the circumstance – Appellant’s link to the death
of the deceased established based on the circumstances and
the established facts – Possibility of the deceased being with
another person other than the appellant before he was shot quite
remote – Prosecution’s case not mere conjecture, but rather based
on established circumstances and facts – Forensic evidence
based on ballistic tests established that the gun recovered at
the instance of the appellant used in causing the bullet injury to
the deceased which led to his death – Weapon of crime directly
* Author
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 907
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
traceable to appellant – Failure to explain the recovery of the gun
and its discharge, and recovery of the spent cartridge implicates
the appellant – Absence of evidence of any witness seeing the
gun being carried by the appellant, not fatal to the prosecution
case – Act of absconding by appellant, rather than helping and
cooperating with the family of his friend, in spite of persistent
enquiries from the father of the deceased, clear indication of his
guilt – Furthermore, failure to prove monetary transaction between
the appellant and the deceased, may not materially affect the
prosecution case – Thus, a clear pattern emerges out of the
circumstances so proved with inferential and logical links which
unmistakably points to the guilt of the appellant for committing
murder of the deceased punishable u/s.302 and also for committing
offences u/s.404 and ss.3 and 5 punishable u/ss.25 and 27 of the
Arms Act – These proved circumstances considered individually
or taken together do not indicate the involvement of anyone else
other than the appellant – Prosecution has been able to prove
the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt – No
material illegality committed by the courts below in appreciating
the evidence against the appellant nor any gross injustice caused
to the appellant by the impugned judgment by misreading or
ignoring any material evidence – Thus, the conviction of the
appellant by the courts below does not warrant any interference
except for setting aside the conviction u/s.404 as regards recovery
of the mobile phone, of which the benefit of doubt given to the
appellant, however, the conviction of the appellant u/ss.302 and
404 as regards murder of the deceased and misappropriation
of gold chain by the appellant and u/ss.25 and 27 of the Arms
Act for unlawful possession and use of the gun, sustained –
Arms Act, 1959 – ss.3, 5, 25, 27 – Evidence Act – ss.27, 106.
[Paras 10.3, 10.5.1, 10.5.9, 10.6.1, 10.6.8, 10.6.12, 10.7, 10.7.4,
10.7.6, 10.7.9, 10.9.1, 10.11.2, 11.1-11.3]
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Scope and nature:
Held: Circumstantial evidence as opposed to direct evidence, is the
inference one draws from the existence of a fact based on certain
established fact/circumstance – This process invariably involves
intuitive reasoning, proper understanding of human behavior and
psychology – Based on lived human experiences and human
behaviour, if any supposition of fact is clearly inferable from an
established fact, the inferred position of fact should be adopted as
908 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
correct – Law does not require that a fact requires to be proved
on absolute terms bereft of all doubts – Law contemplates that for
a fact to be considered proven, it must eliminate any reasonable
doubt – Fact is considered proved if the court, after reviewing the
evidence, either believes it exists or deems its existence probable
enough that a prudent person would act on the assumption that it
exists – Each of the circumstances from which certain inferences
are sought to be drawn, is required to be proved in accordance
with law, and there cannot be any element of surmise and
conjecture, and each of the circumstances so proved must form a
complete chain to clearly point to the guilt of the accused – If the
combined effect of all these circumstances, each of which has been
independently proved, establishes the guilt of the accused, then
the conviction based on such circumstances can be sustained – If
upon evaluation of a set of proved circumstances consistent with
understandable and socially recognised human behavior, as a
cumulative consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges
which irresistibly points to the culpability of the accused, such an
inferred conclusion can be accepted to be correct to fasten criminal
liability on accused. [Paras 10.12-10.12.1]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Significance of –
Examination of accused u/s.313 – Explained. [Para 10.16.1]
Case Law Cited
Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2022] 6 SCR
989 : (2022) 8 SCC 253; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Rajesh Yadav
and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2022] 16 SCR 967 : (2022)
12 SCC 200; State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. [2007] 3
SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC 755; Mukesh & Anr. v. NCT of Delhi &
Ors. [2017] 6 SCR 1 : (2017) 6 SCC 1; Matru @ Girish Chandra v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [1971] 3 SCR 914 : (1971) 2 SCC 75; G.
Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka [2010] 10 SCR 377 : 2010 (8)
SCC 593; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006]
Supp. 7 SCR 156 : (2006) 10 SCC 681; Manu Sao v. State of
Bihar [2010] 8 SCR 811 : (2010) 12 SCC 310 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Arms Act, 1959; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 909
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
List of Keywords
Murder; Carrying and using gun without valid license; Unlawful
possession of gun; Circumstantial evidence; D.B.B.L. gun;
Weapon of crime; Recovery of articles; Forensic evidence; Act of
abscondence; Gunshot injury; Motive; Last-seen theory; Beyond
reasonable doubt; No direct evidence; Ballistic injuries to vital
organs; Ballistic test; Not ordinary weapon of crime; Special
knowledge; Misleading family of deceased; Element of grudge
against deceased; Human experiences and human behavior; No
element of surmise and conjecture; Fatal injury by use of firearms;
Chain of circumstantial evidence; Examination of accused; Monetary
dispute; Misappropriation of mobile phone and gold chain belonging
to victim; Unnatural death; Homicide; Bullet injury; Recovery of
gun and its discharge; Recovery of spent cartridge.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1568 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in CRLA No. 666 of 2007
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
D.N.Goburdhun, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Rajani K Prasad, Ms. Abha R.
Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Muhammad Ali Khan, A.A.G., Ms. Eesha Bakshi, Prashant Pratap
Singh, Kamran Khan, V. N. Raghupathy.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and
order dated 06.12.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad in the Criminal Appeal
No. 666 of 2007, whereby the High Court upheld the conviction
910 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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and sentence imposed upon the present appellant under Sections
302 and 304 of the IPC and for offences under Sections 3 and 5
punishable under Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act,1959 by judgment
dated 28/29.03.2007 passed by the F.T.C.-II & Addl. Sessions Judge,
Belgaum in Sessions Trial No 267 of 2006.
2. The conviction is based on circumstantial evidence relying on the
last seen theory supported by the recovery of articles including the
weapon of crime and forensic evidence and the act of abscondence
by the appellant.
3. As the appellant is seeking reversal of the concurrent findings by
the two courts below, the Sessions Court and the High Court, this
Court has to tread very cautiously, as observed by this Court on
numerous occasions including in Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253, wherein it has been held that unless the
findings are perverse and rendered in ignorance of material evidence,
this Court should be slow in interfering with concurring findings. It
was thus observed by this Court in Mekala Sivaiah (supra) in the
following words:
“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that Article
136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred under
the said Article are not hedged by any technical hurdles.
This overriding and exceptional power is, however, to be
exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of
justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted
in grave miscarriage of justice by some misapprehension
or misreading of evidence or by ignoring material evidence
then this Court is not only empowered but is well expected
to interfere to promote the cause of justice.
16. It is not the practice of this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence for the purpose of examining whether the
findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court
and the High Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and
exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality
or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of
misreading or ignoring material evidence, that this Court
would interfere with such finding of fact.”
4. Keeping the aforesaid cautionary approach in mind, this Court would
proceed to examine the appeal at hand by considering whether
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 911
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
there is manifest error or illegality in the impugned judgment and
whether any grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of
misreading or ignoring material evidence has occurred in the present
case. This would invariably require a proper examination of the facts
and context of the case, for which we must revisit the background
facts of the case and the evidence adduced, considered by the Trial
Court as well as the High Court.
5. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
5.1 The Prosecution case in brief is that the appellant and the
deceased Vikram Sinde were friends. About eight months prior
to the incident which occurred on 10.07.2006, the appellant had
borrowed a sum of Rs. 4000/- (Rupees Four Thousand only)
from one Ravindra Chavan (PW19), in order to lend the same
in turn to the deceased, which however, was not returned by
the deceased to the appellant even after a lapse of about 7-8
months, despite repeated demands to return the same. In that
connection, there was an argument between the appellant and
the deceased in which the deceased had apparently insulted
the appellant, because of which the appellant bore a grudge
against the deceased.
5.2 It is further the case of the Prosecution that the appellant on
10.07.2006 at about 20.30 hours after taking a 12 Bore D.B.B.L
Gun with cartridges belonging to his grandfather on the pretext
of going for hunting, took the deceased along with him on his
Hero Honda motorcycle to the sugarcane grove located in
Shahapur village, which belonged to the complainant, namely,
Arun Kumar Minache (PW1). It has been alleged that at about
22.00 hours on the same night, the appellant shot the deceased
dead with the said D.B.B.L gun and thus, committed the offence
under Section 302 of the IPC.
5.3 It was further alleged that after committing the said offence, he
took the Nokia mobile phone and gold chain belonging to the
deceased and misappropriated the same, thus committing the
offence under Section 404 of the IPC.
According to the Prosecution, since the appellant carried and
used the D.B.B.L gun belonging to his grandfather without a
valid license, he committed the offence under Section 3 read
912 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
with Section 25 of the Arms Act. The appellant was also charged
with committing an offence punishable under Section 5 read
with Section 27 of the Arms Act.
5.4 As per the Prosecution, as the deceased did not return after
he left home at around 7.45 PM of 10.07.2006, the father of
the deceased telephoned the house of the appellant but was
informed that he was not at home. He then went to the house
of the appellant early morning next day on 11.07.2006 and
enquired from him about the whereabouts of his son, to which
the appellant gave false information that he had parted ways
with the deceased at about 8.00 PM the previous evening. The
father of the deceased also received a call from one Chandrakant
Shinde informing him that the deceased had gone to Pune
and would return within two days. Thereafter, the father of the
deceased started searching for his missing son and filed a
missing report.
5.5 It is the case of the Prosecution that on 13.07.2006 the dead
body of the deceased was found in the sugarcane field belonging
to Arun Kumar Minache (PW -1), who informed the police
about the discovery of the body. However, since the dead body
was decomposed, his identity could not be ascertained. Upon
recovery of the dead body, a police case was registered at
Kagawad Police Station, and necessary messages were flashed
to other police stations to seek information about the identity of
the deceased. Thereafter, an investigation was launched and
an inquest was held. The post-mortem examination of the dead
body was also conducted on 13.07.2006. Since the identity of
the dead body could not be ascertained, the discovery of the
dead body was published in the newspaper which was noticed
by the father on 14.07.2006 and then he went to Kagawad
Police Station and identified the dead body through photographs,
handkerchief, motorcycle key found in the pant pocket, and
sweater on the dead body.
