CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARDversusCENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ORS.

                         [2010] 4 S.C.R. 680


A         CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
                                  V.
      CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION
                          AND ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 2010)
B                         APRIL 15, 2010
       [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

        Electricity Act, 2003:
c
        s. 125, proviso - Appeal to Supreme Court - Period of
  limitation - Application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for condonation
  of delay of 160 days - HELD: Not maintainable - Electricity
  Act is a special legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of
D Limitation Act - s. 5 of Limitation Act cannot be invoked for
  entertaining an appeal filed against decision of Tribunal
  beyond the period of 120 days as specified in s. 125 of
  Electricity Act and its proviso - There is no provision in
  Electricity Act under which Supreme Court can entertain an
E appeal against an order of Tribunal after more than 120 days
  - Limitation Act, 1963 - ss. 5 and 29(2).

        Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, form, fee
    and record of proceedings) Rules, 2007:

F     rr. 94(2) and 98(2) rlw s. 125 of Electricity Act - Notice of
  pronouncement of order of Tribunal and 'communication'
  thereof- HELD: In view of r. 94(2), the date of pronouncement
  as notified in the cause list shall be a valid notice of
  pronouncement of the order - Once order is pronounced after
G being shown in cause list with title of the case and name of
  the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been
  communicated to the parties - Rule 98(2) read in conjunction
  with s. 125, makes it clear that once the factum of
  pronouncement of the order of the Tribunal is made known
H                                680
 CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 681
                    & ORS.
to the parties and they are given opportunity to obtain a copy   A
thereof, the order will.be deemed to have been communicated
to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main
part of s. 125 will commence from that date - Electricity Act,
2003 - s.125 - Interpretation of Statutes - Contextual
interpretation.                                                  B

    Words and Phrases:

     'Communication' as occurring in r. 98(2) of Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of
Proceedings) Rules, 2007 - Connotation of                        C
     The appellant-Chattisgarh State Electricity Board filed
the instant appeal on 24.12.2007 challenging the order of
the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity passed on 17.5.2007.
Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application        o
for condonation of 160 days' delay. It was stated in the
application that the appellant came to know about the
order in July, 2007; that the letter dated 7.6.2007 signed
by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal on 11.6.2007
informing the appellant that the matter was disposed of          E
on 14.5.2007 could not be treated as communication in
accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XVI
of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form,
Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007.
Respondent No. 3, the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity
                                                                 F
Board resisted the application contending that even
according to appellant's assertion that it came to know
about the order in July 2007, in the absence of any
explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from
July 2007 to December, 2007, the appeal could not be             G
entertained.

     The questions for consideration before the Court
·were: (i) "Whether s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be
 invoked by the Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved
 person to file an appeal uls 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003   H
    682      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A after more than 120 days from the date of communication
  of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for
  Electricity?" and (ii) "What is the date of communication
  of the decision or order of the Tribunal for the purpose
  of s.125 of the Electricity Act?"
B
       Dismissing the appeal, the Court

         HELD: 1.1. The Electricity Act, 2003 is a self-
   contained comprehensive legislation, which not only
   regulates generation, transmission and distribution of
C electricity but also ensures creation of special
   adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious adjudication of
   disputes emanating from operation and implementation
   of the provisions of the Act. The Act excludes the
  jurisdiction of civil courts qua an order made by the
D adjudicating officer. Section 111 provides for an appeal
   against the order of the adjudicating officer or
  appropriate commission to the Appellate Tribunal within
  the period prescribed therein. Section 125 lays down that
  any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
E Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days
  from the date of communication of the decision or order
  of the Tribunal. Proviso to s.125 empowers this Court to
  entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days
  if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
F appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that
  the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals u/ss
  111 (2) and 125 is substantially different from the period
  prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits etc.
  The use of the expression 'within a further period of not
G exceeding 60 days' in the proviso to s.125 makes it clear
  that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There
  is no provision in the Act under which this Court can
  entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of
  the Tribunal after more than 120 days. [Para 11) [696-H;
H 697-A-D]
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 683
                     ORS.
     1.2. It is evident that the Electricity Act is a special   A
legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation
Act. Therefore, s. 5 pf the Limitation Act cannot be
invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed
against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the
period of 120 days specified in s.125 of the Electricity Act    B
and its proviso. Any interpretation of s. 125 of the
Electricity Act which may attract applicability of s.5 of the
Limitation Act read with s.29(2) thereof will defeat the
object of the legislation, namely, to provide special
limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order   c
of the Tribunal and proviso to s.125 will become
 nugatory. [Para 11 and 16] [697-F; 703-C-E]

     Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (1974) 2 SCC
133; Union of India v. Popular Construction Company 2001
                       =
(3) Suppl. SCR 619 (2001) 8 SCC 470; Mangu Ram v. D
                                                    =
Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1976 (2) SCR 260 (1976)
1 SCC 392; Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel 1964
 SCR 129 = AIR 1964 SC 1099; Patel Naranbhai
Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai 1992 (3) SCR 384         =
(1992) 4 SCC 264; Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of E
Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others (2008) 3 SCC 70;
Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres
Ltd. 2008 (2 ) SCR 861 = (2008) 3 SCC 73; Commissioner
of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private
Limited and another (2009) 5 sec 791, relied on.         F

    Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1           =
                               (1995) 5 sec 5, held
inapplicable.
    2.1. The word 'communication' has neither been G
defined in the Electricity Act, 2003 nor in the Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, 'Fee and Record
of Proceedings) Rules, 2_002. Therefore, the same
deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of
contextual interpretation and keeping in view the H
    684    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A language of the relevant provisions. In terms of Rule 98(2),
  the Deputy Registrar is requfred to send the case file to
  the Registry for taking steps to prepare copies of the
  order and their communication to the parties. If Rule 98(2)
  is read in conjunction with s. 125 of the Electricity Act, it
B becomes clear that once the factum of pronouncement
  of order by the Tribunal is made known to the parties and
  they are given opportunity to obtain a copy thereof, the
  order will be deemed to have been communicated to the
  parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main
c part of s.125 will commence from that date. Besides, r.
  94(2) requires that when the order is reserved, the date
  of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause list and
  that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order.
  Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the
  cause list with the title of the case and name of the
0
  counsel, the same will be deemed to have been
  communicated to the parties and they can obtain copy
  through e-mail or by filing an application for certified
  copy. [Para 18 and 19] [704-C-G; 705-D-E]

E       Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v. Nand
    Singh 1980 (1) SCR 131 = (1979) 4 SCC 19, relied on.

      Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
  Acquisition Officer 1962 SCR 676 = AIR 1961 SC 1500;
F Muthiaha Chettiar v. I. T. Commissioner, Madras AIR 1951
  Madras 2004; Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami
  ILR 34 Madras 151; and Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan AIR
    1930 Madras 490, referred to.
      Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis. M. M. Rubber
                                         =
G and Co., Tamil Nadu 1991 (3) SCR 862 (1992) Supp 1 SCC
    471, distinguished.

      2.2. In the instant case, even though the name of the
  counsel for the appellant was not shown in the cause list
H of 14.5.2007 i.e., the date on which the impugned order
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 685
                   & ORS.

was pronounc_ed by the Tribunal, the factum of A
                ' I
pronouncement was conveyed by the Registry of the
Tribunal, which communication was received in the
secretariat of the appellant on 21.6.2007. The appellant
had come to know about the impugned order on
17.7.2007 from another source i.e., respondent No.5, s
which had sent communication for payment of FLEE
charges. Thus, on 21.6.2007 or at least on 17.7.2007, the
appellant had come to know of the order of the Tribunal
through proper channel. The preparation of appeal,
which bears the date 7.9.2007, is a clinching evidence of c
the fact that the appellant had not only become aware of
the order of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof.
The appellant has not offered any tangible explanation as
to why the appeal, which was filed only on 24.12.2007,
could not be filed for more than three and half months
                                                          0
after its preparation. Thus, the appeal having been filed
after more than 120 days from the date of communication
of the Tribunal's order, cannot be entertained. [Para 24]
[713-B-H; 714-A-B]
                     Case Law Reference:                  E
 (1974) 2 sec 133           relied on           para 12
 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 619 relied on              para 13
 1976 (2) SCR 260           relied on           para 13   F
  1964 SCR 129              relied on           para 13
  1992 (3) SCR 384          relied on           para 13
  (2008) 3 sec 10           relied on           para 14
                                                          G
  2008 (2) SCR 861          relied on           para 14
  (2009) 5 sec 191          relied on           para 15
  1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1     held inapplicable   para 17
  1962 SCR 676              referred to         para 20   H
    686       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A     1980 (1) SCR 131               relied on              para 21
      AIR 1951 Madras 2004           referred to            para 22
      ILR 34 Madras 151              referred to            para 22
      AIR 1930 Madras 490            referred to            para 22
B
      1991 (3) SCR 862               distinguished          para 23

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    3378 of 2010.
c       From the Judgment & Order dated 17 .5.2007 of the
    Appellate Tribunal for Electricity at New Delhi in I.A. No. 4 of
    2007 in Appeal No. 21 of 2006.

      Ravi Shankar Prasad, Suparna Srivastava, Ram Swarup
D Sharma for the Appellant.

       C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sakesh Kumar, K.V. Bharathi
    Upadhyaya for the Responde:'lt.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
          G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation
  Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Limitation Act') can be invoked by this
  Court for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under
  Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, 'the Electricity
F Act') after more than 120 days from the date of communication
  of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
  (for short, 'the Tribunal') is the question which requires
  determination in this appeal filed against order dated 17.5.2007
  passed by the Tribunal in I.A. No.4 of 2007 in Appeal No.21 of
G 2006.
      2. Appellant, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board was
  established under Section 58 of the M.P. Reorganization Act,
  2000. In a sense, it is a successor of Madhya Pradesh
  Electricity Board insofar as the State of Chhattisgarh is
H concerned. A dispute arose between the appellant and
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 687
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
respondent No.3 - Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board in         A
the matter of payment of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in
the Western Region under the "Frequency Linked Energy
Exchange" scheme, which was introduced with effect from
1.6.1992. The FLEE charges were payable to the beneficiaries
on the basis of monthly advises issued by Western Regional          B
Electricity Board (renamed as Western Regional Board
Committee) (respondent No.5 herein). The matter was
considered by respondent No.1 - Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission, which passed an order dated 8.12 .2005 fixing the
liability of the appellant and respondent No.3 in the matter of     c
payment of FLEE charges.

      3. The appellant challenged the aforementioned order in
 Appeal No.21/2006, which was allowed by the Tribunal vide its
 order dated 14.11.2006. Soon thereafter, respondent No.3 filed
 IA No.4/2007 for issue of a direction to respondent No.5 to        D
 recalculate FLEE charges in accordance with the Tribunal's
·order in relation to post-reorganization period. By order dated
 17.5.2007, the Tribunal allowed that application and directed
 respondent No.5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance
 with order dated 14.11.2006.                                       E

      4. Feeling aggrieved by the last mentioned order of the
 Tribunal, the appellant filed this appeal on 24.12.2007. Along
 with the appeal, the appellant filed an application for
 condonation of 160 days' delay. The reasons for not filing         F
 appeal within the period of 60 days specified in Section 125
 of the Electricity Act, as disclosed in the application are as
 under: -

      (i) The impugned order had been pronounced by the
      Tribunal on 17.5.2007 but the counsel for the appellant did   G
      not receive intimation of the said pronouncement and as
      such he was not aware of the same.

