CHARU KISHOR MEHTAversusJOINT CHARITY COMMISSIONER, GREATER BOMBAY REGION & ORS.

                       [2015] 5 S.C.R. 846


A                    CHARU KISHOR MEHTA
                                v.
     JOINT CHARITY COMMISSIONER, 'GREATER BOMBAY
                     REGION &ORS.
B                (Civil Appeal No. 2819 OF 2015)
                        MARCH 12, 2015
         [V. GOPALAGOWDAAND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]
c         Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950-s. 410-Application
  under- By one of the trustees of the Public Trust - Against
  the other trustees (respondent Nos. 2· to 9) including a
  deceased trustee - Seeking their dismissal from trusteeship
  and alleging nonfeasance and malfeasance - Application
D dismissed by Joint Charity Commissioner holding that 7 of
  the trustees are liable to be exonerated as they can be only
  held negligent in delegating their powers and duties in favour
  of the deceased trustee (the managing trustee)- The order
  was affirmed by High Court- On appeal, held: Courts below
E rightly exonerated the trustees (respondents) in a reasonable
  and fair manner - Delegation of powers and functions by
  the respondent-trustees in favour of the Managing Trustee
  was permissible because the instrument of the Trust provided
  for that- Trusts- Trusts Act, 1882 - s. 46 and 47.
F
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

         HELD: 1. Clauses 9 and 11(h) of the Trust Deed of
  the Trust provide for the delegation of the powers and
G functions by the trustees of the Trust by appointing one
  or more of the existing Trustees from among themselves
  to discharge all such powers and functions of the
  trustees of the Trust as they may deem fit and proper.
  By the Resolution dated 30.8.2001, the trustees,
H respondent nos.2 to 9 including the appellant had
                                846
 CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 847
           GREATER BOMBAY REGION

delegated their powers and functions to the deceased A
to manage the affairs of the trust. Thus, clauses 9 and 11
(h) of the Trust deed clearly go to show that there is ample
scope for such delegation of powers and functions of
the Trustees to another Trustee or Trustees of the Trust
to act on their behalf. [Paras 17, 18 and 19] [857-F; 858- B
E; 859-F-G]

     J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co.
     Ltd. (2005) 1 sec 112: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 648 -
     relied on.                                               C

       2. The plea on the basis of Sections 46 and 47 of
the Trusts Act, 1882, to the effect that the trustee cannot
renounce his office that requires him to discharge his
duties and functions and he cannot delegate the same          o
to a co-trustee, is not applicable to the public charitable
Trust. [Para 21] [861-E]

     Thayarammal v. Kanakammal & Ors. (2005) 1 SCC
     457: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 734 - relied on.                E

       3. The Joint Charity Commissioner has rightly
held that the guilt of respondent Nos. 2 to 9 are not proved
and has also held that they are negligent for only
delegating their powers and functions to the Managing F
Trustee, but the charges levelled against them are not
proved as they are not responsible for the alleged
transactions, therefore, there is no complicity on the
allegations made against them. The said conclusion of
the Commissioner is based on facts and evidence on G
record, therefore, he has rightly exonerated them from
the liability and has not imposed punishment u/s. 41 D of
the Act, in exercise of his power in a reasonable and fair
manner and therefore, the same cannot be said to be
arbitrary and unreasonable in nature. [Para 23) [864-E- H
HJ
848         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A       Sheikh Abdul Kayum & Ors. v. Mui/a Alibhai & Ors.
        (1963) 3 SCR      6 2 3; J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd.
        v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 172: 2004 (5)
        Suppl. SCR 648; D. Gopalaswami Mudaliar v.
        Subramanya Pillai &Anr. (1942) 1MLJ272; Lala Man
B       Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad & Ors. AIR (32) 1945 Privy
        Council 23 - distinguished.

                         Case Law Reference

c AIR (32) 1945                        distinguished. Para 10
      Privy Council 23

      (1963) 3 SCR 623                 distinguished. Para 13

      2004(5) Suppl. SCR 648           relied on.         Para 19
D
      2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 734          relied on.         Para 21

      (1942) 1 MLJ 272                 distinguished. Para 24

        CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
E 2819 of2015

             From the Judgment and Order dated 1.12.2010 of the
      Division bench of High Court of Bombay in Letters Patent
      Appeal No. 268 of 2010 in W. P. No. 9501 of 2009
 F
            V. Giri, Ajay Bhargava, Vanita Bhargava, Raj Patel, Nitin
      Mishra, (for Khaitan & Co.) for the appellant.

         Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Shankar Chillarge, AGA,
G Aniruddha P. Mayeee, Balaji Srinivasan, Mihir Mody, Sandeep
  Gupta, Tushar Gupta, Jesal Shah, (for KAshar & Co.), Prateek
  S., Ranjeeta Rohtagi, GauravAgrawal for the respondents.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

 H           V. GO PALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.
 CHARU KISHORMEHTA v. JOINTCHARITYCOMMR., 849
 GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

       2. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against A
the impugned judgment and order dated 01.12.2010 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in Letters Patent Appeal
No.268 of 2010 (for short "LPA") in Writ Petition No. 9501 of
2009, whereby the High Court dismissed the LPA filed by the
appellant and upheld the judgment and order dated 02.03.2010 B
passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court.

        3. For the purpose of ·considering the rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties in this appeal and
with a view to find out whether this Court is required to interfere C
with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, the
necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:

        The appellant herein is the permanent trustee of the
Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust (for short "the Trust") which o
is a public registered Trust in accordance with the terms of the
registered Trust Deed and is governed under the provisions
of the Bombay Public TrustAct, 1950 (for short "the Act"). The
respondent nos.2 to 9 are the trustees of the aforesaid Trust
along with the now deceased Vijay Mehta, who was the E
Managing Trustee of the Trust during the relevant period of
time. The case of the appellant is that respondent Nos.2 to 9
have allegedly continuously neglected their duties and have
committed malfeasance by acting in breach of trust with respect
to the Trust properties. They have also misappropriated and F
improperly dealt with the properties of the Trust from the year
2001 to 2006. It has been further alleged by the appellant that
they have also squandereq the Trust money to the tune of crores
of rupees and have committed serious acts of malfeasance.
                                                                   G
      4. The appellant on coming to know of this fact in the
year 2006, filed an application, being Application No. 17 of
2006 under Section 41 D of the Act before the Joint Charity
Commissioner (for short "JCC"), making various allegations
against the aforesaid respondent Nos.2 to 9 including the H
850       SUPREMECOURTREPORTS                     [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A deceased Vijay Mehta and alleged that they are liable for
  dismissal from their Trusteeship of the Trust for their acts of
  nonfeasance and malfeasance, inter alia, contending that they
  have abdicated their functions and duties as provided under
  the provision of Section 36A of the Act, after their acceptance
B as trustees in the said Trust as provided under Sections 46
  and 47 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, which is applicable to the
  fact situation of the present case.

         On the basis of the said application, the JCC, framed
C 8 grave and serious charges jointly against the respondent
  Nos. 2 to 9 (original respondent nos. 1to8) and the deceased
  Vijay Mehta (the original respondent no.9).

          5. The JCC vide its order dated 25.9.2009, after
D affording opportunity to the parties in the present case,
  recorded its findings on the charges and held that the charges
  against respondent Nos. 2 to 9 except charge No. 4 which
  was against the deceased Vijay Mehta have been proved. The
  JCC however, dismissed the application against the
E respondent Nos. 2 to 9 and exonerated them by holding that
  they are only negligent in putting blind faith in delegating their
  powers and duties to be performed as trustees of the Trust in
  favour of the deceased Vijay Mehta, the Managing Trustee of
  the Trust. Therefore, the application against them was
F dismissed by him. The appellant herein being aggrieved by
  the said findings and reasons recorded by the JCC filed writ
  petition No. 9501 of 2009 before the learned single Judge of
  the High Court, whereby the High Court vide its order dated
  2.3.2010 dismissed the writ petition.
G
         6. Thereafter, the appellant filed LPA No.268 of 2010
  before the High Court, which was also dismissed by the
  Division Bench on the basis of the findings recorded by the
  learned single Judge and held that the charges framed against
H the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 by the JCC were established.
  CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 851
  GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