5.6 In the course of the investigation, it was revealed that the
appellant and the deceased were last seen together near
Mahishyal bus stand and thereafter seen on a motorcycle
going towards Shahapur, as noticed by one Ashok Shinde,
the prosecution witness (PW-4), Ashok Jamadar (PW-5) and
Jamir Mulla (PW-3).
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 913
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
5.7 On the basis of the said information, the police arrested the
appellant on 22.07.2006 at Miraj after making search for him in
several locations and was brought to Kagawad Police Station.
During the investigation, the appellant confessed to the crime
and volunteered to produce the gun with which he committed
the crime and also volunteered to show the place where he
shot the deceased and the place where he sold the mobile
phone belonging to the deceased. The appellant also produced
the gold chain, which purportedly belonged to the deceased
which was seized by the Inspector. Thereafter, the appellant
led the police to the house of his grandfather, Ramchandrarao
Chavan (PW-20), and produced one 12 Bore D.B.B.L gun, two
empty cartridges, one live cartridge, one torch, Hero Honda
motorcycle and one empty handbag which were all seized. The
appellant then led the police to the sugarcane field from where
the left chappal of the deceased was recovered. He then led
the Investigation Officer and the panchas near Bellanki Saravu
(back water falls) and showed the spot where he had shot the
deceased dead. Thereafter, the appellant led the police to Srigiri
Complex at Dilukh Nagar, Hyderabad, where he pointed out an
electronic shop of S. Samba Shivakumar (PW-25) to whom he
had sold the mobile phone. According to the Prosecution, the
shop-owner identified the appellant and admitted the transaction
and handed over the mobile phone along with a xerox copy of
the driving license of the appellant, which was kept as proof
of address given by the appellant to the shop keeper, which
were seized by the police.
5.8 During the trial the Prosecution sought to prove the case against
the appellant by examining as many as 31 witnesses and
exhibited a number of documents and articles as mentioned
above. The appellant took the plea of total denial. The appellant
also did not lead any evidence in his defence.
5.9 The Trial Court, Fast Track Court II and Additional Sessions
Judge, Belgaum, in Sessions Case No.267/2006 after hearing
the Prosecution and defence and on consideration of the
materials produced before it, convicted the appellant under
Sections 302 and 404 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 5 punishable
under Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act.
914 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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Accordingly, upon being convicted under Section 302 of the IPC,
the Court sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
life and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment,
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
The appellant was also sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in
default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
three months for the offence under Section 404 IPC.
Furthermore, the appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-(Rupees
five hundred) and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three months for contravention of
Section 3 punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act.
The appellant was also sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-
(Rupees one thousand) and in default of payment of fine
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for
contravention of Section 5 punishable under Section 27 of the
Arms Act.
All these sentences were directed to run concurrently.
5.10 Being aggrieved by the conviction by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Belgaum, as above, the appellant preferred an appeal
before the Karnataka High Court Circle Bench at Dharwad
by filing Criminal Appeal No. 666/2007. The said appeal was
dismissed by the impugned order dated 06.12.2010, against
which the appellant has preferred this appeal before us.
Since the conviction by the Trial Court was affirmed by the High
Court, it may be appropriate first to examine the basis on which
the Trial Court convicted the appellant and how it was upheld
by the High Court upheld it.
6. CONSIDERATION BY THE TRIAL COURT:
6.1 As can be seen from the narration of the incident by the
Prosecution, the case is based on circumstantial evidence, as
no eyewitness had seen the shooting of the deceased by the
appellant with a gun, which led to his death.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 915
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
As we embark upon the exercise to scrutinize the correctness
of the conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we may
recollect the five golden principles of law governing trials based
on circumstantial evidence, which this Court had dealt with from
time to time, and succinctly explained in the celebrated case of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984)
4 SCC 116 as follows:-
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the
High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on
the nature, character and essential proof required
in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial
evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic
decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 :
1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] . This case has
been uniformly followed and applied by this Court
in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for
instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
55] and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972)
4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656] . It may be useful to
extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant
case [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952
SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that
916 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned “must or should”
and not “may be” established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between “may
be proved” and “must be or should be proved”
as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783]
where the observations were made: [SCC para
19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’
and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 917
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused”.
6.2 As can be seen from the records, the Trial Court formulated
five points for consideration which are reproduced as follows: -
“1. Whether the prosecution has proved that on
10.07.2006 at about 2200 hours the deceased
had died homicidal death due to gunshot injury?
2. Whether the prosecution has proved that it is
the accused who has caused homicidal death
of the deceased by firing shot through D.B.B.L
gun marked as MO.9.?
3. Whether the prosecution has proved that on the
said date, the accused after causing the murder
of deceased Vikram Shinde, dishonestly mis-
appropriated or converted to his own use gold
chain and mobile which were in possession of
Vikram Shine at the time of death and thereby
committed any offence punishable u/s 404 of
IPC?
4. Whether the prosecution has proved that on
the same day at about 2030 hours the accused
carried 12 bore BBL gun belonged to his
grandfather Ramachandra Chavan, from his
house to the land of complainant Arun Kumar
and he was in possession of the said gun and
cartridges without possessing required licence
and thereby contravened provisions of Sec.3 of
Arms Act punishable u/s 25 of the Arms Act?
5. Whether the prosecution has proved that on the
said date at about 2200 hours in the land of Arun
Kumar complainant situated within Shahapur
village limits the accused used 12 Bore DBBL
gun (MO.9) to cause death of the deceased
Vikram Shine and thereby contravened the
918 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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provisions of sec.5 punishable u/s 27 of the
Arms Act?”
6.3 The Trial Court consolidated all these issues together and
considered the same in the light of the evidence adduced and
held that the Prosecution had proved their case.
6.4 While it may not be necessary to deal in detail at this stage of
the analysis of the evidence by the Trial Court, nevertheless,
it would be desirable to briefly refer to the findings of the Trial
Court for better appreciation of the case.
6.5 Since the case revolves around circumstantial evidence, the
Trial Court identified the following circumstances/aspects for
consideration:
(1) Motive.
(2) Homicidal death of the deceased by gunshot injury.
(3) The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused
in between 8 and 9.30 p.m. on 10.07.2006.
(4) False information given by the accused to the father of
deceased and his uncle.
(5) Abscondence of the accused from 11.07.06 till his arrest
on 22.07.06.,
(6) Extrajudicial confession on 12.07.06 before PW.18 by
going over to the room of his friend Yuvaraj Bennalkar
situated at Dharwad.
(7) Recovery of gold chain belonged to the deceased from
the possession of the accused after his arrest on 22.07.06
and recovery of Nokia mobile belonging to the deceased
from PW.25 at the instance of the accused.
(8) Recovery of the DBBL gun, 2 spent cartridge cases, one live
cartridge, Eveready battery and star gutka empty handbag
from the house of PW-20, Ramachandra Chavan, the
grandfather of the accused at the instance of the accused.
(9) Discovery of the place of murder and recovery of left foot
chappal of the deceased from sugarcane field situated
near the place where the dead body was found at the
instance of the accused.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 919
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
(10) Discovery of fact i.e. where mobile sim card was thrown
at the instance of the accused.
6.6 As regards the motive that impelled the appellant to commit the
crime, the Prosecution case is that since the deceased failed to
return Rs.4000/- which was lent by the appellant and was also
insulted by the deceased, the appellant bore a grudge against
the deceased and, as revenge, killed the deceased.
As regards this issue of motive, the Trial Court, on consideration
of the evidence on record, concluded that the monetary
transaction, which was the basis for constituting the motive for
committing the crime, was not fully established.
The Trial Court, however, was of the view that the Prosecution
case cannot be thrown out merely because the motive could
not be established.
6.7 The Trial Court concluded based on the evidence that the death
of the deceased was not accidental or suicidal but homicidal.
6.8 To link the appellant with the said homicidal death, the Trial
Court relied on the last-seen theory, for which the Trial Court
referred to the evidence of a number of witnesses, including
the brother of the deceased, Digvijay Shinde (PW-12), who
had seen the appellant and the deceased near Mahishyal bus
stand in the evening of the incident, which was also noticed by
another witness, Anil (PW-11), a friend of PW-12.
The Trial Court also relied on the evidence of another witness,
namely Jamir Mulla (PW-3), who deposed that when he was
standing by the side of the road, he saw the deceased riding
on the pillion of a motorcycle.
The Trial Court also considered the evidence of Ashok Shinde
(PW-4) who was an autorickshaw driver who testified to have
seen the deceased and appellant together at about 5.45 PM on
the fateful day when he was standing near Karamveer Vidyalaya
High School ground.
The evidence of another witness, namely Ashok Jamadar (PW-5)
was also relied upon, who, while he was returning to Mahishyal
and standing near the Kagawad Circle, saw the deceased
920 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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and the appellant on a motorcycle going towards Shiraguppi
at around 9.15 PM on 10.07.2006. The said witness, PW-5,
after coming to know about the death of Vikram Shinde, went
to Kagawad Police Station and identified the body. Though
PW-5 was declared hostile by the Prosecution as he resiled
from his previous statement on other aspects of the incident,
the Trial Court held that the versions of PW-12, PW-11, and
PW-5 regarding the deceased and the appellant being last seen
together cannot be disbelieved.
6.9 The Trial Court, thereafter, considered the other circumstance
that the appellant had given false information to his uncle and
his friend Devaraj Sutar (PW-14), which, according to the Trial
Court proved his guilty mind.
6.10 The Trial Court held that another incriminating circumstance
was the abscondence of the appellant from 11.07.2006 till he
was arrested on 22.07.2006 at Miraj.
6.11 The Trial Court, thereafter, took into consideration the extrajudicial
confession allegedly made by the appellant on 12.07.2006 in
the room of one Yuvaraj Bennalkar in Dharwad where the
witness namely Sandip Sandalage (PW-18) was staying. The
appellant apparently made the extrajudicial confession to the
said witness, PW-18, that he took the deceased on 10.07.2006
on the pretext of going for hunting and killed him by shooting
him with the gun as the deceased did not repay the loan of
Rs. 4000/- and insulted him when he demanded the money.
6.12 The Trial Court also considered the other incriminating
circumstances, i.e., recovery of gold chain belonging to the
deceased from the possession of the appellant, recovery of
Nokia mobile phone belonging to the accused, recovery of
D.B.B.L gun, 2 spent and 1 live cartridges case, Everready
battery and Star Gutka empty handbag from the residence of his
grandfather where the appellant was staying, left foot chappal
of the deceased from the sugarcane field and discovery of the
place of murder at the instance of the appellant.
