Supreme Court of India

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC SCIENCES & ANR.versusBIKARTAN DAS & ORS.

Citation: 2023 INSC 733
Decided: 16 August 2023
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: D Y CHANDRACHUD

Holding

The High Court erred; the age of superannuation for CCRAS employees is governed by its own Bye‑Laws, not by the enhanced age applicable to AYUSH doctors, and the interim relief was improper.

Summary

The case concerned Dr. Bikartan Das, a Research Assistant appointed by the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS), who sought to have his retirement age enhanced from 60 to 65 years in line with the benefit granted to AYUSH doctors under a Cabinet decision. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) had rejected his claim, holding that CCRAS’s own Bye‑Laws governed superannuation, but the High Court set aside that order and granted interim relief allowing him to serve beyond 60 years. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in interpreting Clause 34 of the CCRAS Bye‑Laws, the applicability of Fundamental Rule 56(bb) to CCRAS employees, and the propriety of granting interim relief. The Court held that the Bye‑Laws expressly fix the retirement age at 60 unless the Governing Body decides otherwise, and that the Fundamental Rules apply only mutatis mutandis subject to Clause 34, so the enhanced age for AYUSH doctors does not extend to CCRAS staff. Consequently, the High Court’s order was unsustainable and set aside, and the interim relief was deemed improper. The appeal was allowed, restoring the CAT’s decision and confirming that the respondent is not entitled to the enhanced superannuation age.

Issues considered

The High Court's correctness in setting aside the CAT order granting enhanced retirement age to the respondent.
Whether Fundamental Rule 56(bb) and related statutory rules apply mutatis mutandis to employees of CCRAS under its Bye‑Laws.
The proper interpretation of Clause 34 of the CCRAS Bye‑Laws concerning the age of superannuation.
The legality of granting interim relief allowing the respondent to continue in service beyond the prescribed retirement age.
Whether the denial of the enhanced retirement age to the respondent violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Subjects

service lawsuperannuationage of retirementautonomous bodybye‑lawsFundamental RulesArticle 14certiorariinterim reliefCentral Administrative TribunalHigh CourtSupreme Court

Judgment

[2023] 11 S.C.R. 731 : 2023 INSC 733

CASE DETAILS

CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC
SCIENCES & ANR.
v.
BIKARTAN DAS & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023)
AUGUST 16, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, CJI AND
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.]

HEADNOTES

Issue for consideration: High Court, if erred in setting aside the order
passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and holding that respondent
No.1 was entitled to the beneﬁt of enhancement of retirement age from 60
to 65 years as applicable to the AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry
of AYUSH.
Service Law – Grant of beneﬁt of enhancement of retirement age
– Unsustainability:
Held: Respondent No.1 was appointed as a Research Assistant by the
appellant-Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS)
and was functioning as a Researcher under the Research Council and his
service conditions were also diﬀerent compared to the AYUSH doctors
serving with the Ministry of AYUSH – Appellant-Council is a registered
autonomous body and is administratively controlled by the Ministry of
AYUSH, Government of India – The recruitment rules, procedure and the
service conditions of its employees are governed by the Bye-Laws and
Memorandum of Association of the Council – High Court misdirected itself
saying that the beneﬁt of enhanced age of superannuation can also be granted
if the duties performed are the same like AYUSH doctors – Governing body
of the Council is not obliged to take a decision in tune with the decision
of the Ministry of AYUSH regarding superannuation more particularly
having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not applicable
731
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

to an autonomous body like CCRAS – Age of superannuation is always
governed by the statutory rules governing appointment on a particular
post – Hence, even if it is averred that the nature of work involved in the
two posts is similar, the same cannot be a ground to increase or alter the
service conditions of an employee as each post is governed by its own set
of rules – Impugned order not sustainable, set aside – Society Registration
Act, 1860. [Paras 23, 34, 44 and 48]
Service Law – Interim relief for continuation in service granted
– Impropriety:
Held: Court or the Tribunal should be slow and circumspect in granting
interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of
unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds,
he can always be compensated – But if he fails, he would have enjoyed
undeserved beneﬁt of extended service and caused injustice to his immediate
junior – In the present case, High Court went to the extent of granting interim
relief extending the period of service beyond 60 years till the disposal of
the Original Petition by the CAT – By virtue of such interim order which
the High Court ordinarily should not grant, the respondent No. 1 although
was to retire in 2018 yet continued in service till 2021 – It is only when
Supreme Court stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the
High Court while issuing notice that the service of the respondent No.1
came to an end. [Para 48]
Service Law – Memorandum of Association of the Central Council
for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences – Bye-Laws – Clauses 25(b), 34, 35
and 47 – Plea of respondent No.1 was that the provisions of FR 56(bb)
would apply to him in his capacity as an employee of the Council in view
of Clause 35, Bye-Laws of the Council by which the provisions of the FR
and SR would apply to the employees of the Council mutatis mutandis:
Held: Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 and 47 of the Bye-Laws in the Memorandum
of Association indicate that the employees are recruited through a selection
committee of the Council – It further indicates that the Fundamental Rules,
1922 will have no direct application in cases where the governing body
ﬁnalises the rules of superannuation – In terms of Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws,
the governing body had decided the age of superannuation to be 60 years
on 01.12.1998 – The said decision was ratiﬁed on 27.01.2000 - CAT rightly
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 733
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS

took the view that the plea canvassed on behalf of the respondent No.1 that
the Council failed to consider the Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws which states
that the FR, Supplementary Rule (SR) and General Financial Rules (GFR)
as amended from time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees
of the Council, was without any merit and deserved to be rejected – CAT
rightly rejected such argument because the applicability would be subject
to the provision speciﬁc to the Clause 34 governing superannuation of the
employees of the Council – There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws
on the basis of which, it could be said that the same will have an overriding
eﬀect on Clause 34 as regards the age of retirement – Clause 47 of the Bye-
Laws makes it abundantly clear that for the matters not speciﬁcally provided
in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to the government employees would
apply – However, as there is a speciﬁc provision regarding superannuation
in Clause 34, the rules governing the government services in respect of
superannuation are not applicable to the employees of the Council unless
it is in accordance with Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws – Fundamental Rules,
1922. [Paras 25, 28 and 29]
Words and Phrases – “or”, “and” – Interpretation – Plea of
respondent No.1 that clause 34 of the Bye-Laws should be read in two
parts- the ﬁrst part states that the Rules governing the retirement of
employees of the Government of India as amended from time to time
would apply to the employees of the Central Council; the second part
of Clause 34 which reads “or as desired by the governing body” is
merely an enabling provision empowering the governing body to take
a decision whether an employee deserves to be retained beyond the
prescribed age of superannuation and that such power should not be
read in a negative form to clothe the governing body with the power to
prescribe lesser age of superannuation than what has been prescribed
by the Central Government from time to time:
Held: Such argument cannot be accepted – The word “or” is normally
disjunctive and the word “and” is normally conjunctive – Both of them
can be read as vice-versa, but that interpretation is adopted only where the
intention of the legislature is manifest – In the present case, the language of
Clause 34 is very clear. What is important to note while reading the Clause
34 is the word “or” – Thereafter, there is a proviso which says that an
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

employee can be retained in service after prescribed age of superannuation
if he continues to be physically ﬁt and eﬃcient and it is in the interest of
the Central Counsel to retain him in the service – The expression “the rules
governing the retirement of employees of Government of India as amended
from time to time” is separated from the rest of the part of the Bye-Law by the
word “or” which is disjunctive and giving natural meaning to the said word
separates the rules that may be framed by the Government of India and the
rules that the Council may desire to frame as regards the age of retirement
of the employees of the Council – Interpretation of Statutes. [Paras 30-32]
Service Law – Age of retirement vis-à-vis service conditions
relating to pay and allowances and revision of pay – Respondent
No.1 contended that as the terms and conditions of the services of the
employees of the Council on all other aspects like the Provident Fund/
GPF, Pension, Gratuity, Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules and
other conditions of services are the same as applicable to the employees
of the Central Government as set out in Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44 and
47 respectively of the Bye-Laws, the matter of age of superannuation
of the respondent No. 1 should not be treated diﬀerently:
Held: What should be the age of superannuation is a matter of policy
– It is not within the domain of the court to legislate – It is only if a policy
decision or a notiﬁcation is arbitrary it may invite the frowns of Article 14
of the Constitution – The question of age of retirement stands on a diﬀerent
footing from the service conditions relating to pay and allowances and
revision of pay. [Para 35]
Service Law – Claim of respondent No.1-Research Assistant
that his age of superannuation be at par with the AYUSH Doctors –
Infringement of Article 14 alleged:
Held: It is too late in the day for the respondent No.1 to raise all
such issues including infringement of Article 14 on the ground of artiﬁcial
distinction between the Research Assistant and AYUSH Doctors –
Respondent No.1 knew from the date of his appointment that he was being
appointed as a Research Assistant – His service conditions and mode of
recruitment are diﬀerent compared to the AYUSH Doctors – It is a diﬀerent
thing that he might have treated the patients but that by itself would not
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 735
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS

entitle him to claim that his age of superannuation should be at par with the
AYUSH Doctors – Present case is not one of discrimination – Article 14 has
no application having regard to the facts of the present case – Constitution
of India – Article 14. [Paras 37 and 39]
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Extraordinary jurisdiction
– Principles of law governing – Issue of Writ of certiorari – Discussed.

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma and
Others 2021 SCC Online SC 540 – held not applicable.
Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine v. Dr. Salma Khatoon
and Others 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1332; V.M. Gadre v. M.G. Diwan and
Others (1996) 3 SCC 454 : [1996] 3 SCR 480; Census Commissioner and
Others v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 : [2014] 11 SCR 463; State of
Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Rajesh Chander Sood and Others (2016)
10 SCC 77 : [2016] 6 SCR 851; T.M. Sampath and Others v. Secretary
Ministry of Water Resources and Others (2015) 5 SCC 333 : [2015] 1 SCR
748; State of Maharashtra and Another v. Bhagwan and Others (2022)
4 SCC 193; Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General
Subordinate Services Association and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Others (1980) 3 SCC 97 : [1980] 1 SCR 1026; State of Bihar and Another
v. Teachers’ Association of Govt. Engineering College and Others (2000)
10 SCC 527; Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Associations v. State
of Kerala and Others AIR 2018 SC 2652 : [2018] 6 SCR 1139; Union of
India and Others v. Lieut (Mrs) E. Iacats (1997) 7 SCC 334; New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority and Another v. B D Singhal and Others
AIR 2021 SC 3457; T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another AIR 1954
SC 440 : [1955] SCR 250; Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others
AIR 1964 SC 477 : [1964] SCR 64; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and
Others (2003) 6 SCC 675 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 290; Hari Vishnu Kamath
v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others AIR 1955 SC 233 : [1955] SCR 1104; K.M.
Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others AIR 1963 SC 1626 : [1964]
SCR 809; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 : [1960] SCR 890; Indian Overseas
Bank v. I.O.B. Staﬀ Canteen Workers' Union and Another AIR 2000 SC
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

1508 : [2000] 2 SCR 1212; Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawabai Aboobakar
v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi (1952) 1 SCC
798; Parry and Company Limited v. Commercial Employees’ Association,
Madras and Another (1952) 1 SCC 449 : AIR 1952 SC 179 : [1952] SCR
519; Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another v. Messrs S.K. Shaw and Brothers,
AIR 1951 SC 115 : [1951] SCR 145; G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman
and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Others (1952) 1 SCC
334 – referred to.
Justice G.P. Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation
(Thirteenth Edition 2012) page 485 – referred to.
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and Another
(1969) 2 AC 147; King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC);
Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417; R. v. Brighton
and Area Rent Tribunal (1950) 1 All England Reporter 946 – referred to.

OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.3339 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2020 of the High Court of
Orissa at Cuttack in WPC No. 30620 of 2020.
Appearances:
Aman Lekhi, Sr. Adv., Harish Pandey, Adv. for the Appellants.
K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Col. R. Bala, Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar, Gurmeet
Singh Makker, Kanu Agrawal, Kush Chaturvedi, Ketan Paul, Madhav
Sinhal, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Yogesh Kumar Mahur, Harkesh Prashar,
Ronak Karanpuria, Advs. for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. This appeal by special leave is at the instance of the Central Council
for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS), Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 737
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy (AYUSH), Government
of India (appellant No. 1) and its Director General (appellant No. 2). The
two appellants before us were the original respondents before the High
Court of Orissa. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 17.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack in W.P. (C)
No. 30620 of 2020 by which the High Court allowed the writ application
ﬁled by the original petitioner (respondent No. 1) before us, setting aside the
order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Cuttack Bench,
Cuttack and thereby holding that the respondent No. 1 herein, namely, Dr.
Bikartan Das is entitled to the beneﬁt of enhancement of retirement age
from 60 to 65 years as applicable to the AYUSH doctors working under the
Ministry of AYUSH.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The respondent No. 1 herein was appointed by the Council as a
Research Assistant w.e.f. 07.10.1985. The Oﬃce Order No. 183 of 1985
dated 11.10.1985 reads thus:
“No. P.1-67/86-CRIA/DDSR/Estt./748(5) Dt 11.10.85
OFFICE ORDER No. 183/85
Dr. Bikartan Das is appointed as a Research Assistant (AY) with
eﬀect from the forenoon of the 7th October, 1985 until further orders
in the Central Research Institute (AY), Unit, Bhubaneshwar-9. He
will be on probation for a period of two years from this date. He will
draw a basic pay of Rs. 425/- per month in the scale of Rs. 425-15-500
PB-15-560-20-700 with usual allowance admissible under the rules.

(Dr. PREM KISHORE )
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AY) I/C”
3. The Government of India in its Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare vide letter dated 01.12.1998 addressed to the Council, approved
the decision of the Council to enhance the beneﬁt of extension in age of
retirement from 58 years to 60 years in respect of employees of the Council
w.e.f. 31.05.1998 in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Department
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

of Personnel and Training (DoPT) vide O.M. No. 25012/8/98-Estt. (A) dated
13.05.1998.
4. On 27.09.2017, the Union Cabinet took a decision to enhance
the age of superannuation up to 65 years for the AYUSH doctors working
under the Ministry of AYUSH (respondent No. 2 herein) and in the Central
Government Health Scheme (for short, ‘the CGHS’) Hospitals.
5. By way of letter dated 31.10.2017, the Ministry of AYUSH clariﬁed
that the eﬀect of the Cabinet decision referred to above would be applicable
only to the AYUSH doctors directly working under the Ministry of AYUSH
and in the CGHS Hospitals. It was clariﬁed that the decision to enhance
the age of superannuation up to 65 years would not be applicable to the
autonomous bodies functioning under the Ministry of AYUSH. The letter
dated 31.10.2017 addressed by the Ministry of AYUSH to the Director
General, CCRAS and CCRUM, reads thus:
“ FTS No. 32797/2017
Ministry of Ayurvedic, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha &
Homoeopathy (AYUSH)
(Research Desk)
‘B’ – Block, GPO Complex,
AYUSH Bhawan, Behind the INA Market,
New Delhi – 110023
Dated: 31st October, 2017
To
The Director General,
CCRAS and CCRUM
61-65, Institutional Area,
Opposite “D” Block,
Janakpuri, New Delhi – 110058.
Subject: Enhancement of superannuation age to 65 years -reg.
Sir,
I am directed to say that the Ministry has been receiving a number
of representations from various oﬃcials of the Councils regarding
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 739
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

enhancement of superannuation age to 65 years. It is stated that as per
Press Information Bureau the Union Cabinet has taken the following
decision:-
“The superannuation age has been enhanced to 65 years in
respect of doctors under the administrative control of the respective
Ministry/Department [M/o AYUSH (AYUSH Doctors), Department
of Defence (civilian doctors under Directorate General of Armed
Forces Medical Service), Department of Defence Production (Indian
Ordnance Factories Health Service Medical Oﬃcers), Dental Doctors
under D/o Health & Family Welfare, Dental doctors under Ministry of
Railways and of doctors working in Higher Education and Technical
Institutions under Department of Higher Education]”.
2. The decision of the Cabinet is applicable to the AYUSH doctors
directly working under the administrative control of Ministry of AYUSH
i.e. AYUSH doctors working under CGHS. The decision of the Union
Cabinet is not applicable to autonomous bodies functioning under
Ministry of AYUSH i.e. Research Councils/National Institutes.
3. All such representations are therefore being sent to the respective
Councils. It is requested that the Councils may inform them accordingly.
Yours faithfully,
N. K. Lakhanpal
Senior Consultant”
6. By order dated 24.11.2017, the Ministry of AYUSH enhanced the
age of superannuation to 65 years for the AYUSH doctors working in the
Ministry of AYUSH and in CGHS Hospitals w.e.f. 27.09.2017. The order
dated 24.11.2017 reads thus:
“ F.NO. D.14019/4/2016-E-I(AYUSH)
Government of India
Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and
Homoeopathy
AYUSH Bhawan,
‘B’ Block, GPO Complex,
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

INA, New Delhi - 110023
Dated, the 24th November, 2017.

ORDER
The President is pleased to enhance the age of superannuation
of the AYUSH doctors under the Ministry of AYUSH and working in
CGHS Dispensaries/Hospitals to 65 years with eﬀect from 27.09.2017,
i.e. the date of the approval of the Union Cabinet.
2. The doctors shall hold the administrative posts only till the date
of attaining the age of 62 years and thereafter their services shall be
placed in non-administrative positions.
(ROSHAN JAGGI)
Joint Secretary to the Government of India
Tel.24651953”
7. By notiﬁcation dated 05.01.2018, the Ministry of Personnel, Public
Grievances and Pensions, DoPT notiﬁed the Fundamental (Amendment)
Rules, 2018 whereby Rule 56(bb) in the Fundamental Rules, 1922 (FRs) was
substituted and the age of superannuation of AYUSH doctors was enhanced
to 65 years. The notiﬁcation reads thus:
“MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES
AND PENSIONS
(Department of Personnel and Training)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 5th January, 2018
G.S.R. 27(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso
to article 309 of the Constitution, the President hereby makes the
following rules further to amend the Fundamental Rules, 1922,
namely:—
(1) These rules may be called the Fundamental (Amendment) Rules,
2018.
(2) In the Fundamental Rules, 1922, in rule 56, for clause (bb), the
following shall be substituted, namely:—
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 741
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

“(bb) The age of superannuation in respect of General Duty Medical
Oﬃcers and Specialists included in Teaching, Non-Teaching and
Public Health sub-cadres of Central Health Service, AYUSH doctors,
Civilian doctors under Directorate General of Armed Forces Medical
Services, Medical oﬃcers of Indian Ordnance Factories Health
Services, dental doctors working under Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, doctors of Indian Railways Medical Service and dental
doctors under Ministry of Railways, doctors of General Duty Medical
Oﬃcers sub-cadre of Central Armed Police Forces and Assam Riﬂes
and Specialist Medical oﬃcers of Central Armed Police Forces and
Assam Riﬂes shall be sixty-ﬁve years:
Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other
rules, above doctors except in Central Armed Police Forces and Assam
Riﬂes shall hold the administrative posts till the date of attaining the
age of sixty-two years and thereafter their services shall be placed in
Non-Administrative positions.”
[F.No.25012/4/2016-Estt.(A-IV)]
GYANENDRA DEV TRIPATHI, Jt. Secy.”
8. By letter dated 25.01.2018, the appellant Council circulated the
clariﬁcation letter issued by the Ministry of AYUSH dated 31.10.2017
referred to in para 5 as above. The letter reads thus:
“F 3-8/2017-CCRAS/Vig/3094 Dated: 25 JAN 2018

To
All the Heads of Institutes/Centres/Units functioning
under this Council.
Sub: - Enhancement of superannuation age of 65 years.
Sir/Madam
The undersigned is directed to circulate herewith the clariﬁcation
on the subject mentioned above received from Ministry of AYUSH
vide letter FTS No.32797/2017 dated 31.10.2017 for information.
The contents of Ministry’s letter may be circulated among all oﬃcers
working under your control.
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Yours faithfully

(SB MISRA)
Administrative Oﬃcer (Vigilance)
For Director General”

It is pertinent to note that the letter issued by the appellant Council
dated 25.01.2018 referred to above was never made a subject matter
of challenge.
9. The respondent No. 1 herein preferred a representation dated
22.03.2018 addressed to the appellant No. 2 herein with an appeal to enhance
his age of superannuation up to 65 years i.e., up to 30.04.2023 instead of
30.04.2018. It appears from the materials on record that the representation
preferred by the respondent No. 1 herein before the above was rejected and
a notiﬁcation dated 04.04.2018 was issued by the Council stating that the
respondent No. 1 herein would retire w.e.f. 30.04.2018 upon attaining the
superannuation age of 60 years. The notiﬁcation dated 04.04.2018 reads
thus:
“F. No. 26-3 / 2018-C.C.R.A.S. / Est. 17
Date: 04.04.2018
Notiﬁcation
It is hereby notiﬁed that
Dr. Bikartan Das, Assistant Director (AYUSH), Central Ayurvedic
Research Institute for Hepatobiliary Disorder, Bhubaneswar is retiring
from Council service on attaining the age of superannuation at 60
years on 30.04.2018 (pm). His date of birth is 04.04.1958.
Accordingly, his name will be removed from the list of C.C.R.A.S.