      (ii) That the procedure which was being followed by the
      Tribunal at that time was that the Registry of the Tribunal   H
    688       SUPREME COURT REPORTS
                                     •                (2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         used to telephonically give advance intimation to the
          counsel of the parties regarding pronouncement of the
          order.

          (iii) The appellant came to know about the order in July,
          2007 when respondent No.5 sent intimation for payment
B
          of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in the Western
          Region. Thereupon, the appellant informed its counsel
          about the impugned order who then sent letter dated
          26.7.2007 to the Registrar of the Tribunal that intimation
          regarding pronouncement of the order had not been given
c         to him (the date has been wrongly typed in paragraph 3
          of the application as 26.11.2007).

          (iv) Respondent No.3 had filed a review petition against
          order dated 14.11.2006, which was not decided by the
D         Tribunal along with I.A. No.4 of 2007 and the same was
          withdrawn on 25.10.2007.

          (v) Thereafter, the impugned order was considered and
          discussed by the appellant and after obtaining legal
          opinion, it was decided to file an appeal.
E
          (vi) In the light of the decision taken by the appellant, the
          counsel proceeded to prepare the appeal but some delay
          was caused due to extensive pleadings and voluminous
          documents.
F
       5. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No.3, it has
  been averred that the impugned order was communicated by
  the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide his letter dated
  11.6.2007; that the appellant and the respondents before the
G Tribunal were informed by the said letter that the matter was
  disposed of on 14.5.2007 and the parties may request for a
  copy of the order in PDF format through e-mail at registrar-
  aptel@nic.in or apply for a certified copy and further that the
  order would also be available in the Tribunal's website
H (www.aptel.gov.in). It has been further averred that letter sent
 CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 689
             & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal was received by the            A
appellant on 21.6.2007 which was entered in its receipt register
at serial No. 2082 and subsequently, the same was received
by the office of the Chief Engineer (Commercial) on 29.6.2007.
Respondent No.3 has supported this assertion by placing on
record photostat copies of the inward register maintained in the       B
office of Secretary of the appellant, which were made available
pursuant to an application filed under the Right to Information
Act. Respondent No.3 has then relied upon the appellant's
assertion that it came to know about order dated 17.5.2007 in
July, 2007 and prayed that in the absence of any explanation           c
by the appellant for remaining silent from July, 2007 to
December, 2007, the appeal cannot be entertained. As regards
the review application, respondent No.3 has averred that the
same has no bearing on the appellant's grievance against order
dated 17.5.2007 and in the absence of any explanation for the          D
delay after 21.6.2007, the appeal should be dismissed as
barred by time.

     6. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant,
it has been pleaded that in the absence of communication of
order by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions                E
contained in Chapter XVI of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity
(Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules,
2007 (for short, 'the Rules'), the appeal cannot be dismissed
as barred by time. It has then been averred that letter dated
7.6.2007 of the Tribunal, which was signed by Deputy Registrar         F
on 11.6.2007 cannot be treated as communication of order
dated 17.5.2007. It has been further averred that letter dated
7.6.2007 was received in the secretariat of the appellant on
25.6.2007 and the same was forwarded to the concerned
department on 28.6.2007. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it has       G
been averred that officers of the appellant had no knowledge
of the impugned order till the receipt of intimation from
respondent No.5 in July 2007 regarding payment to the
beneficiaries in the Western Region and, thereafter, steps were
taken for filing appeal.                                               H
                                                                          ,_
     690      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2010] 4 S.C.R.


 A       7. Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel for
   the appellant argued that even though the appeal was filed after
   more than 120 days counted from the date of the Tribunal's
   order and, in terms of proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity
   Act, this Court can extend the time for filing an appeal up to a
 B maximum of 60 days only, power under Section 5 read with
   Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be exercised for
   condonation of delay beyond the period of 120 days. In support
   of this argument, Shri Prasad placed reliance on the judgment
   of this Court in Mukri Gopa/an v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayi/
 c Aboobacker (1995) 5 sec 5. Learned senior counsel laid
   considerable emphasis on the fact that by virtue of the impugned
   order huge liability has been created against the appellant and
   if the appeal is not entertained, it will suffer irreparable injury.

         8. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel
  D appearing for respondent No.3 argued that in view of the plain
    language of the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act,
    this Court has no power to extend the period for filing an appeal
    beyond 'i 20 days and the provisions of the Limitation Act
    cannot be invoked for negating the legislative inten<~ment to
' E prescribe special. limitation for filing an appeal against any
    decision or order of the Tribunal. Learned senior counsel further
    argued that letter dated 7.6.2007 sent by Deputy Registrar of
    the Tribunal informing the parties that the IA was disposed of
    on 17.5.2007 and they may request for a copy of the order in
  F PDF format through e-mail or apply for a certified copy amounts
    to communication of the order within the meaning of Section
    125 of the Electricity Act read with Rule 98 of the Rules and
    the appeal filed after more than 120 days from the date of
    receipt of letter dated 7.6.2007 is liable to be dismissed as
  G barred by time. Learned senior counsel submitted that even if
    intimation given by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide
    letter dated 7.6.2007 is ignored, the appeal is liable to be
    dismissed because the appellant had become aware of the
    Tribunal's order on 17.7.2007 i.e., the day on which letter dated
  H 6.7.2007 sent by respondent No.5 was received in the office
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 691
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]

of its Secretary. Learned senior counsel submitted that if the        A
period of limitation is counted from 17.7.2007, the appeal could
be filed by 15.9.2007 whereas the same was actually filed on
24.12.2007. Learned senior counsel then invited the Court's
attention to the memo of appeal and application filed for
condonation of delay to show that the same had been prepared          B
on 7.9.2007 but were filed on 24.12.2007 i.e., after more than
three and half months. In support of his argument that this Court
cannot extend the time beyond 60 days in terms of proviso to
Section 125 of the Electricity Act, Shri Vaidyanathan relied upon
the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Popular              C
Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470, Singh Enterprises
v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others
(2008) 3 SCC 70 and Commissioner of Customs and Central
Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and another (2009) 5
sec    791.
                                                                      D
    9. For deciding the question framed at the threshold of this
judgment, it will be useful to notice the relevant statutory
provisions.