The Trial Court, accordingly, held based on said evidence
adduced that the aforesaid circumstances/facts have been
proved.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 921
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
6.13 However, the Trial Court held that the Prosecution was not able
to prove the motive, and the extrajudicial confession said to
have been made by the appellant. Nevertheless, in the light of
the other circumstances that, according to the Trial Court were
proved, despite noticing certain irregularities and lapses in the
course of the investigation, which according to the Trial Court
were not material nor could be fatal to the prosecution case
and by holding that irregularities in the investigation would not
entitle the accused to be acquitted, held that the charges under
Sections 302 and 404 of the IPC, Section 3 and 5 of the Arms
Act punishable under Section 25 and 27 Arms Act have been
proved and proceeded to convict that the appellant as above.
7. CONSIDERATION BY THE HIGH COURT
7.1 The High Court noticed that of the 31 witnesses examined by
the Prosecution, several witnesses namely PW-1, PW-3, PW-5
to PW-9, PW-16, PW-18 to PW-20, PW-25 and PW-26 had
turned hostile to the case of the Prosecution. Nevertheless,
based on the testimony of the other remaining witnesses and
other evidence, the High Court held that the Prosecution had
been able to prove the charges against the appellant.
As regards the motive for the commission of the crime, though
the same was held not proved by the Trial Court, the High
Court based on the evidence of PW-12 and PW-4 held that
the Prosecution had been able to prove the motive for the
commission of the crime.
7.2 The High Court held that the circumstance of the last seen
together of the appellant with the deceased has been proved
by the evidence of PW-4, PW-11 and PW-12.
7.3 The High Court considered the evidence of PW-14, (Devraj
Sutar) who was a friend and classmate of the appellant who
stated that the appellant had contacted him on the phone on the
day of the incident and told him that if his uncle contacted him,
to inform his uncle that he (PW-14) is in Pune, though PW-14
was in Ahmednagar. Thus, the appellant sought to mislead his
relatives about his whereabouts.
7.4 As regards the seizure of the gun, the High Court held that the
appellant had led the Police to the house of the grandfather
922 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and the same was seized from his house. As per the evidence
of the ballistic expert PW-30, it was proved that the said
gun was functional and had shown discharge, which could
not be explained either by the appellant or his grandfather-
Ramachandrarao, PW-20, which would go to prove that the
gun seized had been used for shooting the deceased. The
gunshot injuries, pellets and wads found in the skull of the
deceased would show that the deceased had died due to
gunshot injuries.
7.5 The High Court on consideration of the expert witness N.G.
Prabhakar (PW-30), the Assistant Director of Forensic Science
Laboratory, Bangalore, who examined the D.B.B.L gun,
cartridges, pellets and wads found in the skull of the dead body,
held that it was proved that the death of the deceased was
caused by the gunshot fired from the said D.B.B.L gun which
was recovered at the instance of the appellant.
7.6 The High Court also held that the Prosecution has been able
to prove from the evidence of PW-31, Investigation Officer (IO)
of the recovery of the gold chain from the possession of the
appellant immediately on his arrest, and seizure of the mobile
phone at the instance of the appellant in Hyderabad, which
the same witness corroborated. These, according to the High
Court would show that the appellant had secured possession
of the articles namely the gold chain, mobile phone immediately
after the death of the deceased, which clearly incriminates the
appellant.
7.7 The High Court, based on the presented evidence, determined
that the appellant and the deceased were last seen together. As
the appellant did not explain the whereabouts of the deceased
on the night of the incident, and in consideration of the recovery
of the gun and cartridges as well as the recovery of the gold
chain and Nokia mobile phone, the act of abscondence, evasive
behaviour, post-mortem report, ballistic report, and the chain
of circumstances, the High Court concluded that the incident
in which the appellant killed the deceased was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 923
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
8. SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT BEFORE US:
8.1 It was strenuously argued before us by Mr. D.N. Goburdhun,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the Prosecution
had not been able to prove that the appellant and appellant
alone was responsible for the death of the deceased as there
was no eyewitness to the incident.
Ld. Sr. Counsel points out that no witness had spoken anything
about the appellant holding the gun when he was allegedly seen
together with the deceased in the evening/night of the incident.
8.2 Even the “last seen” incident on which the Prosecution has
heavily relied upon cannot be said to have been proved.
According to Ld. Sr. Counsel, the evidence of the witnesses
who had seen them together is not credible. One of the
witnesses, Digvijay Shinde (PW-12) was the younger brother of
the deceased. The other witness PW-11 (Anil Babarao Bagat)
was a friend of PW-12, hence, they were interested witnesses.
Consequently, their evidence cannot be relied upon.
As far as PW-4 (Ashok Shinde), the auto rickshaw driver is
concerned, he is certainly a chance witness and as such,
reliance cannot be placed on his evidence.
This leaves two other witnesses namely, Jamir Mulla (PW-3)
and Ashok Jamadar (PW-5).
PW-3 stated that he saw the deceased riding on the pillion of a
motorcycle, but he did not see who was riding the motorcycle.
Thus, this evidence cannot be invoked to support the last seen
theory as the deceased was not seen with the appellant.
As far as the other witness, namely PW-5 (Ashok Jamadar) is
concerned, he can also be said to be a chance witness, as he
saw the deceased and appellant together while he was standing
at Kagawad Circle.
Accordingly, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
has submitted that the fact of the appellant and the deceased
being last seen together cannot be said to have been established
with cogent evidence. Thus, if this circumstance is held to be
not proved in accordance with law, nothing survives in the case,
as no one had seen the appellant shooting the deceased as
924 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
alleged by the Prosecution nor they were seen together in the
field where the dead body of the deceased was found.
8.3 It was submitted that the recovery of the mobile phone at
the instance of the appellant was not proved as S. Samba
Shivakumar, PW-25, the mobile shopkeeper, had categorically
denied purchasing any mobile from the appellant.
8.4 It was also submitted that the D.B.B.L gun was not seized at
the instance of the appellant and in fact, it was the grandfather
of the appellant who had produced the gun when the Police
came to his residence. According to the learned Senior Counsel
one of the seizure witnesses, Villas Macchendra Davari
(PW-7), had categorically denied that anything was recovered
in his presence, though he admitted that the signature on the
seizure memo was put as directed by the police.
8.5 The learned senior counsel has submitted that the ballistic report
itself is doubtful. Though it is the case of the Prosecution that one
live cartridge was recovered from the house of the grandfather
of the appellant, it was not given to the ballistic expert for his
opinion, and as regards the two cartridges that were used for
testing of the gun, it is not clear how these were purchased
and given to the ballistic expert. Thus, this important link in the
prosecution’s case cannot be said to have been established.
8.6 Learned senior counsel also submits that since the Prosecution’s
case is entirely based on the last seen theory, in absence of
any motive for committing the offence, which in the present
case has not been established, the foundation of the last seen
theory becomes shaky.
Learned senior counsel submits that even the Trial Court held
that the monetary transaction between the appellant and the
deceased had not been proved strictly. Thus, the very basis
of the case of the Prosecution that the appellant had killed the
deceased to take revenge after the deceased failed to repay
the loan taken from the appellant is absent. Since the motive
had not been established, the Prosecution’s case based on
circumstantial evidence cannot stand.
8.7 It was also pleaded that it could not be proved conclusively
that the dead body recovered from the field was that of the
deceased as the dead body was in a highly decomposed state.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 925
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
8.8 Learned senior counsel for the appellant has also submitted
that there are so many inconsistencies and contradictions in
the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as had noted by the
Trial Court and the High Court. Yet, both the Courts chose to
ignore these inconsistencies and the contradictions and relied
only on those parts of the evidence that were favourable to the
Prosecution to convict the appellant.
8.9 Accordingly, learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted
that since there are glaring gaps in these circumstances, and
there is no proper linkage, and these circumstances are also
not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution’s case
based on circumstantial evidence must fail.
It has been submitted that it cannot be said that the Prosecution
has been able to prove that all circumstances are of such
conclusive nature and tendency which exclude every possible
hypothesis except that the appellant had caused the death of
the deceased, and it cannot be said that the chain of evidence
established in the present case is so complete that it has not
left any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the appellant, and that in all probability the
act was committed by the appellant.
9. SUBMISSION OF THE STATE BEFORE US:
9.1 On the other hand, Ms. Eesha Bakshi, learned counsel
appearing for the State/Prosecution has contended that all the
circumstances leading to the guilt of the appellant have been
proved which would only lead to the inference that the appellant
and appellant alone was responsible for murdering the deceased.
9.2 Learned State Counsel submits that the defence did not seriously
dispute the identity of the dead body and since PW-2, who
was the father of the deceased and PW-12, the brother of the
deceased had identified the body based on the photograph, and
the dress worn by the deceased, there cannot be any doubt
about the identity of the dead body. The aforesaid evidence
has been strengthened by the fact that the motorcycle key was
found in the pocket of the deceased.
9.3 It was also submitted that the motive for the commission of
the offence had been duly proved as it has been established
926 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
that the deceased had borrowed a sum of Rs.4000/- (Rupees
Four Thousand only) from the appellant regarding which a
quarrel occurred between them which was witnessed by PW-4,
Ashok R Shinde.
9.4 It was also submitted that there were as many as five
eye-witnesses who had seen the appellant with the deceased
the evening before his dead body was found three days later.
The deceased was seen along with the appellant around 9 pm
of 10.07.2006 and he was found missing as evidenced by the
evidence of his father (PW-2), who filed a missing report on
12.07.2006. The dead body was recovered on 13.07.2006 and
there is no evidence to show the presence of the deceased
anywhere else during this intervening period, and as such,
there cannot be any doubt that as the appellant was last seen
with the deceased, the onus was on the appellant to explain
the whereabouts of the deceased after they were seen last
together which he failed to explain before the Court. Therefore,
the irresistible inference that can be drawn is that the appellant
was responsible for the death of the deceased.
9.5 Learned State Counsel further submit that it has come clearly on
record that the appellant had remained absconding during the
aforesaid period from 11.07.2006 to 22.07.2006 when the Police
ultimately arrested him on 22.07.2006 in Miraj. That abscondence
and his attempt to mislead others is clearly proved by the evidence
of his own friend and classmate Devraj Sutar (PW-14).
According to the learned State Counsel all the evidence clearly
shows that the appellant was trying to mislead his relatives and
others about his whereabouts and trying to hide which is clearly
indicative of the guilty mind of the appellant.