 However, as there was no evidence against respondent Nos.            A
 2 to 9 to hold them responsible for the transactions from the
 year 2001 to 2006, except on charge No.4, it has held that
 there is culpability of the deceased Vijay Mehta and further,
 the JCC has held that the charges against respondent Nos. 2·
 to 9 in delegating their powers and functions to the deceased        B
 Vijay Mehta as per clauses 9 and 11 (h) of the Trust Deed vide
·the Resolution of the Trust dated 30.8.2001 stood established
 and proved against them but they cannot be held guilty for the
 same as the appellant herself was a signatory to the above
 Resolution. The Division Bench of the High Court vide order          C
 dated 1.12.2010 declined to interfere with the order dated
 2.3.2010 passed by the learned single Judge and found that
 the same is justified after considering that the appellant herself
 was a party to the above mentioned Resolution that has
                                                                      0
 appointed the deceased Vijay Mehta as the Managing Trustee
 of the Trust. Further, no steps were taken for the cancellation
 of the Resolution by her as she did not even enter into the
 witness box before the JCC to justify her conduct that she is
 not a signatory to the Resolution wherein the deceased Vijay         E
 Mehta was appointed as the Managing Trustee by other
 Trustees who are respondent nos.2 to 9 in the present appeal.
 Further, the High Court held that the appellant did not object to
 his functioning as a Managing Trustee at the time when all the
 powers were being delegated to him and found that the petition       F
 was not seriously contested before the learned single Judge
 and rejected the appeal of the appellant.

       7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of the
Division Bench of the High Court, the present appeal is filed G
by the appellant with a prayer to set aside the judgments and
orders of the JCC and the High Court by quashing the same
and requested to pass such orders as this Court may deem fit
and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case by urging
various facts and legal contentions.                            H
852         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A         8. Mr. V. Giri, the learned senior counsel on behalf of
  the appellant has contended that the appellant was not present
  in any of the meetings during the relevant period, i.e. 30.3.2002
  and 1.4.2007 and in particular the meetings held on 30.8.2001
  and 19.7.2002 which fact has been deposed by Mr. Kishor K.
B Mehta (the original respondent No.1 Obefore the JCC), the
  husband of the appellant in the proceedings before the JCC.
  The JCC however, has erroneously exonerated respondent
  Nos. 2 to 9 and has imposed punishment for the removal of
  the deceased Vijay Mehta only, in exercise of its discretionary
C power under the provision of Section 41 D of the Act even
  though respondent Nos. 2 to 9 were also found guilty of
  nonfeasance and misfeasance charges in respect of the Trust
  properties. Therefore, the exercise of the discretionary power
  under the provision of Section 41 D of the Act by the JCC is
0
  erroneous in law as he has failed to impose any penalty against
  them as provided under the above provision of the Act.

              9. Further, it is contended by the learned senior counsel
      for the appellant that the appointment of the deceased Vijay
 E    Mehta as the Managing Trustee of the Trust on behalf of
      respondent nos. 2 to 9 cannot be construed as the abdication
      of the core functions of the Trust as the trustees have to
      prudentially manage the affairs of the Trust in such a manner
 F    as a man of ordinary prudence would do. He has placed strong
      reliance upon Section 36A of the Act in support of the above
      legal contentions and has further contended that the provision
      under Section 15 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, which provision
      reiterates that a trustee is bound to deal with the Trust
G     properties as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would
      deal with such property, as if it were his own. Sections 46 and
      47 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882, state thatthe trustee cannot
      renounce his office that requires him to discharge his duties
      and functions and he cannot delegate the same to a co-trustee
 H    unless the instrument of trust so provides.
  CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 853
  GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

 Therefore, it is contended by the learned senior counsel that    A
 non exercise of the discretionary powers by the JCC properly
 and not imposing penalty as provided under Section 41 D of
 the Act upon the respondent nos. 2 to 9 is erroneous in law
.which order of him has been erroneously approved by the
 High Court in the impugned judgment and order and therefore,     B
 the learned senior counsel for the appellant has prayed for
 setting aside the same. Further, during the course of
 submission, the learned senior counsel had produced an
 affidavit dated 06.01.2015 on behalf of the appellant, wherein
 the Minutes Book of the Trust, for the period 2000-2007 was      C
 produced before this Court in support of his contention, the
 said Minutes Book is produced by him to highlight the facts
 that if they are read as they stand, the same would
 unequivocally and predominantly demonstrate that the original
                                                                  0
 respondent Nos. 1 to 8 before the JCC were positively aware
 about the maia fide acts of the deceased Managing Trustee
 Vijay Mehta for which he had been dismissed from the
 trusteeship of the Trust.

