CHANDRA BABU @ MOSESversusSTATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ORS.

                         [2015] 6 S.C.R. 1002


A                   CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES
                                   v.
      STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ORS.
                  (Criminal Appeal No.866 of 2015)
B
                            JULY 07, 2015
          [DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
           Code of Criminal Procedure, 19 73: s. 173(8) - Power
c   of Magistrate to forward the complaint for further investigation
    - Magistrate had held that the Inspector, Crime branch had
    conducted investigation in a biased manner and the final
    report of the Inspector was not acceptable and directed the
    Additional Director General of Police to confer the power to
D   Inspector, CBCID to investigate the case - High Court held
    that there were material discrepancies in the evidence
    brought on record and, therefore, set aside the order of
    Magistrate - On appeal, held: High Court fell into error in its
    appreciation of the order passed by the Magistrate - The
E   order, in fact, presents that the Magistrate was actually
    inclined to direct further investigation but because he chose
    another agency, he used the word "reinvestigation" -
    Therefore, that part of the order is set aside and it is directed
    that the investigating agency that had investigated shall carry
F   on the further investigation and such investigation shall be
    supervised by the concerned Superintendent of Police -After
    the further investigation, the report shall be submitted before
    the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall deal with the same
G   in accordance with law- Investigation.
         Jurisdiction: Revisional jurisdiction - Scope of.
         Disposing of the appeal, the Court

         HELD: 1. The Single Judge has dwelled upon in
H
                                 1002
     CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                      1003
              INSPECTOR OF POLICE

great detail on the statements of the witnesses to arrive        A
at the conclusion that there are remarkable
discrepancies with regard to the facts and there is
nothing wrong with the investigation. In fact, he has
noted certain facts and deduced certain conclusions,
which, are beyond the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.       B
It is well settled in law that inherent as well as revisional
jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. Normally, a
revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question
of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved,
then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in       C
a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to
be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse
of power by the Court. The High Court has adverted to
the facts not to see the perversity of approach, or to see
                                                                 0
that justice is done, but analysed it from an angle as if it
is exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the
High Court's conclusion with regard to the factual score
is unsustalnable. [Paras 12 and 13) [1009-G-H; 1010-A-
~                                                                E
    Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander 2012 (7) SCR 988 :
    (2012) 9 sec 460 - relied on.

       2. A Magistrate can disagree with the police report
and take cognizance and issue process and summons F
to the accused. Thus, the Magistrate has the jurisdiction
to ignore the opinion expressed by the investigating
officer and independently apply his mind to the facts
that have emerged from the investigation. The High Court
fell into error in its appreciation of the order pass.ed by G
the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The Magistrate could not
have di.rected another investigating agency to
Investigate as that would not be within the sphere of
further investigation and, in any case, he does not have H
the jurisdiction to direct reinvestigation by another
1004         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2015] 6 S.C.R.


 A     agency. [Paras 16, 19, 21] [1012-G; 1018-A-B; 1019-G]

         Hasanbhai Valibhai Quareshi vs State of Gujarat am:j
         Ors. 2004 (3) SCR 762: (2004) 5 sec 347; Hemant
         Dhasmana vs CBI and Anr. 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 646:
 B       (2001) 7 sec 536; Sonalai Soni VS State of Chattisgam
         and Ors. 2005 Crl. L.J.4461; Chattishgarh); Uma
         Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar 2010 (10) SCR 1132:
         (2010) 9 SCC 479; Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash
         2013 (6) SCR 496: (2013) 9 SCC 199; Dharam Pal v.
 C       State of Haryana (2014) 3 SCC 306; Kishun Singh v.
         State of Bihar 1993 (1) SCR 31: (1993) 2 sec 16;
         Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police 1985 (3) SCR
         942: (1985)2SCC537; VinayTyagiv. lrshadAli2012
         (13) SCR 1005: (2013) 5 sec 762- referred to.
 D
                         Case Law Reference
       2004 (3) SCR 762                  Referred to.   Para5
       2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 646           Referred to.   Para 5
       2005 Crl. L.J.4461 (Chattishgarh) Referred to.   Para 7
 E     2012 (7) SCR 988                  Relied on.     Para 12
       2010 (10) SCR 1132                Referred to.   Para 14
       2013 (6) SCR 496                  Referred to.   Para 14
       (2014) 3 sec 306                  Referred to.   Para 15
       1993 (1) SCR 31                   Referred to.   Para 15
 F
       1985 (3) SCR 942                  Referred to.   Para 16
       2012 (13) SCR 1005                Referred to.   Para 18
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
       Appeal No. 866 of 2015.
G
            From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2011 in
       Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 790 of2011 of the Madurai
       Bench of Madras High Court.

