Holding

The power under Article 311(2)(b) may be validly exercised when the authority, after recording reasons, is satisfied that a disciplinary enquiry is not reasonably practicable; such satisfaction is upheld if based on material evidence, as in Manchanda’s case, but not where the inference is unsupported, as in Singh’s case.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined two dismissals of police Sub‑Inspectors, Ajay Manchanda and Kuldip Singh, effected under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution without a departmental enquiry. In Manchanda's case, a Deputy Superintendent’s report concluded that the complainant and witnesses were terrorised and unwilling to testify, leading the Senior Superintendent to be satisfied that a regular enquiry was not reasonably practicable. The Court held that the authority’s recorded satisfaction and reasons satisfied the constitutional requirement, so the dismissal was valid. In Singh’s case, the only basis for the authority’s inference of terrorisation was the complainant’s letter indicating a compromise, which the Court found insufficient; consequently, the dismissal was set aside. The judgment reaffirmed that the power under Article 311(2)(b) may be exercised when the authority, after recording reasons, is satisfied that an enquiry is not reasonably practicable, but such satisfaction is subject to judicial review.

Issues considered

Whether dismissal of a civil servant under Article 311(2)(b) is valid when the authority is satisfied that a departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable due to alleged witness intimidation.
Whether the authority must record specific reasons for invoking clause (b) and whether such recording was complied with.
Scope of judicial review of the authority’s satisfaction under Article 311(2)(b).
Whether an inference of terrorisation can be drawn solely from a complainant’s statement of compromise.
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal erred in setting aside the dismissal orders.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)(b), s. Article 311(3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 420, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

Article 311Dismissal without enquiryDepartmental enquiryPolice extortionJudicial reviewWitness intimidationPublic policy

Judgment

A CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION,
UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH AND ORS.
v.
AJAY MANCHANDA ETC.

MARCH 26, 1996
B
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 A1ticle 311(2}-Second Proviso-Clause
(b).
c
Dismissalc-Dispensing with enquiry--l'olice Office1--Allegation of ex-
ortion-Enquiry by Deputy Superintendent of Police-Report confinning al-
legation and stating that complainant and witnesses were threatened and
terrorised by Police Officer--f'anic-stricken witnesses and complainant not
willing to pursue the matter--f'assing dismissal order in such circumstances
D dispensing with .enquirj-Held valid.
•
Police Officer-Extortionc-Complaint by Advocate-Enquiry by Super- -t-
intendent of Police-Report that Police Officer misused his official position
and extorted money-But no report of terrorising the witness or com-
' . .
E plainant-<::omplainant writing to Senior Superintendent of Police that in view
of compromise with Police Officer he does not wish to pursue the com-
plaint-SSP infening from such· writing. that complainant was terrorised by
Police Office,-,[nference held not justified-Dismissal of Police Officer
with~!li enquily held not valid-Service Law. ·

F Judicial Review

· Service Law-Civil servanrDismissal without regular departmelltal
enqui1y-Judicial review-Scope and extent of

The respondents A and K, both Sub-Inspectors of Police in the State
G of Punjab, were dismissed from service under clause (b) of Second Proviso
to Article 311(2) i.e. without regular departmental enquiry. The charge
against the former was that as an Investigation Officer in a case he had
extorted Rs. 50,000 from an accused and had further demanded the same
amount from him. The Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the
H enquiry reported that the complaintant and other witnesses were so ter-
918
CHANDIGARH ADMN., UNION TERRITORYv. A. MANCHANDA 919

rorised by threats given by A that they had expressed their inability to . A
pursue·the matter in the court of faw or in any other enquiry. against him
an'd ·to make any formal statement in this regard. On the basis of this
report the Senior Superintendent of Poiice was satisfied that in vie\\> of
inability of the witnesses to come forward i to depose against the delinqnent ~ ' . ,..
-~h ~ ~ -·~·

officer a regular departmental enquiry was uot reasonably prac"ticable. B
Conseque'!tly he passed the ~}~mi,ssal 0 rde~ i!' e~e~cise of the ~ow~r. under 1
Article 311(2)(b). The dismissal order was successfully challenged before
the Ad.;.inistrative T~ibu~al ~hlch.held th~t (i) •tth~"i~p~gned
. • . ""' . • '. f > ' ·...
' •
o~der
h,-,
doe~
.
not state.that A had given any threats .to any of t_he witnesses. or the
complaina~t;& .{nd (ii). mer~iy
4• .- ' ' •
becan~e '
a po'lice otf.~er
.,, ...
w~~ the ~ccuse!l, it J. . ' . ' .. _, -