        10. Further, the Minutes of the Meetings of the Trust     E
during the relevant period would point out that all the major
decisions of the deceased Vijay Mehta were conveyed by him
to the other trustees and the findings recorded by the JCC on
this aspect in his judgment and order are enough to show that     F
the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 in the present case and other
trustees were very much aware of the various transactions and
functions of the Trust. In these circumstances, the JCC could
not have exonerated respondent Nos. 2 to 9 by holding that
they were unaware of the misdeeds of the deceased Vijay           G
Mehta in the affairs of the Trust as they could have interfered
and taken corrective steps to save the Trust from any further
losses. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has placed
strong reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in the
case of Lala Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad & Ors. 1 in            H
' AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 23
854       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A support of his legal contention to show that the law does not
  permit delegation of the powers and functions by the Trustee
  in favour of another Trustee except in cases of necessity or
  with the consent of the beneficiary or the authority of the Trust
  Deed itself and also to show that there is delegation of some
B functions only. However, the delegation of all functions and all
  powers is nothing short of the abdication of the same in favour
  of a new body of men and also to further show that the act of
  one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee
  may be regarded as an act of both. Therefore, the non exercise
C of his discretionary powers and the non imposition of penalty
  by the JCC on respondent nos. 2 to 9 as provided under
  Section 41 D of the Act is erroneous in law which has further
  been erroneously upheld by the High Court in the impugned
D judgment and order.

         11. On the other hand, it has been contended by Dr.
  Rajeev Dhawan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
  respondent nos. 2 to 9 that both the JCC as well as the High
  Court took into consideration the fact that they cannot be held
E responsible because they had completely delegated their
  powers and functions to the deceased Vijay Mehta and
  therefore, they are not responsible for any acts of omission
  and commission committed by the Managing Trustee and
F hence no action could be taken against them under the provision
  of Section 41 D of the Act by the JCC.

         12. He has further vehemently sought to justify the
  findings and reasons recorded in the judgment and order in
  not imposing penalty upon them by the JCC which has been
G concurred with by the High Court based on clauses 9 and 11 (h}
  of the Trust Deed which permit the trustees of the Trust to
  delegate their powers and duties to the Managing Trustee as
  has been delegated by respondent nos. 2 to 9 in favour of the
H deceased Vijay Mehta, who was the Managing Trustee of the
    CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 855
    GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

 Trust, by passing the Resolution of the Trust dated 30.8.2001, A
 to which Resolution, the appellant is also the signatory. He has
 also placed strong reliance upon clauses 9 and 11 (h) of the
 Trust Deed, which enables the Trustees to delegate their
 powers and duties in favour of another trustee.
                                                                  B
 13.     The learned senior counsel also placed reliance upon
 the decision of this Court in Sheikh Abdul Kayum & Ors. v.
 Mui/a Alibhai & Ors. 2 to substantiate his legal submission
 that the aforesaid clause of the Trust Deed enables respondent
 nos. 2 to 9 to delegate their powers and duties to the Managing C
 Trustee of the Trust. Further, he has submitted that as is clear
from the minutes of the Resolution of the Trust held on
 30.8.2001, the appellant was present in the meeting of the
Resolution. On the basis of the same, the JCC has rightly held
that the appellant was present in the meeting and the Resolution D
was valid. He has further placed reliance upon the findings
recorded by the JCC and the High Court in the impugned
judgment and orders wherein they have held that the
delegation of powers and duties by respondent nos. 2 to 9 in
favour of the deceased Vijay Mehta is proper and non E
imposition of punishment upon them by both the JCC and the
High Court for the reason that their culpability on the charges
has not been proved by the appellant and therefore, it is urged
by him that they are legal and valid and the same cannot be F
interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction.