            K. V. Vishwanathan, B. Ragunath, Mehul G. Gupta,
 H
 . CHANDRA BABU@ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                      1005
            INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Vijay Kumar for the Appellant.                                 A
      M. Yogesh Kanna, A. Santha Kumaran, Vanita C. Giri,
 S. Thananjayan for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                               B
      DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
       2. In this appeal, by special leave, the informant-
 appellant calls in question the defensibility of the order dated
 13.12.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High C
 Court of Judicature of Madras at Madurai in Criminal Revision
 No. 790/2011 whereby he has annulled the order dated
 2.9.2010 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
 Nagercoil directing further investigation in exercise of power
 under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure D
 (CrPC) and also directing the investigation to be carried out
 by C.B.C.l.D.; on the foundation that in the obtaining fact
 situation there are no exceptional circumstances for ordering
 re-investigatiqn.
                                                               E
         3. As the facts would unfurl, the appellant filed an FIR
  with the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kulasekaram Police Station,
  upon which Crime No. 119/2007 was registered u/s 147,
  148, 341, 324, 323 and 307 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) .
. The informant had alleged that on 05.06.2007 about 2 p.m., F
  Manikandan, Jegan, Murugan, Vijayan, Sunil and some
 .others attacked him with 'Vettu Kathi', knife and iron rod and
  in the said attack he sustained multiple injuries. The motive
  behind the assault, as per the FIR, was due to business
  rivalry that existed between the appellant and Manikandan, G
 as both are contractors. The Inspector of Police,
 Kulasekaram Police Station conducted the initial investigation
  and subsequently the case was transferred to the District
  Crime Branch Police, Kanyakumari and thereafter, the H
1006              SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2015] 6 S.C.R.


·A     Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch filed a final report
       before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Padmanabhapuram
       stating that the case was a mistake of fact. The learned
       Judicial Magistrate on intimation to the informant accepted
       the final report.
 B
              4. In the meantime, the appellant had filed a protest
   petition dated 5.1.2009 forming the subject matter of Crl.
   M.P. no. 1974/2009 on the file of the learned Judicial
   Magistrate praying therein to direct CBCID to re-open the
 C case and file a fresh report. However, as the final report had
   already been accepted before disposing the protest petition,
   the appellant preferred Crl. O.P. no. 1727/2009 before the
   Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court. The High Court
   called for the report from the Magistrate's Court and,
 D thereafter, set aside the order accepting the final report and
   directed the Magistrate to consider the final report along with
   the protest petition.

         5. The learned Magistrate vide order dated 29.07 .2009
 E dismissed the protest petition. It took note of the decisions
   in Hasanbhai Valibhai Quareshi vs State of Gujarat and
   Ors. 1 and Hemant Dhasmana vs CBI and Anr. 2 , and held
   that as the investigation officer had examined all the
   witnesses as averred by the informant and received the
 F evidence and as no new witnesses were cited to be
   examined, there was no justification for directing
   reinvestigation of the case. It further directed that the protest
   petition to be treated as a separate private complaint.

 G            6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant
       preferred Criminal Revision Petition, i.e., Crl. R.C. No. 458
       of 2009 in the High Court. Before the High Court, the
       appellant contended that the order of the Magistrate was
       based on the acceptance of the final report submitted by the
 H     1 (2004)   s sec 347
       2 (2001) 1    sec 536
   CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                       1007
     INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

police and the order did not reflect any application of mind A
on his part. It was further urged that the order was bereft of
discussion of the evidence gathered by the Investigating
Officer, and that apart there was total non-application of mind
either for acceptance or rejection of the statements of the
witnesses filed along with the final report. The High Court B
while setting aside the order of learned Magistrate observed
that the lower court fell into error by neither discussing the
material available, nor clearly spelling out the reasons and
shirked its duty by merely permitting the petitioner, therein,
to pursue his cause by way of private complaint. The learned C
Single Judge_,. accordingly, allowed the revision and
concluded thus:-