Signature in English Illegible
R.K. Ahluwalia
Dated 27.03.2018
Dy. Director (Administration)
Through Director General”
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 743
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

10. The respondent No. 1 being dissatisﬁed with the aforesaid went
before the CAT, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack by way of Original Application
No. 210 of 2018 and prayed for the following reliefs:
“The Hon’ble Tribunal may be graciously pleased to admit the
Original Application, call for the records and issue notice to the
Respondents and upon hearing the parties declare the impugned
letter of clariﬁcation of Ministry of AYUSH dtd. 31.10.2017 as under
Annexure-4 Series and the letter dtd. 04.04.2018 under Annexure 3
directing the Applicant to retire on 30.04.2018 on attaining age of 60
years, to be illegal, arbitrary unreasonable and discriminatory and
quash the same and direct the Respondent to allow the Applicant to
continue in the service upto 65 years as per amended rules.
x x x
Pending ﬁnalization of the Original Application, the Applicant prays to
stay the order under Annexure-3 and allow the Applicant to continue
in the service.”
11. By order dated 17.04.2018 the CAT issued notice, however,
declined to grant any interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1
herein. As CAT declined to grant any interim relief and the respondent No.
1 was to retire on 30.04.2018, he went before the High Court of Orissa,
Cuttack by ﬁling W. P. (C) No. 6663 of 2018 questioning the order passed
by the CAT declining to grant any interim relief. The High Court passed
the following order dated 25.04.2018:
“SI. No. of Order- 03
Date of Order- 25.04.2018
Heard Mr. B. Senapati, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Mr. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General.
This Writ Petition has been ﬁled by the petitioner challenging
the order dated 17.04.2018 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 260/210/2018 wherein
the Tribunal while issuing notice directed the opposite parties to ﬁle
their reply on the interim prayers and regular counter.
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

As it appears that the Central Government has taken a decision
under the Ministry of AYUSH to enhance the age of retirement of
the Doctors up to 65 years. However, so far as the petitioner is
concerned, since the notice of superannuation was issued to him, he
has approached the Tribunal. Since the Original Application is pending
before the Tribunal, without expressing any opinion on the merits of
the case, we dispose of this Writ Petition with an observation that since
the Doctors who are similarly after continuing the age of 65 years
after attaining the age of 60 years, let the Petitioner continue in the
service and let the notice of superannuation under Annexure-3 shall
remain stayed till disposal of the Original Application.
Mr. Bose, learned Assistant Solicitor General submitted that
the central government will ﬁle their counter within a period of two
weeks from today before the Tribunal, in such event the Tribunal may
dispose of the Original Application at the earliest, preferably by end
of June, 2018. Accordingly, we request the Tribunal may dispose of
the Original Application at the earliest/as per its schedule. However,
the petitioner shall not claim any equity.
Sd.- S. Panda, J.
Sd.-K.R. Mohapatra”
12. Thus, from the aforesaid, it appears that the High Court protected
the respondent No. 1 till the disposal of the original application by the CAT.
By virtue of the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 1 continued in service
beyond 30.04.2018.
13. CAT ultimately adjudicated the original application ﬁled by the
respondent No. 1 herein and vide its order dated 02.11.2020 rejected the
same holding that the respondent no. 1 is not entitled to seek parity with
AYUSH doctors in regard to the age of superannuation.
14. The sum and substance of the ﬁndings recorded by the CAT may
be summarised as under:
(i) The Fundamental Rules notiﬁed under Article 309 of the Constitution
of India are applicable to the employees working directly under the
Government of India. Its applicability to the employees of the Council
is on account of Clauses 34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws. This
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 745
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

issue was considered by the Hyderabad Bench of the CAT vide order
dated 04.09.2020, wherein it was observed that-
“Clause 34 of the bye-law makes it crystal clear that the Governing
Body has to take a decision in regard to the enhancement of the
retirement age. The Governing body has no necessity to take a
decision in the context of the Ministry of AYUSH, Govt. of India
having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not
applicable to an autonomous body like CCRAS. Therefore, the
G.O.I. rule of not extending the enhancement of retirement age
to CCRAS compliments the clauses 35 & 47 of the byelaws. We
do not ﬁnd any error in the decision taken by the respondents in
terms of the bye laws.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) CAT did not accept the respondent No. 1’s argument of Clause
35 and application of the Fundamental Rules mutatis mutandis to
the employees of the Council saying that the clause relates to the
general applicability of FRs, Supplementary Rule (SRs) and General
Financial Rules (GFRs) to the Council employees; the same is subject
to the provision speciﬁc to Clause 34 governing superannuation of the
employees of the Council. There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-
Laws to have an overriding eﬀect on Clause 34 regarding retirement
age.
(iii) Clause 47 of the Bye-Laws makes it clear that for the matters
not speciﬁcally provided in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to
the government employees would apply. But since there is a speciﬁc
provision regarding superannuation in Clause 34, the rules governing
government servants in respect of superannuation will not be applicable
to the employees of the Council unless it is in accordance with Clause
34 of the Bye-Laws.
(iv) There is nothing in the Cabinet resolution in question and in the
amended FR-56(bb) to show that these decisions are applicable to
the employees of the autonomous institutions. The assumption of the
respondent No. 1 that the FR-56, as amended from time to time, is
automatically applicable to the Council employees is not correct since
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

it is subject to the provisions of Clauses 34 & 35 respectively of the
Bye-Laws.
(v) There is nothing wrong with the clarification letter dated
31.10.2017. It cannot be stated to be overriding the Cabinet decision
in question, and the objection to the letter on that ground is not
sustainable. The clariﬁcation letter was circulated by the Council by
a subsequent letter dated 25.01.2018 among its oﬃcers, after issuance
of the ﬁrst amendment to FR-56. This implies that the Council, which
is the employer of the respondent No.1, had consciously accepted the
clariﬁcation of the Ministry. The respondent No. 1 had not challenged
the Council’s letter dated 25.01.2018 but had only challenged the
AYUSH Ministry’s letter dated. 31.10.2017.
(vi) There is nothing in the pleadings of the respondent No.1 to show
that the amended FR-56(bb) is applicable to the employees of the
Council, except for citing the provisions of the Bye-Laws. As per
Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws, the rules governing the retirement of the
government employees will be applicable to the employees of the
Council as adopted by the Governing Body. This means that the unless
the Governing Body adopts the changes in rules for the retirement of
government servants, such changes are not automatically applicable
to the employees of the Council.
(vii) The CAT placed reliance on the decision of this Court in DDA
v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, reported in (2008)
2 SCC 672 to hold that there are certain speciﬁc grounds on which
a policy decision can be subjected to judicial review, and in this
situation there was no valid ground to challenge the policy decision of
the AYUSH Ministry as per the clariﬁcation letter dated 31.10.2017.
(viii) In the last, the CAT considered that even if the respondent
No.1’s contention that he had treated patients was to be accepted, such
acceptance could not have negated the decision taken by the Ministry of
AYUSH in its clariﬁcation letter dated 31.01.2017, which was further
accepted by the Council in its subsequent letter dated 25.01.2018.
15. The respondent No. 1 feeling dissatisﬁed with the aforesaid order
passed by the CAT challenged the same before the High Court in W.P.(C)
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 747
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

No. 30620 of 2020. The High Court allowed the writ application ﬁled by
the respondent No. 1 holding as under:
“On the analysis of the above factual matrix, we ﬁnd that though the
petitioner is functioning as Researcher under the Research Council/
National Institute, but as a requirement for upgrading the research
skill, he treats patients in the OPD and IPD. In fact, he performs similar
nature of duties like AYUSH doctor. Though his service condition is
covered by diﬀerent laws, but for all practical purposes, the petitioner
is performing like a doctor. Though there is a clear-cut distinguishing
features between the AYUSH doctor and that of the petitioner. The
petitioner herein is also treating the patients like AYUSH doctors in
the OPDs and IPDs on regular basis.
The Clause-34 and 35 of the bye-laws extends the force of the argument
of the petitioner to be treated as AYUSH doctor, even though he has
been appointed as Researcher.
Clauses-34 & 35 of the said bye-laws deal with superannuation which
read as under:
“34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the
Government of India as amended from time to time or as desired
by the Governing Body shall apply to the employees of the Central
Council. Provided that an employee can be retained in service
after prescribed age of superannuation if he continues to be
physically ﬁt and eﬃcient and it is in the interest of the Central
Council to retain him in service.
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General
Financial Rules of Government of India as amended from time
to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central
Council.”
In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the view taken
by the learned Tribunal vide its decision dated 02.11.2020 is
erroneous.
The learned CAT, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack has failed to consider the
petitioner’s duty and devotion in treating the OPD and IPD patients.
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Hence, the order dated 02.11.2020 passed by the learned CAT, Cuttack
Bench, Cuttack is liable to be quashed and accordingly, it is quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, the plain reading of the impugned order passed by the
High Court referred to above would indicate that what weighed with the
High Court was that the respondent No. 1 herein used to treat patients like
AYUSH doctors in the Out-Patient Departments (OPDs) and In-Patient
Departments (IPDs) on regular basis and the duty and devotion exhibited
by the respondent No. 1 in treating the OPD and IPD patients would
entitle him to claim the beneﬁt of the enhanced age of superannuation
i.e., up to 65 years. The High Court recorded the said ﬁnding despite
acknowledging that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a researcher
under the Research Council and his service conditions were governed by
diﬀerent laws. Of course, the High Court also took support of Clauses
34 and 35 respectively of the Bye-Laws while granting relief to the
respondent No. 1.
17. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here
before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
18. Mr. Aman Lekhi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants made the following submissions:
a. The issue involved in the present case is the entitlement to
seek extension in superannuation age as per FR 56(bb) and its
applicability to the appellant Council which is an autonomous
body. The said FR has been amended from time to time and the
rule applicable in the present case i.e. at the time of the retirement
of the respondent No. 1 is of 05.01.2018.
b. The respondent No. 1 was an employee of CCRAS having joined
as Research Assistant and his terms of service were governed under
the Rules of CCRAS. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of
Research Oﬃcer and at the time of superannuation he was holding
the post of an Assistant Director.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 749
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

c. The relevant clauses of CCRAS which are applicable to the facts
of the present case are Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 and 47 of CCRAS Bye-
Laws which are extracted herein for the sake of convenience:
“Appointments
25.(a)...
(b) Recruitments, appointments and promotions to all posts shall be
made according to the recruitment rules laid down by the Governing
Body or designated competent authority for the posts. Selection shall
be made through the Selection Committees/Departmental Promotion
Committees duly constituted with the approval of the respective
appointing authority.
Superannuation
34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of Government
of India as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing
Body shall apply to the employees of the Central Council. Provided
that an employee can be retained in service after the prescribed age
of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁt and eﬃcient
and it is in the interest of the Central Council to retain him in service.
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial
Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time shall apply
mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central Council.
Xxx xxx xxx
Other Conditions of Service
47. In respect of matters not provided for in these regulations the rules
as applicable to Central Government servants regarding the general
conditions of service, pay, allowances T.A. and daily allowances,
foreign service terms, deputation in India and abroad, etc. and orders
and decisions issued in this regard by the Central Government from
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the
Central Council.”
(Emphasis supplied)
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

d. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rules indicates that the employees
are recruited through a selection committee of the Council and the FRs
will not directly apply where the Governing Body ﬁnalises the rules
of superannuation.
e. In terms of Clause 34, the Governing Body had decided to ﬁx the
age of superannuation to be 60 years on 01.12.1998. The said decision
was ratiﬁed on 27.01.2000 in the 14th Meeting of the Governing Body
of CCRAS as Agenda Item No. GB 14.4.
f. The decision of the Governing Body as aforementioned applied on
30.04.2018 i.e. the date of superannuation of the Respondent.
g. No reference has been made by the respondent No. 1 to the
aforementioned decision of the governing body in his representation.
In fact, the Respondent relied on Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws which on
its terms indicates that the rules governing the retirement of employees
of Government of India will not apply in the instant case.
h. Reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 in its representation on the
case of Salma Khatoon is equally inapt as the relevant rule in the said
case was diﬀerent from the Clause 34 of Bye-Laws herein. The said
case pertained to the Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine
(‘CCRUM’) which is governed by its own rules and regulation and
the applicable rule in that case was worded diﬀerently. Moreover, the
said case is still pending before the High Court of Delhi. The interim
order in favour of Salma Khatoon was vacated by this Court in the
case of Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine v. Dr. Salma
Khatoon and Others reported as 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1332.
i. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench (‘CAT’)
rightly held that the assumption of the respondent No. 1 that FR 56 is
automatically applicable is not correct as it is subject to Clause 34 of
the Bye-Laws of CCRAS.
j. The very same grounds as aforesaid were urged by the Appellants
in the Counter Aﬃdavit ﬁ led by them before the High Court of
Orissa.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 751
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