        14. The learned senior counsel for the respondent nos.
2 to 9 has also placed strong reliance on the findings of the
JCC in his judgment and order and upon the provisions of
Section 41 D of the Act, contending that the JCC has rightly G
exercised his discretionary power in not imposing penalty upon
respondent nos. 2 to 9, which has also been noted by the High
Court stating that the findings recorded by the JCC against
2   (1963) 3 SCR 623
                                                                H
856        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A the said respondents did not warrant interference by the High
  Court to impose penalty as provided under Section 41 D of
  the Act. Alternatively, he has also submitted that the charges
  made against the above respondents do not warrant exercise
  of power by the JCC under Section 41 D of the Act to impose
B penalty upon the above respondents, as the said provisions
  would have serious consequence by imposing punishment
   upon the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 and therefore, the same shall
   not be strictly adhered to.

 C         15. Further it has been contended by him that the
   appellant was also one of the trustees of the Trust at the meeting
   on 30.8.2001, who had also delegated her powers and
   functions in favour of the Managing Trustee and she did not
   even enter into the witness box before the JCC to refute her
 D participation in the meeting and her signature on the Resolution
   passed on the date referred to above, wherein she has
   delegated her powers and functions in favour of the deceased
   Vijay Mehta. Further, she did not produce the Trust records
   when asked by the JCC to do so, for this reason alone the
 E JCC should have rejected the application of the appellant filed
   against respondent nos. 2 to 9.

           16. It is further vehemently contended by the learned
   senior counsel for the above respondents that the appellant
 F has indulged in the abuse of process of the Authority of the
   JCC by filing a complaint before him when she herseif was
   complicit in the delegation of powers and functions to the
   deceased Vijay Mehta. Thus, she cannot contend that the
   delegation of powers and duties to the said Vijay Mehta by
 G the trustees-respondent nos. 2 to 9, vide the Resolution of the
   Trust dated 30.8.2001 is an invalid delegation. Therefore, the
   learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the
   view of the JCC which has been rightly concurred with by the
 H High Court is legal and valid. Hence, no substantial question
  CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 857
  GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

of law is involved in this case for the consideration and A
interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
against the impugned judgment and order. The other learned
counsels on behalf of the other respondents have also adopted
the submission of the learned senior counsel who has argued
on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 9.                             B

        17. With reference to the abovementioned rival legal
contentions urged on behalf of the parties, we have examined
the impugned judgements and orders of the JCC as well as
the High Court to find out whether any substantial question of C
law would arise in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. After careful examination of the documents produced
by the appellant before this Court and on a careful perusal of
the judgments and orders of the JCC and the High Court, we
are of the view that no substantial question of law would arise . D
in this case as there is no miscarriage of justice for our
interference. In support of the above said conclusions arrived
at by us, we record our reasons as hereunder:-

        It is an undisputed fact that the Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta E
Medical Trust is a public registered Trust under the provisions
of the Act. The clauses 9 and 11(h) of the Trust Deed of the
Trust which are extracted below provide for the delegation of
the powers and functions by the trustees of the Trust by
appointing one or more of the existing Trustees from among F
themselves to discharge all such powers and functions of the
trustees of the Trust as they may deem fit and proper. The
relevant clauses of the Trust Deed read thus:-

  "9. The trustees forthetime being of these presents may          G
  appoint one or more of the trustees from among them as
  the Managing Trustee or Managing Trustees, with all or
  such of the powers and authorities of the Trustees as the
  Trustees may think fit, and may from time to time withdraw
                                                                   H
858       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A      any such powers and authorities.

       11. For the accomplishment of the Trustees of these
       presents and without prejudice to the generality of any
       powers hereby or by law conferred or implied or vested
B      in the Trustees the following powers and authorities are
       hereby expressly conferred on the Trustees, that is to say


          (h).To delegate by Power of Authority or otherwise to
c         any Trustee or Trustees or other persons whomsoever
          any power implied by law or conferred by statute or
          vested in the Trustees by these presents but the
          Trustees shall not be held liable or responsible for the
          acts or defaults of any persons or person but only for
D         their own respective acts and defaults;"

          18. The findings of the JGC are based on the pleadings
   and the material evidence produced on record by the parties
   and the Resolution dated 30.8.2001, wherein the trustees,
 E respondent nos.2 to 9 including the appellant of the Trust had
   delegated their powers and functions to the deceased Vijay
   Mehta to manage the affairs of the trust. The relevant
   paragraphs 1to4 and 9 of the Resolution dated 30.08.2001
   regarding the delegation of powers given to the delegatee
 F deceased Vijay Mehta read thus:-

       "Resolved that Shri Vijay K. Mehta be and is hereby
       appointed as Managing Trustee of the Trust with absolute
       and sole powers and authority in respect of the
 G     management of the Trust and all the activities of the Trust
       subject to provisions of the law applicable to a Charitable
       Trust including the following :-
       1. To manage the affairs of Lilavati Hospital & Research
       Centre, Mumbai in all respects viz. Financial, Technical,
 H
       Administrative and Management of the Hospital.
  CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 859
  GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOV:DA, J.]