cannot -·
be
r
presumed
. ...
that no.one
. •·
~·
will come. .
forward
. .. -
to depose
~.-·__·:
against him. C
It.also commented on the Senior Sup,erintendent of Police observing that
..
he "has taken,
- '·'
the ,, matter.
'' -· '
in• 'a very, casual
:
manner
. "' .- - "
;.without giving
. .
due. -
.
' ' • ._.. ; ' ,_ u '~·-
consideration and applying his dispassionate discretion in the issnance of·
the impugned
.
order. and- . coming 'to the ,
conclusioil to dispense-. ;,...witll"'the
'-. ,_ '. - .
regular en_quiry". 1 r ,,..,-•L a~ ... ~ t • , • •. '~""'.-.•. '""' • ,_ ~- D
:_.;.'~'1 .,,. "ll t•·
., ' ..• The charge against the other respondent K was .that he .had extorted
an ~mount of rupees :nine hundred _from- an. advocate on .the. ,pretext. ~f .a
minor.traffic violation. The .Snperintendent·of.·Police (headquarters) who
·conducted the·enquiry·reported that K had committed gross misuse of his
official position·_ and extorted money from an innoceiat· victim, .the _.cOm- E
plainant-Advocate, as a fine for violation of traffic regulation and misap· ·
'prcipriated ·a major pa<! of tlie amount to himself•. However, he did not
report that K had either terrorised the complainant or the witnesses. On
receiving the Enquiry ReporUhe Senior Superintendent of Police wrote to
;the complainant-Advocate .to meet.him in connection with enquiry,c but the F
··I ·fatter requested for an alternative date. However, in response to second
letter of SSP the complainant-Advocate ·replied that .since a :compromise
had been effected between him and K by respectable persons, he does.not
·Wish to pursue· the complaint. From this second Jetter the SSP inferred
and conduded that the complainant was terrorised by K _and had been won
·o'Ver bf holding out threats. On that basis, he concluded that'it was not G
reasonably practicabJe·to hold an enquiry against the respondent. Conse-
i' 'quently 'he pa'ssed· an iirder 'dismissing K from service resorting to
"proviso(b) to Article 311(2)!•This· order was also· sucfessfully challenged
before the Administrative Tribunal ·which held that there was no .basis
upon which the SSP could have arrived at the conclusion that (i) the H
'~i •. -1'
1 .(1 ;f" .'!':.·•·.!I'-'·•~·,.· ··1!
~I
'

920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A complainant was won over by threats ; an!! (ii) it was pot reasonably
practicable to bold an enquiry, Against th• 0rders passed by the Tribun.al
in both the cases appeals were preferre!l before this Court.

Disposin.g of the appe11ls, this Court

B HELD : 1. On perusal of tile orjgiµ;il record as well as material
pla~ed before ~this Court it is not possible to say that there were no
reasonable grJunds or relevant material before the Senior Superintendent
of Police for ~~Ing satisfied that in the circumstances and the situation
then obtaining, it ·was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary
C enquiry against A. No one was willing to come forward to depose. The
requirement of recording of reasons is also satisfied in this case. Indeed,
the dismissal ·order itself incorporates the reasons. [928-D-F]
l
2. It Is true that in such matters the courts{fribunals are the only·
protection for the persons proceeded against and that unless strict stand-
D ards are adopted for judging the "satisfaction", the government officials
will· have no ·protection against the arbitrary acts and orders of the
superior officers who may succumb to the temptation of adopting the
e.asier course 1of dismissinl}'removinglreducing in rank the lower officers
without holding an enquiry instead of following the regular procedures
E prescribed by the rules. At the same. time, each 'case had to be judged on
Its own merits, keeping in mind the relevant provisions of Article 311(2).
One has to keep in mind the sitnation obtaining in Punjab in the year 1993
and must appreciate the orders passed by the SSP in that context. It was
natural In· siich a situation that the higher and responsible officers are
obliged to resort to the provision contained in clause (b) of the second
F proviso to Article 311 (2) to dispense with the services of bad elements >
without an en11uiry. [929-D-F; 923-E-H]

3. There is no reason not to believe that the power under clause (h)
of second proviso to Article 311(2) was invoked by the SSP for proper
G reasons; The comments made against him by the Tribunal to the effect that
he acted casually, is unacceptable besides being uncharitable. The
Tribunal was also not justified in saying that the order of dismissal does
not say that.A was responsible for intimidating and terrorising the com-
plainant and the witnesses. [930-D-F]

f!: 4. The conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal with regard to the case
\/

CHANDIGARH ADMN., UNION TBRRIT0RY v. A. MAN CHANDA {B.P. JEBVAN REDDY, J.} 921

against K needs no interference. No one had ev~r stated either before the A
•. • • • ' •: I ~ ~·.