  "This Court has resisted from entering upon a
  discussion on the merits of the case or on the materials      D
  before it so as to avoid prejudice to either side. With
  the aim is to avoid prejudice and alleged bias, as rightly
  submitted by the learned senior counsel, it would be
  better that the reconsideration of the final report and
  also the materials towards arriving at a finding of           E
  whether the case is one calling for further proceedings
  against the accused or otherwise, be left to the judicial
  discretion of another Court. Accordingly, the Judicial
  Magistrate, Padmanabhapuram, is directed to forward
                                                                F
  all records pertaining to Crime no. 119 of 2007 on the
  file of the respondent police to the Court of the Chief
  Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil within a period of two
  weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
  The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagercoil is in turn           G
  directed to consider the 173 report as also the materials,
  hear both the public prosecutor and the de-facto
  complainant who has filed the protest petition and pass
  orders in accordance of law."
                                                                H
     7. After the remit, the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
1008            SUPREME COURT REPORTS            1201s1 s s.c:R.


 A Nagercoil, took up the case for further enquiry. The Court
   after hearing both the appellant and the Assistant Public
   Prosecutor came to the conclusion that the investigation by
   the Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch had been
   conducted in a biased manner and the said authority had
 B laboured hard to save the accused persons and hence, the
   final report submitted by the investigating officer was not
   acceptable. Thereafter, it took note of the judgments in
   Hemant Dhasmana (supra), Sona/ai Soni vs State of
   Chattisgarh and Ors. 3 , and Hasanbhai Valibhai Quareshi
 C (supra), and came to hold that in terms of the said judgments
   there is power under S. 173 (8) of CrPC to forward the
   complaint for further investigation and resultantly by order
   dated 02.09.2010 directed the Additional Director General
 D of Police, CBCID to confer the power on the Inspector,
   CBCID, Nagercoil to investigate the case in Crime no. 119/
   2007 and file a report.

         8. Being aggrieved by the said order, one of the
   accused, Jegan, filed Criminal Revision No. 790 of 2011.
 E The High Court, vide the impugned order, after discussing
   the evidence on record, came to hold that there were material
   discrepancies in the evidence brought on record and,
   therefore, in the present fact situation there were no
 F exceptional circumstances for ordering re-investigation, and
   that apart, the scheme of Section 173(8) CrPC only enables
   the investigating officer to request for further investigation.
   The High Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the Chief
   Judicial Magistrate and further observed that as the learned
 G Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 13.07 .2009 had directed
   that the protest petition was to be treated as a private
                                                                •
   complaint, the de-facto complainant still had an opportunity
   for presenting the case before the Court and no prejudice
   was caused to him.
 H     3   2005 Crl.L.J. 4461 (Chattlshgarh)
    CHANDRA BABU@ MOSES v: STATE THROUGH                         1009
      INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     9. We have heard Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned              A
senior counse.Jifor the appellant and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna,
learned counsel for the State and Mr. S. Thananjayan,
learned counsel for the respondent no.3.

       10. It is submitted by Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior B
counsel that the High Court has absolutely flawed by entering
into the merits of the case when the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate had only directed for reinvestigation by different
investigating agency. It is urged by him that if the order
passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate is read in entirety, it C
would convey that he in actuality has directed for further
investigation, but has used the expression "reinvestigation"
as it was directing investigation to be carried out by another
agency. It is his further submission that in view of the earlier
order passed by the High Court, the order impugned in this D
appeal is wholly unsustainable.

      11. Learned counsel for the private respondent no.3 in
supp.art of the decision of the High Court has submitted that
the learned Magistrate has no power for directing                 E
reinvestigation, and hence, the order passed by the High
Court is absolutely impregnable. It is also his submission
that when a protest petition is filed and it has been directed
to be treated as a private complaint, the appellant, in no
manner, is prejudiced and, therefore, there is no warrant for     F
interference in this appeal.

      12. First, we shall dwell upon the issue whether the
 High Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, should
 have adverted to the merits of the case in extenso. As the G
factual matrix would reveal, the learned Single Judge has
dwelled upon in great detail on the statements of the
witnesses to arrive at the conclusion that there are
remarkable discrepancies with regard to the facts and there
is nothing wrong with the investigation. In fact, he has noted H
1010        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 6 S.C.R.