9.6 It has also been submitted that the Prosecution, by relying
on the opinion of the ballistic expert, has proved that the gun
produced before the Trial Court was used for committing the
crime. It has also been established that pellets and wads that
were recovered from the skull cavity of the deceased were part
of 12 bore cartridge and these could be fired from the gun, as
per the ballistic expert, PW-30. Thus, there cannot be any doubt
that it was the appellant who had shot the deceased dead with
the D.B.B.L gun.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 927
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
10. ANALYSIS AND FINDING BY THIS COURT
10.1 We have given our anxious consideration to the issues raised
before us and carefully examined the evidence on record.
10.2 As discussed above, the case revolves around the death of
Vikram Shinde, whose dead body was found in an agricultural
field. The appellant is sought to be implicated in his death on the
ground that he was seen last together with the deceased before
the dead body was found three days later, and also because
the deceased had suffered gunshot injury on his head, which
led to his death, and a double barrel gun was recovered at the
instance of the appellant from the house of his grandfather, with
whom the appellant was staying. The forensic evidence based
on ballistic examination showed that the gun was in working
condition and was used, and the pellets and wads found in
the brain and cavity of the skull of the deceased could be fired
from the said gun.
Since, there was no direct evidence on the death of Vikram
Shinde, the Prosecution case is entirely based on circumstantial
evidence.
10.3 As the allegation is of commission of the offence of murder,
the first and foremost exercise to be undertaken is to ascertain
whether it was a case of suicide or accidental death or homicide.
There does not appear to be not much of a controversy that it
was a case of homicide.
The fact that the deceased died an unnatural death due to
gunshot injuries cannot be doubted in the light of the post-
mortem and forensic evidence. The Medical Officer, PW-28,
who conducted the post-mortem had given his final opinion that
the cause of death was ballistic injuries to vital organs. Though
the post-mortem report itself was assailed by the appellant, in
view of the other attending evidence of the panch witnesses
there cannot be any shadow of doubt about the unnatural death
due to gunshot injury. Thus, it was a clear case of homicide.
Given the nature of the gunshot injury received by the deceased
on his head and in the absence of recovery of any gun in the
hand of the deceased or near his body and since the gun shot
was fired within a range of 3 ft from the muzzle of the weapon
928 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and the exit of the gunshot wound was in the face, a suicidal
gunshot injury can be safely ruled out.
That it was also not a case of accidental death can be clearly
inferred because of the absence of any evidence indicating so.
10.4 As we proceed further, it may be noted that, in the present case,
though the appellant had made a feeble attempt to show that
the dead body that was recovered from the agricultural field was
not that of Vikram Shinde, who was missing, because of the
evidence of Ajitrao Shinde, PW-2, the father of the deceased,
and PW 12, Digvijay Shinde, brother of the deceased, who
had identified the dead body based on the identification of the
deceased’s sweater, pants and recovery of the motorcycle key
from the pants of the deceased, there can be no doubt about
the identity of the dead body.
10.5 We will now deal with the most crucial circumstance of last
seen together, upon which much emphasis has been laid by
both the contesting parties in support of their rival contentions.
10.5.1 The last seen theory is based on the evidence of five
witnesses, namely, Jamir P. Mulla (PW-3), Ashok R.
Shinde (PW-4), Ashok R. Jamadar (PW-5), Anil Babarao
Bagat (PW-11) and Digvijay Shinde (PW-12).
10.5.2 PW-3, Jamir P. Mulla, claims to know both the appellant
and the deceased. He stated that on 10.07.2006 at
about 8.30 pm when he was standing by the side
of the road at Ambika Nagar, he saw the deceased
Vikram Shinde riding on the pillion of a motorcycle and
on seeing him he wished him. The motorcycle went
towards Narawad side. However, he stated that he
did not know who was riding the motorcycle. He also
stated that he did not observe anything being carried
on the motorcycle.
In view of the specific evidence that he did not see
who was riding the motorcycle his evidence cannot
independently be used to support the last seen theory
against the appellant unless propped by other evidence.
Though the said witness was declared hostile by the
Prosecution, in the cross-examination, this witness
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 929
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
reiterates that he had seen the deceased Vikram Shinde
going on a motorcycle, and he could later identify the
dead body as that of Vikram Shinde from the clothes
he was wearing when he saw him last. This evidence
is thus consistent with the evidence of other witnesses
who had seen the deceased Vikram Shinde going with
the appellant on a motorcycle.
10.5.3 The other witness relied upon by the Prosecution is
Ashok R. Shinde (PW-4), who was an auto rickshaw
driver who knew both the deceased and the appellant.
PW-4 stated that on 10.07.2006 at about 5.45-6.00
pm, when he was standing near Karamveer Vidyalaya
High School ground parking, both the appellant and
deceased came near his auto rickshaw, and he heard
them discussing certain money transaction, and the
appellant was heard demanding return of certain
amount from the deceased to which the deceased
denied having any knowledge. He also heard the
deceased abusing the appellant as haramkhor though
the appellant did not react to it. He also stated that he
heard them talking about hunting. He stated that as
they were talking, passengers came and, thereafter
did not give any further attention to their discussion.
This evidence would show that the appellant and the
deceased, who were friends, were together shortly
before they were seen together again later riding a
motorcycle by Ashok R. Jamadar (PW-5). This evidence
will also be relevant to arguments between the two
parties over some money matters and their plans for
hunting.
10.5.4 Ashok R. Jamadar (PW-5) is the other witness through
whom the Prosecution seeks to establish the last seen
theory. PW-5 knew both the families of the appellant
and the deceased. He deposed that on 10.07.2006,
at about 9:15 pm, while he was standing at Kagawad
Circle to proceed to Mahishyal, he saw the appellant
and the deceased going together on a motorcycle
towards the Shiraguppi side. On seeing them, he
waved his hand. He also stated that the deceased was
930 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
carrying a bag and had spoken to him, but he did not
talk to the appellant. Thereafter, he came to Mahishyal.
Later, on 14.07.2006, he learnt about the murder of
Vikram Shinde when people were talking about him
and thereafter, he went to the Kagwada police station
along with others regarding the case.
Although he was declared a hostile witness as he
resiled from his previous statement made during the
investigation, he reiterated during his cross-examination
that the appellant was riding the motorcycle and the
deceased was with him on the motorcycle proceeding
towards Shiraguppi. Despite the witness being
thoroughly cross-examined on behalf of the appellant,
nothing could be elicited from him to cast any doubt
on his testimony as far as this vital evidence of them
being seen together last, before the discovery of the
dead body, is concerned.
In our opinion, if the said witness did not fully support
the Prosecution case and resiled from his previous
statement given during investigation, nothing prevented
him resiling from the statement that he saw the appellant
and the deceased together. It may be noted that even
though PW-5 was declared hostile, he reiterated in his
cross examination that he saw the deceased and the
appellant together. Thus, his evidence is trustworthy
as regards this aspect.
10.5.5 The evidence of the aforesaid witness PW-5 has also
been sought to be impeached on the ground that he
is a chance witness and thus his evidence be ignored.
We do not think that it can be ignored.
It is for the reason that he knew both the appellant
and the deceased, and nothing was shown that he
was inimical to the appellant and more friendly to the
deceased. He was not a stranger suddenly emerging
out of nowhere in the scene. PW-5 had explained in his
cross-examination as to the reason why he was present
at the Kagawad Circle when he saw them together. He
stated that he had gone to Kagawad to visit one of his
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 931
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
relatives. While returning home, he was passing through
the said circle to catch a bus to Mahishyal. Hence, we
see no reason to disbelieve his testimony.
10.5.6 Moreover, even if he is considered to be a chance
witness who happens to witness the appellant and the
deceased together going on a motorcycle by chance,
yet the testimony cannot be ignored in the light of the
decision of this Court in Rajesh Yadav and Another
v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 12 SCC 200 wherein
it was held as follows:-
“29. A chance witness is the one who
happens to be at the place of occurrence
of an offence by chance, and therefore,
not as a matter of course. In other words,
he is not expected to be in the said place.
A person walking on a street witnessing
the commission of an offence can be a
chance witness. Merely because a witness
happens to see an occurrence by chance,
his testimony cannot be eschewed though a
little more scrutiny may be required at times.
This again is an aspect which is to be looked
into in a given case by the court. We do
not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position
of law which has been clearly laid down by
this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu
Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy,
(2003) 12 SCC 660 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 817] :
(SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13)
“12. Criticism was levelled against the
evidence of PWs 4 and 9 who are
independent witnesses by labelling them
as chance witnesses. The criticism about
PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses
is also without any foundation. They
have clearly explained as to how they
happened to be at the spot of occurrence
and the trial court and the High Court
have accepted the same.
932 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13. Coming to the plea of the accused
that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance
witnesses” who have not explained how
they happened to be at the alleged place
of occurrence, it has to be noted that
the said witnesses were independent
witnesses. There was not even a
suggestion to the witnesses that they
had any animosity towards any of the
accused. In a murder trial by describing
the independent witnesses as “chance
witnesses” it cannot be implied thereby
that their evidence is suspicious and their
presence at the scene doubtful. Murders
are not committed with previous notice
to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If
murder is committed in a dwelling house,
the inmates of the house are natural
witnesses. If murder is committed in a
street, only passers-by will be witnesses.
Their evidence cannot be brushed aside
or viewed with suspicion on the ground
that they are mere “chance witnesses”.
The expression “chance witness” is
borrowed from countries where every
man’s home is considered his castle and
everyone must have an explanation for
his presence elsewhere or in another
man’s castle. It is quite unsuitable an
expression in a country where people
are less formal and more casual, at
any rate in the matter explaining their
presence.”
10.5.7 PW-11 and PW-12 also saw the appellant and the
deceased together near the bus stand in the evening
of 10.7.2006.
PW-12 is the brother of the deceased. According to
him, his deceased brother went out of the house after
7.45 PM in the evening on a scooter. When PW-12 also
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 933
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
went out to meet his friend, Anil Bagat, PW-11 near
the bus stand that evening, he saw both the deceased
and the appellant coming together on the scooter at
the bus stand, and his brother asked him (PW-12) to
take the scooter home by telling him that he would
come home later. His brother, however, did not return.
PW-11, a friend of PW-12, corroborates the aforesaid
evidence of PW-12. PW-11 stated that he was
acquainted with the appellant as he was from the
village of the appellant. PW-11 stated that he also knew
the deceased. According to him when he was near
Mahishyal Bus Stand at about 8.00 PM on 10.07.2006,
Digvijay, the brother of the deceased, came there, and
while they were talking, the appellant and the deceased
came there on a scooter. Vikram Shinde (the deceased)
then instructed his brother, Digvijay (PW-12), to take
the scooter home, informing him that he would return
later. He also heard the appellant saying that he would
be going for hunting.