Superintendent of Police (Hqrs.) or before the. Senior Superintendent of
Police that the complainant has been terrorised, Intimidated or threaiened
.by K. Only because the complainant-Advocate, mentioned in his letter that
he does not wish· to proceed with the ~omplaint In vieW iif the compromise
effected between the parties, it cann~t.be inferred that the com'plai11ant ha~ 1

be~n terrorised and intimidatet!.: 111 ~uch sltuatio~, the inference drawn a B
by the SSP cannot be said to be a.reasonable or reievarit~o~e. Thus there
was .absolutely no material tip~n which the SSP could· be satisfied that it
was not reasonably practicable to hoid· a dlsciplinary enquiry against the
respondent because of the intimidation and threats held out by K to the
, • r ·, ,, , "' '
complainant or other witnesses. [930-G·H; 931-A·CJ .
-
.
' ,: .. i.J • J ,,. '
C
Union of1nditi v. Tulsiram Pate([l985]'3 SCC 398; A.K Kaul y;
Union of india; [199S] 4 SCC13;'collector of Mongliyr ~; Keshait'Prasad
Goenka; [1963] l SCR 98; St~te of Rlijasthan v.'Oliio/i·of llldia, [1977] 3
SCC 592 and ·S.R. Bominai v. Union of India, [1994] 3 SCC l, referred to .
. " -.~·; ·, :·" ••. · .... • r ., ·· ··~ .. · 01 D
.CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ;.CiVil Appeal.No. 6954 of
1996 Etc. , ,. .
' · .. ~ . j-' ; ,.
· From the Judgment and Order dated .24;8.95 of the .Central Ad-
ministrative Tr.ibunal at Chandigarh in 0,A. No. 366 - .CH of 199~. ,., . E
,. '
Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants. • ·
' . " .! ' •' -·.' . -- • . . .

j:•.r. Rao, R.K. s'harma and Rak~sli"Kumar Sharma for the Respon,
'•
dents. · '" ' 1 -
'·
,J.
;,_
,
'·.·
'
1~ ' , .)-
T
•
t
•
~- ;

The Judgment of the Court delivered. by F
' • ·i ,,

.parties..B.P. .JEEVAN REDDY; J. Leave: granted. Heard
...
counsel for the
., ' .,
•J1:' •.

• , '1 . ' .. "\ . •,] .

Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India declares .that
no person who holds a ciVil post undi;r th~ U;,ion or the Staie "shall be G
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which
he has been infornied of .the charges against
"J . .• ~ t"·
'and given a re~sonabie
' ,. ' ;
hi.;, ~ " ' . .
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges": The sec.ond proViso
·to cl~~~e (2), however, specifies tliree situati~ns in which the ;equiiements
iii clause (2) do n~t apply. Clinise (b)'. of the second proViiio states that H
\./

922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 3 S.C.R.

A "where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to
reduce him in fhnk is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that
'
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry",
the enquiry and the opportunity provided by clause (2) can be dispensed
with and puni~hment 'imposed straightaway. Clause (3) of Article 311 is
really a contin~ation of clause (b) of the second proviso. Clause (3) says,
B "if, in respect of any such person. as aforesaid, a question arises whether it
is reason~bly piacticable to hold such ~n inquiry as is referred to in clause
(2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove
such person .
. . or to reduce him in rank shall be final."
C In Unio1I' of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985) 3' SCC 398, it has been
held by the Constitution Bench that the second proviso to Article 311 is
based on pubfic policy, is conceived in public interest and is to be employed
for public gC?od. The Constitution Bench has pointed out that the
paramount thi!;g to bear in mind is that the second proviso will apply only
D where the conduct of the government servant is such that he deserves the
punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. It was further
pointed out that once the above test is satisfied and the conditions specified
in the relevant clause in the second proviso are satisfied, the said proviso
is attracted and it would not be necessary to comply with the requirements
specified in clause (2). That was a case where a large number of railway
E employees had participated in an illegal All-India strike and the Govern-
ment had responded by orderi.ng their dismissal en masse. The action was
held to be justified in the circumstances. At the same time, it was held that
recording of reasons for forming the requisite satisfaction is mandatory.
Though it is not necessary that ihose reasons must find a place in the order
F of punishment, it ·was held, the authority must produce the same when
called upon to do so by the Court. The desirabifity of incorporating the
said reasons in the order imposing punishment was emphasised. It has been
held by this Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, [1963]
1 S.C.R. 98 that where the statute requires the recording of reasons, any
action taken without recording the reasons is invalid. Here, of course, the
G requirement is contained in the constitutional provision itself.