k. While passing the impugned order, the High Court acknowledges
that the respondent No. 1 was working as a Researcher and his service
conditions were covered by a diﬀerent clause. Strangely, however,
the High Court makes no reference to Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws.
This is despite the fact that the appellants had clearly pleaded that
the respondent was not entitled to relief in terms of Clause 34 and
that FR 56 was not applicable to him. Pertinently, this submission
has been recorded by the High Court itself as also the clariﬁcation
of 31.10.2017 and the separate method of recruitment. These factors
were not considered while passing the impugned order.
l. The impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable as it is against
the following settled propositions of law:
(i) Even a Constitutional Court cannot substitute the existing
service conditions of an employee. V.M. Gadre v. M.G. Diwan
and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 454 para 10 at page 459.
(ii) A writ in the nature of mandamus cannot be issued to frame
a policy in a particular manner. Census Commissioner and
Others v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796 para 25-26 at
page 806-807.
(iii) The Court cannot fasten monetary liability on State
instrumentality unless it emerges from the rights and liabilities
canvassed in the lis itself. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others
v. Rajesh Chander Sood and Others, (2016) 10 SCC 77 para
88 at page 160.
(iv) Employees of autonomous bodies are governed by their
own rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity with
government employees. T.M. Sampath and Others v. Secretary,
Ministry of Water Resources and Others, (2015) 5 SCC 333
para 3 at page 336 & para 15 at page 345; State of Maharashtra
and Another v. Bhagwan and Others, (2022) 4 SCC 193 para
24-26 at page 203-204.
m. The reliance placed by the respondent No. 1 on the judgment of
this Court North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Ram Naresh
Sharma and Others reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 540 is completely
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

misplaced. The issue in the said case pertained to diﬀerent dates of
enhancement of age of superannuation of AYUSH and CHS doctors
of NDMC. In the said case, the policy decision of enhancing the age
of superannuation to 65 years was adopted by NDMC for AYUSH
doctors but it was applied from a later date which was found to
be discriminatory. Whereas, in the present case the appellant is an
autonomous body with its own service rules and the government
decision was never adopted by the Governing Body at any point of
time.
n. The reference made to the appointment of Director of the Institute
of Teaching and Research in Ayurveda (‘ITRA’) in context with the
retirement age of 65 years is wholly misplaced. The appointments
to ITRA are made as per the provisions of the Institute of Teaching
and Research in Ayurveda Act, 2020. Section 5(e) of the Act, 2020
provides for the tenure of the Director of 5 years or until the age of
65 years whichever is earlier. Hence, the respondent No. 1 who is
not covered under the provisions of the said Act cannot claim parity
with the employees of ITRA.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
19. Mr. Col. R. Balasubramanian, the learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondent No. 1 made the following submissions:
a. His client is an AYUSH Doctor being fully and duly qualiﬁed in
Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery (BAMS). The fact that
his client is an AYUSH Doctor is admitted by the appellants in their
counter aﬃdavit ﬁled before the CAT. As per the existing rule, those
who have completed BAMS from any University of India, which is
recognised by the Central Council for Indian Medicine (CCIM) and
who have registered under any State Council of Indian Medicine or
CCIM, New Delhi are AYUSH Doctors. This is also admitted by
AYUSH in their RTI reply.
b. That being a duly qualiﬁed AYUSH doctor, the respondent No.
1 was appointed as a Research Associate in the Central Research
Institute (Ayurveda), Bhuvaneshwar under the Control of the Ministry
of AYUSH, vide appointment letter dated 03.10.1985. The terms
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 753
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of appointment speciﬁcally stated inter alia, in para 2 (vi) & (vii)
thereof, that “Private or Consultancy service is strictly prohibited”
and that “Other terms and conditions of service will be governed by
the rules and instruction applicable to similar personnel under the
Government of India” respectively. Further it was stated that the
pay and dearness allowances etc. will be as applicable to the Central
Government servants of equivalent status and will be governed by
the CCS Rules as amended by the Government of India from time
to time.
c. The fact that the Institute where the respondent No. 1was serving is
under the ‘pervasive control’ of the Government/Ministry is admitted
by the appellants in their counter aﬃdavit ﬁled before the CAT and
also in the Counter aﬃdavit ﬁled before the High Court. Therefore,
two factual aspects are admitted and it is beyond any doubt that (i) the
respondent No. 1 is an AYUSH Doctor and (ii) the Institute is under
the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH.
d. In view of the aforesaid admitted facts, it is evident more particularly
from the Union Cabinet decision of the appellants that the Government
of India had approved the enhancement of age of superannuation
from 60 to 65 years. This decision of the Cabinet was applicable
to the respondent No. 1. In terms of the said decision at “iii. that
the superannuation age has been enhanced to 65 years in respect of
doctors under their administrative control of the respective Ministries/
Departments [M/o of AYUSH (AYUSH Doctors,………”.
e. The Cabinet has not made any distinction or diﬀerence in treatment
between the AYUSH Doctors working under the administrative
control of the Ministry of AYUSH in the matter of enhancement of
retirement age up to 65 years. It is reiterated that only two conditions
are required to be satisﬁed to avail the enhanced age of superannuation
up to 65 years of age viz., (i) AYUSH Doctor and (ii) being under the
Administrative Control of the Ministry. Therefore, the respondent No.
1 is squarely covered by the Cabinet’s decision and is entitled to the
enhanced age of retirement of 65 years.
f. That accordingly, Rule 56(bb) of the Fundamental Rules, 1922,
which is a statutory rule framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

the Constitution of India, was amended vide Gazette Notiﬁcation
dated 05th January, 2018 in terms of which the age of superannuation
inter alia of the AYUSH doctors [3rd line of amended Rule (bb)
shall be sixty-ﬁve years. This was further amended vide the Gazette
Notiﬁcation dated 11.08.2018 categorically laying down that the age
of superannuation of doctors belonging to various cadres including
AYUSH and working under the Ministry of AYUSH shall be 62 years
unless they opt to continue in teaching, consultancy, etc in which case
it shall extend up to 65 years. Therefore, even in the 2nd Gazette all
the AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry of AYUSH were
included without any distinction whether working in the Ministry or
in any autonomous body.
g. That contrary to the Cabinet decision, the impugned letter dated
31.10.2017 was issued denying the extension of age up to 65 years to
the AYUSH doctors working in autonomous bodies like the respondent
No. 1. Para 2 of said letter is not sustainable in law and on facts for
the following amongst other reasons:-
i. That the decision was a Cabinet decision and the same could not have
been diluted or misinterpreted by the impugned letter of a subordinate
functionary viz., a Senior Consultant working in the Ministry of
AYUSH by excluding the AYUSH Doctors working in the autonomous
bodies under the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH.
ii. That there is no Cabinet approval to exclude the AYUSH doctors
working in autonomous bodies. Therefore, the impugned letter is
contrary to the Cabinet decision and on this count alone the same
cannot be enforced against the respondent No. 1.
iii. The letter dated 31.10.2017 in any case stood overruled/superseded
in view of the subsequent Gazettes dated 05.01.2018 and 11.08.2018
respectively.
iv. That the sub classiﬁcation introduced by the impugned letter
besides being contrary to the Cabinet decision, is a suspect
classiﬁcation, and it is directly violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21
respectively of the Constitution of India. The reason being ﬁrst, there
is no rationale or nexus with the object which it seeks to achieve i.e,
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 755
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

exclusion of the AYUSH Doctors working in autonomous bodies
and secondly, it creates an artiﬁcial distinction of AYUSH doctors
working in the Ministry and elsewhere, although both are similarly
qualiﬁed and discharge functions of OPD/IPD treatment of patients
including surgery etc, albeit at diﬀerent places. The respondent No.
1 also drew NPA (Non-Practicing Allowance). These facts have not
been disputed.
v. That it is well settled in law where the classiﬁcation has no nexus with
the object it seeks to achieve and that there is artiﬁcial distinction the
same would fall foul of Articles 14 and 21 in the matter of conditions
of service of an employee.
vi. That even otherwise, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to the beneﬁt
of enhanced age of retirement of 65 years on the strength of plain
reading of Clause 34 of the Society Rules extracted @ Pg 12 of the
Judgement by the High Court, on which extensive reliance is placed
by the appellants contending that the applicability of the extension
of age is dependent upon the decision to be taken by the Governing
Body of the autonomous body, and hence the Central Govt rule of age
of superannuation is not automatic. This contention is not correct for
the following reasons:
- Clause 34 is in two parts. The ﬁrst part is that the rules governing
the retirement of employees of the Government of India as
amended from to time shall apply to the employees of the Central
Council. The plain and simple reading of this part makes it clear
and unambiguous that the rules governing the retirement of
Central Government employees as amended from time to time
shall apply.
- The second part of Clause 34 “or as desired by the Governing
Body” is merely an enabling provision to enable the Governing
Body to take a decision regarding retention of an employee beyond
the prescribed age of superannuation. In other words, the ‘desire’ of
Governing Body is to extend the age of an employee even beyond
prescribed age if he continues to be physically ﬁt and eﬃcient and
it is in the interest of the Council to retain him in service.
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

- Therefore, the second part of Clause 34 really gives power to the
Governing Body to retain an employee even after the prescribed
age of superannuation provided the conditions for grant of such
retention is met. This power cannot be negatively read to clothe the
Governing Body with power to prescribe less age of superannuation
than what is prescribed by the Central Government from time to
time.
- While the age of superannuation of an employee of the Central
Council shall be at par with the age of superannuation prescribed
by the Central Government, the Governing body has the enabling
power to retain the employee even beyond the age of superannuation
in organisational interest.
- It is submitted that Clause 34 cannot be read negatively to deny
the age of increase given by the Cabinet to AYUSH Doctors by
wrongly interpreting Clause 34.
vii. That the terms and conditions of service of employees of the
Council on all other aspects like Provident Fund/ GPF, Pension, Gratuity,
Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules, and other conditions of service
are the same as applicable to Central Government employees as set out in
Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44, and 47 respectively of the Rules. Therefore, in
the matter of age of superannuation the respondent No. 1 cannot be treated
diﬀerently.
viii. That the appellants on one hand claim that the AYUSH doctors
working in autonomous bodies are not entitled to increase in age of
superannuation up to 65 years whereas other AYUSH doctors working in the
Ministry of AYUSH and other autonomous institutions have been granted
extension of age up to 65 years.
ix. That similarly, AYUSH doctors working in CGHS have been
granted increase in age up to 65 years vide letter dated 24.11.2017. Therefore,
the letter not to grant identical beneﬁt to the respondent No. 1 is not only
arbitrary but it is discriminatory and hence it is unsustainable.
h. This Court has dealt with the issue of extension of age of
superannuation of similar AYUSH doctors working in the NDMC in Dr. Ram
Naresh Sharma (supra), where in paras 23 and 24 it was held as follows:
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 757
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