Based on the above evidence, both the Trial Court and
the High Court came to the conclusion that the deceased
was last seen together on 10.07.2006, before the dead
body was discovered in the morning of 13.07.2006.
10.5.8 PW-11 states that he had acquaintance with the
appellant as he was from the same village. Hence, we
see no reason to doubt his credibility as he is unlikely
to falsely testify against his own co-villager and he
corroborates the evidence of PW-12, the brother of
the deceased.
As far as PW-5 is concerned, though the defence had
made strenuous attempts to discredit him as he was
earlier working for PW-2, the father of the deceased,
nothing could be elicited to discredit his testimony as
regards this fact of being last seen together.
We are of the view that while the evidence of PW-
5, PW-11 and PW-12 supports the last seen theory,
the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 strengthens this
circumstance.
934 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
10.5.9 We have also noted that specific questions were
asked from these witnesses that if they had seen the
appellant and the deceased going together on the night
of 10.07.2006, why this information was not given to
the father of the deceased, PW-2 earlier before the
dead body was discovered on 13.07.2006.
It may be noted that even though the deceased may
have been missing since 10/11.07.2006, till the dead
body was recovered and identified, members of the
public may not be concerned about the missing of the
deceased, unless the family members specifically asked
them of the deceased. It is only after the dead body
was identified on 14.07.2006 and brought to public
notice that witnesses were likely to come forward to
give information of any such relevant material and
earlier sighting of the deceased with the appellant.
Therefore, non-informing the family members of the
deceased at an earlier point of time by the prosecution
witnesses who saw the appellant going in a motorcycle
or seeing the appellant and deceased going together
on a motorcycle on the night of 10.07.2006 cannot be
a ground for disbelieving their testimony.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that
the Trial Court and High Court have committed a
serious illegality in concluding that the deceased and
the appellant were last seen together or that the said
finding was by ignoring material evidence or contrary
to the evidence on record.
10.6 The next and most crucial consideration will be how the
appellant could be linked to the death of the deceased.
10.6.1 In our opinion, the link is established based on the
following circumstances and established facts.
(i) The dead body of the deceased was recovered
in a decomposed state on 13.7.2006, three days
after the deceased was last seen together with
the appellant on 10.07.2006.
(ii) As per the Medical Officer who conducted the
postmortem on 13.07.2006, the death occurred
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 935
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
3/4 days before the postmortem examination
which is consistent with the time the deceased
was seen last together with the appellant.
(iii) The dead body was discovered with gunshot
wounds on the head.
(iv) A double barrel gun with 2 spent and 1 live
cartridges were recovered at the instance of
the appellant.
(v) As per the opinion of the ballistic expert,
(a) The gun showed signs of discharge.
(b) The gun was in working condition.
(c) Pellets and wads were recovered from the
brain/skull of the dead body, and these could
have been fired through the gun examined.
(d) The double-barrel gun could be dismantled.
10.6.2 The aforesaid facts are supported by the following
circumstances and acts of the appellant, which
strengthens the linkage.
(i) The appellant remained hidden from 11.07.2006
till 22.07.2006. He was arrested on 22.07.2006
after extensive search on numerous locations
after the identification of the identity of the dead
body on 14.07.2006.
(ii) The appellant had misled his friends, his family
members and that of the deceased.
(iii) Personal effects of the deceased like gold chain
was recovered from the appellant.
The aforesaid circumstances and acts are
discussed in more detail as follows :
10.6.3 As regards the discovery of the dead body, PW1,
Arun Kumar Minache stated that on 13.7.2006, his
workers had gone to the land to measure sugar
cane crops. At 9:30 AM, one of his workers came to
his house and informed him that a dead male body
was lying in the sugarcane field. Thereafter, PW-1
936 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
went to the sugar field and found the dead body in
a decomposed state. The matter was reported to the
police on the same day.
It may be noted that while the deceased was
found missing since the night of 10.07.2006, and
was subsequently found dead on 13.07.2006, the
appellant was found missing from 11.07.2006 till the
police arrested him on 22.07.2006.
10.6.4 Though, the dead body was discovered after three
days of the deceased went missing on 13.07.2006,
as per opinion of the forensic expert, the time of
death of the deceased was between 3 to 4 days
prior to post-mortem examination on 13.07.2006,
thus indicating that the deceased died soon after
he went missing.
10.6.5 At this stage, it may be apposite to address a weighty
argument advanced by Mr. Goburdhun, learned senior
counsel for the appellant who contended that the last
seen theory in the present case is not applicable for
the simple reason that there is a long passage of
time between the appellant and the deceased last
seen together and the time when the dead body of
the deceased was discovered.
The deceased was last seen along with the appellant
in the night of 10.07.2006 and the dead body of the
deceased was discovered on 13.07.2006 after a gap
of three days.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the time gap
should be so small that the possibility of any other
person being with the deceased in the company of
any other person should be ruled out. Hence, because
of this long gap of time, the last seen theory sought
to be invoked by the Prosecution loses its steam,
giving rise to reasonable doubt as to whether the
appellant was the real culprit or not.
10.6.6 In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel has relied
on the decision of this Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 937
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755 wherein this
Court held that :-
“31. Before we analyse the evidence of PW
11 Dinesh Adhikari, who was working as a
domestic help in the bar and restaurant Iguana
Miraj, PW 14 Calvert Gonsalves, who was said
to be in the company of A-1 and D-1 on the
evening of 27-2-1999 outside the lounge of the
restaurant and PW 6 Amit Banerjee, who was
working as Receptionist of Hotel Seema, we
would refer to certain decisions of this Court on
the point of “last seen together”. It is a settled
rule of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion,
however grave, cannot be substituted for proof
and the courts shall take utmost precaution in
finding an accused guilty only on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. This Court has applied
the abovementioned general principle with
reference to the principle of last seen together
in Bodhraj v. State of J&K [(2002) 8 SCC 45 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 201] as under: (SCC p. 63,
para 31)
“31. The last seen theory comes into
play where the time gap between the
point of time when the accused and the
deceased were seen last alive and when
the deceased is found dead is so small
that possibility of any person other than
the accused being the author of the crime
becomes impossible. It would be difficult in
some cases to positively establish that the
deceased was last seen with the accused
when there is a long gap and possibility of
other persons coming in between exists. In
the absence of any other positive evidence
to conclude that the accused and the
deceased were last seen together, it would
be hazardous to come to a conclusion of
guilt in those cases.”
938 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
32. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy [(2006)
10 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 512 : JT (2006)
4 SC 16] this Court further opined that even in
the cases where time gap between the point
of time when the accused and the deceased
were last seen alive and when the deceased
was found dead is too small that possibility of
any person other than the accused being the
author of the crime becomes impossible, the
courts should look for some corroboration.”
10.6.7 However, it may be noted that this Court also observed
in the aforesaid decision of Sanjay Thakran (supra)
that it cannot be said in all cases that the evidence of
last seen together is to be rejected merely because
the time gap is for a considerable long period, as
stated in para 34 of the aforesaid decision which is
reproduced herein as below:
“34. From the principle laid down by this Court,
the circumstance of last seen together would
normally be taken into consideration for finding
the accused guilty of the offence charged with
when it is established by the prosecution that
the time gap between the point of time when
the accused and the deceased were found
together alive and when the deceased was
found dead is so small that possibility of any
other person being with the deceased could
completely be ruled out. The time gap between
the accused persons seen in the company of the
deceased and the detection of the crime would
be a material consideration for appreciation of
the evidence and placing reliance on it as a
circumstance against the accused. But, in all
cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last
seen together is to be rejected merely because
the time gap between the accused persons and
the deceased last seen together and the crime
coming to light is after (sic of) a considerable long
duration. There can be no fixed or straitjacket
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 939
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
formula for the duration of time gap in this
regard and it would depend upon the evidence
led by the prosecution to remove the possibility
of any other person meeting the deceased
in the intervening period, that is to say, if the
prosecution is able to lead such an evidence
that likelihood of any person other than the
accused, being the author of the crime, becomes
impossible, then the evidence of circumstance
of last seen together, although there is long
duration of time, can be considered as one of
the circumstances in the chain of circumstances
to prove the guilt against such accused persons.
Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light
of the facts and circumstances of the case,
there was no possibility of any other person
meeting or approaching the deceased at the
place of incident or before the commission of the
crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last
seen together would be relevant evidence. For
instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing
that the accused persons were in exclusive
possession of the place where the incident
occurred or where they were last seen together
with the deceased, and there was no possibility
of any intrusion to that place by any third party,
then a relatively wider time gap would not affect
the prosecution case.
(emphasis added)
10.6.8 In the present case, as stated above, PW-28, Dr.
S.V. Havinal, the Medical Officer who conducted the
post-mortem examination on the dead body during
his cross-examination stated that it is not correct to
say that the person might have died 5 days before
the post-mortem examination. He stated that he
might have died 3 to 4 days before the post-mortem
examination. Thus, the Prosecution case that the
deceased was shot dead on the night of 10.07.2006
before his dead body was discovered on 13.07.2006
940 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
does not appear to militate against the last seen theory
in view of the medical evidence that death occurred
about 3/4 days prior. Thus, it cannot be said that the
time gap is for a considerable long period.
10.6.9 The obvious inference the defence wanted to draw
was that if death had occurred 5 days earlier, it
would be earlier to 10.07.2006, which would have
demolished the Prosecution case. Similarly, if
the death had occurred about 2 days before the
postmortem was conducted, it would be after a few
days of the missing of the deceased on 10.07.2006
which would have cast a genuine doubt on the
Prosecution case because of time gap.
10.6.10 The forensic and ballistic opinion along with the
subsequent recovery of the gun, pellets and wads
and other object like gold chain from the appellant
literally obliterates the doubtful element which can be
attributed to the gap in time and space of the last seen
together aspect of the circumstantial evidence. Had
this scientific evidence and subsequent recoveries
not been available, certainly, the time lapse between
the fact of last seen together and the time of death
could have proved fatal to the Prosecution case in
the present case.
Thus, this submission of the appellant that there was
a long time lapse, does not hold water.
10.6.11 It may be also noted that the place where the dead
body of the deceased was discovered in a sugarcane
field does not appear to be visited by public except
for the workers who work in the field. In fact, the dead
body was discovered belatedly only by the workers of
the owner of the sugarcane field, PW-1, Arun Kumar
Maruti Minache.