It is trJ~ that clause (3) of Article 311 declares further that when a ·+-
question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the
decision of the competent authority shall be final on that question. But that
H doe~ not me~n that the scope of judicial review is excluded altogether. In
7
CHANDIGARH ADMN., UNION 1ERRITORY v. A. MAN CHANDA (B.P. JEEVANREDDY, J.] 923
., '
., State of Rajasthan v, Union of India, [1977) 3 S.C.C. 592, it was held that A
cla~se (5) of Article 356 (ini;oduced by Constitution 38th Amendment Act
and deleted by the 44th Amendment Act,' which provided that "not-
withstanding anything in this Constitution, the satisfaction of the President
mentioned in' clause (1) shall be final and conciusive and shall not be
questioned in any court on any ground") does not preclude the Court from
entertaining the challenge to a notification under Article 356(i) on the ~
giou~d that the requisite satisfaction was formed malafide or that in was
founded on extraneous grounds; because' it was' pointed. ou( in either of
those cases, there is in lawn~ s1tisfactfon as contemplated by clause .(1)
of Article 356. It has b'~eii'held by thiS C~urt in s.R.. Bon;m~i v. Unio11of
b;dia: [1994) 3 sec i'th~t even in the matter of exercise ot'powe; ~tider c
l
Articie 356 ~.of the Co'iistitution, the saiisfactlon of the P;esident, while
~do~btedly
. -
subfective,
. ..
.is not. beyond
,
the judiciai
..,.
scrutinyI of.,,,the c~~rts
. '·
·~•

under.. Article' 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The parameters of
judicial revi~w enunciated i;, S.R. Bommai have been held. applicable in
AX Kaul v.' Vnion of India (1995): 4 S.C.C. 73 to a ;,,att~r arisi~g u~der D
proviso (c) to Article 311(2).. A-re.ading of clauses (b) an~.(c) of the second
proviso would establish that, if at all, the power. under. clause (b} is more
circumscribed tran the power under clause (C).-: 1 ....
'}•' ., .. ' . v. ! • \'... t.;

·until receiitly, Punjab was in the thro'es ofa serious ·internal distur-
bance. Armed groups has created a sitnation' where the State was obliged E
'to deploy p'olice arid other armed forces in ·substantial number to suppress
the 'militancy.' In the very'·nature of the siiuaiion, vast po,,;ers had· to be
veted in the police to' deal' with the emergllig situations. and ihey did
'ulti~ately overcome the separatist forces.".fhey had fo pay a substantial
price in the'process. A large n,il~ber 'of p?iicemen arid members' of the .F
para-military and armed forces paid with their lives. The naticirt feels
gratel'.u\ fo~ .their performance ~d remei:idiers the ;acfifices mad~ by' J:hem.
•. .'f'·
..~ . . .,~.J. ·' t ,·,· . ' . ~· - •
Unfortunately, the transition to.a peace-time situaiion has not proved easy.
• • ~
<" :· ''Lf '• .• ' • ' • ~· t , , ; , <' i •

A few among the p9lice. force yet want to lord it over thC c_itiZency. Some
of the_m do not hesitate. to indulge in those very acts of ~hich the militants
were a~used of, viz., extorti~n, abd~ction a~d worse. ~~s n~tural in such It G
'.'sitl)atio~ thaqhe higher an'd ~e~p91,isibl~ officer.~ of,th5' police slio~ld try
to curb these excesses: Jn appropriate cases, they are obliged to resort to
the pr~'visio~ contained i~ clause .(b) of the second pr~vis;, to Artie!~
311(2) to dispense with the services of such bad elements without an
inquiry. The Chandigarh Administration, appellant in these two appeals, H
• . ' · · ,, , ,·''-• ;.. .,., • . I , , ·.. ~· c. /.
\,/

924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 3 S.C.R.

A says that acts and deeds of the two respondents herein did call for the
exercise of the extraordinary power under proviso (b) to Article 311(2)
which it did invoke. It says that the Central administrative Tribunal, Chan-
digarh was in error in interdicting its orders dismissing the respondents.