      Electricity Act and the Rules                                   E
     125. Appeal to Supreme Court.- Any person aggrieved
    by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal, may,
    file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from
    the date of communication of the decision or order of the
    Appellate Tribunal, to him, on any one or more of the · F
    grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure, 1908 (5 OF 1908):

     Provided that the Supreme Court qiay, if it is satisfied that
     the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing      G
     the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within
     a further period not exceeding sixty days.

      94. Pronouncement of order.-(1) The Bench shall as far
      as possible pronounce the order immediately after the
                                                                      H
    692      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A         hearing is concluded.

          (2) When the orders are reserved, the date. for
          pronouncement of order shall be notified in the cause list
          which shall be a valid notice of intimation of
          pronouncement".
B
          (3) Reading of the operative portion of the order in the open
          court shall be deemed to be pronouncement of the order.

          (4) Any order reserved by a Circuit Bench of the Tribunal
c         may also be pronounced at the principal place of sitting
          of the Bench in one of the aforesaid modes as exigencies
          of the situation require.

          98. Transmission of order by the Court Master.- (1) The
          Court Master shall immediately on pronouncement of
D         order, transmit the order with the case file to the Deputy
          Registrar.

          (2) On receipt of the order from the Court Master, the
          Deputy Registrar shall after due scrutiny, satisfy himself
E         that the provisions of these rules have been duly compiled
          with and in token thereof affix his initials with date on the
          outer cover of the order. The Deputy Registrar shall
          thereafter cause to transmit the case file and the order to
          the Registry for taking steps to prepare copies and their
F         communication to the parties.

          106. Filing through electronic media. - The Tribunal may
          allow filing of appeal or petition or application through
          electronic media such as online filing and provide for
          rectification of defects by e-mail or net and in such filing,
G         these rules shall be adopted as nearly as possible on and
          from a date to be notified separately and the Chairperson
          may issue instructions in this behalf from time to time.


H
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 693
              ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

   Limitation Act                                                      A

   5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-,Any
   appeal or any application, other than an application under
   any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil
   Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) , may be admitted after the             8
   prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies
   the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
   appeal or making the application within such period.

   Explanation.-The fact that the appellant or the applicant
   was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High           C
   Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period
   may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.

    29. Savings.- (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section
    25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).                   o
    (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
    appeal or application a period of limitation different from .
    the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
    section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
    prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of E
    determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
    appeal or application by any special or local law, the
    provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
    apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
    not expressly excluded by such special or local law.          F

    (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time
    being in force with respect to marriage and divorce,
    nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other
    proceeding under any such law.                                     G
    (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement"
    in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories
    to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may
    for the time being extend.
                                                                       H
    694      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         10. The Electricity Act was enacted in the backdrop of
    dismal performance of various state electricity boards and
    alarming decline in the availability of power necessary for
    domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors. Before enactment
    of the Electricity Act, the electricity supply industry was governed
B   by the Indian Electricity Act 1910, The Electricity (Supply) Act,
    1948 and the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998.
    The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 mandated the creation of
    electricity board for every state. The state electricity boards had
    the responsibility of arranging the supply of electricity in the
c   state. Over a period of time, the performance of state electricity
    boards deteriorated on account of various factors including their
    inability to take decisions on tariffs in a professional and
    independent manner. In practice, the state governments started
    determining tariff and huge concessions were provided to
    various segments of the consumers, many of which were not
0
    deserving. Cross-subsidies had reached unsustainable level.
    To address this issue and to provide for independent
    determination of tariffs, the Electricity Regulatory Commissions
    Act, 1998 was enacted. Under that Act, the Central Government
    created the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and
E   most of the state governments created the State Electricity
    Regulatory Commissions either under the Central Act or under
    their respective state legislations with a view to implement the
    policy of ericouraging private sector participation in generation,
    transmission and distribution of electricity and to harmonize and
F   rationalize the provisions of the three Acts, the Electricity Act
    was enacted. Part II thereof contains provisions under which the
    Central Government is entitled to prepare the National
    Electricity Policy and tariff policy, in consultation with the state
    governments and the Central Electricity Authority for
G   development of the power system based on optimal utilisation
     of resources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear substances or
     materials, hydro and renewable sources of energy. Under the
     same part, the Central Government can prepare and notify
     national policies, permitting stand alone systems for rural areas,
H   for rural electrification and for bulk purchase of power and
· CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 695
  .             ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
 .                I
 management of local distribution in rural areas through                 A
 panchayat institutions, users' associations, co-operative
 societies, non-governmental organisations or franchisees. Part
 111 contains provision relating to generation of electricity. Part IV
 regulates grant of licenses for transmission of electricity,
 distribution of electricity and trading in electricity. Part V deals    B
 with transmission of electricity including inter-st,!ite
 transmission. Pait VI deals with distribution of electricity. Part
 V+I contains provision relating to tariff. The provisions contained
 in Part IX provide for establishment of the Central Electricity
 Regulatory Authority and its functions and duties and those             c
 contained in Part X provide for establishment of the Central and
 State E_lectricity Regulatory Commissions and their functions.
 The Electricity Act also envisages establishment of Tribunal to
 hear appeals against the orders of adjudicating officers or
 regulatory commissions (Part XI). In terms of Section 111, any
                                                                         0
 person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer
 except the one made under Section 127 or an order made by
 an appropriate Commission under this Act can prefer an
 appeal to the Tribunal. The composition of the Tribunal and
 qualifications prescribed for appointment of Chairperson and            E
 Member shows that the legislature intended to create a
 specialized adjudicatory forum for deciding various disputes
 emanating from the operation of the Act. Section 125 provides
 for an appeal to this Court against any order or decision of the
 Tribunal which can be filed within 60 days from the date of
 communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. The             F
 limitation placed on the jurisdiction of this Court is that the
 appeal can be entertained only on one or more of the grounds
 specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain the
 appeal within a further period not exceeding 60 days, if it is          G
 satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
 from filing the appeal within the said period. In other words, an
 appeal under Section 125 can be filed within a maximum
 period of 120 days if this Court is satisfied that there was
 sufficient cause for not filing the same within 60 days from the        H
    696      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   date of communication of the decision or order appealed
    against. Part XII contains provisions relating to investigation
    leading to assessment of electricity charges payable by the
    consumer and enforcement of the orders of assessment. It also
    contains provisions for appeal against the final order passed
B   under Section 126. Part XIV contains provisions to deal with
    theft of electricity, electric lines and materials, interference with
    meters and work of licensees and also provides for fiscal
    penalties and substantive punishments. Section 145 declares
    that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
c   proceeding in respect of any matter which an assessing officer
    referred to in Section 126 or an appellate authority referred to
    in Section 127 or the adjudicating officer appointed under the
    Act is empowered by or under the Act to determine and no
    injunction shall be granted in such matters.