10.6.12 PW-1 deposed that on 13.07.2006 his workers namely
Bismilla, Popat and Praveen had gone to the land
for measuring sugarcane crop and at about 9.30
AM of the same day, Bismilla came to his house
and informed him that the dead body of a male was
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 941
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
lying near Bellanki Saravu i.e., on the southern side
of the land.
Thus, by the very nature of the location and as evident
from the testimony of the owner of the land, it is quite
apparent that the place where the dead body was
found was not frequently visited because of which the
dead body was discovered only on 13.07.2006 even
though the death occurred about 3 to 4 days ago as
per the evidence of PW-28, the Medical Officer who
conducted the post-mortem examination. Hence,
the possibility of the deceased being with another
person other than the appellant before he was shot
is quite remote.
10.7 It is to be noted that it is not merely the discovery of the dead
body on 13.07.2006 after the deceased was last seen together
with the appellant on 10.07.2006 that the Prosecution case
is based. This last seen theory is reinforced by the fact that
the cause of death of the deceased was gunshot injury and
the weapon of crime was recovered at the instance of the
appellant and there is forensic evidence in the form of pellets,
and the wads found in the skull cavity of the deceased which
could be fired from the said gun recovered which links the
appellant with the crime.
In our opinion, given the subsequent recovery of the gun and
empty pellets and forensic and ballistic evidence of a link
between the pellets recovered from the body of the deceased
and the gun recovered, the time lapse which could have thrown
doubt on the last seen theory pales into insignificance, rather
it is rendered inconsequential.
Thus, the prosecution’s case is not mere conjecture, but rather
based on established circumstances and facts.
10.7.1 PW-28, the Medical Officer conducted the post-
mortem examination at the burial ground of Shiraguppi
on 13.07.2006 at 2:40 PM as the body was in early
decomposition state, and the following external
injuries were found:
1) Circular shaped wound with diameter 1.5 cm, 3
cm, above the mastoid process in parietal bone.
942 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2) Irregular shape wound in left infraorbital region,
measuring about 2 x 3 cm. There was no shoot
deposit around the circular shaped wound.
Pellets were found sprayed inside the cranium.
Two wads were also found inside the skull cavity.
There were multiple fractures of the skull and brain
haemorrhages due to pellet injuries. These multiple
pellets and wads, which are part of the cartridge
found in the skull cavity, were later sent for forensic
examination.
As per the postmortem examination, the entry wound
was in the skull and the exit wound was in the left
infraorbital region.
It may be noted that left infraorbital region is the area
of the face located below the left eye socket.
This is indicative of the fact that the bullet entered
from behind the head.
According to PW-28, the Medical Officer, the cause
of death was due to injury to a vital organ leading
to neurogenic shock, which is the primary cause,
and secondary cause was hypovolemic shock due
to intracranial haemorrhage.
PW 28, after receipt of the ballistic report from the
Forensic Science Laboratory, Bangalore, gave his
final opinion that the cause of death is ballistic
injuries to the vital organ leading to neurogenic and
hypovolemic shock.
10.7.2 We will now examine the evidence of the ballistic
expert N. G. Prabhakar, PW-30, who examined the
double barrel gun which was recovered at the instance
of the appellant and other materials, i.e. two spent 12
bore cartridges, two plastic wads, lead pellets sent
to him for examination. Two live 12 bore cartridges
which were purchased by the police for testing of the
gun were also sent.
10.7.3 These articles were received by the FSL, Bangalore
on 19.09.2006 and were examined on the same day
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 943
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
and upon examination, PW-30 furnished the following
opinion which is reproduced verbatim:
“1) The D.B.B.L gun in Article No. 1 bears signs
of discharge.
2) The D.B.B.L gun in Article No. 1 was in working
condition at the time of examination.
3) The cartridges in Article no. 3 were live and the
same can be fired through the D.B.B.L Gun in
Article No. 1.
4) The effective range of the D.B.B.L gun in Article
No. 1 is about 40 yards.
5) The cartridges case marked as 2(a) and 2
(b) in Article No. 2 have been fired through
the right and left barrel of the D.B.B.L Gun in
Article No. 1.
6) The wads and lead pellets in Article Nos. 4 & 5
are the components of 12-bore cartridges and
the same could have been fired through the
D.B.B.L Gun in Article No. 1.”
It may be noted that Article No.1 was the D.B.B.L
gun recovered at the instance of the appellant, Article
No.2 consisted of spent cartridges also recovered at
the instance of the appellant. Article No.3 consisted
of two live cartridges which were purchased by the
police for testing of the gun.
The said ballistic expert was subjected to intense
cross examination. However, his evidence could not
be shaken in respect of any of the opinions given
by him.
10.7.4 In our considered view, the aforesaid forensic
evidence based on ballistic tests is not only crucial
and critical in understanding the case, but also seals
the fate of the appellant, which establishes the fact
that the gun recovered at the instance of the appellant
was used in causing the bullet injury to the deceased
which led to his death.
944 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
It is not the case of the defence that such a gun
is readily and easily available and can be used by
anybody. One needs to have a license to possess
such a gun. It is not an ordinary weapon of crime
like a knife which is readily available which can be
used to injure a person fatally. In the present case,
the weapon of crime is directly traceable to the
appellant, who had taken it from his grandfather as
it was recovered at the instance of the appellant as
per the evidence of the Investigation Officer, PW-31
corroborated by the panch witness, PW-6.
10.7.5 The double barrel gun was recovered at the instance
of the appellant, as witnessed by the seizure
witnesses, namely, Ismail Mohammad Dange (PW-
6) and Villas Macchendra Davari (PW-7). PW-7,
however, turned hostile and stated that nothing
was recovered at the instance of the appellant in
his presence. On the other hand, PW-6 remained
consistent, both in his examination in chief as well
as in the cross examination that the appellant in
his presence produced the gun, one live cartridge,
two spent cartridges from his house. Other articles
like a handbag, Hero Honda Motorcycle were also
produced by the appellant in presence of PW-6. Even
though PW-6 was declared hostile as he did not
fully support the prosecution case, yet as far as the
recovery of the aforesaid articles is concerned, he
stood his ground and he remained consistent even
in his cross examination. The said witness testified
that the appellant led the Police and other witnesses
to the spot from where the appellant shot the gun.
Thus, the recovery of the gun and cartridges at the
instance of the appellant was proved.
It may also be noticed that ballistic expert, on
examination of the two spent cartridges recovered
along with the gun at the instance of the appellant,
gave his opinion that these were fired from the gun.
10.7.6 The double barrel gun, one live, and two spent
cartridges, and handbag was recovered at the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 945
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
instance of the appellant from the house of the
grandfather of the appellant where the appellant
lived. Hence, these materials or “facts” recovered
would come within the scope of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. Since the discovery of these materials
was proved, it was incumbent upon the appellant to
explain the discovery and attributes of the articles,
more particularly, the gun and spent cartridges. Since
it was within the special knowledge of the appellant
how these spent cartridges were kept in the house
and how the gun was used for discharge before it
was recovered, the appellant owes an obligation to
explain the same. Even if the appellant did not explain
the same, at least his grandfather, PW-20 who was
the owner of the gun was obligated to explain it as
he was living with the appellant, and he was the real
owner of the gun. There was no such explanation
offered either by the appellant or his grandfather
(PW-20), how the spent cartridges were found and
how the gun was used for discharge. The grandfather,
PW-20 merely stated that the appellant did not take
the gun on 10.07.2006 and used it. It was natural on
the part of the grandfather to protect his grandson,
but he was supposed to know of about the use of the
gun as well as the recovery of the spent cartridges.
Thus, the failure to explain the recovery of the gun
and its discharge, and recovery of the spent cartridge
certainly implicates the appellant, specifically when
the ballistic expert gave his opinion that the lead
pellets and wads recovered from the brain skull
could be used from the aforesaid gun and the gun
had shown signs of discharge.
As held by this Court in Mukesh & Anr. Vs. NCT
of Delhi & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 1, when recoveries
are made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the
accused should explain how he came into possession
of the incriminating articles.
10.7.7 The clear scientific evidence that the pellets and
wads found in the skull cavity of the deceased could
946 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be fired from the aforesaid gun recovered at the
instance of the appellant and the gun bore signs of
discharge and was in a working condition clearly links
the appellant to the crime.
10.7.8 Even though the appellant had tried to make out a
case that nobody had seen the appellant carrying the
gun, in our opinion, the said contention is devoid of
merit in view of the evidence of the forensic expert
who examined the gun who clearly stated that gun
can be dismantled. There is the evidence of PW-5,
Ashok Ram Jamadar, who had given the testimony
of seeing the appellant along with the deceased
in the night of 10.07.2006 going in a motorcycle
towards Shiraguppi that the deceased was carrying
a bag. If the double barrel gun could be dismantled,
it certainly can be kept in the bag. Hence, merely
because there is no evidence of any witness seeing
the gun being carried by the appellant, it cannot be
fatal to the prosecution case.
10.7.9 Once it has come to the fore, based on scientific
evidence that the gun which was recovered at the
instance of the appellant was in working condition,
that it had shown sign of discharge, and the pellets
and wads found in the skull cavity of the deceased
could be fired from the said gun, in the absence of any
explanation by the appellant or by the owner of the
gun, the grandfather of the appellant, the only logical
inference that can be drawn in the circumstances is
that it was the appellant who had used the said gun
causing the bullet injury on the deceased which led
to his death.
10.8 Under these circumstances, since it has been proved that the
appellant was seen last together with the deceased going on
a motorcycle carrying a bag, and there is also evidence that
there was an argument between them of certain monetary
transaction and discussion about going for hunting before
they left together, in our opinion, there cannot be any doubt
that the appellant was responsible for causing the death of
the deceased by use of the double-barrel gun.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 947
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
10.9 There is also a specific finding by the Trial Court and the
High Court that the appellant remained in abscondence from
11.07.2006 till he was arrested by the police on 22.07.2006.
10.9.1 It is on record that the appellant and the deceased
were friends. They were not strangers. Thus, this act
of absconding by the appellant, rather than helping
and cooperating with the family of his friend, in spite
of persistent enquiries from the father of the deceased
is a clear indication of his guilt.
The Investigating Officer, PW-31 stated that after
recording the statements of the witnesses who
saw the deceased and appellant together last on
10.7.2006, the police searched for the appellant
going to various places at Miraj, Sangali, Hiruyuru,
Bangalore but the appellant could not be traced. On
22.07.2006 at 6.00 AM, after PW-31 received an
anonymous call to the effect that the appellant has
come to Miraj, he was arrested there and brought
to the police station.