B Ajay Manchanda, respondent in civil appeal (arising from Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 26926 of 1995) was a Sub-Inspector of Police
attached to Sector-11 Police Station. F.l.R. No. 125 was registered in the
said police station on July 31, 1993 under Sections 420/468/471 of the
Indian Penal Code concerning issuance/preparation of fake passports. The
respondent was associated with the investigation .of the said case. In the
C course of the investigation, certain persons including one Swaran Singh @
Makhan Singh were arrested and remanded to police custody, Sometime
later, Makhan Singh filed a complaint before the higher police officers
stating that the respondent took him away from his shop on the evening of
December 7, 1993 and placed him in the lock up and that the respondent
demanded a sum of Rupees three lakhs to release him and to delete his
D name from the said case. Because of the pressure exerted by the respon-
dent and the threats held out by him, he said, he agreed to pay a sum of
Rupees one lakh, out of which Rupees fifty thousand was paid through his
brother). He complained that the respondent was pressing for the balance .,._
Rupees fifty thousand. On the basis of the said complaint, the Senior •
E Superintendent of Police (S.S.P.) ordered an enquiry to the conducted by
Sri S.C. Sagar, Deputy Superintendent of Police (D.S.P.) (Central) :-vho
submitted a detailed report on March 11, 1994 affirming the contents of
the said complaint. He also reported that the complainant and the wit-
nesses were terrorised by the respondent and on that account, they were
not prepared to proceed with the complaint or the case further. After
F examining the report, the S.S.P. was satisfied that the respondent had
extorted Rupees fifty thousand from the said Swaran Singh @ Makhan
Singh and that he was further demanding a sum of Rupees fifty thousand
and that he had also threatened and intimidated Makhan Singh and the .
witnesses with dire consequences. He was satisfied that the witnesses were
so terrorised th~t they expressed their inability to pursue the matter. On
G the above basis; he held that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an
inquiry against 'ihe respondent and accordingly dismissed him invoking the
power under Article 311(2)(b). The relevant portion of the order reads t
thus:

H "Makhan Singh @ S.waran Singh made a complaint which was
y
CHANDIGARH ADMN., UNION TERRITORYv. A. MAN CHANDA {B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.J 925

marked to Sh. S.C. Sagar DSP/Central, who submitted detailed A
report dated 11.3.94 whereby he found truth in the allegations of
•Makhan Singh @ Swaran Singh against S.L Ajay Manchanda. SJ.
Ajay Manchanda has extorted Rs. 50,000 and was further demand-
ing Rs. 50;000 more from the accused. He threatened the accused
to such an extent that the .accnsed and the witnesses refused to B
make any statement before DSP. S.C .. Sagar.

Shri S.C.
. .
Sagar,
...
DSP ha~· reported
- .
that the- .witnesses
' .. -
are so { .
te.rr9rised by th~ t)lreats o~. S.I. Ajay Manchanda that they have
. expressed their inability to pursue the matter in the court of law
j or in any other enqui~y against him and more so they refused to c
, make a11y statem~nt b~fore hi;,,. · · ' , ·' ·•

Whereas after going through.the report of DSP s.c.' Sagar, the
I . ' • ' ·I " . - ,,
complaint of Makhan Singh@ Swaran Singh and my.oral examina-
tion' of Makhan Singh @ SWaran Smgh, it has bee,;_ ·proved to my ,
sub}ective' s'atisfaction that s.i.':Aj~y Manchanda has ertorted Rs. D
' .... , ~ ~ 50,000
• "
f~om'
.
ac~u~ed
. . ·, •.
Makhan Singh'@' s*aran Singh' and he wa~ .
. .. . , ,_.', ': . , ,. . r . . •
• further demanding Rs. 50,000 ·more and he threatened him with
''-~ ~; •• ··- ~~ 1.1. ' ., '°'.>'" '·-~ ' .• ' ..•
dire conseqilences and the witnesses are so terrorised. that they
·~ ~ ' ', " •. M '• •, p od ' ; • > ''' ' ~
expressed tlieir in.ability tci pmsue the matter. ... . .
I . I: .. , . ..,., t ~ ' . ~-
'
The.Judicial prcisecutioi'ds'riot otdered in the case. The regular E
departmental enquiry is also not reasonably practicable in view of
threats and ·witnesses in~bility to 'come. forward to depose against ,
th6 delinquent official due to threats of elimi~ation:· Tb~refore, I .
dispense .with rei>ular:department'al enquiry' in· exercise' of power
. . vested in' me under A!ticl~ 311(Zj (B)' o.f the Co,;.stitutio~·oflndia." F
,'!: -')!"''" ' . ' .: " ¥ !' . : _. ;.,_.. . - ~ . . . . •. ,

The respondent challenged the order of dismissal before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh. The Tribunal f~und that the im-
pug;,elo~der does '~ot. state that th; respondent' had'given any threats to
any of the iitnesse; or the' coillplainant and that in fact th~re is no
~eference 'to ·the act ~f te!rorising by the respondent. The Tribun'al opined G
that merely because 'a police office~ is the accused, it ii.l.rtnoi be presumed
that no one will come forward to depose against him: it observed that the
Senior' Superintendent
.• . ' - •
of Police
i- ·' '
"has
. .
taken the
• ,.
matter in .a very casual 1

manner without giving due 9onsideration .:ai;id, applying his di.spassionate
discretion in the issuance of the impugned order and coming to the H
\,/