 A certain facts and deduced certain conclusions, which, as we
   find, are beyond the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It is
   well settled in law that inherent as well as revisional
   jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. Normally, a
   revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of
 B law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it
   must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse
   finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so
   that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the
   Court. (see Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander).
 c
         13. Judging on the aforesaid premises, we have no
   shadow of doubt that the High Court has adverted to the
   facts not to see the perversity of approach, or to see that
   justice is done, but analysed it from an angle as if it is
 D exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the High
   Court's conclusion with regard to the factual score is
   unsustainable.

        14. Presently to the thrust of the matter, the controversy
 E before the learned Single Judge was basically two-fold,
   namely, whether the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could
   have directed for reinvestigation and secondly, whether it
   could have directed for reinvestigation by another
   investigating agency. To appreciate the said issues, it is
 F necessary to analyse the scheme of Section 190 of the CrPC.
   The said provision reads as follows:-

        "190.      Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.
        - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any
 G      Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the
        second class specially empowered in this behalf under
        sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence_

         (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute
 H       such offence.
       ' (2012) g sec 460
      CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                       1011
        INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.)

   (b)    upon a police report of such facts;                      A

   (c) upon information received from any person other
   than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that
   such offence has been committed.
                                                                   B
   (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any
   Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance
   under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within
   his competence to inquire into or try."

      In Uma Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar, a two-Judge C
Bench was considering the issue pertaining to the power of
the Magistrate under Section 190(1 )(b) of CrPC. The Court,
scanning the anatomy of the provision, opined that the
Magistrate is not bound to accept the final report filed by the D
investigating agency under Section 173(2) of the Code and
is entitled to issue process against an accused even though
exonerated by the said authorities. The principle stated by
the two-Judge Bench reads as follows:-

   "19 . ... even if the investigating authority is of the view    E
   that no case has been made out against an accused,
   the Magistrate can apply his mind independently to the
   materials contained in the police report and take
   cognizance thereupon in exercise of his powers under
                                                                   F
   Section 190(1)(b) CrPC."

    The said principle was followed by another two-Judge
Bench in Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash6 .

15.  In Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana 7 , the Constitution- G
Bench, while accepting the view in Kishun Singh v. State
of Bihar, has held thus:-
• (2010) 9 sec 479
• (2013) 9 sec 199
' (2014) 3 sec 305
                                                                   H
' (1993) 2 sec 16
1012      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 6 S.C.R.


 A     "35. In our view, the Magistrate has a role to play while
       committing the case to the Court of Session upon taking
       cognizance on the police report submitted before him
       under Section 173(2) CrPC. In the eventthe Magistrate
       disagrees with the police report, he has two choices.
 B     He may act on the basis of a protest petition that may
       be filed, or he may, while disagreeing with the police
       report, issue process and summon the accused.
       Thereafter, if on being satisfied that a case had been
       made out to proceed against the persons named in
 c     column 2 of the report, proceed to try the said persons
       or if he was satisfied that a case had been made out
       which was triable by the Court of Session, he may
       commit the case to the Court of Session to proceed
       further in the matter.
 D
       36. This brings us to the third question as to the
       procedure to be followed by the Magistrate if he was
       satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out to
       go to trial despite the final report submitted by the police.
 E     In such an event, if the Magistrate decided to proceed
       against the persons accused, he would have to proceed
       on the basis of the police report itself and either inquire
       into the matter or commit it to the Court of Session if
       the same was found to be triable by the Sessions
 F
       Court."

        16. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to
  reiterate the legal position that a Magistrate can disagree
  with the police report and take cognizance and issue process
G and summons to the accused. Thus, the Magistrate has the
  jurisdiction to ignore the opinion expressed by the
  investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the
  facts that have emerged from the investigation.

 H        17. Having stated thus, we may presently proceed to
"       CHANDRA BABU@ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                      1013
          INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    deal with the facet of law where the Magistrate disagrees A
    with the report and on applying his independent mind feels
    there has to be a further investigation and und.er that
    circumstance what he is precisely required to do. In this·
    regard, we may usefully refer to a notable passage from a
    three-Judge Bench decision in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. B
    of Police9 , which is to the following effect:-

      "4. Now, when the report forwarded by the officer in
      charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-
      section (2)(1) of Section 173 comes up for consideration     c
      by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may
      arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears
      to have been committed by a particular person or
      persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do
      one of three things: (1) he may accept the report and        D
      take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or
      (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the
      proceeding, or (3) he may direct further investigation
      under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the
      police to make a further report. The report may on the       E
      other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no
      offence appears to have been committed and where
      such a report has been made, the Magistrate again
      has an option to adopt one of three courses: (1) he
                                                                   F
      may accept the report and drop the proceeding, or (2)
      he may disagree with the report and taking the view
      that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further,
      take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or
      (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by        G
      the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. Where,
      in either of these two situations, the Magistrate decides
      to take cognizance of the offence and to issue process,
      the informant is not prejudicially affected nor is the
    ' (1985) 2 sec 537                                             H
1014      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 6 S.C.R.