10.9.2 It is trite that mere absconding by itself does not
constitute a guilty mind as even an innocent man
may feel panicky and may seek to evade the police
when wrongly suspected of being involvement
as an instinct of self-preservation. But the act of
abscondence is certainly a relevant piece of evidence
to be considered along with other evidence and is
a conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act,
1872, which points to his guilty mind. The needle of
suspicion gets strengthened by the act [See: Matru
@ Girish Chandra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1971) 2 SCC 75].
10.9.3 It is also on record that the appellant did not merely
remain in hiding but also misled his relatives and of
the family of the deceased and his friends about his
whereabouts.
It is in evidence that when PW-2, the father of the
deceased telephoned the house of the appellant on
the night of 10.07.2006, he was informed that the
948 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
appellant was not at home. PW-2 again visited the
appellant’s house in the morning of 11.07.2006 to
enquire about the deceased. The appellant informed
PW-2 that he had left the deceased near the water
tank situated near the bus stand the previous evening
and he did not know where the deceased had gone.
Further, when PW-2 again went to the house of the
appellant next day on 12.07.2006 to inquire about the
whereabouts of his missing son, the appellant was
not found in the house. PW-2 however, met his uncle,
namely, Dhananjay Chavan who informed PW-2 that
the appellant had gone to Pune in search of job and
said Dhananjay Chavan gave the mobile number of
one Devraj Sutar (PW-14), a friend of the appellant
who was stated to be staying in Pune. When the
father of the deceased contacted the said Devraj
Sutar (PW-14) on his mobile phone, and inquired
about the appellant, the said Devraj Sutar (PW-14)
informed the father of the deceased that the appellant
had not come to meet him. Later when the father of
the deceased rang up Devraj Sutar (PW-14) again,
he informed PW-2 that he (PW-14) was not in Pune
but in Ahmednagar. PW-2, the father of the deceased
then confronted Devraj Sutar as to why he was lying,
Devraj Sutar told him that the appellant had asked
him to do so. It was thereafter that the father of the
deceased filed a missing report.
We have also gone through the missing report filed
by PW-2. The narration of the incidents in the missing
report about the acts of the appellant in misleading
and avoidance substantially corroborates what PW-2
had deposed about the appellant before the Trial
Court, thus lending credibility to his testimony before
the Court.
10.9.4 When we critically examine the evidence of Devraj
Sutar (PW-14), we find that he corroborates the
testimony of PW-2, the father of the deceased.
PW-14 testified that he was a classmate and friend
of the appellant and knew him.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 949
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
PW-14 stated that on 11.07.2006 he received a
call from the appellant at around 9:00 pm and the
appellant asked him to tell his uncle if he contacts
him on the phone to inform him that he (PW-14) is in
Pune, though PW-14 was in Ahmednagar. PW-14 also
stated that the appellant appeared to be frightened
and asked him to tell a lie and thereafter disconnected
the phone. PW-14 further testified that on the next day
on 12.07.2006 he received a phone call from the uncle
of the appellant who enquired about the appellant,
to which PW-14 told him that the appellant had not
come. On the second call received from the uncle
of the appellant, PW-14 narrated the actual facts by
stating that he was actually in Ahmednagar and not
in Pune and the appellant had not come to him. He
stated that thereafter, he was contacted over phone
by the police who asked him to come to Miraj Police
Station where he went and gave his statement. He
also stated that after 3-4 days of the recording of his
statement, the police again asked him to report to
the Kagawad Police Station where he was informed
that one Vikram Shinde has been murdered.
10.9.5 In our opinion, the evidence of PW-14 is not only
highly relevant but critical to support the case of the
prosecution that the appellant had been in hiding
and was misleading others about his whereabouts
and he remained in abscondence from 11.07.2006
till 22.07.2006.
His testimony also appears to be truthful.
It is to be noted that PW-14 had specifically deposed
that he was a friend of the appellant, and he did not
know the deceased. PW-14 stated that he was a
classmate of the appellant, and he had undertaken
diploma course along with the appellant.
He did not have any idea of the missing of Vikram
Shinde and the subsequent discovery of the dead
body of Vikram Shinde. PW-14 came to know of
the murder of Vikram Shinde only when he was
950 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
called at the Kagawad Police Station after about a
week of his recording of statement at Miraj Police
Station. Hence, there is no reason to doubt the
credibility of his evidence. Rather, he, being a friend
of the appellant, it would not have been surprising
if he had turned hostile as in the case of some of
the prosecution witnesses like Sandip Sandalage
(PW-18). According to the Prosecution, the appellant
had allegedly made an extra-judicial confession in
the presence of Sandip Sandalage (PW-18) who was
a friend of the appellant, but PW-18 turned hostile
and resiled from his previous statement. Hence,
we have not taken into account his evidence in
our consideration. However, Devraj Sutar (PW-14),
despite being a friend of the appellant did not turn
hostile but supported the prosecution case. Thus,
there cannot be any doubt about the credibility of
the evidence of PW-14, Devraj Sutar.
10.10 As regards the recovery of gold chain, from the possession
of the appellant, the same is proved as per evidence of the
Investigating Officer, PW-31, and seizure witness, Ismail
Mohammad Dange, PW-6. PW-6 stated that on 22.07.2006
when he was called to the Police Station, the appellant had
produced a gold chain and at that time, a goldsmith (PW-13)
was present who tested and measured it. The said PW-13
also corroborates the testimony of PW-6 though the other
panch witness, PW-7, Vilas Macchendra Davari, does not
support the same.
In respect of seizure of mobile phone, the shopkeeper, Shiv
Kumar, PW-25 had denied having purchased it from the
appellant, though there was no explanation of the recovery
of a paper containing the driving licence particulars and
photograph of the appellant with the signature of the shop
owner and seal of the shop. Nevertheless, we give the benefit
of doubt in regard of proof of recovery of mobile phone from
the appellant, yet the fact remains that the said witness PW-
25 admitted that the signature on the said document was
his and the seal pertains to his shop, which indicates certain
relationship of the appellant with the said shopkeeper, PW-25.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 951
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
Be that as it may, in our opinion, this may not have much
bearing on the case in view of the recovery of the gun,
cartridges, motorcycle, bag and gold chain at the instance
of the appellant, which clearly points the finger of culpability
towards the appellant.
10.11 This takes us to the other contentious issue of motive which
prompted the appellant to commit the crime. According to the
Prosecution, the appellant murdered the deceased by using
firearms as he was upset by the non-repayment of the loan
taken from him by the deceased.
10.11.1 The Prosecution case is that the appellant had taken
a certain amount from Ravindra S. Chavan, PW-19 to
lend it to the deceased. However, Ravindra Chavan
denied having given any money to the appellant.
In view of the above evidence, the Trial Court held
that the monetary transaction cannot be said to be
proved. On the other hand, the High Court based
on the other evidence held the same to be proved.
In this regard, we may scrutinize the evidence of
other witness, namely, Ashok R Shinde (PW-4), the
auto-rickshaw driver who allegedly heard arguments
between the appellant and the deceased regarding
certain monetary matter. Even if the exact amount of
the monetary transaction cannot be ascertained as
held by the Trial Court, it is on record that there was
an argument between them relating to money and
insulting words being used by the deceased to the
appellant which was heard by PW-4. This interaction
would show that there was an element of grudge
by the appellant against the deceased because of
certain monetary dispute which constituted the motive
behind the crime.
10.11.2 Even if it is held that there was no such monetary
transaction between the appellant and the deceased,
the same may not materially affect the Prosecution
case. As is well known, the motive is something that
is very difficult to prove as it remains hidden in the
deep recess of the mind of the person concerned and
952 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
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in the absence of any open declaration by the person
concerned himself, the motive has to be inferred
from the activities and conduct of the person. From
the evidence of Ashok R Shinde (PW-4), it can be
stated that there was a certain argument between
the appellant and the deceased, and the deceased
was heard using insulting words to the appellant. It
is to be noted that the PW-4 is known to both the
appellant and the deceased, and he was having good
terms with the family members of both the deceased
and appellant and as such it will be highly improbable
that this witness would give false statement favouring
the appellant and against the deceased. Nothing was
suggested during his cross examination of him being
inimical to the appellant.
10.11.3 The law is now well-settled that while proof of motive
certainly strengthens the prosecution case based on
circumstantial evidence, failure to prove the same
cannot be fatal. In this regard, one may refer to G.
Parshwanath vs. State of Karnataka 2010 (8) SCC
593 in which it was held as follows:
“45. The argument that in absence of motive
on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased
benefit of reasonable doubt should be given,
cannot be accepted. First of all every suspicion
is not a doubt. Only reasonable doubt gives
benefit to the accused and not the doubt of a
vacillating judge. Very often a motive is alleged
to indicate the high degree of probability that
the offence was committed by the person who
was prompted by the motive. In a case when
the motive alleged against accused is fully
established, it provides foundational material
to connect the chain of circumstances. It afforts
a key on a pointer to scan the evidence in the
case in that perspective and as a satisfactory
circumstance of corroboration. However, in a
case based on circumstantial evidence where
proved circumstances complete the chain of
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 953
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
evidence, it cannot be said that in absence
of motive, the other proved circumstances
are of no consequence. The absence of
motive, however, puts the court on its guard
to scrutinize the circumstances more carefully
to ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not
take place of legal proof. There is no absolute
legal proposition of law that in the absence of
any motive an accused cannot be convicted
under Section 302 IPC. Effect of absence of
motive would depend on the facts of each case.
Therefore, this Court proposes to examine the
question of motive which prompted the appellant
to commit the crime in question.”
10.12 The present case is clearly one that is founded on circumstantial
evidence. By its very nature, circumstantial evidence as
opposed to direct evidence, is the inference one draws
from the existence of a fact based on certain established
fact/circumstance. This process invariably involves intuitive
reasoning, proper understanding of human behaviour and
psychology. This reasoning has to be rational, probative and
which accords with the natural human behaviour. At the same
time, there will always be certain subjective elements, which
however, cannot be in the nature of surmise or conjecture. The
inference may not lead to absolute certainty as we are dealing
with human behaviour and reconstructing a past incident in
hindsight. Naturally, when evaluating the proven circumstances
for drawing certain inferences therefrom, a logical, rational
and pragmatic approach must be adopted without being too
technical, pedantic, or seeking absolute proof, for this principle
of circumstantial evidence is not based on statutory provision.