926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A conclusion .to dispense with the regular enquiry."
Kuldip Singh, respondent in civil appeal (arising from Special Leave
Petition (C) 26970 of 1995) was also a Sub-Inspector of Police under the
Chandigarh Administration. One Sri K.B. Raheja, Advocate, Ferozepur
complained to the S.S.P., Chandigarh that the respondent extorted an
B amount of Rupees nine hundred from him on the pretext of a minor traffic
violation while he was driving his car on the wrong side near cricket
stadium on March 9, 1993. An enquiry was ordered into the said complaint
to be conducted by Sri Arvind Deep, SP (Headquarters). The said officer
reported that the resp.ondent has "committed gross misuse of his official
C position and extorted money from an innocent victim Sri Kulbhushan
Raheja as a fine for violation of traffic regulation but he misappropriated
a major part of the amount to himself and misbehaved with him and also
impounded the car". He reported that while the respondent collected
Rupees nine hund.red from Sri Raheja, he issued a receipt to him only for
Rupees four hundred and remitted only a sum of Rupees one hundred into
D the Government account. He reported that while in the receipt issued to
the said advocate,' the amount collected from him was mentioned as rupees
four hundred both in words and figures, the counterfoil of the said receipt
contained only a.Jigure of Rupees one hundred in figures. It is significant
to notice that the's.P. (Headquarters) did not report ihat the respondent
E had either terrorised the complainant or the witnesses, if any. On this
report, the S.S.P. made the following endorsement on 29th March, 1993 :

"Enough-and sufficient indications that witness is being pressurised
and compelled to withdraw his statement. In fact his reluctance to
appear before me is clear vide his letter dated 25.3.93. His mention
F ofa compromise in his letter dated 28.3.93 are clear indications of
no chance of free deposition by the witness in the enquiry.

The obvious fact is that witness has been won over under the
threat of injury to his person an,d property and threat may be to
the extent of elimination of the witness, the delinquent official
G
being in ,uniform. The fact fmding enquiry conducted by SP/HQ
found truth in the allegation in the complaint regarding misap-
propriation of money.
;
· +
The judicial prosecution is not ordered in the case. The regular
H departmental enquiry is also not reasonably practicable in view of
y \
,_

- -i
CHANDIGARH ADMN., UNION TERRITORYv. A. MAN CHANDA jB.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.]

the letter of the 'complainant. Therefore, I dispe;,se with ~egular A
depar\mel'tal enquiry in exercise_ of power vested in me under
.. Article 311(2)(B)." -
927

. ·I ' . " •

On the sam~ day, i.e., 29th March, 1993, the S.S.P. passed an o;der
dismiising the respondent from service -resorting to proviso (b) to Article
·311(2)- Before proceeding- further, it is necessary notice a few facts for B to
a proper appreciation of the aforesaid endorse,;..ent made by the S.S.P. ori
-29th March, 1993. It appears that after receiving the enquiry. report of the
S.P. (Headquarters) on 22nd.March, 1993, the S.S.P. sent a message to Sri
Raheja, Advocate 'to come and meet him in connection with his complaint.
bn Zsth Ma~ch, 1993, Sri Raheja Wrote to the'S.S.P. ihat on'account of his C
... I ··' · I ' • . · -
· engagements in the sessions ccmrts, he would_ not be able to meet the S.S.P.
'in his office -on 26th March, 1993 and that he may be called on some other
a
day,. preferably Saturday or Sunday. It app'ears that he was called again
in. response' to· whi~h Sri Raheja addressed . another Jette~ (dated 28th
·March, 1993) thaf since a compromise has been effected between him and D
the respondent by respectable persons; he does not wish to pursue the
compl;.mt ag~inst the respondeni. lt is from_ ihis second letter that the
· s.s:i>. se~;;;s to have inferred and concluded thatthe ·advocate was being
terrorls~d by the respondent and has been won over by hoiding out threats.
'oii'that ba~is, h~ concliided. that ii was noi reasonably practicable to hold E
an enqiliry ag~i~st th~ redPOncient.-
. ; ·'I ... . • ' .. ; - . ' . . r.'
., . ' . . I '

.. ' .. - ' . _·. . ... _, .· ··~·_,; .. ..
_ - .·".
' When the matter_ went before _tlie Central Administrative Tribunal,
Chandigarh, . it : aliow~d .the original applic'ation filed by· the _respondent
holding that there 'was no material before ih~ s.s.r: ~ri thebasis of which
_he could have ·been_ ieasoriably satisfied tha(it was not reas~nably prac- F
tic~ble to hold ~ disciplinary eiiquiry against- the respondciit. The Tribunal
noieci that the complainant is not an ordinary person but an advocate
practising in the sessions courts and_ that there was ·no basis_ upon which
the S.S.P. could have arrived at· the ,conclusion that the sa'id ~dvocate was • ·
won over by' threats -o~ thai he was beillg' terrorised or t1iat. h.e was afraid d
"or being '.eli~inaied' by the responde~t. . '
. .. - :·
' .. ' .
. . 1tf"1