   2. To manage the affairs of Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta             A
   Charitable Hospital, Palanpur in all respects viz.
   Financial, Technical Administrative and Management of
   the Hospital.

   3. To appoint and authorise any agency and/or bankers           B
   and/or any executives to execute the functions and/or any
   work of the activities of the Trust and to appoint any
   Trustees to execute any agreements, documents or any
   deeds on behalf of the Trust.
                                                                   c
   4. To accept donations of money and/or property
   movable or immovable on such terms and conditions as
   the Trustees may think fit not being inconsistent with these
   presents of the Trust hereby established. No donation
   however, will be accepted with a condition requiring            o
   change in the name of the Trust and its present activities.

         xxx              xxx             xxx
   9. To give donations or subscriptions out of the Trust
   Fund or income thereof to such public charitable                E
   institutions funds for their all or any of the objects or
   purposes."

        19. Thus, a careful perusal of the clauses 9 and 11 (h)
of the Trust deed would clearly go to show that there is ample F
scope for such delegation of powers and functions of the
Trustees to another Trustee or Trustees of the Trust to act on
their behalf. In support of the same, the learned senior counsel
on behalf of the respondents has rightly placed reliance upon
ihe judgment of this Court in the case of J.P. Srivastava & G
Sons (P) Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. 3, which reads thus:-

   "29. Therefore although as a rule, trustees must execute
   the duties of their office jointly, this general principle is
                                                                   H
' (2005) 1 sec 112
860        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


A      subject to the following exceptions when one trustee may
       act for all ( 1) where the trust deed allows the trusts to be
       executed by one or more or by a majority of trustees; (2)
       where there is express sanction or approval of the act by
       the co-trustees; (3) where the delegation of power is
 B     necessary; (4) where the beneficiaries competent to
       contract consent to the delegation; (5) where the
       delegation to a co-trustee is in the regular course of the
       business; (6) where the co-trustee merely gives effect to
       a decision taken by the trustees jointly."
 c
                                   (emphasis laid by this Court)

            20. The JCC has rightly recorded his finding of fact on
   the basis of the Resolution dated 30.8.2001 of the Trust, holding
 o that the appellant was also one of the signatories to the said
    Resolution and the learned senior counsel on behalf of
    respondent nos. 2 to 9 has rightly pointed out to us that the
   appellant was present in the meeting on 30.8.2001 as is clear
   from the Minutes of the Meeting, which fact has also been
 E .recorded by the JCC in his order dated 25.9.2009. The fact
    that the signature of the appellant in the Resolution is seriously
    disputed before this Court, cannot be accepted by us in view
    of the finding of fact recorded by the JCC based on record
    which has been rightly concurred with by the High Court and
 F the said finding cannot be said to be erroneous in this appeal
    for the reason that the appellant did not enter into the witness
    box before the JCC to refute the correctness of her signature
    and the Minutes Book of the Resolution. Further, the husband
    of the appellant, original respondent No.10 before the JCC
 G had entered into the witness box, to support the charges made
    by the appellant against the respondent nos. 2 to 9, however,
     he has not deposed any other evidence except filing affidavit
     evidence before the JCC. The Minutes Book of the Trust as
 H well as the Resolution from the year 2000 to 2007 and the
      CHARU KISHORMEHTA v. JOINTCHARITYCOMMR., 861
    · GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

     additional compilation paper book produced in this case are        A
     not taken on record by this Court as the same have been rightly
     opposed by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, the learned senior counsel,
     on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 contending that the
     same had not been placed as evidence on record before the
    JCC and therefore, the same cannot be looked into in this           B
     appeal. By a bare perusal of the Minutes Book of the
     Resolution, wherein the Resolution of the Trust dated 30.8.2001
    was recorded, the JCC has held on the facts and evidence on
     record that there was mismanagement of Trust by the
    Managing Trustee, deceased Vijay Mehta. Further, it is pointed      C
    out by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondent
    Nos. 2 to 9 that Mr. Kishor Mehta, the original respondent No.10
    before the JCC, had no knowledge of the transactions in
    respect of which charges have been framed against them as
                                                                        0
    the financial transactions were handled solely by deceased
    Vijay Mehta.