Thus, based on lived human experiences and human
behaviour, if any supposition of fact is clearly inferable from
an established fact, the inferred position of fact should be
adopted as correct. Law does not require that a fact requires
to be proved on absolute terms bereft of all doubts. What law
contemplates is that for a fact to be considered proven, it must
eliminate any reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt does not
mean any trivial, fanciful or imaginary doubt, but doubt based
954 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
on reason and common sense growing out of the evidence
in the case. A fact is considered proved if the court, after
reviewing the evidence, either believes it exists or deems its
existence probable enough that a prudent person would act
on the assumption that it exists.
10.12.1 It is also settled that where the evidence is
circumstantial in nature, the circumstances from
which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, should
be fully established. In other words, each of the
circumstances from which certain inferences are
sought to be drawn, is required to be proved in
accordance with law, and there cannot be any
element of surmise and conjecture, and each of
these circumstances so proved must form a complete
chain without any break to clearly point to the guilt
of the accused person. The court has to examine
the cumulative effect of the existence of these
circumstances, which would point to the guilt of the
accused, though any single circumstance may not in
itself be sufficient to prove the offence. Thus, if the
combined effect of all these circumstances, each of
which has been independently proved, establishes
the guilt of the accused, then the conviction based
on such circumstances can be sustained. These
circumstances so proved must be consistent only
with the hypothesis with the guilt of the accused
and should exclude every hypothesis except the
one sought to be proved.
Thus, if upon evaluation of a set of proved
circumstances consistent with understandable and
socially recognised human behaviour, as a cumulative
consequence, a clear and definitive pattern emerges
which irresistibly points to the culpability of the
accused person, we see no reason why we should
not accept such an inferred conclusion to be correct
to fasten criminal liability on the accused. On the other
hand, if such an inference is sought to be assailed
on the ground of any doubt, the doubt must be a
reasonable one consistent with human behaviour
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 955
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
under the circumstances of the case and not fanciful,
abstract speculation or imagination.
10.12.2 Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, if we
consider all these circumstances, all of which, in our
opinion, have been proved in the present case, the
cumulative effect of these would clearly demonstrate
that no other person other than the appellant could
have caused the fatal injury to the deceased by use
of fire arms.
As the saying goes, while men may lie, circumstances
do not.
10.13 As discussed above, it has been proved through cogent and
credible evidence that the appellant was last seen together
with the deceased on 10.07.2006 and though the dead
body of the deceased was discovered on 13.07.2006, death
had occurred around the time the deceased went missing
and during this intervening period, the whereabouts of the
deceased could not be ascertained. On the other hand, the
appellant had been hiding and misleading his relatives and
friends about his whereabouts for which the Trial Court and
the High Court had rightly inferred his guilty mind.
10.13.1 The other incriminating circumstance is the recovery
of pellets and wads from the brain and skull of the
deceased. The post-mortem report indicates that
the deceased died of bullet injury. The exit wound
was below the left eye socket, which would show
that the victim was fired at from behind. As per the
forensic expert, the size of the injury on the head of
the appellant corroborates with the injury that may
be caused by firing from the double barrel gun. What
is, however, of utmost and critical significance is
the recovery of the pellets and wads from the brain
inside the skull of the deceased and the opinion
of the ballistic expert that these pellets and wads
can be fired from the double barrel gun which was
recovered at the instance of the appellant which
belongs to the appellant’s grandfather. The ballistic
expert had also given his opinion that there is
956 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
evidence of discharge of the gun and the gun was
in working condition.
10.13.2 Further, as per the ballistic expert, the spent two 12
bore D.B.B.L cartridges recovered at the instance
of the appellant were fired from the same gun and
that the pellets and wads recovered from the body
were parts of the 12 bore cartridge.
10.14 Since the gun and empty pellets were recovered from the
house of the appellant/his grandfather, the incriminating
evidence clearly indicates the involvement of the appellant.
As the appellant had access to the said gun and since it was
recovered at his instance, it was upon him to explain the
circumstances in which the gun showed signs of discharge
and how the empty pellets were recovered as required under
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides
that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of
any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
As there was ballistic evidence that the pellets and wads
recovered from the cavity of the skull of the deceased
showed a link, the appellant had an obligation to explain
the circumstances. Even if the appellant may claim that
he was not the owner of the gun, his grandfather owned a
duty to explain the position.
All the prosecution witnesses, including the forensic expert
and ballistic expert had been subjected to intense cross
examination with the endeavour to shake their credibility, yet,
the appellant has chosen not to lead any evidence except
for denying any role in the crime.
10.14.1 The appellant’s connection to the case deepened
as various forensic and ballistic analyses were
introduced. The recovery of the weapon and
supporting evidence, including the corroborative
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, established a
compelling narrative. While motive is often challenging
to substantiate, the chain of circumstantial evidence
in this case continuously narrowed the focus toward
the appellant’s culpability. The scientific analysis
of the gun and its discharged state, alongside the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 957
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
recovered empty pellets, played a critical role in
aligning the timeline of events surrounding the crime.
10.15 It is true that even in cases based on circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution cannot depend on the false alibi or unproven
defence plea since the onus is always on the prosecution to
prove the prosecution case and the onus never shifts to the
accused. However, in such circumstances where prosecution
has been able to prove on the basis of cogent evidence that
the weapon of crime was traced to the accused, as in the
present case, it was incumbent upon the appellant to explain
the circumstances of the recovery of the weapon with which
a linkage has been established with the injury suffered by the
deceased through scientific evidence. However, apart from
claiming ignorance and denying the various incriminating
evidence presented during the trial, the appellant chose not to
adduce any evidence to explain these circumstances. Thus,
his silence and failure to explain any of the incriminatory
circumstances, would strengthen the prosecution case based
on circumstantial evidence against him as proved by the
Prosecution.
10.15.1 In this regard, we may also refer to the decision in
this Court rendered in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v.
State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 it was
held that where the circumstantial evidence is the
basis for any case, where no eyewitness account is
available, and when the incriminating circumstances
are put to the accused, if the accused does offer
any explanation or the explanation that is found
to be false, it provides an additional link to the
chain of circumstances as observed in para 21 of
the aforesaid decision which is reproduced herein
below: -
“21. In a case based on circumstantial
evidence where no eyewitness account is
available, there is another principle of law
which must be kept in mind. The principle
is that when an incriminating circumstance
is put to the accused and the said accused
either offers no explanation or offers an
958 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
explanation which is found to be untrue,
then the same becomes an additional link
in the chain of circumstances to make it
complete. This view has been taken in
a catena of decisions of this Court. [See
State of T.N. v. Rajendran [(1999) 8 SCC
679 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 40] (SCC para 6);
State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash
Mittal [(1992) 3 SCC 300 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 642 : AIR 1992 SC 2045] (SCC para
39 : AIR para 40); State of Maharashtra v.
Suresh [(2000) 1 SCC 471 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 263] (SCC para 27); Ganesh Lal v.
State of Rajasthan [(2002) 1 SCC 731 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 247] (SCC para 15) and
Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. [(1995) 3
SCC 574 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 552] (SCC
para 4).]
10.16 We may not also lose sight of the significance of the provision
of Section 313 of the CrPC in the case. As a trial comes to
a conclusive phase and all the evidence are adduced by the
prosecution, the veracity and credibility of which are tested
with the tool of cross examination and when a certain clear
picture emerges based on the incriminating materials on
evidence, as a procedural safeguard, the court draws the
attention of the accused to these incriminating evidence to
enable the accused to explain these facts and circumstances
which point to his guilt. While the accused is not obligated
to answer the questions put to him and still can maintain
his silence or deny the evidence, yet silence or evasive or
wrong answers to the questions put by the court provides a
perspective to the court in properly evaluating the incriminating
materials which have been brought forth by the prosecution
by drawing necessary inference including an adverse one.
[See, Manu Sao v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 310].
10.16.1 Examination of an accused under Section 313
CrPC is an important component of the process
of judicial scrutiny of the evidence sought to be
relied upon by the prosecution against an accused.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 959
Chetan v. The State of Karnataka
At the time of indictment and framing of charges
against an accused, the untested evidence
marshalled by the investigating authority in the
course of the investigation is laid bare before the
accused, who would have an idea as to the nature
of evidence and case being built up against him by
the prosecution. This is to enable the accused to
prepare and strategize his defence. He will have
all the opportunities to discredit any prosecution
witness or question any evidence through the tool
of cross examination. He will thereafter have the
opportunity to lead his defence evidence if any.
It is in this context that the answers given by an
accused assume great significance in assessing
the evidence by the court.
10.16.2 In the present case, despite the incriminating
evidence which has come up against him has
been pointed out to him by the Court, he has not
explained any of these but merely denied or feigned
ignorance to which necessary inference can be
drawn against him.
11. CONCLUSION
11.1 For the reasons discussed above, on consideration of the
circumstantial evidences and other proven facts, in our
considered opinion, a clear pattern emerges out of the
circumstances so proved with inferential and logical links
which unmistakably points to the guilt of the appellant
for committing murder of the deceased Vikram Shinde,
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and also for
committing offences under Section 404 of the IPC and
Sections 3 and 5 of the Arms Act,1959 punishable under
Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act.
These proved circumstances considered individually or taken
together do not indicate the involvement of anyone else other
than the appellant.
In the circumstances so proved, the possibility of any other
person being responsible for the death being ruled out, it can
960 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be safely said that the Prosecution has been able to prove
the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
There can thus be no doubt that no one else other than the
appellant could have committed the crime.
11.2 For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that no material
illegality has been committed by the Trial Court and the High
Court in appreciating the evidence against the appellant nor
it can be said that any gross injustice has been caused to
the appellant by the impugned judgment by misreading or
ignoring any material evidence.
11.3 We are, therefore, satisfied that the conviction of the appellant
by the Trial Court which the High Court upheld does not
warrant any interference from this Court except for setting
aside the conviction under Section 404 of the IPC as regards
recovery of the Nokia Mobile Phone, of which we give the
benefit of doubt to the appellant, but sustain the conviction
of the appellant under Sections 302 and 404 of the IPC as
regards murder of the deceased and misappropriation of gold
chain by the appellant and under Sections 25 and 27 of the
Arms Act, 1959 for unlawful possession and use of the gun.
11.4 Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit
Bench at Dharwad passed on 06.12.2010 in Criminal Appeal
No. 666 of 2007 is upheld to the extent indicated above.
Consequently, bail bonds furnished by the appellant stand
cancelled and the appellant who had been released on bail
is directed to surrender before the Trial Court forthwith to
undergo the remaining period of sentence awarded by the
Trial Court as affirmed by the High Court.
Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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