D      11. The brief analysis of the scheme of the Electricity Act
  shows that it is a self-contained comprehensive legislation,
  which not only regulates generation, transmission and
  distribution of electricity by public bodies and encourages
  public sector participation in the process but also ensures
E creation of special adjudicatory mechanism to deal with the
  grievance of any person aggrieved by an order made by an
  adjudicating officer under the Act except under Section 127 or
  an order made by the appropriate commission. Section 110
  provides for establishment of a Tribunal to hear such appeals.
F Section 111 (1) and (2) lays down that any person aggrieved
  by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate
  commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal
  within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of
  the order made by an adjudicating officer or the appropriate
G commission is received by him. Section 111 (5) mandates that
  the Tribunal shall deal with the appeal as expeditiously as
  possible and endeavour to dispose of the same finally within
  180 days from the date of receipt thereof. If the appeal is not
  disposed of within 180 days, the Tribunal is required to record
H reasons in writing for not doing so. Section 125 lays down that
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 697
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]

any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal          A
can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of
communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso
to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed
within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of    B
60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for
filing appeals under Sections 111 (2) and 125 is substantially
different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for
filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within a further period
of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso to Section 125 makes it           c
clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There
is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain
an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after
more than 120 days. The object underlying establishment of a
special adjudicatory forum Le., the Tribunal to deal with the          D
grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of
an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate commission with
a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of
special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125
 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and           E
 implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are
expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except
this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of
the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts
(Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is
also a pointer in that direction. It is thus evident that the          F
 Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where
any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
 application a period of limitation different from the one
 prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall         G
apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the
 Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period
of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless
 they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.          H
    698       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A        12. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (1974) 2
    SCC 133, this Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation
    Act in the backdrop of the plea that the provisions of that Act
    are not applicable to the proceedings under the Representation
    of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the words "expressly
B   excl-uded" appearing in Section 29(2) would mean that there
    must be an express reference made in the special or local law
    to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the
    operation is to be excluded. While rejecting the argument, the
    three-Judge Bench observed:
c         "...........what we have to see i§ whether the scheme of the
          special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of
          the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature
          intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone
          should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an
D         examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the
          provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded,
          then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid
          to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even
          in a case where the special law does not exclude the
E         provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
          express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the
          Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature
          of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
          scheme of the special law exclude their operation."
F
                                                (emphasis supplied)

         13. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
    1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the
    Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v.
G   Popular Construction Company (2001) 8 SCC 470. The
    precise question considered in that case was whether the
    provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to
    an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the
    Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench
H   referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. Municipal
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 699
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]

Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla           A
v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. L.N. Mishra (supra), Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai
v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held:

    "12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act       B
    is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter"
    used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this
    phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the
    meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would
    therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act.
    Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court   C
    could entertain an application to set aside the award
    beyond the extended period under the proviso, would
    render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No
    principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
                                                                    D
    16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse
    to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by
    an application for setting aside such award "in accordance
    with" sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2)
    relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not        E
    relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond
    the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would
    not be an application "in accordance with" that sub-section.
    Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the
    court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond           F
    the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed
    under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of
    Section 36 which provide that

           "where the time for making an application to set
           aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has            G
           expired ... the award shall be enforced under the
           Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner
           as if it were a decree of the court".
                                                               .
    This is a significant departure from the provisions of the      H
    700      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time
          to set aside the award expired, the court was required to
          "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award,
          and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall
          follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time
B         expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award
          becomes immediately enforceable without any further act
          of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the
          interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the
          scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour
c         of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the
          operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."

                                                (emphasis supplied)

       14. In Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur and
D others (supra), the Court interpreted Section 35 of Central
  Excise Act, 1944, which is pari materia to Section 125 of the
  Electricity Act and observed:

          "The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also
          the Tribunal being creatures of statute are vested with
E
          jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible
          period provided under the statute. The period up to which
          the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily
          provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of
          the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can
F         be availed for condonation of delay. The: first proviso to
          Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has
          to be preferred within three months from the date of
          communication to him of the decision or order. However,
           if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was
G          prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal
          within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to
           be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other
           words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed
           within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days'
H          time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 701
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
   the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35        A
   makes the position crystal clear that the appellate
   authority has no power to allow the appeal to be
   presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language
   used makes the position clear that the legislature
   intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal        B
   by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry
   of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring
   appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section
    5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High
    Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no    c
   power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days'
    period."

                                          (emphasis supplied)

The same view was reiterated in Commissioner of Cµstoms,           0
Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 73.