“23. The common contention of the appellants before us is that
classiﬁcation of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in diﬀerent
categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not
appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the ﬁndings of the Tribunal
and the Delhi High Court that the classiﬁcation is discriminatory and
unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the
same function of treating and healing their patients. The only diﬀerence
is that AYUSH doctors are using indigenous systems of medicine
like Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are using Allopathy for
tending to their patients. In our understanding, the mode of treatment
by itself under the prevalent scheme of things, does not qualify as an
intelligible diﬀerentia. Therefore, such unreasonable classiﬁcation and
discrimination based on it would surely be inconsistent with Article 14
of the Constitution. The order of AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017
extending the age of superannuation to 65 Years also endorses such
a view. This extension is in tune with the notiﬁcation of Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare dated 31.05.2016.
24. The doctors, both under AYUSH and CHS, render service to
patients and on this core aspect, there is nothing to distinguish them.
Therefore, no rational justiﬁcation is seen for having diﬀerent dates
for bestowing the beneﬁt of extended age of superannuation to these
two categories of doctors. Hence, the order of AYUSH Ministry
(F. No. D. 14019/4/2016-E-I (AYUSH)) dated 24.11.2017 must be
retrospectively applied from 31.05.2016 to all concerned respondent-
doctors, in the present appeals. All consequences must follow from
this conclusion.”
i. The appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs and directions be
issued to the appellants to release the consequential beneﬁts including arrears
of salary for the period from 01.05 2018 to 30.04.2023 which would cover the
entire period of 5 years of increase in age of superannuation. The respondent
No. 1 worked from 25.04.2018 following the order of stay grated by the
High Court till 05.04.2021 when stay was granted by this Court following
which the services of the respondent No. 1 were abruptly ended.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENORS/
APPLICANTS IN I.A. NO. 90789 OF 2022 IN SLP (C) NO. 4110 OF 2021
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

20. It is the case of the intervenors/applicants that their W.P.(C) Nos.
9554 of 2018 and 9584 of 2018 respectively are pending adjudication
before the High Court of Delhi and one Original Application No. 272 of
2020 before CAT, Lucknow Bench. They submitted that the ﬁnal outcome
of the present appeal will have a direct impact on the aforesaid litigations.
The intervenors claim that they are doctors under another corporation of
AYUSH, namely, CCRUM.
21. Submissions canvassed on their behalf are as under:
a. That the Intervenors/applicants are qualiﬁed Unani Doctors by
qualiﬁcation and are equivalent to any other qualiﬁed Doctors,
be it MBBS Doctors or otherwise.
b. The Intervenors/applicants are working under the Direct
Administrative Control of Ministry of AYUSH and their
service conditions are governed by the Ministry in spite of them
performing the duties in CCRUM.
c. The Intervenors/applicants have been receiving the Non-
Practicing Allowance while working under CCRUM which
clearly indicates that the Intervenors/applicants are indeed
qualiﬁed doctors at par with the other Doctors who also get the
same allowances.
d. The Recruitment Rules which apply to the Intervenors/
applicants are: “for functional purpose, a medical officer
(Ayurveda) when posted in the Ministry of AYUSH will be
designated as Research oﬃcer (Ayurveda) and thus the medical
oﬃcer and Research oﬃcer are one and the same and there cannot
be any distinction between the two”.
e. That the Government of India (Cabinet) vide its order has
granted the beneﬁt of enhancement of superannuation age to
65 years to the doctors under the administrative control of the
respective Ministries/Department (Ministry of AYUSH) (AYUSH
doctors) which is fully applicable to the doctors working under
the appellant council but the Ministry of AYUSH erroneously
by their mis-interpretation has excluded the beneﬁts to doctors
working under autonomous bodies like the council. It is because
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 759
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of the wrong interpretation made by the Ministry of AYUSH, the
said beneﬁt was erroneously denied to the AYUSH doctors like
the Intervenors/applicants.
f. That the Govt. of India vide its own order dated 02.11.2020
has given the said beneﬁt to the Director of ITRA and enhanced
the age of superannuation to 65 years. Therefore, as per own
interpretation made by the Ministry of AYUSH, the beneﬁt of
enhancement of superannuation of age is fully applicable to all
doctors (working in any capacity including researcher) who are
under the administrative control of AYUSH and when Govt. of
India (Cabinet) did not exclude the autonomous institution like
Intervenors/applicants council then the Ministry of AYUSH has
no right to diﬀerentiate and deny the beneﬁt of superannuation to
the Intervenors/applicants.
g. It is submitted that Clauses-34 & 35 of the Bye-Laws issued
by the CCRAS, deals with superannuation and prescribes that the
Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial
Rules of the Government of India as amended from time to time
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Central
Council.
h. It is submitted that the Intervenors/applicants during their entire
tenure performed duties like treating patients in OPD and IPD
along with research activities which would clearly establish that
the Intervenors/applicants have been attending the patients, both,
the OPDs and IPDs. The Intervenors/applicants have worked for
prestigious hospitals like the RML & DDU while performing duties
which include treating the patients along with Research work.
i. It is submitted that Non-Practicing Allowance has been given
to the doctors working under Intervenor/applicants council and
the said beneﬁt was given to the Intervenor/applicants as well
which clearly contradicts the stand of council that the Intervenors/
applicants were not performing the duties of doctors. In fact,
the Non-Practicing Allowance has been sanctioned only on the
basis that the Intervenors/applicants are qualiﬁed doctors and are
performing the duties of Clinical Doctor which includes the OPD
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

& IPD duties and thus are not allowed to practice outside the scope
of their oﬃcial duties and in lieu were given the Non-Practicing
Allowance.
j. It is submitted that those doctors are considered as AYUSH
doctors who have completed the degree course either in BAMS,
BHMS, BUMS, BNYS & BSM in Ayurveda, Homeopathy,
Unami, Siddha, Yoga and Naturopathy and are at par with any
other qualiﬁed Doctors.
k. The Intervenors/applicants Council is an autonomous body
under the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India and the
Council has a Governing Body comprising of the Union Minister-
In-Charge of AYUSH as its President and Secretary, Ministry of
AYUSH as its Vice President. Its Bye-Laws reveal the pervasive
control of the Union Government over the Central Council.
l. The aforesaid is clearly depicted from the Bye-Laws of
Intervenor/applicants council. That the Clauses - 34 and 35 of
the Bye-Laws deal with the superannuation of the employees of
the Council which are quoted herein below: Clauses-34 & 35 of
the said Bye-Laws deal with superannuation which read as under:
“34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the
Government of India as amended from time to time or as
desired by the Governing Body shall apply to the employees
of the Central Council. Provided that an employee can be
retired in service after prescribed age of superannuation if
he continues to be physically ﬁt and eﬃcient and it is in the
interest of the Central Council to retain him in service.
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General
Financial Rules of Government of India as amended from
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the
Central Council.”
m. That, the clariﬁcation of Ministry of AYUSH vide its letter dated
31.10.2017 is not only misconceived but also uncalled for, arbitrary
and discriminatory. The same is also contrary to the object for which
the Central Council is established. The aforesaid clariﬁcation would
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 761
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

rather frustrate the objectives for which the Central Council was
established. The same is against Public Policy and liable to be struck
down and the High Court of Orrisa rightly gave decision in favour of
the respondent in the instant appeal.
n. That the Intervenor/applicants though were appointed as researcher
but along with that they have been performing duties of doctors like
treating patient in OPD, IPD etc. and for which requisite certiﬁcate
was issued to them time to time.
ANALYSIS
22. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through materials placed on record the only question that falls
for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in
passing the impugned judgment?
23. The appellant Council is an autonomous body registered under
the Society Registration Act, 1860 and is administratively controlled by the
Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India. It is a body constituted for the
purpose of undertaking, cooperating, formulating, developing and promoting
the research on scientiﬁc guidelines in Ayurvedic Sciences. The recruitment
rules, procedure and the service conditions of these employees are governed
by the Bye-Laws and Memorandum of Association of the Council.
24. With a view to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the
litigating parties before us, we must look into the Clauses 25(b), 34, 35
and 47 of the Bye-Laws in the Memorandum of Association of the Central
Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences:
“Appointments
25. (a)...
(b) Recruitments, appointments and promotions to all posts shall be
made according to the recruitment rules laid down by the Governing
Body or designated competent authority for the posts. Selection shall
be made through the Selection Committees/Departmental Promotion
Committees duly constituted with the approval of the respective
appointing authority.
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Superannuation
34. The rules governing the retirement of employees of the Government
of India as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing
Body shall apply to the employees of the Central Council. Provided
that an employee can be retained in service after the prescribed age
of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁt and eﬃcient
and it is in the interest of the Central Council to retain him in service.
35. The Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and General Financial
Rules of Government of India as amended from time to time shall apply
mutatis mutandis to employees of the Central Council.
Other Conditions of Service
47. In respect of matters not provided for in these regulations the rules
as applicable to Central Government servants regarding the general
conditions of service, pay, allowances T.A. and daily allowances,
foreign service terms, deputation in India and abroad, etc. and orders
and decisions issued in this regard by the Central Government from
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the
Central Council.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
25. A plain reading of the aforesaid clauses of the Bye-Laws would
indicate that the employees are recruited through a selection committee of
the Council. It further indicates that the Fundamental Rules, 1922 will have
no direct application in cases where the governing body ﬁnalises the rules
of superannuation. In terms of Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws, the governing
body had decided the age of superannuation to be 60 years on 01.12.1998.
The said decision was ratiﬁed on 27.01.2000, in the 14th meeting of the
governing body of the Council.
26. In our view, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants
is right in his submission that the decision of the governing body dated
27.12.2000 applied on 30.04.2018 i.e., the date of superannuation of the
respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was working as
a researcher and the service conditions of a Research Assistant are altogether
diﬀerent compared to the AYUSH Doctor. It is also not in dispute that the
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 763
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

method of recruitment of the respondent No. 1 is diﬀerent compared to that
with the AYUSH doctors.
27. The principal argument canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is that the provisions of FR
56(bb) would apply to the respondent No. 1 in his capacity as an employee
of the Council in view of Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws of the Council referred
to above, by which the provisions of the FR and SR would apply to the
employees of the Council mutatis mutandis. On the other hand, the case
put up by the appellants is that the said provisions are not applicable to the
employees of the Council in view of the clariﬁcation of the Ministry dated
31.10.2017. In regard to the clariﬁcation of the Ministry vide its letter dated
31.10.2017, the stance of the respondent No. 1 is that such clariﬁcation
cannot override the decision of the Cabinet or the provisions of the FR 56
as amended.
28. The aforesaid aspect was duly considered by the CAT. The CAT
rightly took the view that the argument canvassed on behalf of the respondent
No. 1, that the Council failed to consider the Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws
referred to above, which states that the FR, SR and (GFR) as amended from
time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to employees of the Council, was
without any merit and deserved to be rejected. The CAT in our opinion
rightly rejected such argument. We say so because the applicability would be
subject to the provision speciﬁc to the Clause 34 governing superannuation
of the employees of the Council.
29. There is nothing in Clause 35 of the Bye-Laws referred to above
on the basis of which, it could be said that the same will have an overriding
eﬀect on Clause 34 as regards the age of retirement. Clause 47 of the Bye-
Laws makes it abundantly clear that for the matters not speciﬁcally provided
in the Bye-Laws, the rules applicable to the government employees would
apply. However, as there is a speciﬁc provision regarding superannuation
in Clause 34, the rules governing the government services in respect of
superannuation are not applicable to the employees of the Council unless
it is in accordance with Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws.
30. We shall now deal with one another submission canvassed by
Mr. R. Balasubramanian, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent No. 1. It was submitted that Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