 A     injured or in case of death, any relative of the deceased
       aggrieved, because cognizance of the offence is taken
       by the Magistrate and it is decided by the Magistrate
       that the case shall proceed. But if the Magistrate
       decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
 B     further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that
       though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
       some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
       against others mentioned in the first information report,
       the informant would certainly be prejudiced because
 c     the first information report lodged by him would have
       failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when
       the interest of the informant in prompt and effective
       action being taken on the first information report lodged
       by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained
 D
       in sub-section (2) of Section 154, sub-section (2) of
       Section 157 and sub-section (2)(it) of Section 173, it
       must be presumed that the informant would equally be
       interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes
 E     cognizance of the offence and issues process, because
       that would be culmination of the first information report
       lodged by him. There <?an, therefore, be no doubt that
       when, on a consideration of the report made by the
       officer in charge of a police station under sub-section
 F     (2)(1) of Section 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to
       take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the
       informant must be given an opportunity of being heard
       so that he can make his submissions to persuade the
       Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue
 G     process. We are accordingly ofthe view that in a case
       where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded
       under sub-section (2)(1) of Section 173 decides not to
       take cognizance of the offence and to drop the
       proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient
 H     ground for proceeding against some of the persons
      CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                       1015
        INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

      mentioned in the first information report, the Magistrate    A
     must give notice to the informant and provide him an
      opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of
     the report. It was urged before us on behalf of the
      respondents that if in such a case notice is required to
     be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary     B
     delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of
     the notice on the informant. But we do not think this
     can be regarded as a valid objection against the view
     we are taking, because in any case the action taken by
     the police on the first information report has to be          c
     communicated to the informant and a copy of the report
     has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2)(1) of
     Section 173 and if that be so, we do not see any reason
     why it should be difficult to serve notice of the
                                                                   D
     consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover,
     in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the
     informant cannot possibly provide any justification for
     depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard
     at the time when the report is considered by the              E
     Magistrate."

      18. Relying on the said paragraph, a two-Judge Bench
in Vinay Tyagi v. lrshad Ali1°, has opined thus:-

     "37. In some judgments of this Court, a view has been         F
     advanced, [amongst others in Reeta Nag v. State of
     WB 12 , Ram Naresh Prasadv. State of Jharkhand 11 and
     Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Admn.} 13] that a
     Magistrate cannot suo motu direct further investigation
     under Section 173(8) of the Code or direct                   G
     reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar
     contained in Section 167(2) of the. Code, and that a
10 (2013) s sec 762
11  (2009) 9 sec 129
12
    (2009) 11 sec 299
                                                                   H
13 (1997) 1 sec 361
    1016      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 6 S.C.R.


     A     Magistrate could direct filing of a charge-sheet where
           the police submits a report that no case had been made
           out for sending up an accused for trial. The gist of the
           view taken in these cases is that a Magistrate cannot
•          direct reinvestigation and cannot suo motu direct further
     B     investigation.

           38. However, having given our considered thought to
           the principles stated in these judgments, we are of the
           view that the Magistrate before whom a report under
     c     Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is empowered in
           law to direct "further investigation" and require the police
           to submit a further or a supplementary report. A three-
           Judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh has, in
           no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as
     D     afore noticed.

           39. The contrary view taken by the Court in Reeta Nag
           and Randhir Singh do not consider the view of this Court
           expressed in Bhagwant Singh. The decision of the
     E     Court in Bhagwant Singh in regard to the issue in hand
           cannot be termed as an obiter. The ambit and scope of
           the power of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173 of
           the Code was squarely debated before that Court and
           the three-Judge Bench concluded as aforenoticed.
     F     Similar views having been taken by different Benches
           of this Court while following Bhagwant Singh, are thus
           squarely in line with the doctrine of precedent. To some
           extent, the view expressed in Reeta Nag, Ram Naresh
           and Randhir Singh, besides being different on facts,
     G     would have to be examined in light of the principle of
           stare decisis."