            21. Further, the reliance placed upon Sections 46 and
    47 of the Act of 1882, by the learned senior counsel on behalf
    of the appellant is not applicable to the public charitable Trust E
    as held by this Court in the case of Thayarammal v.
    Kanakammal &Ors. 4, which reads thus:-

      "15. The contents of the stone inscription clearly indicate
      that the owner has dedicated the property for use as              F
      "Dharamchatra" meaning a resting place for the travellers
      and pilgrims visiting the Thyagaraja Temple. Such a
      dedication in the strict legal sense is neither a "gift" as
      understood in the Transfer of Property Act which requires
      an acceptance by the donee of the property donated nor            G
      is it a "trust". The Indian Trusts Act as clear by its preamble
      and contents is applicable only to private trusts and not
      to public trusts. A dedication by a Hindu for religious or
'    (2005) 1 sec 457                                                   H
862           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 5 S.C.R.


 A         charitable purposes is neither a "gift" nor a "trust" in the
           strict legal sense .... "

          Therefore, the delegation of all the powers and functions
   by respondent nos. 2 to 9 and also the appellant in favour of
 B the Managing Trustee of the Trust deceased Vijay Mehta, is
   permissible in law as the instrument of the Trust provides for
   that.

               22. The findings of facts are recorded in the judgment
 c       and order by the JCC at para 255 which reads thus:-

           "255. In the application, allegations are made against all
           the trustees. However, specific allegations with regard
           to all the charges are against only respondent No.9. The
           tenor of paragraph numbers 10,27, 2 etc. of the
 D
           application is that he is mismanaging the affairs of the
           trust. He is trying to carry out the activities of the trust
            single handedly. Names of Mr. Dushyant Mehta and Mr.
            Suresh Motwani are repeatedly mentioned as
 E          associates, or cohorts of respondent No.9. The
            allegations against rest of the trustees are that of
            collusions and connivance. But the allegations are
            general in nature. They are vague. No specific allegations
            are levelled against the respondent Nos. 1to8."
  F
                 The typed copy of the order of the JCC was produced
         in this case is not a correct one. The learned senior counsel
         for the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 has produced the certified copy
         of the order of the JCC, which reads thus:
  G         "265. To sum, I hold that the charges 1 to 8 are established
            against respondent No.9. However, there is no evidence
            against respondent Nos.1 to 8 to hold them responsible
            for the charged transaction."

     H           By a careful reading of the above extracted paragraphs
 CHARU KISHOR MEHTA v. JOINT CHARITY COMMR., 863
 GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

from the order of the JCC makes it clear that no complicity is A
proved against respondent Nos. 2 to 9, for the reason that the
JCC found that there is no evidence against them to hold them
responsible for the charged transaction, which means that the
JCC has held that the culpability against respondent Nos. 2 to
9 are not established. Further, the JCC has rightly exercised B
 his discretionary power under Section 41 D of the Act in a
 responsible way and not in an arbitrary manner, as could be
 seen from the reading of paragraphs 261 and 262 of his finding ·
 which read thus:-
                                                                  c
   "261. To conclude, I do not find anything against
   respondent Nos. 1 to 8 to connect them directly with the
   alleged transactions. The respondents No. 2,3,4 and 7
   admittedly joined board of trustees much later i.e. in the
   year 2004. It would be wrong to blame them for the acts        D
   done in past, before they joined as trustees.

   262. These respondents may be negligent in putting blind
   faith in respondent No.9. It was wrong to give free hand
   trust affairs to him. They were over dependent on              E
   respondent No.9. Probably the facts that he is the eldest
   member of Mehta family, and since he took over as the
    Managing Trustee, the hospital earned both fortune and
   fame might have weighed much in their minds, for which
   they put total faith and reliance on him. They are certainly   F
   to be criticized for that. However, theiroverdependence
    on respondent No.9, in action, negligence and lack of
    interest, would not warrant their dismissal."