should be read in two parts. The ﬁrst part states that the Rules governing the
retirement of employees of the Government of India as amended from time
to time would apply to the employees of the Central Council. According to
the learned Senior Counsel, the second part of the Clause 34 which reads
“or as desired by the governing body” is merely an enabling provision
empowering the governing body to take a decision whether an employee
deserves to be retained beyond the prescribed age of superannuation.
According to the learned Senior Counsel such power should not be read in
a negative form to clothe the governing body with the power to prescribe
lesser age of superannuation than what has been prescribed by the Central
Government from time to time. We are afraid, we are not in a position to
accept such an argument. The language of Clause 34 is very clear. What is
important to note while reading the Clause 34 is the word “or”. Thereafter,
there is a proviso which says that an employee can be retained in service
after prescribed age of superannuation if he continues to be physically ﬁt
and eﬃcient and it is in the interest of the Central Counsel to retain him in
the service.
31. The expression “the rules governing the retirement of employees
of Government of India as amended from time to time” is separated from
the rest of the part of the Bye-Law by the word “or” which is disjunctive
and giving natural meaning to the said word separates the rules that may be
framed by the Government of India and the rules that the Council may desire
to frame as regards the age of retirement of the employees of the Council.
32. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that
the word “or” is normally disjunctive and the word “and” is normally
conjunctive. Both of them can be read as vice-versa, but that interpretation
is adopted only where the intention of the legislature is manifest.
33. Justice G.P. Singh in the Principles of Statutory Interpretation
(Thirteenth Edition 2012) page 485 has stated as follows:
“The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally
conjunctive but at time they are read as vice versa to give eﬀect to the
manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context. As
stated by SCRUTTON, L.J.: “You do sometimes read “or” as ‘and’ and
in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because ‘or’
does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 765
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

And as pointed out by LORD HALSBURY the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’
is not to be resorted to, “unless some other part of the same statute
or the clear intention of it requires that to be done”. Where provision
is clear and unambiguous the word ‘or’ cannot be read as ‘and’ by
applying the principle of reading down. But if the literal reading of
the words produces an unintelligible or absurd, result ‘and’ may be
read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying
the words is less favourable to the subject provided that the intention
of the Legislature is otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of
‘and’ and ‘or’ produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense
of the portion following ‘and’, ‘or’ cannot be read in place of ‘and’.
The alternatives joined by ‘or’ need not always be mutually exclusive.”
34. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we reject the submission
canvassed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as regards the interpretation
of the Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws. In this context, we may only say that
the governing body of the Council is not obliged to take a decision in tune
with the decision of the Ministry of AYUSH regarding superannuation more
particularly having made it clear that enhancement of retirement age is not
applicable to an autonomous body like CCRAS.
35. We are also not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf
of the respondent No. 1 that as the terms and conditions of the services of
the employees of the Council on all other aspects like the Provident Fund/
GPF, Pension, Gratuity, Leave Rules, Scales of Pay, Conduct Rules and
other conditions of services are the same as applicable to the employees
of the Central Government as set out in Clauses 31, 32, 33, 42, 44 and 47
respectively of the Bye-Laws, the matter of age of superannuation of the
respondent No. 1 should not be treated diﬀerently. What should be the age
of superannuation is a matter of policy. It is not within the domain of the
court to legislate. It is only if a policy decision or a notiﬁcation is arbitrary
it may invite the frowns of Article 14 of the Constitution. In any case, the
question of age of retirement stands on a diﬀerent footing from the service
conditions relating to pay and allowances and revision of pay.
36. We may at this stage, refer to the following decision in Tamil Nadu
Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

Association and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in
(1980) 3 SCC 97 : [ SCC pp. 99 SCC (L&S) p. 296, para 7]
“7. In Service Jurisprudence integration is a complicated administrative
problem where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruise to a few
cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints, even some wobbling,
must be left to government without fussy forensic monitoring, since
the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the
executive, not to the court. All life, including administrative life,
involves experiment, trial and error, but within the leading strings of
fundamental rights, and, absent unconstitutional ‘excesses’, judicial
correction is not right. …..”
37. It is too late in the day for the respondent No. 1 to raise all such
issues including infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution on the
ground of artiﬁcial distinction between the Research Assistant and AYUSH
Doctors. The respondent No. 1 knew from day one i.e., from the date of his
appointment that he was being appointed as a Research Assistant. His service
conditions and mode of recruitment are diﬀerent compared to the AYUSH
Doctors. It is a diﬀerent thing that he might have treated the patients but
that by itself would not entitle him to claim that his age of superannuation
should be at par with the AYUSH Doctors.
38. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a decision
of this Court in the case of State of Bihar and Another v. Teachers’
Association of Govt. Engineering College and Others, reported in (2000)
10 SCC 527 wherein, the respondents were teachers of three engineering
colleges owned by the State of Bihar. They were recruited through the Bihar
Public Service Commission. Their service conditions were governed by
the Bihar Service Code. Under the relevant provisions of the Bihar Service
Code, the age of superannuation up to 1989, was 58 years. However, with
eﬀect from 01.10.1989 it was raised to 60 years. They claimed that their
age of retirement should be the same as the age of retirement of Bihar
Engineering College which was a college of the Patna University. Its teachers
were recruited through the University Service Commission. Their service
conditions were governed under the Patna University Act. At the relevant
time, the age of retirement for university teachers was 62 years. However,
with eﬀect from 15.08.1992 the age of retirement was reduced to 60 years.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 767
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

The respondent’s claim was upheld by the High Court. Allowing the State’s
appeal, this Court held:
“5. The respondents contend that their age of retirement should be
the same as the age of retirement of university teachers employed in
Bihar Engineering College, Patna. But the terms and conditions of
service of teachers in the three engineering colleges of the State are
diﬀerent from the terms and conditions of service of the university
teachers employed in Bihar Engineering College at Patna. The
authority responsible for recruitment is also diﬀerent. The method of
recruitment is diﬀerent and service conditions are prescribed under
diﬀerent rules and regulations and/or under a separate Act. We fail
to see how in respect of the teachers who are government servants,
governed by the Bihar Service Code, the age of superannuation should
be diﬀerent from the age of superannuation for all other government
servants governed by the Bihar Service Code. The High Court ought
not to have equated the service conditions in the three State colleges
with the service conditions in a University college. Application of
Article 14, in these circumstances, is misconceived, when there are
valid criteria for diﬀerentiating between the service conditions in the
two sets of colleges. In the premises the impugned judgment of the
High Court insofar as it directs that the age of superannuation of
teachers working in the three engineering colleges other than Bihar
College of Engineering, Patna should be brought on par with the age
of superannuation of those working in Bihar College of Engineering
at Patna, is set aside. The further direction to pay arrears or give
beneﬁts ﬂowing from the extended age of superannuation is also set
aside. The appeals are allowed accordingly.”
39. The only idea with which we have referred to and relied upon
the aforesaid decision is to convey that the case on hand is not one of
discrimination. Article 14 of the Constitution has no application having
regard to the facts of the present case.
40. Mr. Lekhi, the learned Senior Council appearing for the appellants
placed strong reliance on two decisions of this Court: (i) T.M. Sampath
(supra) and (ii) Bhagwan (supra). Both these decisions have been relied
upon to fortify the contention that the employees of autonomous bodies are
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

governed by their own rules and Bye-Laws and they cannot claim parity
with the government employees. We must look into both these decisions.
Paras 3, 15, 16 and 17 respectively of T.M. Sampath (supra) are as follows:
“3. The facts of these appeals are brieﬂy stated hereinafter. The
appellants herein are the employees of National Water Development
Agency (“NWDA”) which was established as a society in July 1982 and
was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Society
NWDA, which falls under the aegis and control, both administrative
and ﬁnancial, of the Ministry of Water Resources, is fully funded by
the Government of India, headed by the Union Minister for Water
Resources as the President. NWDA framed rules and regulations for
its smooth functioning. Whatever emoluments have been prescribed
for the government servants by the Central Government Office
Memorandum (“the OM”, for short) the same apply mutatis mutandis
to the employees of NWDA. Bye-law 28 of NWDA also mandates
that the rules and orders applicable to the Central Government
employees shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of NWDA
subject to modiﬁcation by the Governing Body concerning service
conditions and only in case of any doubt, the matter has to be referred
to the Governing Body for a decision. Bye-law 26(a) provides for
the emoluments structure for all employees that will be adopted by
NWDA, with the approval of the Ministry of Finance (Department of
Expenditure). Bye-law 28 provides that till such time NWDA frames
its rules governing service conditions of the employees, rules and
orders applicable to the Central Government employees shall apply
mutatis mutandis, subject to such modiﬁcations as made by NWDA
from time to time.
xxx xxx xxx
15. In light of the facts and circumstances of this case and the
submissions made by the learned counsel on both sides, it can be
concluded that NWDA had framed its regulation: the CPF Rules, 1982
and they were duly approved by the Governing Body of NWDA.
As NWDA is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Water
Resources, it has framed its own bye-laws governing the employees.
It has been time and again reiterated that the court must adopt
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 769
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

an attitude of total non-interference or minimal interference in the
matter of interpretation of rules framed by autonomous institutions.
In Kerala SRTC v. K.O. Varghese [(2007) 8 SCC 231 : (2007) 2 SCC
(L&S) 862], this Court held : (SCC pp. 240-41, paras 18 & 21)
“18. … KSRTC is an autonomous corporation established under
the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It can regulate the
services of its employees by making appropriate regulations in
that behalf.
* * *
21. The High Court … is not correct in thinking that there is any
compulsion on KSRTC on the mere adoption of Part III of KSR
to automatically give all enhancements in pension and other
beneﬁts given by the State Government to its employees.”
Thus, as the appellants are governed by the CPF Rules, 1982, the OM
applicable to the Central Government employees is not applicable to
them.”
16. On the issue of parity between the employees of NWDA and
Central Government employees, even if it is assumed that the 1982
Rules did not exist or were not applicable on the date of the OM i.e.
1-5-1987, the relevant date of parity, the principle of parity cannot be
applicable to the employees of NWDA. NWDA cannot be treated as
an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution
merely on the basis that its funds are granted by the Central
Government. In Zee Teleﬁlms Ltd. v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC
649], it was held by this Court that the autonomous bodies having some
nexus with the Government by itself would not bring them within the
sweep of the expression “State” and each case must be determined on
its own merits. Thus, the plea of the employees of NWDA to be treated
on a par with their counterparts in the Central Government under
sub-rule (6)(iv) of Rule 209 of the General Financial Rules, merely
on the basis of funding is not applicable.
17. Even if it is presumed that NWDA is “State” under Article 12 of
the Constitution, the appellants have failed to prove that they are on
a par with their counterparts, with whom they claim parity. As held
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