     15. In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v.
Hongo India Private Limited and another (2009) 5 SCC 791,
a three-Judge Bench considered the scheme of the Central · E
Excise Act, 1944 and held that High Court has no power to
condone delay beyond the period specified in Section 35-H
thereof. The argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can
be invoked for condonation of delay was rejected by the Court
and observed:
                                                                   F
    "30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to
    Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and
    revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has
    specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the
    case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the     G
    number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of
    an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional
    period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central
    Government has been provided. However, in the case of
    an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and             H
    702       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010J 4 S.C.R

A         reference application to the High Court under Section 35-
          H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further
          period for filing an appeal and making reference to the
          High Court is mentioned in the Act.

8         32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections
          35, 35-8, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear
          that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be
           made within 180 days only from the date of communication
          of the decision or order. In other words, the language used
           in other provisions makes the position clear that the
c          legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the
          appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after
          expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period
          for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause
          condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the
D         prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section
          5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore,
          justified in holding that there was no power to condone the
          delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.

E         35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly
          excluded" would mean that there must be an express
          reference made in the special or local law to the specific
          provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is
          to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme
F         of the special law which here in this case is the Central
          Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein
          is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete
          code by itself which alone should govern the several
          matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the
          relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the
G
          Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits
          conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement
          the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even
          in a case where the special law does not exclude the
          provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
H
 CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C.               703
             & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
      express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the           A
      court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature
      of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
      scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other
      words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation
      Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the        B
      Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise
      Act relating to filing of reference application to the High
     ·Court."· ·

                                             (emphasis supplied)       C

       16. In view.of the above discussion, we hold that Section
. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for
  entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the
  Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section
  125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of    D
  Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability
  of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2)
  thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to
  provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the
  decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125         E
  will become nugatory.

        17. The judgment in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat
 Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (supra) on which reliance has been
 placed by Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad has no bearing on this
                                                                       F
 case. The issue considered in that case was whether Section
 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked for condoning the delay
 in filing ah appeal under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Control
 Act. A two-Judge Bench interpreted Section 18 of the Kerala
 Rent Control Act and held that even though that section is a
 special provision, in the absence of any indication of maximum        G
 period within which the appeal can be entertained by the
 Appellate Authority, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would get
 attracted. It is significant to note that there is no provision in
 the Kerala Rent Control Act similar to the one contained in
  proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act, Section 34(3) of      H
    704      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Section 35( 1) or 35-H
  of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the ratio of Mukri
  Gopa/an v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayi/ Aboobacker (supra) .
  cannot be invoked for declaring that this Court has the power
  to entertain an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act
B after 120 days counted from tne date of communication of the
  decision or order of the Tribunal.

          18. The next question which requires consideration is as
    to what is the date of communication of the decision or order
C   of the Tribunal for the purpose of Section 125 of the Electricity
    Act. The word 'communication' has not been defined in the Act
    and the Rules. Therefore, the same deserves to be interpreted
    by applying the rule of contextual interpretation and keeping in
    view the language of the relevant provisions. Rule 94(1) of the
    Rules lays down that the Bench of the Tribunal which hears an
D   application or petition shall pronounce the order immediately
    after conclusion of the hearing. Rule 94(2) deals with a situ~tion
    where the order is reserved. In that event, the date for
    pronouncement of order is required to be notified in the cause
    list and the same is treated as a notice of intimation of
E   pronouncement. Rule 98(1) casts a duty upon the Court Master
    to immediately after pronouncement transmit the order along
    with the case file to the Deputy Registrar. In terms of Rule 98(2),
    the Deputy Registrar is required to scrutinize the file, satisfy
    himself that provisions of rules have been complied with and
F   thereafter, send the case file to the Registry for taking steps to
    prepare copies of the order and their communication to the
    parties. If Rule 98(2) is read in isolation, one may get an
    impression that the registry of the Tribunal is duty bound to send
    copies of the order to the parties and the order will be deemed
G   to have been communicated on the date of receipt thereof, but
    if the same is read in conjunction with Section 125 of the
    Electricity Act, which enables any aggrieved party to file an
    appeal within 60 days from the date of communication of the
    decision or order of the Tribunal, Rule 94(2) which postulates
H   notification of the date of pronouncement of the order in the
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 705
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]

cause list and Rule 106 under which the Tribunal can allow filing   A
of an appeal or petition or application through electronic media
and provide for rectification of the defects by e-mail or net, it
becomes clear that once the factum of pronouncement of order
by the Tribunal is made known to the parties and they are given
opportunity to obtain a copy thereof through e-mail etc., the       B
order will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties
and the period of 60 days specified in the main part of Section
125 will commence from that date.

      19. The issue deserves to be considered from another          C
angle. As mentioned above, Rule 94(2) requires that when the
order is reserved, the date of pronouncement shall be notified
in the cause list and that shall be a valid n.otice of
pronouncement of the order. The counsel appearing for the
parties are supposed to take cognizance of the cause list in
which the case is shown for pronouncement. If title of the case     D
and name of the counsel is printed in the cause list, the same
will be deemed as a notice regarding pronouncement of order.
Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the cause
list with the title of the case and name of the counsel, the same
will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and         E
they can obtain copy through e-mail or by filing an application
for certified copy.