        The said findings and observations of the JCC are G
 affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment,
 which reads thus:-

    ".... The Joint Charity Commission has given reasons for
    making the order for removal of respondent No.9 only.         H
 864        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 5 S.C.R.


 A      The reasons given by the Joint Charity Commissioner
        can by no stretch of imagination be said to be perverse
        or impossible. In our opinion, therefore considering that
       the order is within the jurisdiction of the Joint Charity
        Commissioner and the reasons given by him for making
 B     the order are also possible and plausible reasons. The
       learned Single Judge was justified in not interfering with
       the order. We have also been informed that when the
       learned Single Judge was considering the validity of the
       order in the Writ Petition, the finding recorded in the order
 c     against respondent No.9 were stayed in the appeal filed
       against that order by him before the Competent Court."

              23. Thus, in view of the fact that the appellant did not
      enter into the witness box and also the fact that similar charges
 D as levelled against the respondent nos. 2 to 9 were also
     pending against her before the JCC for being the signatory to
     the Resolution dated 30.8.2001 in delegating her powers and
     functions to the deceased Vijay Mehta, the JCC should not
     have accepted the evidence of the original respondent No.10
 E before the JCC and recorded the findings on charges in his
    order. Further, he has rightly held that the guilt of respondent
     Nos. 2 to 9 are not proved and has also held that they are
    negligent for only delegating their powers and functions to the
F Managing Trustee, deceased Vijay Mehta but the charges
    levelled against them are not proved as they are not responsible
   for the alleged transactions, therefore, there is no complicity
   on the allegations made against them. The said conclusion of
   the JCC is based on facts and evidence on record, therefore,
G he has rightly exonerated them from the liability and has not
   imposed punishment under Section 41 D of the Act, upon
   respondent nos. 2 to 9, in exercise of his power in a reasonable
   and fair manner and therefore, the same cannot be said to be
   arbitrary and unreasonable in nature. Therefore, the High Court
H has rightly concurred with the findings of the JCC in exonerating - -
    CHARU KISHORMEHTA v. JOINTCHARITYCOMMR., 865
    GREATER BOMBAY REGION [V. GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

the respondent nos. 2 to 9 from the charges levelled against A
them by passing a well reasoned judgment and order.

        24.     The cases relied upon by the learned senior
counsel for the appellant, i.e. Sheikh Abdul Kayum & Ors. v.
Mui/a Alibhai & Ors.(supra}, J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) B
Ltd. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd.(supra) and D. Gopalaswami
Mudaliar v. Subrainanya Pillai & Anr. 5, have no relevance
to the fact situation of the present case, as they do not support
the case of the appellant The learned senior counsel for the
appellant has strongly placed reliance on the case of Lala Man C
Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad & Ors.(supra), the relevant
extract of the judgment of the Privy Council reads thus:-

     "In the case of co-trustees the office is a joint one. Where
     the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees,      o
     they all form as it were but one collective trustee, and
     therefore must execute the duties of the office in their
     joint capacity. It is not uncommon to hear one of several
     trustees spoken of as the acting trustee, but the Court
     knows no such distinction; all who accept the office are       E
     in the eyes of the law] acting trustees. If anyone refuse or
     be incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to
     proceed without him, but the administration of the trust
     must in that case devolve upon the Court. However, the
     act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of      F
     a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But
     such sanction or approval must be strictly proved."

However, the said decision cannot be applied to the fact
situation of this case in view of the facts and the evidence G
placed on record.

      25. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the
impugned judgment and orders of the High Court and the order
5   (1942) 1 MLJ 272                                                H
    866          SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2015] 5 S.C.R.


    A of the JCC are legal and valid and the same cannot be
.     interfered with by this Court in exercise of its appellate
      juri~diction. The appeal is dismissed.

            26. Since the appeal against the findings and penalties
    s imposed against the deceased Vijay Mehta is pending before
      the Civil Court which is being pursued by his legal
      representatives and therefore, the Civil Court is required to
      examine the said case independently without being influenced
      by the observations and reasons assigned by us in this
    C judgment. We would like to make it very clear that the said
      appeal is required to be examined in the backdrop of the legal
      grounds and contentions urged therein independently and
      dispose the same in accordance with law.

    D     Kalpana K. Tripathy                        Appeal dismissed.