by this Court in UT, Chandigarh v. Krishan Bhandari [(1996) 11 SCC
348 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 391], the claim to equality can be claimed
when there is discrimination by the State between two persons who
are similarly situated. The said discrimination cannot be invoked in
cases where discrimination sought to be shown is between acts of
two diﬀerent authorities functioning as State under Article 12. Thus,
the employees of NWDA cannot be said to be “Central Government
employees” as stated in the OM for its applicability.”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. The decision in the case of T.M. Sampath (supra) was later referred
to and relied upon by this Court in the case of Bhagwan (supra). This Court
in the Bhagwan (supra) observed in para 26 as under:
“26. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the
employees of the autonomous bodies cannot claim, as a matter of right,
the same service beneﬁts on a par with the government employees.
Merely because such autonomous bodies might have adopted the
Government Service Rules and/or in the Governing Council there may
be a representative of the Government and/or merely because such
institution is funded by the State/Central Government, employees of
such autonomous bodies cannot, as a matter of right, claim parity with
the State/Central Government employees. This is more particularly,
when the employees of such autonomous bodies are governed by their
own Service Rules and service conditions. The State Government and
the autonomous Board/body cannot be put on a par.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
42. We must also look into the decision of this Court in the case
of Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Associations v. State of Kerala
and Others reported in AIR 2018 SC 2652, wherein the Assistant Public
Prosecutors were seeking parity with respect to the age of superannuation
to that of Public Prosecutors. This Court took notice of the fact that the
method of selection between the two posts is very diﬀerent and that the
former are considered to be government employees, whereas the latter
are not. The Court thereafter, proceeded to hold that merely because the
nature of work between the two is similar, the same does not imply that the
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 771
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

age of superannuation ought to be similar as well. The relevant portion is
produced hereunder:
“6. … The fact that the nature of duties and functions of Assistant
Public Prosecutors and Public Prosecutors are similar, per se, cannot
be the basis to claim parity with Public Prosecutors in respect of age
of superannuation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. In Union of India and Others v. Lieut (Mrs) E. Iacats, reported
in (1997) 7 SCC 334, the respondent therein had ﬁled a writ petition in the
Guahati High Court challenging her retirement at the age of 55 years on the
ground that in other nursing services under the military establishment the
age of retirement was 58 years. It was argued before the High Court that it
was discriminatory to retire the nurses who were appointed for local service
only at the age of 55 years. The Petition was allowed by the High Court.
The UOI came before this Court in appeal. This Court while allowing the
appeal ﬁled by the UOI, observed as under:
“ 3. … If diﬀerent nursing services are constituted under separate
army instructions carrying their own separate terms and conditions
of service, one cannot complain of discrimination if the ages of
retirement prescribed under these diﬀerent services are diﬀerent. Each
will be governed by its own rules and regulations. The respondent
is, therefore, not justiﬁed in claiming that she has been discriminated
against because she has retired at the age of 55.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. The age of superannuation is always governed by the statutory rules
governing appointment on a particular post. Hence, even if it is averred that
the nature of work involved in the two posts is similar, the same cannot be a
ground to increase or alter the service conditions of an employee as each post
is governed by its own set of rules. The same was held in the case of New
Okhla Industrial Development Authority and Another v. B D Singhal and
Others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 3457, wherein this Court held as under:
“24. … Since the enhancement of the age of superannuation is a
‘public function’ channelised by the provisions of the statute and the service
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

regulations, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to challenge
the action of NOIDA.”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. We shall now look into the decision of this Court in Dr. Ram
Naresh Sharma (supra). This decision of this Court has been relied upon
by Mr. R. Bala, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent
No. 1. He has relied upon paras 23 and 24 respectively which read thus:
“23. The common contention of the appellants before us is that
classiﬁcation of AYUSH doctors and doctors under CHS in diﬀerent
categories is reasonable and permissible in law. This however does not
appeal to us and we are inclined to agree with the ﬁndings of the Tribunal
and the Delhi High Court that the classiﬁcation is discriminatory and
unreasonable since doctors under both segments are performing the
same function of treating and healing their patients. The only diﬀerence
is that AYUSH doctors are using indigenous systems of medicine
like Ayurveda, Unani, etc. and CHS doctors are using Allopathy for
tending to their patients. In our understanding, the mode of treatment
by itself under the prevalent scheme of things, does not qualify as an
intelligible diﬀerentia. Therefore, such unreasonable classiﬁcation and
discrimination based on it would surely be inconsistent with Article 14
of the Constitution. The order of AYUSH Ministry dated 24.11.2017
extending the age of superannuation to 65 Years also endorses such
a view. This extension is in tune with the notiﬁcation of Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare dated 31.05.2016.
24. The doctors, both under AYUSH and CHS, render service to
patients and on this core aspect, there is nothing to distinguish them.
Therefore, no rational justiﬁcation is seen for having diﬀerent dates for
bestowing the beneﬁt of extended age of superannuation to these two
categories of doctors. Hence, the order of AYUSH Ministry (F. No. D.
14019/4/2016EI (AYUSH)) dated 24.11.2017 must be retrospectively
applied from 31.05.2016 to all concerned respondent doctors, in the
present appeals. All consequences must follow from this conclusion.”
46. The aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Ram Naresh
Sharma (supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 773
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

respondent No. 1 is of no avail for the simple reason that in the said case, the
only question that arose was whether the beneﬁt of enhancement of age of
retirement from 60 years to 65 years granted in favour of allopathy doctors
was available even for ayurveda doctors or not? The said decision was based
upon an order of the Ministry of AYUSH dated 24.11.2017.
47. As seen from paragraph 23 of the said decision referred to above,
the age of retirement of allopathy doctors was enhanced by an order dated
31.05.2016 issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. This
was followed by consequential amendment of the Fundamental Rules and
Supplementary Rules, 1922. Since, Ayurveda doctors were not covered
by the Ministry’s order dated 31.05.2016, the Ayurveda doctors ﬁled
applications before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal
allowed the applications by an order dated 24.08.2017. The North Delhi
Municipal Corporation (Employer) ﬁled writ petitions before the High Court
of Delhi challenging the decision of the Tribunal. During the pendency of
the writ petitions, the Ministry of AYUSH issued an order dated 24.11.2017
enhancing the age of retirement of AYUSH doctors also to 65 years, but
w.e.f. 27.09.2017. It is in that context that this Court held as aforesaid in
Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (supra). Thus, this decision is in no manner helpful
to the respondent No. 1.
48. We may only say that the entire approach of the High Court towards
the present litigation was incorrect. We are a bit disappointed to observe
that the High Court dealt with the present litigation in a very casual manner.
First, the High Court went to the extent of granting interim relief
extending the period of service beyond 60 years till the disposal of the
Original Petition by the CAT. By virtue of such interim order which the
High Court ordinarily should not grant, the respondent No. 1 although was
to retire in 2018 yet continued in service till 2021. It is only when this Court
stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the High Court while
issuing notice that the service of the respondent No. 1 came to an end. The
Court or the Tribunal should, therefore, be slow and circumspect in granting
interim relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of
unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds,
he can always be compensated. But if he fails, he would have enjoyed
undeserved beneﬁt of extended service and merely caused injustice to his
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

immediate junior. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the High Court
was conscious of the fact as very much recorded in the impugned order
that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a Research Assistant and was
functioning as a Researcher under the Research Council and his service
conditions were also diﬀerent compared to the AYUSH doctors serving with
the Ministry of AYUSH. The High Court misdirected itself saying that the
beneﬁt of enhanced age of superannuation can also be granted if the duties
performed are the same like AYUSH doctors. We fail to understand how
can the Court ﬁx the age of superannuation of an employee saying that he
is very much devoted towards his job. The age of superannuation is always
governed by statutory rules & other service conditions.
49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something
important in the aforesaid context:
Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly
when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari.
50. The ﬁrst cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in
granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of
Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which
the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes
the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous
but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The
writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of
the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be
issued on mere asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even
if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal
and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice
between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary
remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal
injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this ﬂexible power
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 775
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal
formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact
situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with
equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal
formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing
in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the ﬁnal
order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would
render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.
52. The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief
history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in
T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440.
The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in
‘all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner’ so long as the broad and
fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated
as follows:
“7. … In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’, the superior court does
not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not
review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination
of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the
order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably
erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the
inferior tribunal …..
8. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of
certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer
in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is
the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualiﬁcations and conditions
of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its
exercise. ….
9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction.”
53. Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), laid down the following
propositions as well established:
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

“(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction,
as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in
excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts
illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides
without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates
the principles of natural justice.
(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a
supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this
is that the court will not review ﬁndings of fact reached by the inferior
court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.”
54. This Court explained that a court which has jurisdiction over a
subject matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the
Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision,
it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to
rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own ﬁnding in certiorari.
55. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, reported in
AIR 1964 SC 477, P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJ., speaking for the Constitution
Bench, placed the matter beyond any position of doubt by holding that a writ
of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed
by inferior courts or tribunals. The observations of this Court in para 7 are
worth taking note of:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts
in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these
are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals
without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise
of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity to be heard to the party aﬀected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 777
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that ﬁndings of fact reached by the inferior Court or
Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent
on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a ﬁnding of
fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said ﬁnding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has inﬂuenced the impugned
ﬁnding. Similarly, if a ﬁnding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however,
we must always bear in mind that a ﬁnding of fact recorded by the
Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari
on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before
the Tribunal was insuﬃcient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
ﬁnding. The adequacy or suﬃciency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said ﬁnding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction
conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised…..”
56. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and Others, reported in
2003 (6) SCC 675, a Bench of two Judges held that the certiorari jurisdiction
though available, should not be exercised as a matter of course. The High
Court would be justiﬁed in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of
justice had been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, the
procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior
court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its
inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine, whether on the face
of the record the inferior court has committed any of the errors as explained
by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others, AIR
1955 SC 233 occasioning failure of justice.
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

57. From the aforesaid, it could be said in terms of a jurisdictional
error that want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject
matter so that the inferior court or tribunal might not have the authority to
enter on the inquiry. It may also arise from the absence of some essential
preliminary or jurisdictional fact. Where the jurisdiction of a body depends
upon a preliminary ﬁnding of fact in a proceeding for a writ of certiorari,
the court may determine, whether or not that ﬁnding of fact is correct. The
reason is that by wrongly deciding such a fact, the court or tribunal cannot
give itself jurisdiction.
58. In Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and
Another, reported in (1969) 2 AC 147, the House of Lords has given a very
broad connotation to the concept of ‘jurisdictional error’. It has been laid
down that a tribunal exceeds jurisdiction not only at the threshold when
it enters into an inquiry which it is not entitled to undertake, but it may
enter into an enquiry within its jurisdiction in the ﬁrst instance and then do
something which would deprive it of its jurisdiction and render its decision
a nullity. In the words of Lord Reid:
“But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction
to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the
course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a
nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made
a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the
course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice.
It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving
it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it
and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have
refused to take into account something which it was required to take
into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which,
under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account.
I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.”
59. So far as the errors of law are concerned, a writ of certiorari could
be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. To attract the
writ of certiorari, a mere error of law is not suﬃcient. It must be one which
is manifest or patent on the face of the record. Mere formal or technical
errors, even of law, are not suﬃcient, so as to attract a writ of certiorari.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 779
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