     20. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land
Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500, this Court considered         F
whether an award made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
can be treated to have been communicated on the date of its
making. The application filed by the respondent for making
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was
rejected by the Collector on the ground that the same had been      G
made after more than six months from the date of award i.e.,
25.3.1951. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by
the appellant. This Court noted that no notice of the award was
given to the appellant as per the requirements of Section 12(2)
and it was only on or about January, 1953 that he received the      H
    706       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 4 S.C.R.
                                                             ··~




A   information &bout making of the award. He then filed
    application on 24.2.1953 for reference. This Court considered
    the nature of the award made by the Collector under Section
    12(2) and held that the period of six months prescribed for
    making application would commence from the date the award
8   was made known to the party. Paragraph 6 of the judgment
    which contains discussion on the issue of communication of
    award reads as under:

           "There is yet another point which leads to the same
           conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative
c          decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the
           valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear
           that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the
          owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions
          which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the
D         said decision should be communicated to the said party.
          The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision,
          either actual or constructive, is an essential element which
          must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into
          force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot
E         consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or
          signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it
          must involve the communication of the said award to the
          party concerned either actually or constructively. If the
          award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose
F         rights are affected by it it can be said to be made when
          pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the
          award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly
          pronounced on the date previously announced the award
          is said to be communicated to the said party even if the
G         said party is not actually present on the date of its
          pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of
          its pronouncement, an award is pronounced and a party
          is not present the award can be said to be made when it
          is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the
          party affected by the award, either actual or constructive,
H
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 707
            & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.)
    being an essential requirement of Fairplay and natural             A
    justice the expression "the date of the award" used-in the
    proviso must mean the date when the award is either
    communicated to the party or is known by him either
     actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would
     be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of           B
     the Collector's award" used in the proviso to Section 18
     in a literal or mechanical way."

                                             (emphasis supplied)

     21. In Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v.               C
Nand Singh (1979) 4 SCC 19, this Court considered a
somewhat similar question in the context of filling an appeal
under Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935.
The Allahal>ad High Court held that the date of the
communication of the order will be the starting point for limitation   D
of filing an appeal. While approving the view taken by the High
Court, this Court observec::l as under:

     "In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and
     cannot be interfered with by this Court. Apart from the           E
     reasons given by this Cpurt in the earlier judgment to the
     effect that the order must be made known either directly
     or constructively to the party affected by the order in order
     to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may
     give one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is
                                                                       F
     plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office
     of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the
     sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the
     order is meant. The order must be communicated either
    ·directly or constructively in the sense of making it known,
     which may make it possible for the authority to say that          G
     the party affected must be deemed tq have known the
     order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in
     communication under certain circumstances may be
     taken to be the date of the communication of tf?e order
                                                                       H
    708      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [201 OJ 4 S.C.R.


A         or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally
          speaking, the order would be effective against the person
          affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either
          directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts
          stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the
B         respondent had no means to know about the order of the
          Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he
          received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the
          meaning of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation
          Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting
c         point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date."

                                                  (emphasis supplied)

       22. In Muthiaha Chettiar v. I. T. Commissioner, Madras
  AIR 1951 Madras 2004, a two-Judge Bench of Madras High
D Court considered the question whether the limitation of one
  year prescribed for filing revision under Section 33-A (2) of the
  Income Tax Act, 1922 is to be computed from the date when
  the order was signed by the Income-tax Commissioner or the
  date on which the petitioner had an opportunity of coming to
E know of the order. It was argued on behalf of the department
  that other provisions of the Act have been amended to provide
  for appeal within specified time to be counted from the date of
  the receipt of the order sought to be appealed against, but no
  such amendment was made in Section 33-A and therefore, the
F period of limitation will start from the date of order. While
  rejecting the argument, Rajamannar, C.J., referred to earlier
  decisions in Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami ILR
  34 Madras 151 and Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan AIR 1930
  Madras 490 and observed:
G         " ........... The only question that we have to decide is as to
          whether there is anything in the reasoning of the learned
          Judges in Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami,
          34 Mad. 151 : (8 l.C. 398) & Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan,
          53 Mad. 491:(A.l.R. (17) 1930 Mad. 490) which makes the
H
CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. & 709
              ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]

    application of the rule laid down by them dependent on the       A
    provisions of a particular statute. We think there is none.
    On the other hand, we consider that the rule laid down by
    the learned Judges in the above two decisions - & we are
    taking the same view - is based upon a salutary & just
    principle, namely that, if a person is given a right to resort   B
    to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a
    prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from
    a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved
    actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing
    the order & therefore, must be presumed to have had              c
    knowledge of the order."
                                ...
   23. In Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis. M.M.
Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu (1992) Supp 1 SCC 471, a
three-Judge Bench highlighted a distinction between making
of an order and communication thereof to the affected person         D
in the context of Section 35-E (3) and (4) of the Central Excise
Act, 1944. The Bench noted the scheme of Section 35,
distinction between sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof and held
that in case where the order is subject to appeal, the same is
required to be communicated to the affected person. Relevant         E
portions of that judgment are extracted below:

    "5. Before we discuss the arguments of the learned
    counsel, it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions
    in the Act. Section 35 of the Act provides for an appeal         F
    by a person aggrieved by any decision or order passed
    under the Act by a Central Excise Officer lower than a
    Collector of Central Excise and that such an appeal will
    have to be filed "within three months from the date of the
    communication to him of such decision or order". Sub-            G
    section (5) of Section 35-A requires that on the aisposal
    of the appeal, the Collector (Appeals) shall communicate
    the order passed by him to the appellant, the adjudicating
    authority and the Collector of Central Excise. Ser;;tion 35-
    B provides for a right of appeal to any person aggrieved
                                                                     H   ·~
    710       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         by, among other orders, (1) an order passed by the
          Collector (Appeals) under Section 35-A and (2) a decision
          or order passed by the Collector of Central Excise as an
          adjudicating authority. Such an appeal will have to be filed
          "within three months from the date on which the order
B         sought to be appealed against is communicated to the
          Collector of Central Excise or as the case may be the
          other party preferring the appeal". The Appellate Tribunal
          also is required to send a copy of the order passed in the
          appeal to the Collector of Central Excise and the other
c         party to the appeal. .................... ..

          8. At this stage itself we may state that sub-section (4) of
          the Act provides that the adjudicating authority shall file the
          application before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order .
          made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) "within a
D         period of three months from the date of communication of
          the order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) to the
          adjudicating authority".