           And eventually the Division Bench ruled:-

     H     40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and
 CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                         1017
   INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would state         A
the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a
Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section
173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code:

40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct                     B
"reinvestigation" or "fresh investigation" (de novo) in
the case initiated on the basis of a police report.

40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct "further
investigation" after filing of a police report in terms of      c
Section 173(6) of the Code.

40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 40.2 above is in
conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant
Singh case by a three-Judge Bench and thus in
                                                                D
conformity with the doctrine of precedent.

40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific
provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by
the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot
be construed so restrictively as to deprive the                 E
Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the
provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of
Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have
to be read into the language of Section 173(8).
                                                                F
40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must
receive a construction which would advance the cause
of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved.
It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided
power of further investigation to the police even after         G
filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the
court to the extent that even where the facts of the
case and the ends of justice demand, the court can
still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further
                                                                H
investigation which it could do on its own."
1018      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 6 S.C.R.


 A       19. We have reproduced the conclusion in extenso as
   we are disposed to think that the High Court has fallen into
   error in its appreciation of the order passed by the learned
   Chief Judicial Magistrate. It has to be construed in the light
   of the eventual direction. The order, in fact, as we perceive,
 B presents that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was really
   inclined to direct further investigation but because he had
   chosen another agency, he has used the word
   "reinvestigation". Needless to say, the power of the
   Magistrate to direct for further investigation has to be
 C cautiously used. In Vinay Tyagi (supra) it has been held:

       "The power of the Magistrate to direct "further
       investigation" is a significant power which has to be
       exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve
 D     the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and
       unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the
       investigating agency and the court in its supervisory
       capacity is required to ensure the same. Further
       investigation conducted under the orders of the court,
 E     including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its
       own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the
       filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary
       report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report.
       This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Sections
 F
       173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in
       terms of Section 173(8) of the Code."

       20. In the said case, the question arose, whether the
  Magistrate can direct for reinvestigation. The Court, while
G dealing with the said issue, has ruled that:-

       "At this stage, we may also state another well-settled
       canon of the criminal jurisprudence that the superior
       courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
H      Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to
   CHANDRA BABU @ MOSES v. STATE THROUGH                        1019
     INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

  direct "further investigation", "fresh" or "de novo" and       A
  even "reinvestigation". "Fresh", "de novo" and
  "reinvestigation" are synonymous expressions and their
  result in law would be the same. The superior courts
  are even vested with the power of transferring
  investigation from one agency to another, provided the         B
  ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is
  also a settled principle that this power has to be
  exercised by the superior courts very sparingly and with
  great circumspection."
                                                                 c
  And again:-

  "Whether the Magistrate should direct "further
  investigation" or not is again a matter which will depend
  upon the facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate         D
  or the higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct
  "further investigation" or "reinvestigation" as the case
  may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the
  Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the
  courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further,              E
  reinvestigation or even investigation de novo depending
  on the facts of a given case. It will be the specific order
  of the court that would determine the nature of
  investigation."
                                                                 F
      21. We respectfully concur with the said view. As we
have already indicated, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
has basically directed for further investigation. The said part
of the order cannot be found fault with, but an eloquent one,
he could not have directed another investigating agency to G
investigate as that would not be within the sphere of further
investigation and, in any case, he does not have the
jurisdiction to direct reinvestigation by another agency.
Therefore, that part of the order deserves to be lancinated
and accordingly it is directed that the investigating agency H
1020          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015) 6 S.C.R.


 A that had investigated shall carry on the further investigation
   and such investigation shall be supervised by the concerned
   Superintendent of Police. After the further investigation, the
   report shall be submitted before the learned Chief Judicial
   Magistrate who shall deal with the same in accordance with
 B law. We may hasten to add that we have not expressed any
   opinion relating to any of the factual aspects of the case.

             22. In view of the aforesaid analysis and conclusion,
       the order passed by the High Court is set aside except where
 C     it has held that the learned Magistrate could not have allowed
       another agency to investigate. We have clarified the position
       in the preceding paragraph.

             23. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
 D
       Devika Gujral                                Appeal disposed of.