As reminded by this Court time and again, this concept is indeﬁnite and
cannot be deﬁned precisely or exhaustively and so it has to be determined
judiciously on the facts of each case. The concept, according to this Court in
K.M. Shanmugam v. The S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. and Others, reported in AIR 1963
SC 1626, ‘is comprised of many imponderables… it is not capable of precise
deﬁnition, as no objective criterion could be laid down, the apparent nature
of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element.’
A general test to apply, however, is that no error could be said to be apparent
on the face of the record if it is not ‘self-evident’ or ‘manifest’. If it requires
an examination or argument to establish it, if it has to be established by a
long drawn out process of reasoning, or lengthy or complicated arguments,
on points where there may considerably be two opinions, then such an error
would cease to be an error of law. (See : Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde and Others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, reported in AIR
1960 SC 137.)
60. However, in our opinion, such a test should not be applied in a
straitjacket formula and may fail because what might be considered by one
Judge as an error self-evident, might not be considered so by another Judge.
61. At this stage, it may not be out of place to remind ourselves of
the observations of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra) on this point, which
are as follows:
“Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by
an inferior court or tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation
of the relevant statutory provision, or something in ignorance of it,
or may be even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons
which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. Certiorari would also not lie to correct mere errors
of fact even though such errors may be apparent on the face of the
record. The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the court exercising it
is not to act as an appellate court. It is well settled that the writ court
would not re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion
of fact for that recorded by the adjudicating body, be it a court or a
tribunal. A ﬁnding of fact, howsoever erroneous, recorded by a court
or a tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for certiorari on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

the court or the tribunal was insuﬃcient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned ﬁnding.
It is also well settled that adequacy or suﬃciency of evidence led on
a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said ﬁnding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and these points cannot
be agitated before the writ court.”
62. In the aforesaid context, it will be proﬁtable for us to refer to the
decision of this Court in the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staﬀ
Canteen Workers’ Union and Another, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1508.
This Court observed as under:
“… The ﬁndings of fact recorded by a fact-ﬁnding authority duly
constituted for the purpose and which ordinarily should be considered
to have become ﬁnal, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of
having been based on materials or evidence not suﬃcient or credible
in the opinion of the writ Court to warrant those ﬁndings at any rate,
as long as they are based upon such materials which are relevant for
the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view which
can be reasonably and possibly undertaken. …”
63. However, we may clarify that ﬁndings of fact based on ‘no
evidence’ or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse
points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such ﬁndings could be
regarded as an error of law.
64. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no
hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high
prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of
a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a deﬁnite case for
the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue
to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure
to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there
has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or
determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings.
By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong
decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari
is not appellate but only supervisory.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 781
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

65. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a
superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions
by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority
had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that
the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the
jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that
the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to
give proper ﬁndings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may
only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the
court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to
test the legality thereof with a view to reach a diﬀerent conclusion. If there
is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is
drawn from it or not. It is a well-established principle of law that a writ of
certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority
is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See: King v. Nat Bell Liquors
Ltd., (1922) 2 AC 128 (PC))
66. We may quote with proﬁt a decision of this Court in the case of
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde (supra) to understand the true purport
and meaning of an error apparent on the face of the record or an error which
could be termed as self-evident. The facts of that case were as below:
67. The respondent made an application in the Revenue Court of
the Mamlatdar of Sirsi praying for the delivery of possession of property
which the appellant was on that date possessing as the tenant under him on
the basis of a ‘Mulegeni’ deed executed by the respondent’s predecessor-
in-interest in favour of the appellant’s predecessor-in-interest. The case
was governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,
and one of the questions in controversy was whether before applying for
the delivery of possession, it was incumbent upon the respondent to have
given a notice terminating the tenancy. The Mamlatdar made an order for
possession in favour of the respondent. The Collector allowed the appeal
and set aside the order of the Mamlatdar. The Bombay Revenue Tribunal,
to whom the matter was taken up on appeal, held that as the respondent
had failed to terminate the tenancy by notice before instituting the action
for ejectment, he was not entitled to entertain the application for recovery
of possession.
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

68. Thereafter, the respondent made an application to the High Court
of Bombay under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for the quashing of
the order of the Revenue Tribunal and the Collector and for the restoration
of the order of the Mamlatdar. The High Court was of the opinion that the
Tribunal had committed an error which was apparent on the face of the
record in holding that an order of possession could not be made unless
a notice terminating the tenancy had been given before the institution of
the proceeding and it issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the
Tribunal and restoring that of the Mamlatdar.
69. An appeal was ﬁled against the order of the High Court and this
Court reversed that order on the ground that the alleged error in the judgment
of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, namely that an order for possession should
not be made unless a previous notice required by Section 14 of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, had been given, was not an error
apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by
a writ of certiorari and the following observations were made by this Court:
“17.…. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process
of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions
can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.
As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error
in the present case is far from self-evident and if it can be established,
it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do
not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according
to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such
a writ. .…”
70. We may also quote with proﬁt one more decision of this Court
explaining the true scope of issue of a writ of certiorari and what is an error
apparent on the face of the record, which could be corrected by issue of a
high prerogative writ like certiorari. In the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar and
Hawabai Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New
Delhi, reported in (1952) 1 SCC 798, this Court made the observations in
paras 12, 13, 14 and 15, which we quote below:
“12. The remaining three questions canvassed before us, unless they are
of such a nature as would make the decision of the respondent dated
13-5-1950, a nullity, cannot be the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari.
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 783
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of
an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision
is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that
the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of
jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that
the inferior court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry
or upon some part of it. It may also arise from the absence of some
essential preliminary or upon the existence of some particular facts
collateral to the actual matter which the court has to try and which are
conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it. But once
it is held that the court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made
a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by
law for setting matters right inasmuch as a court has jurisdiction to
decide rightly as well as wrongly. The three questions agitated before
us do not seem to be questions which bear upon the jurisdiction of the
court of appeal, or its authority to entertain them.
13. It was contended that no court of limited jurisdiction can give itself
jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of
the case upon which the limit of its jurisdiction depends and that the
questions involved in the appeal before the respondent were collateral
to the merits of the case. As pointed out by Lord Esher, M.R., in R. v.
CIT [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD 313 (CA)] , the formula enunciated
above is quite plain but its application is often misleading. The learned
Master of the Rolls classiﬁed the cases under two categories thus :
(QBD pp. 319-20)
“… When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to
exercise the power of deciding facts, is ﬁrst established by Act of
Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will
give that tribunal or body. It may in eﬀect say that, if a certain
state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it
proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such
things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to
decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the
jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned,
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But
there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature
may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which
includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary
state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, [and] on ﬁnding
that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more.
When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body
with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever
jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal
from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second
of the two cases, I have mentioned it is erroneous application
of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves
jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because
the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts
including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the
further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were
given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given,
there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”
14. The tribunal constituted to hear appeals under Section 24 has been
constituted in these terms:
“Any person aggrieved by an order made under Section 7, Section
16, Section 19 or Section 38 may prefer an appeal in such manner
and within such time as may be prescribed—
(a) to the Custodian, where the original order has been passed
by a Deputy or Assistant Custodian;
(b) to the Custodian General, where the original order has
been passed by the Custodian, an Additional Custodian or an
authorised Deputy Custodian.”
15. Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil
cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in
words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his
jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence
of any particular state of facts. Ordinarily, a court of appeal has not
only jurisdiction to determine the soundness of the decision of the
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 785
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

inferior court as a court of error, but by the very nature of things it has
also jurisdiction to determine any points raised before it in the nature of
preliminary issues by the parties. Such jurisdiction is inherent in its very
constitution as a court of appeal. Whether an appeal is competent, whether
a party has locus standi to prefer it, whether the appeal in substance is
from one or another order and whether it has been preferred in proper
form and within the time prescribed, are all matters for the decision of
the appellate court so constituted. Such a tribunal falls within Class 2 of
the classiﬁcation of the Master of the Rolls [R. v. CIT, (1888) LR 21 QBD
313 (CA)] . In these circumstances, it seems to us that the order of the
High Court of Punjab that a writ of certiorari could not be issued to the
respondent quashing the order of 13-5-1950, was right. We are further of
the opinion that none of the contentions raised has any merit whatsoever.”
71. This Court in Parry and Company Limited v. Commercial Employees’
Association, Madras and Another (1952) 1 SCC 449 : AIR 1952 SC 179, held:
“14. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the
face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the
Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural
justice. Thus there was absolutely no grounds here which would justify a
superior court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or
proceeding of an inferior tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise
the powers of an appellate court and correct what it considered to be an
error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot
do. The position might have been diﬀerent if the Labour Commissioner
had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such
cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to
determine questions which it left undecided [Board of Education v. Rice,
1911 AC 179 (HL)]; but no certiorari is available to quash a decision
passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that
such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore,
in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable.
(Emphasis supplied)
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

72. In another case, the same Court held:
““A certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of the appellate
tribunal on these points on the ground that the decision is wrong” -
‘Ebrahim Aboobakar v. The Custodian General of Evacuee Property’,
1952 Mad W.N. 502 (SC).”
73. It is, therefore, clear that in all ﬁndings on matters of fact and
interpretation of law except in cases of defective jurisdiction, the decision
of the tribunal must be deemed to be ﬁnal.
74. The position is authoritatively summed up in Halsbury’s Laws of
England Vol.IX in para 1493 where it is laid down thus:
“1493. Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the
magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ
of certiorari on the ground that the Court below has misconceived a
point of law. When the Court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it
cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it
incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects
legal evidence, or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence, or
convicts without evidence. Nor will certiorari be granted to quash the
decision of an inferior court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the
decision is wrong in matters of fact, and the Court will not hear evidence
impeaching the decision on the facts. ….”
75. Similarly in the case reported in - ‘Colonial Bank of Australasia
v. Willan’, (1874) LR 5 PC 417, it is observed by their Lordships thus: “The
question is whether the inferior court has jurisdiction to enter upon the enquiry
and not whether there has been miscarriage of the procedure in the course of
enquiry.” At page 443 of the same case, the learned Judges observed - “An
adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter is, if no
defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of facts stated therein.
“The case in (1874) LR 5 PC 417 has been approvingly cited by Fazl Ali, J. who
held - ‘Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another v. Messrs S.K. Shaw and Brothers’,
AIR 1951 SC 115 that an error of law does not constitute an error of jurisdiction
and that a wrong decision on facts or law cannot be questioned in a civil Court.
76. It being open to the tribunals to come to one or the other conclusion
on the materials before them, it cannot by any means be said that the decisions
CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN AYURVEDIC 787
SCIENCES v. BIKARTAN DAS [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

are incorrect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction for interference by a
writ of certiorari. In a King’s Bench decision in R. v. Brighton and Area Rent
Tribunal, (1950) 1 All England Reporter 946, Lord Goddard, CJ. observed that:
“… As the tribunal had observed all the formalities of the Act, had oﬀended
against none of its provisions or against the regulations made under it,
there was no ground for holding that the tribunal’s determination was
not in accordance with law, and, therefore, the motions for certiorari and
mandamus should be refused”.
77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to conﬁne
the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular
exercise, or the non-exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct
errors of ﬁnding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the
exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is
that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question
which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise,
it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G.
Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore
District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed:
“26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously
intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where
the subordinate tribunals or bodies or oﬃcers act wholly without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of
natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them,
or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such
act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice.
However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is
not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself
into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the
decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken
or the order to be made.”
78. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to the
conclusion that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not
sustainable in law and the same deserves to be set aside.
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 11 S.C.R.

79. In the result, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned order
passed by the High Court dated 17.12.2020 in the Writ Petition (C) No.
30620 of 2020 is set aside.
80. No order as to costs.
81. The interim application filed by the intervenors also stands
disposed.

Headnotes prepared by : Appeal allowed.
Divya Pandey

Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "service law"Sign in to search