          9. The words "from the date of decision or order'' used with
E         reference to the limitation for filing an appeal or revision
          under certain statutory provisions had come up for
          consideration in a number of cases. We may state that the
          ratio of the decisions uniformly is that in the case of a
          person aggrieved filing the appeal or revision, it shall
F         mean the date of communication of the decision or order
          appealed against. However, we may note a few leading
          cases on this aspect.
          10. Under Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860
          the starting point of limitation for appeal by way of suit
G         allowed by that section was the passing of the Survey
          Officer's decision and in two of the earliest cases, namely,
          Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Cloete and Seshama v.
          Sankara it was held that the decision was passed when it
          was communicated to the parties. In Secretary of State for
H
CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C.             711
            & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

   India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu           A
   construing a similar provision in the Survey and Boundary
   Act, 1897 the same High Court held that a decision cannot
   properly be said to be passed until it is in some way
   pronounced or 'published under such circumstances the
   parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of          B
   knowing what it contains. ''Till then though it may be written
   out, signed and dated, it is nothing but a decision which
   the officer intends to pass. It is not passed so long it is
   open to him to tear off what he has written and write
   something else." In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v.             c
   Deputy Land Acquisition Officer construing the proviso to
   Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribed
   for applications seeking reference to the court, a time-limit
   of six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector
   under Section 12(2) or within six months from.the date of
                                                                    0
   the Collector's award whichever first expires, this Court
   held that the six months period will have to be calculated
   from the date of communication of the award. In Asstt.
   Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v. Nand Singh
   construing the provision of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor         E
   Vehicles Taxation Act, it was held that for an aggrieved
   party the limitatio~ will run from the date when the order
   was communicated to him.

   11. The ratio of these judgments were applied in
   interpreting Section 33-A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act,       F
   1922 in Muthia Chettiar v. CITwith reference to a right of
   revision provided to an aggrieved assessee. Section 33-
   A( 1) of the Act on the other hand authorised the
   Commissioner to suo mote call for the records of any
   proceedings under the Act in which an. order has been            G
   passed by any authority subordinate to him and pass such
   order thereon as he thinks fit. The proviso, however, stated
   that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under that
   sub-section "if the order (sought to be revised) has been
   made more than one year previously". Construing this             H
    712      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A         provision the High Court in Muthia Chettiar case held that
          the power to call for the records and pass the order will
          cease with the lapse of one year from the date of the order
          by the subordinate authority and the ratio of date of the
          knowledge of the order applicable to an aggrieved party
B         is not applicable for the purpose of exercising suo moto
          power. Similarly in another decision reported in
          Viswanathan Chettiar v. CIT construing the time-limit for
          completion of an assessment under Section 34(2) of the
          Income Tax Act, 1922, which provided that it shall be made
c         "within four years from the end of the year in which the
          income, profit and gains were first assessable, " it was
          held that the time-limit of four years for exercise of the
          power should be calculated with reference to the date on
          which the assessment or reassessment was made and not
          the date on which such assessment or reassessment order
D
          made under Section 34(2) was served on the assessee.

          13. So far as the party who is affected by the order or
          decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he
          should be made aware of passing of such order.
E          Therefore courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of
          law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from
          the date on which the order was communicated to him
          or the date on which it was pronounced or published
          under such circumstances that the parties affected by it
F         have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of
          the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party
          affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive
          is thus an essential element which must be satisfied
          before the decision can be said to have been concluded
G         and binding on him. Otherwise the party affected by it will
          have no means of obeying the order or acting in
          conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise
          having it set aside. This is based upon, as observed by
          Rajmannar, C.J. in Muthia Chettiar v. CIT "a salutary and
H         just principle". The application of this rule so far as the
 CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C.E.R.C. 713
             & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.]
    aggrieved party is concerned is not dependent on the              A
    provisions of the particular statute, but it is so under the
    general law."

                                            (emphasis supplied)

       24. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that even     B
though the name of the counsel for the appellant was not shown
in the cause list of 14.5.2007 i.e., the date on which the
impugned order was pronounced by the Tribunal, the factum of
pronouncement was conveyed to the parties including the
appellant vide letter dated 7.6.2007, which was signed by the         C
Deputy Registrar on 11.6.2007 and they were informed that they
can obtain copy through e-mail or make an application for
certified copy. Undisputedly, that letter was received in the
secretariat of the appellant on 21.6.2007. The appellant had
come to know about the impugned order in July 2007 from               D
another source i.e., respondent No.5, which had sent
communication for payment of FLEE charges. The
communication sent by respondent No.5 was received by the
appellant on 17.7.2007. It is, thus, evident that on 21.6.2007
or at least on 17. 7 .2007, the appellant had come to know            E
through proper channel that the order has been pronounced by
the Tribunal in I.A. No.4/2007. It is not clear from the record
whether the appellant had applied for certified copy or obtained
the one through e-mail, but this much is evident that the
appellant did obtain/receive a copy of order dated 17.5.2007.         F
If that was not so, the appellant could not have flied appeal under
Section 125 of the Electricity Act. The preparation of appeal,
which bears the date 7.9.2007 is a clinching evidence of the
fact that the appellant had not only become aware of the order
of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof. However, instead      G
of filing appeal within 60 days from the date of receipt of letter
dated 7.6.2007 sent by the registry of the Tribunal or the
communication sent by respondent No.5, the appellant chose
to file appeal only on 24.12.2007 and that too despite the fact
that the same was prepared on 7.9.2007. The appellant has
                                                                      H
    714     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   not offered any tangible explanation as to why the appeal could
    not be fifed for more than three and half months after its
    preparation. Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that
    the appeal has been filed after more than 120 days from the
    date of communication of the Tribunal's order and, as such, the
B   same cannot be entertained.

         25. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, the
    parties are left to bear their own costs.

    R.P.                                       Appeal dismissed.