.. - •• , - • f ";_. .,_ .• '' -,, .. .. , ' ,· . ' • ' j

. , _ Ms: Kamirii J aiswal, .learned COUl)Sel for th~ appellant, assaHed _the
reasoning and conclusion of the Tribnrial in .both the matters whereas S/Sri
P J>.
Rao and D.V. Sehgal, appea'ring for the respondents respectively H
v
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 3 S.C.R.

A supported the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal.
..
We shall first take up the case against Ajay Manchanda. It was
December, 1993. The complainant Swaran Singh @ Makhan Singh was one
of the persons named as accused in the F.I.R. He was arrested. Admittedly,
the respondent was one of the officers investigating the said case. Swaran
B
Singh complained to the S.S.P. of extortion and the continuing harassment
by the respondent. The S.S.P. ordered an enquiry through D.S.P. who
reported that the complaint is true. The D.S.P. reported expressly that the
complainant and other witnesses "are so terrorised by the threats given by
SI Ajai Manchanda that they have expressed their inability to pursue the
C matter in the court of law or in any other enquiry against him. They are so
terrorised that they have even explained their inability to make any formal
statement before me. Keeping in· view the above circumstances when
complainant and other witnesses are so terrorised and panic-striken that
they are not Willing to come forward the departmental enquiry shall also
D not serve any purpose." On the basis of the said report, the S.S.P. was
satisfied that it was "not reasonably practicable in view of threats and
witnesses' inability to come forward to depose against the delinquent
officer due to threats,,of elilnination" and accordingly passed the order of
dismissal. On the basis ·of the material placed before us - we have also
E perused the original record which war placed before us by Ms. Karnini
Jaiswal pursuant to o~r direction - it is not possible for us to say that there
were no reasonable grounds or relevant material before the S.S.P. for being
satisfied that in the circumstances and the situation then obtaining, it was
not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary enquiry against .the
respondent. No one would come forward to depose. The requirement of
F
recording of reasons is also satisfied in this case. Indeed, the dismissed
order itself incorporates the reasons. We have also looked into the report
of the D.S.P. and the relevant record.

Sri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that
G there was no relevant material on the basis of which the S.S.P. could form
the requisite satisfaction. He submitted that only a minor penalty has been
imposed upon the Station House Officer. Inspector Jagbir Singh who too
is alleged to have extorted a sum of Rupees fifteen thousand from the said
complainant as against· his demand for Rupees thirty thou;and. The
.H learned counsel complained that the respondent is being made the
CHANDIGARH ADMN.. UNION TERRITORYv. A MAN CHANDA [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.J 929
. ' ' .

scapegoat for the wrong done by his superiors and that the action taken A
against him is not.bonafide.Counsel further submitted that the D.S.P. who
conduct~d the' preliminary enquiry and submitted the report was himself
involved in the alleged extortion. This the learned counsel says, is estab-
lished from the statement of Sri Swaran ·Singh @ Makhan Singh wherein
he had stated 'after some days' Deputy Superintendent of Police Subhash B
Sagar himself called us and told Ajay Manchanda and Jagbir Singh that
my r~mand will have to be extended by two more days. On that, Ajay
Manchanda and Jagbir ,Singh in a satirical note said that "Makhan to
makhan laga chuke hai" (in other words, ~~ney has aire'ady been taken
from him)." From this statement, Sri P.P. Rao seeks io infer that D.S.P.
Subhash Sagar (who had conducted the enquiry against the respondent and C
submitted. the enquiry report) w~ in the know of and was a party to tlie
, , ' .
,entire episode, and, therefore, could not have peen appointed as the
enquiry officer against the respondent. He was in the nature of a witness,
it is ~ont~nded. Learned counsel further submitted that if'the complainant
_;,as so terrorised, h~ would not have gone to the S.S.P. complaining of D
harassmenl in writing 'nor would he have deposed before the D.S.P. (en-
quiry officer). The said facts, learned counsel submitted, negatived the plea ·
of terrorising or intimidation. The learned counsel finally submitted that in
.such matters the courts/t.ribuil~ls are the.'only protection for the pers~ns
proceeded against and that unless sirict standards are adopted for judging
the "satisfaction", th~ g~veniment offici;us will have no protectibn against E
the
.
arbiirary
, . 1
acts
.;· _
and orders of
·
th~" .superior· Iofficers
_
who may-
succumb to
the temptation
. ~ .
of adopting the easier
·''
course
.
of dis111issing/removing/reduc-
ing in rank the'lower officers without holding an enquiry instead of follow-
ing ihe regular proced~res prescribed by the rules. ' .
... ' ....
. . ' F
We agree with and share the concern of the learned counsel con-
tained in his last sub;.,;ssion. At the same time, we have to judge each case
on its 0 wn merits, keeping in mind the relevant provisions of Article 311(2)
. and the interpretation,placed upon it by this Court in Tulsiram Patel. We
must say immediately that tlie learned counsel is not rightin inferring from
the state~ent of the, complainant ~xtracted hereinabove that the D.S,P. G
(en'.J.irirY officer) was also a part}> to the extortion. The statem~nt extract~d
hereinabove does not establish that the said w~rds were addressed to' or
were meant for the benefit of the D.s.P: Moreover, the words "Makhan ko
makhan laga chuke hai" do nqt ;.,ean what th~ complainant thought they
meant So far as the allegation against Jagbif' Si~gh is co~cerned; it is H
. ' ' , ,
' ·.,, ·'
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19%] 3 S.C.R.

A equally unacceptable. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal has produced the file relating to
the proceedings taken against Jagbir Singh which we have perused. The
charge against Jagbir Singh was not one of extortion from the complainant
or anyone else, but one of laxity and negligence in carrying out the
investigation. May be that th~ complainant had made an allegation against
B Jagbir Singh but there is no reference to it in the D.S.P. (enquiry officer's)
report and we do not know the circumstances in which Jagbir Singh was
not proceeded against for extortion. This plea was not raised by the
respondent before the Tribunal. It has been raised for the first time before
us. Since the allegation is factual in nature, we are not inclined to entertain
the same at this stage. In any event, as stated above, we have perused the
C file concerning Jagbir Singh also, and are satisfied that the charge against
Jagbir Singh was altogether different. We are, therefore, unable. to agree
with Sri P.P. Rao that there was no material upon which the S.S.P. could
be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary
enquiry against the respondent. One has to keep in mind the situation
D obtaining in Punjab in the year 1993 and must appreciate the orders passed
by the S.S.P. in that context. We see no reason not to believe that the
aforesaid power under clause (b) was invoked by the S.S.P. for proper
reasons. The comments made against him by the Tribunal to the effect that
he acted casually is unacceptable besides being uncharitable. The Tribunal
was also not j~~tified in saying that the order of dismissal does not say that
E the respondent was responsible for intimidating and terrorising the com-
plainant and the witnesses. It was an hyper-technical objection. The order
read as a whole and the accompanying report of the D.S.P. and the
endorsement of S.S.P. on the report do clearly establish that it was respon-
dent who was intimidating and Oterrorising the said persons. The judgment
F and order of the Tribunal in O.A. 366-Ch/94 is accordingly set aside and
the appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (C) 26926 of 1995 is allowed.

No costs.

Now, coming to the case against kuldip Singh, we are of the opinion
G that the conclusion. arrived at by the Tribunal in this matter needs no
interference at our hands. We have pointed out hereinabove while discuss- +
-ing the facts ~f this case that no one had ever stated either before the S.P.
(Headquarters) (preliminary enquiry officer) or before the S.S.P. that he
has b.een terrorised, intimated or threatened by the· respondent. Only
H because the complainant Sri Raheja, Advocate, mentioned in his letter that
y
CJ-:IANDIGARHADMN., UNION TERRITORYv. A. MAN CHANDA [B.P. JEEVANREDDY. J.j 931

he does not wish to proceed with 'the 'compfaint i~ vie;.:, of the compromise A
effected between him and the respondent by certain respectable elders, the
S.S.P. inferred that the"said complainant has been terrorised and in-
tirni.dated, We· a.re not satisfied that that is only inference that flows from
the c.omplainant's second letter. The 's.S.P.c also docs not say either in the
order· of dismissal - or. anywhere in the record - th;it he ha.d information
. , , .~,"· ''"' . ·n • ,... • . - B
to the above effect from some other . source. In such a· situation, the
inference drawn by the.S.S.P. c~fil{(,1 be said to be'~ reasonable or relevant
one. In short, there was absolutely no material upon wh.ich, the ~.S.. P. could
be satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary
enquiry against the respondent because of .the i.ntimidation and threats held
O\ll by the n;spondent to t.he complainant or other witnesses, if any. C
Accordingly.the appeal arising from Sp~cial leave Petition (CJ 26970 of
1995 is dismissed: ·

• No costs. . ' . '
T.N.A. Appeal disposed of:

, .

''